TCR_Public/161225.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 25, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 359

                            Headlines

APIDOS CLO XX: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B2
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2016-SPL2: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on B4 Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim Rates BB Rating on D-R Notes
CARNOW AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
CATAMARAN CLO 2014-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes

CD 2016-CD2: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating on 2 Tranches
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Debt Rating to Caa3
CITIGROUP 2008-C7: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D
CITIGROUP 2015-101A: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Debt
COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 2 Tranches

COLT 2016-3: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
COMM 2014-UBS2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CONNECTICUT AVE 2016-C07: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on 2 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE 2015-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
DBWF 2016-85T: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class  E Certificates

DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 5 Certs.
EATON VANCE 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on E-R Notes
FORTRESS CREDIT VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt
GOLDMAN SACHS 2012-GC6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
GSMPS MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B1 Debt to Caa2
IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Maintains BB Rating on Class G Debt on Review
IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Maintains BB Rating on Class G Debt on Review
JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 6 Tranches

JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Csf
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Debt to B1
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Notes

JP MORGAN 2014-INN: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to B+
JP MORGAN 2016-5: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2015-JP1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on F Notes
KKR CLO 16: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Debt Rating to Caa2

LCM XIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Class E-R Notes
LCM XXIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class D Notes
MARANON LOAN 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
MERLIN AVIATION: S&P Assigns Preliminary B+ Rating on Cl. C Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. IO Debt

MERRILL LYNCH 2008-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. M Certs to 'Dsf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: S&P Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Reviews B Rating on Cl. B Certs
MRFC MORTGAGE 2000-TBC2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-5 Debt Rating to Caa1
NATIONSLINK FUNDING 1999-LTL1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X Cert

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-4: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes
OHA CREDIT VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
OHA CREDIT XIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
OZLM FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1999-NRF1: Moody's Affirms Ca on K Certs

SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C3: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
SLM STUDENT 2003-12: Fitch Cuts Class B Notes Rating to 'BBsf'
SOFI MORTGAGE 2016-1: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Cl. B4 Notes
SOFI MORTGAGE 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class B-5 Certs
SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: S&P Rates Class D Notes 'Bsf'

STACR 2015-DN1: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class M-3 Notes
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa2
SYMPHONY CLO XVIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
TACONIC PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
TOWD POINT 2016-5: DBRS Rates Class B2 Notes 'B(sf)'

TOWD POINT 2016-5: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C15: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. F Debt
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C28: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba3
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C34: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B-

WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Notes
WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class G Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB+sf'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C25: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
YORK CLO-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
[*] DBRS Reviews 21 Ratings From 4 U.S. ABS Transactions
[*] Fitch Lowers Ratings on 23 Bonds in 13 Transactions to 'D'
[*] Moody's Hikes $1.3BB of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007

[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $673MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.75BB of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $155.3MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $27MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] S&P Completes Review of 73 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Completes Review of 74 Classes From 10 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 45 Classes From 9 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 6 Classes From 5 US CMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Puts 90 Tranches From 24 CLO Deals on Watch Positive

                            *********

APIDOS CLO XX: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on these notes
issued by Apidos CLO XX:

  $9,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2027, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015,
   Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Apidos CLO XX, issued in February 2015, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period will end in January
2019.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

This rating action is primarily a result of the collateral pool's
outperformance versus certain covenant requirements.  In
particular, Moody's expects that the deal will benefit from a
higher weighted average recovery rate (WARR) level compared to its
covenant level.  Additionally, the deal is expected to benefit from
an increase in excess spread resulting from the refinancing of the
Class A-1, the Class A-2 and the Class B notes on 9 December 2016.
Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios are stable.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): This transaction has a
     significant exposure to loans with LIBOR floors, and the
     inclusion of LIBOR floors in its determination of compliance
     with its WAS test can create additional ratings volatility.
     Even though LIBOR floors result in increased interest
     proceeds when LIBOR is below the floor, the net interest
     benefit of the floor disappears when the deal's floating rate

     liabilities re-price once LIBOR increases above the floor
     (unless the assets with floors are replaced by assets with
     comparable yields).  The WAS would also decrease if the
     assets with LIBOR floors mature, prepay, or are sold and are
     not replaced with assets with comparable yields.
     Additionally, the deal may find it necessary to replace such
     assets with those of lower credit quality in order to
     maintain the yield received by the replacement assets.  To
     test the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to LIBOR floors,
     Moody's ran an additional scenario which gives limited credit

     to the benefit of LIBOR floors in its modeling of WAS.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

  Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2401)
  Class E: +1
  Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3601)
  Class E: -3
  Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $500 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 24.61% (implying a
WARF of 3001), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.21%, a diversity score of 70 and a weighted average spread of
3.59% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2016-SPL2: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on B4 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2 (the Notes) issued by
Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2 (the Trust):

   -- $142.3 million Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- $142.3 million Class A-IOA at AAA (sf)

   -- $142.3 million Class A-IOB at AAA (sf)

   -- $18.5 million Class B1 at AA (sf)

   -- $18.5 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)

   -- $18.5 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)

   -- $5.7 million Class B2 at A (sf)

   -- $5.7 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)

   -- $14.7 million Class B3 at BBB (sf)

   -- $14.7 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)

   -- $14.7 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)

   -- $11.7 million Class B4 at BB (sf)

   -- $11.7 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)

   -- $11.7 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)

   -- $9.3 million Class B5 at B (sf)

Classes A-IOA, A-IOB, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B2-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B4-IOA
and B4-IOB are interest-only notes. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 37.15% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 29.00%,
26.50%, 20.00%, 14.85% and 10.75% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by approximately 4,274 loans with a total
interest-bearing principal balance of $226,444,819 as of the
Cut-Off Date (November 30, 2016).

The portfolio is 97.9% composed of daily simple interest loans and
has an average original loan size of $71,355. The loans are
approximately 127 months seasoned and all are current as of the
Cut-Off Date, including 0.1% bankruptcy-performing loans.
Approximately 90.2% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent based on the interest paid-through date for the
past 36 months under the Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency
methods. Approximately 36.7% of the loans have been modified, and
99.7% of such modifications happened more than two years ago.
Within the pool, 2,025 mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred
amounts, which are not included in the principal balances of the
mortgage loans and will instead be payable to the holders of the
Class X Notes. As a result of the seasoning of the collateral, none
of the loans are subject to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage rules.

An affiliate of BFA IVb Depositor, LLC (the Depositor) acquired the
loans from CitiFinancial Credit Company and its lending
subsidiaries during the period from March 2016 through September
2016, and subsequently transferred the loans to various
transferring trusts owned by the Sponsor. On the Closing Date, the
transferring trusts will assign the loans to the Depositor, who
will contribute the loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb L.P. will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
to satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. These loans were originated and previously
serviced by CitiFinancial Credit Company. As of the Cut-Off Date,
all of the loans are serviced by Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(BLS).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A and Class B1 Notes (and the related interest-only bonds),
but such shortfalls on more subordinate bonds will not be paid from
principal. In addition, diverted interest from the mortgage loans
will be used to pay down principal on the Notes sequentially.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis, an
experienced servicer and strong structural features. Additionally,
a third-party due diligence review was performed on the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history, servicing
comments, data capture and title and lien review. Home Data Index
values were provided for all but seven of the mortgage loans and
broker price opinions or 2055 appraisals were provided for
approximately 52.6% of the mortgage loans.

The representations and warranties provided in this transaction
generally conform to the representations and warranties that DBRS
would expect to receive for a RMBS transaction with seasoned
collateral; however, the transaction employs a representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb L.P.) with a backstop
by an unrated entity (Bayview Asset Management, LLC) and certain
knowledge qualifiers. Mitigating factors include (1) significant
loan seasoning and relatively clean performance history in recent
years; (2) third-party due diligence review; (3) a strong
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including
delinquency review trigger; and (4) for representations and
warranties with knowledge qualifiers, even if the Sponsor did not
have actual knowledge of the breach, the Remedy Provider is still
required to remedy the breach in the same manner as if no knowledge
qualifier had been made.

The enforcement mechanism for breaches of representations includes
automatic breach reviews by a third-party reviewer for any
seriously delinquent loans or any loans that incur loss upon
liquidation. Resolution of disputes are ultimately subject to
determination in an arbitration proceeding.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BLUEMOUNTAIN 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim Rates BB Rating on D-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R floating-rate replacement notes
from BlueMountain CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in 2013 that is managed by BlueMountain
Capital Management LLC.  The replacement notes will be issued via a
proposed amended and supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 16, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria "CDOs: Mapping
A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's
Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited number of
public ratings from other Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations for the purposes of assessing the credit quality of
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria provide
specific guidance for treatment of corporate assets not rated by
S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines treatment of
securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2013-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2013-1 Inc.
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-1-R                AAA (sf)      310.00
A-2-R                AA (sf)        62.00
B-R                  A (sf)         39.00
C-R                  BBB (sf)       26.00
D-R                  BB (sf)        23.60

NR--Not rated.


CARNOW AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to CarNow Auto
Receivables Trust 2016-1's $109.77 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 9,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 67.9%, 58.3%, 47.3% and
      41.9% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on stressed break-even cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of more than 2.00x, 1.65x, 1.35x,
      and 1.20x S&P's expected net loss range of 33.00%-34.00% for

      the class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments by S&P's assumed
      legal final maturity dates made under stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios that are appropriate to the assigned
      preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, C, and D notes
      likely would not decline by more than one rating category
      within the first year, (all else being equal).  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities and a two-
      category downgrade for 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rated securities

      under moderate stress conditions.  Under the 'BBB' moderate
      stress, the class D notes would ultimately default.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized: The pool is approximately eight months
      seasoned, and all of the loans have an original term of 60
      months or less, which S&P expects will result in the pool
      being paid down faster relative to many other subprime pools

      with longer loan terms and less seasoning.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CarNow Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class       Rating       Type            Interest        Amount
                                         rate          (mil. $)
A           AA (sf)      Senior          Fixed            57.73
B           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed            22.77
C           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed            21.14
D           BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed             8.13


CATAMARAN CLO 2014-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
and B-R replacement notes from Catamaran CLO 2014-2 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that
is managed by Trimaran Advisors LLC.  S&P withdrew its ratings on
the original class A-1, A-2, and B notes following payment in full
on the Dec. 6, 2016, refinancing date.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes, which were not
part of the refinancing.

On the Dec. 6, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, and B-R replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the original class A-1, A-2, and B notes as outlined in the
transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original notes in line with their full redemption,
and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Catamaran CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating        Amount (mil $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)              283.50
A-2-R                     AA (sf)                53.75
B-R                       A (sf)                 35.50

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Catamaran CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Class                     Rating
C                         BBB (sf)
D                         BB (sf)
E                         B (sf)
Subordinated notes        NR

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Catamaran CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
                           Rating
Original class       To           From
A-1                  NR           AAA (sf)
A-2                  NR           AA (sf)
B                    NR           A (sf)


CD 2016-CD2: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to the
German American Capital Corp.'s CD 2016-CD2 mortgage trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2016-CD2:

   -- $17,465,263 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69,061,053 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,742,105 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $252,631,579 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $308,873,684 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $721,789,474b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $39,015,789 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $721,789,474c class V1-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $76,811,579ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $76,811,579 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $76,811,579c class V1-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,673,684 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,673,684c class V1-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,304,211ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,304,211a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,304,211ac class V1-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,043,158ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,043,158a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,972,632ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,972,632a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest only.
  (c) Exchangeable certificates.

A vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5% of each
class (as of the closing date) is retained as part of risk
retention compliance.  Fitch does not rate the $37,797,120 class
X-G, the $37,797,120 class G, the $76,812,910 class V1-E or the
$975,391,857 class V2.

Fitch has withdrawn the expected rating on the interest-only class
X-C certificates as they are no longer being offered.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 30 loans secured by 37
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $975.4 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by German American Capital
Corporation and Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 91.1% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 92.4% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.19x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 105.8%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 8.49%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 12.4% to issuer cash flows.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool has leverage statistics in-line with
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.  The pool's Fitch
DSCR and LTV for the trust are 1.19x and 105.8%, respectively,
while the 2016 YTD averages are 1.20x and 105.7%.  Excluding
credit-opinion loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.17x and
110.7%, respectively.

Concentrated by Loan Size: The top 10 loans compose 66.9% of the
pool, which is worse than the respective 2015 and 2016 YTD averages
of 49.3% and 54.5%.  The pool's loan concentration index (LCI) is
563, which is above the 2016 YTD average of 418.  For this
transaction, the losses estimated by Fitch's deterministic test at
'AAAsf' exceeded Fitch's base model loss estimate.  Due to the
exceptionally high property quality (84.7% of the top 10 loans
received a property quality grade of 'B+' or higher) and strong
location (65.5% of the top 10 are located within the New York Metro
market), Fitch's concluded loss estimate at 'AAAsf' is 100 basis
points lower than indicated by Fitch's deterministic test.

Investment-Grade Credit-Opinion Loans: Two loans representing 11%
of the pool have investment-grade credit opinions, above the 2016
YTD average of 7.3%.  10 Hudson Yards (6.9% of the pool) received
an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone
basis.  667 Madison Avenue (4.1% of the pool) received an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone
basis.

Weak Amortization: Eleven loans (58.2%) are full-term interest-only
and seven loans (25.9%) are partial interest-only.  Fitch-rated
transactions in 2016 YTD had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 32.4% and a partial interest-only percentage of 36%.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will pay down
by only 5.5%, which is significantly below the 2016 YTD average of
10.4%.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CD
2016-CD2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AAsf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could
result.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Debt Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes,
downgraded the ratings on five classes and placed the ratings on
five classes under review for possible downgrade in CFCRE
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb. 26, 2016 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes were downgraded due to higher
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans,
primarily due to an increase in expected losses from the Hudson
Valley Mall Loan, which reprsents 17.7% of the pool. The ratings on
the four P&I classes were placed on review for possible downgrade
resulting from uncertainty regarding potential resolutions of the
Hudson Valley Mall Loan.

The rating on one IO class (Class X-A) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

The rating on one IO Class (Class X-B) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes. The rating on Class X-B,
whose referenced classes include some of those P&I classes placed
on review for possible downgrade, was also placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.3% of the
current balance, compared to 8.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to a Herf of 14 at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 56% to $277 million
from $635 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 69% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 3% of the pool, has defeased and
is secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool with a minimal loss (for
less than 1% loss severity). One loan, constituting 18% of the
pool, is currently in special servicing. The specially serviced
loan is the Hudson Valley Mall Loan ($49.0 million -- 17.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 765,500 square foot (SF) component of
a regional mall located in Kingston, New York, approximately 100
miles north of New York City. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2015 due to imminent default and the loan has
since become delinquent. At securitization, the mall was anchored
by a J.C. Penney, Macy's, Sears, Target (ground lease), Regal
Cinemas and Dick's Sporting Goods. Two of the three department
store anchors, J.C. Penney and Macy's, have vacated their spaces,
though both will continue to pay rent through their respective
lease expiration dates in 2017. Additional tenants operate with
kick-out clauses that would allow them to leave the mall if sales
do not improve. Financial performance has deteriorated
substantially since 2011. Moody's has factored into its analysis an
elevated loss for the loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan constituting 5.9% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 97% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 87% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 21% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Santa Fe Retail Portfolio
Loan ($24.2 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
seven property portfolio located in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The
portfolio consists of six retail and one office building totaling
189,000 SF. The office component is 12,500 SF and comprises 6% of
the allocated balance. The majority of the retail tenants are
galleries or art related. As of June 2016, the portfolio was 95%
leased, the same as at July 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
97% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.09X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Walker Center Loan ($17.8 million --
6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 154,000 SF office building
located in the CBD of Salt Lake City, Utah. As of June 2016, the
property was 88% leased compared to 90% leased as of June 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.18X, respectively,
compared to 83% and 1.27X at the last review.

The third largest loan is The Heights at McArthur Park Loan ($16.3
million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 216-unit
garden-style apartment complex located near Fort Bragg and Pope Air
Force Base in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The property was 87%
leased as of June 2016, up from 80% as of February 2016. The net
operating income (NOI) dropped in 2015 and 2016 due in part to
lower occupancy. The loan remains on the watchlist as the DSCR is
below the 1.10X threshold. Due to the low DSCR, Moody's has
identified this loan as a troubled loan.


CITIGROUP 2008-C7: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on four classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C7, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes A-M, A-MA, A-J, and A-JA reflect credit
support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the 13 assets ($255.3 million, 24.3%) with the
special servicer (discussed below), as well as credit deterioration
in the Huntsville Office Portfolio I (seventh-largest loan in the
pool; $30.4 million, 2.9%) and Huntsville Office Portfolio III
(fourth-largest loan in the pool; $32.4 million, 3.1%) loans.  Both
loans are secured by properties that have occupancy and cash flow
declines in recent years.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes A-J and A-JA to 'D (sf)' to
reflect its expectation that the accumulated interest shortfalls on
the classes will remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

According to the Nov. 14, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthlyinterest shortfalls totaled $496,668 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $299,615;

   -- Interest reduction due to rate modification totaling
      $97,489; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $94,907.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class A-J and A-JA.

The 'AAA (sf)' affirmations on the class A-4 and A-1A principal-
and interest-paying certificates reflect the results of our cash
flow analysis, which indicated that both classes should receive
full principal repayments because of time-tranching as described in
"U.S. CMBS 'AAA' Scenario Loss And Recovery Application," published
July 21, 2009.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 14, 2016 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.05 billion, or 56.8% of the pool balance at
issuance.  The pool currently includes 60 loans and six real
estate-owned assets, down from 96 loans at issuance.  Thirteen of
these assets ($255.3 million, 24.3%) are with the special servicer,
four ($35.2 million, 3.3%) are defeased, and 11 ($321.6 million,
30.6%) are on the master servicers' combined watchlist. The master
servicers, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC and Midland Loan
Services, reported financial information for 99.2% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 91.4% was partial-year or
year-end 2015 data and 7.4% was partial-year 2016 data.

"We calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.19x and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 85.2%
using an S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate of
7.5%.  The DSC, LTV and capitalization rate calculations exclude
the 13 specially serviced assets, four defeased loans, and one
subordinate B note ($11.3 million, 1.1%).  The top 10 nondefeased
loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $517.1
million (49.2%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, we calculated an
S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.00x and 87.3%,
respectively, for four of the top 10 nondefeased performing loans.
The remaining six loans are specially serviced and discussed
below," S&P said.

To date, the transaction has experienced $152.4 million in
principal losses, or 8.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 13.5% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 13 specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Nov. 14, 2016, trustee remittance report, 13 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC.  Details
of the two-largest specially serviced assets, both of which are top
10 nondefeased loans, are:

The Alexandria Mall loan ($46.5 million, 4.4%) is the
second-largest nondefeased loan in the trust and the largest loan
with special servicer with a total reported exposure of $46.5
million. The loan is secured by retail property totaling 559,438
sq. ft. in Alexandria, La.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Oct. 12, 2012, due to imminent default as the borrower
claimed it will not be able to refinance the loan as a reciprocal
easement (REA) and ground lease providing critical parking and
access for the entrance to the mall will expire shortly after the
loan's maturity.  Discussion with the special servicer on a
possible loan modification is ongoing.  The reported DSC and
occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 1.15x and 82%, respectively.
S&P expects a moderate loss upon the loan's eventual resolution

The Huntsville Office Portfolio II loan ($38.6 million, 3.7%) is
the third-largest nondefeased loan in the trust and the
second-largest loan with the special servicer with a total reported
exposure of $40.0 million.  The loan is secured by leasehold
interest on eight office properties totaling 672,328 sq. ft.
located in Huntsville, Ala.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on June 9, 2016, because of imminent default for
cash flow issues.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end
2015 were 1.05x and 56%, respectively. S&P expects a minimal loss
upon the loan's eventual resolution.

The 11 remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent less than 3.1% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 13 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 37.8%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2008-C7
                                 Rating
Class             Identifier     To                  From
A-4               17313KAF8      AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
A-1A              17313KAG6      AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
A-M               17313KAH4      BB+ (sf)            BBB (sf)
A-MA              17313KAJ0      BB+ (sf)            BBB (sf)
A-J               17313KAK7      D (sf)              CCC- (sf)
A-JA              17313KAL5      D (sf)              CCC- (sf)
X                 17313KAM3      AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)


CITIGROUP 2015-101A: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-101A, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2015-101A.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral.  As of the November 2016 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate certificate balance remained at $200 million,
unchanged from issuance.  The loan is interest only (annual
interest rate of 4.65%) for the entire 20-year term.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the issuing
entity, the primary asset of which is one loan secured by the
leasehold interest in the 101 Avenue of the Americas office
property in New York, NY.  The two largest tenants, NY Genome
Center (38.5% of total square footage) and Two Sigma (32.3%) occupy
approximately 71% of the property.  Other major tenants include
Digital Ocean (10.3%) and REGUS (7.3%).

Stable Performance: Performance of the property is stable as
exhibited by strong occupancy and limited near-term rollover.
Occupancy has improved to 99.7% as of September 2016 from 94.5% at
issuance.  For the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2016, the net
operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
1.76x, compared with 2.05x at issuance.

High-Quality Manhattan Asset: The 23-story, class A office building
is located within the South Broadway/Hudson Square submarket in
Manhattan.  The property was gut renovated between 2011 and 2013
including upgraded building systems as well as a new lobby,
restrooms, and green roof terrace.  The building is LEED Silver
certified.

Limited Near-Term Rollover: The property has no immediate rollover
until 2019 when 3.6% of leases expire.  An additional 7.3% expires
in 2023.  The majority of the building rollover is associated with
the two largest tenants which both roll prior to the loan's
maturity date in January 2035.  The largest tenant (38.5%) has
lease expiration in 2033 and the second largest tenant (32.3%)
expires in 2029.

Concentrated Tenancy: Tenancy in the building is concentrated with
the five largest tenants representing 94% of the gross leasable
area (GLA).  The majority of the building is comprised of the two
largest tenants representing 71% of the GLA, both of which are on
long-term leases.

Leasehold Interest: The property is subject to a 99-year ground
lease that expires in December 2088.  The loan is structured with
monthly reserves for all payments associated with the ground lease
and is recourse to the borrower and guarantor for termination of
the ground lease.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  No rating
actions are anticipated unless there are material changes in
property occupancy or cash flow.  The property performance is
consistent with issuance.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $96,000,000 class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $96,000,000 class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30,000,000 class X-B* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $16,000,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $14,000,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,000,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,000,000 class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19,000,000 class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class X-A is equal to the notional balance of class
A.  Interest-only class X-B is equal to the notional balance of
class B and class C.  Fitch does not rate the class G
certificates.



COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed fifteen classes and downgraded
one class of COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-JFX, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Upgraded

      to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Confirmed

      at C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes, Classes A-1A through A-JFX were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on nine P&I classes, Classes B through K, was affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.0% of the
current balance compared to 8.8% at last review. The deal has paid
down 16% since last review and 43% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 10.6% compared to 9.4% at last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were " Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Conduit Loan Herf of 16 compared to 21 at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 43% to $1.4 billion
from $2.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 94 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 47% of
the pool. Nine loans, constituting 6% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Forty loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $91.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%). Fourteen loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the 90 Merrick Avenue Loan
($38.0 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 242,659
SF, nine-story suburban office building located in East Meadow, New
York. The property was 88% occupied as July 2016. The loan is
interest-only and scheduled to mature on 2/11/2017 and per the
Borrower, the property's value is materially below the current UPB
and therefore the loan will not be repaid at maturity.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 275 Broadhollow
Road Loan ($33.2 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by
a 126,770 sf office property built in 1989 and located in Melville,
New York. The loan is interest-only and scheduled to mature on
2/11/2017; however, per the Borrower, Capital One, the sole tenant
occupying 100% of the property's NRA has indicated that it will be
vacating the property upon its 12/31/2018 lease expiration.

The remaining twelve specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $99.7 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (51.8% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for twelve poorly
performing loans, constituting 11.2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $27.7 million (an 18.1% expected loss based on
a 51.3% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 94% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 92% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106%, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 0.96X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 75 Broad Street Loan ($243.5 million -- 17.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 648,000 square foot (SF) office
telecom building located in the Financial District of New York. The
property was 90% leased as of September 2016 compared to 92% leased
as of March 2015 and 95% leased at year-end 2014. The largest
tenants include Internap (13% of the new rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration December 2018) and the Millennium High School (12% of
the NRA; lease expiration September 2018). The loan is interest
only for its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123%
and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 124% and 0.77X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is The Woodies Building Loan
($160.7 million -- 11.7% of the pool) which is secured by two
buildings totaling 484,200 SF with street level retail and office
space above. These properties are located in the East End
sub-market of Washington, D.C. The office component represents 73%
of the NRA and is predominantly leased to government agencies. The
largest office tenants are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (34%
of the total NRA; lease expiration 2020) and the National Endowment
of Democracy (14% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2021). The
largest retail tenants are Forever 21, H&M, Madame Tussauds and
Zara. As of July 2016 the property was 90% leased, compared to 99%
leased in February 2015 at last review. The loan has amortized 7%.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.09X, respectively,
compared to 101% and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1515 Flagler Waterview -- A Note Loan
($31.9 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by 163,487 SF
medical office property located in West Palm Beach, FL. The
property was 72% occupied as of June 2016 compared to 77% in March
2015. The property had historically sustained upper 90% occupancy
from securtization through 2012. The Loan was modified in July 2016
with an A-Note, B-Note split after the property's occupancy and
revenues sharply declined between 2013 and 2014 due to a loss of
tenancy. The Loan is now encumbered with a $3.3 million B-Note. The
maturity date is now 2/1/2019 making the ARD of 2/1/2017 no longer
applicable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 137% and 0.75X,
respectively, compared to 127% and 0.81X at last review.


COLT 2016-3: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3 (the Certificates) issued
by COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust (the Trust):

   -- $129.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $26.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)

   -- $37.1 million Class A-3 at A (sf)

   -- $9.8 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)

   -- $7.2 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)

   -- $7.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 42.45% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 30.60%, 14.15%, 9.80%, 6.60% and 3.45% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, prime and non-prime, first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 474 loans with a total
principal balance of $225,745,589 as of the Cut-Off Date (December
1, 2016).

Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber) is the originator and servicer
for 71.2% of the portfolio. The Caliber mortgages were originated
under the following five programs:

   -- Jumbo Alternative (31.2%) – Generally made to borrowers
with
      unblemished credit who do not meet strict prime jumbo or
      agency/government guidelines. These loans may have interest-
      only (IO) features, higher debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-
      value (LTV) ratios, or lower credit scores as compared with
      those in traditional prime jumbo securitizations.

   -- Homeowner's Access (29.8%) – Made to borrowers who do not
      qualify for agency or prime jumbo mortgages for various
      reasons, such as loan size in excess of government limits,
      alternative or insufficient credit, or prior derogatory
      credit events that occurred more than two years prior to
      origination.

   -- Fresh Start (8.8%) – Made to borrowers with lower credit
and
      significant recent credit events within the past 24 months.

   -- Investor (1.3%) – Made to borrowers who finance investor
      properties where the mortgage loan would not meet agency or
      government guidelines because of such factors as property
      type, number of financed properties, lower borrower credit
      score or a seasoned credit event.

   -- Foreign National (0.2%) – Made to non-resident borrowers
      holding certain types of visas who may not have a credit
      score.

Sterling Bank and Trust, FSB (Sterling) is the originator and
servicer for 22.3% of the portfolio. The Sterling mortgages were
originated under Sterling's Advantage Home Ownership Program
(Advantage), which focuses on high-quality borrowers with clean
mortgage payment histories and substantial equity in their
properties who seek alternative income documentation products.
LendSure Mortgage Corp. (LendSure) originated approximately 6.5% of
the pool through its wholesale lending network, all of which is
serviced by Caliber.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as the Master
Servicer, Securities Administrator and Certificate Registrar. U.S.
Bank National Association will serve as Trustee.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ability-to-repay (ATR) rules,
they were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for
agency, government or private-label, non-agency prime jumbo
products for the various reasons described above. In accordance
with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.7% of the loans are
designated as QM Safe Harbor, 31.1% as QM Rebuttable Presumption
and 61.7% as non-QM. Approximately 6.5% of the loans are not
subject to the QM rules.

The servicers will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent, and they are obligated to make advances in respect of
taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs incurred in the
course of servicing and disposing of properties.

On or after the two-year anniversary of the Closing Date, the
Depositor has the option to purchase all of the outstanding
certificates at a price equal to the outstanding class balance plus
accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

   -- ATR Rules and Appendix Q Compliance: All of the mortgage
      loans were underwritten in accordance with the eight
      underwriting factors of the ATR rules. In addition,
      Caliber's underwriting standards comply with the Standards
      for Determining Monthly Debt and Income as set forth in
      Appendix Q of Regulation Z with respect to income
      verification and the calculation of DTI ratios. All but one
      of the LendSure-originated loans are Appendix Q-compliant as

      well.

   -- Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-
      prime mortgages, underwriting standards have improved
      significantly from the pre-crisis era. The Caliber loans
      were underwritten to a full documentation standard with
      respect to verification of income (generally through two
      years of W-2s or tax returns), employment and asset.
      Generally, fully executed 4506-Ts are obtained, and tax
      returns are verified with IRS transcripts if applicable.
      Although loans in the Sterling Advantage program were
      underwritten to limited documentation standards, borrowers
      are required to have strong credit profiles, substantial
      equity in their properties and generally no delinquencies in

      the past 12 months. The Sterling loans were all originated
      through the retail channel and have a weighted-average
      original combined LTV (CLTV) of 61.7%.

   -- Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:

      -- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have
         robust loan attributes as reflected in CLTV ratios,
         borrower household income and liquid reserves, including
         the loans in Homeowner's Access and Fresh Start, the two
         programs with weaker borrower credit.

      -- The pool contains low proportions of cash-out and
         investor properties.

      -- LTVs gradually reduce as the programs move down the
         credit spectrum, suggesting the consideration of
         compensating factors for riskier pools.

      -- The pool comprises 25.7% fixed-rate mortgages, which have

         the lowest default risk due to the stability of monthly
         payments. The pool comprises 68.5% hybrid adjustable-rate

         mortgages (ARMs) with an initial fixed period of five to
         seven years, allowing borrowers sufficient time to credit

         cure before rates reset. Only 5.8% of the pool are hybrid

         ARMs with an initial fixed period of three years.

   -- Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party

      due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
      compliance reviews on 100.0% of the loans in the pool. Data
      integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

   -- Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Of the

      approximately 1,621 mortgages originated to date, only 32
      were ever 30 days delinquent, which generally self-cured
      shortly after.

Four loans have been 60 days delinquent, and two loans have been 90
days delinquent. Sterling's Advantage portfolio has experienced no
delinquencies since October 2011, and Sterling's servicing
portfolio maintains low delinquency rates of 0.06% as of October
2016. In addition, voluntary prepayment rates have been relatively
high, as these borrowers tend to credit cure and refinance into
lower-cost mortgages.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

   -- Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:

      The R&W framework is considerably weaker compared with that
      of a post-crisis prime jumbo securitization. Instead of an
      automatic review when a loan becomes seriously delinquent,
      this transaction employs an optional review only when
      realized losses occur (unless the alleged breach relates to
      an ATR or TRID violation). In addition, rather than engaging

      a third-party due diligence firm to perform the R&W review,
      the Controlling Holder (initially the Sponsor or a majority-
      owned affiliate of the Sponsor) has the option to perform
      the review in house or use a third-party reviewer. Finally,
      the R&W providers (the originators) are unrated entities,
      have limited performance history of non-prime, non-QM
      securitizations and may potentially experience financial
      stress that could result in the inability to fulfill
      repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
      factors:

      -- The holders of Certificates representing 25.0% interest
         in the Certificates may direct the Trustee to commence a
         separate review of the related mortgage loan, to the
         extent that they disagree with the Controlling Holder's
         determination of a breach.

      -- Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100.0% of the
         loans included in the pool. A comprehensive due diligence

         review mitigates the risk of future R&W violations.

      -- DBRS conducted on-site originator (and servicer) reviews
         of Caliber and Sterling and deems them to be
         operationally sound.

      -- The Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor will retain
         the Class B-2, Class B-3 and Class X Certificates, which
         represent at least 5.0% of the fair value of all the
         Certificates, aligning Sponsor and investor interest in
         the capital structure.

      -- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator
         scores downward to account for the potential inability to

         fulfill repurchase obligations, the lack of performance
         history as well as the weaker R&W framework. A lower
         originator score results in increased default and loss
         assumptions and provides additional cushions for the
         rated securities.

   -- Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans:
      Compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this
      portfolio contains some mortgages originated to borrowers
      with weaker credit and prior derogatory credit events as
      well as QM-rebuttable presumption or non-QM loans.

   -- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
      factors as required by the ATR rules. The Caliber loans were

      also underwritten to comply with the standards set forth in
      Appendix Q. All but one of the LendSure-originated loans are

      Appendix Q-compliant as well.

   -- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the

      pre-crisis era.

   -- DBRS RMBS Insight Model incorporates loss severity penalties

      for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans as explained
      in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the related
      report.

   -- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the

      Homeowner's Access and Fresh Start programs, borrower credit

      events had generally happened 42 months and 26 months,
      respectively, prior to origination, on average. In its
      analysis, DBRS applies additional penalties for borrowers
      with recent credit events within the past two years.

   -- Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest
      (P&I): The servicers will advance scheduled P&I on
      delinquent mortgages until such loans become 180 days
      delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss severities

      to the transaction because advanced P&I will not have to be
      reimbursed from the trust upon the liquidation of the
      mortgages, but will increase the possibility of periodic
      interest shortfalls to the Certificateholders. Mitigating
      factors include that principal proceeds can be used to pay
      interest shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding
      senior Certificates are paid in full as well as the fact
      that subordination levels are greater than expected losses,
      which may provide for payment of interest to the
      Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated

      P&I advancing up to 180 days for delinquent loans; the cash
      flow scenarios are discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow

      Analysis section of the related report.

   -- Servicers' Financial Capability: In this transaction, the
      servicers, Caliber and Sterling, are responsible for funding

      advances to the extent required. The servicers are unrated
      entities and may face financial difficulties in fulfilling
      its servicing advance obligation in the future.
      Consequently, the transaction employs Wells Fargo, rated AA
      (high) by DBRS, as the Master Servicer. If a servicer fails
      in its obligation to make advances, Wells Fargo will be
      obligated to fund such servicing advances.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal (excluding IO classes) by
the legal final maturity date in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (sf),
BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of
interest and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity
date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.


COMM 2014-UBS2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-UBS2 issued by COMM
2014-UBS2 Mortgage Trust as follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-M at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the pool consisted of 59 loans
secured by 95 commercial and multifamily properties. The pool has
since experienced a collateral reduction of 3.7% as a result of
scheduled amortization, with all of the original 59 loans
outstanding. The pool also benefits from defeasance collateral as
one loan, representing 0.9% of the current pool balance, is fully
defeased. Based on YE2015 financials, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.60
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 10.3%. Comparatively, the YE2014
WA DSCR and WA debt yield were 1.50x and 9.4%, respectively.

As of the November 2016 remittance, there is one loan in special
servicing, representing 2.0% of the current pool balance, and seven
loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 4.8% of the current
pool balance. The specially serviced loan is Prospectus ID #15,
Creekside Mixed Use Development. That loan transferred to the
special servicer in November 2014 for imminent default. A receiver
was appointed in March 2015 and after attempts to sell the property
were unsuccessful, the special servicer reported a foreclosure
hearing was scheduled for late 2016. Based on the most recent
financials, the loans on the watchlist reported a WA DSCR and debt
yield of 1.46x and 9.2%, respectively.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted and for the specially serviced
loan, as well as for the largest 15 loans in the pool, in the DBRS
CMBS IReports platform.

The ratings assigned to Classes C, PEX and F materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative model that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CONNECTICUT AVE 2016-C07: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Fannie Mae's risk transfer
transaction, Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C07 (CAS
2016-C07), as:

   -- $192,504,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $310,146,000 class 2M-2B notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $449,177,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2I exchangeable notional notes
      'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2R exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2S exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2T exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $139,031,000 class 2M-2U exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $21,614,589,756 class 2A-H reference tranche;
   -- $10,132,779 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
   -- $7,317,785 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
   -- $16,324,366 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
   -- $60,000,000 class 2B notes;
   -- $165,151,976 class 2B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 2M-1 note reflects the 3.10%
subordination provided by the 0.65% class 2M-2A note, the 1.45%
class 2M-2B and the 1.00% 2B note, and their corresponding
reference tranches.  The notes are general senior unsecured
obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed
MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
LTVs greater than 80.01% and less than or equal to 97.00%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C07 (CAS 2016-C07) is
Fannie Mae's 16th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $22.5 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors.  Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 2M-1,
2M-2A and 2M-2B notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of
the mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE)
available through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default
Rating.  The notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters
and will carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from January 2016 through April 2016.  In this
transaction, Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) from 80.01%-97.00%.  Overall, the
reference pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent
CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's eighth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule.  The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in the pool are covered either by
borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI).
Fannie Mae will be guaranteeing the mortgage insurance (MI)
coverage amount, which will typically be the MI coverage percentage
multiplied by the sum of the unpaid principal balance as of the
date of the default, up to 36 months of delinquent interest, taxes,
and maintenance expenses.  While the Fannie Mae guarantee allows
for credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount
of BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision as
required by the Homeowners Protection Act when the loan balance is
first scheduled to reach 78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, and 2B
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity.  As a result,
any collateral losses on the reference pool that occur beyond year
12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction.
Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year window in its default analysis
and applied a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
fourth transaction in which Fitch received third-party due
diligence on a loan production basis as opposed to a
transaction-specific review.  Fitch believes that regular, periodic
third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are
sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality control (QC)
processes.  The sample selection was limited to a population of
7,391 loans that were previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's
post-purchase QC review and met the reference pool's eligibility
criteria.  Of those loans, 1,998 were selected for a full review
(credit, property valuation, and compliance) by third-party due
diligence providers.  Of the 1,998 loans, 347 were part of this
transaction's reference pool.  Fitch views the results of the due
diligence review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The 2M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior 2M-2A, 2M-2B, and 2B classes which are locked
out from receiving any principal until classes with a more senior
payment priority are paid in full.  However, available CE for the
junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference pool
increases in tandem with the paydown of the 2M-1 class.  Given the
size of the 2M-1 class relative to the combined total of all the
junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class 2M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 2A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as at least 50% of the first loss
2B-H reference tranche, sized at 73 bps.  Fannie Mae is also
retaining an approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 2M-1,
2M-2A, and 2M-2B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons.  As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs.  Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in our current
rating of Fannie Mae.  However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A, and 2M-2B
notes' ratings affected.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels.  The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 23.4% at the 'BBBsf' level and 18.6% at the 'BBsf'
level.  The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


CREDIT SUISSE 2015-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Credit Suisse USA CSAIL
2015-C1 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral and no material changes to the pool metrics
since issuance.  As of the November 2016 remittance, the
transaction has experienced 0.8% collateral reduction as a result
of amortization.  All of the original 82 loans remain outstanding.


Stable Performance: There have been no material changes to the
pool's overall performance since issuance.  There are no delinquent
or specially serviced loans.  Four loans (2.6% of the pool) are
currently on the servicer's watchlist, three of which are being
flagged for deferred maintenance items.

High Fitch Leverage: At issuance, the Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV
were 1.21x and 110.4%, respectively.  Six loans (31.5% of the pool)
have pari-passu notes securitized in other CMBS transactions.

Concentration: The largest state concentration is New York (24.6%
of the pool) with the three largest loans secured by properties in
New York City.  The next largest state concentrations are
California (15% of the pool) and Texas (13.1% of the pool).  The
deal also has an above-average concentration of hotel properties,
which represent 23.8% of the pool balance.

Limited Amortization: Five loans (27.9% of the pool) are
interest-only for the full term.  An additional 40 loans were
structured with partial interest-only periods.  Beginning with the
January 2017 remittance, 27 of those 40 loans (33.3% of the pool)
will still be in their interest-only periods.  Based on the
scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is scheduled to amortize
10.7%.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $33.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $56.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $270 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $405.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $74.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $84.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $924.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $66.7 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $66.7 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $53.1 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $62.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $62.2 million*X-D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $24.3 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $24.3 million* class X-E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.2 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.2 million* class X-F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class NR or X-NR certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the class X-C certificate.


DBWF 2016-85T: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class  E Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to DBWF 2016-85T Mortgage
Trust's $217.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-85T.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by a $217.0 million trust mortgage loan, which is part of a
whole mortgage loan totaling $396.0 million, secured by a first
lien on the borrower's fee interest in 85 Tenth Avenue, a 11-story
office building totaling 632,548 sq. ft. and located in Manhattan's
Chelsea submarket.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 5,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The ratings reflect the collateral's historic and projected
performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

DBWF 2016-85T Mortgage Trust

Class     Rating            Amount ($)
A         AAA (sf)         106,001,000
X-A       AAA (sf)      106,001,000(i)
B         AA- (sf)          25,849,000
C         A- (sf)           36,693,000
D         BBB- (sf)         45,010,000
E         BB- (sf)          57,447,000

(i)The notional amount of the class X-A certificates will be equal
to the class A certificate balance.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 5 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage
Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
1999-CG3.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class B-4 is a result of stable performance,
high credit enhancement and significant defeasance.  While the
credit enhancement remains high and the majority of the class is
covered by defeasance, Fitch capped the rating at 'Asf', as there
is a possibility of interest shortfalls to re-occur.

As of the November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.8% to $11 million from
$899.3 million at issuance.  Fitch modeled losses of 8% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
5.3%, including $46.7 million (5.2% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes B-5 through D.

Pool Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only four
of the original 160 loans remaining.  One loan (28.4%) is defeased
and the remaining three loans (71.6%) are backed by multifamily
properties.

Fully Amortizing Loans: Three loans (48%) are covered by fully
amortizing loans scheduled to mature in 2023 and 2024.  The
remaining loan is scheduled to mature in 2018 (52%).

The Loan of Concern is the Whitfield Village Apartments loan (11.6%
of the pool), secured by four two-story and one one-story buildings
that consist of 48 2-bedroom/two-bathroom, Class C, multifamily
units located in Sarasota, FL (55 miles south of Tampa).  The loan
was modified effective Jan. 1, 2015, and modification terms include
an interest rate reduction to 5.25% from 8.58%, maturity extension
to Dec.1, 2024 from July 1, 2019; and prepayment allowed in whole
or in part on any payment date without penalty.  The loan was
returned to the master servicer in April 2015.  As of June 2016,
the property was 96% occupied.

The largest loan in the pool (52%) is secured by the Regency
Apartments, a 186-unit multifamily property located in
Fayetteville, NC.  The property was built in 1996.  The amenities
include a pool, clubhouse, playground, and tennis and volleyball
courts.  As per the servicer reporting the property's occupancy has
improved to 93% as of June 2016, compared to 84% as of December
2015.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class B-4 is Stable due to sufficient credit
enhancement and continued paydown.  Classes B-5 through C have
realized losses and will remain at 'D'.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises recovery estimates as
indicated:

   -- $3.7 million class B-4 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.3 million class B-5 at 'Dsf'; RE 90%;
   -- $0 class B-6 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class B-7 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class B-8 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, B-1, B-2 and B-3
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class D
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class S certificates.


EATON VANCE 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-X, A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from
Eaton Vance CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2013 that is managed by Eaton Vance
Management.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 20, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, specifies the below amendments:

   -- The transaction will issue additional A-X and subordinated
      notes.

   -- The replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
      are expected to be issued at a higher spread than the
      original notes.  The replacement class E notes spread is
      expected to be unchanged from the original notes.

   -- The reinvestment period will be extended approximately
      3.7 years.  The stated maturity will be extended
      approximately 3.2 years.  The non-call period and weighted
      average life test date will also be reset.

   -- The transaction will also amend the subordinated management
      fee, overcollateralization ratio thresholds, and target par
      amount.

                   CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)         (%)     (%)       (%)
A-X         2.40   3ML + 1.00     90.44   63.89     26.55
A-1-R     260.60   3ML + 1.42     70.85   63.89      6.96
A-2-R      58.90   3ML + 2.10     66.06   56.43      9.63
B-R        27.50   3ML + 3.10     57.55   50.89      6.66
C-R        21.00   3ML + 4.40     50.40   44.94      5.46
D-R        21.00   3ML + 8.00     37.54   36.14      1.41
E-R         1.50   3ML + 5.75     36.85    30.49     6.36

Effective date
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate(%)          (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1       257.00   3ML + 1.36     71.10   63.53      7.48
A-2        60.10   3ML + 1.80     67.27   55.76     11.50
B          36.00   3ML + 2.75     55.01   49.74      5.26
C          21.30   3ML + 3.30     49.17   43.72      5.45
D          17.20   3ML + 5.00     42.90   36.76      6.13
E           7.50   3ML + 5.75     38.57   30.81      7.77

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.
3ML--Three-month LIBOR.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
supplemental indenture, to estimate future performance.  In line
with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Eaton Vance CLO 2013-1 LTD.
Replacement class         Rating         Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A-X                       AAA (sf)         2.40
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)       260.60
A-2-R                     AA (sf)         58.90
B-R                       A (sf)          27.50
C-R                       BBB (sf)        21.00
D-R                       BB- (sf)        21.00
E-R                       B- (sf)          1.50


FORTRESS CREDIT VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Fortress
Credit Opportunities VII CLO Ltd./Fortress Credit Opportunities VII
CLO LLC's $552.90 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by middle market speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 6,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      middle market speculative-grade senior secured term loans
      that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The credit
      enhancement provided through the subordination of cash
      flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The rating requirements of Natixis as the class A-1R
      noteholder, as well as rating requirements of any future
      class A-1R noteholders.  

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Fortress Credit Opportunities VII CLO Ltd./Fortress Credit
Opportunities VII CLO LLC

Class                     Rating             Amount
                                           (mil. $)
A-1R                      AAA (sf)           100.00
A-1T                      AAA (sf)           190.80
A-1F                      AAA (sf)            40.00
B                         AA (sf)             92.00
C                         A- (sf)             63.70
D                         BBB- (sf)           42.00
E                         BB- (sf)            24.40
Subordinated notes        NR                 147.20

NR-Not rated.


FREDDIE MAC 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Asset-Backed Securities, Series 2016-1 (the Certificates) issued by
Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust 2016-1 (the
Trust):

   -- $32.7 million Class M-1 at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- $93.4 million Class M-2 at B (low) (sf)

The BBB (low) (sf) and B (low) (sf) ratings on the Certificates
reflect 20.0% and 10.0% of credit enhancement, respectively,
provided by subordinated Certificates in the pool.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
re-performing first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of asset-backed Certificates (the Certificates). The
Certificates are backed by approximately 4,064 loans with a total
principal balance of $934,267,704 as of the Cut-Off Date.

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole loan form since their acquisition. The loans
were held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and deposited into
the Trust as of the Closing Date.

The portfolio contains 100% modified loans. Historically, each loan
experienced at least one credit event and was modified under either
GSE HAMP or GSE non-HAMP modification programs. Within the pool,
3,847 mortgages have forborne principal amounts as a result of
modification, which equates to 20.9% of the total principal balance
as of the Cut-Off Date. For all but three loans (or 0.1% of the
pool), the modifications happened more than two years ago. The
loans are approximately 119 months seasoned and all are current as
of the Cut-Off Date. All of the mortgage loans have been zero times
30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least the past 37 months under
the Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency methods. None of the
loans are subject to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc. (SPS). There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal
or interest on any mortgages by the servicer; however, the servicer
is obligated to advance to third parties any amounts necessary for
the preservation of mortgaged properties or real estate owned (REO)
properties acquired by the Trust through foreclosure or a loss
mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor and Trustee of the Trust.
Wilmington Trust, National Association will serve as Trust Agent.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will serve as the Custodian for the Trust.
U.S. Bank, National Association will serve as the Securities
Administrator for the Trust and will act as paying agent,
registrar, transfer agent and authenticating agent.

Freddie Mac will make certain representations and warranties (R&W)
with respect to the mortgage loans. It will be the only party from
which the Trust may seek indemnification (or, in certain cases, a
repurchase) as a result of a breach of R&Ws as set forth in the
Pooling Agreement. If a breach review trigger occurs, the Trust
Agent, Wilmington Trust, will be responsible for the enforcement of
R&Ws. The warranty period will only be extended through December
20, 2017 (approximately one year from the Closing Date), for
substantially all R&Ws.

The mortgage loans will be divided into two loan groups. The Group
M loans were subject to fixed-rate modifications and Group H loans
were subject to step-rate modifications. Principal and interest
(P&I) on the Group M and Group H senior certificates (the
Guaranteed Certificates) will be guaranteed by Freddie Mac. The
Guaranteed Certificates will be backed by collateral from each
group respectively. The remaining Certificates, including the
subordinate, interest-only (IO) and residual Certificates, will be
cross-collateralized between the two groups. This is generally
known as a Y-Structure.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Certain principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls
on the rated Class M-1 and Class M-2 Certificates. Senior classes
benefit from guaranteed P&I payments by the Guarantor Freddie Mac;
however, such guaranteed amounts, if paid, will be reimbursed to
Freddie Mac from the interest and principal collections prior to
any allocation to the subordinate certificates. The senior
principal distribution amounts vary subject to the satisfaction of
a series of step-down tests. Realized losses are allocated reverse
sequentially.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis (0 x
30 days delinquencies in the past 37 months), good credit quality
relative to other re-performing pools reviewed by DBRS, and a
strong servicer. Additionally, a third-party due diligence review,
albeit on less than 100% of the portfolio, was performed on a
sample that generally meets or exceeds DBRS's criteria. The due
diligence results and findings on the sampled loans were
satisfactory.

The transaction employs a considerably weaker R&W framework than
other re-performing loan securitizations rated by DBRS. The SCRT
2016-1 framework includes a 12-month sunset without an R&W reserve
account, substantial knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan
representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools. DBRS
increased loss expectations quite significantly (approximately 15%
to 20%) from the model results to capture the weaknesses in the R&W
framework. Other mitigating factors include (1) significant loan
seasoning and very clean performance history in the past three
years, (2) stringent and automatic breach review triggers, (3)
Freddie Mac as the R&W provider and (4) satisfactory third-party
due diligence review.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the rated Certificates and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for interest
payments to the rated Certificates.

The DBRS ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Certificates.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the related report.

Notes:

All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodologies are RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and Rating Methodology, Unified
Interest Rate Model for Rating U.S. Structured Finance
Transactions, Third-Party Due Diligence Criteria for U.S. RMBS
Transactions, Representations and Warranties Criteria for U.S. RMBS
Transactions, Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS
Originators, Operational Risk Assessment for U.S. RMBS Servicers
and Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance, which can be found
on our website under Methodologies.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the
rating process. DBRS had access to the accounts and other relevant
internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities.

The full report providing additional analytical detail is available
by clicking on the link to the right under Related Research or by
contacting us at info@dbrs.com.

RATINGS

Issuer           Debt Rated          Rating Action       Rating
------           ----------          -------------       ------
Freddie Mac      Asset Backed        Provis.-Final       BBB (low)
Seasoned         Securities,
Credit           Series 2016-1,
Risk Transfer    Class M-1
Trust, Series
2016-1

Freddie Mac      Asset Backed        Provis.-Final       B (low)
Seasoned         Securities,
Credit           Series 2016-1,
Risk Transfer    Class M-2
Trust, Series
2016-1


GOLDMAN SACHS 2012-GC6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 10 rated classes of Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Company GS Mortgage Securities Trust (GSMS) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2012-GC6.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on overall stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the November 2016 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
12.7% to $1.007 billion from $1.154 billion at issuance.  One loan
(1.9%) was previously in special servicing and modified due to a
violation of the loan covenants but was returned to master servicer
in February 2014 after approval of a transfer of ownership.  There
are currently no delinquent or specially serviced loans.  Six loans
(4.6%) are fully defeased.

Stable Performance: Based on full-year 2015 financial statements,
the pool's overall net operating income has been relatively stable
with a 4.8% increase since the previous year and an 11.9% increase
since issuance for those loans reporting financials.

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated three top 15 loans (12%),
SunTrust International Center, Audubon Crossing and Audubon
Commons, and Chase Tower, as Fitch Loans of Concern.  Each property
has seen declines in occupancy.  Secondary Markets: Several of the
largest loans within the pool are backed by properties located in
secondary markets.  Locations such as Reno, NV, Rochester, NY,
Lancaster, PA, and North Olmsted, OH are all represented by top 15
loans.

Hotel Concentration: Loans backed by hotel properties represent
15.1% of the pool, including two within the top 15.  The average
Fitch LTV for hotels in the pool is 97.3%.

Retail Concentration: Loans backed by retail properties represent
41% of the pool.

Minimal Subordinate Debt: Only one loan, representing 0.7% of the
pool, has additional debt. 13 loans, 25.3% of the pool, allow for
future debt.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these classes

   -- $0.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $570.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $89.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $903.2 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $119.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $63.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44.7 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.6 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1 has repaid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class G
and class X-B certificates.



GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC10: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-GC10 as follows:

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (high) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (high) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. At issuance, the transaction consisted of 61 loans
secured by 93 commercial and multifamily properties. The pool has
since experienced a collateral reduction of 7.4% as a result of
scheduled amortization and the prepayment of one loan. The pool
also benefits from defeasance collateral as four loans,
representing 5.4% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased.
Based on YE2015 financials, the pool reported a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.73 times (x) and a WA
debt yield of 10.9%. Comparatively, the YE2014 WA DSCR and WA debt
yield were 1.58x and 9.9%, respectively.

As of the November 2016 remittance, there is one loan in special
servicing, representing 0.5% of the current pool balance, and 11
loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 5.4% of the current
pool balance. Based on the most recent financials, the loans on the
watchlist reported a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.41x and 10.4%,
respectively.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted and specially serviced loans, as
well as for the largest 15 loans in the pool, in the DBRS CMBS
IReports platform.

The ratings assigned to Classes E and F materially deviate from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


GSMPS MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B1 Debt to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches from two transactions issued by GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust
2003-1 and GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3.

The collateral backing these deals consists of first-lien fixed and
adjustable rate mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban
Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
(VA).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3

  Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. AX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools and the structural nuances of the transactions.  The
tranches downgraded are primarily due to the erosion of credit
enhancement supporting these bonds.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults.  A VA guarantee
covers only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of
either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid
interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount.
HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers
submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties on
servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits.  This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty.  The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses they
deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Methodology" published in November 2013.

The methodology used in rating the interest-only securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Maintains BB Rating on Class G Debt on Review
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited maintained the Under Review with Negative Implications
status on the following classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2012-2 issued by Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) 2012-2:

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
      Implications

   -- Class F at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

   -- Class G at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

The ratings do not carry trends.

DBRS initially placed these classes Under Review in March 2016
because of the concerns surrounding the third-largest loan,
Lakewood Apartments (Prospectus ID#3, 8.3% of the pool), which
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 for imminent
default. The loan is secured by a four-storey, 111-unit condominium
apartment building located in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer because the borrower advised
that debt service obligations could no longer be met, given the
cash flow declines at the property, driven by general economic
difficulty in the Fort McMurray area. As of the November 2016
remittance report, the loan was brought current after typically
running between 30 and 60 days delinquent. DBRS received the
borrower's October 2016 year-to-date unaudited financial statement
from the servicer, which reported an operating loss of $679,230.65.
The reported loss suggests that the borrower was able to bring the
loan current through funds derived from alternative sources; DBRS
has requested further confirmation from the special servicer.

Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing, the loan was
being monitored for property performance declines related to the
downturn in the oil industry over the past few years. Following the
May 2016 wildfire, which, according to the special servicer, only
caused incidental damage to the subject properties, occupancy has
improved as of the November 2016 rent roll to 83.6%, up from the
July 2016 occupancy rate of 80.0%. However, rental rates declined
during that period from $2,013 per unit in July to $1,881 per unit
in November. According to the Canada Mortgage Housing Corporation,
as of October 2015, the Wood Buffalo Municipal Region reported an
average vacancy rate of 29.4%; the average rental rate for all unit
types was reported at $1,761 per unit.

There has not been an updated appraisal for the property since
issuance, as the special servicer declined to order new files until
the loan reached 90 days delinquency (which has not occurred to
date), in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
(PSA). While this approach is in line with the guidelines set forth
in the PSA, DBRS believes it is uncommon for a servicer to delay
ordering an appraisal when existing loan performance issues have
the potential to be long term, which DBRS believes to be the case
with this loan. The appraised value of the property at issuance was
approximately $34.8 million. DBRS expects the values to have
declined significantly since that time, given the property's
performance decline in recent years and the general economic
difficulty in the area.

The loan has full recourse to the sponsors: Lanesborough Real
Estate Investment Trust (LREIT), 2668921 Manitoba Ltd. and Shelter
Canadian Properties Limited. LREIT's assets are heavily
concentrated in Alberta, and the portfolio has been significantly
affected by the downturn in the oil industry. In its Q3 2016
financial statements, LREIT reported total assets of $262 million
and total liabilities of $263 million, resulting in a deficit of
$1.1 million. In addition, LREIT reported a loss before
discontinued operations of $10.6 million for the three months
ending September 30, 2016, but reported an income of $2.3 million
for the nine months ending September 30, 2016. In conjunction with
the subject loan's transfer to special servicing, seven other
assets located in Fort McMurray and secured by DBRS-rated
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) loans in LREIT's
portfolio were also transferred to special servicing for similar
issues. All of these loans are current as of the November 2016
remittance. According to LREIT's Q3 2016 financial statements,
LREIT sold three properties in 2016, including Beck Court,
Willowdale Gardens and Elgin Lodge, all of which are apartment
buildings or retirement homes respectively located in Yellowknife,
Northwest Territories; Brandon, Manitoba; and Port Elgin, Ontario.
With these sales, LREIT's portfolio is almost entirely located in
Fort McMurray. The narrative in the financial statement states that
the property sales were completed to reduce LREIT's liabilities and
fulfill debt obligations. During Q1 2016, 12 mortgages secured by
13 LREIT-owned properties in Fort McMurray were in default, but as
per the Q3 2016 financial statement, LREIT was able to reduce
and/or defer the debt service payments, as well as to negotiate
with lenders to modify the loan terms and/or forbearance
agreements. LREIT notes that it will continue to rely on its
lenders to provide breathing room in the environment of sustained
economic difficulty for the area.

Although the subject loans and other CMBS were recently brought
current, with the special servicers indicating that the loans are
expected to transfer back to the master servicer following a
monitoring period in early 2017, the general outlook for these
assets is significantly depressed, particularly given the upcoming
maturity for most of LREIT's CMBS book in the next 18 to 24 months.
As the lending environment is essentially frozen in the area, given
the general economic decline and no room for significant
improvement in sight for the near term, and given LREIT's generally
difficult economic position, finding replacement loans for these
properties will be challenging to say the least. As such, it is
likely the special servicer will see these and the other CMBS loans
again, and loan modifications could be necessary. As such, DBRS
maintains the bonds as previously listed Under Review with Negative
Implications to reflect the increased risk and general uncertainty
surrounding the subject loan. Given the general lack of concrete
information on the status of the loan's workout and the current
financial performance for the collateral properties, DBRS has
coordinated a trip to Fort McMurray with the special servicer to
tour these and other properties secured by DBRS-rated CMBS debt and
to gather information about the current performance outlook for
both these assets and the market in general. These tours will take
place in mid-December, and shortly following that visit, DBRS will
bring this and the other related CMBS transactions back up for
review to incorporate the information gathered as part of the
visit.


IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Maintains BB Rating on Class G Debt on Review
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited maintained the Under Review with Negative Implications
status on the following classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2013-3 issued by Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series 2013-3:

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
      Implications

   -- Class F at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

   -- Class G at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

The ratings do not carry trends.

DBRS initially placed these classes Under Review in March 2016
because of concerns surrounding three loans that were transferred
to special servicing in February 2016 for imminent default. The
Lunar and Whimbrel Apartments (Prospectus ID#10), Snowbird and
Skyview Apartments (Prospectus ID#11) and Parkland and Gannet
Apartments (Prospectus ID#17) loans are secured by multifamily
properties located in Fort McMurray, Alberta, and collectively
represent 8.8% of the current pool balance. The loans were
transferred to the special servicer because the borrower advised
that debt service obligations could no longer be met, given the
cash flow declines at the properties, driven by general economic
difficulty in the Fort McMurray area. As of the November 2016
remittance report, the loans were brought current after typically
running between 30 and 60 days delinquent. DBRS received the
borrower's October 2016 year-to-date unaudited financial statements
from the servicer, which reported operating losses ranging from
$309,692 to $517,550. The reported losses suggest that the borrower
was able to bring the loans current through funds derived from
alternative sources; DBRS has requested further confirmation from
the special servicer.

Prior to the loans' transfer to special servicing, the loans were
being monitored for property performance declines related to the
downturn in the oil industry over the past few years. Following the
May 2016 wildfire, which, according to the special servicer, only
caused incidental damage to the subject properties, occupancy has
not improved as significantly at the subject properties as it has
with other Lanesborough Real Estate Investment Trust (LREIT)
properties in the area. As of the November 2016 rent rolls,
occupancy rates ranged from 57.1% to 60.4%, which compares with the
January 2016 occupancy rates that were between 52.4% and 69.4%. In
addition to the increased vacancy floor, the average rental rates
have declined further from the already depressed January 2016
rental rates. Across the three loans, one-bedroom units,
two-bedroom units and three-bedroom units reported an average
rental rate on a per-unit basis of $1,246, $1,349 and $1,650,
respectively, according to the November 2016 rent rolls. In
comparison, the January 2016 reported average rental rates for
one-bedroom units, two-bedroom units and three-bedroom units were
$1,396, $1,514 and $1,834, respectively. According to the Canada
Mortgage Housing Corporation, as of October 2015, the Wood Buffalo
Municipal Region reported an average vacancy rate of 29.4%; the
average rental rate for all unit types was reported at $1,761 per
unit.

There has not been an updated appraisal for any of the properties
since issuance, as the special servicer declined to order new files
until the loans reached 90 days delinquency (which has not occurred
to date), in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
(PSA). While this approach is in line with the guidelines set forth
in the PSA, DBRS believes it is uncommon for a servicer to delay
ordering an appraisal when existing loan performance issues have
the potential to be long term, which DBRS believes to be the case
with these loans. The appraised value at issuance was $14.8 million
for the Lunar and Whimbrel properties, $13.7 million for the
Snowbird and Skyview properties and $11.2 million for the Parkland
and Gannet properties. DBRS expects the values to have declined
significantly since that time, given the properties' performance
decline in recent years and the general economic difficulty in the
area.

The loans have full recourse to LREIT and a partial guarantee in
the form of 25.0% of the loan balance by 2668921 Manitoba Ltd.
LREIT's assets are heavily concentrated in Alberta, and the
portfolio has been significantly affected by the downturn in the
oil industry. In its Q3 2016 financial statements, LREIT reported
total assets of $262 million and total liabilities of $263 million,
resulting in a deficit of $1.1 million. In addition, LREIT reported
a loss before discontinued operations of $10.6 million for the
three months ending September 30, 2016, but reported an income of
$2.3 million for the nine months ending September 30, 2016. In
conjunction with the subject loans' transfer to special servicing,
two other assets located in Fort McMurray and secured by DBRS-rated
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) loans in LREIT's
portfolio were also transferred to special servicing for similar
issues. All of these loans are current as of the November 2016
remittance. According to LREIT's Q3 2016 financial statements,
LREIT sold three properties in 2016, including Beck Court,
Willowdale Gardens and Elgin Lodge, all of which are apartment
buildings or retirement homes respectively located in Yellowknife,
Northwest Territories; Brandon, Manitoba; and Port Elgin, Ontario.
With these sales, LREIT's portfolio is almost entirely located in
Fort McMurray. The narrative in the financial statement states that
the property sales were completed to reduce LREIT's liabilities and
fulfill debt obligations. During Q1 2016, 12 mortgages secured by
13 LREIT-owned properties in Fort McMurray were in default, but as
per the Q3 2016 financial statement, LREIT was able to reduce
and/or defer the debt service payments, as well as to negotiate
with lenders to modify the loan terms and/or forbearance
agreements. LREIT notes that it will continue to rely on its
lenders to provide breathing room in the environment of sustained
economic difficulty for the area.

Although the subject loans and other CMBS were recently brought
current, with the special servicers indicating that the loans are
expected to transfer back to the master servicer following a
monitoring period in early 2017, the general outlook for these
assets is significantly depressed, particularly given the upcoming
maturity for most of LREIT's CMBS book in the next 18 to 24 months.
As the lending environment is essentially frozen in the area, given
the general economic decline and no room for significant
improvement in sight for the near term, and given LREIT's generally
difficult economic position, finding replacement loans for these
properties will be challenging to say the least. As such, it is
likely the special servicer will see these and the other CMBS loans
again, and loan modifications could be necessary. As such, DBRS
maintains the bonds as previously listed Under Review with Negative
Implications to reflect the increased risk and general uncertainty
surrounding these loans. Given the general lack of concrete
information on the status of the loans' workout and the current
financial performance for the collateral properties, DBRS has
coordinated a trip to Fort McMurray with the special servicer to
tour these and other properties secured by DBRS-rated CMBS debt and
to gather information about the current performance outlook for
both these assets and the market in general. These tours will take
place in mid-December, and shortly following that visit, DBRS will
bring this and the other related CMBS transactions back up for
review to incorporate the information gathered as part of the
visit.


JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 6 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of JP Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2000-C10.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation is a result of high credit enhancement, defeasance
and stable performance of the underlying collateral.  As of the
November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 98.7% to $9.6 million from
$738.5 million at issuance.  Fitch modeled losses of 4.3% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
8.5%, including $62.3 million (8.4% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes G through NR.

Pool Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only six
of the original 169 loans remaining.  None of the remaining loans
are in special servicing or considered a Fitch Loan of Concern. One
loan (14.5%) is defeased, four loans (78.4%) are backed by retail
properties including two single tenant Eckerds / Rite Aids (23.6%),
and the remaining loan is secured by a self-storage property
(7.2%).

Fully Amortizing Loans: Three loans (68.9% of the pool) are
scheduled to mature in 2020.  Maturities for the remaining loans
are scheduled to occur in 2018 (9.5%) and 2019 (21.7%).

The largest loan in the pool is a grocery anchored retail property
in Richardson, TX (38%).  The property is anchored by Albertson's
(34.3% of the net rentable area [NRA]) whose lease expires in
October 2016.  According to the master servicer, Albertson's has
exercised their option and extended the lease.  The requested new
lease expiration date has not been provided.  Additional major
tenants include Richardson Bike Mart (20.2%) and Dress Barn (5.3%).
Occupancy was reported at 93% as of June 2016.  The loan matures
in 2020 and the most recently reported debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) is 1.44x as of December 2015.

The second largest loan in the pool is an unanchored retail
shopping center built in 1979 in Dallas, TX (16.7%).  Major tenants
include 24 Hour Fitness (38%; 9/2022), Salons by JC (10% NRA) and
Cindi's (4.6% NRA).  As of June 2016, the property was 88%
occupied.  The loan matures in 2020 and the most recently reported
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.91x as of December 2015.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class F is Stable with no rating actions
expected. Classes G through M have realized losses and will remain
at 'D'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $3.5 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E have paid in full.  Class NR is not
rated.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only
class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. (JPMCC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of classes F and G reflect the pool's significant
concentrations and expected losses in relation to the classes'
credit enhancement.

Loan Concentration: Only 15 loans of the original 151 remain in the
pool, most of which are located in tertiary markets.  There are no
specially serviced or delinquent loans.

Loan of Concern: The largest loan in the pool is secured by a
107,000 square foot (sf) office property located in Yardley, PA.
The property is 100% leased to MediMedia USA through December 2017.
The tenant is required to give notice of intent by Dec. 31, 2016,
and has not indicated their future plans to either stay or vacate.
The loan matures in April 2018.

Loan Amortization: Classes F and G will continue to benefit from
amortization and continued paydown.  The transaction includes 36.5%
in fully amortizing loans and 23% or $7 million in defeased
collateral.

Maturity Concentration: 64.8% (2018), 4.0% (2022) and 31.2%
(2023).

As of the November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.4% to $30.6 million from
$1.2 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes G and below.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlook on class F reflects the increasing credit
enhancement and expected continued pay down to the class. Due to
the concentrations, further upgrades are unlikely.  The rating on
class F was capped at 'Asf' due to the pool's concentration,
upcoming rollover risk at the largest property, and tertiary market
locations of the remaining collateral.  Fitch's analysis included a
sensitivity analysis which applied significant losses to the
largest loan due to lack of information on the single tenant's
potential lease renewal.  Credit enhancement to class G remained
sufficient to support the rating.  The Positive Rating Outlook on
class G reflects the potential for an upgrade should the tenant
renew its lease.  Fitch will continue to monitor the largest loan
as leasing status updates are received. Downgrades would be
considered should loans transfer to special servicing or expected
losses increase.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $10.6 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
      from Stable;
   -- $6.9 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class NR is not rated.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on two classes and
downgraded the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-LDP1 as follows:

   -- Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes F and G were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 47% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on Class H was downgraded due to an increase in realized
losses. Class H has already experienced a 54% realized loss as
result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded to C (sf) due
to the fact that it currently does not, nor is expect to, receive
interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 34.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $44.8 million
from $2.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 30% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 5% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Thirty three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $115 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
South Park Business Center Loan ($6.3 million -- 14% of the pool),
which is secured by three office buildings totaling approximately
162,500 SF located in Greenwood, Indiana, roughly 12 miles
southeast of the Indianapolis central business district. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2015 due to balloon
payment / maturity default and the loan became REO in July 2016. As
of the September 2016 rent roll, the three buildings were
collectively 79% leased. The special servicer indicated they are
actively working to lease up the property.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 84% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 62% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 80%, compared to 67% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 22% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.61X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 62% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Golf Glen Mart Plaza Loan ($13.6 million -- 30%
of the pool), which is secured by a 235,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located in Niles, Illinois which is about 26 miles northwest
of downtown Chicago. The grocery anchor (45% of the NRA) vacated in
June 2016 due to low sales, which was ahead of their lease
expiration in December 2024. As per the September 2016 rent roll,
the property was 89% leased (but only 44% occupied), compared to
83% leased at the prior review. The loan has amortized 13.4% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111.7% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 82.3% and 1.18X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Chimney Hill Center Loan ($8.5
million -- 19% of the pool), which is secured by a 197,500 square
foot (SF) retail center anchored by Farm Fresh with a lease
expiration of January 2020. The property is located in Virginia
Beach, Virginia. As per the September 2016 rent roll the property
was 97% leased, compared to 94% at the prior review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 75.3% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
81.9% and 1.19X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Crenshaw Plaza Loan ($5.8 million --
13% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery anchored retail
center in Los Angeles, California. The anchor, Ralph's grocery
store, has a lease expiration in June 2024. The loan's collateral
portion of the property was 86% leased as of September 2016,
compared to 85% leased at the prior review. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 29% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 42.1% and 2.31X, respectively, compared to
41.9% and 2.32X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Debt to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Series 2005-LDP2 as:

  Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. E, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016, Affirmed

   Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 30, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 35% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-A, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance (or weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.6% of the
current balance, compared to 26.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type.  Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to
$149.8 million from $2.979 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
(excluding defeasance) constituting 83.2% of the pool.  One loan,
constituting 0.6% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Six loans, constituting 33.7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $189.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 32%).  Three loans, constituting 27% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Fort Knox Executive Office Center Loan ($26.6 million
  -- 17.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 291,000 SF suburban
office building located in Tallahassee, Florida.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in March 2015 due to imminent
maturity default and has passed its April 2015 maturity date.  The
largest tenant represents approximately 80% of the net rentable
area (NRA) with lease expirations in 2020.  Moody's analysis
incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for the tenant
concentration risk.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by an office
and retail property.  Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for two poorly performing loans, constituting 19.4% of
the pool.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $32.1 million loss for
specially serviced loans and troubled loans.

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 operating results for
92% of the pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 50% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 76%, compared to 93% at Moody's
last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.62X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.38X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 36.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Reflections A-Note Loan
($24.2 million -- 16.2% of the pool), which is secured by two
office properties located in Reston, Virginia.  Reflections I is a
five-story office building totaling 123,546 SF and was built in
2000.  The property is currently fully vacant but was previously
100% leased to Raytheon.  Reflections II is a two-story office
building totaling 64,253 SF and was built in 1984 and renovated in
2001.  The property is also fully vacant and was previously 100%
leased to the Department of the Interior.  The loan was transferred
to the special servicer in January 2013 for imminent default due to
both properties being 100% vacant.  The loan was consolidated and
subsequently bifurcated via an A-Note / B-Note split.  The A-Note
and B-Note have balances of $24.2 million and $4.8 million,
respectively.  As part of the modification, the loan maturity was
extended to December 2017.  The loan is currently performing under
the terms of the modification.  Due to vacancy at the properties,
Moody's has identified both the A-Note and B-Note as troubled
loans.

The second largest loan is the Ball Corporation -- Warehouse
Facility Loan ($16.5 million -- 11.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 576,876 SF warehouse facility located in Ames, Iowa.
The property was built in 1999 and renovated in 2002.  The property
features 33-foot ceiling heights, 16 loading docks, frontage along
I-35 and is food-grade equipped.  The property was 100% leased as
of September 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and
1.21X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Mounts Corner Shopping Center Loan
($13.7 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 76,000
SF component of a 132,500 SF anchored neighborhood retail center
located in Freehold, New Jersey; approximately 40 miles south of
Manhattan.  The property was 100% occupied as of the September 2016
rent roll.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.23X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2007-LDP12.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and Stable Rating Outlooks reflect sufficient
credit enhancement relative to pool expected losses. As of the
November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 49% to $1.28 billion from $2.5 billion
at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 16 loans (10% of the pool)
are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes D
through NR.

Higher Loss Expectations: Fitch modeled losses of 18.4% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
15.4%, including $151.4 million (6% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date. Modeled losses at the previous rating
action were 12.7% of the original pool balance. The higher modeled
loss is due to higher losses on the specially serviced loans,
including additional specially serviced loans. The three largest
contributors to expected losses are Liberty Plaza (3.1% of the
pool), a real estate owned (REO) asset, BB&T Tower (2.2%), REO
asset and St. Joe-150 Main St., an office building in Norfolk, VA
(3.5%) with lease volatility.

Increased Defeasance: Sixteen loans (10% of pool) are defeased, up
from three loans (2%) at Fitch's last rating action.

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 27 (27.4% of current pool
balance) Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 14 specially
serviced assets (12.1%). Three of the top 15 loans (7.5%) are
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced assets
include seven that are REO (8.3%), four loans (0.7%) which are over
90+ days delinquent and three loans (3.1%) in foreclosure.

Maturity Concentration: Excluding the specially serviced assets,
88% of the pool is scheduled to mature in 2017. The majority of the
2017 loan maturities are concentrated during third and fourth
quarters (48.5% and 25.6% of pool, respectively).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-4, A-1A, and A-M reflect
sufficient credit enhancement relative to pool expected losses. The
distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades if there is
an increase in the number of specially serviced loans and
additional losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has also affirmed the following classes as indicated:

   -- $524.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $153.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $250.5 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Stable

      from Positive;

   -- $197.2 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 55%;

   -- $21.9 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $28.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $21.9 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $12.5 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- $25 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- $28.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- $14.6 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class T at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-SB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class NR certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes (Classes B & C) were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 20% since Moody's
last review.

The ratings on the IO classes (Classes X-A & X-B) were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 16 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to $712 million
from $1.03 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by thirty mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
71.6% of the pool.

One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, The Cove at Southern ($6 million), has been liquidated
from the pool, resulting in a realized loss of less than a 1% of
the loan balance. Two loans, constituting 2.9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Fairview Heights Plaza loan ($10.9 million -- 1.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 199,000 square foot (SF) community
retail center located in Fairview Heights, Illinois, 10 miles east
of St. Louis, Missouri. The property is anchored by a 60,000 SF
Gordmans. However, the former Sports Authority space (40,500 SF)
recently went dark. As of December 2016, the property was 81%
leased. The loan transferred to Special Servicing in May 2016 due
to imminent default.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 79% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 80%, compared to
84% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.88X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.75X and 1.26X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the InterContinental Hotel Chicago Loan ($139
million -- 19.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 792-key
full-service hotel located on North Michigan Avenue in Chicago,
Illinois. The property includes over 25,000 SF of meeting space, a
Michael Jordan's steakhouse restaurant, full service spa and an
indoor junior Olympic size pool. The property saw a decline in
performance in 2015. For the trailing-twelve month period ending
December 2015, the property had a RevPAR penetration of 95.5%
compared to its competitive set. The RevPAR penetration is down
from the prior three years which were all in excess of 102%.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 1.05X, respectively,
compared to 106% and 1.04X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the SunTrust Bank Portfolio I Loan ($89
million -- 12.6% of the pool). The loan is secured by 119 bank
branches and two single-tenant office buildings. The properties are
100% leased to SunTrust Bank (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1,
stable outlook) as part of a master lease agreement. The properties
are located in nine Eastern states, from Maryland to Florida.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.74X, respectively,
compared to 66% and 1.48X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Asheville Mall Loan ($70 million --
9.8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 324,000 square foot
component of a 974,000 square foot regional mall located in
Asheville, North Carolina. The mall anchors include Dillard's,
Sears, JC Penney, Belk, and Barnes and Noble. The total mall was
99% leased as of December 2015 compared to 97% at last review and
in-line space was 98% leased. The mall has reported occupancy above
94% since at least 2008. The loan sponsor is CBL & Associates
Properties, Inc., a retail REIT based in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.38X, respectively,
compared to 74% and 1.36X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-INN: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to B+
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-INN, a U.S. commercial
mortgage back securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions on the certificates follow S&P's analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the mortgage loan secured by 47
hotels in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

The upgrades on classes B, C, and F reflect S&P's expectation of
the available credit enhancement for these classes, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
underlying collateral has displayed stronger performance since
issuance, with no notable declines in performance for the largest
assets in the pool.

The affirmations on classes A, D, and E reflect S&P's expectation
of the available credit enhancement for these classes, which it
believes is within its most recent estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.

S&P raised its rating on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than the
lowest-rated reference class.  Class X-EXT's notional balance
references the class A, B, C, D, E, and F certificates.

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging properties that secure the
trust's mortgage loan.  The portfolio is geographically diverse
because the 47 hotels, totaling 6,094 guestrooms, are located
across 16 states.  No properties have been released or substituted
since issuance.

To determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the
lodging properties, S&P based its analysis partly on a review of
the master servicer provided portfolio net cash flow (NCF), which
has increased every year since 2012.  In the trailing 12 months
ended June 30, 2016, the portfolio NCF has increased by
$2.0 million from year end 2015, and $9.0 million from year end
2014.

S&P also considered the long-term trends and the cyclical nature of
the hospitality industry in deriving our NCF.  S&P then divided its
derived NCF by a 9.51% weighted average capitalization rate to
determine S&P's expected-case value.  This yielded an 86.0% S&P
Global Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a 1.90x S&P Global
Ratings debt service coverage (DSC) based on the 2.23050% spread
and 3.50% LIBOR cap.  The master servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a
consolidated DSC of 3.64x on the trust balance for the trailing 12
months ended June 30, 2016.

According to the Nov. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has a $635.0 million trust balance, which is the same
as at issuance.  As of the November 2016 trustee remittance report,
the loan pays an annual floating interest rate of 2.23050% over
LIBOR.  There is additional debt in the form of two mezzanine
loans, which have a combined total of $205 million.  According to
the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the special
servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs and
expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections the special
servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

RATINGS RAISED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-INN
              Rating
Class     To          From
B         AA (sf)     AA- (sf)
C         A (sf)      A- (sf)
F         B+ (sf)     B (sf)
X-EXT     B+ (sf)     B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-INN
Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
D         BBB- (sf)
E         BB- (sf)


JP MORGAN 2016-5: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-5
(JPMMT 2016-5) as:

   -- $346,800,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $16,377,000 class A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $171,320,000 class 1-A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $8,090,500 class 1-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $175,480,000 class 2-A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $8,286,500class 2-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,706,700 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $5,009,300 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3,660,700 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,926,700 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating these certificates:

   -- $3,853,354 class B-5 certificates;
   -- $19,267,154 class RR exchangeable certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of two groups of very high-quality prime loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage and substantial liquid
reserves.  87.3% of the loans in the pool were originated by FRB,
which Fitch considers to be an above-average originator of prime
jumbo product.  The pool has a weighted average (WA) FICO score of
767 and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 62.5%.

High Geographic Concentration (Concern): The pool's primary
concentration risk is in California, where approximately 43.8% of
the collateral is located, followed by New York at 23%.
Approximately 78.4% of the pool is located in the top five
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the subject pool (San
Francisco, New York, Boston, Los Angeles and San Jose).  Given the
pool's significant regional concentrations, an additional penalty
of approximately 19% was applied to the pool's lifetime default
expectation.

Payment Shock Exposure (Concern): The pool consists entirely of ARM
loans, while approximately 40.9% also have interest-only (IO)
features.  Loan products that result in periodic changes in a
borrower's payment, such as ARMs and IOs, expose borrowers to
payment reset risk.  Future increases in interest rates and payment
re-amortization after the expiration of IO periods can raise
monthly payments considerably.  To account for this risk, Fitch
applied a probability of default (PD) penalty of approximately 1.9x
to the pool.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years.  The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal.  The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.50% of the
original balance will be maintained for the certificates.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Concern): The trust is obligated to
reimburse the breach reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha), each month for any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred if the company is requested to participate in any
arbitration, legal or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings.
These expenses include Pentalpha's legal fees and other expenses
incurred outside its annual fee schedule and are not subject to a
cap or certificateholder approval.

Furthermore, certificateholders are obligated to pay Pentalpha a
termination fee of $140,000 from year two to five, $80,000 from
year five to eight and $25,000 after year eight, to terminate the
contract.  While Fitch accounted for the potential additional costs
by upwardly adjusting its loss estimation for the pool, Fitch views
this construct as adding potentially more ratings volatility than
those that do not have this type of provision.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Concern): Extraordinary expenses,
which include loan file review costs, arbitration expenses for
enforcement of the reps and additional fees of Pentalpha, will be
taken out of available funds and not accounted for in the
contractual interest owed to the bondholders.  This construct can
result in principal and interest shortfalls to the bonds, starting
from the bottom of the capital structure.  To account for the risk
of these noncredit events reducing subordination, Fitch adjusted
its loss expectations upward by 35bps at the 'AAAsf' level.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Concern): Fitch
believes that the value of the rep and warranty framework is
diluted by the presence of qualifying and conditional language in
conjunction with sunset provisions, which reduces lender breach
liability.  While Fitch believes the high credit-quality pool and
clean diligence results mitigate these risks, the weaker framework
was considered in the analysis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level.  The implied rating sensitivities
are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper market value declines at the
national level.  The analysis assumes market value declines of 10%,
20% and 30%, in addition to the model-projected 4.2%.  The analysis
indicates that there is some potential rating migration with higher
MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2015-JP1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-JP1 issued by JPMCC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-JP1:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class G at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The collateral consists of 51 fixed-rate loans
secured by 58 commercial and multifamily properties. As of the
November 2016 remittance, the pool has experienced a collateral
reduction of 0.4% since issuance, with all of the original 58 loans
remaining in the pool. Given the late 2015 closing date for this
transaction, updated financial reporting is relatively limited,
with 34 loans representing 61.4% of the current pool balance
reporting Q2 2016 financials, and 29.3% of the pool reporting Q3
2016 financials. The 11 loans within the top 15 loans reporting
2016 figures showed an annualized weighted average (WA) net cash
flow (NCF) improvement of 11.11% since DBRS underwriting. The pool
reports a WA debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield
of 1.90 times (x) and 9.2%, respectively. In comparison, the DBRS
underwritten WA DSCR and WA debt yield were 1.60x and 9.4%,
respectively.

As of the November 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and two loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing
2.2% of the pool balance.

DBRS has provided updated loan level commentary and analysis for
the watchlisted loans and for the largest 15 loans in the pool in
the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.




KKR CLO 16: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by KKR CLO 16 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "KKR CLO 16").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$455,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$76,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$27,100,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive
      Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$9,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
      Notes due 2029 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$47,100,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$29,600,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

KKR CLO 16 is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 83% ramped as
of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $700,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2959

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2959 to 3403)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2959 to 3847)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Debt Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class,
affirmed the ratings on four classes and downgraded the ratings on
one class in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7 as follows:

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
      2016 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-OL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class L was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 30% since Moody's last review and 98% since
securitization.

The rating Class K was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes M and N were affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class N has
already experienced a 53% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class X-OL was affirmed because the rating is
commensurate with the performance of its referenced loan One
Lincoln Street ($19.7 million; 80.4% of the pool), which is fully
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

The rating on the IO Class X-CL was downgraded due to the decline
in the credit performance (or weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of its reference classes resulting from principal paydowns of
higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current balance, compared to 1.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the original
pooled balance, the same as the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $24.5 million
from $1.415 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three remaining mortgage loans. One loan,
constituting 80.4% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%).

There are two remaining non-defeased performing loans. The largest
non-defeased loan is the Garrison Ridge Loan ($2.8 million -- 11.5%
of the pool), which is secured by an 18,200 square foot (SF) strip
center located in Marietta, Georgia. The property is shadow
anchored by a Lowe's and was 92.5% occupied as of September 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.04X, respectively,
compared to 94% and 1.03X at the last review.

The other non-defeased loan is the Pecan Creek Loan ($2.0 million
-- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 11,372 SF unanchored
retail center located in Southlake, Texas. The property was 68%
leased as of October 2016, the same as December 2015. The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR, which has been
below 1.00X since 2012. Due to the low occupancy and DSCR, Moody's
has identified this as a troubled loan and assumed a high default
probability.


LCM XIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Class E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-R, A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from LCM XIII
L.P., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by LCM Asset Management LLC.  The replacement
notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 16, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, specifies the below amendments:

   -- The transaction will issue additional class X-R notes and
      remove the existing combination notes.

   -- The replacement class A-R, D-R, and E-R notes are expected
      to be issued at a higher spread than the original notes.

   -- The replacement class C-R and B-R notes are expected to be
      issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

   -- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, and weighted
      average life test date will be extended 4.5 years.

   -- The maximum allowable exposure to covenant-lite loans has
      been increased from 40% to 65%, and the target par balance
      has been slightly increased.  

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)         (%)     (%)       (%)
X-R         1.75   3ML + 1.75     92.85   65.71     27.14
A-R       322.50   3ML + 1.41     68.39   65.71      2.68
B-R        52.50   3ML + 1.85     68.32   58.43      9.89
C-R        41.50   3ML + 2.70     56.11   52.91      3.21
D-R        26.00   3ML + 4.05     48.49   46.83      1.66
E-R        21.25   3ML + 7.30     39.39   37.98      1.41

Effective date
Class        Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
           (mil. $)   rate(%)          (%)     (%)       (%)
X (i)         3.25    3ML + 1.00     93.44   63.41     30.03
A           322.50    3ML + 1.30     68.54   63.41      5.14
B            52.50    3ML + 2.15     67.33   55.44     11.90
C            45.00    3ML + 2.90     53.62   49.42      4.20
D            22.50    3ML + 3.80     48.22   43.46      4.76
E            21.25    3ML + 4.85     41.74   36.58      5.17
Combination  20.00    Pass through   50.87   46.81      4.07
notes(ii)

(i) The original class X notes were paid in full.  The transaction
will issue additional class X-R notes per the refinancing.  
(ii) The combination notes' principal amount comprised $12 million
of class C and $8 million of class D note principal.  At the
effective date, the rating on the combination notes addressed
principal only.  
BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.  
3ML--Three-month LIBOR.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
supplemental indenture, to estimate future performance.  In line
with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XIII L.P./LCM XIII LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
X-R                       AAA (sf)               1.75
A-R                       AAA (sf)             322.50
B-R                       AA (sf)               52.50
C-R                       A (sf)                41.50
D-R                       BBB (sf)              26.00
E-R                       BB-(sf)               21.25
Subordinated notes        NR                    52.00

NR--Not rated.


LCM XXIII: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to LCM XXIII
Ltd./LCM XXIII LLC's $369.50 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 6,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XXIII Ltd./LCM XXIII LLC

Class                Rating            Amount
                                     (mil. $)
X                    AAA (sf)            2.00
A-1                  AAA (sf)          247.00
A-2                  AA (sf)            53.00
B (deferrable)       A (sf)             32.00
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)           20.00
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)            15.50
Subordinated notes   NR                 38.10

NR--Not rated.


MARANON LOAN 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to eight classes of debt
issued by Maranon Loan Funding 2016-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"Maranon 2016-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$89,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Loans maturing in
      2027 (the "Class A-1 Loans"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$75,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
      2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$20,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$23,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$7,000,000 Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027 (the "Class E-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- US$17,400,000 Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027 (the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Loans, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E-1
Notes and the Class E-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Debt."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected losses posed
to debtholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on
the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Maranon 2016-1 is a managed cash flow SME CLO. The issued debt is
collateralized primarily by middle market first lien senior secured
corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 5%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans or senior
unsecured loans. We expect the portfolio to be approximately 63%
ramped as of the closing date.

Maranon Capital, L.P. (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may not reinvest.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $300,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 29

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3350

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.95%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3350 to 3853)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Loans: -1

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class E-2 Notes : -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3350 to 4355)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Loans: -1

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class E-2 Notes : -1


MERLIN AVIATION: S&P Assigns Preliminary B+ Rating on Cl. C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Merlin
Aviation Holdings DAC's $250.8 million series A, B, and C
fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by aircraft and their related leases, and shares or beneficial
interests in entities that directly and indirectly receive aircraft
portfolio lease rental and residual cash flows, among others.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 16,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The likelihood of timely interest on the class A notes
      (excluding the step-up amount) on each payment date,
      ultimate interest on the class B and C notes (excluding the
      step-up amount), and ultimate principal payment on the class

      A, B, and C notes on the legal final maturity at the
      respective rating stress.

   -- The collateral pool, which is expected to consist of 18 in-
      production passenger planes (eight A320-200, eight B737-800,

      and two B737-700).

   -- The 63.2% loan-to-value (LTV; based on the lower of the mean

      and median (LMM) of the aircraft half-life base values and
      half-life current market values) ratio for the class A
      notes, the 70.8% LTV on the class B notes, and the 75.9% LTV

      for the class C notes.

   -- The 14.5-year weighted average age of the mid-life aircraft
      collateral portfolio, which is older than that associated
      with most of the recent transactions rated by S&P Global
      Ratings.

   -- ACG Leasing Ireland's demonstrated aircraft servicing
      ability.  ACG Leasing Ireland has made a preliminary exit
      plan for each aircraft after the existing leases mature
      through extension, re-leasing, and sale.

   -- The existing and future lessees' estimated credit quality
      and diversification.  The 18 aircraft are currently leased
      to 17 airlines in 16 countries, many of the initial lessees
      have low credit quality, and approximately 63.4% of lessees
      (by aircraft value) are domiciled in emerging markets.  
      Three of the 18 aircraft are leased to flag carriers
      internationally.

   -- Each class' scheduled amortization profile, which is
      approximately 13 year amortization to zero for the class A
      notes and approximately seven-year amortization to zero for
      the class B and C notes.

   -- The transaction's debt service coverage ratios, utilization
      trigger, and lease expiration trigger--a failure of which
      will result in the class A, B, and C notes' turbo
      amortization.

   -- Additional principal amounts to pay down the class A notes
      in year six and seven.  Specifically, in year six of the
      transaction, 25% of remaining available collections after
      the payment of expenses, interest on the class A notes,
      liquidity facility obligations, replenishment of the
      maintenance reserve, principal on the class A notes,
      disposition shortfall amounts, and interest and principal on

      the class B notes will be used to pay additional principal
      on the class A notes.  In year seven, 50% of available
      collections remaining will be used to pay additional
      principal on the class A notes.  The subordination of class
      B and C principal and interest to the class A interest and
      principal.

   -- A revolving credit facility that MUFG Securities EMEA PLC
      will provide, which is available to cover senior expenses,
      including hedge payments and interest on the class A notes.
      At closing, the commitment amount will be $25 million.  The
      maximum commitment amount will decrease as the notes
      amortize, but will have a floor of 18 months interest on the

      class A notes.

   -- The junior liquidity reserve, which will be funded at
      closing with note proceeds in an amount equal to six months
      interest on the class B notes.  Amounts on deposit may be
      used to pay interest on the class B notes and principal on
      the class B notes at stated maturity.

   -- ICF's provided maintenance analysis prior to closing, which
      is expected to provide maintenance analysis yearly after
      closing.

   -- The senior indemnification (capped at $10 million), which is

      modeled to occur in the first 12 months.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC

Class       Rating            Amount
                            (mil. $)

A           A- (sf)            209.0
B           BBB- (sf)           25.1
C           B+ (sf)             16.7


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. IO Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes,
upgraded the ratings on two classes and remained the ratings on two
classes under review for possible upgrade in Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL
as follows:

   -- Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
      Possible Upgrade; previously on Jan 28, 2016 Upgraded to A2
      (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remains On Review for
      Possible Upgrade; previously on Jan 28, 2016 Upgraded to Ba3
  
      (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. IO, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I Classes A-PO, B, and C were affirmed due to the
sufficiency of the credit support level and the transaction's key
metric, the weighted average rating factor (WARF), being within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I Classes D and E were upgraded because of
increased credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The pool has paid down 17% since the last review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes D and E remain on review for
possible upgrade due to the possible upgrade of Rite Aid
Corporation, whose credit backs a sizeable share of this
transaction. Due to the potential acquisition of Rite Aid
Corporation (Moody's Senior Unsecured Rating B3/Caa1, Rating Under
Review for Possible Upgrade) by Walgreen Co. (Moody's Senior
Unsecured Rating Baa2, Rating Under Review for Possible Downgrade),
and a subsequent possible improvement in the Rite Aid Corporation
credit, the CTL weighted average rating factor (WARF) may be
positively affected. This may be credit positive for these two
classes.

The rating on the IO Class was affirmed due to the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a higher
dark loan to value. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease
Financings" published in October 2016.

DESCRIPTION OF MODEL USED

Moody's used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model to generate a portfolio loss distribution to
assess the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 77% to $147 million
from $630 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 82 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool. Sixty-three of the loans are CTL loans
secured by properties leased to eight corporate credits. Nineteen
loans, representing 31% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans currently in special servicing. Twenty-one loans
have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $38 million (56% loss severity on average). Due to
realized losses, Classes G, H, J and K have been wiped out and
Class F has experienced a 37% principal loss.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($42.5
million -- 28.9% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: B3/Caa1 --
on review for possible upgrade), Georgia Power Company ($27.8
million -- 18.9% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: A3 -- stable
outlook), and Kroger Co. (The) ($13.5 million -- 9.2% of the pool;
senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook). The bottom-dollar
WARF for this pool is 1974 compared to 2108 at the last review.
WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse
credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


MERRILL LYNCH 2008-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. M Certs to 'Dsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed 17 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust (MLMT) series 2008-C1, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect increased loss expectations.  The downgrade
to class M is a result of incurred losses.  Fitch modeled losses of
12.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 9.8%, including $33.1 million (3.5% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date.  As of the November 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 48.9% to $485.1 million from $948.8 million at issuance.
Eight loans (6.9% of pool), including one of the top 15 loans
(2.5%), are fully defeased as of November 2016. Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting classes L through T.

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 19 Fitch Loans of Concern
(33.5%), including five (20.2%) of the top 15 loans and three
(4.7%) specially serviced loans.  The three largest drivers to
Fitch losses are the Fort Office Portfolio (9.9%), Landmark Towers
(3.3%) and Ashley Overlook (2.9%) due to high rollover concerns and
weak office markets.

Pool Concentrations: Loan maturities are concentrated in 2017 (73%)
and 2018 (25%).  Eleven loans representing 20.7% of the pool are
full-term interest only.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for classes A4 and A-1A remain Stable as credit
enhancement remains high.  Negative Rating Outlooks for classes AM
and below indicate downgrades are possible should loss expectations
increase, particularly if larger loans with significant rollover
have difficult re-leasing.

Fitch has downgraded these classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $41.8 million class AJ to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised

      to Negative from Stable;
   -- $3.7 million class AJ-A to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      revised to Negative from Stable;
   -- $2.2 million class AJ-AF to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      revised to Negative from Stable;
   -- $11.9 million class C to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $1.3 million class M to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Outlooks as indicated:


   -- $221 million class A4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $338.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $71.2 million class AM at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $6.3 million class AM-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $10.7 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- $8.3 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $8.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $9.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $9.5 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
   -- $10.7 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $11.9 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $10.7 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.
   -- $8.3 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-SB, A-1AF and AM-AF certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class T certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: S&P Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2007-IQ16, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
seven other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-MA, and A-MFL
to reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral and
available liquidity support.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.61 billion, which is 62.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 168 loans and three real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 234 loans at issuance.  Six of
these assets ($40.8 million, 2.5%) are with the special servicer,
16 ($186.8 million, 11.6%) are defeased, and 49
($514.0 million, 31.8%) are on the master servicers' combined
watchlist.  The master servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC,, and National Cooperative Bank N.A.,
together reported financial information for 90.0% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 15.3% was partial-year 2016
data, 82.0% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was year-end
2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.24x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 88.9% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.49% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the six specially serviced
assets, 16 defeased loans, and three ($889,248; 0.1%) loans secured
by cooperative housing properties.  The top 10 nondefeased loans
have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $664.5 million
(41.2%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers, we calculated a
S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.21x and
92.2%, respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $217.8 million in
principal losses, or 8.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
six specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Nov. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, six assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC. Details
of the two largest specially serviced assets are :

   -- The Danbrook Realty Portfolio Roll-Up loan ($11.1 million,
      0.7%) has a total reported exposure of $14.8 million.  The
      loan is secured by two retail properties totaling 187,416
      sq. ft. in Barkhamsted, Conn. and Meriden, Conn.  The loan
      was transferred to the special servicer in 2012 because of
      payment default.  Of the two properties that currently
      secure the loan, the special servicer stated that there is
      an environmental issue at the Mallory Brook property located

      in Barkhamstead.  The loan was offered through auction in
      September and October 2015, but did not trade.  The reported

      occupancy as of year-end 2015 was 90.0%.  An appraisal
      reduction amount (ARA) of $9.1 million is in effect against
      this loan.  S&P expects a significant loss upon this loan's
      eventual resolution.

   -- The Peninsula Corporate Center loan ($9.0 million, 0.6%) has

      a total reported exposure of $11.2 million.  The loan is
      secured by a 45,803-sq.-ft. suburban office building in Boca

      Raton, Fla.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer in February 2014 for payment default.  The special
      servicer stated that it filed for foreclosure in March 2014,

      and foreclosure litigation is ongoing.  An ARA of
      $4.2 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a
      moderate loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The four remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 0.5% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 55.0%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
Commercial mortgage pass through certificates series 2007-IQ16
                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                  From
A-1A              61756UAB7       AAA (sf)            AA+ (sf)
A-4               61756UAE1       AAA (sf)            AA+ (sf)
A-M               61756UAF8       A (sf)              BBB (sf)
A-MFL             61756UBE0       A (sf)              BBB (sf)
A-MA              61756UAG6       A (sf)              BBB (sf)
A-J               61756UAH4       B (sf)              B (sf)
A-JFX                             B (sf)              B (sf)
A-JA              61756UAJ0       B (sf)              B (sf)
B                 61756UAN1       B- (sf)             B- (sf)
C                 61756UAP6       B- (sf)             B- (sf)
D                 61756UAQ4       CCC (sf)            CCC (sf)
X-1               61756UAK7       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Reviews B Rating on Cl. B Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited placed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP25 (the Certificates)
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Series 2007-TOP25 as
follows:

   -- Class X at AAA (sf), Under Review with Developing
      Implications

   -- Class A-M at AA (sf), Under Review with Developing
      Implications

   -- Class A-J at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
      Implications

   -- Class B at B (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

   -- Class C at CCC (sf), Under Review with Developing
      Implications

DBRS has placed all classes Under Review with Developing
Implications due to the significant upcoming scheduled loan
maturities. Nine of the 21 loans remaining in the pool as of the
December 2016 remittance, representing 79.4% of the current pool
balance, have scheduled maturities in January 2017. The most
recently reported 2016 annualized cash flows for the seven
non-defeased loans maturing in January 2017 exhibit exit debt
yields ranging between 7.32% and 26.22%, with a weighted-average of
9.91%. DBRS will continue to monitor the transaction and assess the
progress of the maturing loans toward successful repayment and
expects to provide an updated rating assessment following receipt
of the January 2017 remittance.

As of the December 2016 remittance, the trust has a current balance
of $212.2 million, representing collateral reduction of 87.8% since
issuance due to scheduled loan amortization, loan repayments and
realized losses experienced to date. Four loans have been
liquidated from the trust in the past 12 months, with loss
severities that ranged from 41.6% to 64.2%. Total cumulative
realized losses from loan liquidations of $95.9 million have risen
up the capital stack into Class D. Three loans (representing 27.5%
of the current pool balance) are fully defeased, including the
second-largest loan.

Four loans (representing 11.6% of the current pool balance) are
currently in special servicing, the largest of which, Romeoville
Towne Center (Prospectus ID#16; 8.8% of the pool balance), is
current and has a scheduled maturity in January 2017. In addition,
two loans (3.1% of the pool balance) are past their maturity dates
and are considered non-performing matured balloon loans. Nine loans
(representing 49.2% of the current pool balance) are on the
servicer's watchlist, the majority of which have been flagged for
upcoming loan maturities.


MRFC MORTGAGE 2000-TBC2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-5 Debt Rating to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eleven
tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2000-TBC2

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2000
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2000 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2000
Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 15, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-1A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-1B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 15, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools, Moody's updated loss expectation on the bonds and
on related pools, and bond specific credit enhancement in the
transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

The methodology used in rating interest-only securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


NATIONSLINK FUNDING 1999-LTL1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X Cert
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class in
NationsLink Funding Corporation, Commercial Loan Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-LTL-1 as:

  Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of its
referenced classes.  The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.2% of the
current balance, compared to 5.3% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes.  An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes.  An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest.  Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation.  Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

                METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant
Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in October 2016.

                        DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's also used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its CDO
rating model CDOROM, to generate a portfolio loss distribution to
assess the ratings for a pool of CTL ratings.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 22, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to
$47.3 million from $492.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by sixty-two mortgage loans ranging
in size from less than 1% to 11.7% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 65% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan,
representing 7.1% of the pool that has an investment grade
structured credit assessment.

Three loans, representing 2.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.2 million (22% loss severity on
average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2015 operating results for 100%
of the pool (excluding defeased, CTL, and specially serviced loan),
respectively.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 21% compared
to 22% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially
serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.52X and 11.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 8.37X at prior review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Broadway at the
Beach Loan ($3.3 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by
a 343,000 square foot entertainment retail complex located in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.  The property includes specialty
shops, restaurants and tourist attractions.  The loan is fully
amortizing and has paid down over 93% since securitization. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to aaa (sca.pd) and >4.00X at
last review.

The top conduit loans represent 4.5% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the MHC Portfolio Loan ($1.2 million -- 2.6% of the
pool), which is secured by the following four properties located in
Connecticut and New Hampshire: Beechwood Manufactured Housing
Community, Crestwood Manufactured Housing Community, Forest Hill
Manufactured Housing Community and Farmwood Manufactured Housing
Community.  The loans are fully amortizing and have paid down over
86% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 6% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 9% and >4.00X at prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza Galeria Loan ($861 thousand --
1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a retail center located in
the historic old town plaza area of Santa Fe, New Mexico.  As of
September 2016, the property was 73% leased, compared to 71% the
prior year.  Performance dropped in 2015 as a number of new tenants
were signed throughout that year; performance is expected to
rebound.  The loan is fully amortizing and has paid down over 84%
since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and
2.86X, respectively, relatively unchanged from the prior review.

The CTL component consists of 56 loans, totaling 89% of the pool,
secured by properties leased to 16 tenants.  The largest exposures
are Delhaize America LLC ($8.6 million -- 20.7% of the pool; senior
unsecured rating: Baa2 -- Positive outlook) and Rite Aid
Corporation ($7.9 million -- 18.8% of the pool; backed senior
unsecured rating: Caa1 -- Ratings Under Review).  Fourteen of the
tenants have a Moody's rating.  The bottom-dollar weighted average
rating factor (WARF) for this pool is 1,846 compared to 1,452 at
last review.  WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within the pool.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-4: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2016-4 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4 (the Trust):

   -- $209.7 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-2 at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)

   -- $7.3 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

   -- $6.3 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

In addition, DBRS has assigned new ratings to the following Notes
issued by the Trust:

   -- $209.7 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)

   -- $209.7 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)

   -- $219.0 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-1B at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-1C at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B1-IOC at AA (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-2A at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-2B at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B-2C at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B2-IOA at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B2-IOB at A (sf)

   -- $9.4 million Class B2-IOC at A (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)

   -- $6.5 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B3-IOA, B3-IOB and B3-IOC
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B2-IOA,
B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B3-IOA, B3-IOB and B3-IOC Notes
are exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of initial exchangeable notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 20.55% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 17.00%,
13.45%, 11.00%, 8.25% and 5.85% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 2,237 loans with a total principal balance of
$263,910,247 as of the Cut-Off Date (November 1, 2016).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted-average age of
154 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 91.8% of the pool is current,
6.5% is 30 days delinquent and 1.7% is in bankruptcy (all
bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 66.8% and 76.5% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent for the past 24 months and 12 months,
respectively, under both the Office of Thrift Supervision and
Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency methods. The portfolio
contains 37.0% modified loans. The modifications happened more than
two years ago for 71.5% of the modified loans. Because of the
seasoning of the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC (NRZ), will acquire the loans on or
prior to the Closing Date in connection with the termination of
various securitization trusts that had acquired the mortgage loans
from various underlying sellers. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2016-4 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute loans to the
Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp., through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than the residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 82.6% of the pool is serviced by Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 15.3% by Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and
2.1% by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC. Nationstar will also act as
the Master Servicer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.


Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance and title/lien but was limited with
respect to payment history, data integrity and servicing comments.
Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions were provided
for the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed on the
majority of updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.



OHA CREDIT VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement floating-rate notes from
OHA Credit Partners VII Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in 2012 that is managed by Oak Hill
Advisors L.P.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 15, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

   -- Extend the reinvestment period to November 2020 from
      November 2016.

   -- Extend the non-call period to November 2018 from November
      2014.

   -- Extend the legal final maturity date of the rated notes to
      November 2027 from November 2023.

   -- Extend the weighted average life test (used for trading
      purposes) to eight years calculated from the Dec. 15, 2016,
      refinancing date from eight years calculated from the
      original closing date, November 2012.

   -- Adopt the non-model version of the CDO Monitor application.

   -- Adopt the recovery rate methodology and S&P industry
      classifications as outlined in S&P's August 2016 corporate
      CDO criteria update.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

Replacement Notes
Class               Amount     Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate
A-R                 461.00     LIBOR + 1.42%
B-R                 102.00     LIBOR + 1.90%
C-R                  54.00     LIBOR + 2.65%
D-R                  38.50     LIBOR + 4.25%
E-R                  36.00     LIBOR + 7.50%
Subordinated notes   74.00

Original Notes
Class               Amount     Interest  
                   (mil. $)    rate
A                   461.00     LIBOR + 1.42%
B-1                  87.00     LIBOR + 2.25%
B-2                  15.00     3.5501%
C-1                  34.00     LIBOR + 3.25%
C-2                  20.00     4.6216%
D                    38.50     LIBOR + 4.00%
E                    36.00     LIBOR + 5.00%
Subordinated notes   74.00

There is no change anticipated to the balance on the subordinated
notes in connection with this proposed refinancing.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OHA Credit Partners VII Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             461.00
B-R                       AA (sf)              102.00
C-R                       A (sf)                54.00
D-R                       BBB (sf)              38.50
E-R                       BB- (sf)              36.00
Subordinated notes        NR                    74.00

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

OHA Credit Partners VII Ltd.
Class                     Rating
A                         AAA (sf)
B-1                       AA (sf)
B-2                       AA (sf)
C-1                       A (sf)
C-2                       A (sf)
D                         BBB (sf)
E                         BB (sf)


OHA CREDIT XIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes to be issued by OHA Credit Partners XIII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
   Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  $256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  $7,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $36,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $18,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  $11,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  $16,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $22,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the
Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

OHA Credit Partners XIII is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to
be approximately 50% ramped as of the closing date.

Oak Hill Advisors, L.P. (the Manager) will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

  Par amount: $400,000,000
  Diversity Score: 55
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2830
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The prinicipal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2830 to 3255)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B-1 Notes: -2
  Class B-2 Notes: -2
  Class C-1 Notes: -2
  Class C-2 Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2830 to 3679)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B-1 Notes: -3
  Class B-2 Notes: -3
  Class C-1 Notes: -3
  Class C-2 Notes: -3
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1



OZLM FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from OZLM Funding
III Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued
in 2013 that is managed by Och-Ziff Loan Management L.P.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 15, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

   -- Extend the stated maturity/reinvestment period/non-call
      period by four years; and

   -- Extend the weighted average life test.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P's review of this transaction also relied in part upon a
criteria interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third
Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global
Rating Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a
limited number of public ratings from other nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.  The criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of
corporate assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the
interpretation outlines treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OZLM Funding III Ltd./OZLM Funding III LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)    396.500
A-2-R                     AA (sf)     78.875
B-R                       A (sf)      47.375
C-R                       BBB (sf)    30.500
D-R                       BB (sf)     30.000
Subordinated notes        NR          70.000

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

OZLM Funding III Ltd./OZLM Funding III LLC
Class                     Rating
A-1                       AAA (sf)
A-2A                      AA+ (sf)
A-2B                      AA+ (sf)
B                         A+ (sf)
C                         BBB (sf)
D                         BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1999-NRF1: Moody's Affirms Ca on K Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corporation 1999-NRF1,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-NRF1
as:

  Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)

  Cl. A-EC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the remaining P&I class was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses.  Class K has already experienced a 50% realized loss as
result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, unchanged from Moody's last review.  Moody's does
not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment.  However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance.  Moody's ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.3% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $1.67 million
from $928.92 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

One loan, constituting 17% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $29.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 50% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 27%, compared to 28%
at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 13.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.23X and 5.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.66X and 4.83X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Westchester Gardens Loan ($1.39 million --
82.9% of the pool), which is secured by a rehabilitation care
center in Safety Harbor, Florida.  As of March 2015, the property
was 94% leased.  Performance increased in 2015 due to revenue
increasing while expense remained flat.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 29% and 4.96X, respectively, compared to 36% and 4.03X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Crescent Heights Plaza Loan ($285
thousand -- 17.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 20,000 square
foot unanchored retail property located in West Hollywood,
California.  The loan is on the watch-list as the borrower has been
non-compliant with providing operating statements. U pdated
financials have not been received since 2013.  The borrower has not
missed a debt-service payment.  The loan has amortized over 83%
since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 15% and
7.85X, respectively, compared to 22% and 5.48X at the last review.


SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C3: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one
interest-only class of Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2000-C3 as
follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced class. The IO class is the
only outstanding Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 22.3% of the
current balance, compared to 21.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 19, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $14.9 million
from $915 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans. One loan, representing 2% of
the pool has defeased and is secured by US Government securities.
There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of approximately $49 million (26% loss
severity on average). Two loans, representing 91% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The two specially serviced loans are the
A-Note and B-Note for the Granite State Marketplace Loan, which was
previously modified to include an A/B note split. The A-Note is
$10.3 million (representing 69% of the pool) and the B-Note is $3.3
million (representing 22% of the pool). The mortgage loan is
secured by a 250,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail center
located in Hooksett, New Hampshire. The loan originally transferred
to special servicing in September 2008 for maturity default and a
loan modification was subsequently executed that included a note
split and maturity date extension. The loan did not pay off at the
extended maturity date in November 2012 and the asset is currently
real estate owned (REO). As of June 2016, the property was 79%
occupied, the same as at last review

Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.3 million loss for a specially
serviced loan (100% expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2015 and partial year 2016
operating results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 84%. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 23% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.02X and 1.46X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

There are two performing non-defeased loans that represent 9% of
the pool balance. Both loans are fully amortizing. The largest loan
is the K-Mart Shopping Center -- Salt Lake City Loan ($885,500 --
6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant retail
center located in Murray, Utah. The property is 100% leased to the
Kmart Corporation until May 2020. Given the single tenant exposure
of this property, Moody's applied a lit dark analysis for this
asset. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 32% and 3.20X,
respectively, compared to 30% and 3.46X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Edgewood Apartments Loan
($156,678 -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-unit
multifamily property in Duluth, Minnesota, approximately 160 miles
north of Minneapolis. The property was 100% leased as of September
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 14% and >4.00X,
respectively, compared to 20% and >4.00X at last review.



SLM STUDENT 2003-12: Fitch Cuts Class B Notes Rating to 'BBsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2003-12:

   -- Class A-5 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Negative;

   -- Class A-6 downgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Negative;

   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Although Fitch's cash flow model indicated a higher rating for the
class A-5 and A-6 notes, the downgrade to 'AAsf' is due to the
counterparty risk introduced by the cross-currency swap. Swap
documents do not contemplate swap counterparty replacement, or the
appointment of a guarantor following the downgrade of the swap
counterparty below minimum ratings expected by Fitch's counterparty
criteria. Fitch believes that counterparty replacement, or the
appointment of a guarantor, are the only viable longer term options
for a counterparty of a continuation type derivative with
deteriorating creditworthiness. The assessment of the materiality
of the inconsistencies against any available mitigants, which
included sufficient collateral posting and replacement provisions
delinked from Fitch's ratings, suggested that contractual
provisions could support ratings up to 'AAsf'.

The downgrade of the class B notes is because the bonds did not
pass Fitch's 'BBBsf' credit stress scenario.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest. Fitch's U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Stable
Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
13.25% and a 39.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 13.25% implies a
constant default rate of 2.4% (assuming a weighted average life of
15.2 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 4.7%, 8.3%, 11.1% and 8.5%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.21%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization, excess spread and, for the class A notes,
subordination. As of September 2016, total and senior effective
parity ratios (which include the reserve account) are,
respectively, 100.45% (0.45% CE) and 105.28% (5.0% CE). Liquidity
support is provided by a reserve account sized at the greater of
0.25% of the pool balance, and $3,759,518. Excess cash will
continue to be released as long as 100% parity is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final maturity
dates under the commensurate rating scenario.

Operational Capabilities: Fitch believes Navient to be an
acceptable servicer, due to its extensive track record as the
largest servicer of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

Swap documents for SLM 2003-12 do not contemplate any counterparty
replacement, or the appointment of a guarantor, following downgrade
of the swap counterparty below the minimum ratings expected by
Fitch's counterparty criteria. In addition, collateralisation
criteria are broadly in line with Fitch's expectation, in spite of
lower volatility cushions than expected and no adjustments for
liquidity and FX risk in collateral valuation. Fitch assessed the
materiality of the inconsistencies against the available mitigants,
which included sufficient collateral posting, and concluded that
contractual provisions can support ratings up to 'AAsf'; this
represents a criteria variation from Fitch's counterparty criteria
to take into account the partial compliance of the swap documents
with Fitch's criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBsf';

   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBsf';

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B
      'BBsf';

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B
      'BBsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBsf';

   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBBsf';

   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBBsf';

   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBsf'.

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


SOFI MORTGAGE 2016-1: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating on Cl. B4 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1 (the Certificates) issued
by SoFi Mortgage Trust Series 2016-1 (the Trust) as follows:

   -- $124.0 million Class 1A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $124.0 million Class 1A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- $124.0 million Class 1A-2X at AAA (sf)

   -- $112.1 million Class 1A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- $112.1 million Class 1A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- $112.1 million Class 1A-4X at AAA (sf)

   -- $84.1 million Class 1A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- $84.1 million Class 1A-6 at AAA (sf)

   -- $84.1 million Class 1A-6X at AAA (sf)

   -- $28.0 million Class 1A-7 at AAA (sf)

   -- $28.0 million Class 1A-8 at AAA (sf)

   -- $28.0 million Class 1A-8X at AAA (sf)

   -- $11.8 million Class 1A-M at AAA (sf)

   -- $11.8 million Class 1A-MF at AAA (sf)

   -- $11.8 million Class 1A-MI at AAA (sf)

   -- $34.6 million Class 2A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $34.6 million Class 2A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- $34.6 million Class 2A-2X at AAA (sf)
  
   -- $31.3 million Class 2A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- $31.3 million Class 2A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- $31.3 million Class 2A-4X at AAA (sf)

   -- $23.5 million Class 2A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- $23.5 million Class 2A-6 at AAA (sf)

   -- $23.5 million Class 2A-6X at AAA (sf)

   -- $7.8 million Class 2A-7 at AAA (sf)

   -- $7.8 million Class 2A-8 at AAA (sf)

   -- $7.8 million Class 2A-8X at AAA (sf)

   -- $3.3 million Class 2A-M at AAA (sf)

   -- $3.3 million Class 2A-MF at AAA (sf)

   -- $3.3 million Class 2A-MI at AAA (sf)

   -- $15.1 million Class A-M at AAA (sf)
   
   -- $4.0 million Class B1 at AA (sf)

   -- $2.4 million Class B2 at A (sf)

   -- $1.2 million Class B3 at BBB (sf)

   -- $928.0 thousand Class B4 at BB (sf)

   -- $760.0 thousand Class B5 at B (sf)

Classes 1A-2X, 1A-4X, 1A-6X, 1A-8X, 1A-MI, 2A-2X, 2A-4X, 2A-6X,
2A-8X and 2A-MI are interest-only certificates. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes 1A-1, 1A-2, 1A-2X, 1A-3, 1A-4, 1A-4X, 1A-5, 1A-7, 1A-M,
2A-1, 2A-2, 2A-2X, 2A-3, 2A-4, 2A-4X, 2A-5, 2A-7, 2A-M and A-M are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a
combination of depositable certificates as specified in the
offering documents.

Classes 1A-3, 1A-4, 1A-4X, 1A-5, 1A-6, 1A-6X, 1A-7, 1A-8, 1A-8X,
2A-3, 2A-4, 2A-4X, 2A-5, 2A-6, 2A-6X, 2A-7, 2A-8 and 2A-8X are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Classes 1A-M, 1A-MF,
2A-M, 2A-MF and A-M) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the certificates reflect 6.05% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
transaction. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf)
ratings reflect 3.70%, 2.30%, 1.60%, 1.05% and 0.60% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 270 loans with a total principal balance of $168,790,946
as of the Cut-off Date (December 1, 2016).

The loans are divided into two pools. Pool 1 consists of fully
amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with original terms to
maturity of 30 years, while Pool 2 consists of fully amortizing
FRMs with original terms to maturity of 15 years.

The loans were originated by SoFi Lending Corp. (SoFi) and are
serviced by Cenlar FSB (Cenlar). CitiMortgage, Inc. (CitiMortgage)
will act as the Master Servicer, and Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) will
act as the Securities Administrator. Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as Trustee, and Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company will act as the custodian.

SoFi is a wholly owned subsidiary of Social Finance, Inc. (SFI)
that is headquartered in San Francisco. Founded in 2011, SoFi is a
premium financial services platform with a unique branding and
marketing strategy that targets creditworthy early career
professionals, principally from graduate schools and top tier
undergraduate schools. SoFi began making refinanced student loans
in 2012, and as of the date of this report, SoFi has issued 12
rated term student loan ABS transactions, all of which have been
rated by DBRS. Performance of these securitizations has been
satisfactory to date.

SoFi’s focused consumer base along with the company’s
geographic location contributes to a heavy concentration of
borrowers within California (77.5% of the SOFI 2016-1 pool) and
particularly the San Francisco Bay Area (57.3%).

SoFi underwrites loans using traditional guidelines, while also
considering alternative data such as a borrower’s Free Cash Flow.
SoFi began originating mortgage loans in March 2014 and has
experienced one 60+ day delinquency to date.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.
Pool 1 and Pool 2 senior certificates will be backed by collateral
from each pool, respectively. The subordinate certificates will be
cross-collateralized between the two pools. This is generally known
as Y-Structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

The Originator has made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans. The enforcement mechanism for
breaches of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a
third-party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and
resolution of disputes may ultimately be subject to determination
in an arbitration proceeding.

DBRS views the representations and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with previous DBRS-rated prime jumbo
transactions; however, the Originator, an unrated entity, may
potentially experience financial stress that could result in its
inability to fulfill repurchase obligations. To capture the above
perceived weakness, DBRS adjusted the originator score downward.
Such an adjustment (and consequent increases in default and loss
rates) is to account for the Originator’s potential inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations.


SOFI MORTGAGE 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class B-5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate SoFi Mortgage Trust 2016-1 (SFPMT
2016-1) as follows:

   -- $123,952,000 class 1A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $123,952,000 class 1A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $112,144,000 class 1A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $112,144,000class 1A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $84,108,000 class 1A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $84,108,000class 1A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $28,036,000 class 1A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $28,036,000 class 1A-8 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11,808,000 class 1A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11,808,000 class 1A-MF certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook     
      Stable;

   -- $34,626,000 class 2A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $34,626,000 class 2A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,328,000 class 2A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,328,000 class 2A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,496,000 class 2A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,496,000 class 2A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,832,000 class 2A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,832,000 class 2A-8 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $3,298,000 class 2A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $3,298,000 class 2A-MF certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15,106,000 class A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $123,952,000 class 1A-2X notional exchangeable certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $112,144,000 class 1A-4X notional exchangeable certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $84,108,000 class 1A-6X notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $28,036,000 class 1A-8X notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $11,808,000 class 1A-MI notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $34,626,000 class 2A-2X notional exchangeable certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,328,000 class 2A-4X notional exchangeable certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,496,000class 2A-6X notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,832,000 class 2A-8X notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $3,298,000 class 2A-MI notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $3,967,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2,363,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1,182,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $928,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $760,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

   -- $1,012,946 class B-6 certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral attributes of
the pool are among the strongest of those securitized and rated by
Fitch. The collateral pool consists of high-quality 15- and 30-year
fully amortizing loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles,
low leverage and adequate liquid reserves. The pool has a weighted
average (WA) FICO score of 777 and an original combined
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 56.5%.

Geographically Concentrated Pool (Concern): The pool has a
relatively low number of loans (270) and is heavily concentrated in
California (78%). Concentration penalties and adjustments based on
deterministic tests resulted in roughly a 2.0x increase to the
mortgage pool loss assumptions.

New Lender (Neutral): SoFi is an online financial services provider
that began mortgage loan originations in 2014. Applications are
sourced exclusively through its online retail platform using a
proprietary automated underwriting system (AUS) imbedded into the
company's website. While originally rooted as a marketplace or
peer-to-peer lender, SoFi's funding strategy has evolved to more
traditional sources and is currently not materially different from
many other mortgage originators. Based on a satisfactory
operational assessment and a 100% due diligence review, Fitch
believes industry historical data can be used as a reliable proxy
to analyze the credit risk of the pool.

Earthquake Risk (Concern): The pool has a high concentration of
borrowers in areas that are susceptible to large-scale earthquakes.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates the chance of a 6.7 magnitude
(or greater) earthquake occurring within the next 10 years to be
roughly 15% for the area within 50 kilometers of the most
concentrated zip code in the pool. Based on the historical
experience of loans affected by the Northridge earthquake in 1994,
Fitch believes investment grade classes will likely be protected
against a similarly sized earthquake due to increased credit
enhancement and the unusually strong credit quality of the
borrowers.

Solid Due Diligence Results (Positive): Loan-level due diligence
reviews were conducted on 100% of the pool in accordance with
Fitch's criteria. Roughly 15% of the loans received an 'A' grade
and the remainder were graded 'B'. The 123 loans were assigned a
grade 'B' due to nonmaterial credit findings, such as initial
applications with missing/incorrect detail and mortgage history
exceptions. All of these loans contained compensating factors such
as large reserves, low LTV, low DTIs and high FICOs. In Fitch's
view, the results of the diligence indicate acceptable controls and
adherence to underwriting guidelines.

Tier I Representation and Warranty Framework (Neutral): Fitch
considers the transaction's representation, warranty and
enforcement (RW&E) mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I
quality. While transactions with a framework identified by Fitch as
Tier I may benefit from a reduction to PD to reflect lower default
risk due to strong repurchase framework, no credit is being applied
to the transaction due to the financial opinion of the originator
as rep provider.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest Y structure with full cross collateralization,
whereby the subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal
and are locked out from receiving unscheduled principal or
prepayments for five years. The lockout feature helps maintain
subordination for a longer period should losses occur later in the
life of the deal. The applicable credit support percentage feature
redirects subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if
specified credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

High CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as
the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination
floor of 2.25% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates. The 2.25% floor is one of the larger floors, on a
percentage basis, seen in recent Fitch-rated transactions.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

The transaction was analyzed with a variation to the standard loss
assumptions described in Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria' report. While the loan attributes included in this pool
are well represented by the historical dataset that was used to
regress the U.S. RMBS Loan Loss model, the pool is
disproportionately concentrated with loans having superior credit
attributes where the model's data set is more widely distributed
across the credit spectrum. As a result, the model output may be
slightly underestimating the default probability for these loans.
To account for this risk, the loss assumptions floored the
loan-level model output default probability at 5% at 'AAAsf' down
to 1% at 'BBsf' and no floor at 'Bsf'. The result of this variation
likely resulted in loss assumptions two notches higher than what
would have been the case from model only output.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Three sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes market value declines of 10%, 20% and 30%, in
addition to the model-projected 6.9%. The analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Clayton Holdings LLC (Clayton). The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on a compliance review,
credit review and valuation review. The due diligence companies
performed a review on 100% of the loans. Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and it did not have an effect on
Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch believes the overall results
of the review generally reflected strong underwriting controls.





SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: S&P Rates Class D Notes 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Springleaf Funding Trust
2016-A's $532.43 million asset-backed notes series 2016-A.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 43.9%, 37.5%, 31.7%, and
      26.7% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of S&P's 'A+ (sf)',
      'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of credit

      deterioration as equal to a two-category downgrade within
      the first year for 'A (sf)' through 'BB (sf)' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to
      be made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
      appropriate to the assigned ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- The operational risks associated with Springleaf Finance
      Corp.'s decentralized business model.

   -- The uncertainty concerning the integration of OneMain's
      operations with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s operations.  OneMain

      Holdings Inc. (formerly known as Springleaf Holdings Inc.)
      acquired OneMain from CitiFinancial Credit Co., a wholly
      owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., on Nov. 15, 2015.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Springleaf Funding Trust 2016-A
Class       Rating        Type          Amount (mil. $)
A           A+ (sf)       Senior                 422.81
B           BBB(sf)       Subordinate             45.59
C           BB (sf)       Subordinate             31.60
D           B (sf)        Subordinate             32.43


STACR 2015-DN1: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class M-3 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned ratings to the Debt Notes from four previously
issued Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) transactions as
follows:

   STACR 2015-DN1:

   -- $345.0 million Class M-3 at BB (sf)

   -- $345.0 million Class M-3F at BB (sf)

   -- $345.0 million Class M-3I at BB (sf)

   -- $478.8 million Class MA at BB (sf)

   STACR 2015-DNA3:

   -- $330.0 million Class M-3 at B (high) (sf)

   -- $330.0 million Class M-3F at B (high) (sf)

   -- $330.0 million Class M-3I at B (high) (sf)

   -- $824.5 million Class MA at B (high) (sf)

   STACR 2016-DNA3:

   -- $389.5 million Class M-3 at B (high) (sf)

   -- $199.5 million Class M-3B at B (high) (sf)

   STACR 2016-HQA1:

   -- $220.0 million Class M-3 at B (sf)

   -- $220.0 million Class M-3F at B (sf)

   -- $220.0 million Class M-3I at B (sf)

   -- $434.2 million Class MA at B (sf)

DBRS has previously assigned ratings to some other classes in the
above transactions.

STACR debt notes represent unsecured general obligations of the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). The notes are subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a certain reference pool
of residential mortgage loans held in various GSE-guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities. Reference pools are divided into
transactions based on original loan-to-value (LTV), low LTV and
high LTV.

Cash flow from the reference pools is not used to make any payments
to the noteholders; instead, the GSEs are responsible for making
monthly interest payments at the applicable note rate and periodic
principal payments on the notes based on the actual principal
payments they collect from the reference pools.

Depending on the type of issuances, note writedowns may be based on
a predetermined set of loss severities or actual realized losses.


STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by Structured
Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2008-1

  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 31, 2012,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. A21, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 31, 2012,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. A22, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are primarily due to the improving performance
and declining loss projections on the pool.  The upgrades also
reflect the faster principal payments to Class A21 owing to the
transaction's principal distributions which are allocated pro rata
among Classes A1, A2 and A3 and, within class A2, sequentially to
Class A21 and then to Class A22.  The upgrades also reflect the
additional credit enhancement provided by super senior support
classes Class A31 and Class A32 to class A2.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SYMPHONY CLO XVIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes to be issued by Symphony CLO XVIII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $310,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $70,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $28,750,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $31,250,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Symphony XVIII is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second-lien loans and unsecured
loans.  The portfolio was approximately 70% ramped as of the
closing date.

Symphony Asset Management LLC (Manager) will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-and-a-half year reinvestment
period.  Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

  Par amount: $500,000,000
  Diversity Score: 60
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2899
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2899 to 3334)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -2
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2899 to 3769)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B Notes: -3
  Class C Notes: -4
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1


TACONIC PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Taconic Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

U.S.$325,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$55,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$28,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$32,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Taconic Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1



TOWD POINT 2016-5: DBRS Rates Class B2 Notes 'B(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following Asset
Backed Securities, Series 2016-5 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2016-5 (the Trust):

   -- $349.5 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $35.3 million Class A2 at AA (sf)

DBRS has also assigned ratings to the following Notes issued by the
Trust:

   -- $30.9 million Class M1 at A (sf)

   -- $27.1 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)

   -- $23.3 million Class B1 at BB (sf)

   -- $19.5 million Class B2 at B (sf)

These rating actions are the result of DBRS applying its updated
“RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology” published in November 2016.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 35.60% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect credit
enhancement of 29.10%, 23.40%, 18.40%, 14.10% and 10.50%,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by approximately 2,498 loans with a total
principal balance of $542,736,293 as of the Cut-Off Date (November
30, 2016).

As of the Statistical Calculation Date (October 31, 2016), the
portfolio contains approximately 2,517 loans with a total principal
balance of $550,277,424. All the below statistics regarding the
mortgage loans are based on the Statistical Calculation Date. The
portfolio contains 77.8% modified loans. Within the pool, 548
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates
to 3.9% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 93.5% of the
modified loans. The loans are approximately 115 months seasoned.
The pool has 104 mortgages that have a current or prior delinquency
related to a servicing transfer. After excluding delinquencies that
may be related to servicing transfers, all loans (100.0%) were
current as of the Statistical Calculation Date, including 0.8%
bankruptcy-performing loans. Approximately 69.2% of the mortgage
loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least
the past 24 months under both the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency methods.
In accordance with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 3.0% of
the loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor, 0.5% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and 0.1% as non-QM. Approximately 96.4% of the loans
are not subject to the QM rules.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2016 and are beneficially owned by both the Responsible Party and
other funds managed by affiliates of Cerberus Capital Management,
L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the transferring trusts,
FirstKey, through a wholly owned subsidiary, Towd Point Asset
Funding, LLC, will contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor,
FirstKey, through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and
retain a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of securities
to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to satisfy the
credit risk retention requirements. These loans were originated and
previously serviced by various entities through purchases in the
secondary market. As of the Cut-Off Date, all loans are serviced by
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
non-performing loans or real estate owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. The asset
sale price has to equal a minimum reserve amount to maximize
liquidation proceeds of such loans or properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis,
strong servicers and Asset Manager oversight. Additionally, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review was performed on the
portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history
and data capture as well as title and tax review. Servicing
comments were reviewed for a sample of loans. Updated broker price
opinions or exterior appraisals were provided for 100.0% of the
pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed on the updated
values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider (FirstKey) with a backstop by an unrated
entity (Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P.), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan
representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.
Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and
relative clean performance history in recent years, (2) a
comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong representations
and warranties enforcement mechanism, including delinquency review
trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


TOWD POINT 2016-5: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns ratings to Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-5
(TPMT 2016-5) as follows:

   -- $349,522,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35,278,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $30,936,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $27,136,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,338,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19,538,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $14,654,000 class B3 notes;

   -- $21,167,000 class B4 notes;

   -- $21,167,292 class B5 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consisted of
2,498 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $542.7 million (which includes $21
million, or 3.88%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the cut-off
date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1 notes reflects the 35.60%
subordination provided by the 6.50% class A2, 5.70% class M1, 5.00%
class M2, 4.30% class B1, 3.60% class B2, 2.70% class B3, 3.90%
class B4 and 3.90% class B5 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer: Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS, rated 'RPS1-'), and the
representation (rep) and warranty framework, minimal due diligence
findings and the sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as "clean current" (71%), and loans
that have recent delinquencies or incomplete paystrings, identified
as "dirty current" (29%). Since the statistical cut-off date, a
number of loans have rolled 30 days delinquent; 77.8% of the loans
have received modifications.

Due Diligence Compliance Findings (Concern): The third-party review
(TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 10.5%
'C' and 'D' graded loans. For 61 loans, the due diligence results
showed issues regarding high cost testing - the loans were either
missing the final HUD1 or used alternate documentation to test -
and therefore a slight upward revision to the model output loss
severity (LS) was applied, as further described in the Third-Party
Due Diligence section beginning on page 6. In addition, timelines
were extended on 165 loans that were missing final modification
documents.

Servicing Transfer Risk (Concern): At the time of the initial
analysis, Fitch was notified that approximately 38% of the pool had
not yet been transferred to Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS)
and that an increase in delinquency related to the transfer was to
be expected. Fitch increased its loss expectations by 25 bps to
reflect the increase in risk. After the servicing transfer was
completed, approximately 4% of the pool is delinquent using the MBA
delinquency reporting method (0% is delinquent using the OTS
reporting method). Fitch believes the delinquency is temporary and
that the initial 25-bp increase is sufficient to mitigate the risk.


No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior class is repaid in full.
Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order. Furthermore, the
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions is
highly supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in
the absence of servicer advancing.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey), as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in January 2018.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in January 2018. If FirstKey does not
fulfill its obligation to repurchase a mortgage loan due to a
breach, Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund, L.P.
(the responsible party) will repurchase the loan.

Tier 2 Representation Framework (Concern): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism
construct for this transaction to be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. Thus, Fitch increased its
'AAAsf' loss expectations by roughly 229 bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses
in the reps.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): An
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the
relevant local jurisdiction, was also performed. Per the
representations provided in the transaction documents, all loans
have either all been recorded in the appropriate jurisdiction, are
in the process of being recorded, or will be sent for recordation
within 12 months of the closing date.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, Fitch believes that FirstKey's
oversight for completion of these activities serves as a strong
mitigant to potential delays. In addition, the obligation of
FirstKey or Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P. to repurchase loans for which assignments are not recorded and
endorsements are not completed by the payment date in January 2018,
aligns the issuer's interests regarding completing the recordation
process with those of noteholders.

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Fitch's analysis of loans that have
had clean pay histories for 24 months or more found that, for these
loans, its loan loss model projected a probability of default (PD)
that was more punitive than that indicated by actual delinquency
roll rate projections. To account for this difference, Fitch
reduced the pool's lifetime default expectations by approximately
9.3%.

Deferred Amounts (Concern): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $21.04 million (3.88%) of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 548 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): A majority-owned affiliate
of FirstKey will acquire and retain a 5% eligible vertical interest
in each class of the securities to be issued.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from the "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned and Re-performing Loan Criteria" as described below.

The variation is non-application of a default penalty to income
documentation for loans with less than full income documentation
that are over five-years seasoned. Fitch conducted analysis
comparing the performance between loans that were full
documentation and non-full documentation at origination. The
analysis showed that after five years of seasoning, the performance
was similar. The impact on the loss expectations from application
of this variation resulted in lower loss expectations of roughly
100 bps depending on the rating category.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.4% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company (WestCor), Clayton
Holdings LLC, and American Mortgage Consultants (AMC)/JCIII &
Associates, Inc. (JCIII). The third-party due diligence described
in Form 15E focused on: regulatory compliance, pay history,
servicing comments, the presence of key documents in the loan file
and data integrity. In addition, Westcor and AMC were retained to
perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a review to
confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant local
jurisdiction and the related assignment chains.

A regulatory compliance and data integrity review was completed on
100% of the pool. A pay history review was conducted on 100% of the
pool, and a servicing comment review was completed on the loans
which have experienced a delinquency in the past 12 months.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and based on the
findings, Fitch made minor adjustments to its analysis:

Fitch made an adjustment on 61 loans that were subject to federal,
state, and/or local predatory testing. These loans contained
material violations including an inability to test for high cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability. These loans were marked as
"indeterminate". Typically the HUD issues are related to missing
the Final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing
pages, or only having estimated HUDs. The final HUD1 was not used
to test for High Cost loans. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a
100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do
not purchase list of "high cost" or "high risk". Ten loans were
affected by this approach.

For the remaining 51 loans, where the properties are not located in
the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not purchase list, the
likelihood of all remaining loans being high cost is low. "However,
we assume the trust could potentially incur notable legal expenses.
Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by 5% for these
loans to account for the risk." Fitch said.

There were 165 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C15: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded one class and affirmed four
classes in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C15,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C15 as
follows:

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016
      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Downgraded

      to C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Downgraded

      to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as a significant increase
in defeasance. The pool has paid down by 31% since Moody's last
review. In addition, defeasance now makes up 26.5% of the current
pool balance, compared to 9% at the last review.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 61% of the
current balance, compared to 56% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 4 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $41.5 million
from $1.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 5% to
38.8% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 26.5% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $49.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 41%). Two loans, constituting 68.5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the 4 Sylvan Way Loan ($13.7 million -- 38.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 105,140 SF office building located in
Parsippany, New Jersey. As of February 2016, the property was 100%
leased to T-Mobile through May 2017. The loan transferred to the
special servicing in August 2014 due to imminent maturity default.
The property has been REO since September 2015.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 10 East Baltimore
Street Loan ($10.5 million -- 29.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 168,400 SF office building in Baltimore, Maryland's central
business district. As of December 2016, the property was 64%
occupied. The property transferred to special servicing in March
2013 due to imminent default. The property became REO in August
2014.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $21.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans.

The non-defeased performing loan is the CVS-Cedar Park, Texas Loan
($1.8 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a former
single tenant CVS property that has since been sublet to Goodwill.
The property is located in Cedar Park Texas. The loan matures in
September 2024 and is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 77% and 1.30X, respectively.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C28: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on five classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C28,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C28 as:

  Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 28, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 28, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 79% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 23.0% of the
current balance, compared to 7.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.9% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

                 METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 76% of the pool is in
special servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 18%
of the pool.  In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that it expects will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs.  Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of nine, compared to a Herf of 23 at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $433 million
from $3.60 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool.

Five loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss
to the trust, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of
$265.8 million (for an average loss severity of 39%).  Thirteen
loans, constituting 76% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 500-512
Seventh Avenue Loan ($97.9 million -- 22.6% of the pool), which
represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The
loan is secured by a leasehold interest in three office buildings
totaling 1.2 million square feet (SF).  The buildings are located
in the Garment District of Midtown Manhattan, New York.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2016 due to a
maturity default.  The properties were 68% leased as of June 2016,
compared to 90% as of November 2014.

The remaining 12 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $86 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (26% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 7% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $13 million (a 44% expected loss based on a 68%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the November 18, 2016 remittance statement monthly interest
shortfalls were approximately $332,000 and total unpaid interest
was $19.2 million.  Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will
continue because of the exposure to specially serviced loans and/or
modified loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 95% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95%, compared to 97% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.65X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 18% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the ITC Crossing South Shopping
Center Loan ($41.7 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured
by an open air shopping center anchored by Wal-Mart
(non-collateral), Lowe's, Babies R' Us, Bed Bath & Beyond and TJ
Maxx. The property is located in Flanders, New Jersey approximately
35 miles northwest of Newark, New Jersey.  The property was 100%
leased as of September 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
100% and 1.02X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 135 Crossways Park Drive -- A Note
($18.0 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 121,631
SF office property located on Long Island approximately 30 miles
east of Manhattan.  The property was 100% leased as of September
2016.  In 2011, this loan was split into an A Note and a B Note,
both of which are part of the pooled balance.  In the event that
there is no default, the outstanding principal balance of the B
Note and all accrued and unpaid interest will be forgiven.  Moody's
treats the B Note (but not the A Note) as a troubled loan. Moody's
A Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.12X, respectively, the
same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Hughes Plaza West Loan
($16.2 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,546
SF low-rise office located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The property is
located about 10 miles west of the Las Vegas strip and was
constructed in 2005.  The property was 96% leased as of September
2016.  However, NOI has remained fairly low in 2014 and 2015.
Moody's has treated this as a troubled loan.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 182%
and 0.59X at the last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on six classes and downgraded the ratings on
four classes in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C29 as:

  Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, Affirmed
   B3 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, Affirmed
   Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Ca (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2016 Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016, z
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

                           RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 72% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.  The ratings on four P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on three P&I classes were downgraded due to the
imminency of anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 43.1% of the
current balance, compared to 13.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to a Herf of 28 at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 82% to $598 million
from $3.37 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 32 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 68% of
the pool.  Two loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Sixteen loans, constituting 52% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool at a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $113.7 million (for an
average loss severity of 37%).  Twelve loans, constituting 33% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the New Market Pool Loan
($34.8 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of six Class-B office buildings totaling 470,000 square
feet (SF) located in Marietta, Georgia.  The buildings were
developed from 1981 to 1986.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2010 due to imminent default and became real
estate owned (REO) in December 2013.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $136.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (71% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 27% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $90.9 million (a 57% expected loss based on an
82% probability default) from these troubled loans.

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, remittance statement monthly interest
shortfalls were $1.28 million and cumulative unpaid interest was
$64.5 million.  Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will
continue because of the exposure to specially serviced loans and
modified loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 87% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 118%, compared to 99% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.26X and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 1.61X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 31% of the
pool balance.  The largest loan is the 21-25 West 34th Street Loan
($100.0 million -- 16.9% of the pool), which is secured by a single
tenant retail property in New York, New York located near Herald
Square.  The property is 100% leased by Apple Corp., but is 100%
vacant as Apple never moved into the space.  Rental payments under
the lease commenced in February 2007 and the 15-year term runs
through January 2022.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and
0.68X, respectively, compared to 139% and 0.66X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Renaissance Tower Office
Building -- A Note ($57.0 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a Class A office tower located in the Dallas CBD.  The
property was 60% leased as of September 2016, compared to 56% as of
December 2015 and 55% as of December 2014.  The loan was modified
in February 2013 to create an A Note and a B Note.  The B Note is
held within the pool and is $60.0 million -- 10.1% of the pool.
Moody's analysis treats both the A Note and B Note as troubled
loans.

The third largest loan is the Barry Woods Crossings Shopping Centre
Retail Loan ($28.2 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a movie theater anchored retail center located in Kansas City,
Missouri.  The property is located near a Wal-Mart, Target and
other retail centers in close proximity.  The property was 93%
leased as of August 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121%
and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 121% and 0.82X at the last
review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C34: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on eight classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C34, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on two other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings on classes A-3 through E reflect the reduced
pool trust balance, the increase in defeasance by 28% ($304.2
million), and S&P's expectation of the credit enhancement available
to the classes, which S&P believes is greater than its estimates of
the credit enhancement necessary at the most recent rating levels.
It also reflects S&P's view of the collateral's current and future
performance.

The affirmation on the class F certificates reflects S&P's concern
about interest shortfalls from the 11 assets ($224.1 million,
20.4%) with the special servicer.  The affirmation also reflects
S&P's view regarding the collateral's current and future
performance, the transaction structure, and liquidity support
available to the class.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes A-M, A-J, B, C, D, and E, S&P's
analysis also considered their susceptibility to reduced liquidity
support from the special serviced assets.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class IO interest-only
(IO) certificate based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.10 billion, which is 74.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 62 loans and nine real
estate owned (REO) assets (reflecting crossed loans), down from 84
loans at issuance.  Eleven of these assets ($224.1 million, 20.4%)
are with the special servicer, 12 loans ($304.2 million, 27.7%;
reflecting cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans) are
defeased, and 19 ($143.9 million, 13.1%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 96.1% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, of which 70.6% was year-end 2015 data, 24.8% was
partial 2016 data, and the remainder was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.33x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and an 84.1% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.79% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
assets, the defeased loans, and one ground lease loan.  The top 10
nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance
of $324.3 million (29.5%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.37x and 87.7%, respectively, for six of the top 10
nondefeased loans.  Excluded from our DSC and LTV calculations are
the ground lease and the specially serviced assets.  The specially
serviced assets are discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $29.9 million in principal
losses, or 2.0% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 8.2% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, 11 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC.  Details of the three largest specially serviced assets, all
of which are top 10 nondefeased assets, are:

   -- The Sheraton Park Hotel-Anaheim, CA REO asset
      ($65.0 million, 5.9%) is the largest asset in the
      transaction and has $75.5 million in total reported
      exposure.  The asset is a 490-room lodging property in
      Anaheim, Calif.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on Feb. 15, 2012, due to imminent monetary default.

      The property became REO on June 28, 2013.  A $21.0 million
      appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against this
      asset.  The reported DSC as of year-end 2015 was 1.06x and
      the occupancy reported as of June 2016 was 78.4%.  S&P
      expects a moderate loss upon its eventual resolution.

   -- Glenbrooke At Palm Bay REO asset ($27.1 million, 2.5%) is
      the fourth-largest asset in the transaction and has
      $31.4 million in total reported exposure.  The asset is a
      170-unit multifamily property in Palm Bay, Fla.  The loan
      was transferred to the special servicer on April 26, 2012,
      due to imminent monetary default.  The property became REO
      on July 10, 2013.  A $6.8 million ARA is in effect against
      this asset.  The reported DSC as of year-end 2015 was 0.91x
      and occupancy as of October 2016 was 92.4%.  S&P expects a
      moderate loss upon its eventual resolution.

   -- Kendron Village-Phase II REO asset ($25.3 million, 2.3%) has

      $26.1 million in total reported exposure.  The asset is a
      157,409-sq.-ft. retail property in Peachtree City, Ga.  The
      loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 16,
      2013, due to monetary default.  The property became REO on
      July 2, 2013.  The reported DSC as of year-end 2015 was
      1.02x and reported occupancy as of October 2016 was 93.4%.
      S&P expects a minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

The eight remaining assets with the special servicer have each
individual balances that represent less than 2.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 40.8%.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C34
                                Rating
Class            Identifier     To                   From
A-3              92979FAD2      AAA (sf)             AA (sf)
A-1A             92979FAE0      AAA (sf)             AA (sf)
IO               92979FAF7      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-M              92979FAG5      A+ (sf)              BBB- (sf)
A-J              92979FAH3      BB+ (sf)             B (sf)
B                92979FAJ9      BB- (sf)             B- (sf)
C                92979FAK6      B+ (sf)              B- (sf)
D                92979FAL4      B (sf)               CCC (sf)
E                92979FAM2      B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
F                92979FAN0      CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on seven classes, and downgraded the
rating on one class in Washington Mutual Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SL3 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed

      B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-J, B and C were upgraded primarily
due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last review,
resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 33% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 22% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 5 months.

The ratings on the P&I classes D through G were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes H, J and K were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded because it is
not, nor expected to, receive interest payments; however, it can
receive prepayment penalties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.4% of the
current balance, compared to 6.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 145, compared to 195 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 23, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 81% to $240 million
from $1.28 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 262 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 17% of the pool.

Ninety-nine loans, constituting 47% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ninety-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $46.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%). Five loans, constituting 1.2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $0.4
million loss for the specially serviced loans (21% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 44 poorly
performing loans, constituting 21% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $8.9 million (an 18% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 88% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.8% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.50X and 1.33X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


WELLS FARGO 2014-LC18: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC18,
issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-LC18 as
follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-F at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-G at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. The Class PEX certificates are exchangeable
with Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates (and vice versa).
Classes X-E, X-F, X-G, D, E, F and G have been privately placed
pursuant to Rule 144A.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance in December 2014. The collateral
consists of 99 loans secured by 117 properties and as of the
November 2016 remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of
1.6% since issuance as a result of scheduled amortization. All of
the original loans remain in the pool. The weighted-average (WA)
net cash flow growth for the top 15 loans reporting YE2015 figures
was 19.0% over the DBRS UW figures, with a WA DSCR of 2.02 times
(x), as compared to the WA DBRS UW DSCR of 1.70x.

As of the November 2016 remittance report, there are no loans in
special servicing and seven loans, representing 3.1% of the pool,
on the servicer's watchlist. Five of those loans, representing 1.9%
of the pool, are on the watchlist forf deferred maintenance;
however, none of the issues noted appear to suggest a material
impact on the overall condition of the property or operations in
general. The remainder of loans, representing 1.2% of the pool, are
on the watchlist for reporting a low trailing 12 months June 2016
DSCR, or for upcoming tenant rollover. DBRS has requested
information from the servicer regarding the status of these loans
and will monitor closely for developments.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class G Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C37 (the
Certificates) to be issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2016-C37:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-EF at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-G at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-H at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-J at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (sf)

   -- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class G at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class H at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, X-EF, X-G, X-H, X-J, D, E, F, G, H and J will be
privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-EF, X-G, X-H and X-J balances are
notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address
the likelihood of receiving interest based on the notional amount
outstanding. DBRS considers the IO certificates' positions within
the transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
ratings.

The collateral consists of 63 fixed-rate loans secured by 141
commercial and multifamily properties. Two of the loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into one crossed group.
The DBRS analysis of this transaction incorporates this crossed
group, resulting in a modified loan count of 62, and the loan
number references within this report reflect this total. The
transaction is a sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit
pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting
the long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, no loans had a DBRS Term Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess
refinance risk given the current low interest rate environment,
DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This
resulted in 15 loans, representing 41.6% of the pool, having
Refinance (Refi) DSCRs below 1.00x. These credit metrics are based
on whole-loan balances. Two of the pool's loans with DBRS Refi
DSCRs below 0.90x, Hilton Hawaiian Village and Potomac Mills which
total 11.9% of the transaction balance, are shadow-rated and have
large pieces of subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust. Based
on A-note balances only, the deal's weighted-average DBRS Refi DSCR
improves to 1.22x and the concentration of loans with DBRS Refi
DSCRs below 1.00x and 0.90x reduces to 31.3% and 6.7%,
respectively.

Three of the largest four loans, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Quantum
Park and Potomac Mills, have trust participations that exhibit
credit characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow
ratings. Combined, these loans represent 18.8% of the pool. Hilton
Hawaiian Village and Quantum Park have credit characteristics
consistent with a BBB (high) shadow rating while Potomac Mills
exhibits credit characteristics consistent with an A (low) shadow
rating. In addition, 30 loans, representing 54.4% of the pool, have
a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. This includes eight of the
largest 15 loans. Even when excluding the three shadow-rated loans,
each of which has large pieces of subordinate mortgage debt held
outside the trust, the deal continues to exhibit a favorable DBRS
Term DSCR of 1.50x. DBRS sampled 29 of the 62 loans in the pool,
which represents a considerable 73.4% of the transaction balance.
The loan sellers appear to have exercised relatively prudent
underwriting standards with the DBRS average NCF haircut of -6.2%
for sampled loans. This compares favorably with more recent
transactions by DBRS, where the average sampled haircut is
typically in excess of -7.5% and commonly around -10.0%.

The transaction has a moderate concentration of loans that is
secured by assets either fully or primarily used as retail at
29.3%. The retail sector has generally underperformed since the
Great Recession because of a general decline in consumer spending
power, store closures, chain bankruptcies and the rapidly growing
popularity of ecommerce. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
ecommerce sales represented 7.0% of total retail sales in 2015
compared with 3.9% in 2009. As the ecommerce share of sales is
expected to continue to grow significantly in the coming years, the
retail real estate sector may continue to be relatively weak. DBRS
considers 60.2% of this concentration to be secured by either
anchored or regional mall properties, which are more desirable and
have shown lower rates of default historically. Just over 16% of
this retail concentration consists of Potomac Mills, which is a
dominant regional mall in an established suburban market. The
property is owned and operated by Simon Property Group, which DBRS
considers to be one of the strongest in its industry. Additionally,
Potomac Mills is shadow-rated A (low) by DBRS. DBRS identified 12
loans, representing 16.3% of the pool, which have sponsorship
and/or loan collateral associated with a voluntary bankruptcy
filing, a prior DPO, loan default, limited net worth and/or
liquidity, a historical negative credit event and/or inadequate
commercial real estate experience. This concentration includes
three of the top 11 loans, and eight loans, representing 8.3% of
the pool, made to the same sponsor. DBRS increased the POD for
loans with identified sponsorship concerns. Furthermore,
twenty-three loans, representing 26.3% of the pool, are secured by
properties located in tertiary or rural markets, including three of
the top 15 loans. Properties located in tertiary and rural markets
are modeled with significantly higher loss severities than those
located in urban and suburban markets.

The ratings assigned to Classes B, C and H differ from the higher
rating implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation and, in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to
occur post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C37: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB+sf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C37 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

   -- $35,482,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $105,724,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $28,449,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $120,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $188,138,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $47,561,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $58,165,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $525,354,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $96,628,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $38,463,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $34,711,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,525,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $17,825,000ab class X-EF 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8,443,000ab class X-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,525,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,320,000b class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,505,000b class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8,443,000b class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $7,505,000ab class X-H;

   -- $22,515,779ab class X-J;

   -- $7,505,000b class H;

   -- $22,515,779b class J.

a) Notional amount and interest only.
b) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Nov. 29, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 63 loans secured by 141
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$750,506,780 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Bank PLC, Ladder Capital Finance LLC, Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC,
Silverpeak Real Estate Finance LLC and C-III Commercial Mortgage
LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 68.4% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
78.6% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The transaction has slightly better leverage than
other recent Fitch-rated transactions. The Fitch LTV for the trust
of 103.4% is below the YTD 2016 average of 105.5%. The Fitch DSCR
for the trust of 1.21x is similar to the YTD 2016 average of 1.20x.
Excluding credit-opinion loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are
1.16x and 108.9%, respectively. Comparatively, the YTD 2016 average
Fitch DSCR and LTV for Fitch-rated deals excluding credit-opinion
and co-op loans are 1.16x and 109.9%, respectively.

Above-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by
12.2% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is above
the 2016 YTD average of 10.5%. Six loans (25.6% of the pool) are
full-term, interest-only, and 18 loans (30.0%) are partial
interest-only. The remaining 39 loans (44.4% of the pool) are
amortizing balloon or ARD loans with initial terms of five to 10
years.

Investment-Grade Credit-Opinion Loans: Two loans in the pool,
Hilton Hawaiian Village (7.0% of the pool) and Potomac Mills
(4.8%), have investment-grade credit opinions. Hilton Hawaiian
Village has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis and Potomac Mills has an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis. The two loans have a
weighted average Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.57x and 62.0%,
respectively. The proportion of credit-opinion loans in this pool
of 11.8% is above the YTD 2016 average of 7.7%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 18.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-C37 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could occur. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could occur.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on eight classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C6 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes B and C were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization as well as an increase in defeasance. The
deal has paid down 13% since Moody's last review and defeasance has
increased to 9% of the current pool balance compared to 2% at the
last review.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-2 through A-S and D through F were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class X-A was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current balance, compared to 2.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 38, compared to 37 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to $762 million
from $925 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 83 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 33% of the pool. Five loans, constituting 9% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Eight loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. One loan, constituting
0.3% of the pool, is currently in special servicing. The sole
specially serviced loan is the Northwest Self Storage. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2015 due to the
bankruptcy filing of a guarantor. The loan continues to perform and
the guarantor's bankruptcy is still open.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 89% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 88%, compared to 84% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 1.36X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the National Cancer Institute Center Loan ($72
million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 341,000 square
foot (SF) Class A office / lab facility located in Frederick,
Maryland. The property was constructed in 2011 as a build-to-suit
to support the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the oldest
Institute within the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
property entirely leased to Leidos Biomedical Research (formerly
Science Applications International) through September 2021. Due to
the single tenant exposure Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis on
this loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 1.03X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Norwalk Town Square Loan ($25.3
million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by secured by a
232,987 SF anchored retail center in Norwalk, California, located
17 miles southeast of Los Angles CBD. The property was constructed
between 1953 and 1976, renovated in 1990, and contains 863 parking
spaces. Anchor tenants include LA Fitness, Regency Theaters, and
DD's Discounts. As of September 2016, the property was 96%
occupied, the same as at Moody's last review and compared to 94% at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.28X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.26X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Boca Industrial Park Loan ($22.2
million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 386,846 SF
multi-tenant industrial park located in Boca Raton, Florida. The
property consists of six free-standing buildings constructed in
1984, and is configured with 36 tenant units. As of November 2016,
the property was 100% occupied, the same as at Moody's last review
and compared to 92% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 95% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 105% and 1.05X at
the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C25: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C25 issued by WFRBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C25 as follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. Up to the full certificate balance of the
Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged for
Class PEX certificates and vice versa.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has experienced a collateral reduction of
0.9% since closing as a result of scheduled loan amortization. At
issuance, the pool consisted of 59 fixed-rate loans secured by 73
commercial and multifamily properties. As at the November 2016
remittance, all loans remain in the pool with an aggregate
outstanding principal balance of $868.2 million. According to the
most recent year-end reporting, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.83
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 10.3%. At issuance, the DBRS WA
DSCR and debt yield for the pool were 1.61x and 9.0%, respectively.
Per YE2015 financials, the top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.86x
and a WA net cash flow (NCF) increase of 12.2% over the DBRS
underwritten cash flows.

As at the November 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and six loans are on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 10.5% of the current pool balance. Of these six loans,
two have been flagged for deferred maintenance concerns generally
minor in nature, one was flagged for a casualty event that is being
addressed and another loan, representing 0.6% of the pool balance,
has been watchlisted because of a market-driven performance decline
(see below). The two other loans (both secured by apartment
complexes in Warrensville Heights, Ohio, and owned by the same
sponsor) have reported cash flow declines from the DBRS UW figures
of -23.9% and -27.4% as at YE2015 resulting from increased
operating expenses, as occupancy and rental rates have remained
stable. Both loans have reported an improvement with the Q2 2016
annualized financials.

The two largest loans in the pool, representing 23.0% of the total
pool balance, are secured by large regional malls operated by Simon
Property Group and are highlighted below.

The St. Johns Town Center loan (Prospectus ID#1; 11.5% of the
current pool balance) is secured by a 1.4 million square foot (sf)
regional mall located in Jacksonville, Florida, and is considered
to be the pre-eminent shopping destination in the city. As at
September 2016, mall occupancy remains strong at 98.1% with an
average rental rate of $29.83 per square foot (psf) — figures
comparable with 99.3% and $27.04 psf at issuance, respectively. The
slight decrease in occupancy is attributable to the premature
departure of Forever 21 (1.5% of the net rentable area (NRA)) in
March 2016, which was noted as a surprise as the store appeared to
be popular with shoppers. This space currently represents the
largest vacancy at the mall, and according to local news reports,
Apple is planning to move into this space from its smaller unit at
the mall, with a $3.5 million build-out planned. In addition,
several large tenants have recently executed five-year lease
renewals, including Jo-Ann Fabrics, Ross Dress for Less, DSW Shoe
Warehouse and Barnes & Noble. Tenant rollover remains minimal in
the next 12 months. The loan, which is interest only (IO) for the
full term, reported a Q3 2016 whole-loan DSCR of 2.43x, an
improvement over 2.32x at YE2015, and represents an annualized NCF
increase of +20.5% over the DBRS UW figures.

At issuance, DBRS assigned an investment-grade shadow rating to
this loan. DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of this
loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

The Colorado Mills loan (Prospectus ID#2; 11.5% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 1.1 million sf regional mall located in
Lakewood, Colorado, a Denver suburb. The subject is the largest
mall statewide with the most in-line space and contains a mix of
regular and outlet space tenants as well as some non-traditional
tenants, such as an indoor trampoline park and an indoor putting
green park. Mall occupancy has recently declined to 85.2% as a
result of Sports Authority (4.0% of the NRA) vacating its 43,500 sf
anchor space in July 2016; however, this space is being assumed by
Dick's Sporting Goods with an April 1, 2017 planned opening date,
as per the online mall directory. There is considerable upcoming
tenant rollover as United Artists Theatre (7.5% of the NRA),
JumpStreet (3.7% of the NRA) and Saks Off 5th (2.5% of the NRA)
have leases maturing in the second half of 2017. Junior anchor
Burlington Coat Factory recently executed a five-year renewal
through 2021 at a similar rental rate. The loan reported a Q2 2016
whole-loan DSCR of 2.08x on an amortizing basis, in line with
YE2015, and represents an annualized NCF increase of 16.1% over the
DBRS UW figures. The loan has a remaining IO term of 11 months.

The loan's sponsor, Simon Property Group, is currently developing
another outlet mall, the 320,000 sf Denver Premium Outlets located
21 miles north of the subject with a planned opening in October
2017. DBRS believes the impact to the subject will be minimal, as
the new mall will be located much farther out and will not have the
large population and existing infrastructure surrounding the
subject, which benefits from being closely located to Interstate 70
and Highway 6.

The Cornerstone Apartments loan (Prospectus ID#38; 0.6% of the
current pool balance) is secured by a 120-unit multifamily complex
located in Midland, Texas. The loan has been placed on the
servicer's watchlist as a result of a decline in property
performance resulting from the decline in the energy-based local
economy. As at June 2016, the property was 82.5% occupied with an
average rental rate of $712 per unit, a decline from 97.5% and $774
per unit at issuance, respectively. The current vacancy rate is in
line with the 16.2% vacancy rate reported by Reis for similar
vintage properties in the Midland-Odessa market. The March 2016
property inspection revealed that lowered rents, move-in incentives
and solid long-term management have prevented an even larger
occupancy decline. During the inspection, it was noted that the
neighboring residential complex was 52% vacant at the time. The Q2
2016 DSCR of 1.22x reflects an NCF decline of 32.3% from the DBRS
UW figures. With collateral performance dependent on a recovery in
the local economy, the loan is expected to perform at a similar
level in the medium term.

The ratings assigned to the Classes C, E, F and PEX certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the sustainability of loan performance trends not
demonstrated.


YORK CLO-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by York CLO-4 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $2,000,000 Class X Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030, Assigned

   Aaa (sf)

  $252,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $48,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2030, Assigned A2 (sf)

  $23,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2030, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
   2030, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

York CLO-4 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  The portfolio is at least 70% ramped as of the
closing date.

York CLO Managed Holdings, LLC (Manager) will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, reinvestment is prohibited.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 50
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2712
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2712 to 3119)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -2
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2712 to 3526)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B Notes: -3
  Class C Notes: -4
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1



[*] DBRS Reviews 21 Ratings From 4 U.S. ABS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 21 ratings from four U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 21 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, seven were confirmed, ten were
upgraded and four were discontinued. For the ratings that were
confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their new
respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

Debt Class  Rating Action    Rating
----------  -------------    ------
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-1
Series 2013-1
Class C Confirmed     AAA (sf)
Class D Upgraded     AA (high) (sf)
Class E Upgraded     A (sf)
Class B Disc.-Repaid    Discontinue

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-5
Series 2013-5
Class B Confirmed    AAA (sf)
Class C Upgraded    AAA (sf)
Class D Upgraded    AA (sf)
Class E Upgraded    BBB (high) (sf)
Class A-3 Disc.-Repaid   Discontinued

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-1
Series 2014-1
  Class A-3  Confirmed    AAA (sf)
  Class B    Confirmed    AAA (sf)
  Class C    Upgraded     AA (high) (sf) US
  Class D    Upgraded     A (high) (sf) US
  Class E    Upgraded     BBB (low) (sf)

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2015-1
Series 2015-1
Class A-3    Confirmed    AAA (sf)
Class B   Upgraded    AAA (sf)
Class C   Upgraded    AA (sf)
Class D      Confirmed     BBB (high) (sf
Class E   Confirmed     BB (high) (sf)
Class A-2A   Disc.-Repaid  Discontinued
Class A-2B   Disc.-Repaid  Discontinued


[*] Fitch Lowers Ratings on 23 Bonds in 13 Transactions to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on already
distressed U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) bonds.
Fitch downgraded 23 bonds in 13 transactions to 'D', as the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were all previously
rated 'CCC' or below, which indicates that losses were possible. Of
these 23 bonds downgraded to 'D', the ratings on two of the classes
(in two separate transactions) have simultaneously been withdrawn,
as the only remaining ratings in the transactions are now 'D' after
this committee's actions; as a result the ratings are considered
immaterial.

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on 20 classes within three
transactions (two transactions are in connection with the
simultaneous downgrade and withdrawals referenced in the above
paragraph) as a result of realized losses. The trust balances have
been reduced to $0 or have experienced non-recoverable realized
losses and are no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the
agency's coverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Today's downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs.
Any remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch would
further review the affected classes.


[*] Moody's Hikes $1.3BB of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 50 tranches
from 15 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 27, 2014
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 27, 2014
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-3

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-PT, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-C

Cl. 1-AV-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-B

Cl. 1-AV-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. Upgrades in the following deals
were also due to an reduction in moody's projection of lifetime
collateral expected losses: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-1,
Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Long Beach Mortgage Loan
Trust 2005-2, and Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-B. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $673MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 tranches,
from 11 transactions issued by various issuers backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE4

  Cl. A1A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
Series MO 2006-HE6

  Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH2

  Cl. MV-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2010,
   Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2010,
   Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5

  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-A

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-HE2

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-NC2

  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 16, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating upgrade on Ownit Mortgage Loan
Trust 2006-5 Cl. A-1A is also due to the reduced risk of future
interest shortfalls given the paydown of the tranche.  The actions
reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's
updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.75BB of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of ten tranches
and downgraded the ratings of thirty-one tranches synthetically
linked to Prime Jumbo RMBS loans originated by miscellaneous
originators via a credit default swap, and upgraded one tranche and
downgraded one tranche backed by resecuritized synthetic RMBS.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Real Estate Synthetic Investment Securities, Series 2005-B

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013,
   Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-A, Series 2003-A

  Cl. B6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B8, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B9, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B10, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. B7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. B8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. B9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-C, Series 2003-C

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. B4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1/RESI Finance DE
Corporation 2003-CB1

  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2003-D/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2003-D

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-A/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-A

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 15, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 15, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-B/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-B

  Cl. A5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C RESI Finance
Limited Partnership 2004-C/RESI Finance DE Corporation 2004-C

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2012,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-A

  Class A4 Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 27,
   2013, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)
  Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 21,
   2011, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-C

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Issuer: SASI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-A, Sovereign Asset
Synthetic Investment Securities, Series 2006-A

  Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-A

  Cl. B10, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-B

  Cl. B9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are the result of a review of the performance of
the underlying pools using recently developed cash flow models
which considered the timing of cash flows, principal amortization
of the bonds, and build-up or reduction in credit enhancement
available to the bonds, and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these bonds.  These transactions were previously
analyzed using an alternative, static approach which compared
expected losses to enhancement available to the bonds.  Both the
static approach and the cash flow approach are described in more
detail in "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November
2013.

Due to a combination of features in these prime jumbo RMBS
transactions -- such as shifting interest waterfalls, multiple
outstanding subordinate bonds, hyper-tranching and pools with
substantial remaining loan counts -- use of the cash flow modeling
led to rating changes.

The rating upgrades for RESI 2003-A also reflect the increase in
credit enhancement available to the bonds owing to the additional
support from tranche B-12 which does not receive principal
distributions until all other bonds have been reduced to zero.
Similarly, the rating upgrades on tranches from RESI 2005-A, RESI
2005-B, RESI 2005-C, and SASI 2006-A reflect a buildup in credit
enhancement available to those bonds.  In accordance with the
Moody's "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" with regards to shifting
interest structures, all tranches upgraded to Aaa have passed the
shifting interest stress test whereby our projection of losses was
increased and the timing of future defaults was delayed in order to
assess the vulnerability of these bonds to tail risk.
The rating downgrades are a result of the changes which incorporate
the timing of cash flows and tail risk to the bonds. In addition,
the ratings downgrades on tranches from RESI 2003-CB1 RESI 2003-D,
RESI 2004-A, RESI 2004-B, and RESI 2005-A take into account the
declining credit enhancement available to those bonds.

The rating actions on the resecuritized bonds are a direct result
of actions taken on the underlying securities.

For all transactions except Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked
Notes, Series 2003-A and Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes,
Series 2003-B, the principal methodology used in these ratings was
"US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.  For
Resix Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-A and Resix
Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2003-B, the principal
methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Resecuritizations" published in November 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $155.3MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2005-2006
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 14 tranches and
downgraded 2 tranches from three transaction backed by Alt-A RMBS
loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-10

  Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 19,
   2016 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 19,
   2016, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-1

  Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6AR

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-B-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrades are due
to the build-up of undercollateralization on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0 % in Nov 2016 from 4.6% in Nov
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $27MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of eight tranches
and downgraded two tranches from three transactions backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3F

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. 3A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 6A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. VII-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions on Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
2006-AR6 Trust Class V-A-2, Class VII-A-2, Class V-A-1 are
primarily due to the strong coverage from credit enhancement on
pools backing the transaction to protect from future projected
losses. The upgrade actions on GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F
Class 6A-1, Class 1A-1, Class 2A-1, Class 3A-1, and Class 4A-3 are
due to the increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.
The downgrade on GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F Class A-X is due
to the fact that it is an interest-only (IO) bond linked to
multiple pools; under Moody's methodology, this IO bond is capped
at the implied ratings on weighted average projected losses of the
linked pools. The actions are a result of the recent performance of
the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pools.

The downgrade action on GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3F Class A-X
is the result of an error correction. Class A-X is an IO bond
linked to a single pool. Under Moody's methodology, this IO bond
should be capped at the rating of the highest rated senior class
backed by this pool, which is Class 2A-4. In the prior rating
action on February 16, 2016, Class 2A-4 was downgraded to B3(sf)
from B2(sf); however, the rating on Class A-X was not changed
accordingly. This has been corrected, and the rating action
reflects this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. Please see
the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

The methodology used in rating the interest-only securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review of 73 Classes From 17 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 73 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2007.  The review yielded 21 upgrades, five
downgrades, and 47 affirmations.  The transactions in this review
are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate alternative-A,
home-equity-line-of-credit (HELOC), scratch and dent, second-lien,
and subprime mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first
and second liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

                            ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include six ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

The upgrades on five classes from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2004-RES1 reflect a decrease in our projected losses and
S&P's belief that its projected credit support for the affected
classes will be sufficient to cover its revised projected losses at
these rating levels.  S&P decreased its projected losses because
there have been fewer reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance periods compared to those reported during the previous
review date.  Total delinquencies decreased to 9.01% in November of
2016 from 15.2% in March of 2014, and severe delinquencies
decreased to 6.93% in November of 2016 from 14.46% in March of
2014.  S&P raised its rating on class M3 to an investment-grade
level as a result of the aforementioned decreased delinquencies.
In addition, S&P raised its rating on class M5 to 'B (sf)' from
'CCC (sf)' because it believes this class is no longer vulnerable
to default.

The five-notch upgrades on classes A4 and A7 from First Franklin
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF10 reflect the increase in credit
support of approximately 35% since the last review in March 2014.
The increase in credit support allowed S&P to upgrade the classes
to 'BB+ (sf)' to reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher
level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

S&P raised two ratings from Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D.
Class AF-4 has received approximately $588,000 in principal
payments per month on average over the past 12 months; hence, the
class was raised six notches due to an expected short duration. The
upgrade on class AF-6 to 'AA- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' reflects the
increase in credit support since the last full review in March
2014.

Among the second-lien collateral upgrades, Home Equity Mortgage
Trust 2004-3's class M4 experienced improved delinquencies, which
led to decreased loss projections and accordingly, a five-notch
upgrade to 'A+ (sf)'.

                            DOWNGRADES

The five downgrades include two ratings that were lowered three or
more notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on two classes to
speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  Another two of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining downgraded class
already had a speculative-grade rating.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that its projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of these:

   -- Increased delinquencies;
   -- Eroded credit support; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

The rating on Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD1's
class M1 was lowered from 'A (sf)' to 'BB (sf)' because the class'
credit support has been eroding.  The lack of principal class M1
has received over recent periods exposes it to losses later in its
life.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

Class AF-5 from Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D exhibited
weighted average coupon (WAC) deterioration that resulted in a
nine-notch downgrade to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)'.  The class
factor and coupon increase of 50 basis points are contributing to a
maximum potential rating (MPR) of 'CCC (sf)' on the class, per our
Loan Modification Methodology.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a WAC and the interest owed to that
class is reduced because of loan modifications, S&P imputes an
amount of interest owed to that class of securities by applying
"Methodology For Incorporating Loan Modifications And Extraordinary
Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings," April 17, 2015, and "Principles
For Rating Debt Issues Based On Imputed Promises," Dec. 19, 2014.
Based on S&P's criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of
securities that are affected by reduced interest payments over time
due to loan modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a
particular class, the resulting rating may be lower than if it had
solely considered that class' paid interest based on the applicable
WAC.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover our projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed S&P's ratings
on those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover S&P's 'B' expected case projected losses for these
classes. Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC',
'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)'
affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes are still
vulnerable to defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect
its view that these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;

   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;

   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                     http://bit.ly/2hUyF0w




[*] S&P Completes Review of 74 Classes From 10 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 74 classes from 10 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2005.  The review yielded 20 upgrades, 10
downgrades, 30 affirmations, 12 withdrawals, and two
discontinuances.  The transactions in this review are backed by a
mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime, alternative-A, and
first-lien high loan-to-value (LTV) mortgage loans, which are
secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-unit single-family
residential properties.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations
S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                               UPGRADES

The upgrades include 12 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Increased credit support relative to S&P's projected
      losses;

   -- A change in payment allocation due to failing triggers;
      and/or

   -- The class' expected short duration.

The upgrades on classes A-1, M-1, and M-2 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ2
Trust, classes M-1 and M-2 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ3, classes A-2,
M-1, and M-2 from Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-4,
classes A-2 and M from Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-6,
and classes M-3, M-4, M-5, M-6, M-7, and M-9 from RAMP Series
2005-RZ1 Trust are due to an increase in the credit support
available to each class.  As a result, each class is able to
withstand loss stresses at higher rating scenarios.

The upgrades on class A-6 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ3 Trust and class
M-2 from RAMP Series 2005-RZ1 Trust are due to an expected short
remaining duration based off of the current rate of payments
received.

The upgrades on classes A-5-A and A-5-B from RAMP Series 2003-RZ3
Trust reflect the impact of the transaction's cumulative loss
trigger's failure, resulting in permanent sequential principal
payments to all classes.  These classes will now receive
all-principal payments until they have been paid down to zero,
during which time, principal payments will not be made to more
subordinate classes.  This sequential principal payment mechanism
prevents credit support erosion and results in an earlier pay down
to the more senior classes before back-end losses can occur.

S&P raised its ratings on classes M-2 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ2
Trust and M-2 from RAMP Series 2003-RZ3 to 'B (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
because S&P believes these classes are no longer vulnerable to
default.  S&P also raised the rating on class M-9 from RAMP Series
2005-RZ1 Trust to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because S&P believes
this class is no longer virtually certain to default, primarily due
to the improved performance of the collateral backing this
transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' rating reflects S&P's belief
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected losses for these classes and that the classes are
still vulnerable to defaulting.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include two ratings that were lowered four or more
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on two classes to speculative
grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or higher).
Another six of the lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade
level, while the remaining two downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect one or
more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Declining constant prepayment rates (CPRs);
   -- Principal-only (PO) criteria; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

The downgrades on classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-5, A-6, B-1, and B-2
from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S8 Trust
reflect the increase in S&P's projected losses and its belief that
the projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover the projected losses S&P applied at the
previous rating levels.  The increase in our projected losses is
due to higher reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance periods when compared to those reported during the
previous review dates.  Severe delinquencies increased to 6.15% in
October 2016 from 2.11% in May 2015.

The downgrade to class P reflects the application of S&P's PO
criteria.  The PO strip rating was lowered commensurate with the
lowest-rated senior class within the structure.

The downgrade on class M-1 from RFMSI Series 2003-S12 Trust
reflects a decrease in the CPR observed for the underlying pool to
16.00% in October 2016 from 27.15% in March 2014.  Because the
payment allocation triggers have failed, resulting in permanent
sequential principal payments to all classes, the lower CPR has
limited principal payments to this more senior mezzanine class.
This has extended its duration and made it more susceptible to
back-end losses.

Tail Risk
RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust is backed by a small remaining pool of
mortgage loans.  S&P believes that pools with less than 100 loans
remaining create an increased risk of credit instability, because a
liquidation and subsequent loss on one loan, or a small number of
loans, at the tail end of a transaction's life may have a
disproportionate impact on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit
support.  S&P refers to this as "tail risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk by conducting a loan-level analysis
that assesses this risk, as set forth in our tail risk criteria.
The downgrade on class A-2 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' from this
transaction reflects the application of S&P's tail risk criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The ratings affirmations in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating categories
reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support on these
classes remained relatively consistent with its prior projections
and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for those rating
scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' reflect S&P's belief that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its 'B'
expected case projected losses for these classes.  Pursuant to
"Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings,"
Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.  

                             WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on 11 classes from Deutsche Mortgage
Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-1 because the
related pool has a small number of loans remaining.  Once a pool
has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there is a high
degree of credit instability that is incompatible with any rating
level.

The rating on class X from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-S8 Trust was withdrawn according to S&P's interest-only
(IO) criteria, which states that S&P will maintain the current
rating on an IO class until the ratings on all of the classes that
the IO security references, in the determination of its notional
balance, are either lowered below 'AA- (sf)' or have been retired,
at which time S&P will withdraw the IO rating.  All of the
referenced classes have a current rating below 'AA- (sf)'.

A criteria interpretation for the above mentioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
prior to the release of this criteria.

                         DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on classes M-3 and B-1 from
RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust.  These classes have a zero balance and
have been written down as a result of realized losses that remain
outstanding.  S&P discontinued these ratings according to our
surveillance and withdrawal policy, as S&P views a subsequent
upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the
relevant criteria.

                        ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;

   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;

   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                   http://bit.ly/2hkZslV



[*] S&P Completes Review on 45 Classes From 9 RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 45 classes from nine
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 1998 and 2005.  The review yielded 10 upgrades, 19
downgrades, and 16 affirmations.  The transactions in this review
are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo
mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.

For insured obligations where S&P maintains a rating on the bond
insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the class without
bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P relied
solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  Of the
classes reviewed, MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2005-1's class
2-A-2 ('AA (sf)') is insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.,
currently rated 'AA' by S&P Global Ratings.

Some of the rating actions reflect the application of S&P's
interest-only (IO) criteria, which provide that S&P will maintain
the current rating on an IO class until all of the classes that the
IO security references are either lowered to below 'AA- (sf)' or
have been retired--at which time S&P will withdraw the IO rating.
The ratings on each of these classes have been affected by recent
rating actions on the reference classes upon which their notional
balances are based.

A criteria interpretation for the abovementioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
prior to the release of this criteria.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                            UPGRADES

The upgrades include five ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect improved collateral
performance/delinquency trends and/or increased credit support
relative to S&P's projected losses.

The upgrades on classes II-A-1, II-A-2, II-A-3, and II-A-4 from
BellaVista Mortgage Trust 2004-1 and classes A-1 and A-2 from Bear
Stearns ARM Trust 2005-2 reflect a decrease in S&P's projected
losses for the related transactions and S&P's belief that its
projected credit support for the affected classes will be
sufficient to cover its revised projected losses at these rating
levels.  S&P has decreased its projected losses because there have
been fewer reported delinquencies for the associated pools during
the most recent performance periods compared to those reported
during the previous review dates.  BellaVista Mortgage Trust
2004-1's severe delinquencies decreased to 7.5% in October 2016
from 12.25% in October 2014.  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-2's
severe delinquencies decreased to 2.8% in October 2016 from 4.2% in
October 2014.

The upgrades on class II-A-1 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5 and
classes 2-A-1, 2-A-2, and 3-A from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2003-58 are due to an increase in credit support available to each
class.  The increase in credit support is attributed to the
collateral amortizing faster than the junior support class
reduction.  In both of these transactions, there are insufficient
available funds to fully pay the junior support class' principal
after allocating available funds to senior class' principal and
interest and junior class' interest.  As a result, these classes
were able to withstand loss stresses at higher rating scenarios.

                             DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include 16 ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on six classes to speculative
grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or higher).
Another four of the lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade
level, while the remaining nine downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect one or
more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Erosion of credit support;
   -- Rising constant prepayment rates (CPRs);
   -- Tail risk; and/or
   -- Increased reperforming loans.

The downgrades on classes 2-A-8 and 2-A-9 from MASTR Asset
Securitization Trust 2005-1 reflect the impact of delinquency
triggers that are now allowing unscheduled principal payments to be
made to more subordinate classes, eroding credit support for the
affected senior classes.  Before the recent passing of the
delinquency triggers, all unscheduled principal was applied to
paying down the senior classes locking out the junior classes of
unscheduled principal.

The downgrade on class M from Fannie Mae Remic Trust 1998 W6
reflects an increase in the prepayment rate observed for the
underlying pool.  The higher prepayments have allowed more
principal payments to be made to the transaction's subordinate
classes, eroding credit support for the senior classes leaving them
vulnerable to potential back-ended losses.  The 12-month CPR has
increased to 19% at October 2016 from 12.4% at April 2016.  The
average 12-month CPR was 12% from April 2014 to April 2016.

The downgrades on class 1-B-1 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5,
on class 1-A-1 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7 and on classes
A-3 and A-4 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-2, are due to
decreased credit enhancement available to these classes.  Both of
these classes have experienced the paydown and write-downs of
junior support classes, therefore eroding credit support.  As a
result, these classes are exposed to potential back ended losses.

The downgrades on classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 from Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2004-D and on classes A-1 and
A-2 from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2005-B
reflect the increase in S&P's projected losses and its belief that
the projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover the projected losses S&P applied at the
previous rating levels.  The increase in S&P's projected losses is
due to higher reported delinquencies during the most recent
performance periods compared to those reported during the previous
review dates.  Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC
2004-D's severe delinquencies increased to 12.1% in October 2016
from 7.4% in October 2014.  Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
Series MLCC 2005-B's severe delinquencies increased to 14.2% in
October 2016 from 8.5% in October 2014.

The downgrade on class 1-A-1 from MASTR Asset Securitization Trust
2005-1 reflects the collateral impact of a recent loan modification
on one large-balanced loan in collateral group 1. This modification
brought the loan from over 90 days delinquent to a reperforming
status, but increased the loan's remaining term from 45 months to
223 months, which results in extending principal payments to class
1-A-1. The maturity date of class 1-A-1 is May 2020, which
ultimately reduces the likelihood of payoff at maturity and exposes
class 1-A-1 to future losses at higher rating scenarios due to the
term extension.

Tail Risk

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7 is backed by a small remaining pool
of mortgage loans.  S&P believes that pools with less than 100
loans remaining create an increased risk of credit instability,
because a liquidation and subsequent loss on one loan, or a small
number of loans, at the tail end of a transaction's life may have a
disproportionate impact on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit
support.  S&P refers to this as "tail risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes I-A-2, II-A-1, III-A,
and IV-A from this transaction by conducting a loan-level analysis
that assesses this risk, as set forth in our tail risk criteria.
Today's rating actions on these classes reflect the application of
S&P's tail risk criteria.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced -- or a complete stop of --
unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.5% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

           http://bit.ly/2h6Kgg8



[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 6 Classes From 5 US CMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from five U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

Specifically, S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on four classes
from four U.S. CMBS transactions due to accumulated interest
shortfalls that S&P expects to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.

S&P also lowered its ratings on two other classes to 'AA- (sf)' and
'CCC- (sf)' from one U.S. CMBS transaction due to current and
potential interest shortfalls.

The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates
are primarily due to one or more of these factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets;

   -- The lack of servicer advancing for loans/assets where the
      servicer has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

   -- Interest rate modifications or deferrals, or both, related
      to corrected mortgage loans; and

   -- Special servicing fees.

S&P's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts based on
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using recent Member
of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P also considered
servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing
fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts according
to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms
call for an ARA equal to 25% of the stated principal balance of a
loan to be implemented when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
time frame.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from the
affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  This is because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the MAI
appraisals.

Servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt-service advancing, the recovery of previously
made advances after an asset was deemed nonrecoverable, or the
failure to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations
have been determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not
limited to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

Discussions of the individual transactions follow.

                     CD 2006-CD3 MORTGAGE TRUST

S&P lowered its rating on the class X-S interest-only (IO)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates to 'AA- (sf)' and the
class B certificates from the same transaction to 'CCC- (sf)' to
reflect current interest shortfalls and accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for one month each.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfalls to the trust will vary
over the near term.  This is primarily due to variable expenses to
the trust as a result of expenses associated with the 660 South
Figueroa Tower asset, which was liquidated from the trust in May
2014.  Due to ongoing litigation with the borrower, the trust has
incurred expenses averaging about $145,000 since October 2015.  The
most recent expense incurred by the trust in the November 2016
trustee remittance report was $351,843.  While the shortfalls to
these classes may be repaid in the near-term, any increase in
expenses can result in additional shortfalls as well as prolong
periods of shortfalls outstanding. But if the shortfalls remain
outstanding for an extended period of time, additional rating
actions may be taken on classes X-S and B.

According to the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $216,441 (offset by
$505,688 of principal proceeds) and resulted primarily from:

   -- Other shortfalls totaling $351,843;
   -- Current ASER totaling $296,945;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $60,404; and
   -- Shortfalls due to interest rate modifications totaling
      $12,933.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
outstanding in the transaction except for class A-M, which is the
most senior class.

      GMAC COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC. SERIES 2004-C2

S&P lowered its rating on the class B commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfall outstanding for seven months.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term.

According to the Nov. 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $245,133 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Interest not advanced totaling $262,997;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $12,512; and
   -- Other shortfalls totaling $1,351.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class B.

              CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2004-C2

S&P lowered its rating on class J commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for five months.  Based on S&P's analysis, it expects
interest shortfalls to continue in the near term.  While class J
may experience repayment of its outstanding interest shortfalls
upon liquidation of certain specially serviced assets, S&P believes
this class will continue to experience future shortfalls in
subsequent periods.

According to the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $85,450 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Current ASER totaling $68,091; and
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $17,359.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class J.

CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP. SERIES
2003-C4

S&P lowered its rating on the class L commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for five months.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term.

According to the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $19,810 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Interest not advanced totaling $19,122; and
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $860.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class L.

              ML-CFC COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-1

S&P lowered its rating on the class C commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for five months.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term.

According to the Nov. 14, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current net monthly interest shortfalls totaled $45,099 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- Other shortfalls totaling $28,133;
   -- Current ASER totaling $14,355;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $1,543; and
   -- Workout fees totaling $1,069.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class C.

RATINGS LOWERED

CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                       Reported
              Rating             interest shortfalls ($)
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
B         CCC- (sf)   CCC (sf)    106,546        106,546
X-S       AA- (sf)    AAA (sf)     12,349         12,349

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                       Reported
              Rating             interest shortfalls ($)
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
J         D (sf)      B+ (sf)      21,445         50,700

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-C4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                       Reported
              Rating             interest shortfalls ($)
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
L         D (sf)      B (sf)        4,943         23,439

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                       Reported
              Rating             interest shortfalls ($)
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
B         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)    82,707        578,949

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                       Reported
              Rating             interest shortfalls ($)
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
C         D (sf)      B- (sf)      36,062        159,799


[*] S&P Puts 90 Tranches From 24 CLO Deals on Watch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed on CreditWatch with positive implications
its ratings on 90 tranches from 24 U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transactions.  At the same time, the rating on one
tranche from one U.S. CLO transaction was placed on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The CreditWatch placements follow
S&P's surveillance review of U.S. cash flow collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions.  The affected tranches had an
original issuance amount of approximately $2.23 billion.

The CreditWatch positive placements resulted from enhanced
overcollateralization due to paydowns to the senior tranches of
these CLO transactions.  All of the transactions have exited their
reinvestment periods.

The CreditWatch negative placement resulted from the failing junior
overcollateralization ratio test and the high concentration of
'CCC' rated assets in the portfolio.  S&P believes that the credit
support available to these notes may no longer be commensurate with
their current rating.  The impacted tranche is subordinate within
its respective transaction and therefore more vulnerable to
distressed market conditions and losses in the transaction.

The table below reflects the year of issuance for the 25
transactions whose ratings were placed on CreditWatch.

Year of issuance    No. of deals
2006                2
2007                6
2011                1
2012                13
2013                1
2015                2

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements within 90 days
after it completes a comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee
review for each of the affected transactions.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ACA CLO 2007-1 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
C           AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
D           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)

AMMC CLO X Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf
C           AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
D           A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
F           BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)

Ares XXIII CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-R-1       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf
B-R-2       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Babson CLO Ltd. 2012-I

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-R         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

Cornerstone CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D           B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

Emerson Place CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)

Flatiron CLO 2011-1 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-1         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
C-2         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO VII Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
A-2R        AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
C-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
D-R         BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Gale Force 3 CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
C           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

Gramercy Park CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
A-2-R       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
C-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
D-R         BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

JFIN CLO 2012 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
A-2a        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2b        AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-1         A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
B-2         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-1         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-F         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C           A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E VFN       BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)
Combo       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

JFIN Revolver CLO 2015-II Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-1         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-F         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C           A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E VFN       BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

JFIN Revolver CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA (sf)
C           A (sf)/Watch Pos     A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BB (sf)

KVK CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C           AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
D           A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

LCM X Ltd. Partnership

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-R         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E-R         BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Madison Park Funding VIII Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-R         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

MAPS CLO Fund II Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners XII Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-1-R       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B-2-R       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E-R         BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)

Schiller Park CLO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
C           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)

Sound Point CLO I Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Stone Tower CLO VI Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Symphony CLO VIII Ltd. Partnership

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
B-R         AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C-R         A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D-R         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E-R         BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
D           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg     B+ (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

                   *** End of Transmission ***