TCR_Public/161204.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 4, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 338

                            Headlines

ACCESS GROUP 2004-A: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on 2 Tranches
APPLIANCES PLUS: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee
ARCAP 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class A Notes
ARROWPOINT CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C6: Fitch Rates Class X-E Notes BB-

CPS AUTO 2012-C: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C7: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. X-E Debt
CREST 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class C Notes
CSAIL 2016-C7: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes

CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
G-STAR 2003-3: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Class A-2 Notes
JER CRE 2006-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 12 Tranches
JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Debt
MCAP CMBS 2014-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Debt
OHA LOAN 2012-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
OHA LOAN 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
SLM STUDENT 2012-7: Fitch Cuts Class A-3 Notes Rating to 'Bsf'
WILLIAMS FLAGGER: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $194.7MM of Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $310.3MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $537MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006

                            *********

ACCESS GROUP 2004-A: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on 2 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior and subordinate notes of Access
Group 2004-A, and revises the Outlooks on the A-3 and A-4 notes to
Positive from Stable, and revises the Outlooks on the B-1 and B-2
notes to Negative from Stable. The Outlook revisions are due to
input errors discovered in the 2015 review of the transaction. The
A-2 note remains on Outlook Stable. The rating actions are as
follows:

   Access Group, Inc. Series 2004-A Indenture of Trust:

   -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
      from Stable;

   -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
      from Stable;

   -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable;

   -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Correction: The revised Outlooks are due to input errors that
result from the 2015 annual surveillance review of the trust. In
the 2015 annual review, the Administrative Allowance fees that were
input are lower than actual, the correction of which has a negative
impact on the subordinate B notes. In the 2015 annual review, while
evaluating the A-3 and A-4 senior notes, the senior parity
requirement for class B paydown that was applied was lower than
actual, the correction of which has a positive impact on the senior
A-3 and A-4 notes.

Adequate Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by
approximately $197.0 million of private student loans as of October
2016. The loans were originated by Access Group, Inc. Projected
remaining gross defaults are expected to be in the range of 7%-9%
of the current collateral balance. A recovery rate of 30% was
applied, which was determined to be appropriate based on the latest
data provided by the issuer.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by
overcollateralization (OC; the excess of trust's asset balance over
bond balance) and excess spread. Senior and total parity ratios are
currently 169.12% and 102.00% respectively.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a
$400,000 capitalized interest account.

Satisfactory Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is
provided by Xerox Education Services. Fitch believes the servicing
operations are acceptable at this time.

Criteria Variation

Eligible Investment: Under the Counterparty Criteria for Structured
Finance and Covered Bonds, dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its
own ratings in analysing counterparty risk and assessing a
counterparty's creditworthiness. The definition of permitted
investments for this deal allows for the possibility of using
investments not rated by Fitch, which represents a criteria
variation. Since the only available funds to invest are monthly
collections, and the funds can only be invested for a short
duration of one month given the payment frequency of the notes,
Fitch doesn't believe such variation has a measurable impact upon
the current ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the bonds and may make certain
bond ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.


APPLIANCES PLUS: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee
---------------------------------------------------------
The Office of the U.S. Trustee on Nov. 30 disclosed in a court
filing that no official committee of unsecured creditors has been
appointed in the Chapter 11 case of Appliances Plus, Inc.

Appliances Plus, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Case No. 16-23814) on October 11,
2016.  The petition was signed by Rocco A. Perla, president.  The
Debtor is represented by Christopher M. Frye, Esq., at Steidl and
Steinberg, P.C.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets and
liabilities of less than $500,000.


ARCAP 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class A Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by ARCap 2005-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation Certificates, Series 2005-1 ("ARCap 2005-1"):

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. While
the credit quality of the current collateral pool has improved
since last review, as evidenced by WARF, the implied and realized
losses to the collateral pool offset this improvement. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

ARCap 2005-1 is a static cash transaction, that is wholly backed by
a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100%
of the pool balance) issued between 2004 and 2005. As of the
October 21, 2016 report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $533.7 million,
compared to $568.3 million at issuance with the paydown directed to
the senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of full and
partial amortization of the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5786,
compared to 7130 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (4.3% compared to 0.0% at last
review); A1-A3 (2.8% compared to 0.0% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(3.9% compared to 3.7% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (9.0% compared to
7.2% at last review; B1-B3 (18.9% compared to 12.0% at last review;
and Caa1-Ca/C (61.0%, compared to 77.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.3 years, the same as that at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through loan exposure.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.3%, compared to 100% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ARROWPOINT CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Arrowpoint CLO 2013-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by Arrowpoint Asset Management LLC.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D
notes following payment in full on the Nov. 25, 2016, refinancing
date.

On the Nov. 25, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.


The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, also:

   -- Issue the notes at a higher spread than the original notes.
   -- Issue the notes as floating-rate notes.
   -- Extend the stated maturity, reinvestment period, and
      weighted average life test by approximately four years.
   -- Change the concentration limitations: other than senior
      secured loans, cash and eligible investments went to 6.0%
      from 5.0%; 'CCC' rated collateral obligations went to 7.5%
      from 5.0%; and, additionally, it is anticipated that the
      transaction will no longer be able to purchase bonds or
      letter of credit obligations.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Arrowpoint CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             225.72
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               44.28
B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                26.28
C-R (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              16.92
D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              18.00
Subordinated notes        NR                    36.20

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Arrowpoint CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Original class            Rating
A-1                       AAA (sf)
A-2                       AA+ (sf)
B (deferrable)            A+ (sf)
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.



CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C6: Fitch Rates Class X-E Notes BB-
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Cantor Commercial Real Estate
CFCRE 2016-C6 Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2016-C6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are slightly
better than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed- rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of
1.19x and 103.6%, respectively, are slightly better than the YTD
2016 average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.19x and 105.8%,
respectively. The Fitch Stressed DSCR and LTV for the conduit
portion of the pool (net of Investment-Grade Credit-Opinion Loans)
are 1.14x and 112.2%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit-Opinion Loans: Two loans representing 17.8%
of the pool have investment-grade credit opinions. Potomac Mills
(8.9% of the pool) received an investment grade credit opinion of
'BBBsf*' on a standalone basis. Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ (8.9% of
the pool) received an investment grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'
on a standalone basis.

Below-Average Amortization: Eight loans comprising 48.0% of the
pool are full interest-only. This is worse than average when
compared to other Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals of 23.3% for
2015 and 32.4% for YTD 2016. There are 10 loans comprising 15.3% of
the pool which are partial interest-only. This is better than
averages of 43.1% for 2015 and 36.0% YTD 2016 for other Fitch-rated
U.S. deals. Overall, the pool is scheduled to pay down by 8.9%
which is worse than average when compared with the averages of
11.7% for 2015 and 10.3% YTD 2016 for the other Fitch-rated U.S.
deals.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.68% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CFCRE
2016-C6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP. The third party due diligence information was provided on
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Cantor Commercial Real Estate CFCRE 2016-C6 Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2016-C6

   -- $30,937,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $33,226,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $220,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $267,118,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $551,281,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $98,443,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $59,066,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $39,377,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,408,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19,689,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,875,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $42,331,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19,689,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,875,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Since Fitch issued its presale report on October 25, 2016, the
interest-only classes X-C and X-D were removed from the transaction
and the ratings were subsequently withdrawn as they were no longer
applicable. Fitch does not rate the $30,517,880ab interest-only
class X-G or the $30,517,880a class G. The classes above reflect
the final ratings and deal structure.


CPS AUTO 2012-C: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 14 and affirmed 29
securities from CPS Auto Receivables Trusts issued between 2012 and
2015. The transactions are serviced by Consumer Portfolio Services,
Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follow:

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

   -- Class A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Class D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Class E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B1 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

   -- Class A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Class D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

   -- Class A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Class D, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Class E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-B

   -- Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016

      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

   -- Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

   -- Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

   -- Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

   -- Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016

      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

   -- Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 7,
      2016 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016

      Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are based on the build-up of credit enhancement due to
non-declining reserve accounts. Other credit enhancement for the
deals includes overcollateralization and the sequential pay
structure of transactions issued after 2013-B. All CPS transactions
issued prior to the 2013-C have pro-rata structures, in which bonds
are due to receive target payments. Weak deal performance has been
offset in part by the build-up of credit enhancement.

The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectations were increased
on the 2012-D, 2013-A and 2013-B transactions from 18.00% to
19.00%, on the 2013-D and 2014-A transactions from 17.00% to
19.00%, and on the 2014-D and 2015-A transactions from 15.50% to
19.00%. The CNL expectations were unchanged at 19.00% on the 2012-C
and 2013-C transactions. The increased CNL expectations were due to
worse than expected collateral performance.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the November 2016
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL expected loss expressed as a percentage of the original pool
balance; Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and Moody's Aaa
(sf) level, both expressed as a percentage of the current pool
balance. The Aaa level is the level of credit enhancement
consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset pool.
Performance metrics include pool factor or the ratio of the current
collateral balance to the original collateral balance at closing;
total credit enhancement, which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per
annum excess spread.

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 19.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 18.08%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 11.64%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 43.59%, Class B.
      34.59%, Class C 29.60%, Class D 20.52%, Class E 17.77%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.6%

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) - 18.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 23.37%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 13.62%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 42.34%, Class B
      33.34%, Class C 25.70%, Class D 19.12%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 15.0%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) - 18.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 19.47%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 18.36%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 40.20%, Class B.
      31.20%, Class C 21.20%, Class D 16.07%, Class E 15.28%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 15.2%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-B

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 18.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 20.70%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 21.76%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 38.85%, Class B.
      29.85%, Class C 19.85%, Class D 15.72%, Class E 15.49%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.8%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 19.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 17.44%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 25.71%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class B. 63.77%, Class C
      40.44%, Class D 20.99%, Class E 10.29%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 12.5%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 17.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 20.15%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 44.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 29.06%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 98.94%, Class B.
      58.51%, Class C 37.85%, Class D 20.65%, Class E 11.17%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.0%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation - 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 17.00%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 22.33%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 44.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 34.37%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 93.11%, Class B.
      59.65%, Class C 32.73%, Class D 18.19%, Class E 10.18%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.0%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 15.50%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 20.50%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 46.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 51.47%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 70.54%, Class B.
      41.40%, Class C 21.00%, Class D 12.26%, Class E 5.94%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.5%

   Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

   -- Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (June
      2016) -- 15.50%

   -- Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 21.49%

   -- Aaa (sf) level - 46.00%

   -- Pool factor -- 59.06%

   -- Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 61.99%, Class B.
      36.60%, Class C 18.82%, Class D 11.20%, Class E 5.69%

   -- Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.7%

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of
payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US job
market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C7: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. X-E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Ratings
Outlooks to the Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C7
pass-through certificates:

   -- $40,491,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5,938,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15,900,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $163,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,354,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $65,656,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $590,113,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29,746,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52,774,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29,746,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,422,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,029,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,595,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,098,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,029,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,595,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $32,624,581ab class X-NR and the
$32,624,581a class NR.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 53 loans secured by 199
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$767,627,581 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Column Financial Inc., Benefit Street Partners CRE
Finance LLC, and Silverpeak Real Estate Finance LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 72.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.6%, and asset summary reviews
of 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage In-Line with Recent Transactions: The Fitch loan to
value (LTV) and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) are 104.7% and
1.16x, respectively, compared to the year-to-date (YTD) averages of
105.8% and 1.19x. Excluding credit opinion loans and loans secured
by multifamily cooperative properties, Fitch's normalized LTV and
DSCR are 109.6% and 1.11x, respectively.

Above-Average Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the pool will pay down 16.2%, which is above the YTD
average of 10.3%. Two loans representing 8.6% of the pool are
interest-only loans, 17 loans representing 40.0% of the pool are
partial interest-only, and the remaining 35 loans (51.4% of the
pool) are balloon loans with loan terms of five to 10 years.

Highly Correlated Pool by Property Type and Geography: The largest
property type concentration is retail at 40.7% of the pool,
followed by office at 27.7% and multifamily at 18.5%. The pool is
highly concentrated by geography with 30.3% of the pool in Florida.
Additionally, 50.5% of the pool is located in the Southeast BEA
Geographic region.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 8.6% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions. The 9 West 57th Street
senior note (6.5% of the pool) contributed to the trust has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'AAAsf*' on a stand-alone basis.
GLP Industrial Portfolio Pool B (2.1% of the pool) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'A+sf*' on a stand-alone basis
and 'AAAsf*' on a pooled basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSAIL
2016-C7 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from KPMG LLP.
The due diligence focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and the findings
did not have an impact on our analysis/conclusions.


CREST 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
notes issued by Crest 2001-1, Ltd.:

   -- Cl. C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2034,
      Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 25, 2015 Affirmed Ca
      (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the note because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

Crest 2001-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the collateral pool balance). As of the August 25, 2016 trustee
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, is $33.6 million, compared to $500.0 million at
issuance. The paydowns are the result of regular amortization and
prepayment of assets, including credit risk collateral, as well as
the redirection of interest to pay principal as the result of the
failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains two assets totaling $7.2 million (100.0% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's October 28, 2016 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect significant/moderate losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000
compared to 7,132 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 28.7% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (100.0% compared to 71.3% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.5 years, compared to 3.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, given the current outstanding ratings and the
key transaction indicators, Moody's believes that it is unlikely
that the ratings are sensitive to further stresses in recovery
rates.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CSAIL 2016-C7: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-C7 (the Certificates) to be issued by CSAIL 2016-C7 Commercial
Mortgage Trust:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-F at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-NR at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class C at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-E, X-F, X-NR, D, E and F have been privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-E, X-F and X-NR balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood
of receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.
DBRS considers the IO certificates’ position within the
transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

The collateral consists of 53 fixed-rate loans secured by 199
commercial properties comprising a total transaction balance of
$767,627,582. The transaction has a sequential-pay pass-through
structure. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the
provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of loan
default within the term, as well as liquidity at maturity. When the
cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Stabilized net
cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual constants, two loans,
representing 4.7% of the total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess
refinance risk given the current low interest rate environment,
DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This
resulted in 17 loans, representing 43.6% of the pool, having
refinance DSCRs below 1.00x.

Two loans exhibit credit characteristics consistent with an
investment-grade shadow rating: 9 West 57th Street and GLP
Industrial Portfolio Pool B. Nine West 57th Street is the
third-largest loan, representing 6.5% of the pool, and has credit
characteristics consistent with a AAA shadow rating. GLP Industrial
Portfolio Pool B, the 16th largest loan, representing 2.1% of the
pool, has credit characteristics consistent with an A (high) shadow
rating. Additionally, three of the largest 15 loans, which comprise
31.8% of the DBRS sample, exhibit strong sponsorship: Coconut
Point, Gurnee Mills and Peachtree Mall. All three loans are in the
top ten and comprise 26.0% of the total transaction. The sponsors
of all three loans not only have extensive experience in the
commercial real estate sector, but they also exhibit significant
financial wherewithal. The pool exhibits a strong DBRS Term DSCR of
1.48x based on the whole loan balances, which indicates moderate
term default risk. Eleven loans, representing 19.8% of the pool,
three of which are in the top ten, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess
of 1.50x. Furthermore, only two loans are secured by properties
that are fully leased to a single tenant. Both loans, encompassing
6.3% of the total pool, are in the top 15 and include CVS Office
Centre Building (#6), which comprises 3.7% of the transaction, and
BJ’s Wholesale Club – Miami (#11), which comprises 2.6% of the
total transaction. Loans secured by properties occupied by single
tenants have been found to suffer from higher loss severities in
the event of default.

The pool is concentrated based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to that of a pool of 22 equal-sized loans. The
largest five and ten loans total 37.0% and 50.0% of the pool,
respectively. The transaction has a notable above-average
concentration of loans suffering from elevated refinance risk. The
transaction’s weighted-average DBRS refinance (Refi) DSCR is
1.04x, with 17 loans, representing 43.6% of the pool, demonstrating
DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 1.00x. Additionally, five loans,
representing 26.8% of the pool, demonstrate DBRS Refi DSCRs less
than 0.90x. Lastly, the pool has a high concentration of properties
that are securitized by assets that are fully or primarily used as
retail, representing 40.7% of the pool. The retail sector has
generally underperformed since the Great Recession because of a
general decline in consumer spending power, store closures, chain
bankruptcies and the rapidly growing popularity of e-commerce.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, e-commerce sales represented
7.0% of total retail sales in 2015 compared with 3.9% in 2009. As
the e-commerce share of sales is expected to continue to grow
significantly in the coming years, the retail real estate sector
may continue to be relatively weak.

The DBRS sample included 31 of the 53 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 56 of the 199 properties in the
portfolio (75.8% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS
conducted meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent
or a representative of the borrowing entity for 54.4% of the pool.
The DBRS sample had an average NCF variance of -10.0%, ranging from
-30.3% to 1.8%.

The rating assigned to Class F differs from the higher rating
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation, and in this case, the ratings reflect
the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to occur
post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-MFF (the Certificates) issued by CSMC Trust 2016-MFF. The
trends are Stable.

   -- Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-CP at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-EXT at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class D at A (high) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All classes have been privately placed.

The Class X-CP and Class X-EXT balances are notional and interest
accrual will be calculated based on the balance of the A-2 portion
of the Class A certificates. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO)
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers the IO
certificates' position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral for the transaction consists of the fee interest in
27 single-tenant retail stores across Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa
that are subject to one Master Lease. The properties are wholly
occupied by Mills Fleet Farm (MFF), the farm goods and home
improvement retail chain. The MFF portfolio contains 27 locations
and the properties vary in age – construction dates range from
1958 to 2013 – but have an average vintage of roughly 26 years.
All properties that were built before 2000 have since been
renovated. The properties range in size from 110,291 square feet
(sf) to 292,774 sf. MFF was acquired by an affiliate of KKR & Co.
L.P. (KKR) in February 2016 for a purchase price of roughly $1.6
billion. KKR currently has approximately $600.0 million of equity
invested in the company.

At loan closing, MFF entered into a 25-year Master Lease with a
sponsor-affiliate that is structured with four five-year extension
options. Rent increases throughout the portfolio by 2.0% annually.
The Master Lease rent payment of $42,875,000 equates to a lease in
place (LIP) of $7.21 per square foot (psf) triple net. The Master
Lease rent of $7.21 psf is supported by Cushman & Wakefield's
weighted-average (WA) market-rent determination of $6.83 psf. The
allocated individual properties LIP rental rates range from $4.00
psf to $11.26 psf, which is similar to the appraiser's market-rent
rental range for the portfolio from $4.00 psf to $10.75 psf. Based
on a CoStar query conducted on September 20, 2016, for retail
rental rates within a ten-mile radius around the property, the WA
net rentable area by property CoStar rental rate of $10.09 psf is
higher than the $7.21 psf LIP for the portfolio. CoStar also
purported a WA vacancy rate of 7.2%, which is in line with the
DBRS-underwritten economic vacancy figure of 7.5%, but above the
in-place vacancy rate of 0.0%.

DBRS identified 16 properties located in either rural or tertiary
markets, accounting for 46.0% of the total allocated senior loan
balance. Properties located in tertiary and rural markets are
disadvantaged by access to liquidity, especially in times of
economic stress, relative to properties located in core suburban
and urban markets. When determining the cap rate, DBRS applied a
10.5% cap rate to properties located in tertiary markets and an
11.5% cap rate to properties located in rural markets, which is 100
basis points (bps) and 200 bps higher than the 9.5% cap rate
applied to suburban properties, respectively. DBRS noted during the
site inspection that the majority of properties located in tertiary
and rural markets were well positioned off their city's respective
primary commercial thoroughfares and near local highways. Many of
the older MFF properties were the first to-market big-box retailers
in their respective markets and helped to establish the local
retail corridors. According to the current management at MFF, the
original founders sought out locations in Wisconsin with the
highest density of cows when choosing store locations to be near
farming communities. Since the first MFF was constructed in 1959,
MFF – Marshfield, big-box competitors such as Walmart, Target,
The Home Depot, Cabela's, Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse,
Menards and Tractor Supply Company (Tractor) have leased big-box
locations near MFF. The stores' steady growth and limited operation
volatility have benefited from a diverse product mix, business
lines and loyal customer base. While the portfolio's average sales
of $333.00 psf are below competitive big-box retailers such as
Walmart at $423.00 psf and Cabela's at $349.00 psf, the portfolio's
sales compare favorably with competitors such as Target at $303.00
psf and Tractor at $258.00 psf. For the trailing 12 months (T-12)
ending June 2016 period, total portfolio sales were $1.13 billion,
$189.00 psf based on total square footage and $333.00 psf based on
selling square footage. Throughout the recession in 2007 to 2009,
MFF outperformed its retail peers and demonstrated positive EBITDA
growth in each of those years and only one year with same-store
decline (-1.2%) in 2009. The properties exhibit a favorable
EBITDAR-to-Master Lease rent ratio of 3.90 times for the T-12
ending June 2016 period.

Loan proceeds, mezzanine debt and sponsor cash equity financed the
acquisition of real estate collateral that was previously
unencumbered with real estate debt and had not been securitized.
Cushman & Wakefield has determined the as-is fee-simple value of
the property to be $496.0 million ($83.44 psf) using an 8.2% cap
rate. The DBRS-concluded value of $343.3 million ($57.76 psf)
equates to a 30.8% discount to the appraiser's value and is based
on a WA portfolio 10.0% cap rate. The resulting DBRS loan-to-value
ratio of 81.6% is indicative of leverage that is considered to be
very favorable and is further supported by the loan's strong 12.3%
DBRS Debt Yield. Cushman & Wakefield has determined the dark value
for the portfolio to be $258,700,000 ($43.52 psf) based on a WA
7.94% cap rate. The loan proceeds of $43.23 psf for Class E of the
capital structure are noted to be in line with the appraiser's dark
value estimate of $43.52 psf. The two-year initial term and three
one-year extension terms are IO throughout.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.



CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by CSMC
Trust 2016-MFF, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2016-MFF:

   -- Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Interest-Only Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

CSMC Trust 2016-MFF is a securitization backed by a single floating
rate loan collateralized by a portfolio of 27 standalone retail
properties all occupied under a unitary Master Lease by a Midwest
regional outdoor and lifestyle retailer, Mills Fleet Farm. Our
ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of the
transaction.

Our approach to rating this transaction involved the application of
both our Single Borrower methodology and our IO Rating methodology.
The rating approach for securities backed by a single loan compares
the credit risk inherent in the underlying property or properties
with the credit protection offered by the structure. The
structure's credit enhancement is quantified by the maximum
deterioration in property value that the securities are able to
withstand under various stress scenarios without causing an
increase in the expected loss for various rating levels. In
assigning single borrower ratings, we also consider a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of the loan is determined primarily by two factors:
1) our assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by the DSCR, and 2) our assessment of the severity of loss
in the event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

Moody's DSCR is based on our stabilized net cash flow. The Moody's
Trust First Mortgage DSCR is 2.46X and the Moody's Trust First
Mortgage Stressed DSCR at a 9.25% constant is 1.25X. The Moody's
LTV ratio for the Trust First Mortgage balance is 98.7%.

The loan is secured by a portfolio which has a property level
Herfindahl score of 23.5. A loan that is secured by multiple
properties benefits from lower cash flow volatility given pooling.
Excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment another's
cash flow to meet debt service requirements. Although multiple
property loans also benefit from the pooling of equity from each
underlying property, significant correlations exist due to pooling
within a single property type, especially with respect to
properties exposed to a both single industry and in this instance a
single tenant.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

“Our review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which we use for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions.” Moody's said. The large loan model
derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from our MLTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type. These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations. Our
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator which references the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for losses
for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO
type corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology. Please see the Ratings Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5%, 13.8%,
or 21.9%, the model-indicated rating for the currently rated Aaa
(sf) class would be Aa1 (sf), Aa3 (sf), or A2 (sf), and currently
rated Aa3 (sf) class would be A2 (sf), Baa1 (sf), or Baa3 (sf),
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather they
are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal
has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings
impact of each scenario from a quantitative/ model-indicated
standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.



G-STAR 2003-3: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Class A-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by G-Star 2003-3, Ltd.:

   -- Cl. A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038, Affirmed Caa1
      (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038, Affirmed Ca
      (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on two classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

G-Star 2003-3, Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) asset backed securities, primarily in the form of
residential subprime securities (ABS) (89.6% of collateral pool
balance); ii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (5.5%);
and iii) real estate investment trust bonds (REIT) (4.9%). As of
the September 15, 2016 note valuation report, the aggregate note
balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, has
decreased to $89.3 million from $426.0 at issuance, as a result of
pre-payments and regular amortization, recoveries from defaulted
collateral, and principal proceeds resulting from the failure of
certain par value and interest coverage tests.

The pool contains eleven assets totaling $8.2 million (26.5% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's October 17, 2016 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5763,
compared to 5846 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 3.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.1% compared to 0.3% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(11.3% compared to 10.6% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (3.7% compared to
2.9% at last review); B1-B3 (15.7% compared to 17.0% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (69.1% compared to 66.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.3 years, compared to 3.4 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 4.4%, compared to 6.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 18.9%, compared to 9.7% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other key parameters constant, reducing
the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by 5% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to one notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of
the collateral pool by 5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch
up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


JER CRE 2006-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 12 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by JER CRE CDO 2006-2, Ltd.:

   -- Cl. A-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. B-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015  
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. G-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. H-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. J-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the notes because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

JER CRE CDO 2006-2, Ltd. is a currently static (the re-investment
period ended in October 2011) cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) CRE CDOs (67.5% of the collateral pool balance);
ii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (21.3%); and iii)
mezzanine interests (11.2%). As of the October 20, 2016 note
valuation report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $752.3 million from $1.2 billion at issuance. This
decrease was primarily due to regular amortization, recoveries on
defaulted assets, interest re-classified as principal on defaulted
assets, and interest re-classified as principal as a result of
failing certain par value and interest coverage triggers.

The pool contains six assets totaling $44.0 million (86.6% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's October 20, 2016 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect significant/moderate losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9784,
compared to 9281 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (2.2% compared to 0.0% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 2.2% at last review); and Caa-Ca/C
(97.8%, the same as at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 1.7 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through loan exposure.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.2%, compared to 11.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced today are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to JPMDB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-C4
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

   -- $38,299,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $300,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $381,323,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $67,443,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $879,826,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61,841,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $92,761,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61,841,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $47,786,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $101,194,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $53,408,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22,487,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11,244,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

   -- $47,786,756a class NR.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest only.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 36 loans secured by 42
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,124,378,757 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association and
German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 90.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage is Below 2016 YTD Average: The pool has lower
leverage than other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV for the trust are 1.23x and 102.4%,
respectively, while the 2016 YTD averages are 1.19x and 105.8%.
Excluding credit-opinion loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are
1.16x and 113.2%, respectively.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four
loans in the pool, representing 20.1%, have investment-grade credit
opinions, well above the 2016 YTD average of 7.4%. The two largest
loans in the pool, 9 West 57th Street (7.1%) and 10 Hudson Yards
(7.1%), have investment-grade credit opinions of 'AAAsf'* and
'BBBsf'*, respectively, on a stand-alone basis. Moffett Gateway
(3.8%), the ninth largest loan in the pool, has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf'* on a stand-alone basis. Furthermore,
Westfield San Francisco Centre (2.1%) has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'Asf'* on a stand-alone basis. The implied credit
enhancement levels for the conduit portion of the transaction of
'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are 26.750% and 9.125%, respectively.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The 10 largest loans account for
51.9% of the pool by balance, compared to the 2016 YTD average of
54.7%. The pool's loan concentration index (LCI) is 398, which is
lower than the 2016 YTD average of 421.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMDB
2016-C4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could occur. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could occur. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 12.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on Fitch's
analysis or conclusions.


MCAP CMBS 2014-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-1 (the Certificates) issued
by MCAP CMBS Issuer Corporation, Series 2014-1 as follows:

   -- Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (sf)

   -- Class G at B (sf)

   -- Class X at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class H.

The rating confirmations reflect that the transaction's current
performance remains stable. The collateral consists of 32
fixed-rate loans secured by 40 commercial properties. As of the
November 2016 remittance report, all 32 loans remain in the pool
with an aggregate outstanding principal balance of approximately
$212.4 million, representing a collateral reduction of 5.2% since
issuance because of scheduled loan amortization. To date, 30 loans
(97.5% of the pool) have reported YE2015 financials. While the two
remaining loans (2.5% of the pool) have not yet reported any
financials, they are both 100.0% occupied, with no tenant rollover
through August 2018. According to YE2015 financials, the pool had a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.38 times (x) and 9.7%, respectively, compared with
the DBRS underwritten (UW) figures of 1.25x and 8.3%, respectively.
No loans have any interest-only periods, and seven loans (20.6% of
the pool) are seasoned loans with one to 17 months remaining prior
to maturity. There is a sponsor concentration, as 11 loans,
representing 47.4% of the current pool balance, have related
borrowers to one or more loans within the pool; however, these
loans all have full or partial recourse to their respective
borrowers. Transaction-wide, 22 loans, representing 60.1% of the
current pool balance, have either partial or full recourse to their
respective borrowers. Based on YE2015 financials, the Top 15 loans
(72.5% of the pool) reported a WA DSCR of 1.36x compared with the
DBRS UW figure of 1.25x, reflecting a WA amortizing net cash flow
(NCF) growth of 12.5% over the DBRS UW figures.

There are six loans with scheduled maturities through YE2017,
representing 19.4% of the pool. The DBRS WA Refinance DSCR and WA
Exit Debt Yield for these loans is 1.27x and 9.8%, respectively.
According to the servicer, the timely repayment or refinance of all
of these loans is anticipated at maturity. As of the November 2016
remittance, there are no loans in special servicing and six loans
(23.5% of the pool) on the servicer's watchlist. Four of these
loans (12.3% of the pool) were flagged because of near-term
maturity, while the remaining two loans, 1 & 20 Royal Gate
Boulevard (Prospectus ID#3, 6.5% of the pool) and the Stephenson
Building (Prospectus ID#6, 4.7% of the pool) were placed on the
watchlist for performance-related reasons; these two loans are
highlighted below.

The 1 & 20 Royal Gate Boulevard loan is secured by the fee interest
in a 284,135-square foot (sf) flex property consisting of
industrial (67.5% of the net rentable area (NRA)) and office (32.5%
of the NRA) space located in Vaughn, Ontario. The two-storey
structure was originally constructed in 1990 and expanded to its
current size in 1996. The subject is composed of four industrial
units and seven office units. As of June 2016, the property was
63.3% occupied with an average rental rate of $6.58 per square foot
(psf), down from 83.2% occupied with an average rental rate of
$6.92 psf in July 2014. Two tenants, Dilesh Bhullar (2.8% of the
NRA) and Silicor Materials Inc. (30.1% of the NRA) had lease
expirations and vacated as of April 2015 and December 2015,
respectively. Ideal Warehouse Innovations Inc. (13.1% of the NRA)
recently extended its lease through February 2020. The triple net
lease has an initial annual base rental rate of $5.50 psf for the
first four years, with contractual increases in years five, seven
and nine structured into the agreement. Tenant improvements were
provided prior to the tenant's taking occupancy; however, DBRS was
not provided with the cost of the improvements provided by the
borrower. Prior to YE2017, two tenants, representing 5.0% of the
NRA, will have lease expirations, the larger of the two being
Metroland Media Group (3.2% of the NRA), which has a lease
expiration in December 2017. According to the servicer, Cushman &
Wakefield is actively marketing the property at a net asking rate
of approximately $5.50 psf. The servicer reports that there has
been interest shown in the space; however, discussions with a
previous tenant of interest did not come to fruition. Although no
offers are currently outstanding, the borrower has indicated that
the 100,000 sf of space previously occupied by Silicor Materials
Inc., will be available in units demised to 40,000 sf and 60,000
sf. According to Cushman & Wakefield, as of Q3 2016, industrial
properties within the GTA North market had an average rental rate
of $5.77 psf and a vacancy rate of 2.7%. The loan has partial
recourse (50.0%) to the guarantor and benefits from a $1.95 million
letter of credit (LOC) from the Toronto-Dominion Bank, which was
provided by the borrower to mitigate rollover. The LOC may be
reduced during the loan term, pending the renewal or re-leasing of
the rolling and vacant space at market rates, in addition to
maintaining a minimum NCF DSCR of 1.25x. As of YE2015, the loan had
a DSCR of 1.55x; however, it is expected that the YE2016 figure
will decrease given the departure of Silicor Materials Inc. DBRS
modeled the loan with a stressed cash flow to recognize the
anticipated decline in performance caused by loss in rental
revenue.

The Stephenson Building is secured by a 62,843 sf, Class B office
property located in the Beltline District of Calgary, Alberta.
Originally constructed in 1980, improvements consist of a
seven-storey office building containing 2,153 sf of ground floor
retail space, as well as a 136-space underground parking garage.
The loan was added to the servicer's watchlist as of July 2016
following significant tenant rollover. At issuance, the property
was 100.0% occupied by five tenants, the largest being Krupp Canada
(Krupp; (60.3% of the NRA); however, as of July 2015, Krupp elected
to downsize its space by one unit (15.0% of the NRA), bringing
occupancy down to 85.0%. Krupp was expected to sign a five-year
renewal for the remainder of its space (45.3% of the NRA, with a
lease expiration in July 2016); however, as confirmed by the July
2016 servicer site inspection, the tenant vacated the premises.
According to the servicer, the tenant has relocated to another
building in the area as a result of more favourable terms.
Following the departure of three smaller tenants (5.1% of the NRA),
Alberta Health Services (AHS, (34.6% of the NRA)) remains the sole
occupant at the property, paying $19.00 psf with a lease expiring
in November 2017. According to the servicer, AHS has expressed
interest in expanding its space by a floor or two, while the
borrower has put out a proposal to another tenant for three floors;
however, both discussions are in early stages. Per Cushman &
Wakefield's Q3 2016 Marketbeat report, office properties located in
the Beltline submarket reported an average rental rate of $36.07
psf gross with an average vacancy rate of 18.6% compared with the
overall Calgary markets Class B office property rates of $34.10 psf
gross and 19.4%, respectively. The property is currently managed
and marketed by Strategic Group of Companies (Strategic), which
owns, manages, leases and develops commercial properties, with a
large concentration of properties located in Calgary and Edmonton.
The loan has partial recourse to the guarantor, the CEO and founder
of Strategic, who reported a personal net worth of approximately
$460 million as of January 2015. As of YE2015, the loan had a DSCR
of 0.74x, down from 1.28x at YE2014 and the DBRS UW figure of
1.24x. DBRS has modeled the loan with a stressed cash flow to
recognize the loss in rental revenue.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and rating
outlooks to Morgan Stanley Capital I trust 2016-BNK2 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

   -- $31,400,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,700,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $50,600,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $160,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $194,805,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $482,505,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $85,300,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52,558,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,742,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,879,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,050,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,050,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,047,000ac class E-1 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,047,000ac class E-2 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18,094,000ac class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6,893,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,987,000ac class EF 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

   -- $3,446,500ac class F-1;

   -- $3,446,500ac class F-2;

   -- $6,031,000ac class G-1;

   -- $6,031,000ac class G-2;

   -- $12,062,000ac class G;

   -- $37,049,000ac class EFG;

   -- $7,755,027ac class H-1;

   -- $7,755,028ac class H-2;

   -- $15,510,055ac class H;

   -- $36,278,582ad RRI Interest.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.
c) The class E-1 and E-2 certificates may be exchanged for a
related amount of class E certificates, and the class E
certificates may be exchanged for a ratable portion of class E-1
and E-2 certificates. Class E-1 is senior to class E-2. Likewise,
class F, G and H, and corresponding exchangeable classes, are
structured in a similar fashion. Additionally, a holder of class
E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates may exchange such classes of
certificates (on an aggregate basis) for a related amount of class
EF certificates, and a holder of class EF certificates may exchange
that class EF for a ratable portion of each class of the class E-1,
E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates. A holder of class E-1, E-2, F-1,
F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates may exchange such classes of
certificates (on an aggregate basis) for a related amount of class
EFG certificates, and a holder of class EFG certificates may
exchange that class EFG for a ratable portion of each class of the
class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates.
d) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
pool balance (as of the closing date).

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Nov. 22, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 43
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$725,571,637 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association, and Bank of America, National
Association.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 1.28x and 106.4%, respectively,
are better than the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average Fitch DSCR and
Fitch LTV of 1.19x and 105.8%, respectively.

Low Mortgage Coupons: The pool's weighted average mortgage coupon
is 3.93%, well below historical averages and below the YTD 2016
average of 4.62%. Fitch accounted for increased refinance risk in a
higher interest rate environment by reviewing an interest rate
sensitivity that assumes an interest rate floor of 5.0% for the
term risk for most property types, 4.5% for multifamily properties,
and 6.0% for hotel properties, in conjunction with Fitch's stressed
refinance rates, which were 9.68% on a weighted average basis.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The top 10 loans comprise 60.0% of
the pool, which is greater than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of
49.3% and 54.7%, respectively. The pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) is 483, which is above the YTD 2016 average of 421.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.0% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSC
2016-BNK2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 12.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Deloitte &
Touche, LLP. The due diligence focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on our
analysis/conclusions.


OHA LOAN 2012-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R fixed- and floating-rate
replacement notes from OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013 that
is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P.  The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed amended and supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Nov. 29, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to us in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the preliminary rating levels associated with these
rating actions," S&P said.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2012-1 Inc.
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-R                  AAA (sf)      220.00
B-1-R                AA (sf)        38.00
B-2-R                AA (sf)        11.50
C-R                  A (sf)         25.50
D-R                  BBB (sf)       18.00
E-R                  BB (sf)        17.00
Subordinated notes   NR             40.50

NR--Not rated.


OHA LOAN 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of notes issued by OHA
Loan Funding 2014-1, LLC.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying portfolio, the sufficient credit enhancement available
to the notes, and the asset model implied ratings.  As of the
October 2016 trustee report, the transaction continues to pass all
coverage tests and collateral quality tests, with no reported
defaults.  Portfolio Credit Model results show that expected
default and loss rates have declined since last review and are
below those modeled in the Fitch stressed portfolio cash flow
analysis at transaction close.

The total loan portfolio par amount plus $45.2 million principal
cash is approximately $848.5 million, as of the October 2016
trustee report.  The weighted average spread (WAS) of the portfolio
has tightened to 4.05% from 4.58% at last review in November 2015,
relative to a minimum WAS trigger of 4.0%; however, remains above
3.65% stressed at initial rating.  The portfolio, excluding cash,
is invested in 98.4% senior secured loans. Approximately 86.6% of
the portfolio has strong recovery prospects or a Fitch-assigned
recovery rating of 'RR2' or higher.  The performing portfolio
remains in the 'B/B-' range, according to Fitch's Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) Equivalency Map.

The Stable Outlook on each class of notes of OHA 2014-1 reflects
the expectation that the notes have sufficient levels of credit
protection to withstand potential deterioration in the credit
quality of the portfolio.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the notes may be sensitive to a higher rate of asset
defaults and portfolio migration or significantly lower recoveries
as compared to the levels expected at the initial rating.  Fitch
conducted rating sensitivity analysis on the closing date of OHA
2014-1, incorporating increased levels of defaults and reduced
levels of recovery rates, among other sensitivities.

Initial Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivity are further
described in the New Issue Report published on Nov. 11, 2014.

OHA 2014-1 is an arbitrage cash flow CLO that is managed by Oak
Hill Advisors L.P., with a reinvestment period ending in October
2018 and a noncall period, which ended in October 2016.  The
manager has the ability to reinvest unscheduled principal proceeds
and sales proceeds from the disposal of credit risk or credit
improved obligations after the reinvestment period, subject to
certain conditions.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs' using
Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) to project future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $507,000,000 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25,000,000 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $52,000,000 class B-1 notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $29,800,000 class B-2 notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,000,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38,500,000 class D notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,500,000 class E notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.



SLM STUDENT 2012-7: Fitch Cuts Class A-3 Notes Rating to 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2012-7 (SLM 2012-7):

   -- Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating
      Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- Class A-3 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'A+sf'; removed from Rating

      Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook.

The class A-3 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
13.75% and a 41.25% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 13.75% implies a
constant default rate of 4.1% (assuming a weighted average life of
10.1 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, Income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 11.0%, 17.6%, 16.3% and 13.0%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.06%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread and, for the class A notes, subordination. As of September
2016, total and senior effective parity ratios, respectively, are
101.01% (1.00% CE) and 106.33% (5.95% CE). Liquidity support is
provided by a reserve account sized at the greater of 0.25% of the
pool balance and $1,248,784, currently equal to $1,886,410.10. The
trust will continue to release cash as long as the target
overcollateralization amount of the greater of 1.00%of adjusted
pool balance or $1,300,000 is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
class A-2 notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final
maturity dates under the 'AAA' stress scenarios. The A-3 and B
notes do not pay off before their maturity date in Fitch's
modelling scenarios, including the base cases. If the breach of the
class A-3 maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them
to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer of FFELP student
loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated July 18, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Fitch does not
believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf';

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'BBsf';

   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'AAAsf';

   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.


WILLIAMS FLAGGER: U.S. Trustee Unable to Appoint Committee
----------------------------------------------------------
The Office of the U.S. Trustee on Nov. 30 disclosed in a court
filing that no official committee of unsecured creditors has been
appointed in the Chapter 11 case of Williams Flagger Logistics,
LLC.

Williams Flagger Logistics, LLC, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Case No. 16-23882) on October 17, 2016,
disclosing under $1 million in both assets and liabilities. The
Debtor is represented by Donald R. Calaiaro, Esq., at Calaiaro
Valencik.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $194.7MM of Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 16 tranches and
downgraded 6 tranches from nine transaction backed by Alt-A and
Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-4

  Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2012,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-2-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 25, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5

  Cl. 6-A-1-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 21, 2016,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-2-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 21, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-2-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 21, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9

  Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A-2-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-6

  Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 13, 2010,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-7

  Cl. AF-5A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 24, 2013,

   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR17

  Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 19, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

  Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 12, 2016,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 12, 2016,

   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 12, 2016,

   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 26,
   2010, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 26,
   2010, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-16XS

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3XS

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 21, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrade on CL.
AF-5A from GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-7 is due to the interest
shortfalls on the bond that is unlikely to be recouped and
increasing under collateralization.  The rating downgrades on other
bonds are due erosion of enhancement available to the bonds
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in Oct 2016 from 5.0% in Oct
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $310.3MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 31 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of one tranche from 10 transactions,
backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-9

  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 21, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 3-A-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 21, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB4

  Cl. W-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 13, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR3

  Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,

   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. III-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,

   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. III-X, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2012,
    Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. VI-M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 15, 2013,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-11

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at A3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR3

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 3, 2012,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-7

  Cl. 4-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-5

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 25, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 25, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 15-PO, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 30-PO, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-9

  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 6, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 6, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug. 29, 2013,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-7XS

  Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 9,
   2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. 1-A4A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 9,
   2016, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. 1-A4B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A1B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR1

  Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 26, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2A-1B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 9, 2016,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrades are due
to the erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in October 2016 from 5.0% in
October 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.




[*] Moody's Takes Action on $537MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 22 tranches
and assigned the rating of one tranche from 10 transactions issued
by various issuers, backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
NC 2005-HE8

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2016,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. M6, Assigned C (sf); previously on July 11, 2013, 2015
   WR (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE1

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-FM1

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 20, 2016,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-FM1

  Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 20, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 20, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 8, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC2

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-10

  Cl. A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-NC1

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating upgrade on Home
Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1 Class A-2 is also due to the
reduction in under-collateralization of the Class A-3 which
supports Class A-2 and the Class A-2's short time to payoff.  These
improvements greatly reduce the risk of interest shortfalls on the
Class A-2.  Additionally, the ratings on Class A-2 and Class A-3
both benefit from an improvement in pool expected losses.

The assignment of a rating to Class M6 of Asset Backed Securities
Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-8 reflects the fact that
the prior rating had been withdrawn as the tranche was previously
written down due to losses, but the tranche has since been
partially written back up.  The assigned ratings reflect their
reinstated balances.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in October 2016 from 5.0% in
October 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


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