TCR_Public/161113.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, November 13, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 317

                            Headlines

ABSC HOME 2005-HE3: Moody's Cuts Class M3 Notes Rating to B1
ALM VII(R)-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class D-R Notes
AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-4: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E Notes
AMMC CLO 19: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 9: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

APIDOS CLO XI: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D5: Moody's Affirms Caa3 on PS-1 Debt
AVIATION CAPITAL 2000-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-1 Debt Rating to C
BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Ba1 Debt
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 3 Tranches

BANC OF AMERICA 2008-LS1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-M Debt Rating to Caa3
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Hikes Class J Notes Rating to Ba1
BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR13: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Certs to 'Csf'
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba1
BRISTOL PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

CENT CLO 22: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
CENTEX HOME 2002-A: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class AF-6 Debt to Ba3
CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2016-IMC: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2016-SAVA: S&P Assigns BB+ Rating on Class E Certificates

COSMOPOLITAN HOTEL 2016: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'Csf'
CREDIT SUISSE 2008-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B+
CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C7: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class D Notes

CSAIL 2016-C7: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Certificates
CSFB 2002-34: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D-B-2 Certs to B3
EARNEST STUDENT 2016-D: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class C Notes
FANNIE MAE 2016-C06: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating on 2 Tranches
FULBA TRUST 1998-C2: Moody's Hikes Class K Notes Rating to 'Ba1'

GALAXY XIV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
GALLATIN VI: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
GE CAPITAL 2002-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: DBRS Hikes Class N Notes Rating to BB(high)
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2002-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. M Notes

GS MORTGAGE 2010-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Securities
GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS4: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-'
HILTON USA 2016-SFP: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs
INSITE WIRELESS 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
JAMAICA MERCHANT: Fitch to Assign BB+ Rating on Series 2016-1 Notes

JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Cl. F Debt
LIMEROCK CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to B-
MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Raises Rating on Class M Notes to BB+
MAGNETITE XVIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2007-3: S&P Lowers Cl. 2-1A1 Debt Rating to D
MCF CLO III: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2002-HE1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs to B
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class B Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C13: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: Fitch Rates Class E-1 Certificates 'BB+'

MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: S&P Gives Prelim B+ Rating on 4 Tranches
NELNET EDUCATION 2007-2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
OCP CLO 2012-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Class L Debt
RACE POINT VII: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Notes

SATURN VENTURES I: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A-3 Debt
SAXON ASSET 2004-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. MF-1 Debt Rating to B2
SLM STUDENT 2006-3: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Bsf
THL CREDIT 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E-1 Notes
TICP CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

TRAPEZA CDO X: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to Ba1
TRU TRUST 2016-TOYS: S&P Assigns B- Rating on Cl. F Certificates
UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
WELLFLEET CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2015-C31: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs

WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
WHITEHORSE VI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B-3L Notes
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $224.7MM Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS
[*] S&P Completes Review on 102 Classes From 10 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Completes Review on 91 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 151 Classes From 24 RMBS Deals

                            *********

ABSC HOME 2005-HE3: Moody's Cuts Class M3 Notes Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class M3
from Asset Backed Securities Corporation (ABSC) Home Equity Loan
Trust 2005-HE3, which is backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan
   Trust 2005-HE3

   -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade is primarily due to recent interest shortfalls
that are unlikely to be recouped. The rating action reflects recent
performance of the underlying pool and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in September 2016 from 5.1% in
September 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


ALM VII(R)-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-X, A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R floating-rate replacement
notes from ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in 2013 that is managed by Apollo Credit
Management (CLO) LLC.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which outlines the terms of the replacement notes. Apart
from the changes to the spreads and overcollateralization ratios on
the replacement notes, the changes include incorporating the
non-model version of our CDO Monitor, and updating S&P's industry
codes and recovery rates to conform to its current criteria.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Oct. 17, 2016, trustee report.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  On the Dec. 1, 2016, refinancing date, proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes, upon which S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings
on the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement
notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm
the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its preliminary
ratings on the replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

   -- The replacement class A-1-R and D-R notes are expected to be

      issued at higher spreads than the original notes, whereas
      the replacement class A-2-R, B-R, and C-R notes are expected

      to be issued at lower spreads than the original notes.  
      Class A-X is a new floating-rate tranche expected to be
      issued at three-month LIBOR plus 1.25%.

   -- The reinvestment period and the stated maturity will be
      extended to July 2021 and October 2027, respectively.

   -- The overcollateralization levels will be amended.  The
      transaction will incorporate the formula version of Standard

      & Poor's CDO Monitor tool.  The transaction will incorporate

      the recovery rate methodology and updated industry
      classifications as outlined in S&P's August 2016 CLO
      criteria update.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

Replacement notes

Class                Amount    Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)        
A-X                   5.500    Three-month LIBOR + 1.25
A-1-R               555.000    Three-month LIBOR + 1.43
A-2-R               108.000    Three-month LIBOR + 1.85
B-R                  80.000    Three-month LIBOR + 2.50
C-R                  46.000    Three-month LIBOR + 4.00
D-R                  42.000    Three-month LIBOR + 7.45

Original notes

Class                Amount    Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)        
A-1                 543.175    Three-month LIBOR + 1.33
A-2                 104.475    Three-month LIBOR + 1.85
B                    83.950    Three-month LIBOR + 2.60
C                    59.950    Three-month LIBOR + 3.45
D                    28.050    Three-month LIBOR + 5.00
E                    26.525    Three-month LIBOR + 5.00

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd./ALM VII(R)-2 LLC
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-X                  AAA (sf)       5.500
A-1-R                AAA (sf)     555.000
A-2-R                AA (sf)      108.000
B-R                  A (sf)        80.000
C-R                  BBB- (sf)     46.000
D-R                  BB- (sf)      42.000
Subordinated notes   NR           106.364

NR--Not rated.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-4: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-4's $211.250 million
asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 2,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 63.8%, 57.4%, 47.4%,
      39.1%, and 36.1% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread), which provide
      coverage of approximately 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.37x, and
      1.25x S&P's 26.50%-27.50% expected net loss range for the
      class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that

      it believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.  The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB')
      stress scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes
      would remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary

      'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the
      class C, D, and E notes would remain within two rating
      categories of S&P's preliminary 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and
      'BB (sf)' ratings.  These potential rating movements are
      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
      outline the outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a
      one-rating category downgrade within the first year for
      'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities and a two-rating category
      downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,

      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-4

Class       Rating          Type            Interest    Amount
                                            rate       (mil. $)(i)
A           AAA (sf)        Senior          Fixed      96.875
B           AA (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed      26.875
C           A (sf)          Subordinate     Fixed      43.125
D           BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed      37.500
E           BB (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed      6.875

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.



AMMC CLO 19: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to AMMC CLO 19 Ltd./AMMC
CLO 19 Corp.'s $414.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

AMMC CLO 19 Ltd./AMMC CLO 19 Corp.

Class                  Rating                Amount
                                           (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)             288.000
B                      AA (sf)               52.875
C                      A (sf)                30.375
D                      BBB (sf)              22.500
E                      BB (sf)               20.250
Subordinated notes     NR                    45.850

NR--Not rated.



ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 9: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Anchorage Capital CLO 9, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "Anchorage 9").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$312,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$54,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$28,875,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$33,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$29,375,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3
      (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Anchorage 9 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may
consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. Moody's said, "We
expect the portfolio to be approximately 60% ramped as of the
closing date."

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
collateral principal collections constituting unscheduled principal
payments or the sale proceeds of credit risk obligations in
additional collateral debt obligations, subject to certain
conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue two other
classes of notes, which include subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $500,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 50

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3048

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.9%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3048 to 3505)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3048 to 3962)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


APIDOS CLO XI: S&P Assigns (P)BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the new
class X, A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from Apidos CLO XI, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013 that
is managed by CVC Credit Partners.  The new notes will be issued
via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available to the new proposed notes is commensurate with
the associated rating levels.

On the Nov. 10, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the new notes are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the new notes. However,
if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the ratings on the
original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the new
notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also extend the stated
maturity/reinvestment period/non-call period/weighted average life
test.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest          BDR     SDR  Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)          (%)     (%)      (%)
X          4.00    LIBOR + 1.20     91.14   61.77   29.37
A-R      254.35    LIBOR + 1.44     66.68   61.77    4.91
B-R       43.75    LIBOR + 1.95     65.20   54.42   10.78
C-R       30.10    LIBOR + 2.70     55.11   48.75    6.37
D-R       21.95    LIBOR + 4.05     47.02   43.02    3.99
E-R       16.50    LIBOR + 7.65     37.67   36.49    1.18

Effective date
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)         (%)     (%)       (%)
A        263.25    LIBOR + 1.39    66.00   62.58     3.42
B-1       15.00    LIBOR + 2.25    63.37   54.75     8.62
B-2       25.00    3.24            63.37   54.75     8.62
C         29.75    LIBOR + 3.10    54.14   48.84     5.30
D         20.00    LIBOR + 4.25    48.44   42.99     5.45
E         17.25    LIBOR + 5.25    40.61   36.14     4.47

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Apidos CLO XI
New proposed class       Rating       Amount (mil. $)
X                        AAA (sf)                4.00
A-R                      AAA (sf)              254.35
B-R                      AA (sf)                43.75
C-R                      A (sf)                 30.10
D-R                      BBB (sf)               21.95
E-R                      BB (sf)                16.50
Subordinated notes       NR                     42.60

NR--Not rated.


ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D5: Moody's Affirms Caa3 on PS-1 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
Asset Securitization Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1997-D5 as follows:

PS-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class PS-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes. The IO class is the
only outstanding Moody's rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's does not
anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Our ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, the same as at prior review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16.9 million
from $1.8 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans. Eight loans, representing 79%
of the pool have defeased and are secured by US Government
securities.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.
The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of our ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $103 million (65% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2015 and full or partial year
2016 operating results for 100% and 100% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 25% compared to 32% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.21X and 5.72X,
respectively, compared to 1.09X and 3.94X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 19% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 2080 North Black Horse Pike Loan ($2.5 million
-- 15% of the pool), which is secured by a 135,000 square foot (SF)
single tenant retail property in Williamstown, New Jersey located
approximately 24 miles southeast of Philadelphia. This loan is
fully-amortizing and the property is fully leased to Sam's Club
through October 2019, which is coterminous with the maturity date
of the loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 32% and 3.39X,
respectively, compared to 40% and 2.70X at prior review.

The second largest loan is the Southwind Apartments Loan ($343,680
-- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a 96 unit apartment
building in Bellevue, Nebraska located approximately six miles
south of Omaha. The property was 96% leased as of June 2016. The
loan has amortized 86% since securitization and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 11% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 18%
and >4.00X, at prior review.

The third largest loan is the Value City -- Gurnee Loan ($314,846
-- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a 80,000 SF single tenant
retail property in Gurnee, Illinois located approximately 40 miles
north of Chicago. This loan is fully-amortizing and is fully leased
to Value City through August 2017, which is coterminous with the
maturity date of the loan. Moody's analysis reflects the single
tenant risk. The loan has amortized 92% since securitization and
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 11% and & 4.00X, respectively,
compared to 22% and >4.00X at prior review.


AVIATION CAPITAL 2000-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-1 Debt Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A-1
issued by Aviation Capital Group Trust, Series 2000-1.

The complete rating action is as follows:

   Issuer: Aviation Capital Group Trust, Series 2000-1

   -- Class A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2015
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on Class A-1 issued by Aviation Capital
Group Trust, Series 2000-1 reflects the minimal recovery that the
bond will receive, primarily from the $7.4MM reserve account,
because there are no remaining aircraft backing the transaction and
the dissolution process of the trust has already started.

The transaction also has around $7.0 MM in the expense account, but
it is not yet known how much cash from this account will be
ultimately available to the bond holders after funding all the
expenses to the trust during the dissolution process. Even if all
the cash remaining in the both the reserve and the expense accounts
were to be available to the bond holders, recovery on Class A-1
will be only 11.5%, expressed as percentage of the bond's remaining
balance, consistent with the C rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in March 1999.


Primary source of uncertainty include expenses to the trust.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

It is highly unlikely that rating will be upgraded given all
aircraft backing the transaction has been sold and the trust is in
the process of dissolution.


BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Ba1 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Series 2001-PB1 as:

  Cl. M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2016, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class M was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class XC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment.  However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance.  Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.  Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
3.9% of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last
review.  Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Oct. 11, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.8% to
$2.0 million from $938.3 million at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by one remaining mortgage loan.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $36.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 42%).

The remaining loan is the 6403-6405 El Cajon Boulevard Loan ($2.0
million -- 100% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
single-tenant retail property located in San Diego, California.
The tenant is Rite Aid Corporation and has a lease expiration in
February 2019, which is prior to the loan maturity date in
September 2019.  Due to the single tenant nature of the property,
Moody's value is based on a dark-lit analysis.  The loan has
amortized 41% since securitization and Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 80% and
1.45X at the last review.



BANC OF AMERICA 2007-4: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on seven other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-M, A-J, and B to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the collateral's current
and future performance, available liquidity support, increase in
defeased collateral, and lower trust balance since S&P's last
review.

The affirmations on classes C and D reflect S&P's expectation that
the available credit enhancement for these classes will be within
its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current ratings.  The affirmations on classes E, F, and G reflect
S&P's concern that these classes are susceptible to interest
shortfalls due to the possibility that loans may experience
maturity default, as $1.17 billion (94.8%) of the collateral
matures in 2017, and this may cause special servicing fees and
appraisal subordination entitlement reductions to affect the trust.
The affirmations on all classes reflect S&P's views regarding the
collateral's current and future performance, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Oct. 11, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.23 billion, which is 55.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 89 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset (reflecting crossed loans), down from 143
loans at issuance.  Two of these assets ($6.9 million, 0.6%) are
with the special servicer, 11 ($186.3 million, 15.1%) are defeased,
and 29 ($296.6 million, 24.0%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital,
reported financial information for 99.2% of the nondefeased loans
in the pool, of which 31.0% was partial-year 2016 data, 67.3% was
partial-year or year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was year-end
2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.39x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 96.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.73% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the two specially serviced
assets and 11 defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $616.7 million (50.0%).
Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an S&P
Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.45x and 103.6%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $114.4 million in
principal losses, or 5.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 5.2% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the two specially serviced assets.

                     CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Oct. 11, 2016, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of both specially serviced assets are:

   -- The Puyallup WalMart Center asset ($3.8 million, 0.3%) has a

      total reported exposure of $3.9 million.  The property is
      15,257 sq. ft. of shadow-anchored retail property in
      Puyallup, Wash.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on Feb. 19, 2015, due to imminent default and
      became REO on Nov. 13, 2015.  LNR stated that it sold an
      outparcel in August 2016.  The reported DSC and occupancy as

      of Sept. 30, 2015, were 0.67x and 86.9%, respectively.  An
      appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $1.4 million is in
      effect against this loan.  S&P expects a minimal loss (less
      than 25%) upon its eventual resolution.

   -- The Eastern Anthony Office Building loan ($3.1 million,
      0.3%) has a total reported exposure of $3.1 million.  The
      loan is secured by a 15,527-sq.-ft. office building in
      Henderson, Nev.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on April 12, 2012, due to imminent default.  LNR
      indicated that a payoff is possible in February 2017.  The
      reported DSC as of Sept. 30, 2015, was 1.04x.  An ARA of
      $501,588 is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a
      minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

S&P estimated losses for both specially serviced assets, arriving
at a weighted average loss severity of 11.7%.

RATINGS LIST

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-4
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To             From
A-4              059513AE1             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-1A             059513AF8             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-M              059513AG6             AA (sf)        A (sf)
A-J              059513AH4             BB- (sf)       B (sf)
B                059513AL5             B (sf)         B- (sf)
C                059513AN1             B- (sf)        B- (sf)
D                059513AQ4             B- (sf)        B- (sf)
E                059513AS0             CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)
F                059513AU5             CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)
G                059513AW1             CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2008-LS1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-M Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed four classes in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-LS1 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015
      Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015
      Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4BF, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015
      Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SM, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015
      Affirmed A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015

      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. XW, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-M was downgraded due to Moody's expected loss
as well as an increase in realized losses from liquidated loans.
Class A-M has already experienced a 6% realized loss as result of
previously liquidated loans.

The ratings on the remaining four P&I classes were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO Class (Class XW) was downgraded due to a
decline in the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7% of the
current balance compared to 20% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 24.0% of the
original pooled balance, essentially unchanged since the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 54, compared to 44 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 51% to $1.15 billion
from $2.35 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 161 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 29% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Sixteen loans,
constituting 13% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Fifty-three loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $483 million (for an average loss
severity of 60%). Six loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Capitol Square Office Building Loan ($30 million -- 3% of
the pool), which is secured by a 494,000 square foot office
property located in downtown Columbus, Ohio. The property faces
Capitol Square, a park square which contains the Ohio Statehouse.
The loan entered special servicing after the borrower requested a
loan restructure due to impending cash flow problems. The current
largest tenant, occupying approximately 15% of the property's net
rentable area (NRA), is expected to depart at lease expiration in
June 2017. Two other large tenants which occupied approximately 13%
of the property NRA vacated in 2016, which implies a current
property occupancy of 73%, down from the 86% occupancy reported as
recently as December 2015. The loan is paid through its September
2016 payment date.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $25 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (45% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for sixteen poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $18 million (a 20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 74% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 100% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is The Hallmark Building Loan ($64
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 305,000 square
foot office property in Dulles, Virginia. The property was 80%
leased as of June 2016, unchanged from the prior year. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) occupies approximately 8% of the
property NRA under a lease set to expire in less than one year, in
September 2017. The loan is currently on the watchlist for low
DSCR. The loan is interest only for its entire term and matures in
June 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 166% and 0.62X,
respectively, unchanged from the prior review.

The second largest loan is the Two Liberty Center Loan ($52 million
-- 5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 177,000 square foot
office property located in the Ballston section of Arlington,
Virginia. The property was 100% leased as of June 2016, however the
two largest tenants, together occupying 84% of the property's NRA,
each have leases set to expire within the next 15 months, and
within two months of the loan's scheduled loan maturity date in
December 2017. The loan is now amortizing following the expiration
of an 8.5 year interest-only period. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 111% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 104% and 0.94X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the 255 Rockville Pike Loan ($40 million
-- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 145,000 square foot
office property located in Rockville, Maryland, the county seat of
Montgomery County. The property was 100% leased as of June 2016,
unchanged since securitization. Ninety-nine percent of the property
is leased to the Montgomery County government through 2022. The
loan is scheduled to mature in September 2017 and is interest only
for its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and
0.78X, respectively, compared to 120% and 0.81X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Hikes Class J Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on five classes
and affirmed the ratings on eight classes in Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-PWR6 as follows:

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Affirmed

      Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Affirmed

      Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Affirmed

      Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Affirmed

      Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Upgraded

      to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from amortization as well as
overall improved pool performance. The deal has paid down 5% since
Moody's last review and 90% since securitization.

The ratings on five P&I classes, Classes B, C, D, E and F, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings Classes M and N were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.6% of the
current balance, compared to 0.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, compared to a Herf of six at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $107.8
million from $1.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool. One loan, constituting 11% of the pool, has
an investment-grade structured credit assessment. One loan,
constituting 37% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Five loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 48%).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 47%, compared to 50% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.62X and 2.82X,
respectively, compared to 1.64X and 2.57X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Berry Plastic
Manufacturing Plant Loan ($11.7 million -- 10.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of four industrial buildings
containing a total of 862,866 square feet (SF). The properties are
located in Illinois (2 properties), New York and Arizona. The
properties are 100% net leased to Berry Plastics through November
2023. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 45% since
securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 2.40X, respectively, compared to aa1
(sca.pd) and 2.22X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 36% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Plymouth Square Shopping Center Loan ($23.2
million -- 21.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 275,700 square
foot (SF) anchored retail property in a suburb just north of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As of December 2015, the property was
76% leased compared to 84% at year-end 2014. The loan has amortized
17% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67%
and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 65% and 1.46X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Shaklee Corporation Loan ($10.3
million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 123,750 SF
office building located in a western suburb of San Francisco in the
Hacienda Business Park. The business park is home to many Fortune
500 companies. As of December 2015, the property was 100% leased to
Shaklee Corporation with a lease expiration in May 2024. The loan
is fully amortizing and has amortized 45% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 37% and 2.63X, respectively,
compared to 40% and 2.43X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Castle Rock Portfolio ($5.1 million
-- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by eight industrial
properties located in Colorado (7 properties) and Arizona (1
property). All of the properties are 100% occupied with lease
expirations in June 2024. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 45% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 33% and 3.09X, respectively, compared to 35% and 2.86X at the
last review.



BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR13: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Certs to 'Csf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class, downgraded two classes and
affirmed 11 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust, 2006-PWR13, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                      KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class A-J reflects paydown from loan liquidations
and an increase in credit enhancement relative to expected losses.
Despite the improved credit enhancement, Fitch limited its upgrade
of class A-J and affirmed two other classes based on the high
concentration of specially serviced loans with uncertain
dispositions, possibility of an increase in interest shortfalls and
binary risk associated with the pool's performing loans.  The
downgrades to two distressed classes are due to the high modeled
losses on specially serviced assets.

Fitch modeled losses of 35% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 8.4%, including realized losses
to date.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 92.2% to $227.1
million from $2.9 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes E, F and H through P.

High Percentage of Specially Serviced Loans: As of the October 2016
remittance, 16 loans (65.6% of the pool) are in specially servicing
including six of the top 10 loans.  The two largest loans in the
pool defaulted during the term due to loss of tenants.  The largest
loan, First Industrial Portfolio (20.9% of the pool), is a
portfolio of 21 flex industrial properties located outside of
Atlanta, GA.  The loan is listed as 30 days delinquent after
transferring to special servicing in June 2014 for imminent default
due to high vacancy.  The second largest loan (11.6%), a mixed-use
property located in suburban Wilmington, DE, transferred to special
servicing in July 2015 as the largest tenant vacated and the
sponsor has not been able to fill the vacancy.

Increased Pool Concentration: As the transaction is 10 years from
issuance, the pool has realized approximately $2.5 billion in
paydown and only 26 loans remain.  Of the remaining loans, 40.1% is
collateralized by retail properties and 32.5% by industrial
properties.

High Realized Losses to Date: $165.3 million in realized losses
which has reached from the non-rated class P up to class E as of
the October 2016 remittance.

Defeasance: Three balloon loans (21.4% of the pool) are defeased
with scheduled maturity dates in 2020.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class A-J remains Stable; however, an upgrade
may be warranted as paydown occurs from loan liquidations and
scheduled amortization prior to the maturity of the defeased loans
in 2020.  The Outlook for class B is expected to remain Stable as
uncertainty regarding dispositions and pool concentrations offset
potential increase in credit enhancement. Distressed classes may be
subject to downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch has upgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $43.6 million class A-J to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

   -- $40 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 25%;
   -- $29.1 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $65.4 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $29.1 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $20 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes G, H, J, K, L, M, N and O are affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0% due
to realized losses.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A and A-M have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the fully depleted class P.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only classes X-1 and X-2.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by BlueMountain CLO III Ltd.:

  $20,250,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
   due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  $21,150,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes, due
   2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $131,487,500 Class A-1a Senior Floating Rate Notes, due 2021
   (current outstanding balance of $15,621,066), Affirmed
    Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $131,487,500 Class A-1b Senior Floating Rate Notes, due 2021
   (current outstanding balance of $15,621,066), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Revolving Floating Rate Notes, due
   2021 (current outstanding balance of $5,940,133), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $31,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, due 2021,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $29,250,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
   due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

BlueMountain CLO III Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015.  The Class
A-1 and A-2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 71.82% or
$94.8 million since then.  Based on the Trustee's October 2016
report, the OC Ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class
E Notes are reported at 219.60%, 154.01%, 127.62%, and 108.25%,
respectively, versus October 2015 levels of 152.40%, 129.27%,
116.98%, and 106.41%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since October 2015.  Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2896, compared to 2696 in
October 2015.  Additionally, the percentage of CLO collateral with
lowest credit quality, or Caa1 and below rated collateral (Caa
collateral), has increased since October 2015.  Based on Moody's
calculations, which include adjustments for ratings with a negative
outlook and ratings on review for downgrade, exposure to Caa
collateral has increased to 16.4%, compared to 9.4% in October
2015.

Consistent with Moody's current methodology for rating structured
finance securities insured by financial guarantors, the rating of
the Class A-1a notes is the higher of the guarantor financial
strength rating and the current underlying rating on the security.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.

  6) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
     liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
     outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
     Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
     exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
     default.  The historical default rate is higher than average
     for these assets.  Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

     which constitute around $1.9 million of par, Moody's ran a
     sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

  7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains securities
     whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed through
     credit estimates.  If Moody's does not receive the necessary
     information to update its credit estimates in a timely
     fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected by any
     default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of
     updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2317)
Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +1
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3476)
Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -2
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $152.0 million, defaulted par
of $2.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 15.73%,
(implying a WARF of 2896), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.53%, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted average
spread of 3.45% (before accounting for LIBOR Floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

A proportion of the collateral pool includes debt obligations whose
credit quality Moody's assesses through credit estimates. Moody's
analysis reflects adjustments with respect to the default
probabilities associated with credit estimates.  Specifically,
Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for unrated assets or assets
with credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 1.8% of the collateral pool.


BRISTOL PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Bristol Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $357,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  $60,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029,

   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $33,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  $33,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $23,375,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Bristol Park is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $550,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.8%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


CENT CLO 22: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2a-R,
A-2b-R, and B-R notes from Cent CLO 22 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014 that is managed by
Columbia Management Investment Advisers LLC.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, and B notes
following payment in full on the Nov. 7, 2016, refinancing date. In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes.

On the Nov. 7, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2a-R, A-2b-R, and B-R replacement note issuance were used
to redeem the original class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, and B notes,
respectively, as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line
with their full redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes, which were not refinanced.

The assigned and affirmed ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the
credit support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for all
classes except the class A-1-R notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the deal is still within its
reinvestment period.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cent CLO 22 Ltd.
Replacement classes   Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                 AAA (sf)            383.75
A-2a-R                AA (sf)              40.80
A-2b-R                AA (sf)              30.00
B-R                   A (sf)               41.30

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Cent CLO 22 Ltd.
                      Rating
Original class    To           From
A-1               NR           AAA (sf)  
A-2a              NR           AA (sf)
A-2b              NR           AA (sf)
B                 NR           A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cent CLO 22 Ltd.
Class                Rating
C                    BBB (sf)
D                    BB (sf)
E                    B (sf)

OTHER CLASSES OUTSTANDING

Cent CLO 22 Ltd.
Class                 Rating
Subordinated notes    NR

NR--Not rated.


CENTEX HOME 2002-A: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class AF-6 Debt to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
issued by Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-A, and assigned a
rating to one tranche issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS
2004-5HE.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-A

  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2004-5HE

  Cl. M-3, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, WR (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The assignment of the rating
for Class M-3 of Terwin Mortgage Trust Series 2004-5HE reflects the
fact that the prior rating had been withdrawn as the tranche was
previously written down due to losses, but the tranche has since
been partially written back up due to recoveries that are recently
received from prior loss determinations.  The rating actions
reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's
updated loss expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in September 2016 from 5.1% in
September 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2016-IMC: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CGBAM Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-IMC's $610 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $610 million, with three one-year extension
options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 17 showroom
properties, 14 of which are located in High Point, N.C. and three
in Las Vegas.

The ratings reflect the collateral's historical and projected
performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CGBAM Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-IMC

Class       Rating          Amount ($)

A           AAA (sf)       247,650,000
B           AA- (sf)        86,100,000
C           A- (sf)         64,000,000
D           BBB- (sf)       84,500,000
E           BB- (sf)       127,750,000


CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-GCJ11.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance.  As of the October 2016,
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 4.8% to $1.14 billion from $1.21 billion at issuance.
Two loans have been designated as Fitch Loans of Concern (4.1%).

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: All loans in the pool
are current as of the September 2016 distribution with
property-level performance generally in line with issuance
expectations and no material changes to pool metrics.  Base case
loss expectations remain in line with expectations from issuance.

Partial Interest and Full-Term Interest Only Loans: Three loans
representing 4.8% of the pool are full-term interest-only, and 14
loans representing 31.3% of the pool have partial-term
interest-only components.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (3.5%) is secured by 677 Ala
Moana Blvd, a 12-story, 293,013-square foot (sf) office building
and 8-story parking garage located along Ala Moana Boulevard in
Honolulu, HI.  The property was built between 1965-1971.  The
property's performance has declined from issuance.  YE 2015 net
operating income (NOI) declined by 19% from YE 2014 and 21%
compared to Fitch NOI at issuance due to declines in income
(largely from lower occupancy) and increases in expenses
(insurance, marketing and maintenance).  As of April 2016, the
property was 81% occupied compared with 83% in December 2014 and
84% in December 2013.  Approximately 56% of the net rentable area
(NRA) rolls within the next three years.  Fitch will continue to
monitor the loan.

The next Fitch Loan of Concern (0.62%) is secured by Hyatt House
Houston, a 116-unit lodging property located in Houston, TX.  The
Houston market has felt the effects of low oil prices and the
impact it has had on energy related businesses.  RevPAR for the
city is down 8.5% for the past three months, down 8.6% YTD and down
6.2% for the trailing 12 months (TTM).  The property is located in
the Katy Freeway West area, which has been hit harder than the city
as a whole due to the concentration of energy industry in this
submarket.  According to the September 2016 STR report, the Hyatt
House Houston reported Sept. 2016, TTM occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR
of 67%, $95, and $64, respectively.  The property is performing
below its competitive set, which reported occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR of 66%, $116, and $77, respectively.  The YTD June 2016 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 0.70x, compared to 1.14x
and 1.31x at YE 2015 and YE 2014, respectively.  Fitch will
continue to monitor the loan.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset-level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $17.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $290.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $236.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $92.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $890.9 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $117.7 million* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.
Fitch does not rate the class G certificate.



COMM 2016-SAVA: S&P Assigns BB+ Rating on Class E Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to COMM 2016-SAVA Mortgage
Trust's $710 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $710 million mortgage loan, secured by a
first lien on the borrowers' fee and leasehold interest in a
portfolio of 155 skilled nursing, assisted living, and independent
living facilities containing 18,870 licensed beds.  The properties
are located in 20 states.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2016-SAVA Mortgage Trust

Class      Rating           Amount ($)
A          AAA (sf)        317,797,000
X-CP       BBB- (sf)       531,434,000(i)
X-EXT      BBB- (sf)       673,434,000(i)
B          AA- (sf)        127,543,000
C          A- (sf)         113,249,000
D          BBB- (sf)       135,675,000
E          BB+ (sf)         15,736,000

(i)Notional balance.  The class X-CP certificates will reference a
portion of the class A and D certificates and the class B and C
certificates.  The class X-EXT certificates will reference the
class A, B, C, and a portion of the class D certificates.


COSMOPOLITAN HOTEL 2016: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Cosmopolitan Hotel Trust
2016-COSMO, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-COSMO:

   -- Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to one property, The
Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas (the "Property"). The ratings are based
on the collateral and the structure of the transaction.

The Property is a full-service, luxury hotel and casino centrally
located in Las Vegas, NV on the Las Vegas Strip. The Subject opened
in 2010 and is one of the newest properties in the market. Total
construction cost was approximately $3.8 billion, with the mortgage
loan representing 25.5% of construction cost. The Property features
3,005, condo-quality rooms and suites situated within two high-rise
towers, a 111,500 SF casino, 30 restaurants, lounges and bars, a
nightclub/dayclub, full-service spa, two fitness centers, a live
theater, 23,500 SF of retail, three outdoor swimming pools, various
public and private spa pools, two rooftop tennis courts, business
center, and 250,000 SF of meeting/conference space. The Property
consistently achieves some of the highest ADR and RevPAR levels in
Las Vegas due to the location, quality and amenities package.

The Property is centrally located on the Las Vegas Strip between
The Bellagio and MGM's City Center and across the Strip from the
Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino. The Property maintains direct
frontage on Las Vegas Boulevard and benefits from the pedestrian
traffic on the Strip.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both our Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and our IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, we also consider a
range of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural
and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $1,037,000,000 represents a Moody's
LTV of 90.7%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 3.85X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.39X.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from our Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type. These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction;
and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5.0%,
13.7%, and 21.7%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa (sf) classes would be Aa1 (sf), Aa2 (sf), and A1 (sf),
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather they
are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal
has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings
impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated
standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.



CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'Csf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes and downgraded one class of
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C4.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the transaction's distressed ratings reflect
the pool's significant concentration with only 30 loans remaining;
16 of which (63.7% of the pool) are specially serviced and two are
hope notes (3.6%).  Additionally, three (3.3%) were flagged as
Fitch Loans of Concern due to significant upcoming tenant rollover
within the next year or as a result of not paying off at maturity.


As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.6% to $273 million from
$4.3 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased and interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes C and below.

High Expected Losses: The pool continues to have high expected
losses relative the remaining collateral balance.  Losses on class
A-J remain possible.

Specially Serviced Loans: The specially serviced loans (63.7%)
include nine of the top 15 loans in the pool.  The Edge at Avenue
North (19.1%), the second largest loan in pool, is secured by a
799-unit (1,207-bed) student housing complex located in
Philadelphia, PA.  Revenue has been negatively impacted by
increased competition from newer housing developments over the past
few years.  The loan transferred in April 2016 due to imminent
maturity default.  The servicer-reported occupancy and debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) were 77% and 0.85x, respectively as of year
to date (YTD) Dec. 31, 2015, compared to 66% and 1.61x at year-end
(YE) June 2013.

Loans Past Maturity: None of the specially serviced loans paid off
at their respective 2016 scheduled maturity dates.  One of the
additional three Fitch Loans of Concern (0.4%) also failed to pay
off at maturity in September 2016.

Maturity Concentration: The remaining loans, excluding the Fitch
Loan of Concern that matured in September 2016 and those that are
specially serviced, mature in 2017 (0.9%), 2018 (22%), 2019 (6%),
2021 (5.6%) and 2026 (1.4%).

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch applied additional stresses in its analysis given the pool's
concentration risk.  The distressed ratings reflect the additional
stress and Fitch's expectation of losses.  The potential for
upgrades to class A-J are limited due to the increased
concentration of underperforming loans and the credit quality of
the remaining collateral.  Should recoveries on specially serviced
asset dispositions exceed expectations, future upgrades are
possible.  Downgrades are likely to the distressed classes should
additional losses be realized.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

   -- $64 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $137.8 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
   -- $26.7 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $37.4 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $7 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4 FL, A-1-A and A-M were repaid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class S certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class A-X,
A-SP and A-Y certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2008-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B+
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2008-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on five other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-3, A-1-A, A-M, A-J, B, and C to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the
collateral's current and future performance, the available
liquidity support, and the lower trust balance.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance, the transaction structure, and liquidity
support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Oct. 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $517.6 million, which is 58.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 39 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 60 loans at issuance.  Two of
these assets ($4.7 million, 0.8%) are with the special servicer,
three ($25.1 million, 4.8%) are defeased, and 12
($67.4 million, 13.0%) are on the master servicers' combined
watchlist.  The master servicers, KeyBank Real Estate Capital and
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported financial information
for all of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 83.9% was
partial- or year-end 2015 data and the remainder was partial-year
2016 data.

S&P calculated a 1.26x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and an 89.9% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.68% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the two specially serviced
assets, and three defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans
have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $379.4 million
(73.3%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated
an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.25x and
91.8%, respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $74.4 million in principal
losses, or 8.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 8.7% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced assets.

                     CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Oct. 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details are:

   -- The George Portfolio asset ($2.9 million, 0.6%) is the
      largest specially serviced asset in the pool and has a total

      reported exposure of $3.1 million.  The asset consists of
      two retail properties totaling 24,269 sq. ft. located in
      Reading and Blandon, Pa.  The loan was transferred to the
      special servicer on May 7, 2014, due to imminent payment
      default, and the properties became REO on July 30, 2015.
      C-III stated that a sale on the Reading property closed on
      Dec. 21, 2015, however the Blandon property failed to meet
      its reserve.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end
      2015 were 0.14x and 24.9%, respectively.  An appraisal
      reduction amount (ARA) of $1.6 million is in effect against
      this asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon this loan's

      eventual resolution.

   -- The Bennington Greenlane Townhomes loan ($1.4 million, 0.3%)

      has a total reported exposure of $1.6 million.  The loan is
      secured by a 24-unit multifamily building in Rochester, N.Y.

      The loan was transferred to the special servicer on May 22,
      2015, due to payment default. C-III indicated that the
      borrower agreed to a consensual foreclosure on March 23,
      2016, but has not executed the required documents.  In
      addition, the loan is being marketed for sale.  The reported

      DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were -0.4x and 37.5%,
      respectively.  An ARA of $0.5 million is in effect against
      this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon its eventual
      resolution.

S&P estimated losses for these two assets, arriving at a weighted
average loss severity of 69.1%.  With respect to the specially
serviced assets noted above, a minimal loss is less than 25%, a
moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a significant loss is 60% or
greater.

RATINGS LIST

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2008-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2008-C1
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A-2              22546NAB0             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-AB             22546NAC8             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3              22546NAD6             AA+ (sf)      A (sf)
A-1-A            22546NAE4             AA+ (sf)      A (sf)
A-2FL            22546NBV5             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-M              22546NAF1             BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)
A-J              22546NAH7             B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)
B                22546NAK0             B (sf)        CCC (sf)
C                22546NAM6             B- (sf)       CCC- (sf)
D                22546NAP9             CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)
E                22546NAR5             D (sf)        D (sf)
A-X              22546NBT0             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)


CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C7: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C7 Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

   -- $40,491,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5,938,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15,900,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $163,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,354,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $65,656,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $590,113,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29,746,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52,774,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29,746,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,422,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,029,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,595,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,098,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,029,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,595,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $32,624,581ab class X-NR;

   -- $32,624,581a class NR.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Nov. 1, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 53 loans secured by 199
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$767,627,581 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Column Financial Inc., Benefit Street Partners CRE
Finance LLC, and Silverpeak Real Estate Finance LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage In-Line with Recent Transactions: The Fitch LTV and
DSCR are 104.7% and 1.16x, respectively, compared to the YTD
averages of 105.8% and 1.19x. Excluding credit opinion loans and
loans secured by multifamily cooperative properties, Fitch's
normalized LTV and DSCR are 109.6% and 1.11x, respectively.

Above-Average Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the pool will pay down 16.2%, which is above the YTD
average of 10.3%. Two loans representing 8.6% of the pool are
interest-only loans, 17 loans representing 40.0% of the pool are
partial interest-only, and the remaining 35 loans (51.4% of the
pool) are balloon loans with loan terms of five to 10 years.

Highly Correlated Pool by Property Type and Geography: The largest
property type concentration is retail at 40.7% of the pool,
followed by office at 27.7% and multifamily at 18.5%. The pool is
highly concentrated by geography with 30.3% of the pool in Florida.
Additionally, 50.5% of the pool is located in the Southeast BEA
Geographic region.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 8.6% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions. The 9 West 57th Street
senior note (6.5% of the pool) contributed to the trust has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'AAAsf*' on a stand-alone basis.
GLP Industrial Portfolio Pool B (2.1% of the pool) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'A+sf*' on a stand-alone basis
and 'AAAsf*' on a pooled basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSAIL
2016-C7 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from KPMG LLP.
The due diligence focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and the findings
did not have an impact on our analysis/conclusions.


CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
note issued by Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP:

   -- Class C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2035,
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Upgraded to
  
      Baa1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the rating on the following note:

   -- Class D Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due 2035,
      Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed Ca
      (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class of notes due to
defeasance within the underlying collateral. While 100% of the
collateral is classified as defaulted securities as per the
transaction governing documents, 49.3% of the collateral is
currently fully defeased. This provides full coverage plus cushion
of 1.65x to the senior most outstanding class of notes, Class C.
These factors more than offset the decrease in credit quality as
evidenced by weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR). Moody's has affirmed the rating on
one class of notes because the key transaction metrics are
commensurate with existing ratings. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic) transactions.

Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (100.0% of the
current pool balance). As of the August 25, 2016 note valuation
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $64.3 million from $500.4
million at issuance as a result of pay-downs due to regular
amortization, prepayments, and recoveries from defaults on the
underlying collateral.

The pool contains eight assets totaling $27.6 million (100.0% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's September 30, 2016. While there have
been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect low/moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), the WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3330,
compared to 2560 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (63.2% compared to 16.5% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 38.1% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(0.0% compared to 11.6% at last review), and Caa1 -Ca/C (36.8%
compared to 33.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.9 years, compared to 2.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
loans within the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 8.4%, compared to 8.3% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other parameters constant, increasing the
recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by 5% would result in
an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero
notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CSAIL 2016-C7: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C7 (the
Certificates) to be issued by CSAIL 2016-C7 Commercial Mortgage
Trust:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-F at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-NR at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class C at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-E, X-F, X-NR, D, E and F will be privately placed.

The X-A, X-B, X-E, X-F, and X-NR balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood
of receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.
DBRS considers the IO certificates’ position within the
transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

The collateral consists of 53 fixed-rate loans secuted by 199
commercial properties, comprising a total transation balance of
$767,627,582. The transaction has sequential-pay pass-through
structure. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the
provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of loan
default within the term, as well as liquidity at maturity. When the
cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Stabilized NCF
and their respective actual constants, two loans, representing 4.7%
of the total pool, had a DBRS Term DSCR below 1.15x, a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 17 loans, representing 43.6%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x.

Two loans exhibit credit characteristics consistent with an
investment-grade shadow rating: 9 West 57 Street and GLP Industrial
Portfolio Pool B. Nine West 57th Street is the third-largest loan
representing 6.5% of the pool and has credit characteristics
consistent with a AAA shadow rating. GLP Industrial Portfolio Pool
B, the 16th largest loan, representing 2.1% of the pool, has credit
characteristics consistent with an A (high) shadow rating.
Additionally, three of the largest 15 loans that comprise 31.8% of
the DBRS sample exhibit strong sponsorship: Coconut Point, Gurnee
Mills, and Peachtree Mall. All three loans are in the top ten and
comprise 26.0% of the total transaction. The sponsors of all three
loans not only have extensive experience in the commercial real
estate sector, but they also exhibit significant financial
wherewithal. The pool exhibits a strong DBRS Term DSCR of 1.48x
based on the whole loan balances, which indicates moderate term
default risk. Eleven loans representing 19.8% of the pool, three of
which are in the top ten, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x.
Furthermore, only two loans are secured by properties that are
fully leased to a single tenant. Both loans, encompassing 6.3% of
the total pool, are in the top 15 and include CVS Office Centre
Building (#6), which comprises 3.7% of the transaction, and BJ’s
Wholesale Club – Miami (#11), which comprises 2.6% of the total
transaction. Loans secured by properties occupied by single tenants
have been found to suffer from higher loss severities in the event
of default.

The pool is concentrated based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to that of a pool of 22 equal-sized loans. The
largest five and ten loans total 37.0% and 52.8% of the pool,
respectively. The transaction has a notable above average
concentration of loans surffering from elevated refinance risk. The
transaction’s WA DBRS Refi DSCR is 1.04x, with 17 loans,
representing 43.6% of the pool, demonstrating DBRS Refi DSCRs less
than 1.00x. Additionally, five loans, representing 26.8% of the
pool, demonstrate DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x. Lastly, the pool
has a high concentration of properties that are securitized by
assets that are fully or primarily used as retail, representing
40.7% of the pool. The retail sector has generally underperformed
since the Great Recession because of a general decline in consumer
spending power, store closures, chain bankruptcies and the rapidly
growing popularity of ecommerce. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, ecommerce sales represented 7.0% of total retail sales in
2015 compared with 3.9% in 2009. As the ecommerce share of sales is
expected to continue to grow significantly in the coming years, the
retail real estate sector may continue to be relatively weak.

The DBRS sample included 31 of the 53 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 56 of the 199 properties in the
portfolio (75.8% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS
conducted meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent
or a representative of the borrowing entity for 54.4% of the pool.
The DBRs sample had an average NCF variance of –10.0%, ranging
from -30.3% to 1.8%.

The rating assigned to Class F differs from the higher rating
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation, and in this case, the ratings reflect
the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to occur
post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


CSFB 2002-34: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D-B-2 Certs to B3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches from two transactions, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans,
issued by CSFB.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-34

  Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 24, 2015,

   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-17

  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 15, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 15, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions primarily reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools.
The ratings downgraded are due to the erosion of enhancement
available to the bonds.  The downgrades of Classes D-B-2 and D-B-3
from CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-34
are also the result of a correction to the cash-flow model used by
Moody's in rating this transaction, relating to the notional
amounts of Classes I-X and A-X.  In the corrected model, the
notional amounts of Classes I-X and A-X are larger, resulting in
more interest due to these bonds and less funds available to the
subordinate bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in September 2016 from 5.1% in
September 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


EARNEST STUDENT 2016-D: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by Earnest Student Loan Program 2016-D LLC (EARN
2016-D):

   -- Series 2016-D, Class A-1 rated AA (low) (sf)

   -- Series 2016-D, Class A-2 rated AA (low) (sf)

   -- Series 2016-D, Class B rated BBB (sf)

   -- Series 2016-D, Class C rated BB (sf)

The finalized ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the
following analytical considerations:

   -- The transaction’s form and sufficiency of available credit

      enhancement.

   -- The quality and credit characteristics of the student loan
      borrowers.

   -- Structural features of the transaction that require the
      Class A Notes to enter into full turbo principal
      amortization if certain performance triggers are breached or

      if credit enhancement deteriorates.

   -- Earnest’s capabilities in regard to originations,
      underwriting and servicing.

   -- The benefits offered by the existence of a hot backup
      servicer.

   -- The legal structure and legal opinions that address the true

      sale of the student loans, the non-consolidation of the
      trust, that the trust has a valid first-priority security
      interest in the assets, and consistency with the DBRS
“Legal
      Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance” methodology.

The variable-rate Class A-1 Notes are primarily secured by a group
of variable-rate loans. The fixed-rate Class A-2 Notes are
primarily secured by a group of fixed-rate loans. The Class B and
Class C Notes are secured by both the fixed-rate and variable-rate
loan groups.

EARN 2016-D uses a traditional pass-through structure, with credit
enhancement consisting of overcollateralization, a separate reserve
account for each class of Class A Notes, a liquidity account for
the Class B and Class C Notes, subordination provided by the Class
B and Class C Notes for the benefit of the Class A Notes, excess
spread and limited cross-collateralization.


FANNIE MAE 2016-C06: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Fannie Mae's risk transfer
transaction, Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C06 as:

   -- $393,343,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2A notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $361,875,000 class 1M-2B notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $550,679,000 class 1M-2 exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2I exchangeable notional notes
      'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2R exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2S exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2T exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $188,804,000 class 1M-2U exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook

      Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $31,798,710,605 class 1A-H reference tranche;
   -- $20,702,711 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
   -- $9,937,941 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
   -- $19,047,054 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
   -- $80,000,000 class 1B notes;
   -- $251,236,568 class 1B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 2.75%
subordination provided by the 0.60% class 1M-2A note, the 1.15%
class 1M-2B and the 1.00% 1B note, and their corresponding
reference tranches.  The notes are general senior unsecured
obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed
MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
LTVs greater than 60% and less than or equal to 80%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C06 (CAS 2016-C06) is
Fannie Mae's 15th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $33.1 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors.  Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 1M-1,
1M-2A and 1M-2B notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of
the mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE)
available through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default
Rating.  The notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters
and will carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from November 2015 through February 2016.  In this
transaction, Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) from 60% to 80%.  Overall, the
reference pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent
CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's seventh
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule.  The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, and 1B
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity.  As a result,
any collateral losses on the reference pool that occur beyond year
12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction.
Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year window in its default analysis
and applied a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
second transaction in which Fitch received third-party due
diligence on a loan production basis as opposed to a
transaction-specific review.  Fitch believes that regular, periodic
third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are
sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality-control (QC)
processes.  The sample selection was limited to a population of
7,309 loans that were previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's
post-purchase QC review and met the reference pool's eligibility
criteria.  Of those loans, 1,998 were selected for a full review
(credit, property valuation, and compliance) by third-party due
diligence providers.  Of the 1,998 loans, 607 were part of this
transaction's reference pool.  Fitch views the results of the due
diligence review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The 1M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior 1M-2A, 1M-2B, and 1B classes, which are locked
out from receiving any principal until classes with a more senior
payment priority are paid in full.  However, available CE for the
junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference pool
increases in tandem with the paydown of the 1M-1 class.  Given the
size of the 1M-1 class relative to the combined total of all the
junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class 1M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 1A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as at least 50% of the first loss
1B-H reference tranche, sized at 76 bps.  Fannie Mae is also
retaining an approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 1M-1,
1M-2A, and 1M-2B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons.  As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs.  Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in Fitch's
current rating of Fannie Mae.  However, if, at some point, Fitch
views the support as being reduced and receivership likely, the
ratings of Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 1M-1, 1M2A, and
1M-2B notes' ratings affected.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels.  The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MDVs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 23.6% at the 'BBBsf' level and 18.9% at the 'BBsf'
level.  The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


FULBA TRUST 1998-C2: Moody's Hikes Class K Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on two classes,
downgraded the rating on one class and affirmed the rating on one
class in First Union-Lehman Brothers-Bank of America (FULBA)
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Upgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes J and K were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 16% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on Class L was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss. Class L has already experienced a 33%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating of the IO class, Class IO, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.6% of the
current balance, compared to 6.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable
Lease Financings" published in October 2016.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's review also used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in
its public CDO rating model CDOROM, to generate a portfolio loss
distribution for the CTL component of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, compared to 27 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $105.6
million from $3.4 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 79 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 52% of the pool. Seventeen loans,
constituting 9.6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
Government securities. The pool contains a Credit Tenant Lease
(CTL) component that includes 40 loans, representing 49% of the
pool.

Ten loans, constituting 21.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $62 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%). Two loans, constituting 4.6% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$3.8 million loss (78% expected loss) from the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 85% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 44%, compared to 47%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 3.81X,
respectively, compared to 1.31X and 3.45X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the AMC Entertainment Movie Theater
Loan ($5.6 million -- 5.3% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
48,000 SF movie theater located in Hodgkins, Illinois, about 20
miles outside of Chicago. The property is 100% leased to Plitt
Theaters (currently AMC Entertainment) through February 2023. The
fully amortizing loan matures in February 2023. Due to the single
tenant exposure Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis. The loan has
amortized 54% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 64% and 1.62X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.45X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the North Atherton Place Loan ($5.5
million -- 5.2% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 241,000 SF
retail property located in Patton Township, Pennsylvania. The
property is anchored by Wal-Mart, which occupies 84% of NRA with a
lease expiration in May 2021. As of March 2016, the property was
94% leased. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized by 56%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and
3.02X, respectively, compared to 44% and 2.36X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Minges Brook Mall Loan ($4.8 million
-- 4.5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 87,000 SF retail
property located in Battle Creek, Michigan. The property is
shadow-anchored by Target, with a lease expiration in December
2024. Major tenants at the property include Felpausch Food Center
and ABC Warehouse. As of June 2016, the property was 95% leased
compared to 94% at the year-end 2015. The loan has amortized 28%
since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and
1.50X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.54X at the last review.

The CTL component consists of 40 loans, totaling 49% of the pool,
secured by properties leased to 11 tenants. The largest exposure is
Brinker International, Inc.($28.4 million -- 26.9% of the pool;
Senior Unsecured Rating: Ba1 -- stable outlook). The bottom-dollar
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool is 2,234,
compared to 1,628 at last review. WARF is a measure of the overall
quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability.



GALAXY XIV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Galaxy XIV CLO
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2012 that is managed by PineBridge Investments LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended and
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Nov. 15, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Galaxy XIV CLO Ltd/Galaxy XIV CLO LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             318.75
B-R                       AA (sf)               53.25
C-R                       A (sf)                40.50
D-R                       BBB (sf)              27.50
E-R                       BB (sf)               22.00
Subordinated notes        NR                    58.00

NR--Not rated.


GALLATIN VI: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Gallatin VI 2013-2, LLC
(Gallatin VI) as follows:

   -- $1,875,000 class X notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $215,625,000 class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $0 class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $50,000,000 class A loans at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $57,375,000 class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19,650,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,250,000 class D notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,250,000 class E notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the credit enhancement levels on the
transaction, the stable performance of the portfolio since the last
review in November 2015, and the cushions available in the
collateralized loan obligation's (CLO) cash flow modeling results.
Fitch's cash flow analysis indicates each class of rated notes is
passing all nine interest rate and default timing scenarios at or
above their current rating levels.

The loan portfolio par amount plus principal cash is approximately
$425.6 million, as of the Oct. 4, 2016 trustee report. The
transaction is failing the Maximum Moody's Rating Factor Test,
which must be maintained or improved through reinvestments, per the
transaction's governing documents. All other collateral quality
tests, concentration limitations, and coverage tests are in
compliance, and there are no defaulted assets in the portfolio. The
reported weighted average spread (WAS) including LIBOR floors is
4.06%, versus a minimum WAS trigger of 4.0%. The weighted average
Fitch rating of the portfolio is 'B/B-', as compared to 'B' at the
last review and closing date. Fitch currently considers 9.3% of the
collateral assets to be rated in the 'CCC' and below category
versus 3.7% at the last review, based on Fitch's Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) Equivalency Map. The percentage of the performing
portfolio considered to have strong recovery prospects or a
Fitch-assigned Recovery Rating of 'RR2' or higher has decreased to
90.4% from 94% at the last review.

The Stable Outlook on each class of notes of Gallatin VI reflects
the expectation that the notes have sufficient levels of credit
protection to withstand potential deterioration in the credit
quality of the portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the notes may be sensitive to the following: asset
defaults, portfolio migration, including assets being downgraded to
'CCC', portions of the portfolio being placed on Rating Watch
Negative, overcollateralization or interest coverage test breaches,
or breach of concentration limitations or portfolio quality
covenants. Fitch conducted rating sensitivity analysis on the
closing date of Gallatin VI, incorporating increased levels of
defaults and reduced levels of recovery rates, among other
sensitivities.

Initial Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivity are further
described in the New Issue Report published on April 8, 2014.

Gallatin VI is an arbitrage cash flow CLO that is managed by MP
Senior Credit Partners L.P (MPSCP), with a four-year reinvestment
period ending in January 2018 and a two-year non-call period, which
ended in January 2016. During the reinvestment period,
discretionary sales are permitted at any time and are limited to
25% of the portfolio balance, as measured at the beginning of the
preceding 12-month period. The manager also has the ability to
reinvest unscheduled principal proceeds and sales proceeds from the
disposal of credit risk obligations after the reinvestment period,
subject to certain conditions.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs' using
Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) to project future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio. These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model under
various combinations of default timing and interest rate stress
scenarios, as described in the report. The cash flow model was
customized to reflect the transaction's structural features.


GE CAPITAL 2002-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed two classes of GE
Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2002-1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects pay down from amortization and coverage from
defeasance.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 98.9% to $11.3
million from $1.04 billion at issuance; the pool has experienced
$23.6 million (2.3% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date.  There are three loans remaining in the pool, one
loan (44% of the pool) is defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes N and P.

Pool Defeasance: Since the last review, class L has paid-off in
full and the class M balance is now 100% covered by defeasance. The
defeased loan is the second largest loan in the pool with a $4.9
million loan balance.

Amortization: Near-term pay-off of class M is anticipated due to
amortization of the defeased loan; maturity is in December 2016. In
addition, the third largest loan in the pool (11% of the pool) is
fully amortizing and is secured by a single-tenant office property
in Dearborn, MI leased to Ford Motor Company (rated 'BBB'/Stable
Outlook).  The lease is co-terminus with the maturity date;
however, a lease extension is pending.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating on class M is expected to remain stable as the pool
continues to paydown through amortization.  Downgrades are not
likely due to the defeased loan and the fully amortizing nature of
the third largest loan.  Class N will remain at 'Dsf' due to
realized losses.

Fitch has upgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $3.8 million class M to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $7.6 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 50%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, and L
certificates, and the interest-only class X-2 certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.


GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: DBRS Hikes Class N Notes Rating to BB(high)
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded two classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Series 2004-C2 as follows:

   -- Class M to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)

   -- Class N to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes in the
transaction as follows:

   -- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class O at B (sf)

All trends are stable. In addition, Class L has been discontinued
as the class has been repaid in full with the October 2016
remittance.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of loan amortization and successful loan
repayment. Since issuance, the pool has experienced collateral
reduction of 98.0% with four of the original 119 loans outstanding
as of the October 2016 remittance report. With the October
remittance, the Brentmoor Place loan was liquidated from the trust
with a realized loss of approximately $650,000. The loan was
formerly secured by an independent living property in St. Louis,
Missouri. The actual realized loss was contained to the unrated
Class P and was less than the DBRS-modeled loss as the asset was
sold for more than the most recent appraised value completed in
January 2016. One loan, Continental Center, representing 83.7% of
the pool, is on the servicer’s watchlist, and one loan, Bayshore
Plaza, representing 10.6% of the pool, is in special servicing. The
two remaining loans, representing 5.7% of the pool, are fully
defeased and are scheduled to mature in February 2019.

The largest loan in the pool, Continental Center, remains on the
watchlist for monitoring as it was modified in June 2014 after
numerous years of weak performance; however, performance has
improved significantly since. The loan is secured by a 26-story,
477,259 square foot (sf) Class B office property located in
downtown Columbus, Ohio, constructed in 1972 and most recently
renovated in 2002. The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2012 for imminent default because of cash flow issues and
returned to the master servicer in September 2014 after the loan
was modified. Terms of the modification included bifurcating the
note into an interest-only (IO) $17.5 million A-note and an IO $5.6
million B-note, along with a five-year maturity extension to March
2019. In addition, the A-note was modified with a decrease in the
interest rate, which increases over time to the original rate of
5.75%. The interest accrues on both the B-note and the rate
differential associated with the A-note. Although the loan has
since been returned to the master servicer and continues to perform
per the terms of the modification, the loan will be subject to a
special servicing fee upon disposition from the trust. This event,
coupled with the current interest shortfalls within the capital
stack, could potentially cause interest to be shorted from multiple
classes in the bond stack.

Since the loan was modified, loan performance has improved
considerably with an annualized Q2 2016 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 3.62 times (x) and a YE2015 DSCR of 3.58x. As of the June
2016 rent roll, the property was 79.0% occupied with an average
rental rate of $13.21 per square foot (psf), remaining in line with
May 2015 occupancy of 80.8% and an average rental rate of $12.95
psf. Occupancy and rental rates remain below market as CoStar
reports a vacancy rate of 7.4% and an average rental rate of $18.44
psf for offices in the Downtown Columbus submarket. The largest
tenants at the property include: SBC Ameritech/AT&T (33.6% of net
rentable area (NRA); lease expires on December 31, 2017), the State
of Ohio (28.8% of NRA; lease expires on June 30, 2017) and Miami
Jacobs Career Centre (9.1% of NRA; lease expires on September 30,
2018). There is significant upcoming tenant rollover risk as 62.5%
and 10.0% of the NRA is scheduled to expire in 2017 and 2018,
respectively. The loan currently has a hard lockbox in place to
capture excess cash and there is a current tenant
improvement/leasing commission reserve of $1.6 million. DBRS will
continue to monitor the rollover risk.

The Bayshore Plaza loan was transferred to special servicing in
December 2012 for imminent default and the property is currently
real estate owned. This loan is secured by a 27,702 sf retail strip
center in Gilbert, Arizona, about 22 miles southeast of Phoenix.
Currently, the strategy remains to lease up the vacant space and
renew existing tenants. According to the annualized Q2 2016
Operating Statement Analysis Report, the DSCR was 0.71x, an
increase from 0.14x at YE2015. As of the August 2016 rent roll, the
property was 66.4% occupied; however, the servicer states that the
property has since signed two new tenants, which would increase
occupancy to 88.4% with an average rental rate of $15.27 psf.
Property metrics remain below market as CoStar reports a vacancy
rate of 7.2% and an average rental rate of $17.49 psf for retail
properties in the Gilbert submarket. An August 2016 appraisal
valued the collateral at $4.1 million ($148.00 psf), an increase
over the October 2015 appraised value of $3.9 million ($140.78
psf), but still below the issuance appraised value of $5.25 million
($189.52 psf). According to the most recent appraisal, comparable
sales in the Gilbert and Chandler areas ranged from $137.93 psf to
$275.63 psf in the last two years. DBRS expects that the trust will
incur a loss with the liquidation of the asset.

The ratings assigned to the Classes M, N, and O Certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the uncertain loan level event risk.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2002-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. M Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed
      Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class M was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss. Class M has already experienced a 22%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on IO Class, Class XC, was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 34% of the
current balance, compared to 48% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.2% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 72% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for the specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 99.5% to
$6.25 million from $1.162 billion at securitization. The
certificates are collateralized by three mortgage loans. One loan,
constituting 24% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $46 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%). The one specially serviced loan is the Hope Hotel
& Conference Center Loan ($4.5 million -- 72% of the pool), which
is secured by a 266-key full service hotel located on the Wright
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2008 due to imminent default and the
borrower filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2010. The loan became
REO in May 2014. The property is dated and in need of capital
improvements.

The only non-defeased and non-specially serviced loan is the Tarry
Town Center Loan ($0.23 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 66,000 SF retail center in Austin, Texas. The loan is
fully amortizing and is scheduled to mature in April 2017. The loan
has amortized 92% since securitization and Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 2.6% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 5.8%
and 4.00X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.



GS MORTGAGE 2010-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Services affirmed the ratings on nine classes in
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2010-C2 as:

  Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015, Affirmed

   Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.8% of the
current balance, compared to 1.0% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were " Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Oct. 13, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $571 million
from $876 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 69% of
the pool.  Four loans, constituting 18% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments.  Two loans,
constituting 5% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Three loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Currently no loans have liquidated from the pool or are in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 98% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 81% compared to 84% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.73X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 1.30X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Cole
Portfolio I Loan ($31.5 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a fee interest in 20 single tenant properties located
across 13 states.  The portfolio consists of 17 retail properties,
two industrial properties and one ground leased parcel that is
improved with a retail building.  In aggregate, the portfolio
contains approximately 555,100 square feet (SF) and was 100% leased
as of June 2016.  Only one lease, representing 9% of the net
rentable area (NRA), expires during the loan term.  Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and
1.58X, respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Cole Portfolio II Loan ($30.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which
is secured by a fee interest in 14 single tenant properties and one
multi-tenant industrial property located across 11 states.  In
aggregate, the portfolio contains approximately 331,500 SF and was
100% leased as of June 2016.  Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 1.55X, respectively.

The third largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Payless and Brown Industrial Portfolio ($27.8 million -- 4.9% of
the pool), which is secured by two single tenant industrial
properties.  The Payless Distribution Center represents the larger
of the two properties and totals approximately 802,000 SF of the
Northbrook Industrial Park in Brookville, Ohio.  The property was
built in 2008 and has 32' ceiling heights, three grade drive-in
doors, 76 dock high doors, and approximately 25,000 SF of office
space.  The remainder of the collateral is represented by the Brown
Shoe Distribution Center, a 352,000 SF warehouse/distribution
building located in Lebec, California within the Tenjon Industrial
Complex.  The property was built in 2008 and has 32' ceiling
heights, a single grade drive-in door, 38 exterior docks with
levelers and approximately 12,000 SF of office space.  Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and
1.76X, respectively.

The fourth largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Ruxton Towers Loan ($11.3 million -- 2.0%), which is secured by a
16-story apartment building containing 207 units and built in 1927.
The property is located in the Upper West Side of Manhattan, NY.
As of June 2016, the property was 99% leased. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa1 (sca.pd) and 1.96X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the 52 Broadway Loan ($85.3 million -- 14.9% of the
pool), which is secured by a 19-story, 400,000 SF, Class B office
building located in downtown Manhattan, New York.  The property was
constructed in 1982 and renovated in 2002 at a cost of $4.5 million
($11.25 PSF).  The United Federation of Teachers has occupied the
entire building since the 2002 renovation.  They are currently
operating under a long term net lease expiring in August 2034.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 1X, respectively,
compared to 104% and 0.98X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Station Square Loan ($56.9 million
-- 10.0% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 670,000
SF mixed use property located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
property is comprised of five buildings containing 449,000 SF of
office space and 220,000 SF of retail space, two open-air parking
lots offering approximately 2,500 spaces, a covered parking garage
offering 1,210 spaces, docks leased to the Gateway Clipper Fleet,
marina slips, an outdoor amphitheater leased to a third party
operator and land under a gas stations owned by a third party
operator.  The age of the improvements vary, with the oldest
structure built in 1897 and the newest structure built in 2001.  As
of June 2016, the total property was approximately 80% leased.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.28X, respectively,
compared to 82% and 1.26X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 123 South Broad Loan ($44.6 million
-- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by two interconnected Class
B office buildings located in the central business district of
Philadelphia.  The two buildings are referred to as the Wells Fargo
Building and the Witherspoon Building.  Wells Fargo is the largest
tenant occupying 31% of the NRA through December 2020.  As of June
2016, the property was 95% leased, compared to 96% as of September
2015.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 70% and 1.48X at the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS4: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the GS Mortgage
Securities Trust (GSMS) 2016-GS4 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates series 2016-GS4.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $31,820,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $201,522,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $175,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $267,043,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43,192,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $810,965,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,761,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $92,388,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,761,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $184,777,000c class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43,628,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $53,893,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $53,893,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21,814,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,266,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,212,204a class G 'NR'.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest only.
  (c) Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
      PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
      exchanged for class A-S, B and C certificates.

These expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Nov., 8 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$37,212,204 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 33 loans secured by 95
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.03 billion as of the cut-off date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 80.3% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 93.5% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.34x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 94.6%, and
a Fitch debt yield of 10.6%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 13.2% to issuer cash flows.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The Fitch stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) on the trust-specific debt is 1.34x, higher than the
2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 1.18x and 1.20x, respectively.  The
Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the trust-specific debt
is 94.6%, lower than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 109.3% and
105.7%, respectively, for the other Fitch-rated deals.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
comprise 65.8% of the pool by balance.  Compared to other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this
transaction is higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 average
concentrations of 49.3% and 54.6%, respectively.  The pool's
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 541,
which is higher than the 2015 average of 367 and 2016 YTD average
of 419.

Credit Opinion Loans: The three largest loans in the pool, AMA
Plaza (9.7% of the pool), 225 Bush Street (9.7% of the pool) and
540 West Madison (7.3% of the pool), have investment grade credit
opinions.  AMA Plaza has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis.  225 Bush Street has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf*' on a stand-alone
basis.  540 West Madison has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis.  The three loans have a weighted
average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.53x and 58.6%, respectively.


                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.0% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to GSMS
2016-GS4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.


HILTON USA 2016-SFP: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Hilton USA Trust 2016-SFP,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-SFP:

  Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-CP*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  Cl. X-E*, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)
  Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

  * Reflects interest-only classes

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to two adjacent full-service
hotels, the Hilton San Francisco Union Square ("Hilton Union
Square") and the Hilton Parc 55 San Francisco.  The ratings are
based on the collateral and the structure of the transaction.

The Hilton Union Square is a full-service hotel built in 1964 and
features four interconnected buildings, known as Tower 1, 2, and 3
and the Plaza Building.  The Hilton Union Square is one of the
largest hotels on the West Coast of the United States with 1,919
rooms and occupies an entire city block.  The property offers
approximately 130,000 SF of meeting space, a 16th floor swimming
pool, fitness center, business center with on-site Federal Express
office, 505 parking spaces, four food & beverage outlets and
substantial banquet and catering operations.

The food and beverage outlets include the 250-seat Urban Tavern, a
full-service restaurant that also has a private dining option, Herb
N' Kitchen, a grab-and-go market located in the lobby, the spacious
lobby lounge, and the 46th floor lounge known as CityScape.  The
Property's 130,000 SF of meeting space includes three ballrooms,
one of which, at nearly 30,000 SF, occupies an entire floor of the
Property.  Hilton Union Square has the most meeting space of any
hotel in the market.  As of Aug. 31, 2016, the Hilton Union Square
reported 88.4% occupancy with a $260.04 ADR resulting in a $229.82
RevPAR.

The Parc 55 is a full-service hotel built in 1984, is located
adjacent to the Hilton Union Square and was acquired by Hilton from
Blackstone in February 2015.  Parc 55 provides 1,024 rooms
occupying almost an entire city block, and offers approximately
27,565 SF of meeting space, fitness center, business center with
on-site Federal Express office, a leased parking garage and three
food & beverage options.  The food and beverage outlets include the
208-seat Cable 55 Restaurant & Lounge, a three meal restaurant
offering classic American dishes, Kin Khao, a Michelin Star rated
restaurant serving Thai food, and Barbary Coast, a coffee shop that
serves breakfast and lunch.  As of Aug. 31, 2016, the Parc 55
reported 88.3% occupancy with a $253.61 ADR resulting in a $223.99
RevPAR.

The adjacent Properties are located in San Francisco CBD,
approximately one block southwest of Union Square and one block
north of Market Street.  The Properties are within walking distance
to Union Square, Nob Hill, Chinatown, the Theater District, the
Powell-Mason Cable Car line as well as numerous high-end department
stores and retail shops.  The Properties are approximately one half
mile from Moscone Convention Center, a three-building conference
venue covering more than 20 acres and offering over 700,000 square
feet of exhibit space.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both our Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and our IO Rating methodology.  The rating
approach for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit
risk inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit
protection offered by the structure.  The structure's credit
enhancement is quantified by the maximum deterioration in property
value that the securities are able to withstand under various
stress scenarios without causing an increase in the expected loss
for various rating levels.  In assigning single borrower ratings,
Moody's also considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $725,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 106.5%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 2.28X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.01X.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type.  These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction;
and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5.0%,
14.3%, and 22.7%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated (P) Aaa (sf) classes would be Aa1 (sf), Aa2 (sf), and A2
(sf), respectively.  Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time;
rather they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of
how the initial rating might change if key input parameters used in
the initial rating process differed.  The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged.  Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated
standpoint.  Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter.  Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer.  Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated.  Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance.  Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


INSITE WIRELESS 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
InSite Wireless Group's InSite Issuer LLC and InSite Co-Issuer
Corp. secured cellular site revenue notes, series 2016-1:

   -- $210,500,000 2016-1 class A 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,000,000 2016-1 class B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $70,000,000 2016-1 class C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes:

   -- $121,829,162 2013-1 class A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $39,600,000 2013-1 class B at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14,000,000 2103-1 class C at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Upon the closing of the 2016 series, the 2016-1 class A ranks pari
passu with the 2013-1 class A; the 2016-1 class B with the 2013-1
class B; and the 2016-1 class C with the 2013-1 class C. The new
series of securities was issued pursuant to a supplement to the
indenture.

The transaction is an issuance of notes backed by mortgaged
cellular sites representing approximately 80% of the annualized run
rate (ARR) net cash flow (NCF) and guaranteed by the direct parent
of the co-issuers. The guarantees are secured by a pledge and
first-priority-perfected security interest in 100% of the equity
interest of the co-issuers and their subsidiaries (which own or
lease 1,196 wireless communication sites and own the rights to
operate 19 distributed antennae system [DAS] networks).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Trust Leverage: Fitch's NCF on the pool is $54.6 million (inclusive
of expected cash from the site acquisition account), implying a
Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.23x. The
debt multiple relative to Fitch's NCF is 8.7x, which equates to a
debt yield of 11.4%.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: There are 2,800 wireless tenant
leases. Telephony and data tenants represent 73.7% of annualized
run rate revenue (ARRR), and 58% of the ARRR is from
investment-grade tenants. Tenant leases on the cellular sites have
average annual escalators of approximately 3% and an average final
remaining term (including renewals) of 22 years.

Diversified Pool: There are 1,196 tower sites and 19 DAS sites
spanning 46 states, Canada (145 sites), the U.S. Virgin Islands
(eight sites) and Puerto Rico (52 sites). The largest state (Texas)
represents approximately 11.8% of ARRR. The top 10 states
(including Ontario) represent 61.9% of ARRR.

DAS Networks: The collateral pool contains 19 DAS networks
representing 9.7% of the ARRR. DAS sites are located within
buildings or other structures or venues for which an asset entity
has rights under a lease or license to install and operate a DAS on
the premises or to manage a DAS network on the premises. Fitch did
not give credit for the four sites where InSite has a management
contract to manage a DAS network owned by the DAS venue; these
sites contribute 0.2% of ARRR. Additionally, Fitch limited proceeds
from the DAS networks to the 'BBsf' category (i.e. applied a 'BBsf'
rating cap), based on the uncertainty surrounding the licensing
agreements in a venue-bankruptcy scenario and the limited history
of these networks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch completed a break-even analysis comparing the interest-only
debt service with both the Fitch stressed NCF and in-place
aggregate ARR NCF, derived from data provided by the arranger,
including estimated interest rates. Fitch compared the in-place
aggregate ARR NCF and Fitch NCF with the interest-only debt service
amount and determined that 77.2% and 76.7% reductions in NCF,
respectively, would cause the 'Asf' notes to break even at 1.0x
DSCR on an interest-only basis. Reductions to in-place aggregate
ARR NCF and Fitch NCF of 70.4% and 69.6%, respectively, would cause
the 'BBB-sf' notes to break even at 1.0x DSCR on an interest-only
basis. Reductions to in-place aggregate ARR NCF and Fitch NCF of
58.8% and 57.8%, respectively, would cause the 'BB-sf' notes to
break even at 1.0x DSCR on an interest-only basis.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the 2013-1 and 2016-1 class A
ratings and a 6% additional decline in Fitch NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade to 'BBBsf', while a 16% decline would result
in a downgrade to below investment-grade and a 37% decline would
result in a downgrade below 'CCCsf'. Rating sensitivity was also
performed for the 2013-1 and 2016-1 class B notes and an additional
15% decline in Fitch NCF would result in a one-category downgrade
to 'BB-sf', while a 25% decline would result in a downgrade below
'CCCsf'. The Rating Sensitivity section in the presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence information
was provided on Form ABS Due Diligence Form-15E and focused on a
comparison of certain characteristics with respect to the portfolio
of wireless communication sites and related tenant leases in the
data file. Fitch considered this information in its analysis, and
the findings did not have an impact on its analysis.


JAMAICA MERCHANT: Fitch to Assign BB+ Rating on Series 2016-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the $150 million series 2016-1 notes
to be issued by Jamaica Merchant Voucher Receivables Limited
'BB+(EXP)' with a Stable Outlook.

The existing program is backed by future flows due from Visa
International Service Association (Visa) and MasterCard
International Incorporated (MasterCard) related to international
merchant vouchers acquired by National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd.
(NCBJ) in Jamaica. Fitch currently rates the series 2015-1 notes
issued by Jamaica Merchant Voucher Receivables Limited
'BB+'/Outlook Stable. Fitch's ratings address timely payment of
interest and principal on a quarterly basis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Originator Credit Quality: Fitch assigns NCBJ a local currency (LC)
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' with a Stable Outlook and a
Viability Rating (VR) of 'b'. NCBJ's ratings reflect the high
influence of the operating environment given its large exposure to
the sovereign as well as its reach into the major sectors of the
Jamaican economy. Fitch also assigns the bank a going concern
assessment (GCA) score of 'GC1', reflecting NCBJ's position as a
systemically important top-tier bank representing around 40% of
system assets.

Strength of Merchant Voucher Program: NCBJ's market-leading credit
card franchise continues to support a growing level of
international Visa and MasterCard merchant vouchers. Fitch expects
debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) to be approximately 5.9x. This
calculation considers average rolling quarterly collections during
the last four recorded quarters and the maximum quarterly debt
service for the life of the program.

Low Sovereign/Diversion Risk: The structure mitigates certain
sovereign risks by keeping cash flows offshore until collection of
periodic debt service, allowing the transaction to be rated over
the sovereign country ceiling (CC). Fitch believes diversion risk
is mitigated by consent and agreements (C&As) obligating Visa and
MasterCard to make payments into a collection account controlled by
the trustee.

Moderately High Future Flow Debt: Upon issuance of the series
2016-1 notes, NCBJ's merchant voucher program debt will represent
approximately 9.9% of its consolidated liabilities. Total future
flow debt (including NCBJ's diversified payment rights program)
will be about 13% of consolidated liabilities. While Fitch is
comfortable with the program size at the assigned rating, this
level of future flow debt is a constraint to the ratings of NCB's
future flow transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings assigned to the notes are linked to the credit quality
of NCBJ and the ability of the credit card business to continue
operating, as reflected by the GCA score. Although the future flow
rating is sensitive to changes in the bank's LC IDR, a one-notch
movement in the bank's IDR may not lead to a similar rating action
on the notes.

The transaction rating is sensitive to the performance of the
securitized business line. The expected quarterly DSCR is
approximately 5.9x and, therefore, should be able to withstand a
significant decline in cash flows in the absence of other issues.
Sensitivity analysis was run on the strength of collections. Severe
reductions in coverage levels could result in rating downgrades.

No company is immune to the economic and political conditions of
its home country. Political risks and the potential for sovereign
interference may increase as a sovereign's rating is downgraded.
However, the underlying structure and transaction enhancements
mitigate these risks to a level consistent with the assigned
rating.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has assigned the following rating:

Jamaica Merchant Voucher Receivables Limited

   -- $150,000,000 series 2016-1 notes 'BB+(EXP)'; Outlook Stable.



JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP4.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect Fitch's expected losses, as well as the
pool concentration and adverse selection of the remaining pool.
Fitch's expected losses totalled 27.9% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 9.3%, including
$224.2 million (8.4% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced 96% to
$91.7 million from $2.7 billion at issuance.  There are currently
no defeased loans.  Interest shortfalls are affecting class D, and
L through NR.

Concentrated Pool with Adverse Selection: Although the transaction
has experienced significant paydowns, the remaining pool is highly
concentrated with only 13 of the original 184 loans remaining and
the largest loan accounting for 30.5% of the pool balance.  Current
risk exposure of the remaining loans includes properties with high
vacancies, low debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs), single-tenant
properties, secondary market exposure, and loans previously
modified debt including a Hope note.

High Percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) and Specially
Serviced Loans: Six loans (46% of the pool) have been identified as
FLOC, including two (26%) currently in special servicing.  Both of
the specially serviced assets are REO, both of which have high
vacancies and are located in secondary markets.  Severe losses are
expected given the most recent servicer appraisal valuations.

The largest non-specially serviced FLOC is secured by a 484-unit
student housing property in Kalamazoo, MI (13.3% of the pool),
located across the street from the Western Michigan University
campus.  The loan had previously transferred to special servicing
in August 2013 due to payment default, and a foreclosure sale was
held in May 2015 where the noteholder was the successful bidder.
During the six-month REO redemption period the loan was assumed by
a new borrower and modified, whereby the loan was bifurcated into a
senior ($10 million) and junior ($2.1 million) component.  The loan
assumption required a $100,000 paydown of the senior note to $9.9
million.  The loan remains current under the modified terms, and
transferred back to the master servicer in May 2016.

Property performance remains low with occupancy at 64% and DSCR at
0.54x as of June 2016.  According to the servicer, the new borrower
is focused on an aggressive capital improvements program and
marketing campaign to drive occupancy to market levels. Although
losses are not expected imminently, any recovery to the subject
B-note is contingent upon full recovery to the A-note proceeds at
the loan's maturity in December 2018.  Unless collateral
performance improves, recovery to the B-note component is
unlikely.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a 350,000 square foot
(sf) suburban office building located in Holmdel, NJ 100% occupied
by Vonage (30.5% of the pool).   loan had previously transferred to
special servicing in July 2015 due to a downsizing request by the
tenant after its August 2017 lease expiration, plus significant
funds required for tenant improvements (TIs).  The borrower was
successful in negotiating a lease extension to October 2023 for the
full space.  The lease was modified to include placing the property
under a hard lock box, establishing tax and insurance escrows, and
a waterfall provision for all excess cash flow to fund a rollover
reserve to be used for future TIs.  The loan, which has remained
current since issuance, transferred back to the master servicer in
May 2016.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class B remains Stable due to sufficient
credit enhancement.  Although the credit enhancement will increase
with scheduled amortization, Fitch is concerned with increasing
pool concentration and high potential for performance volatility of
the remaining collateral; therefore, a rating cap of 'BBsf' was
considered appropriate on class B.  Fitch does not foresee positive
or negative rating migration unless there is material economic
change to the remaining loans.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $34.8 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23.4 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $33.5 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 20%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-2FL, A-3A1, A-3A2, A-4, A-SB, A-M, and
A-J certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class
NR certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C33: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Cl. F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2015-C33.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of overall stable pool performance,
which reflects no material changes to pool metrics since issuance;
therefore, the original rating analysis was considered in affirming
the transaction.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.6% to
$757.5 million from $761.8 million at issuance. The pool has
experienced no realized losses to date, and there have been no
specially serviced loans since issuance.  No loans are defeased.
The Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value
(LTV) at issuance were 1.14x and 112.0%, respectively.

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: All loans in the pool
are current as of the October 2016 distribution with property level
performance in line with issuance expectations and no material
changes to pool metrics.

Loan of Concern: Fitch has designated one loan (0.7% of the pool)
as a Fitch Loan of Concern.  The loan, which is secured by a 15,356
square foot unanchored retail center in Mansfield, MA, has been on
the master servicer's watchlist since September 2016.  The servicer
is advancing on real estate tax payments for the loan.

Pool Concentration: The largest loan in the pool, 32 Avenue of the
Americas, represents 16.5% of the pool's balance, and is among the
largest single loan concentrations in CMBS 2.0.  However, the
largest 10 loans account for 48.9% of the pool, which is in line
with the year-to-date (YTD) November 2015 average of 48.1% and the
2014 average of 50.5%.  It was also noted at issuance that the loan
concentration index (LCI) and sponsor concentration index (SCI)
were higher than average for this transaction.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest property type is
multifamily at 36.1%, followed by hotel at 19.5% and office at 19%.
Multifamily and hotel concentrations are above the YTD November
2015 averages for other Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions of 16.7% and 16.6%, respectively.

Below-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 9%
of the initial pool balance prior to maturity.  Sixteen loans
(41.9% of the pool) are interest-only for the full term.  As of
October 2016, all of the nine loans (18.2%) structured with a
partial interest-only component at issuance have yet to convert to
principal and interest payments.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $24.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $135 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $287 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $574.2 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35.2 million class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.9 million class X-C* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23.8 million class D-1** at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20 million class D-2** at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43.8 million class D** at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43.8 million class X-D* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.6 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

**Class D-1 and D-2 certificates may be exchanged for class D
certificates, and class D certificates may be exchanged for class
D-1 and D-2 certificates.  Fitch does not rate the class G or class
NR certificates.



LIMEROCK CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to B-
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class F notes from
Limerock CLO II Ltd., a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) managed by INVESCO Senior Secured Management, by one notch.
In addition, S&P removed this rating from CreditWatch, where it had
been placed with negative implications.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E
notes to reflect adequate credit support at their current
respective rating levels.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Sept. 1, 2016.
The transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period
until April 2018.

Since S&P's effective date rating affirmations, the transaction has
experienced par loss and credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  Comparing the September 2016 trustee report to the May
2014 trustee report used for the effective date analysis shows that
the exposure to 'CCC' rated assets has risen to 8.4% from 1.6%,
while the senior par coverage test has fallen to 130.6% from 134.3%
within the same time frame.  The transaction continues to have
significant exposure to energy-related obligors, some of which have
ratings with a negative outlook.

Despite the heightened downgrade-to-upgrade ratio within U.S.
speculative-grade corporate ratings (i.e., those rated 'BB+' or
lower) in recent months, S&P did note a significant increase in
exposure to assets rated 'B+' and above.  Since the May 2014
trustee report, the exposure to 'BB' category assets has increased
from 21.2% to 33.2%, which has helped to maintain the overall
rating distribution of the portfolio--a potential benefit for the
senior and mezzanine notes.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
A, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E notes.  Although cash flow results
show a higher rating for some of these classes, S&P affirmed its
ratings for these six classes of notes to maintain a rating cushion
as the transaction continues to reinvest.

The class F note was structured as the most subordinated rated note
and is sensitive to potential deterioration of the portfolio. Since
S&P's effective date analysis, the rating cushion for this class
has declined considerably given the deterioration noted above.
Although the cash flow analysis indicated a lower rating, S&P
lowered its rating on the class F note by only one notch to 'B-
(sf)' because S&P do not believe that this tranche meets its
criteria for assigning a 'CCC' rating.

S&P will continue to monitor this transaction and will take rating
or CreditWatch actions as it deems appropriate.

RATING LOWERED

Limerock CLO II Ltd.

                    Rating

Class         To              From    
F             B- (sf)         B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Limerock CLO II Ltd.

Class         Rating

A             AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C-1           A (sf)
C-2           A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)


MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Raises Rating on Class M Notes to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class M and N notes
from MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC, a Canadian resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the October 2016 trustee report.

Since S&P's January 2014 rating actions, the class A, B, C, D, E,
F, G, H, I, J, K, and L notes have been completely paid down, and
class M has started receiving paydowns.  Following the Oct. 21,
2016, payment date, the outstanding balance of class M is about
58.43% of its original balance.

In addition, there have been positive rating movements on the
underlying collateral since January 2014.  As a result, both the
class M and N notes are now backed by higher-quality assets.

The paydowns and the improvement in the credit quality of the
portfolio increased the credit support to the notes.

S&P raised its ratings on the class M and N notes to 'BB+ (sf)' and
'B+ (sf)' respectively, reflecting this increase in credit support.
The ratings are constrained by the application of the largest
obligor default test.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
                Rating
Class       To           From
M           BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
N           B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)


MAGNETITE XVIII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to five classes of notes
issued by Magnetite XVIII, Limited.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$340,260,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$59,890,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$30,210,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$30,740,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$28,090,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Magnetite XVIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans (excluding first lien last out loans), and
up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 84% ramped as of
the closing date.

BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year and nine
month reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $530,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2878

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 8.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.75 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2878 to 3310)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2878 to 3741)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1



MASTR ADJUSTABLE 2007-3: S&P Lowers Cl. 2-1A1 Debt Rating to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on MASTR Adjustable Rate
Mortgages Trust 2007-3 class 2-1A1 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' and
removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The transaction in this review is backed by adjustable-rate
negatively amortizing mortgage loans, which are secured entirely by
first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.  The
downgrade reflects S&P's assessment of the principal write-downs'
impact on the affected class during recent remittance periods.  The
class 2-1A1 was placed on CreditWatch with negative implication in
August 2016 because it had been assessed principal write-downs, but
possessed enough credit support from subordination to cover those
losses. (Class 2-1A1 from MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust
2007-3 receives credit support from class 2-1A2.)

S&P has since contacted the trustee regarding the allocation of
losses, and they informed S&P that the transaction was currently in
litigation and the payments may be subject to adjustment. However,
S&P believes this class has defaulted as of the September 2016
distribution date because it currently has an accumulative
principal write-down amount that is greater than the balance of
class 2-1A2.



MCF CLO III: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes from MCF
CLO III LLC, a U.S. middle-market collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in January 2014 and is managed by MCF
Capital Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the October 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
January 2017.  The rating actions also take into account the
updated recovery rate tables in S&P's Corporate Cash Flow and
Synthetic Criteria.

The upgrades primarily reflect stable credit quality in the
underlying collateral since S&P's effective date rating
affirmations in June 2014.

The transaction has benefited from collateral seasoning, with the
reported weighted average life decreasing to 3.23 years from 3.65
years in May 2014.  This seasoning has decreased the overall credit
risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in defaults since the
May 2014 effective date report; however, assets rated 'CCC+' and
below have decreased in that same time frame.  Specifically, the
amount of defaulted assets increased to $9.61 million as of October
2016, from no defaults as of the May 2014 effective date report.
The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below decreased to $15.26
million (5.1% of the aggregate principal balance) from $38.74
million over the same period.  Overall, the increase in defaulted
assets has been largely offset by the decline in assets rated
'CCC+' and below, as well as the weighted average life of the
collateral portfolio.  The increase in defaulted assets, as well as
other factors, has affected the level of credit support available
to all tranches, as seen by the mild decline in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

According to the October 2016 trustee report that S&P' used for
this review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class
have exhibited mild declines since S&P's June 2014 rating
affirmations.

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 151.09%, down from the 151.85%
      reported in May 2014.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 135.84%, down from 136.53%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 126.12%, down from 126.76%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 113.89%, down from 114.47%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated a higher rating for the
class E notes, its rating actions considers the increase in the
defaults and marginal decline in the portfolio's credit quality.
In addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs that
considered the exposure to specific distressed industries and
allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio given that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A and E notes reflect
S&P's belief that the credit support available is commensurate with
the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

MCF CLO III LLC
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C             AA- (sf)    A (sf)
D             A- (sf)     BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
MCF CLO III LLC
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
E             BB (sf)   


MERRILL LYNCH 2002-HE1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches issued from four transactions backed by Subprime RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2002-HE1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC9

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-11

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The actions also reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in October 2016 from 5.0% in
October 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Certs to B
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2004-BPC1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes D and E to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral and available liquidity
support.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes D and E, S&P's analysis also considered
the certificates' susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from
the specially serviced asset ($13.5 million, 43.5%) and one loan on
the master servicer's watchlist ($8.9 million, 28.8%).

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Oct. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $31.0 million, which is 2.5% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes four loans, down from 94
loans at issuance.  One of these loans ($13.5 million, 43.5%) is
with the special servicer, and one ($8.9million, 28.8%) is on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Midland Loan
Services, reported year-end 2015 financial information for all of
the loans in the pool.

S&P calculated a 1.61x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 58.5% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using an 8.44% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the one specially serviced
loan ($13.5 million, 43.5%).

To date, the transaction has experienced $80.1 million in principal
losses, or 6.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 6.6% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
one specially serviced loan.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Oct. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the Sugar Loaf
Business Center and Southwood 75 Business Center loan ($13.5
million, 43.5%), which is the largest loan in the pool, was the
sole loan with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  The loan has a total reported exposure of $13.6 million
and is secured by two office properties totaling 200,758 sq. ft. in
Duluth and Jonesboro, Ga.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing on Sept. 10, 2014, because of a maturity default after
the borrower was unable to pay off the loan by the Sept. 1, 2014,
maturity date.  In April 2015, a one-year loan extension, with a
one-year option, was granted to the borrower, who again was unable
to repay the loan by its extended Sept. 1, 2016, maturity date.
C-III has approved an additional 12-month loan extension.  The
reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.98x and
49.7%, respectively.  Based on currently available information, S&P
expects a minimal loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Courtyard Dulles Town Center ($8.9 million, 28.8%), the
second-largest loan in the pool, appears on the master servicer's
watchlist because of a low reported DSC, which was 1.01x as of
year-end 2015.  The loan is secured by a 157-room hotel in
Sterling, Va.

RATINGS LIST

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-BPC1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-BPC1

                                     Rating
Class             Identifier         To                 From
D                 59022HFB3          A (sf)             BB+ (sf)
E                 59022HFE7          B (sf)             CCC+ (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust (MSDWCI) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2001-Top3.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class E reflects the pool concentration and the
collateral quality of the remaining loans.  Fitch modeled losses of
4.4% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 5.7%, including $57.2 million (5.6% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.9% to $21.3 million from
$1.03 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(11.1% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes F through N.

Pool Concentration: Performance of the transaction has been stable
since Fitch's last rating action, but Fitch remains concerned about
adverse selection given the concentrated nature of the pool. There
are only 10 loans remaining.  The largest three loans make up 63.3%
of the pool, and 80.1% of pool is secured by retail properties.

Collateral Quality: The third largest loan (15.4% of the pool) is
secured by a dark grocery store located in Tampa, FL.  The property
is shadow-anchored by Home Depot, but has been dark since the
former tenant, Kash N' Karry, closed the store in March 2013. The
tenant is still paying rent and the lease runs through September
2020, which is eight months before the loan's maturity. The former
tenant is trying to sublease the space, but as of January 2015, no
proposals for a sublease have been received; however, the loan has
remained current.

The rest of the pool collateral mainly consists of retail and
self-storage properties located in secondary and tertiary markets,
which may impact the ability of the loans to refinance at maturity
(98% of the pool matures in 2021).  Additionally, 70.7% of the pool
is secured by assets considered to have single-tenant exposure.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class E remains Stable due to the high level
of credit enhancement and expected continued paydown.  Although
expected losses from the remaining loans are minimal, future
upgrades will be limited due to the increasing concentrations
within the pool and the collateral quality of the remaining loans.
Class E may be subject to downgrades if the performance of the
underlying collateral declines.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $14.2 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.1 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 95%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C and D certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.



MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs to B
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed eight classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-HQ6.

                           KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects increased credit enhancement from the
resolution of all five of the specially serviced loans/assets at
better recoveries than previously modeled at Fitch's last rating
action.  There are currently no specially serviced loans or loans
on the master servicer's watchlist.

Rating Cap: Due to concerns of pool concentration and adverse
selection, a rating cap of 'Bsf' was considered appropriate for
class H.  Only three loans remain, compared to the original 177
loans at issuance.  The two largest loans (84% of pool) are secured
by multifamily properties with a related sponsor and the smallest
of the remaining loans is secured by a grocery-anchored retail
shopping center (16%).  All three of these properties are located
in secondary and tertiary markets.

As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.9% to $29.5 million from
$2.75 billion at issuance.  Total realized losses are 5.7% of the
original pool balance.  Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$11.2 million are currently impacting classes J through S.

The largest loan, The Mission Bay Apartments, a 361-unit property
located in Viera, FL (approximately 50 miles southeast of Orlando),
was 97% occupied as of the June 2016 rent roll.  The second largest
loan, Hunters Run Apartments, a 304-unit property located in
Middleburg, FL (approximately 30 miles southwest of Jacksonville,
FL), was 95.7% occupied as of the June 2016 rent roll.  Property
performance and cash flow has been stable to improving for these
two multifamily loans.  Both of these loans mature in April 2018.

The smallest remaining loan, The Old Bakery Place Shopping Center,
a 68,627 square foot retail property located in Bristol, VA, was
94.3% occupied as of the June 2016 rent roll.  The property is
anchored by K-V-A-T Food Stores (operating as a Food City; 71.5% of
net rentable area) with a lease expiring in March 2030, which is
beyond the loan's March 2020 maturity.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlook of class H reflects stable collateral
performance.  Although credit enhancement will increase with
continued scheduled amortization, Fitch is concerned with pool
concentration and collateral quality of the remaining three loans;
therefore, a rating cap of 'Bsf' was considered appropriate for
this concentrated pool.  Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative rating migration unless there is material economic change
to the remaining loans.

Fitch has upgraded and assigned a Rating Outlook to this class:

   -- $11.2 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; assign Outlook
      Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $18.3 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 35%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2A, A-2B, A-AB, A-3, A-4A, A-4B, A-J, B, C,
D, E, F, and G certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class S certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on
the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
certificates issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. 2005-RR6 ("MSC
2005-RR6"):

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

* Interest Only

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

MSC 2005-RR6 is a static cash transaction wholly backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the current pool balance). As of the October 24, 2016 trustee
report, the aggregate certificate balance of the transaction has
decreased to $31.3 million from $564.1 million at issuance as a
result of pay downs and realized losses on the underlying
collateral. Classes A-1 through A-J are fully amortized. Classes D
through N have full realized losses and Class C has partial
realized losses.

No assets had defaulted as of the trustee's October 24, 2016
trustee report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5172,
compared to 6675 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (7.8% compared to 15.6% at last
review), A1-A3 (14.8% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(0.0% compared to 3.4% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (18.3% compared to
5.3% at last review), B1-B3 (12.7% compared to 5.3% at last review)
and Caa1-Ca/C (46.4% compared to 70.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, compared to 1.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.6%, compared to 4.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.1%, compared to 99.9% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant, reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool to 0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificates of zero notches downward (e.g., one notch
down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by 5% would result in
an average modeled rating movement on the rated certificates of
zero to one notch upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust (MSC) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2011-C1.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect continued paydown and overall stable
performance since Fitch's last rating action.  As of the October
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 44.9% to $852.7 million from $1.5 billion at issuance.
Two loans (3.9% of the current balance) are fully defeased.
Interest shortfalls in the amount $288 are currently affecting
class M.

There was a variance from criteria related to class C for which the
model output suggested that an upgrade was possible.  Fitch
determined that an upgrade is not warranted at this time due to the
pool's concentration, high percentage of retail loans, and the
long-dated maturities of the remaining loans.

Stable Performance of the Pool: As of the October distribution
date, all loans in the pool are current and there are no loans with
the special servicer.

Concentrated Pool: Only 26 loans remain, with the top 15
representing 90% of the pool's current balance.

High Percentage of Retail Loans: There are 11 loans in the pool
(44.5%) that are secured by retail properties.

Long-Dated Maturities: The remaining loans in the pool all have
long-dated maturities, with the earliest occurring in 2019.  Loan
maturities are concentrated in years 2020 (47.3%) and 2021
(46.7%).

Occupancy Fluctuations for Top 15 Loans

Performance of the Grace Place & Goodrich Buildings loan (3.7%) is
expected to improve with the re-tenanting of a large portion of the
rentable space.  The loan is secured by a 30,640 sf office building
and a 492,699 sf industrial property located in Commerce, CA.
Occupancy dropped sharply at the properties when two large tenants
vacated leaving the combined properties with occupancy of 20%.
With the decrease in occupancy, the servicer reported net operating
income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) dropped to 0.29x
for the period July 2015 to June 2016.  A new tenant executed a
lease in July 2016 for the vacant space at the industrial property,
bringing the combined occupancy of the properties back up to 88% as
of the August 2016 rent roll.  While the office building still
remains fully vacant, Fitch expects loan performance to improve as
revenue reverts back to its 2014 level.

The Capitol Tower loan (3.2%) is secured by a 20-story tower
containing eight stories of office space, an 11-level parking
garage, and a single level of retail space located in downtown
Austin, TX.  The loan was structured with a cash sweep that was
triggered when the largest tenant, Young & Rubicam Inc. (41% of net
rentable area), failed to provide the borrower notice of their
intention to renew their lease (expiring in January 2017).  Per
servicer reporting, Young & Rubicam Inc. has since renewed their
lease, which now expires in January 2022.  Fitch expects this loan
to be removed from the master servicer's watchlist as a result of
the recent renewal.  Per servicer reporting, the property was fully
occupied with an NOI DSCR of 2.57x as of year-end 2015.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Upgrades are
possible as the transaction continues to season and benefit from
amortization.  Downgrades are also possible if a negative economic
or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $94.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $404.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $498.5 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $89 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $85.2 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.;
   -- $19.4 million class E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13.5 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.5 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have all paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class H, J, I, K, L, M, and X-B certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C13: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust, Series 2013-C13 pass-through
certificates.  The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to overall stable performance.  The stable
performance reflects no material changes to pool metrics since
issuance; the original rating analysis was considered in affirming
the transaction.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 3.3% to
$962.6 million from $995.3 million at issuance.  Eight loans are on
servicer watchlist, four of which (4.8%) have been identified as
Fitch Loans of Concern.

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: All loans in the pool
are current as of the October 2016 remittance with property level
performance generally in line with issuance expectations and no
material changes since issuance.  There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance.

Property Type Concentration: Of the pool, the transaction has a
high retail property concentration (55.8%).  However, three of the
retail properties among the top 10 (Stonestown Galleria, The Shops
at Chestnut Hill, and 428 - 430 N. Rodeo Drive), totaling 28.8% of
the pool, are high-quality properties in strong locations
demonstrating stable performance.

Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs): Fitch has identified four loans as
FLOCs.  The largest FLOC is the Northwest Crossing Centre (2.4%) in
Houston, TX.  The property has significant upcoming lease rollover
in 2017 (38%), including Best Buy (17.6% of the property's NRA) and
Big Lots (15% of NRA).  Fitch is waiting for lease updates from the
servicer.  The other three FLOCs are due to higher vacancies on
retail (2) or mixed use (1) properties in connection with major
tenants which vacated before their lease expiration dates.  Fitch
has applied additional stresses on capitalization rates and cash
flow haircuts to account for lower rental revenue for these FLOCs.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings as indicated:

   -- $16.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $77.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $220 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $274.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class PST Exchangeable Certificates at 'A-sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $44.8 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13.7 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.2 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10 million class G at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest - Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest - Only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class H or class X-C certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: Fitch Rates Class E-1 Certificates 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Morgan Stanley
Capital I trust 2016-BNK2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

   -- $31,400,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,700,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $50,600,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $160,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $194,805,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $482,505,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $85,300,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52,558,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,742,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,879,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,050,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,050,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,047,000ac class E-1 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,047,000ac class E-2 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18,094,000ac class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6,893,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,987,000ac class EF 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $3,446,500ac class F-1;

   -- $3,446,500ac class F-2;

   -- $6,031,000ac class G-1;

   -- $6,031,000ac class G-2;

   -- $12,062,000ac class G;

   -- $37,049,000ac class EFG;

   -- $7,755,027ac class H-1;

   -- $7,755,028ac class H-2;

   -- $15,510,055ac class H;

   -- $36,278,582ad RRI Interest.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.
c) The class E-1 and E-2 certificates may be exchanged for a
related amount of class E certificates, and the class E
certificates may be exchanged for a ratable portion of class E-1
and E-2 certificates. Class E-1 is senior to class E-2. Likewise,
class F, G and H, and corresponding exchangeable classes, are
structured in a similar fashion. Additionally, a holder of class
E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates may exchange such classes of
certificates (on an aggregate basis) for a related amount of class
EF certificates, and a holder of class EF certificates may exchange
that class EF for a ratable portion of each class of the class E-1,
E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates. A holder of class E-1, E-2, F-1,
F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates may exchange such classes of
certificates (on an aggregate basis) for a related amount of class
EFG certificates, and a holder of class EFG certificates may
exchange that class EFG for a ratable portion of each class of the
class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates.
d) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
pool balance (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Oct. 31, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 43
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$725,571,637 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association, and Bank of America, National
Association.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 1.28x and 106.4%, respectively,
are better than the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average Fitch DSCR and
Fitch LTV of 1.19x and 105.8%, respectively.

Low Mortgage Coupons: The pool's weighted average mortgage coupon
is 3.93%, well below historical averages and below the YTD 2016
average of 4.62%. Fitch accounted for increased refinance risk in a
higher interest rate environment by reviewing an interest rate
sensitivity that assumes an interest rate floor of 5.0% for the
term risk for most property types, 4.5% for multifamily properties,
and 6.0% for hotel properties, in conjunction with Fitch's stressed
refinance rates, which were 9.68% on a weighted average basis.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The top 10 loans comprise 60.0% of
the pool, which is greater than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of
49.3% and 54.7%, respectively. The pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) is 483, which is above the YTD 2016 average of 421.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.0% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSC
2016-BNK2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 12.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Deloitte &
Touche, LLP. The due diligence focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on our
analysis/conclusions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-BNK2: S&P Gives Prelim B+ Rating on 4 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2016-BNK2's $725.6 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-BNK2.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 40 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $725.6 million, secured by the fee
and leasehold interests in 43 properties across 15 states and the
District of Columbia.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 1,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect the credit support provided by the
transaction structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's
economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's
relative diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2016-BNK2

Class         Rating(i)         Amount ($)
A-1           AAA (sf)          31,400,000
A-2           AAA (sf)          45,700,000
A-SB          AAA (sf)          50,600,000
A-3           AAA (sf)         160,000,000
A-4           AAA (sf)         194,805,000
X-A           AAA (sf)     482,505,000(ii)
X-B           AA (sf)       85,300,000(ii)
A-S           AAA (sf)          52,558,000
B             AA (sf)           32,742,000
C             A (sf)            31,879,000
X-D(iii)      BBB- (sf)     37,050,000(ii)
D(iii)        BBB- (sf)         37,050,000
E-1(iii)(iv)  BB+ (sf)           9,047,000
E-2(iii)(iv)  BB (sf)            9,047,000
E(iii)(iv)    BB (sf)           18,094,000
F-1(iii)(iv)  BB- (sf)           3,446,500
F-2(iii)(iv)  BB- (sf)           3,446,500
F(iii)(iv)    BB- (sf)           6,893,000
EF(iii)(iv)   BB-(sf)           24,987,000
G-1(iii)(iv)  B+ (sf)            6,031,000
G-2(iii)(iv)  B+ (sf)            6,031,000
G(iii)(iv)    B+ (sf)           12,062,000
EFG(iii)(iv)  B+ (sf)           37,049,000
H-1(iii)(iv)  NR                 7,755,027
H-2(iii)(iv)  NR                 7,755,028
H(iii)(iv)    NR                15,510,055
RR(iii)       NR                36,278,582

(i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.
(iii) Non-offered certificates.
(iv) Class E is exchangeable for replacement certificates E-1 and
E-2; class F is exchangeable for replacement certificates F-1 and
F-2; class EF is exchangeable for replacement certificates E-1,
E-2, F-1, and F-2; class G is exchangeable for replacement
certificates G-1 and G-2; class EFG is exchangeable for replacement
certificates E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1, and, G-2, and class H is
exchangeable for replacement certificates H-1 and H-2.
NR--Not rated.


NELNET EDUCATION 2007-2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
and confirmed the rating of one tranche in three securitizations
backed by student loans originated under the Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP), sponsored by Nelnet Inc.  The loans
are guaranteed by the US government for a minimum of 97% of
defaulted principal and accrued interest.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nelnet Education Loan Funding, Inc. (2004 Indenture)

  2004-1-A2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,

   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  2004-1-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
  2004-1-B-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2005-4

  Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. A-4L, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. A-4AR-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22,
   2015, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. A-4AR-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22,
   2015, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Nelnet Student Loan Trust 2007-2

  Cl. A-3L, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. A-4AR-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,

   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. A-4AR-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,

   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are primarily a result of Moody's analysis
indicating that the tranches will not pay off by final maturity
dates in either some or all of Moody's 28 cash flow scenarios, thus
causing the tranches to incur expected losses that are higher than
the expected loss benchmarks set in Moody's idealized loss tables
for the current ratings.  The low payment rates on the underlying
securitized pools of FFELP student loans are driven primarily by
persistently high levels of loans to borrowers in non-standard
payment plans, including deferment, forbearance and Income-Based
Repayment (IBR), as well as by the relatively low rates of
voluntary prepayments.

The downgrades of Classes 2004-1-B-1 and 2004-1-B-2 of the NELF
2004 Indenture also reflect the correction of an error in
calculating the maximum coupon cap of the notes.  In Moody's June
2016 action, it incorrectly calculated the Commercial Paper Cap,
which led to the coupon of the notes being capped at an
artificially low rate.  As a result of the correction, the coupon
in Moody's cash flow scenarios is higher, and the expected loss for
these classes has increased to a level higher than the expected
loss benchmark levels set in Moody's Idealised Cumulative Expected
Loss Rates table for the current ratings.

The confirmation of Cl. A-3 of NSLT 2005-4 is primarily a result of
Moody's analysis indicating that the tranche is likely to either
successfully pay off by its maturity date, or that its expected
loss across Moody's cash flow scenarios is respectively either
lower or consistent with the expected loss benchmarks in Moody's
idealized loss tables for the current tranche ratings.

In these rating actions Moody's also considered transaction
structure features that might protect the deals from default as a
result of the tranches not fully amortizing by their maturity
dates.  One of such features includes Nelnet's ability to
optionally call the notes on the earlier of a specified date or the
10% pool factor (i.e., when the balance of the collateral pool
declines to 10% of the initial pool balance).  Nelnet's consistent
exercise of this option in the past demonstrates its willingness
and ability to support the transactions and making sure the
tranches do not default at maturity.  Another feature includes the
requirement that the Indenture trustee initiates a sale of the
underlying student loan pools if Nelnet does not notify it of its
intent to call the bonds.  The sale of the student loan pools will
take place only if the proceeds will be sufficient to pay off all
outstanding notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in August 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up
Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the loan
pool increases as a result of declining borrower usage of
deferment, forbearance and IBR, increasing voluntary prepayment
rates, or prepayments with proceeds from sponsor repurchases of
student loan collateral.  Moody's could also upgrade the rating
owing to a build-up in credit enhancement.

Down
Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the
loan pool declines as a result of low voluntary prepayments, and
high deferment, forbearance and IBR rates, which would threaten
full repayment of the classes by their final maturity dates.  In
addition, because the US Department of Education guarantees at
least 97% of principal and accrued interest on defaulted loans,
Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if it were to
downgrade the rating on the United States government.


OCP CLO 2012-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the new
class A1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from OCP CLO 2012-2 Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2012
that is managed by Onex Credit Partners LLC.  The new notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Nov. 22, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the new notes are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the new notes. However,
if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the ratings on the
original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the new
notes.

The new notes are being issued via a supplemental indenture and a
restated indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of
the replacement notes, will also reset the non-call end date,
reinvestment end date, weighted average life test and legal final
maturity date.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest           BDR     SDR  Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)           (%)     (%)      (%)
A1-R      250.00   LIBOR + 1.40     77.74   59.71    18.03
B-R        39.70   LIBOR + 2.00     73.63   51.67    21.97
C-R        35.00   LIBOR + 2.85     60.26   45.28    14.98
D-R        22.50   LIBOR + 4.47     49.82   39.97     9.85
E-R        20.00   LIBOR + 8.30     32.78   31.15     1.63

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2012-2 Ltd./OCP CLO 2012-2 Corp.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A1-R                      AAA (sf)             250.00
B-R                       AA (sf)               39.70
C-R                       A (sf)                35.00
D-R                       BBB (sf)              22.50
E-R                       BB- (sf)              20.00
Subordinated notes        NR                    49.50

NR--Not rated.


PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Class L Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on three classes in PNC Mortgage Acceptance
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class K was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan amortization. The deal has
paid down 3% since Moody's last review and 99% since
securitization.

The rating on Classes L and M were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.1% of the
current balance, compared to 9.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16.1 million
from $1.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 3 mortgage loans.

All three remaining loans are on the master servicer's watchlist.
The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $32.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 86% of
the pool. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average
haircut of 15.7% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

The largest loan is the Northside Marketplace Loan ($13.8 million
-- 86.1% of the pool) which is secured by an anchored retail
property located in Nashville, Tennessee. The loan was previously
in special servicing due to imminent default and passing its
anticipated repayment date (ARD) of September 1, 2010. The loan was
modified and returned to the master servicer in December 2012.
Terms of the modification included an amended hard maturity date to
January 2017 and an interest rate reduction from 8.3% to 4.5% (with
interest only payments). The original final maturity date was
September 2030. The largest tenants are Dick's Sporting Goods, Best
Buy and Big Lots. As of August 2016 the property was 92% leased
compared to 93% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
123% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.89X at Moody's
last review.

The second largest loan is the Mission Bank Building Loan ($1.3
million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 72,236 SF
office property located in downtown Mission, Kansas. As of June
2016, the property was 80% leased, compared to 81% as of December
2015. The loan is a fully amortizing loan that has amortized 62%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 33% and
3.31X, respectively, compared to 41% and 2.62X at Moody's last
review.

The third largest loan is the Rite Aid-Flatbush Loan ($936,344 -
5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant retail
building located in Brooklyn, New York. The property is 100%
occupied by Rite Aid. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 25% and
4.00X, respectively, compared to 27% and 3.99X at Moody's last
review.


RACE POINT VII: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-R, and
C-R notes from Race Point VII CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2012 that is managed by
Sankaty Advisors LLC.  On the Nov. 8, 2016, refinancing date,
proceeds from the class A-R, B-R, and C-R replacement note issuance
were used to redeem the original class A, B, and C notes,
respectively, as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line
with their full redemption.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class D and E notes, which were not refinanced.

The assigned and affirmed ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the
credit support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
September 2016 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B-R, C-R, and D notes, its rating actions considered
additional sensitivity runs that allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Race Point VII CLO Ltd.

Replacement classes   Rating     Amount (mil. $)

A-R                   AAA (sf)            381.00
B-R                   AA (sf)              72.00
C-R                   A (sf)               45.00

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Race Point VII CLO Ltd.
                      Rating
Original class    To           From

A                 NR           AAA (sf)  
B                 NR           AA (sf)
C                 NR           A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Race Point VII CLO Ltd.

Class                Rating

D                    BBB (sf)
E                    BB- (sf)

OTHER CLASSES OUTSTANDING

Race Point VII CLO Ltd.

Class                 Rating

Subordinated notes    NR

NR--Not rated.



SATURN VENTURES I: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A-3 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Saturn Ventures I, Ltd.:

   -- Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf);
      previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed Ca (sf)

   -- Class B Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
      previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed ratings on two classes of notes because the
key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The lower credit risk of the current outstanding pool, as evidenced
by WARF, is offset by the reduction in recovery rates, as evidenced
by WARR. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Saturn Ventures I, Ltd. is a static cash transaction wholly backed
by a portfolio of: i) residential mortgage backed securities
primarily in the form of "subprime", "alt-A", and "prime" (RMBS)
(83.6% of the pool balance); and ii) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (16.4%). As of the trustee's September 30, 2016
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, is $57.6 million, down from $400.0 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the senior most outstanding
class of notes, as a result of full and partial amortization of the
underlying collateral and the re-direction of interest proceeds as
principal proceeds due to the failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains seven assets totaling $4.5 million (64.7% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's September 30, 2016 report. Five of these assets
(74.7% of the defaulted balance) are RMBS, and two assets are CMBS
(25.3%). Moody's does expect significant/moderate losses to occur
on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5375,
compared to 5786 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0% compared to 5.0% at last
review, Baa1-Baa3 and 3.0% compared to 3.0% at last review, Ba1-Ba3
and 28.5% compared to 21.0% at last review, B1-B3 and 12.3%
compared to 12.1% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 56.2% compared to
58.9% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.6 years, compared to 4.7 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying RMBS and CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.0%, compared to 4.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, compared to 100.0% at last review.
The decrease in MAC is primarily due to a small number of high
credit risk assets in the pool.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to a upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral
pool by 10.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SAXON ASSET 2004-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. MF-1 Debt Rating to B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
and affirmed the ratings of three tranches issued from Saxon 2004-2
a transaction backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-2

  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 5, 2013,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. MV-3, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. MV-4, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. MV-5, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Class MF-1 is primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to this bond.

The ratings of Classes MV-3, MV-4, and MV-5 were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected pool loss and the
amount of credit enhancement available to the tranches.  In the
prior rating action in October 2015, these three tranches were
downgraded, due in part to the reduction of actual credit
enhancement available to the Class MV-3 and MV-5 bonds.  The
October 2015 downgrades of these three bonds also reflected the
correction of the cash-flow modeling used in prior actions.  In
rating actions prior to October 2015, the excess spread had not
been modeled properly to cross collateralize the Group I and Group
II notes.  This was corrected in the October 2015 action, thereby
changing modeled future excess spread benefit for these tranches.
The downgrade of the Class MV-4 bond in October 2015 was driven by
this error correction.

The actions also reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in October 2016 from 5.10% in
October 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SLM STUDENT 2006-3: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Bsf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2006-3 (SLM 2006-3):

   -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class A-5 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AA-sf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Stable Outlook.

The class A-5 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, which constitutes a criteria
variation, Fitch has considered qualitative factors such as
Navient's ability to call the notes upon reaching 10% pool factor,
the revolving credit agreement in place for the benefit of the
noteholders, and the eventual full payment of principal in
modelling. Based on the current trajectory of the pool, Fitch
estimates in six to nine months the pool factor will reach 10%
which will cause the trust to stop releasing cash and give Navient
the option to call the bonds.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
18.00% and a 54.00% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 18.00% implies a
constant default rate of 5.6% (assuming a weighted average life of
9.6 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The trailing 12 month average of deferment, forbearance,
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) and constant
prepayment rate (voluntary and involuntary) are 12.1%, 16.8%, 14.4%
and 11.3%, respectively, which are used as the starting point in
cash flow modelling. Subsequent declines or increases are modelled
as per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be
approximately 0.01%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement is provided by excess spread,
overcollateralization, and for the class A notes, subordination. As
of September 2016 distribution, total and senior effective parity
ratios, respectively, are 100.89% (0.88% CE; inclusive of the
reserve account) and 138.95% (28.03% CE). Liquidity support is
provided by a reserve account sized at the greater of 0.25% of the
pool balance and $2,502,119, currently equal to $2,502,119. The
trust will continue to release cash as long as 100.00% total parity
is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the A-4
notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final maturity date
under the 'AAA' rating scenarios. The class A-5 notes, however, do
not pay off before their maturity date in any of Fitch's modelling
scenarios, including the base cases. If the breach of the class A-5
maturity date triggers an event of default, interest payments will
be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them to fail the
base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer of FFELP student
loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

For transactions in surveillance, Fitch will treat certain assets
such as claims filed as short-term assets in its cash flow
analysis. Given that Fitch's current criteria is silent on the
treatment of such assets, this treatment is considered a criteria
variation.

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated July 18, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Fitch does not
believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings
assigned.

Fitch assumed a base case default rate for the credit stresses
based on actual trust performance, which is higher than the output
from its Default Model. There is no rating impact from such
variation.

While under Fitch's maturity and credit base case scenarios the
class A-5 notes miss their legal final maturity date, and the class
B notes suffer an interest shortfall due to the default of the
class A-5 notes, Fitch is downgrading to 'Bsf', rather than 'CCCsf'
or below, which constitutes a criteria variation.


THL CREDIT 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by THL Credit Wind River 2016-2 CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $416,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $74,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,

   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)
  $14,750,,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2(sf)
  $15,250,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2(sf)
  $9,000,000 Class C-3 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2(sf)
  $42,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $13,000,000 Class E-1 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  $13,000,000 Class E-2 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the
Class C-2 Notes, the Class C-3 Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class
E-1 Notes and the Class E-2 Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

THL 2016-2 CLO is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans.  The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of the closing
date.

THL Credit Advisors LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four year reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $650,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.0%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C-1 Notes: -1
Class C-2 Notes: -1
Class C-3 Notes: -1
Class D Notes: -1
Class E-1 Notes: -1
Class E-2 Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -3
Class C-1 Notes: -2
Class C-2 Notes: -2
Class C-3 Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E-1 Notes: -2
Class E-2 Notes: -2



TICP CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by TICP CLO VI 2016-2, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "TICP CLO VI 2016-2").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$52,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$26,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3
      (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

TICP CLO VI 2016-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. Moody's said, "We expect the
portfolio to be approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date."

TICP CLO VI 2016-2 Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60
  
   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2785

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2785 to 3203)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2785 to 3621)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1



TRAPEZA CDO X: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Trapeza CDO X, Ltd.:

  $268,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance of $132,218,258), Upgraded

   to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 5, 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $69,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2041, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 5,

   2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  $31,000,000 Class B Third Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2041 (current balance including deferred
   interest of $32,647,911), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 5, 2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed mainly by a portfolio of bank, insurance and REIT
trust preferred securities (TruPS).

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios, the resumption of interest
payments by a previously deferring asset, and an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since October 2015.  The
actions on the Class A-2 and Class B notes also reflect a
correction to modeling inputs for those notes.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 4.2% or $5.9
million since October 2015 using principal proceeds from the
redemption of underlying assets, recoveries on defaulted assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds.  Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class B
notes have improved to 215.9%, 141.9% and 122.1%, compared to
October 2015 levels of 201.6%, 134.4%, and 116.1%, respectively.
Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to one previously
deferring bank with a total par of $8.0 million that has resumed
interest payment after a recent merger.  The Class A-1 notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the
use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio.  According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) has improved to 966 from
1359.

The rating actions also reflect a correction to modeling inputs for
the Class A-2 and Class B notes.  In the previous rating action,
the expected loss benchmarks were incorrectly calculated for these
notes.  The error has now been corrected and the rating actions
reflect the correct benchmarks.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $285.4
million, defaulted and deferring par of $60.1 million, a weighted
average default probability of 10.58% (implying a WARF of 966), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%. In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy.  Moody's has a stable outlook on the US
     banking sector.  Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the
     US insurance sector.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number

     of banks have resumed making interest payments on their
     TruPS.  The timing and amount of deferral cures could have
     significant positive impact on the transaction's over-
     collateralization ratios and the ratings on the notes.

  5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks, insurance companies and REIT
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly.  To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc, an econometric model developed by Moody's
Analytics, to derive credit scores.  Moody's evaluation of the
credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the
latest FDIC financial data.  For insurance TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance
team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance
firms' annual statutory financial reports.  For REIT TruPS that do
not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit
quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 595)
Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +2
Class C-1: +2
Class C-2:+2
Combo: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1353)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -2
Class C-1: -1
Class C-2: -1
Combo: 0


TRU TRUST 2016-TOYS: S&P Assigns B- Rating on Cl. F Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to TRU Trust 2016-TOYS'
$512 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificates issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction secured by 123 Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us
stores with 5.1 million sq. ft. rentable area across 29 states.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a 98.3% beginning and
a 91.4% ending loan-to-value (LTV) ratio based on our estimate of
the portfolio value under a "dark value" scenario, where the master
lease tenant is no longer able to meet its obligations, vacates,
and the properties must be re-tenanted.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

TRU Trust 2016-TOYS

Class     Rating(i)       Amount ($)
A         AAA (sf)       244,871,000
B         AA- (sf)        52,100,000
C         A- (sf)         39,075,000
D         BBB- (sf)       47,932,000
E         BB- (sf)        65,126,000
F         B- (sf)         62,896,000

(i)Reflects the approximate decline in the $878.8 million appraised
value that would be necessary to experience a principal loss at the
given rating level.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2012-C4.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on overall stable performance since
issuance.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 5.2% to $1.381
billion from $1.456 billion at issuance.  Sixteen loans (14.8% of
the pool) are currently on the servicer watchlist; however, nine of
the loans have issues related to minor deferred maintenance but not
considered Fitch loans of concern.  Seven (8.6%) of the watchlist
loans, which have occupancy and/or performance issues are Fitch
loans of concern.  Eight loans (2.9%) are fully defeased.

Stable Performance: Based on full-year 2015 financial statements,
the pool's overall net operating income has been relatively stable
with a 2.1% increase since last year's review and an 8.1% increase
since issuance for reporting loans.  All loans in the pool are
current as of the October 2016 distribution and no loans are in
special servicing.

Loan Diversity: The largest 10 loans account for 48.6% of the pool
by balance.  It was also noted at issuance that the loan
concentration index (LCI) was lower than average for this
transaction compared to the 2012 peer set.

Single Tenant Exposure: Two of the 10 largest assets, representing
13.1% of the pool, are occupied by a single tenant or present
exposure in excess of 80% of the NRA to a single tenant, creating
idiosyncratic risk to property performance.

Loan Amortization: Six loans, representing nearly 19% of the
collateral balance, are full-term interest-only loans, above the
2012 average of 13%, and one loan (0.5%) has an anticipated
repayment date (ARD).  The pool is comprised of loans that have
maturity dates in 2017 (5.1%), 2020 (9.6%), and 2022 (85.3%).  This
deal is expected to experience amortization of 13.4% between
securitization and maturity.

Two top 10 properties had exposure to Sports Authority: Newgate
Mall and Clifton Commons (8.1%).  Both properties experienced
vacancy after the tenant's bankruptcy liquidation.  Both properties
are considered strong retail centers within its submarket and the
sponsors have begun negotiations with replacement tenants.
Although Fitch projects short-term decreases in cashflow for each
asset, long-term performance issues are not expected due to the
sponsors' experience and strong historical asset operating
performance.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2012-C4

   -- $8.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $132 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $150 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $476 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104 million class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $145.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.089 billion* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $134.7 million* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $65.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $61.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.2 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $51 million class G.


WELLFLEET CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Wellfleet CLO 2016-2, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"Wellfleet 2016-2").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$260,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$47,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$21,500,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$16,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
      Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-1 Notes"),
      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$7,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating

      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$16,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Wellfleet 2016-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and first-lien last out loans. The portfolio is at least 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Wellfleet Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


WELLS FARGO 2015-C31: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Series 2015-C31 pass-through certificates and
maintains Stable Outlooks.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to overall stable performance and no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance.  The original
rating analysis was considered in affirming the transaction.

Stable Performance With No Material Changes: All loans in the pool
are current as of the October 2016 remittance with property level
performance generally in line with issuance expectations and no
material changes since issuance.

High Fitch Leverage: The pool demonstrates high leverage statistics
with a Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value
(LTV) of 1.12x and 112.9%, respectively, at issuance.

Pool Diversity by Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans represent
37.5% of the pool by balance.  The largest loan in the pool, 745
Atlantic Avenue, represents 7.1% of the pool, while the second
largest loan, Sheraton Lincoln Harbor Hotel, represents 6.1% of the
pool.  There is no significant sponsor concentration in the pool.

As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 0.5% to $983.4 million from
$988.5 million at issuance.  There have been no delinquent,
specially serviced, or defeased loans since issuance.

Six loans (8.7% of the pool) are on servicer watchlist, three of
which (4.9%) have been identified as Fitch loans of concern
(FLOCs).  The largest FLOC (2.4%) is secured by the Palouse Mall, a
391,856 square foot (sf) community center located in Moscow, ID.
Macy's (leased 10.6% of the property's net rentable area [NRA] with
lease ending January 2020), a former anchor tenant of the property,
closed in March 2016 but is still paying rent.  The borrower is
working to replace Macy's.

The second largest FLOC (1.7%) is secured by a 372-unit multifamily
apartment complex located in Baton Rouge, LA.  The property
contains 24, two-story apartment buildings.  Property suffered
substantial damage due to the recent flooding that occurred between
Aug. 12, 2016, and Aug. 16, 2016.  The borrower is working with the
insurance company regarding flood insurance. It is estimated that
it will take one year to complete the repair work.

The third FLOC (1%) is secured by a secured by a 63,232 sf retail
center located in Manchester, NH.  The property was 100% occupied
at issuance.  Sports Authority, the former largest tenant that
leased 65.3% of the property's NRA, has closed its store subsequent
to its bankruptcy filing.  The borrower is working to re-lease the
space.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings as indicated:

   -- $33.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $366.1 million class at A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-Only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-Only class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class PEX exchangeable certificates at 'A-sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $56.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24.7 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.1 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C36: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C36 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates:

   -- $41,947,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $39,657,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $220,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $250,203,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,917,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $77,236,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $600,724,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $120,145,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,909,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,473,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41,836,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41,836,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,118,000ac class E-1 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,118,000ac class E-2 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18,236,000ac class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,582,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $26,818,000ac class EF 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b) Notional amount and interest-only.
  c) The class E-1 and E-2 certificates may be exchanged for a
     related amount of class E certificates, and the class E
     certificates may be exchanged for a ratable portion of class
     E-1 and E-2 certificates. Additionally, a holder of class E-
     1, E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates may exchange such classes of

    certificates (on an aggregate basis) for a related amount of
    class EF certificates, and a holder of class EF certificates
    may exchange that class EF for a ratable portion of each class

    of the class E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates.  A holder of
    class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates may
    exchange such classes of certificates (on an aggregate basis)
    for a related amount of class EFG certificates, and a holder
    of class EFG certificates may exchange that class EFG for a
    ratable portion of each class of the class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2,

    G-1 and G-2 certificates.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

   -- $4,291,000ac class F-1;
   -- $4,291,000ac class F-2;
   -- $6,098,000ac class G-1;
   -- $6,098,000ac class G-2;
   -- $12,196,000ac class G;
   -- $39,014,000ac class EFG;
   -- $9,992,979ac class H-1;
   -- $9,992,979ac class H-2;
   -- $19,985,958ac class H.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Nov. 3, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 73 loans secured by 98
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$858,177,959 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by Barclays Bank PLC, Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, C-III Commercial Mortgage LLC, Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC, National Cooperative Bank, N.A., The Bancorp Bank,
and Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 83.1% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
83.9% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.38x and
101.5%, respectively, are better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.19x and 105.8%, respectively.  Only 3.1% of
the pool has a Fitch Stressed DSCR below 1.00x, better than the YTD
2016 average of 22.9%.  Excluding credit opinion loans and loans
secured by multifamily cooperative properties, the pool's Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV is 1.20x and 110.2%, respectively.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 10 loans (8.4%) secured by
multifamily cooperatives.  Nine of the co-ops are located within
the greater New York City metro area, with the remaining co-op
located in Suffolk County, Long Island.  The weighted average Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV of the co-op loans are 2.91x and 54.1%,
respectively.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two of the loans in the
pool, Easton Town Center (5.2%) and Gas Company Tower & World Trade
Center Parking Garage (1.7%) have investment-grade credit opinions.
Easton Town Center has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'A+sf*' on a stand-alone basis, and Gas Company Tower & World Trade
Center Parking Garage has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'Asf*' on a stand-alone basis.  The two loans have a weighted
average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.64x and 54.3%, respectively.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-C36 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could occur.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could occur.  


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C17
issued by WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C17:

   -- Class B to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The ratings upgrades reflect the performance of the overall pool as
well as the benefit of defeasance collateral in the transaction. At
issuance, the transaction consisted of 84 loans secured by 134
commercial and multifamily properties. The pool has since
experienced a collateral reduction of 3.1% as the result of
scheduled amortization, with all of the original 84 loans remaining
in the pool. Three loans, including the second-largest loan,
together representing 10.5% of the current pool balance, are fully
defeased. Excluding the defeased loans, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.08
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 13.1% based on YE2015 financials.
Comparatively, the prior-year reporting showed a WA DSCR and WA
debt yield of 1.90x and 12.1%, respectively.

As of the October 2016 remittance, there are nine loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, representing 11.3% of the current pool
balance. The largest three loans on the watchlist, representing
7.2% of the current pool balance, were placed on the watchlist for
deferred maintenance issues. Each of these loans reported
occupancies of at least 90.0% and healthy DSCRs. The loans are
expected to be removed from the servicer’s watchlist once the
deferred maintenance issues are resolved. One loan on the watchlist
is further discussed below.

The Staybridge Suites – Minot (Prospectus ID#26), representing
1.1% of the current pool balance, is secured by a 102-room hotel,
built in 2012, located in Minot, North Dakota. This loan was placed
on the servicer’s watchlist in August 2015 as a result of a
decline in performance, which is directly attributable to the
deteriorating market conditions in the area. The region is going
through a transition period, as it is heavily reliant on the oil
and gas industry. The decline in oil prices over the past several
years has had a negative economic impact for the area. The subject
property generates most of its room nights from corporate accounts
and the servicer reports that the demand segmentation consists of
60% transient business and 40% extended stay. As a result, the
overall performance of the market and subject has declined;
however, the subject continues to perform near the top of its
competitive set. Based on the trailing 12 month April 2016 Smith
Travel Research report, the subject reported an occupancy of 68.2%,
an average daily rate (ADR) of $100.76 and a revenue per average
room (RevPAR) of $68.76. Comparatively, the competitive set
reported an occupancy of 52.6%, ADR of $86.92 and RevPAR of $45.76.
At YE2014, the subject reported an occupancy of 80.0%, an ADR of
$120.57 and a revenue RevPAR of $96.48, while the competitive set
reported an occupancy of 62.4%, an ADR of $106.62 and a revenue
RevPAR of $66.49. According to the most recent financials, the
annualized Q1 2016 DSCR was 0.53x, decreasing from the YE2015 DSCR
of 1.08x and the YE2014 DSCR of 1.44x. Given the overall decline in
the market and the effects of decreasing demand, DBRS expects this
loan to continue to underperform expectations from issuance. As
such, this loan was modeled with an increased probability of
default.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated one loan, Westfield Mission Valley
(Prospectus ID#3, representing 6.3% of the current pool balance),
as investment grade. DBRS has confirmed that the performance of
this loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

The ratings assigned to Classes D, E and F materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative model that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.


WHITEHORSE VI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B-3L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R, and
A-3-R replacement notes from WhiteHorse VI Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that was originally issued in
2013 and is managed by H.I.G WhiteHorse Capital LLC.  S&P withdrew
its ratings on the original class A-1L, A-2L, and A-3L notes
following payment in full on the Nov. 2, 2016, refinancing date. At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B-1L,
B-2L, and B-3L notes, which were not part of the refinancing.

On the Nov. 2, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, and A-3-R note issuance were used to redeem the
original class A-1L, A-2L, and A-3L notes, as outlined in the
transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the transaction's original notes in line with their full
redemption, and assigned ratings to the replacement notes. The
ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available is
commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

WhiteHorse VI Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating         Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                AAA (sf)                262.50
A-2-R                AA (sf)                  36.00
A-3-R                A (sf)                   36.00

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

WhiteHorse VI Ltd.

                        Rating
Original class      To          From        Amount (mil. $)
A-1L                NR          AAA (sf)             262.50
A-2L                NR          AA (sf)               36.00
A-3L                NR          A (sf)                36.00

RATINGS AFFIRMED

WhiteHorse VI Ltd.

Class                   Rating    Amount (mil. $)
B-1L                    BBB (sf)            18.50
B-2L                    BB- (sf)            17.50
B-3L                    B (sf)               9.00

UNAFFECTED CLASS

WhiteHorse VI Ltd.

Class                   Rating    Amount (mil. $)
Subordinated notes      NR                  36.00

NR--Not rated.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $224.7MM Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and downgraded the ratings of 11 tranches from seven
transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-A Trust

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-A-3A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-A-3B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC6

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
      2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
      2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
      2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
      Dec 9, 2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9,
      2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
      Dec 9, 2015 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

   -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010

      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6

   -- Cl. 1A-1A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-1

   -- Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-10

   -- Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3AC

   -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
      Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-37A

   -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2014
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2014
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 8-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2014
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 8-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2014
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan
Trust 2004-3AC classes A1 and A2 are primarily based on the
correction of an error in the cash-flow model used by Moody's in
rating this transaction. In the prior modeling, the recovery amount
was incorrectly double-counted, thus overestimating the amount of
unscheduled principal distributable to the bonds. This error has
been corrected and today's downgrade actions on classes A1 and A2
reflect the change, as well as the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pools.

The rating actions on Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust
2003-37A Classes 2-A, 4-A, 8-A1, and 8-A2 also reflect corrections
to the cash-flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction.
In prior rating actions, the cross collateralization to seniors was
calculated incorrectly, resulting in more funds to the senior
classes than called for in the transaction documents. In addition,
the subordinate certificate writedown amount was allocated
incorrectly, resulting in more losses to senior classes than called
for in the transaction documents. These errors have now been
corrected, and today's rating actions reflect these changes.

The rating actions on other bonds are a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectation on the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of
the improving performance of the related pools and an increase in
credit enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades
are due to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and
the erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in September 2016 from 5.1% in
September 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 102 Classes From 10 US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 102 classes from 10 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2005.  The review yielded 28 upgrades, 16
downgrades, 57 affirmations, and one withdrawal.  The transactions
in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
prime jumbo mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

For insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating on the bond
insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class without
bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P relied
solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.

Of the classes reviewed, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust
2004-3's class 2-A-4 ('AA (sf)') and MASTR Asset Securitization
Trust 2003-8's class 3-A-5 ('A+ (sf)') are insured by MBIA
Insurance Corp., which is currently rated 'CCC' by S&P Global
Ratings.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include 17 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- The class' expected short duration; and/or
   -- Rising constant prepayment rates (CPRs).

The upgrades on classes 1-A-1, 3-A-12, and 8-A-1 from MASTR Asset
Securitization Trust 2003-8, classes 2-A-1, 2-A-2, 2-A-3, 2-A-5,
2-A-6, and 3-A from Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3, and
class A-1 from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC
2003-C reflect a decrease in our projected losses for the related
transactions, as well as S&P's belief that our projected credit
support for the affected classes will be sufficient to cover S&P's
revised projected losses at these rating levels.  S&P has decreased
its projected losses because there have been fewer reported
delinquencies for the associated pools during the most recent
performance periods compared to those reported during the previous
review dates.

S&P raised its ratings on classes 5-A-1 and 5-A-2 from MASTR Asset
Securitization Trust 2003-8, classes A-1, A-2, and B-1 from Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-E, and classes A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-5, and A-8 from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
MLMI Series 2005-A2 due to an increase in credit support available
to each class.  The increase in credit support is attributed to the
collateral amortizing faster than the junior support class
reduction.  As a result, these classes were able to withstand loss
stresses at higher rating scenarios.

The upgrade on class 4-A from Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust
2004-3 reflects an increase in the CPR observed for the underlying
pool.  The higher CPR has allowed more principal payments to be
made to this senior class, resulting in an earlier projected
paydown before back-end losses occur.  CPRs have increased to 17%
in September 2016 from 14.63% in October 2014, allowing this class
to pay down to 13% of its original balance.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include seven ratings that were lowered three or
more notches.  S&P lowered its rating on one class to speculative
grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or higher).
Another six of the lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade
level, while the remaining nine downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect one or
more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls;
   -- Tail risk;
   -- Principal write-downs; and/or
   -- Erosion of credit support.

S&P lowered three ratings to 'D (sf)' because of principal
write-downs incurred by these classes or the application of S&P's
interest shortfall criteria.

The downgrades on classes 2-A-1, 2-A-2, 2-A-3, and 2-A-7 from MASTR
Asset Securitization Trust 2003-7 reflect the increase in our
projected losses and S&P's belief that the projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover the
projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating levels.  The
increase in S&P's projected losses is due to higher reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods when
compared to those reported during the previous review dates. Severe
delinquencies increased to 36.5% in September 2016 from 9% in
October 2014.

S&P lowered the ratings on class 1-B-1 from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-29 and on class B-1 from
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3, due to decreased credit
enhancement available to these classes.  Both of these classes have
experienced the paydown and write-downs of junior support classes,
therefore eroding credit support.  As a result, these classes were
exposed to future losses at higher rating scenarios.

Interest Shortfalls

The downgrade on class 1-B-2 from Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-29 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'was
based on S&P's assessment of interest shortfalls to the affected
class during recent remittance periods.  The lowered rating was
derived by applying S&P's interest shortfall criteria, which
designate a maximum potential rating to this class.

Tail Risk

RFMSI Series 2003-S14 Trust and MASTR Asset Securitization Trust
2004-5 are backed by a small remaining pool of mortgage loans.  S&P
believes that pools with less than 100 loans remaining create an
increased risk of credit instability, because a liquidation and
subsequent loss on one loan, or a small number of loans, at the
tail end of a transaction's life, may have a disproportionate
impact on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit support.  S&P
refers to this as "tail risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes in this review by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, and
lowered the ratings on seven classes to reflect the application of
our tail risk criteria.  S&P lowered the ratings on classes A-1,
A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6, and A-P from RFMSI Series 2003-S14 Trust and
class 2-A-1 from MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2004-5 by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, as set
forth in S&P's tail risk criteria.  The rating actions on these
classes reflect the application of S&P's tail risk criteria.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments;
   -- Tail risk; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its rating on class 15-A-X from MASTR Asset
Securitization Trust 2004-5 because the rating on the senior
referenced class 2-A-1 from this transaction was lowered to 'A+
(sf)'.  This reflects the application of our interest only (IO)
criteria, which provide that S&P will maintain the current rating
on an IO class until the ratings on all of the classes that the IO
security references, in the determination of its notional balance,
are either lowered below 'AA-' or have been retired, at which time
S&P will withdraw these IO ratings.  The rating on this class has
been affected by recent rating actions on the reference class upon
which its notional balance is based.

A criteria interpretation for the above mentioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
before the release of this criteria.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.5% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                   http://bit.ly/2fHw8IK



[*] S&P Completes Review on 91 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 91 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2000 and 2005.  The review yielded 14 upgrades, seven
downgrades, 45 affirmations, and 25 withdrawals.  The transactions
in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
prime jumbo and Alternative-A mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

For insured obligations where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P
relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  One class
in the reviewed transactions was insured by a rated insurance
provider when the deal was originated, but S&P Global Ratings has
since withdrawn the rating on the insurance provider of that
class.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades include eight ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect either improved collateral
performance/delinquency trends or the class' expected short
duration.

The upgrades on the five classes from three transactions listed
below reflect a decrease in S&P's projected losses and its belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
sufficient to cover S&P's revised projected losses at these rating
levels.

   -- S&P raised its ratings MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
      Series 2000-TBC3's class B-1 to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)',

      class B-2 to 'AA (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)', and class B-3 to
      'A+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)', because the total delinquencies
      decreased to 0.02% in August 2016 from 4.22% in September
      2015, and there have been no severe delinquencies since June

      2015.

   -- S&P raised its rating on class B1 from Structured Asset
      Securities Corp. 2002-5A to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)' because
      the total delinquencies decreased to 5.42% in August 2016
      from 25.01% in September 2014, and severe delinquencies
      decreased to 3.25% in August 2016 from 26.12% in September
      2014.

   -- S&P raised its rating on class A-5 from Wells Fargo Mortgage

      Backed Securities 2005-AR14 Trust to 'BB (sf)' from 'B (sf)'

      because the total delinquencies decreased to 7.95% in August

      2016 from 11.38% in April 2015, and severe delinquencies
      decreased to 6.08% in August 2016 from 10.31% in September
      2014.

S&P also raised its rating on class 4-A from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. 2003-40A to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.  S&P had
lowered its rating on this class on March 5, 2014, based on S&P's
then-outstanding interest shortfall criteria, "Methodology For
Assessing The Impact Of Interest Shortfalls On U.S. RMBS,"
published March 28, 2012.  The last interest shortfall the class
received was in January 2014, and it was fully reimbursed in
February 2014.  Since then the class had no additional interest
shortfalls.  S&P's current interest shortfall criteria, "Structured
Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology," published Dec.
15, 2015, state that "generally, for any tranche downgraded to
below 'BB+' due to temporary interest shortfalls, an upgrade may be
considered to as high as 'BB+' after the reimbursement of all past
interest shortfalls and the subsequent payment of timely interest
over at least the subsequent six months."  Further, the criteria
also state that "any potential upgrade following an interest
shortfall would depend not only upon the criteria outlined above
being met, but also upon our determination that no future
shortfalls are likely to occur, taking into account the underlying
creditworthiness of the securities as considered using the relevant
sector criteria." Based on our review of the class' underlying
creditworthiness and
the likelihood of any future shortfalls, we raised our rating.

S&P also raised its rating on class A-6 from Wells Fargo Mortgage
Backed Securities 2005-AR14 Trust to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
because S&P believes this class is no longer vulnerable to default.


                            DOWNGRADES

The seven downgrades include two ratings that were lowered three or
more notches.  Three of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining four downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that our projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Erosion of credit support; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

The downgrade on class 5-A-1 from CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series
2005-11 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' reflects the increase in
S&P's projected losses due to higher reported delinquencies during
the most recent performance periods.  The total delinquencies for
group 5 increased to 33.20% in August 2016 from 22.71% in September
2014.

Tail Risk

RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust is backed by a small remaining pool of
mortgage loans.  S&P believes that pools with less than 100 loans
remaining create an increased risk of credit instability, because a
liquidation and subsequent loss on one loan, or a small number of
loans, at the tail end of a transaction's life may have a
disproportionate impact on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit
support.  S&P refers to this as "tail risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes from this transaction by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, as set
forth in our tail risk criteria.  S&P lowered its rating on class
A-2 from RFMSI Series 2003-S18 Trust to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'
to reflect the application of S&P's tail risk criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have either insufficient
subordination and/or increasing delinquency trends, which limit any
potential upgrade.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover S&P's 'B' expected case projected losses for these
classes.  Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC',
'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)'
affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes are still
vulnerable to defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect
S&P's view that these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on 25 classes from three transactions,
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-1, RFMSI Series 2004-PS1 Trust,
and Charlie Mac Trust 2004-2 because the related pools have a small
number of loans remaining.  Once a pool has declined to a de
minimis amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of credit
instability that is incompatible with any rating level.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.5% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                      http://bit.ly/2fbCSh5



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 151 Classes From 24 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 151 classes from 24 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2006.  The review yielded 43 upgrades, 23
downgrades, 83 affirmations, and two withdrawals.  The transactions
in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
mixed collateral mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by
first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.  Of the classes reviewed, Structured Asset Investment Loan
Trust 2003-BC8 class 3-A2 ('AAA (sf)') is insured by MBIA Insurance
Corp. ('CCC').  The reviewed transactions also have nine other
classes that were insured by rated insurance providers when the
deals were originated, but S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn
the ratings on those insurance providers.

ANALYSIS
Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 43 classes, including 14 ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more
of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/severe delinquency (greater
      than 90 days delinquent and includes foreclosures and real
      estate owned) trends; and/or

   -- Increased credit support (subordination, excess spread, or
      overcollateralization, where applicable) relative to S&P's
      projected losses.

The upgrades on classes A-I-5, A-I-6, and M-I-1 from RAMP Series
2003-RS7 Trust reflect a decrease in S&P's projected losses and its
belief that its projected credit support for the affected classes
will be sufficient to cover its revised projected losses at these
rating levels.  S&P has decreased its projected losses because
these classes have benefited from severe delinquencies decreasing
to 10.2% in September 2016 from 13% in December 2013.

S&P also raised nine ratings to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because
it believes these classes are no longer virtually certain to
default, primarily owing to the improved performance of the
collateral backing these transactions.  However, the 'CCC (sf)'
ratings indicate that S&P believes that its projected credit
support will remain insufficient to cover S&P's projected losses
for these classes and that the classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting.  In addition, S&P raised its ratings from 'CCC (sf)' on
these classes because we believe these classes are no longer
vulnerable to default:

   -- Class M2 from Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust
      2003-BC8 to ('B+ (sf)');

   -- Class M3 from Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-
      BC8 to ('B- (sf)');

   -- Class M-II-1 from RAMP Series 2003-RS9 Trust to ('B (sf)');
      and

   -- Class I-M-1 from Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-1 to
      ('B- (sf)').

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on 23 classes, including nine ratings that
were lowered three or more notches. Of the 23 downgrades, S&P
lowered its ratings on four classes to speculative-grade ('BB+' or
lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher).  Another nine of
the lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade level, while
the remaining 10 downgraded classes already had speculative-grade
ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected
credit support for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover its projected losses for the related transactions at a higher
rating.  The downgrades reflect deteriorated credit performance
trends.

The downgrades on the classes below reflect the increase in S&P's
projected losses and its belief that the projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover the
projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating levels.  The
increase in S&P's projected losses is due to higher reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods compared
with those reported during the previous review dates.  Accordingly,
these deals were downgraded because credit support decreased or
severe delinquencies increased:

   -- The rating on class A-1 from Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust
      2002-1 was lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' as severe
      delinquencies increased to 21% in September 2016 from 14% in

      April 2014;

   -- The ratings on classes A2 and A4 from Amortizing Residential

      Collateral Trustseries 2002-BC6 were downgraded to
      'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' as credit support decreased to
      39% in September 2016 from 44% in September 2015;

   -- The rating on class A-1 from CWABS Inc.series 2003-BC1 was
      lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' as credit support
      decreased to 24.6% in September 2016 from 31% in July 2014;

   -- The rating on class M-1 from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities
      Inc. series 2003-1 was downgraded to 'B (sf)' from
      'BB+ (sf)' as severe delinquencies increased to 15.6% in
      September 2016 from 14% in September 2015;

   -- The rating on class A-1B from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities

      Inc. series 2004-R1 was downgraded to 'A- (sf)' from
      'AA+ (sf)' as credit support decreased to 31.5% in September

      2016 from 36% in April 2014;

   -- The rating on class IA from Chase Funding Loan Acquisition
      Trust Series 2003-C2 was lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'
      as severe delinquencies increased to 5.8% in September 2016
      from 1.7% in March 2015;

   -- The rating on class A from Argent Securities Inc. series
      2004-W4 was lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'A (sf)' as credit
      support decreased to 18% in September 2016 from 30% in June
      2015; and

   -- The rating on class M-1 from Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I
      Inc. Trust 2004-HE7 was lowered to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'A (sf)'

      as credit support decreased to 44% in September 2016 from
      60% in March 2014.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 43 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remains relatively
consistent with its prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more-senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

S&P affirmed 40 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings to reflect its
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on classes 2-A-1 and 2-A-IO from Banc of
America Funding 2004-2 Trust because the related pool has a small
number of loans remaining.  Once a pool has declined to a de
minimis amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of credit
instability that is incompatible with any rating level.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.5% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2eZmCNj



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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

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