TCR_Public/161002.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, October 2, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 275

                            Headlines

ACACIA CDO 6: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
ALM LTD VII: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Gives Prelim B Rating on D-R Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-2: Moody's Hikes Class O Notes Rating to Ba1
BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes

BCC FUNDING: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to BB

CATHEDRAL LAKE IV: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P5: Fitch Rates on Cl. E Debt 'BB-'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2013-J1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
COLONY MORTGAGE 2015-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
COMM 2014-FL4: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. SOF1 Certificates

CONN RECEIVABLES 2016-B: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Class B Debt
DT AUTO 2016-4: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Debt
DT AUTO 2016-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
EQTY 2014-INNS: S&P Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
FIGUEROA CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
FINN SQUARE: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
FIRST INVESTORS 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
FIRSTMAC MORTGAGE 3-2016: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D Notes

FREDDIE MAC 2016-DNA4: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'Bsf'
GCA2014 HOLDINGS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2003-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. N-2 Debt Rating to B3
GOLUB CAPITAL 11: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
GREENBRIAR CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Class D Notes Rating

GREENWICH STRUCTURED: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on N-1 Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
GSCCRE COMMERCIAL 2015-HULA: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 3 Certs.
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-3: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt

INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-4: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt
JP MORGAN 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-3 Notes
KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Debt Rating to Caa2
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-C4: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Notes Rating to B1
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C8: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to Caa3

MADISON PARK XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH 2007-CANADA: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. L Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. H Debt to B3
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ11: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D Certs to Dsf

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2006-A: Fitch Hikes Cl. B Notes Rating to Bsf
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Notes 'Ba3'
NEWGATE FUNDING 2006-2: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 3 Tranches
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Notes

PRESTIGE AUTO: DBRS Reviews 20 Ratings From 4 ABS Deals
REALT 2006-3: Moody's Hikes Class G Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
REALT 2014-1: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes
REALT 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class F Debt
SDART 2016-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

TCI-SYMPHONY 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
THL CREDIT 2012-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
THL CREDIT 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
TOWD POINT 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Prov. B2 Rating on Cl. B2 Notes
TRINITAS CLO V: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes

UNITED AUTO 2016-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
VOYA CLO 2012-4: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to BB+
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C26: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-M Debt Rating to Ba1
WELLS FARGO 2014-TISH: S&P Affirms BB Rating on 2 Tranches

WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Hikes Class SJ-D Notes to Ba2
[*] DBRS Confirms 123 Classes in Six U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] DBRS Confirms 26 Ratings on 7 U.S. ABS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 20 Ratings From 3 ABS Transactions

[*] DBRS Reviews 42 Ratings From 8 ABS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 9 Ratings From 2 ABS Deals
[*] Moody's Cuts $27MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2006-2007
[*] S&P Completes Review on 48 Classes From 8 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 56 Tranches From 20 CDO Deals


                            *********

ACACIA CDO 6: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed two classes of notes
issued by Acacia CDO 6, Ltd. (Acacia 6). Fitch has simultaneously
withdrawn all ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

These rating actions are a direct result of the sale and
liquidation of the Acacia 6 portfolio on July 19, 2016.
Approximately $39.8 million of net sale proceeds were received from
the liquation and a final distribution was made to noteholders on
Aug. 31, 2016. The class A-1 noteholders received interest payments
of approximately $148,000 and remaining proceeds of $39.7 million
were applied towards a partial repayment of the class A-1 notes
principal balance. No other class of notes received distributions.


Acacia 6 entered an event of default on May 18, 2009. On June 8,
2009, a majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate the
maturity. Most recently, on June 24, 2016, at least 66 2/3% of the
controlling class directed the sale and liquidation of the
collateral.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable as the ratings are being withdrawn.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was reviewed in relation to this
rating action.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn the following ratings:

   -- $10,257,111 class A-1 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

   -- $7,424,914 class C notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

   -- $3,600,859 class D notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

   -- $1,938,255 class E-1 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

   -- $11,983,979 class E-2 notes to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'.

Fitch has affirmed and withdrawn the following ratings:

   -- $16,168,275 class A-2 notes at 'Dsf';

   -- $29,427,331 class B notes at 'Dsf'.

Fitch did not rate the preferred shares.


ALM LTD VII: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, C, and D
notes from ALM VII (R) Ltd. and the class A-2, B, C, and D notes
from ALM VII (R)-2 Ltd.  S&P removed all of these ratings from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Aug. 22, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1 and E notes from ALM VII (R) Ltd. and the class A-1 and E
notes ALM VII (R)-2 Ltd., and removed the ratings on the class E
notes from both transactions from CreditWatch positive.  Both
transactions are U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs) managed by Apollo Credit Management (CLO) LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transactions'
performances using data from their respective August 2016 trustee
reports.

The upgrades primarily reflect the significant paydowns to the
respective class A-1 notes of both transactions since S&P's
February 2014 effective date rating actions.  These paydowns
resulted in improved reported overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
since the November 2013 effective date reports for both
transactions, which S&P used for its previous rating actions.

For example, the class A overcollateralization (O/C) ratio
calculated for ALM VII (R) Ltd .has increased to 146.77% as of the
August 2016 trustee report from 140.19% as of the November 2013
effective date report, while the class A O/C ratio for ALM VII
(R)-2 Ltd. also increased to 146.60% from 140.17% using the trustee
reports as of the same dates.  The O/C ratios have increased for
all classes of both transactions since our effective date
analysis.

The collateral portfolios' credit quality (for both transactions)
have slightly deteriorated since our last rating actions.
Collateral obligations with ratings in the 'CCC' category have
increased as of the August 2016 trustee reports, compared with the
November 2013 effective date reports.  This played a role in the
decline of the weighted average ratings of both portfolios during
this period to 'B' from 'B+'.  However, despite the slightly larger
concentrations in 'CCC' category collateral, both transactions have
benefited from a decrease in the weighted average life of the
respective portfolios due to the underlying collaterals'
seasoning.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels.  The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C, D, and E notes of both transactions, S&P's rating actions
considered the increase in both transactions' exposures to 'CCC'
assets and the decline in both portfolios' credit quality.  In
addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs that
considered the both exposures to specific distressed industries.

S&P's review of these transactions included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolios and transactions as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee reports, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transactions' ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ALM VII (R) Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch POS
B             AA+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch POS
C             BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch POS
D             BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch POS

ALM VII (R)-2 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch POS
B             AA+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch POS
C             BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch POS
D             BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch POS

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

ALM VII (R) Ltd.
                 Rating
Class        To          From
E            B (sf)      B (sf)/Watch POS

ALM VII (R)-2 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class        To          From
E            B (sf)      B (sf)/Watch POS

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ALM VII (R) Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)

ALM VII (R)-2 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Gives Prelim B Rating on D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the A-1R,
A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes from Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Anchorage Capital Group.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed amended and
restated indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of
the replacement notes and certain other changes, will also:

   -- Extend the reinvestment period to Jan. 13, 2019;
   -- Extend the transaction's legal final maturity date to
      Jan. 13, 2027;
   -- Extend the weighted average life test;
   -- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated
      industry classifications as outlined in S&P's August 2016
      CLO criteria update.

The cash flow analysis demonstrates, in S&P's view, that the
replacement notes have adequate credit enhancement available at the
rating levels associated with this rating action.

On the Oct. 13, 2016, refinancing date, proceeds from the issuance
of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the original notes,
upon which S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on the original
notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes. However, if
the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the ratings on the
original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the
replacement notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

Current date after proposed refinancing

Class     Amount    Interest               BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)    rate (%)               (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1R      311.60    LIBOR plus 1.48      67.21   64.48      2.73
A-2R       63.00    LIBOR plus 2.10      62.57   56.56      6.01
B-R        37.10    LIBOR plus 2.70      53.73   50.27      3.46
C-R        25.70    LIBOR plus 4.15      47.42   44.42      3.00
D-R        22.60    LIBOR plus 7.25      40.00   37.44      2.55

Current date before proposed refinancing

Class      Amount   Interest            BDR     SDR   Cushion
         (mil. $)   rate (%)            (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1        311.60   LIBOR plus 1.42   66.06   62.40      3.65
A-2         63.00   LIBOR plus 2.60   61.65   54.74      6.91
B           37.10   LIBOR plus 2.80   52.03   48.48      3.56
C           25.70   LIBOR plus 4.10   44.56   42.85      1.71
D           22.60   LIBOR plus 5.10   34.96   36.10     (1.14)

Effective Date

Class      Amount   Interest            BDR     SDR   Cushion
         (mil. $)   rate (%)            (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1        311.60   LIBOR plus 1.42   69.14   67.52      1.62
A-2         63.00   LIBOR plus 2.60   65.31   59.67      5.64
B           37.10   LIBOR plus 2.80   57.50   53.54      3.95
C           25.70   LIBOR plus 4.10   51.71   47.23      4.48
D           22.60   LIBOR plus 5.10   46.83   39.88      6.95

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating
A-1R                 AAA (sf)
A-2R                 AA (sf)
B-R                  A (sf)
C-R                  BBB (sf)
D-R                  BB (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-2: Moody's Hikes Class O Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-2 as follows:

   -- Cl. O, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
      Upgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on P&I Class O was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.5% of the
current balance, compared to 12.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared with 3 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.5% to $5.4
million from $1.13 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $12.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 71%). One loan, constituting 86% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. That loan is The Alton Corners
Shopping Center ($4.7 million), which is secured by a 50,000 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Alton, Illinois. The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2013 for imminent
default and became real estate owned (REO) in April 2015. The
property is anchored by Petco and shadow anchored by Office Depot.
As of September 2016, the property is 85% leased and remains
unchanged since last review.

The conduit loan, Orchard on the Green Apartments ($790 thousand --
%14 of the pool), is secured by a 198 unit multifamily complex
located in Port Orchard, Washington. As of July 2016, the property
was approximately 98% leased, almost unchanged since last review.
Property performance has been increasing since 2014 due to a
decrease in vacancy and repairs and maintenance expenses. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 12% and 1.75X, respectively, compared to
16% and 1.71X at the last review.


BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, D, and E notes from Battalion CLO IV Ltd.  Battalion CLO IV Ltd.
is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
closed in September 2013 and is managed by Brigade Capital
Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Sept. 7, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date in November 2013, the
trustee-reported collateral portfolio's weighted average life has
decreased to 4.48 years from 5.71 years.  This seasoning has
decreased the overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided
more cushion to the tranche ratings.

The transaction experienced an increase in both defaults and assets
rated 'CCC+' and below since the effective date. Specifically, the
amount of 'CCC+'-and-below-rated assets increased to $27.57 million
(6.9% of the aggregate principal balance) as of September 2016,
from $5.25 million as of the effective date.  The level of
defaulted assets increased to
$1.2 million from none over the same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the mild decline in the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 136.92%, down from 137.69%
      reported in November 2013.
   -- The class B O/C ratio was 122.22%, down from 122.91%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 114.50%, down from 115.14%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.57%, down from 109.18%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life.  However, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considered the
increase in defaulted and 'CCC+'-and-below-rated assets, relatively
higher exposure to the energy and commodity sectors, and
higher-than-average exposure to assets with a negative rating
outlook.  This therefore allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

In addition, while the cash flow results indicated a lower rating
for the class E notes, S&P views the overall credit seasoning as an
improvement to the transaction and also considered the relatively
stable O/C ratios that currently have significant cushion over
their minimum requirements.  However, any increase in defaults
and/or par losses could lead to potential negative rating actions
on the notes in the future.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
September 2016 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Battalion CLO IV Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AA (sf)
B             A (sf)
C             BBB (sf)
D             BB (sf)
E             B (sf)


BCC FUNDING: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to the notes
issued by BCC Funding XIII (BCCFC 2016-1). This is the first
transaction of the year for Balboa Capital Corporation (BCC,
Unrated). The notes are backed by a pool of small-ticket equipment
loans and leases primarily originated by BCC, who is also the
servicer and administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BCC Funding XIII LLC

   -- $135,357,000, 2.20%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series

      2016 1, Class A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- $17,490,000, 2.73%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series
      2016 1, Class B, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

   -- $8,942,000, 3.25%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series
      2016 1, Class C, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

   -- $11,704,000, 4.78%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series
      2016 1, Class D, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

   -- $7,101,000, 6.00%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series
      2016 1, Class E, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

   -- $5,786,000, 6.00%, Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series
      2016 1, Class F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying equipment
contracts and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of BCC as the
servicer.

The definitive ratings for the Class B notes and Class C notes, A1
(sf) and Baa1 (sf) respectively, are one notch higher than their
provisional ratings, (P)A2 (sf) and (P)Baa2 (sf). This difference
is a result of the transaction closing with a lower weighted
average cost of funds (WAC) than Moody's modeled when the
provisional ratings were assigned. The WAC assumption, as well as
other structural features, were provided by the issuer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the BCCFC 2016-1
collateral pool is 3.50%. Moody's based its cumulative net loss
expectation of the BCCFC 2016-1 transaction on an analysis of the
credit quality of the underlying collateral; the historical
performance of similar collateral, including securitization
performance and managed portfolio performance; the ability of BCC
to perform the servicing functions; and current expectations for
the macroeconomic environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and
Class F notes benefit from 25.25% 18.60%, 15.20%, 10.75%, 8.05%,
and 5.85% of hard credit enhancement respectively. Hard credit
enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization of 4.35%, a 1.50% fully funded, non-declining
reserve account and subordination, except for the Class F notes
which do not benefit from subordination. The notes will also
benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such as the one in
this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes.
Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note principal
payments will accelerate this build of enhancement. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a lower
number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the
equipment securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US economy, the market for used
equipment, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
equipment securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US economy, the market for used
equipment, and poor servicing. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include error on the part of
transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.



BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B
notes from Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.'s series 2006-1 and
removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on June 21, 2016.

The rating actions primarily reflect the rated notes' increased
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the underlying engine portfolio's
deteriorated rental and residual cash-generating ability, and the
fact that the class A-1 and A-2 notes still receive the minimum
principal payments while the class B notes' interest is covered by
the junior reserve.

The aircraft engine portfolio consisted of 36 engines as of
September 2016.  The majority of the engines are powered on
end-of-production aircraft, which typically diminishes the engines'
re-leasing and sale prospects.  In recent years, a few engines in
the portfolio have been sold at a price below the note target
price.  With the lower of the mean and median (LMM) of the updated
maintenance-adjusted base values of the portfolio as of June 2016,
and with the adjustment made for off-lease engines (which results
in a $221 million adjusted engine value), the LTV of the class A-1
and A-2 notes rose to about 90% and the LTV of the class B notes
rose to about 98% as of September 2016.

In recent payment periods, the class A-1 and A-2 notes had only
received minimum principal payments, while the class B notes had
not received any minimum principal payments.  The class B notes'
interest had been covered by the junior cash reserve.  As of
Sept. 15, 2016, the junior cash reserve had a balance of
$2.59 million, and the class B notes' interest paid was $61,103.

The class A-1 and B notes have floating-rate coupons.  The
transaction currently has an interest rate hedge, which causes a
cash flow drag to the deal ($0.44 million as of the Sept. 15, 2016,
payment date).  In S&P's analysis, it considered both rising and
forward interest rate scenarios.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH NEGATIVE

Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.
Series 2006-1
                       Rating
Class       To                      From
A-1         B- (sf)                 BB (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2         B- (sf)                 BB (sf)/Watch Neg
B           CC (sf)                 B- (sf)/Watch Neg


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2A, A-2B, B,
and C notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
from BlueMountain CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May 2013 and is managed
by BlueMountain Capital Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the August 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
May 2017.

The upgrades and affirmation on the class A-1 notes primarily
reflect stable credit quality in the underlying collateral and a
slight increase in the portfolio par balance since S&P's effective
date rating affirmations, which used data from the June 2013
trustee report.  Although there has been a slight increase in 'CCC'
rated assets and defaults during the same time, the balance of
assets rated 'BB-' and above has increased as well. Additionally,
the weighted average life of the portfolio has decreased to 4.35
years from 5.71.

Par gain in the underlying portfolio since the effective date has
led to slight increases in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
from the June 2013 trustee report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio is 135.39% compared with 135.07%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio is 122.54% compared with 122.25%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio is 115.25% compared with 114.98%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio is 109.34% compared with 109.09%.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class D notes, it affirmed its rating on this class to maintain
rating cushion as this transaction continues to reinvest.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows us to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review also included a cash flow analysis, based on the
portfolio and transaction as reflected in the aforementioned
trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Bluemountain CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To              From    
A-2A          AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)
A-2B          AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)         A (sf)
C             BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bluemountain CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
D             BB (sf)


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
CLO 2016-3 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 LLC's $368.00 million
floating-rate.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 29,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 Ltd. /BlueMountain CLO 2016-3 LLC

Class                  Rating                     Amount
                                                (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                   248.00
B                      AA (sf)                     58.00
C                      A (sf)                      26.00
D                      BBB (sf)                    20.00
E                      BB (sf)                     16.00
Subordinated notes     NR                          36.10

NR--Not rated.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on Carlyle Global Market
Strategies Commodities Funding 2014-1 Ltd.'s and Carlyle Global
Market Strategies Commodities Funding 2015-1 Ltd.'s senior notes
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
transactions are nontraditional asset transactions collateralized
primarily by revolving pools consisting of the economic equivalent
of repo loans backed by eligible commodities.

The downgrades reflect that ongoing debt service may be highly
dependent on the timing and magnitude of any future payment made
under the insurance claims filed with Lloyd's, as well as any
difficulty unwinding the commodity arrangements with the remaining
counterparty in each transaction.  In February, S&P Global Ratings
was notified that each transaction was unable to take possession of
certain assets of each issuer related to commodity arrangements
with one of the counterparties in this transaction.  As a result,
each transaction submitted insurance claims to Lloyd's for the
value of these assets and have since failed their
overcollateralization ratio tests, which have resulted in the
principal payment of a substantial portion of the senior notes.
However, full repayment of the senior notes in each transaction
will likely depend on any payments made under the insurance claims,
as well as the commodity arrangements.  Additionally, while each
transaction does have a liquidity account to support ongoing
interest payments to the senior notes, the adequacy of those
accounts depends on how long it takes to resolve the insurance
claims, which is difficult to forecast.

As a result, S&P believes the risk profile of the transactions has
increased substantially since their respective closing dates, as
the ability to service debt is no longer supported by a portfolio
of commodity arrangements generating cash flow, but instead the
future magnitude and timing of an insurance claim, as well as the
commodity arrangements.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Carlyle Global Market Strategies Commodities Funding 2014-1 Ltd.

                       Rating
Class          To                  From
Senior         BB (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg

Carlyle Global Market Strategies Commodities Funding 2015-1 Ltd.

                       Rating
Class          To                  From
Senior         BB (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg


CATHEDRAL LAKE IV: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Cathedral
Lake IV Ltd./Cathedral Lake IV LLC's $368.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 23,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cathedral Lake IV Ltd./Cathedral Lake IV LLC

Class                       Rating                     Amount
                                                     (mil. $)
A                           AAA (sf)                   239.00
B                           AA (sf)                     64.00
C (deferrable)              A (sf)                      25.00
D (deferrable)              BBB (sf)                    21.00
E-1 (deferrable)            BB- (sf)                    10.00
E-2 (deferrable)            BB- (sf)                     9.00
Subordinated notes          NR                          36.15

NR--Not rated.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P5: Fitch Rates on Cl. E Debt 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-P5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-P5.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

   -- $35,196,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $96,088,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $220,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,197,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $44,722,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $720,185,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $82,569,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $77,982,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $41,284,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $41,285,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,871,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,871,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,789,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 24, 2016. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$14,909,000 class F and $32,110,420 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 49 loans secured by 73
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $917.4 million as of the cut-off date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.,
Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Macquarie US
Trading LLC d/b/a Principal Commercial Capital.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.4% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 82.1% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.21x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 105.8%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 9.12%. Fitch's aggregated net cash flow
represents a variance of 11.72% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.21x and 105.8%,
respectively, are better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch DSCR and
LTV of 1.18x and 106.5%. Excluding credit-opinion loans, the pool's
Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.18x and 110.4%, respectively.
Comparatively, the YTD 2016 average DSCR and LTV of Fitch-rated
deals, excluding credit-opinion and co-op loans, are 1.14x and
110.2%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans representing 8.99%
of the pool are credit opinion loans. Easton Town Center (4.90%)
has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'A+sf*' on a stand-alone
basis. The loan is a 1.3 million-sf shopping complex that is 96.6%
occupied by 212 tenants. Vertex Pharmaceuticals (4.09%) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone
basis. The Vertex loan is secured by a 1.1 million-sf office
building that is 95.5% occupied by Vertex Pharmaceuticals, a global
biotechnology and pharmaceutical company.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-P5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP. The third-party due diligence information was provided on
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2013-J1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 54 classes from three
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued in 2013: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-J1, CSMC Trust
2013-IVR5, and PMT Loan Trust 2013-J1.  All of these transactions
are backed by first-lien, fixed-rate residential mortgage loans
originated primarily between 2012 and 2013 that are secured by
residential properties to mostly prime borrowers.  Each class of
rated certificates in these transactions receives credit support
from the subordination of the certificates that are lower in the
payment priority.

S&P analyzed the current structural and performance characteristics
and performed collateral analysis to project the losses and cash
flow analysis to apply these losses under different rating
scenarios.  S&P's collateral analysis entailed an assessment of the
transactions' collateral performance by reviewing historical
delinquency behavior and projecting losses for the remaining loans
in the pools by applying S&P's criteria, "Methodology And
Assumptions For Rating U.S. RMBS Prime, Alternative-A, And Subprime
Loans," published Sept. 10, 2009, and using S&P's Loan Evaluation
and Estimate of Loss System (LEVELS) model.

S&P analyzed the surviving loans using original loan
characteristics with updated loan balances and Federal Housing
Finance Agency Index-adjusted property values.  S&P also used the
FICO scores provided at the applicable transaction's closing and
applied additional adjustments to S&P's projected defaults for
loans that have exhibited what S&P considers to be adverse payment
performance (i.e., currently delinquent or delinquent more than
once since the transaction's closing) in accordance with S&P's
published criteria.

The table below lists the number of loans remaining that have been
delinquent in each of the three transactions during the respective
transaction's life.  It excludes instances where loans may have
been delinquent, but did not demonstrate adverse performance
behavior according to S&P's criteria (i.e., they were 30 days
delinquent no more than once since the transaction's closing and
are current).

DELINQUENCIES

Transaction              Delinq    No. of     Portion of
                         status   loans(i)   outst. pool

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-J1   30 days    0
                                        60 days    0
                                        90 days    0

CSMC Trust 2013-IVR5                    30 days    31.19%
                                        60 days    0
                                        90 days    0

PMT Loan Trust 2013-J1                  30 days    10.17%
                                        60 days    10.22%
                                        90 days    0

(i)Including prior and current delinquencies.

Although the current pools in these three transactions have
experienced some delinquencies, the pools are performing according
to S&P's initial base-case loss projections.

For all of these pools, the overall characteristics have not varied
significantly since the transactions' closings; however, the
pool-level loan-to-value ratios have decreased because of
amortization and national property price appreciation since
closing, which is driving a reduction in S&P's projected losses on
these pools.

S&P applied a cash flow analysis based on its loss projections.
Although the projected ratings under S&P's cash flow analysis
showed several upward rating movements, it affirmed all ratings
because of a combination of these factors:

   -- The transactions are still relatively young and are within
      their unscheduled subordinate principal lockout period.

   -- The transactions utilize an amortizing subordination feature

      in which they can begin allocating greater principal amounts

      to more subordinate classes over time, thus reducing credit
      support.

   -- S&P expects prepayment rates for these pools to decline,
      which could leave the transactions more prone to back-ended
      losses.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that S&P believes could affect
residential mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- An inflation rate of 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- An average 30-year fixed mortgage rate of 3.7% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes that RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;

   -- Downward pressure will cause GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in
      2016;

   -- Home price momentum will slow as potential buyers are not
      able to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate will remain a low 3.7%

      in 2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home
      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-J1
Series 2013-J1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        17321LAA7   AAA (sf)
A-2        17321LAB5   AAA (sf)
A-IO       17321LAD1   AAA (sf)
B-1        17321LAE9   AA (sf)
B-2        17321LAF6   A (sf)
B-3        17321LAG4   BBB (sf)
B-4        17321LAH2   BB (sf)

CSMC Trust 2013-IVR5
Series 2013-IVR5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        12647VAA3   AAA (sf)
A-2        12647VAB1   AAA (sf)
A-3        12647VAH8   AAA (sf)
A-4        12647VAM7   AAA (sf)
A-5        12647VAK1   AAA (sf)
A-6        12647VAJ4   AAA (sf)
A-7        12647VAP0   AAA (sf)
A-8        12647VAS4   AAA (sf)
A-9        12647VAR6   AAA (sf)
A-10       12647VAT2   AAA (sf)
A-11       12647VAU9   AAA (sf)
A-12       12647VAV7   AAA (sf)
A-13       12647VAW5   AAA (sf)
A-X-1      12647VAC9   AAA (sf)
A-X-2      12647VAD7   AAA (sf)
A-X-3      12647VAE5   AAA (sf)
A-X-4      12647VAF2   AAA (sf)
A-X-5      12647VAG0   AAA (sf)
A-X-6      12647VAL9   AAA (sf)
A-X-7      12647VAN5   AAA (sf)
A-X-8      12647VAQ8   AAA (sf)
A-X-9      12647VBA2   AAA (sf)
B-1        12647VAX3   A (sf)
B-2        12647VAY1   BBB (sf)
B-3        12647VAZ8   BB (sf)

PMT Loan Trust 2013-J1
Series 2013-J1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        693456AA3   AAA (sf)
A-2        693456AB1   AAA (sf)
A-3        693456AC9   AAA (sf)
A-4        693456AD7   AAA (sf)
A-5        693456AE5   AAA (sf)
A-6        693456AF2   AAA (sf)
A-7        693456AG0   AAA (sf)
A-8        693456AH8   AAA (sf)
A-9        693456AW5   AAA (sf)
A-10       693456AX3   AAA (sf)
A-11       693456AY1   AAA (sf)
A-12       693456AZ8   AAA (sf)
A-13       693456BA2   AAA (sf)
A-14       693456BB0   AAA (sf)
A-IO       693456AM7   AAA (sf)
A-IO-1     693456AJ4   AAA (sf)
A-IO-2     693456AK1   AAA (sf)
A-IO-3     693456AL9   AAA (sf)
B-1        693456AN5   AA (sf)
B-2        693456AP0   A (sf)
B-3        693456AQ8   BBB (sf)
B-4        693456AR6   BB (sf)


COLONY MORTGAGE 2015-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings of six Floating Rate Notes issued
by Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2015-FL3, Ltd. as follows:

   -- Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes E and F are part of the Non-Offered
Notes that were retained by an affiliate of the Issuer.

The rating confirmations reflect that the performance of the
transaction remains in line with DBRS’s expectations at issuance.
At closing, the collateral consisted of 20 interest-only
floating-rate loans totaling approximately $477.6 million secured
by 35 transitional commercial and multifamily properties. Two
loans, LA 11 Multifamily Portfolio (Prospectus ID#3) and Shadow
Creek Apartments (Prospectus ID#16), have fully repaid since
issuance, representing a pay down of $56.2 million and collateral
reduction of 11.8%. As of the September 2016 remittance, 18 loans,
totaling $421.5 million, secured by 23 commercial and multifamily
properties, remained in the pool. Three of these loans,
representing 31.2% of the cut-off trust balance, were structured
with pari passu future funding notes, totaling $18.7 million
(ranging from $1.4 million to $12.3 million) to be used for
renovations and future leasing costs to aid in property
stabilization. These notes will remain outside of the trust, held
by a loan seller affiliate. Some of the loans in the trust are cash
managed, with reserves also funded up front and/or on a monthly
basis for all loans to fund capital expenditure and leasing costs
for the collateral properties.

Overall, the performance for the underlying loans has been as
expected, with select loans showing relatively significant
improvement over DBRS expectations at issuance. The third-largest
remaining loan in the pool, Sheraton Atlanta (Prospectus ID#4, 9.5%
of the pool) reported a trailing 12-month (T-12) net cash flow
(NCF) figure as of June 30, 2016, of $4.44 million, a figure that
represents an increase of 33.2% over the DBRS underwritten (UW)
stabilized NCF figure. That loan is secured by a 763-key
full-service hotel located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia. The trust
loan funded the borrower’s acquisition of the subject property,
with $14.1 million in equity remaining at closing. Initial loan
proceeds of $40.0 million were included in the trust, with a $5.0
million future funding component to be held pari passu outside of
the trust.

The borrower's stabilization plan for the property included a
complete renovation of the property at a cost of approximately
$13.4 million, with an estimated $6.4 million spent at issuance.
The servicer confirmed in September 2016 that all renovations at
the property were complete, with all rooms on line as of January
2016. The future funding commitment has been fully funded.
According to the July 2016 Smith Travel Research (STR) report
forwarded by the servicer, the property had experienced
year-over-year running 12-month revenue per available room (RevPAR)
growth of 22.3%, driven by increases in both ADR and occupancy at
the property with the renovations complete. Year-to-date occupancy
was reported at 82.6%, as compared with 76.9% for the competitive
set, with RevPAR at $115.80 as compared with $117.12 for the
competitive set. These figures compare with the May 2015 STR
figures from issuance that showed an occupancy rate for the subject
of 66.5% and RevPAR of $81.92.

The largest loan in the pool is Prospectus ID#1, Cleveland Office
Portfolio (17.0% of the pool), which is secured by two Class A
office buildings, One Cleveland Center (OCC) and Penton Media
Building (PMB), totaling 1.15 million square feet in downtown
Cleveland, Ohio. The trust loan of $71.7 million ($63 per square
foot (psf)) refinanced existing debt on the properties for the
borrower, with fresh equity of $3.5 million contributed at close.
The future funding commitment for this loan is relatively sizeable,
at $12.3 million, bringing the fully funded senior loan amount to
$84.0 million ($73 psf). The portfolio had a weighted-average
occupancy rate of 68.6% at issuance, with the borrower's
stabilization plan focused on leasing the properties up to market
levels of approximately 80.0%. As of the August 2016 update
provided by the servicer, the properties were 73.9% leased, with
leasing activity in early 2016 for OCC that will boost that
property’s occupancy rate to 78.3% from 67.7% at YE2015. PMB’s
occupancy rate was reported at 57.3% as of August 2016. Occupancy
for that property has remained relatively stable since issuance,
with Penton Media vacating the property in July 2015 and three new
tenants signed since, which combined account for almost all of that
vacated space. The largest tenant to take occupancy, AECOM (6.2% of
the portfolio’s total net rentable area) took occupancy as of
November 2015, and received approximately $1.85 million ($50 psf)
in tenant improvements, as well eight months of rental abatement.
With Penton Media’s departure, the building has been renamed the
AECOM Center. The total amount drawn on the future funding
commitment of as of August 2016 was $1.6 million, with $10.7
million remaining. The servicer’s reported NCF figure of $5.2
million for the T-12 period ending June 30, 2016, represents a
decline of 17.4% from the DBRS UW stabilized figure, but DBRS
expects that figure is depressed as the newly signed tenants did
not take occupancy until early 2016, with previous vacancy and/or
rent abatements in place for a good portion of the reporting
period.

The rating assigned to Class F materially deviates from the lower
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned rating reflects the
sustainability of loan performance trends that have not yet been
demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.




COMM 2014-FL4: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. SOF1 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class C commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2014-FL4 Mortgage
Trust, a U.S. CMBS transaction, to 'AAA (sf)' from 'A- (sf)'.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed the ratings on seven other classes from
the same transaction.

The ratings actions on the class C, D, SOF1, and SOF2 certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, while the
affirmation on the nonpooled AR4 certificates was based on S&P's
analysis primarily using its global CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics and the current and
future performance of the lodging properties securing the two loans
in the transaction, the deal's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

The raised rating on class C reflects S&P's expectation that the
available credit enhancement for the class is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the rating
level.  The affirmed rating on class D reflects S&P's expectation
that the available credit enhancement for the class will be within
its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating.

The affirmations on the class SOF1 and SOF2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's re-evaluation of the Sofitel Chicago Water Tower
loan.  The $80.0 million loan is secured by a 415-room full-service
hotel in Chicago.  These certificates derive 100% of their cash
flow from a subordinate nonpooled component of the loan.

The affirmation on the class AR4 certificates reflects S&P's
re-evaluation of the Renaissance Aruba loan.  The $147.3 million
loan is secured by a 556-key hotel, two casinos, and two shopping
malls in Oranjestad, Aruba.  The certificates derive 100% of their
cash flow from the Renaissance Aruba loan.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-EXT, X-SOF, and AR-X-EXT
interest-only (IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating
IO securities, in which the ratings on the IO securities would not
be higher than that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The
notional balances on classes X-EXT and X-SOF reference classes C
and D, while class AR-X-EXT references classes AR1 through AR4.  

The analysis of large-loan transactions is predominantly a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the properties that secure the mortgage loans in the trust.  S&P
also considered the servicer-reported net operating income (NOI)
and occupancy for the past two years and considered the volatile
collateral performance, specifically the significant declines in
revenue per available room (RevPAR) and net cash flow (NCF) during
the economic downturn in 2009, as well as the slight declines since
issuance in reported RevPAR and NCF for both lodging properties as
of the year ended Dec. 31, 2015.

According to the Sept. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of two floating-rate loans that are not
cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted with a $227.3 million
aggregate trust balance (down from $441.0 million at issuance) that
is divided into a $56.8 million aggregate pooled trust component
and a $170.5 million aggregate nonpooled trust component.  The
reduced trust asset balance predominantly stems from the repayment
in full of two other loans that were initially included in the
transaction: the Blackstone Select Service Portfolio loan and the
Hilton Portland & Executive Tower loans.  According to the
transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the special
servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs and
expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by the
special servicer.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the properties'
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, 2013, and
2012 that the master servicer provided to determine S&P's opinion
of a sustainable cash flow for the hotel properties.

The Renaissance Aruba loan, the larger of the two loans remaining
in the trust, has a $147.3 million whole loan balance as of the
Sept. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, down from $155.0 million
at issuance.  The loan supports the class AR1, AR2, AR3, AR4, and
AR5 nonpooled certificates.  S&P Global Ratings does not rate
classes AR1, AR2, AR3, and AR5.  The loan pays interest at a rate
of one-month LIBOR plus 7.0% per annum, amortizes by
$3 million per year, matures on May 9, 2017, and has two one-year
extension options.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported a 1.16x debt service coverage (DSC) and $183.12 RevPAR for
the six months ended June 30, 2016.  S&P's expected case value,
using a 10.35% capitalization rate, yielded a 96.7% S&P Global
Ratings' loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the whole loan trust
balance.

The Sofitel Chicago Water Tower loan, the smallest loan in the
trust, has a $80.0 million whole loan balance as of the Sept. 15,
2016, trustee remittance report, which is the same as issuance. The
loan is divided into a $56.8 million senior pooled trust component
and a $23.2 million subordinate nonpooled trust component that
supports the class SOF1 and SOF2 raked certificates.  The whole
loan is IO, pays interest at a rate of one-month LIBOR plus 2.3%
per annum, and has an initial two-year term (initial maturity of
March 9, 2016) with three one-year extension options.  The borrower
has exercised one of its three extension options, and the loan's
maturity is currently March 9, 2017.  Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
reported a 3.50x DSC and
$176.52 RevPAR for the 12 months ended June 30, 2016.  S&P's
expected case value, using a 9.00% capitalization rate, yielded an
89.1% S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio on the whole loan trust
balance.

RATING RAISED

COMM 2014-FL4 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                    Rating
Class          To            From
C              AAA (sf)      A- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

COMM 2014-FL4 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class                Rating
AR-X-EXT             BBB- (sf)
AR4                  BBB- (sf)
D                    BBB- (sf)
SOF1                 BB- (sf)
SOF2                 B (sf)
X-EXT                BBB- (sf)
X-SOF                BBB- (sf)


CONN RECEIVABLES 2016-B: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Class B Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assigns the following ratings to Conn's
Receivables Funding 2016-B, LLC (Conn's 2016-B), which consists of
notes backed by retail loans originated and serviced by Conn
Appliances, Inc. (Conn's):

   -- $391,840,000 class A notes 'BBBsf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $111,960,000 class B notes 'BBsf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $48,980,000 class C notes 'Bsf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable;

   -- class R notes 'NR'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The 2016-B trust pool consists of 100%
fixed-rate consumer loans originated and serviced by Conn's
Appliances, Inc. The pool exhibits a weighted average FICO score of
608 and a weighted average borrower rate of 21.52%.

The base case default rate for the 2016-B pool is assumed to be
24.75% and Fitch applied a 2.2x stress at the 'BBBsf' level,
reflecting the high absolute value of the historical defaults,
along with the variability of default performance in recent years
and the high geographic concentration.

Rating Cap at 'BBBsf': Due to higher loan defaults in recent years,
management changes at Conn's, and the credit risk profile of
Conn's, Fitch placed a rating cap on this transaction at the
'BBBsf' category.

Dependence on Trust Triggers: The trust depends on the three trust
triggers -- the Cumulative Net Loss Trigger, the Annualized Net
Loss Trigger, and the Recovery Trigger -- in order to ensure the
payments due on the notes during times of degrading collateral
performance.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by reserve
account, which will be fully funded at closing at 1.50% of the
initial pool balance. The reserve account will step down to 1.25%
of the original collateral balance once overcollateralization (OC)
reaches 30% of the current collateral balance and will step down to
1.00% of the original collateral balance once OC reaches 40% of the
current collateral balance.

Servicing Capabilities: Conn Appliances, Inc. has a long track
record as an originator, underwriter, and servicer. The credit risk
profile of the entity is mitigated by the backup servicing provided
by Systems & Services Technologies, Inc. (SST).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or chargeoffs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of credit enhancement (CE)
and remaining loss coverage levels available to the investments.
Decreased CE may make certain ratings on the investments
susceptible to potential negative rating actions, depending on the
extent of the decline in coverage.

Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case chargeoff assumption by 1.5x, 2.0x, and 2.5x, and
examining the rating implications. The 1.5x, 2.0x, and 2.5x
increase of the base case chargeoffs are intended to provide an
indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration of a transaction's performance.

During the sensitivity analysis, Fitch examines the magnitude of
the multiplier compression by projecting the expected cash flows
and loss coverage levels over the life of investments under higher
than the initial base case chargeoff assumptions. Fitch models cash
flows with the revised chargeoff estimates while holding constant
all other modeling assumptions.

Under the 1.5x base case stress scenario, class A notes would
retain the current rating, while class B notes would experience a
one-notch downgrade. Under the 2.0x base case stress scenario,
class A notes would be downgraded one notch, while class B notes
would downgraded one category to 'Bsf'. Under the 2.5x base case
stress scenario, class A notes would be downgraded to 'B+sf', and
class B and class C notes would fall to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.



DT AUTO 2016-4: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2016-4:

   -- $194,140,000 Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- $63,800,000 Class B at AA (sf)

   -- $76,030,000 Class C at A (sf)

   -- $66,520,000 Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- $38,020,000 Class E at BB (sf)

The DBRS ratings are based on DBRS’s review of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- DTAOT 2016-4 provides for Class A, B, C, D and E coverage
      multiples slightly below the DBRS range of multiples set
      forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes
      that this is warranted given the magnitude of expected loss
      and structural features of the transaction.

   -- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
      originations, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The quality and consistency of provided historical static
      pool data for DriveTime Automotive Group, Inc. (DriveTime)
      originations and performance of the DriveTime auto loan
     portfolio.

   -- The November 19, 2014, settlement of the Consumer Financial
      Protection Bureau inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade

      practices.

   -- Review of the legal structure and presence of legal opinions

      (to be provided), which address the true sale of the assets
      to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of the special-purpose
      vehicle with DriveTime, that the trust has a valid first-
      priority security interest in the assets and the consistency

      with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance"
      methodology.

The DTAOT 2016-4 transaction represents a securitization of a
portfolio of motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts
originated by DriveTime Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator).
The Originator is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of DriveTime.
DriveTime is a leading used vehicle retailer in the United States
that focuses on the sale and financing of vehicles to the subprime
market.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 65.75% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.50%) and overcollateralization (19.25%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect 54.00%, 40.00%,
27.75% and 20.75% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


DT AUTO 2016-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to DT Auto
Owner Trust 2016-4's $438.51 million asset-backed notes series
2016-4.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 26,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 66.7%, 60.4%, 50.2%,
      41.9%, and 37.9% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit
      support levels provide approximately 2.20x, 2.00x, 1.65x,
      1.35x, and 1.20x coverage of our expected net loss range of
      29.50%-30.50% for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal
      final maturity dates made under stressed cash flow modeling
      scenarios that S&P deems appropriate for the assigned
      preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary
      'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively,
      and the rating on the class D and E notes would remain
      within two rating categories of S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)'

      and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively, during the first year.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of
      credit deterioration equal to a one-category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities
      and a two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      through 'BB' rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized, including a high percentage (approximately 87%)

      of obligors with higher payment frequencies (more than once
      a month), which S&P expects will result in a somewhat faster

      paydown on the pool.

   -- The transaction's sequential-pay structure, which builds
      credit enhancement (on a percentage-of-receivables basis) as

      the pool amortizes.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

DT Auto Owner Trust 2016-4

Class   Rating          Type            Interest           Amount
                                        rate             (mil. $)
A       AAA (sf)        Senior          Fixed              194.14
B       AA (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed               63.80
C       A (sf)          Subordinate     Fixed               76.03
D       BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed               66.52
E       BB (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed               38.02


EQTY 2014-INNS: S&P Affirms B- Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from EQTY 2014-INNS
Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included reviewing the portfolio of 96 limited-service and
extended-stay hotels that back the $801.1 million floating-rate
interest-only (IO) mortgage loan.  S&P also considered the deal
structure and liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations on classes A, B, C, D, E, and F also reflect
subordination and liquidity support that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  Although the portfolio's revenue per
available room (RevPAR) and net cash flow (NCF) exhibited growth in
2014, our analysis also considered the more recent declines in the
portfolio's RevPAR and NCF and the potential for the portfolio's
performance to further weaken as supply growth throughout the U.S.
increases or if economic conditions should weaken.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than that of the lowest rated
reference class.  The notional balance on class X-EXT references
classes D, E, and F.

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging properties that secure the
trust's mortgage loan.  The portfolio is geographically diverse as
the 96 hotels totaling 11,177 guestrooms are located across 30
states.  Ten properties were released since issuance.  S&P
considered the servicer-reported NCF for the portfolio overall,
which decreased to $101.0 million in the trailing 12-month period
ended March 31, 2016, from $107.2 million in 2015 and
$110.8 million in 2014.  S&P also factored in the recent
deceleration in RevPAR growth for the portfolio, as well as in
certain U.S. markets thus far in 2016.  S&P then derived its
sustainable in-place NCF, which S&P divided by a 9.86% weighted
average capitalization rate to determine its expected-case value.
This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio of
93.9% based on the trust balance and S&P Global Ratings' annualized
debt service coverage (DSC) of 2.69x based on the trustee's actual
reported debt service per the September 2016 trustee remittance
report and S&P Global Ratings' NCF.  

According to the Sept. 9, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has an $801.1 million trust balance, down from $865.0
million at issuance.  As of the September 2016 trustee remittance
report, the loan pays an annual floating interest rate of LIBOR
plus 3.29%.  There is additional debt in the form of a mezzanine
loan totaling $102.8 million, down from $111.0 million at issuance.
According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NCF for the years ended Dec. 31, 2014, and Dec. 31,
2015, and the trailing 12-month period ended March 31, 2016, that
the master servicer provided to determine S&P's opinion of a
sustainable cash flow for the lodging properties.  The master
servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a consolidated DSC of 3.52x on the
trust balance for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2016.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

EQTY 2014-INNS Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         A- (sf)
D         BBB- (sf)
E         BB- (sf)
F         B- (sf)
X-EXT     B- (sf)


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-3: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-3:

   -- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)

   -- Class B Notes rated A (sf)

   -- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)

   -- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transaction

      benefits from credit enhancement in the form of
      overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the
      reserve fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels
      are sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected cumulative

      net loss assumptions under various stress scenarios.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
      flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
      under which they have invested. For this transaction, the
      rating addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly

      basis and principal by the legal final maturity date.

   -- Exeter’s capabilities with regards to originations,
      underwriting, servicing and ownership by the Blackstone
      Group, Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. and Goldman Sachs
      Vintage Fund.

   -- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter Finance
      Corp. (Exeter) and considers the entity to be an acceptable
      originator and servicer of subprime automobile loan
      contracts with an acceptable backup servicer.

   -- Exeter senior management team has considerable experience
      and a successful track record within the auto finance
      industry.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
      Exeter’s auto loan portfolio.

   -- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
      address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
      consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter and

      that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
      in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS methodology,

      “Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance.”

Notes:

All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

RATINGS
  
Issuer                Debt Rated        Rating Action      Rating
Exeter Automobile    Class A Notes      Provis.-New        AAA(sf)
Receivables Trust
2016-3

Exeter Automobile    Class B Notes      Provis.-New        A(sf)
Receivables Trust
2016-3

Exeter Automobile    Class C Notes      Provis.-New        BBB(sf)
Receivables Trust
2016-3

Exeter Automobile    Class D Notes      Provis.-New        BB(sf)
Receivables Trust  
2016-3


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Exeter
Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-3's $450.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 29,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 50.0%, 41.5%, 33.8%, and
      26.1% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 2.55x, 2.10x, 1.60x, and 1.30x our 18.50%-19.50%
      expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments that S&P believes

      will be made to the preliminary rated notes by the assumed
      legal final maturity dates under stressed cash flow modeling

      scenarios that S&P believes is appropriate for the assigned
      preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes will remain within one rating category of S&P's
      preliminary 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively,
      during the first year and that S&P's ratings on the class C
      and D notes will remain within two rating categories of
      S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings during
      the first year.  These potential rating movements are
      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
      outline the outer bound of credit deterioration as a one-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated
      securities and a two-category downgrade within the first
      year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under the
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

   -- Representation in the transaction documents that all
      contracts in the pool have made at least one payment.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-3

Class       Rating        Type            Interest   Amount
                                          rate(i)   (mil. $)(i)
A           AA (sf)       Senior          Fixed      281.55
B           A (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed      69.50
C           BBB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed      53.00
D           BB (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed      45.95

(i)The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
determined on the pricing date.


FIGUEROA CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, and D notes from Figueroa CLO 2013-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in December 2013 and
is managed by TCW Asset Management Co.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Aug. 9, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
December 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported that
the collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to
4.72 years from 5.76 years.  This seasoning has decreased the
overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion
to the tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the April 2014 effective date report. Specifically,
the amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to $22.8 from
$2.98 million.  The transaction does not hold any defaulted
assets.

According to the Aug. 9, 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
declined since the April 17, 2014 trustee report, which S&P used
for its effective date rating affirmations:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 132.17%, down from 133.71%.

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 121.59%, down from 123.01%.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 114.24%, down from 115.57%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.48%, down from 109.74%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Figueroa CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1     31683VAA8    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2     31683VAC4    AA (sf)    AA (sf)
B       31683VAE0    A (sf)     A (sf)
C       31683VAG5    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)
D       31683WAA6    BB (sf)    BB (sf)


FINN SQUARE: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-1-R, and B-2-R replacement notes from Finn Square CLO Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.  S&P withdrew its ratings on
the transaction's original class A-1, A-2, B-1, and B-2 notes after
they were fully redeemed.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the
class C and D notes, which were not part of the refinancing.

On the Sept. 26, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance were used to redeem the original notes,
as outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew the ratings on the transaction's original notes in line
with their full redemption and assigned ratings to the
transaction's replacement notes.  The ratings reflect S&P's opinion
that the credit support available is commensurate with the
associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Finn Square CLO Ltd.
Replacement class       Rating
A-1-R                   AAA (sf)
A-2-R                   AA (sf)
B-1-R                   A (sf)
B-2-R                   A (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Finn Square CLO Ltd.
Original class          Rating
                    To          From
A-1                 NR          AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR          AA (sf)
B-1                 NR          A (sf)
B-2                 NR          A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Finn Square CLO Ltd.
Class                   Rating
C                       BBB (sf)
D                       BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.



FIRST INVESTORS 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to First Investors Auto
Owner Trust 2016-2's $230 million asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 35.4%, 31.3%, 24.9%,
      19.6%, and 15.7% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide approximately 3.65x, 3.15x, 2.45x, 1.85x, and

      1.50x coverage of S&P's 9.00%-9.50% expected cumulative net
      loss (CNL) range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate
      for the ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would not
      drop by more than one rating category, and the ratings on
      the class C, D, and E notes would not drop by more than two
      rating categories within the first year.  These potential
      rating movements are consistent with S&P's rating stability
      criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the pool being securitized

      with direct loans accounting for approximately 19% of the
      cut-off pool.  These loans historically have lower losses
      than the indirect-originated loans.  First Investors
      Financial Services Inc.'s 26-year history of originating and

      underwriting auto loans, 15-year history of self-servicing
      auto loans, and 12 years as a third-party servicer, as well
      as its track record of securitizing auto loans since 2000.

   -- First Investors' 13 years of origination static pool data,
      segmented by direct and indirect loans.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s experience as the committed back-up
      servicer.

   -- The transaction's sequential payment structure, which builds

      credit enhancement based on a percentage of receivables as
      the pool amortizes.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2016-2

Class    Rating        Type            Interest         Amount
                                       rate           (mil. $)
A-1      AAA (sf)      Senior          Fixed            130.80
A-2      AAA (sf)      Senior          Fixed             44.00
B        AA (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed             11.20
C        A (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed             18.40
D        BBB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed             15.30
E        BB (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed             10.30


FIRSTMAC MORTGAGE 3-2016: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to five of the
six classes of prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
to be issued by Firstmac Fiduciary Services Pty Ltd. as trustee for
Firstmac Mortgage Funding Trust No.4 Series 3-2016.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- S&P's view of the credit risk of the underlying collateral
      portfolio, including the fact that this is a closed
      portfolio, which means no further loans will be assigned to
      the trust after the closing date.

   -- S&P's view of the credit support that is sufficient to
      withstand the stresses it applies.  Credit support for the
      rated notes comprises note subordination, excess spread and
      lenders' mortgage insurance (LMI) on 37.8% of the portfolio.

   -- S&P's expectation that the various mechanisms to support
      liquidity within the transaction, including a liquidity
      reserve equal to 1.2% of the outstanding note balance; the
      principal draw function; 24 months timely payment cover on
      27.4% of the loans in the portfolio; and a spread reserve
      which builds from available excess spread to ensure timely  
      payment of interest.

   -- The extraordinary expense reserve of A$150,000, funded from
      day one by Firstmac Ltd., available to meet extraordinary
      expenses.  The reserve will be topped up via excess spread
      if drawn.

   -- The fixed-to-floating interest-rate swap provided by
      National Australia Bank Ltd. to hedge the mismatch between
      receipts from fixed-rate mortgage loans and the variable-
      rate RMBS.

A copy of S&P Global Ratings' complete report for Firstmac Mortgage
Funding Trust No.4 Series 3-2016 can be found on RatingsDirect, S&P
Global Ratings' Web-based credit analysis system, at:

                 http://www.globalcreditportal.com

The issuer has not informed Standard & Poor's (Australia) Pty
Limited whether the issuer is publically disclosing all relevant
information about the structured finance instruments that are
subject to this rating report or whether relevant information
remains non-public.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Class     Rating       Amount
                     (A$ mil.)
A-1       AAA (sf)     297.5
A-2       AAA (sf)      24.50
B         AA (sf)       20.65
C         A (sf)         3.85
D         BB (sf)        2.66
E         NR             0.84

NR--Not rated.


FREDDIE MAC 2016-DNA4: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's risk-transfer
transaction, Structured Agency Credit Risk Debt Notes Series
2016-DNA4 (STACR 2016-DNA4) as:

   -- $177,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-2 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-2F exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes
      'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-3A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-3AF exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-3AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';

      Outlook Stable;
   -- $177,000,000 class M-3B notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $354,000,000 class M-3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $23,602,630,840 class A-H reference tranche;
   -- $71,448,746 class M-1H reference tranche;
   -- $71,448,746 class M-2H reference tranche;
   -- $71,448,745 class M-3AH reference tranche;
   -- $71,448,746 class M-3BH reference tranche;
   -- $31,000,000 class B notes;
   -- $217,448,746.13 class B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBBsf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 4.00%
subordination provided by the 1.00% class M-2 notes, the 1.00%
class M-3A notes, the 1.00% class M-3B and the 1.00% class B notes.
The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-2 notes reflects the 3.00%
subordination provided by the 1.00% class M-3A notes, the 1.00%
class M-3B notes and the 1.00% class B notes.  The notes are
general unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac ('AAA'/Outlook Stable)
subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of
certain residential mortgage loans held in various Freddie
Mac-guaranteed MBS.

STACR 2016-DNA4 represents Freddie Mac's twelfth risk transfer
transaction applying actual loan loss severity (LS) issued as part
of the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic
Plan for 2013-2017 for each of the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of
risk-transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $24.84 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Freddie Mac where principal repayment of the notes is
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding
principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual
loan's LS percentage related to those credit events, which includes
borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors.  Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1, M-2, M-2F, M-2I,
M-3A, M-3AF, M-3AI, M-3B and M-3 notes will be based on the lower
of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement (CE) available through subordination, and Freddie Mac's
Issuer Default Rating.  The M-1, M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B notes will
be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will carry a
12.5-year legal final maturity.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of 106,116 high-quality mortgage loans totaling
$24.844 billion that were acquired by Freddie Mac between Jan. 1,
2016 and March 31, 2016.  The pool consists of loans with original
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of over 60% and less than or equal to
80% with a weighted average (WA) original combined LTV of 76%.  The
WA debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 35.4% and credit score of 748
reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Freddie Mac's
twelfth actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne
by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed LS schedule. The
notes in this transaction will experience losses realized at the
time of liquidation or loan modification which will include both
lost principal and delinquent interest.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The M-1, M-2, M-3A, and M-3B
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity.  Thus, any
credit events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are
borne by Freddie Mac and do not affect the transaction.  In
addition, credit events that occur prior to maturity with losses
realized from liquidations or loan modifications that occur after
the final maturity date will not be passed through to noteholders.
This feature more closely aligns the risk of loss to that of the
10-year, fixed LS STACRs where losses were passed through when a
credit event occurred; that is, loans became 180-days delinquent
with no consideration for liquidation timelines.  The credit ranged
from 8% at the 'Asf' rating category to 14% at the 'Bsf' rating
category.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive.
Loan quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and
indicate a tight control environment that limits origination risk.
Fitch has determined Freddie Mac to be an above-average aggregator
for its 2013 and later product.  The lower risk was accounted for
by Fitch by applying a lower default estimate for the reference
pool.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
the M-1 class will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage.  Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 class can receive a full pro rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately, as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained, and the cumulative net loss and the
delinquency test are within a certain threshold.  Additionally,
unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination over time due
to scheduled principal payments to more junior classes, the M-2,
M-3A, M-3B and B classes will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-1 class is paid in
full.  The B class will not receive any scheduled or unscheduled
principal allocations until the M-3B class is paid in full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from a solid alignment of
interests.  Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 5% of loss
protection, as well as a minimum of 50% of the first-loss B
tranche, sized at 100 basis points (bps).  Initially, Freddie Mac
will retain an approximately 29% vertical slice/interest in the
M-1, M-2, M-3A, and M-3B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) assets are less
than its obligations for longer than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing.  As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Freddie Mac if it is determined that such action
would promote an orderly administration of Freddie Mac's affairs.
Fitch believes that the U.S. government will continue to support
Freddie Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE.
However, if, at some point, Fitch views the support as being
reduced and receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be
downgraded and ratings on the M-1, M-2, M-3A, and M-3B notes, along
with their corresponding MAC notes, could be affected.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels.  The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 24.2% at the 'BBBsf' level, 22.6% at the 'BBB-sf' level
and 14.7% at the 'Bsf' level.  The analysis indicates that there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


GCA2014 HOLDINGS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on GCA2014 Holdings Ltd.'s
class C and D notes, and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings
on the class A-1, A-2, and B notes from Global Container Assets
2014 Ltd.'s (AssetCo's) series 2014-1 notes.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of both transactions' inability
to withstand the stresses corresponding to the previously assigned
rating levels.

GCA2014 Holdings Ltd. is an asset-backed securities transaction
backed by all outstanding class A shares ($163 million) of AssetCo,
which includes the rights to receive cash flow from available
payments at the bottom of the payment waterfalls in AssetCo.
AssetCo is a container securitization transaction backed by a
$345,040,995 (net book value) portfolio containing 166,072
containers.  AssetCo has the right to net operating income from the
portfolio and any net residual cash flows from the sale of
containers.  GCA 2014 Holdings Ltd. is an ABS transaction backed by
the shares ($163 million) from AssetCo's series 2015-1 notes.

The performance of AssetCo.'s fleet has deteriorated since S&P
assigned ratings to its last issuance in January 2015.  The
utilization rate has dropped to 87% from 94%, while the average per
diem lease rate has declined to $0.72 from $0.92.  The high
percentage of dry containers (87%) has contributed to the poor
performance, as pricing for this type has been hardest hit by the
downturn in the container market.

Earlier this year, the ongoing performance deterioration caused a
partial deferral of interest and principal payments on notes from
GCA2014 Holdings (classes C and D), leading S&P to place those
notes on CreditWatch with negative implications in May 2016.  Since
then, collateral performance has declined further, with the EBIT
ratio test now failing, resulting in the complete deferral of
interest and principal payments on classes C and D, and reducing
the performance of classes A-1, A-2, and B under certain stress
scenarios.  Given this additional decline, the asset portfolio and
structure cannot support any of the ratings originally assigned to
the senior and repack notes.

Specifically, cashflow analysis indicates that classes A-1 and A-2
can only withstand stresses up to the 'A-' level; class B up to the
'BBB-' level; class C up to the 'B' level; and class D does not pay
off interest and principal due under the 'B' scenario.  In the case
of class C, cash flow analysis does indicate continued deferral of
interest payments under the 'B' scenario; however, such deferral
does not constitute an event of default, and all amounts due are
paid by the legal maturity under our stress scenario.  In the case
of class D, while ultimate default appears likely unless conditions
improve, such a default would not be imminent (occurring at legal
maturity in 2030).

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH NEGATIVE

GCA2014 Holdings Ltd.
Asset-backed notes series 2014-1
                Rating
Class       To          From
C           B (sf)      BB (sf)/Watch Neg
D           CCC (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS LOWERED

Global Container Assets 2014 Ltd.
Asset-backed notes series 2015-1
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         A-(sf)      A (sf)
A-2         A-(sf)      A (sf)
B           BBB-(sf)    BBB (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2003-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. N-2 Debt Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. N-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. N-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes M, N-1 and N-2 were upgraded based on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan amortization. The
deal has paid down 9% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class O was affirmed because the class has already
experienced a 96% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects no base expected loss of the current
balance, the same as at the Moody's last review. Moody's does not
anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Our ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $11.7 million
from $1.05 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two remaining mortgage loans.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $20.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 28%). Currently, there are no loans in special
servicing nor on the master servicer's watchlist

The largest loan is the Hologic Facilities Loan ($9.2 million --
78.8% of the pool), which is secured by two suburban office
buildings totaling 269,000 SF. One building, representing 207,000
SF, is located in Bedford, Massachusetts and the other,
representing 62,000 SF, is in Danbury, Connecticut. Both buildings
are fully leased to Hologic, Inc. through August 2022. The loan is
fully amortizing and matures in May 2023, which is less than one
year after the lease expiration date. The loan has amortized 50%
since securitization. Due to the single tenant nature of the loan,
Moody's performed a Lit / Dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 32% and 3.42X, respectively, compared to 35% and 3.10X at
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The other remaining loan is the Copperfield Square II Apartments
Loan ($2.5 million -- 21.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 77
unit multifamily property located 20 miles west of Washington, DC
in Fairfax, VA. The property was 94% leased as of June 2016
compared to 95% as of March 2015. The loan is fully amortizing and
has amortized 52% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 38% and 2.54X, respectively, compared to 41% and 2.37X at
the last review.


GOLUB CAPITAL 11: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, C, and D
notes from Golub Capital Partners CLO 11 Ltd.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction's performance using data from the Aug.
9, 2016 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $132.48 million in paydowns
to the class A-1 notes since S&P's September 2012 rating actions.
These paydowns resulted in improved reported overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios since the September 2012 trustee report, which S&P
used for its effective date review:

   -- The class A-2 O/C ratio improved to 154.43% from 136.86%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio improved to 133.67% from 123.74%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 122.52% from 116.20%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 113.08% from 109.52%.

The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, as
the reported weighted average life has declined to 3.31 years from
5.47 years as of effective date analysis, decreasing the risk
profile of the underlying portfolio.

The affirmation of the 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1 notes
reflects S&P's view that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating level.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, on a criteria
interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's
Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Scale," published May 8, 2014.  This interpretation allows us to
use a limited number of public ratings from other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the
credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The
criteria provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation
outlines the treatment of securitized assets.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Golub Capital Partners CLO 11 Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From

A-2           AAA (sf)         AA (sf)
B             AA+ (sf)         A (sf)
C             A+ (sf)          BBB (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)         BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Golub Capital Partners CLO 11 Ltd.

Class         Rating

A-1             AAA


GREENBRIAR CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Class D Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Greenbriar CLO, Ltd:

   -- US $60,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
      on August 17, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- US $50,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
      A1 (sf); previously on August 17, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US $730,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
      $290,322,792.56), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August
      17, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US $40,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Ba1
      (sf); previously on August 17, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- US $40,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current
      balance of $22,955,095.08), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on

      August 17, 2015 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Greenbriar CLO, Ltd, issued in December 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans with material exposure to long dated and legacy
defaulted assets. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
November 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2015. The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately 44.2% or $229.8 million
since August 2015. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
142.84%, 125.00%, 113.64% and 108.01%, respectively, versus August
2015 levels of 127.47%, 117.35%, 110.35% and 106.69%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since August 2015. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) is currently 3093 compared to 2643 in
August 2015. Additionally, based on Moody's calculations, which
include adjustments for ratings with a negative outlook and ratings
on review for downgrade, assets with a Moody's default probability
rating of Caa1 or below currently make up 21.4% of the portfolio,
compared to 12.4% in August 2015. Moody's also observed that the
deal holds a material dollar amount of thinly traded or untraded
loans, whose lack of liquidity may pose additional risks relating
to the issuer's ultimate ability or inclination to pursue a
liquidation of such assets, especially if the sales can be
transacted only at heavily discounted price levels.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

       notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value. Moody's
      ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
      assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
      prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's
      maturity will drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from
      long-dated assets.

   -- Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a number of
      securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
      through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
      necessary information to update its credit estimates in a
      timely fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected

      by any default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in
      lieu of updated credit estimates.

   -- Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
      liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative

      outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
      Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
      exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
      default. The historical default rate is higher than average
      for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

      which constitute around $13.5 million of par, Moody's ran a
      sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

   -- Operational risk: The deal contains a portion of collateral  
  
      assets that mature after the CLO's legal maturity date.
      Repayment of the notes at their maturity will be highly
      dependent on the issuer's successful monetization of the
      long-dated assets which will be contingent upon issuer's
      ability and willingness to sell these assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2474)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +3

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +1

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3712)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: -1

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -1

   -- Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $487.9 million, defaulted par of
$43.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.17%
(implying a WARF of 3093), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.65%, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average
spread of 3.10% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 4.39% of the collateral
pool.



GREENWICH STRUCTURED: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on N-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of class N-1
tranche from the resecuritization transaction Greenwich Structured
ARM Products CI 2005-2. The tranche and the resecurization
transaction's underlying tranche, Cl. X from CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust 2004-16 were placed on review for upgrade on
July 22nd, 2016 due to the distribution of funds related to the
$8.5 billion settlement related to CW's pre-crisis servicing
practices and alleged breaches of representations and warranties,
between Bank of America, N.A., parent of CW, and Bank of New York
Mellon as trustee.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Greenwich Structured ARM Products CI 2005-2

   -- Cl. N-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 B3

      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating confirmation primarily reflects the rating confirmation
on the underlying tranche of the resecuritization transaction and
the stable paydown on Cl N-1.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
certificate issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR2
("GSMS 2006-RR2"):

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

GSMS 2006-RR2 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the
collateral pool balance). As of the August 25, 2016 trustee report,
the aggregate certificate balance of the transaction has decreased
to $316.2 million from $771 million at issuance, due to full and
partial realized losses applied to certain classes of certificates.
Class A-1 has received payments in the form of pre-payments and
regular amortization of the underlying collateral, as well as
partial realized losses.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6208,
compared to 6721 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (3.7% compared to 2.1% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.5% compared to 3.9% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(8.4% compared to 7.6% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (0.5% compared to
1.2% at last review), B1-B3 (14.0% compared to 8.5% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (72.9% compared to 76.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years, compared to 1.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about the loan within the
underlying look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 2.1%, compared to 1.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.5%, compared to 16.2% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant, increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by 5% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificate of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2). Reducing the recovery
rate of 100% of the collateral pool to 0% would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated certificate of one
notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GSCCRE COMMERCIAL 2015-HULA: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on 3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of GSCCRE Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-HULA Commercial Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates Series 2015-HULA.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The trust certificates represent the beneficial interests in a
mortgage loan secured primarily by the Four Seasons Resort
Hulalalai located in Kailua-Kona, Hawaii.  The subject is situated
on 725 acres along the Kohala Coast.  Amenities of the 243-room
hotel include five swimming pools, multiple indoor and outdoor
function spaces and several F&B outlets.  It is the only AAA Five
Diamond property on Hawaii's Big Island.  The initial loan term is
two years, and can be extended up to an additional five years.  The
debt is interest-only for the fully extended loan term.  A $33.9
million B-note and a $40 million C-note are included in the total
debt structure but held outside of the trust.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
and stable performance of the underlying asset since issuance.  The
subject exhibits superior performance in comparison with its local
competitive set.  For the trailing 12 months ending in
March 2016, the property's occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 84.4%,
$1,138.22 and $960.10, respectively.  At issuance, the property was
also a top performer within its state-wide competitive set and
among high-end luxury resorts across North America.  The hotel is
one of the most successful within the Four Seasons brand.

In addition to the hotel, the collateral also includes a private
membership club with two 18-hole golf courses, two clubhouses, a
water-sports venue, various retail outlets and the Hualalai Sports
Club and Spa.  The third collateral component consists of 55 acres
of fee simple residential land and five acres of unimproved
commercial land parcels.  The resort is situated in a premier,
oceanfront location and offers a true high-end luxury option not
found elsewhere on the island.

Fitch's stressed DSCR and LTV for the trust component are 1.05x and
100.4%, respectively.  Leverage on a per-key basis is
$1.2 million.  The transaction closed in October 2015.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio level
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $130 million class A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $26 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $29 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $44 million class E at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $51 million class F at 'B-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $243.9 million* class X-CP at 'B-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $243.9 million* class X-NCP at 'B-sf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes from Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
closed in September 2013 and is managed by Highbridge Principal
Strategies LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Sept. 8, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported that
the collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to
4.49 years from 5.41 years.  This seasoning has decreased the
overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion
to the tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the December 2013 effective date report.
Specifically, the amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased
to $15.6 million from none.  The transaction does not hold any
defaulted assets.

According to the Sept. 8, 2016, trustee report that S&P used for
this review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class
have remained relatively stable since the Dec. 10, 2013, trustee
report, which S&P used for its effective date ratings affirmation:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 132.3%, up from 132.2%.

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 119.6%, flat with 119.6%.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 113.1%, up from 103.0%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.2%, up from 108.1%.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class A-2, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that factored in the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a lower rating on the class E notes than the rating
action reflects.  However, S&P affirmed the rating on the class E
notes after considering the margin of failure, the stability in the
O/C ratio since the transaction's effective date, and that the
transaction will soon enter its amortization phase.  Based on the
latter, S&P expects an increase in the credit support available to
all rated classes as principal is collected and paydowns to the
senior notes occur.

The affirmation of the ratings reflects S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2, Ltd.
Floating- and fixed-rate notes
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To           From
A-1               42983HAA3              AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2               42983HAC9              AA (sf)      AA (sf)
B-1               42983HAE5              A (sf)       A (sf)
B-2               42983HAJ4              A (sf)       A (sf)
C                 42983HAG0              BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)
D                 42983JAA9              BB (sf)      BB (sf)
E                 42983JAC5              B (sf)       B (sf)


INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-3: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of Institutional Mortgage
Capital, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-3 (IMSCI 2013-3).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and removal of classes F and G from Rating Watch
Negative reflect the overall stable performance of the pool
(excluding the specially serviced assets). Additionally, the
specially serviced assets did not sustain structural damage or loss
from the recent Fort McMurray area wildfires. The pool balance has
been reduced 12.1% to C$220.1 million from C$250.4 million at
issuance with 35 loans remaining. There are no full or partial
interest only loans in the pool. Approximately 17.7% of the pool
has a scheduled maturity date in late 2017 with an additional 26.5%
scheduled maturities in 2018. Of the remaining pool, 90.2% has full
or partial recourse to the borrower and/or sponsor.

There were variances from criteria related to classes B and C for
which the model output suggested that upgrades were possible. Fitch
determined that upgrades are not warranted at this time there
remains uncertainty regarding the impact of the downturn in the
energy market in Alberta on the performance of the full recourse
specially serviced loans. Additionally, the overall pool
performance has been stable and there have been no large loan
payoffs or any defeased loans.

The three specially serviced loans are backed by multifamily
properties in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The loans transferred to
special servicing in March 2016 due a significant decline in
occupancy stemming from the turmoil in the energy sector. The
sponsor and special servicer agreed to a 12-month forbearance
agreement. Operations at the property were subsequently affected by
the Fort McMurray wildfires in early May 2016 with the city and
surrounding area evacuated; however, tenants have subsequently
returned as the properties resumed operations. The loan has full
recourse to the borrower, sponsor and manager. Potential loan
losses may be mitigated by recourse provisions, insurance proceeds
and a recovery in the energy markets.

The largest loan of the pool (10.8% of the pool balance) is secured
by a 362,577 square foot (sf) enclosed shopping center located in
Dollard-des-Ormeaux (Montreal), Quebec. The property is anchored by
Canadian Tire and Super C grocery. The pari passu loan is full
recourse to the borrowing entity and its owner and is partial
recourse to the sponsor.

The second largest loan (9.1%) is secured by the Merivale Mall, a
225,082 sf enclosed shopping center located in Ottawa, Ontario. The
property, which was built in 1977 and renovated in 1994, is
anchored by Farm Boy and Sport Chek. The pari passu loan is full
recourse to the borrowing entity and partial recourse to the
sponsor. Discount retailer Marshalls opened in 2015.

The third largest loan (8.8%) is the Shoppers Drug Mart Portfolio
which consists of eight cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
loans. Each loan is secured by a retail property fully leased by
Shoppers Drug Mart. The portfolio consists of 141,093 sf and is
located across Ontario in Ottawa, London, and Windsor. Lease
expirations for the portfolio range from 2021 to 2031.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on classes E, F and G are Negative due to the
uncertainty regarding the operations and performance of the
specially serviced loans in addition to the transaction's total
exposure to the volatility of the energy market in Alberta (18.9%
of the pool). Stable Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the
majority of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades may occur
with improved pool performance and significant pay down or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms and removes the following classes from Rating Watch
Negative and assigns a Negative Outlook as indicated:

   -- $3.1 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- $2.5 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $7.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $96.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $81.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5.3 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $8.5 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6.9 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
      from Negative;

   -- $3.8 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the C$5 million class H and the interest-only
class X.


INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGE 2013-4: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Institutional Mortgage
Capital, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-4 (IMSCI 2013-4).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and removal of classes E, F and G from Rating
Watch Negative reflect the overall stable performance of the pool
(excluding the specially serviced asset). Additionally, the
specially serviced asset along with the Fort McMurray hotel
property in the pool did not sustain structural damage or loss from
the recent Fort McMurray area wildfires. The pool balance has been
reduced 6.2% to C$309.9 million from C$330.4 million at issuance
with 33 loans remaining. There are no full or partial interest only
loans in the pool. Approximately 40.9% of the pool has a scheduled
maturity date in 2018, including the specially serviced loan. Of
the remaining pool, 66.4% has full or partial recourse to the
borrower and/or sponsor.

There was a variance from criteria related to class B for which the
model output suggested that an upgrade was possible. Fitch
determined that an upgrade was not warranted at this time as there
remains uncertainty regarding the impact of the downturn in the
energy market in Alberta on the performance of the full recourse
specially serviced loan. Additionally, the overall pool performance
has been stable and there have been limited loan payoffs and no
defeased loans.

The specially serviced loan is the fifth-largest loan in the pool,
Nelson Ridge (7%), which transferred to special servicing in March
2016. The property transferred to special servicing due a
significant decline in occupancy stemming from the turmoil in the
energy sector. The sponsor and special servicer agreed to a
12-month forbearance agreement. Operations at the property were
subsequently affected by the Fort McMurray wildfires in early May
2016 with the city and surrounding area evacuated; however, tenants
have subsequently returned as the property resumed operations. The
servicer-reported rent roll as of July 31, 2016 indicated occupancy
of 73%. The loan has full recourse to the borrower, sponsor and
manager. Potential loan losses may be mitigated by recourse
provisions, insurance proceeds and a recovery in the energy
markets.

The largest portfolio, Toulon Portfolio (10.5% of the pool
balance), consists of four cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
loans. The loans are secured by: two retail properties located in
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec; one mixed-use
property located in St. John's, Newfoundland; and one office
building in Montreal, QC. The nonrecourse loans are sponsored by
Toulon Development Corp., a full-service real estate firm with
developments in eastern Canada, Quebec and Colorado in the U.S.

The second largest loan, Calloway Courtenay (8.9% of the pool), is
secured by a participation in a 272,795-sf shopping center located
in Courtenay, British Columbia. Courtenay is located on Vancouver
Island, approximately 190 kilometers northwest of the city of
Vancouver. The property, which was developed in 2001, is anchored
by a Walmart Supercentre and is 100% occupied. Other major tenants
include Sport Chek, Best Buy, Winners and Staples. The loan is
sponsored by SmartREIT (formerly known as Calloway REIT), which has
a public investment-grade rating. In addition, the loan is full
recourse to the sponsor.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on classes E, F and G are Negative due to the
uncertainty regarding the operations and performance of the
specially serviced loan in addition to the transaction's total
exposure to the volatility in the energy market Alberta (16% of the
pool). Stable Outlooks reflect the stable performance of the
majority of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades may occur
with improved pool performance and significant pay down or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed and removed the following classes from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned a Negative Outlook as indicated:

   -- C$5 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- C$3.7 million class at F 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- C$3.3 million class at G 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- C$184.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$80 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$6.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$11.2 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- C$9.1 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative.

Fitch does not rate the C$6.6 million class H and the interest-only
class X.


JP MORGAN 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 28
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-3 (JPMMT 2016-3). The ratings range
from (P) Aaa (sf) to (P) Ba2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by two pools of prime quality, fixed
rate, first-lien mortgage loans originated by various originators.
The first pool consists of primarily 30-year mortgages (Group 1)
and the second pool consists of exclusively 15-year mortgages
(Group 2). Seasoning of the aggregate pool is 25 months. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. is the master servicer and U.S. Bank Trust
National Association is the trustee.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-3

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-AX-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A-M, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-AX-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-AX-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-AX-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-M, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Expected cumulative net losses on Group 1 are 0.40% and reach 4.75%
at a stress level consistent with Aaa ratings. Expected cumulative
net losses for Group 2 are 0.30% and reach 1.50% at a stress level
consistent with Aaa ratings.

The collateral quality for this transaction, by itself, is
consistent with other prime transactions that Moody's recently
rated. The Aaa Moody's Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) credit
enhancement (CE), inclusive of concentration adjustments, is 4.81%
for Group 1 and 1.19% for Group 2. Moody's decreased the MILAN
model's CE by 0.06% for Group 1 and increased the MILAN model's CE
by 0.31% for Group 2 for qualitative factors and adjustments not
factored in the model. Loan-level adjustments are based on: DTI,
self-employment status, channel of origination, number of mortgaged
properties, and the presence of HOA fees for properties located in
super lien states. Moody's also made adjustments to the model
output based on the servicing framework, the originators and
aggregator for the pool, and the representation and warranty (R&W)
framework. Moody's based the MILAN model on stressed trajectories
of home prices, unemployment rates and interest rates, at a monthly
frequency over a 10-year period.

Collateral Description

The JPMMT 2016-3 transaction is a securitization of 553 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of $
395,349,365. The loans in this transaction have comparatively high
weighted average seasoning (25 months) and strong borrower
characteristics. The weighted average current FICO score is 762 and
the weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
is 66.9%. Furthermore, 85.2% of the borrowers by current balance
have liquid reserves greater than 24 months of payments. However,
23.3% of the borrowers are self-employed and refinance loans
comprise 49.2% of the aggregate pool. The pool has a high
geographic concentration with 44.1% of the aggregate pool located
in California and 26.0% located in the San
Francisco-Oakland-Hayward MSA. Additionally, 50 loans in the pool
did not have employment verification and 154 loans had only a
partial verification of assets. This is primarily because First
Republic, the largest originator in the pool, does not require
employment verification and only requires one month of bank
statements (rather than two) in its underwriting guidelines.

There are 26 originators in the transaction. The largest
originators in the pool by balance are First Republic Bank (41.6%),
PHH Mortgage (9.7%), and Primary Capital Mortgage, LLC (6.5%). "We
assess First Republic Bank as a Strong originator of prime jumbo
residential mortgage loans, we currently do not have an originator
assessment for PHH Mortgage, and we assess Primary Capital Mortgage
as an Average originator of prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.
The loans in the pool were aggregated by J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Corp. who we assess as an Above Average aggregator of
prime jumbo residential mortgage loans," Moody's said.

There are 18 servicers in this transaction. The largest three
servicers in the pool by current loan amount are First Republic
Bank (41.6%), PHH Mortgage (9.7%), and Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (8.0%). “We assess First Republic as an SQ2- primary
servicer of prime loans, we currently do not have a servicer
assessment for PHH Mortgage, and we assess Shellpoint as an SQ3+
primary servicer of prime residential mortgage loans.” Moody's
said. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (SQ1- master servicer assessment) will
serve as the master servicer.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties

Four third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, collateral, and regulatory reviews on
100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance
with the originator's underwriting guidelines for the vast majority
of loans, only minor compliance issues, and only a few appraisal
defects for the loans in the transaction. The loans that had
exceptions to the originator's underwriting guidelines had strong
documented compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high
reserves, high FICOs, clean payment histories, and/or stable
employment histories. The TPR firms also identified minor
compliance exceptions for reasons including inadequate RESPA
disclosures (which do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA
Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations. The TRID issues often
related to incomplete or incorrect disclosure forms or forms that
were not sent within proper time frames. Additionally, the TPR
firms identified five C-level valuation exceptions due to the fact
that appraisal values were not supported by post-closing broker
price opinions. "We made only minor adjustments to our expected and
Aaa loss levels due to the TPR results," Moody's said.

The representation and warranty (R&W) framework in this transaction
is adequate. The originators made unambiguous R&Ws, either as of
the closing date or as of a date prior to that. J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Corp., the mortgage loan seller, made gap R&Ws
covering the period from the date on which the originators made the
R&Ws and the closing date. A dedicated independent R&W breach
reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, will perform a series of
pre-defined tests on each loan that becomes 120 days delinquent (or
hits another breach review trigger) to determine whether the
originator or mortgage loan seller is liable to repurchase or
substitute the reviewed loan(s). Financially weak or unrated
entities made R&Ws for 53.6% of the loans. As such, we increased
our base case and Aaa losses for loans to account for the risk that
these entities may be unable to satisfy their repurchase
obligations in the future.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The paying agent and cash management functions will also be
performed by Wells Fargo rather than the trustee. In addition,
Wells Fargo is the master servicer and is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. As master servicer, Wells Fargo is also
committed to act as successor if no other successor servicer can be
found. “We assess Wells Fargo as a SQ1- (strong) master servicer
of residential loans.” Moody's said.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction has a shifting interest structure that allows
subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under certain
defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure allows
subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks,
senior bonds are exposed to increased performance volatility, known
as tail risk. The transaction provides for a senior subordination
floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which mitigates tail
risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement
over time.

Y-Structure with Structural Updates

The transaction is structured as a two-group Y-structure with
structural features similar to JPMMT 2016-2. Compared to some
Y-structures that Moody's has rated, the extent of loss allocation
across groups is limited. For example, realized losses in a given
group are allocated to the super senior bonds for that group before
the senior support bonds of the unrelated group.

In JPMMT 2016-3, all funds from the two groups of mortgages are
commingled, i.e., there is only one available distribution amount.
The percentage of available principal allocated to each group of
senior certificates is based on the "principal collections" in each
respective pool. Principal collections are defined to include the
principal portion of scheduled payments whether or not received, as
well as the principal portion of prepayments and other amounts. Due
to this definition, senior bonds in one group could become
under-collateralized if there are delinquencies in the unrelated
group for which the servicer has stopped advancing. This is because
the delinquent pool is entitled to receive its scheduled principal
payments even if they are not received. This could consume
available funds that are generated by the performing group's
collateral.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Debt Rating to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the rating on two classes and downgraded the rating on one
class in Key Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SL1 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015 Affirmed

      Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Classes A-1A and B were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down by 46% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on Classes C and D were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.6% of the
current balance, compared to 9.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.7% at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $19.6 million
from $237.5 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
3% to 29% of the pool.

Seven loans, constituting 54% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $12.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 70%). Three loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Oak Harbor Mini-Storage Loan ($1.35 million -- 7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 285 unit self-storage facility with 32
open RV/boat storage spaces, totaling 317 units with 37,863
rentable square feet (SF). The property is located in Oak Harbor,
WA approximately 100 miles northwest of Seattle and transferred to
special servicing in July 2016 due to maturity default.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 112%, compared to 84%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.04X and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.50X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 49% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 212th Street Plaza & Valley Self Storage
Loan ($5.6 million -- 29% of the pool), which is secured by 72,000
SF mixed-use retail strip center and self-storage property, located
approximately 20 miles south of Seattle. The property was 96%
occupied as of December 2015 and reported to be in good condition
as per the servicers August 2016 inspection. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.82X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Marina Park Place Loan ($2.6 million
-- 13% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,700 sf retail center
located in Downtown Kirkland, WA approximately 15 miles north east
of Seattle, across Lake Washington. The property was 100% leased as
of December 2015 and reported to be in good condition as per the
servicers December 2015 inspection. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 123% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 129% and 0.84X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Lakemont Academy Loan ($1.4 million
-- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant property
located in Bellevue, WA approximately 11 miles east of Seattle
across Lake Washington. The property is currently 100% leased to
Knowledge Universe Education d/b/a Lakemont Academy, a daycare,
preschool and education center until February 2020. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.43X, respectively, compared to 69% and
1.41X at the last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-C4: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Notes Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C4 as
follows:

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class H was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan amortization. The deal has
paid down 14% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class J was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected and realized loss. Class J has already
experienced a 91% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects no base expected loss of the current
balance, the same as at the Moody's last review. Moody's does not
anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Our ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.4% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Commercial Real Estate Finance: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Financings" published in May
2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's also used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its
public CDO rating model to generate a portfolio loss distribution
to assess the credit risk for a credit tenant lease (CTL) component
of the pool.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 19, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $10.2 million
from $999.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
36% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 13% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. The pool
includes a credit tenant lease (CTL) component of six loans
representing 51% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 54% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $53.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%). There are currently no loans in specially
servicing.

The only conduit loan is the Greenwood Pointe Shopping Center Loan
($3.7 million, 36.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 135,700
square foot neighborhood shopping center located in Indianapolis,
Indiana. The property is located less than two miles from the
Greenwood Park Mall and less than one mile from a Walmart
Supercenter. The loan was modified in June 2011. The loan term was
increased by 137 months, interest rate was lowered from 8.3% to
6.25%, and the principal balance was reduced by $2.3 million. The
property was 100% leased as of October 2014. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 94% and
1.09X at last review.

The CTL component consists of six loans, constituting 51% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to three tenants. The exposures
are CVS Health ($2.6 million -- 25.5% of the pool; senior unsecured
rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook), Walgreen Co. ($2.2 million --
21.5% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa2 -- rating under
review for possible downgrade), and Exxon Mobil Corporation ($0.4
million -- 3.8% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: Aaa --
negative outlook). The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor
(WARF) for this pool is 283, compared to 281 at the last review.
WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse
credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.



LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C8: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on three classes in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C8 as follows:

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class G was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 23.2% since Moody's last review.

The ratings Classes H and J were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-CL, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 25.6% of the
current balance, compared to 18.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.1% of the original
pooled balance, unchanged from the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, compared to six at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 16, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97.9% to $28.2
million from $1.31 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six remaining mortgage loans.

No loans are on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist
includes loans that meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $59.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 25%). Two loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Amelia Center Loan ($7.15 million -- 25.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a grocery-anchored retail center in Amelia,
Ohio. The loan transferred to special servicing in November 2014
for maturity default and became REO in April 2015. The grocery
anchor space was occupied by Kroger, who vacated at their lease
expiration in November 2014. As of March 2016, the property was 27%
leased, compared to 29% at Moody's prior review.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail
property in Casa Grande, Arizona. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$7.2 million loss for the specially serviced loans (79% expected
loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 75% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to
88% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 25% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 57.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 6th Avenue Place Loan ($8.67 million --
30.8% of the pool), which is secured by a flex office/warehouse
property located in the Denver suburb of Golden, Colorado. The
property is comprised of four, single story buildings and is able
to accommodate tenant's which require office, medical, technology,
R&D, showroom and other types of spaces. As of June 2016, the
property was 94% leased to 21 tenants. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 76% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.40X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Parkersburg Towne Center Loan ($4.46
million -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 102,000 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Parkersburg, West Virginia. The
property is located directly across the street from the regional
Grand Central Mall and neighbors Grand Central Plaza shopping
center. Moody's incorporated a lit/dark analysis to account for the
single tenant nature of the property. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 111% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.83X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens-Dallas Loan ($3.02 million
-- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a Walgreens Store
located in Dallas, Texas. The property is 100% triple net leased to
Walgreens through March 2079. The borrower was not able to payoff
by the anticipated repayment date (ARD) and the final maturity date
is in November 2034. Moody's incorporated a lit/dark analysis to
account for the single tenant nature of the property. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 101%
and 0.94X at the last review.



MADISON PARK XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Madison Park Funding XXII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $516,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2029, Assigned
   (P)Aaa (sf)
  $84,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2029, Assigned
   (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $66,350,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2029,
   Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  $40,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2029,
   Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $29,650,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2029,
   Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Madison Park XXII is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans (including participation interests
with respect to senior secured loans), and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and senior unsecured
loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $800,000,000
Diversity Score: 65
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.82%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3191)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of notes issued by Mercury
CDO 2004-1, Ltd. as follows:

   -- $34,676,304 Class A-1NV notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $11,560 Class A-1VA notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $38,156,652 Class A-1VB notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $25,000,000 Class A-2A notes at 'Csf';

   -- $31,050,000 Class A-2B notes at 'Csf';

   -- $38,880,000 Class B notes at 'Csf';

   -- $17,227,486 Class C notes at 'Csf'.

Fitch does not rate the preference shares.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The A-1NV, A-1VA, and A-1VB classes have been affirmed at 'CCCsf'.
The classes' current credit enhancement (CE) levels exceed the
losses projected at the 'CCCsf' rating stress under Fitch's
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) analysis, but
fall below the losses projected at the 'Bsf' rating stress.

The A-2A, A-2B, B, and C classes have been affirmed at 'Csf'. These
classes have credit enhancement (CE) levels that are exceeded by
the expected losses from the distressed collateral (rated 'CCsf'
and lower) of each portfolio. For these classes, the probability of
default was evaluated without factoring potential losses from the
performing assets. In the absence of mitigating factors, default
for these notes at or prior to maturity continues to appear
inevitable.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative migration, defaults beyond those projected, an extension
of the weighted average life for the underlying assets, and lower
than expected recoveries could lead to downgrades for classes
analysed under the SF PCM. Classes already rated 'Csf' have limited
sensitivity to further negative migration given their highly
distressed rating levels. However, there is potential for
non-deferrable classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they
experience any interest payment shortfalls. Continuing amortization
accompanied by better than expected cash flows from distressed
assets could lead to an upgrade.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The transaction
was not analysed through the cash flow model framework, as the
effect of structural features and excess spread available to
amortize the notes were determined to be minimal.

Mercury 2004-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed Nov. 3, 2004 and is managed by Dock Street Capital
Management, LLC. Mercury exited its substitution period in March
2007 and currently has a static portfolio composed of 84%
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and 16% CDOs.


MERRILL LYNCH 2007-CANADA: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. L Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-Canada
21 (the Certificates) issued by Merrill Lynch Financial Assets,
Inc., Series 2007-Canada 21:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class XC at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class G at BB (sf)

   -- Class H at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class J at B (high) (sf)

   -- Class K at B (sf)

   -- Class L at B (low) (sf)

DBRS does not rate the first loss piece, Class M.

The trends on all classes remain Stable, excluding Class K and
Class L, to which DBRS has assigned Negative trends because of
concerns surrounding the ability of certain borrowers to secure
refinancing capital for their respective loans as these loans near
maturity. Concerns include poor financial performance and loans
secured by properties in markets with limited liquidity. Two loans
are highlighted in further detail below.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. As of the September 2016 remittance, 28 of the
original 41 loans remain in the transaction, as there has been
collateral reduction of 41.6% since issuance due to successful loan
repayments and scheduled loan amortization. Of the remaining 28
loans, 27 loans, representing 96.2% of the current pool balance,
are scheduled to mature by January 2017. Based on the most recent
year-end reporting available, the weighted-average (WA) refinance
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and exit debt yield for these
loans are 1.67 times (x) and 12.8%, respectively. The transaction
benefits from defeasance collateral, as four loans, representing
6.7% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased. The largest
15 loans exhibited healthy performance, reporting a WA DSCR and
debt yield of 1.54x and 13.0%, respectively; however, one loan,
which is highlighted below, is secured by a property in Fort
McMurray, which has seen an overall market softening in recent
years.

The Hardin Street Building loan (Prospectus ID#12, representing
4.9% of the current pool balance) is secured by a four-storey,
82,549 square foot (sf) office building. While the region was
significantly affected by a wildfire in May 2016, the servicer
confirmed that the subject was not affected and continues to be in
full operation. According to the August 2016 rent roll, the
property was 100.0% occupied, increasing over the April 2016
occupancy of 89.8% as a result of two tenants signing short-term
leases for the vacant space. These leases expire in November 2016
and January 2017. The largest tenant at the property is the
Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo (RMWB), representing 74.3% of
the total net rentable area (NRA) on leases with multiple
expiration dates. Approximately 23.4% of the RMWB space expires in
2017 with an additional 47.9% of its space scheduled to expire in
2018. According to YE2015 financials, loan performance remains
strong as the reported DSCR of 3.02x remained in line with the
YE2013 DSCR of 3.08x. While financial performance appears stable at
present, DBRS is concerned about the long-term space needs of the
RMWB given the economic slowdown in the region. Additionally, the
loan matures in December 2016 and the lack of lender activity in
the region may result in difficulties for the borrower to secure
take-out financing. As a result, DBRS modelled this loan with an
increased probability of default.

As of the September 2016 remittance, there are ten loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 52.1% of the current pool
balance. The majority of the loans on the servicer's watchlist are
flagged due to upcoming maturity, including the largest loan in the
pool, representing 15.8% of the current pool balance. One of the
loans on the watchlist is highlighted below.

The 5055 Satellite Drive loan (Prospectus ID#5, representing 6.0%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a 151,745 sf flex
industrial/office building located in Mississauga, Ontario. The
property is a part of an industrial park just south of the Toronto
Pearson International Airport. This loan was originally placed on
the servicer's watchlist in August 2010 because of low occupancy.
According to the March 2016 rent roll, the property was 72.7%
occupied with tenants paying an average rental rate of $13.39 per
sf (psf). Occupancy has decreased significantly from March 2014
when the property was 96.0% occupied. The decrease was attributable
to the departure of Bell Mobility (18.9% of the NRA), which vacated
when its lease expired in August 2014. The largest tenant at the
property is ConAgra Foods Canada Inc., representing 28.4% of the
NRA, with a lease that expires in November 2023. According to the
Cushman & Wakefield Industrial Snapshot for Q2 2016, the overall
vacancy rate for the Mississauga submarket was 4.0% with an overall
WA net rent of $5.75 psf. At YE2015, the loan reported a DSCR of
1.06x, decreasing from the YE2014 DSCR of 1.54x. The decline in
performance year over year is directly attributable to lower rental
revenue and expense reimbursements as a result of lower occupancy.
While the loan may still be a good candidate for refinance given
that the current exit debt yield is 8.4%, the loan matures in
December 2016 and there has been little positive leasing momentum
since the departure of Bell Mobility.

DBRS maintains an investment-grade shadow rating on the Maxxam
Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#20, representing 3.2% of the current
pool balance). DBRS has confirmed that the performance of this loan
remains consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.

The ratings assigned to Classes C, F, G, H and J differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, and in this case, the
ratings reflect the uncertain loan-level event risk.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. H Debt to B3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
downgraded the rating on one class and affirmed the rating on one
class in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-TOP11 as:

  Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 21, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. H, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 21, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 21, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 21, 2016,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on classes G and H were upgraded based on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 73% since Moody's last review.

The rating on class J was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.  Class J has already
experienced a 35% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.2% of the
current balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.9% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 12 at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type.  Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Sept. 13, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to
$20.1 million from $1.19 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 74% of the pool.  Four loans, constituting 17% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Four loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized certificate loss of approximately
$21.9 million.  There are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 35%, compared to 33% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.85X and 5.56X,
respectively, compared to 1.75X and 4.91X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the All Size Storage Loan ($3.6 million
-- 17.9% of the pool), which is secured by a self-storage property
with approximately 665 storage units located in San Clemente,
California.  As of March 2016, the storage facility was 83% leased.
The loan is benefiting from amortization and matures in June 2018.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 35% and 2.94X, respectively,
compared 38% and 2.72X at the last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Golden Springs Business
Center Loan ($1.9 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by
an industrial property located in Santa Fe Springs, California. As
of June 2016, the property was 100% leased to 3 tenants, the same
as at prior review.  The loan is fully amortizing and matures in
July 2018.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 10% and >4.00X,
respectively, compared to 12% and 8.84X at the last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Foothilll Junction Shopping
Center Loan ($1.8 million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by
a retail property located in Roseville, California.  As of June
2016, the property was 78% leased, up from 77% in September 2015.
The collateral is shadow anchored by a Save Mart supermarket.  The
loan is fully amortizing and matures in May 2023.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 40% and 2.54X, respectively, compared to 42% and
2.43X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ11: S&P Cuts Rating on Class D Certs to Dsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' on
the class D commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ11, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrade reflects principal losses as detailed in the
September 2016 trustee remittance report.

The Sept. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report reported
$14.9 million in principal losses, which resulted primarily from
the liquidations of two specially serviced assets: Merritt Square
Mall and Pines of Wilmington.  According to the trustee remittance
report, Merritt Square Mall liquidated at a loss severity of 27.0%
of its original balance, and Pines of Wilmington liquidated at a
loss of 0.9% of its original balance.  Offsetting the losses are
recoveries of $0.6 million from the Capital Plaza loan, which was
liquidated in June 2016.  Consequently, class D experienced a 8.5%
loss of its $22.2 million original principal balance, and the
remaining losses were allocated to class E (not rated by S&P Global
Ratings).

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-IQ11

                                        Rating   Rating
Class              Identifier           To       From
D                  617453AY1            D (sf)   B- (sf)


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2006-A: Fitch Hikes Cl. B Notes Rating to Bsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on National
Collegiate Trust 2006-A:

   -- Class A-2 upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised to
      Positive from Stable;

   -- Class B upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCsf'; assigned Outlook
      Stable.

The upgrade on the senior and subordinate notes is due to improved
performance, revised default projection and higher loss coverage
multiples. Although Fitch's analysis indicated a higher rating for
class A-2 notes, Fitch decided to upgrade the notes only to 'AAsf'
due to lack of granular data and concerns for future performance
volatility.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by
approximately $56.2 million of private student loans of which
approximately 80.8% of the loans were originated by the Bank of
America under the GATE program and the remainder of the loans were
originated by CHELA Funding II, LLC. The projected remaining
defaults are expected to range between 8%-12% as a percentage of
current principal balance. A recovery rate of approximately 30% was
applied in the analysis commensurate with 'Asf' and lower rating
stress scenarios based on data provided by the issuer and included
credit to the guarantee provided by Bank of America on loans
originated pursuant to the GATE Program. A 0% recovery rate was
assumed in 'AAsf' or higher rating stress scenarios. Although a
portion of the CHELA portfolio is guaranteed by The Education
Resources Institute (TERI), no credit was given to the TERI
guaranty since TERI filed for bankruptcy on April 7, 2008.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement is provided by
overcollateralization and excess spread. The class A notes also
benefit from subordination from the class B notes. As of the August
2015 distribution senior and total parity is 207.2% and 104.2%
respectively. Cash may be released from the trust at the greater of
(i) 104% total parity, and (ii) the percentage equivalent of
(outstanding notes +$5,300,000)/ (outstanding notes), currently
109%. No cash is currently being released from the trust.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity support for the notes is
provided by a reserve account, which is currently at $1 million.

Acceptable Servicing Capabilities: The portfolio is serviced by
American Education Services (AES), Great Lakes Educational Loan
Services Inc., ACS Education Services (ACS), First Mark Services
LLC and Nelnet Servicing, LLC. Fitch believes all servicers are
acceptable servicers of private student loans.

Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds', dated June 18, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings
in analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Fitch doesn't believe
such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the bonds and may make certain
bond ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2016-3 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3 (the Trust):

   -- $241.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B1-IO at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B-2 at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B2-IO at A (high) (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)

   -- $4.5 million Class B-4 at BB (high) (sf)

   -- $3.9 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has assigned new ratings to the following Notes
issued by the Trust:

   -- $241.9 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)

   -- $256.8 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B-1A at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B-1B at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B-1C at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B1-IOA at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B1-IOB at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B1-IOC at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B-2A at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B-2B at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B-2C at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B2-IOA at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B2-IOB at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B2-IOC at A (high) (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, X, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B-2IOB, B-2IOC, B3-IOA, B3-IOB and B3-IOC
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B2-IOA,
B-2IOB, B-2IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B3-IOC and B are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of initial exchangeable notes as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 14.90% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The A
(high) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf) and B (high) (sf) ratings
reflect 10.15%, 7.30%, 5.80% and 4.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 2,719 loans with a total principal balance of
$301,770,767 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2016).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted average age of
157 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 91.5% of the pool is current,
6.9% is 30 days delinquent and 1.7% is in bankruptcy (all
bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 69.6% and 77.1% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent for the past 24 months and 12 months,
respectively, under both the Office of Thrift Supervision and
Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency methods. The portfolio
contains 23.4% modified loans. The modifications happened more than
two years ago for 57.4% of the modified loans. Because of the
seasoning of the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC (NRZ), will acquire the loans on or
prior to the Closing Date in connection with the termination of 86
securitization trusts that had acquired the mortgage loans from
various underlying sellers. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2016-3 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute loans to the
Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp., through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than the residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 63.9% of the pool is serviced by Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 32.2% by Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and
3.9% by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC. Nationstar will also act as
the Master Servicer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.


Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, but was limited with respect to payment
history, data integrity, title and servicing comments. Updated Home
Data Index and/or broker price opinions were provided for the pool;
however, a reconciliation was not performed on the majority of
updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the related report. Please see the related
appendix for additional information regarding sensitivity of
assumptions used in the rating process.

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: Moody's Rates Class B-4 Notes 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 35
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-3 ("NRMLT 2016-3"). The NRMLT 2016-3 transaction is a
securitization of $301.7 million of first lien, seasoned performing
and re-performing mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of
approximately 158 months, weighted average updated LTV ratio of
55.5% and weighted average updated FICO score of 694. Approximately
80.4% of the loans have been always current in the past 24 months.
Approximately 23.4% of the loans in the pool were previously
modified. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, will act as primary servicers and
Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act as master and successor servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

   Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3

   -- Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1C, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A1-IOA, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A1-IOB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A1-IOC, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B1-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1C, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B1-IOA, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B1-IOB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B1-IOC, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B2-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2B, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-2C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B2-IOA, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B2-IOB, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B2-IOC, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3A, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3B, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-3C, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B3-IOA, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B3-IOB, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B3-IOC, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's losses on the collateral pool average 3.50% in an expected
scenario and reach 18.40% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes. Moody's said, "We based our expected
losses on the pool on our estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances. The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and our assessment of
the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework for this
transaction."

"To estimate the losses on the pool, we used an approach similar to
our surveillance approach. Under this approach, we apply expected
annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment rates (CPRs), loss
severity rates and other variables to estimate future losses on the
pool. Our assumptions on these variables are based on the observed
rate of delinquency on seasoned modified and non-modified loans,
the collateral attributes of the pool including the percentage of
loans that were delinquent in the past 24 months, and the observed
performance of recent New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust issuances
rated by Moody's. For this pool, we used default burnout and
voluntary CPR assumptions similar to those detailed in our "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated before 2005.
We then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to losses
by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and loss
severity assumptions," Moody's said.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2016-3 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor V LLC, has previously purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts. The transaction
consists primarily of 30-year fixed rate loans. 76.8% of the loans
in this pool by balance have never been modified and have been
performing while approximately 23.2% of the loans were previously
modified but are now current and cash flowing. The weighted average
seasoning on the collateral is approximately 158 months.

Property values were updated using home data index (HDI) values or
broker price opinions (BPOs). HDIs were obtained for all but 185
properties contained within the securitization. In addition,
updated BPOs were obtained from a third party BPO provider for 753
properties.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties
("R&W")

A third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review on a sample of 828 loans proposed to be included in the
mortgage pool. The regulatory compliance review consisted of a
review of compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in
Lending Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement
Protection Act/Regulation X (RESPA), and federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations. The TPR identified 420 loans with
compliance exceptions, the majority of which were due to missing
HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charges, missing
right to cancel disclosures, or missing FACTA disclosures. Although
the diligence provider's report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages.

The third party due diligence provider also conducted reviews of
data integrity, pay history, and title/lien on selected samples to
confirm that certain information in the mortgage loan files matched
the information supplied by the servicers. Any issues identified
during the data integrity review were corrected on the data tape,
and the pay history analysis indicated there were no material pay
history issues on the data tape.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer, depositor or
custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage
loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding
the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the
mortgage loan documents, and such missing document, defect or
breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization
against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or
similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title
claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such
actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the related seller, indenture
trustee, depositor, master servicer, related servicer and
custodian. Upon notification of a missing or defective mortgage
loan file, the related seller will have 120 days from the date it
receives such notification to deliver the missing document or
otherwise cure the defect or breach. If it is unable to do so, the
related seller will be obligated to replace or repurchase the
mortgage loan.

"Despite this provision, we increased our loss severities to
account for loans with missing title policies (according to both
the title/lien review and a custodial file review),mortgage notes,
or mortgage/deed/security agreements. This adjustment was based on
both the results of the TPR review and because the R&W provider is
an unrated entity and weak from a credit perspective. In our
analysis we assumed that 2.3% of the projected defaults will have
missing documents' breaches that will not be remedied and result in
higher than expected loss severities," Moody's said.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash management functions
will be performed by Citibank, N.A. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers.

Ocwen has experienced significant losses over the past two years
due to regulatory issues and limited opportunities in its core
market. A further weakening of Ocwen's financial profile could
adversely impact its ability to service the loans serviced by it
adequately. However, having Nationstar Mortgage LLC as a master
servicer mitigates this risk due to the performance oversight that
it will provide. Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the named successor
servicer for the transaction and we assess Nationstar Mortgage
LLC's servicing quality assessment at SQ3+ as a master servicer of
residential mortgage loans.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met. To pass the first test, the
delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50% of
the subordinate bonds outstanding. To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 3.25% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 19.85%. These
provisions mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from our original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above our original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013.


NEWGATE FUNDING 2006-2: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Newgate Funding
PLC series 2006-2's class A3a, A3b, M, Ba, Bb, Da, Db, and E notes.
At the same time, S&P has raised to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'BB (sf)' its ratings on the class Ca and Cb notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using information from the July 2016 investor
report and July 2016 loan-level data.  S&P's analysis reflects the
application of its U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) criteria and its current counterparty criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the performance of the loans in the collateral
pool has improved since its Sept. 13, 2013 review.  Total
delinquencies have decreased to 27.0% from 32.9%, 90+ days
delinquencies to 18.1% from 24.7%, and repossessions to 0.15% from
0.66%.  Although the abovementioned decreases are in line with the
evolution observed in S&P's U.K. nonconforming RMBS index, Newgate
Funding's series 2006-2 pool has historically performed worse than
the other transactions in S&P's index.

Prepayments have remained stable since S&P's previous review.  As
of March 2016, the prepayment rate in this transaction was about
6.6%, which is lower than the 8.1% observed in our index.

The lower arrears levels and greater proportion of the loans in the
pools receiving seasoning credit benefitted S&P's WAFF
calculations.  S&P's WALS assumptions have decreased at all rating
levels.  The transaction has benefitted from the decrease in the
weighted-average current loan-to-value ratios.

Rating        WAFF     WALS
               (%)      (%)
AAA          41.73    37.28
AA           36.39    30.33
A            31.06    19.64
BBB          26.84    13.78
BB           22.51    10.01
B            20.49     7.22

Credit enhancement levels have increased for all rated classes of
notes since S&P's previous review.  The notes benefit from a
liquidity facility and reserve funds.  The facilities are not
amortizing as the respective cumulative loss triggers have been
breached.

The structure started amortizing pro rata in January 2016 because
all of the pro rata triggers are currently met.  S&P has considered
this in its cash flow analysis.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class Da, Db, and E notes is
commensurate with the currently assigned ratings.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'B- (sf)' ratings on these classes of
notes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class Ca and
Cb notes to be commensurate with higher ratings than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'BB (sf)' its ratings on the class Ca and Cb notes.

In S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, it considers the available
credit enhancement for the class A3a, A3b, M, Ba, and Bb notes to
be commensurate with higher ratings than those currently assigned.
However, the liquidity facility and bank account provider (Barclays
Bank PLC; A-/Negative/A-2) breached the 'A-1+' downgrade trigger
specified in the transaction documents, following S&P's lowering of
its long- and short-term ratings in November 2011. Because no
remedy actions were taken following S&P's November 2011 downgrade,
its current counterparty criteria cap the maximum potential rating
on the notes in this transaction to S&P's 'A-' long-term issuer
credit rating on Barclays Bank.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'A-
(sf)' ratings on the class A3a, A3b, M, Ba, and Bb notes.

Newgate Funding's series 2006-2 is a U.K. nonconforming RMBS
transaction with collateral comprising a pool of first-ranking
mortgages over freehold and leasehold owner-occupied properties.
Based on loan-level data provided for July 2016, the collateral
pool comprises 23.7% first-time buyer loans and 74.8%
self-certified loans.

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
          To              From

Newgate Funding PLC
EUR73.9 Million, GBP458.7 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes Series 2006-2

Ratings Affirmed

A3a       A- (sf)  
A3b       A- (sf)  
M         A- (sf)
Ba        A- (sf)
Bb        A- (sf)  
Da        B- (sf)
Db        B- (sf)
E         B- (sf)

Ratings Raised

Ca        BBB- (sf)       BB (sf)
Cb        BBB- (sf)       BB (sf)


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-R, A-T, B,
C, D, E, F, and G notes from NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2013-1
LLC, a middle-market U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in September 2013 and is managed by NewStar
Financial Inc.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Aug. 10, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
September 2016.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 3.73
years from 4.02 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the
tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the Feb. 12, 2014, effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $0.93 million from zero as of the effective date
report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to
$13.92 million (3.5% of the aggregate principal balance) from $3.94
million over the same period.

According to the August 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
increased since the February 2014 trustee report, which S&P used
for its March rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 148.70%, up from 146.50%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 130.98%, up from 129.40%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 122.46%, up from 121.20%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 114.19%, up from 113.20%.

All coverage tests are currently passing and are above the minimum

requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted and 'CCC' assets has been
largely offset by the decline in the weighted average life.
However, any significant deterioration in these metrics could
negatively affect the deal in the future, especially the junior
tranches.  As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B, C, D, E, and F notes, its rating actions considers the
increase in the defaults and decline in the portfolio's credit
quality.  In addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity
runs that considered the exposure to specific distressed industries
and allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio given that
the transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

The cash flow results also indicated a lower rating for the class G
notes; however S&P views the overall credit seasoning as an
improvement, and S&P also considered the improved O/C ratios, which
currently have significant cushion over their minimum requirements.
However, any increase in defaults and/or par losses could lead to
potential negative rating actions on the class G notes in the
future.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2013-1 LLC

Class    Rating
A-R      AAA (sf)
A-T      AAA (sf)
B        AA (sf)
C        A (sf)
D        BBB (sf)
E        BBB- (sf)
F        BB (sf)
G        B (sf)


PRESTIGE AUTO: DBRS Reviews 20 Ratings From 4 ABS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 20 ratings from four Prestige Auto Receivables
Trust U.S. structured finance asset-backed securities transactions.
Of the 20 outstanding publicly rated classes reviewed, 13 were
confirmed and seven were upgraded. For the ratings that were
confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their new
respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:
   
   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodology is the DBRS Master U.S. ABS Surveillance
Methodology, which can be found on our website under
Methodologies.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the
rating process. DBRS had access to the accounts and other relevant
internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities.

The complete press release is available free at:

                    https://is.gd/Qhgo2n


REALT 2006-3: Moody's Hikes Class G Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and upgraded the ratings on nine classes in Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust (REALT), Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-3 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015 Affirmed
      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015 Affirmed
      B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-2, J, K, and L were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes B through H were upgraded primarily
due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last review,
resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 30% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 88% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10% are scheduled to mature
within the next two months.

The ratings on the IO classes XC-1 and XC-2 were affirmed based on
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.0% of the
current balance, compared to 2.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 61% to $167 million
from $426 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 76% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 25% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. One loan,
constituting 4% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by
Canadian government securities.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 86% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of less than $1 million (for an average
loss severity of 27%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 64%, compared to
75% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.77X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.53X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Clearbrook Town Square Loan ($25.4 million -- 15% of the pool),
which is secured by a 189,000 square foot (SF) community shopping
center located in Abbotsford, British Columbia. The center was 95%
leased as of January 2016, compared to 94% leased as of January
2015. The center is anchored by Canada Safeway, which leases 29.5%
of the premises through October 2017. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.38X,
respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Suncor Building Loan ($15.6 million -- 9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 126,000 SF industrial property located in Fort
McMurray, Alberta. The property was 100% leased as of March 2016,
the same as at last review. The largest tenant, Suncor Energy, is
rated Baa1 (Senior Unsecured) -- stable outlook, and currently
leases 97% of the premises. Suncor Energy is a Canadian integrated
energy company based in Calgary, Alberta and they specialize in the
production of synthetic crude from oil sands. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.2X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Beedie Group - Langley Loan ($17.3 million --
10% of the pool), which is secured by a five building, 303,000 SF
industrial portfolio located in Langley, British Columbia. As of
March 2016, the property was 100% leased, the same as at last
review and securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 59%
and 1.46X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.34X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Park Lane Mall and Terraces Loan
($16.2 million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by a 278,000
SF office and retail center located in Halifax, Nova Scotia. As of
March 2016, the property was 85% leased, the same as at the last
review. The loan benefits from amortization and matures in April
2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.67X,
respectively, compared to 67% and 1.45X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Berwick on the Park Loan ($14.3
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 152-unit senior
living facility located in Kamloops, British Columbia. The facility
offers independent living, assisted living and licensed residential
care. The property is 95% occupied as of November 2015, as compared
to 86% occupied in 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and
1.1X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.89X at the last review.


REALT 2014-1: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-1 issued by Real
Estate Asset Liquidity Trust (REALT), Series 2014-1:

   -- Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (sf)

   -- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance in October 2014. The collateral
consists of 34 fixed-rate loans secured by 46 commercial
properties. As of the September 2016 remittance, the pool has
experienced a collateral reduction of 4.1% since issuance as a
result of scheduled loan amortization.

The transaction benefits from a strong concentration of properties
located in the province of Ontario (54% of the current pool
balance) and a healthy concentration of properties located in urban
and suburban markets (77% of the current pool balance). There are
only two loans (representing 9.9% of the pool balance) located in
Alberta. In addition, there are 32 loans, representing 91.2% of the
current pool balance, that have partial or full recourse to their
respective sponsors. Three of the top ten loans, representing 13.8%
of the current pool balance, have full or partial recourse to
entities considered to be strong sponsors. As of the September 2016
remittance, there are no loans in special servicing and three
loans, representing 6.7% of the pool, on the servicer's watchlist.
The largest loan on the watchlist, Prospectus ID#12, Newmarket
Plaza (3.53% of the pool), is on the watchlist for a low debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR), but DBRS believes that figure is
likely significantly depressed due to the borrower's omission of
reimbursements in the YE2015 reporting.

The pool reported a weighted-average DSCR of 1.50 times (x) as of
the most recent reporting on file for the loans as of September
2016, with a weighted-average debt yield of 9.8%. Although the
average DSCR is down from 1.60x, that drop is largely a factor of
the performance decline of one top ten loan and an artificially
depressed DSCR for Prospectus ID #12, with most loans performing in
line or slightly above the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. One of
the top ten loans and one of the watchlisted loans are discussed in
detail below.

The Sheraton Cavalier Hotel Calgary loan (Prospectus ID#5, 5.7% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a 306-key, full-service
hotel located in Calgary, Alberta. The property is situated just
outside of the Calgary International Airport and caters mainly to
corporate clientele. The hotel has operated with the Sheraton brand
since inception in 1983 and the franchise expires beyond the loan
term in July 2033. The property has experienced incremental cash
flow declines since issuance, reflective of the weaker oil price
environment in the provincial energy sector. As of YE2015, the loan
had a DSCR of 3.60x compared to 4.28x at YE2014 and the DBRS UW
DSCR of 4.62x. At issuance, the subject reported an occupancy rate
of 73.75%, average daily rate (ADR) of $163.44 and revenue per
available room (RevPAR) of $120.54. The effects of the current
economic environment in Alberta are reflected in the June 2016
trailing 12-month (T-12) Smith Travel Accommodation Report (STR) as
the subject reported occupancy at 65%, ADR of $159.34 and RevPAR of
$103.58. The softer market has impacted the competitive set, as
well, with the average occupancy at 68% and RevPAR at $89.00. The
soft market conditions will likely continue as new supply was
recently added in the Calgary Airport Marriot In-Terminal Hotel, a
318-key hotel that opened in September 2016. At issuance, DBRS
shadow rated the loan AAA, reflective of the strong credit metrics,
recent investment in property upgrades and strong operating
history. Although the property performance has declined, with the
issuance AAA shadow rating no longer supported, the performance is
still within the DBRS standards for an investment-grade shadow
rating.

The Four Points Sheraton Kamloops loan (2.62% of the current pool
balance) is the second-largest loan on the watchlist and is secured
by a 78-key, full-service hotel constructed in 1998 in Kamloops,
British Columbia, approximately 20 kilometres (km) from the
Kamloops Airport. This loan was added to the servicer's watchlist
for a low YE2015 DSCR of 1.03x. Comparatively, the DBRS UW DSCR was
1.58x. The low YE2015 DSCR was due to a decrease in occupancy and
room revenue driven by increased competition with the addition of
The Fairfield Inn by Marriott approximately one km west of the
subject in June 2015. According to the T-12 ending July 2016 STR
report, performance continues to lag the issuance levels as the
subject had an occupancy rate of 66.8%, ADR of $117.20 and RevPAR
of $78.25. The figures reported by the borrower at issuance
indicate YE2013 occupancy was 81.6%, with ADR and RevPAR at $125.30
and $102.29, respectively. Although occupancy has declined, the
subject still outperforms its competitive set that reports an
occupancy rate of 53.6%, ADR at $119.91 and RevPAR of $64.23. News
reports found online by DBRS indicate that tourist traffic in
Kamloops has increased in 2016, driven by the favourable exchange
rate for travellers from the United States and lower gas prices
that have drawn travellers from Alberta; however, it remains to be
seen if these factors will contribute to a significant improvement
in property cash flows. To account for the increased risk with the
cash flow decline, this loan was modelled with an increased
probability of default. DBRS will continue to monitor closely for
developments.


REALT 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust's (REAL-T) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-2.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 47 loans secured by 72 commercial
properties located in Canada having an aggregate principal balance
of approximately $421.5 million as of the cutoff date. The loans
were originated or acquired by Royal Bank of Canada, MCAP Financial
Corporation, Macquarie US Trading LLC, and Trez Commercial Finance
Limited Partnership.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 86% of the properties, by
balance, cash flow analysis on 100%, and asset summary reviews on
100% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.13x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 105.1%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 8.7%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 4.4% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.13x and 105.1%,
respectively, are slightly better than the REAL-T 2016-1 metrics of
1.12x and 110%, but slightly worse than the 2015 through 2016 YTD
Canadian transaction average DSCR and LTV of 1.16x and 105.1%.

Less Concentrated Pool: The pool's loan concentration index (LCI)
score of 329 and the top 10 concentration of 44.2% (including
crossed loans) represent better diversity than recent Canadian
transactions; the 2015 through 2016 YTD Canadian transaction
average LCI was 374 and top 10 concentration was 53.5%. The pool's
sponsor concentration index (SCI) score of 679 represents
significant sponsor concentration. The largest sponsor is the
Skyline Group of Companies, which is the sponsor of eight loans
representing 18% of the pool.

Canadian Loan Attributes and Historical Performance: The ratings
reflect strong historical Canadian commercial real estate loan
performance, including a low delinquency rate and low historical
losses of less than 0.1%, as well as positive loan attributes, such
as short amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower, and
additional guarantors.

Retirement and Hospitality Concentration: The pool has higher
concentration of retirement and hotel property types (21.6%), which
generally tend to exhibit more cash flow volatility over time and,
therefore, have higher default probabilities in Fitch's
multiborrower model. The 2015 through 2016 YTD Canadian average
concentration of these property types was 13%.

Strong Collateral Quality: The collateral quality of the portfolio
is better than typical Canadian transactions, with six properties
(21.4% of the pool) receiving grades of 'A-' or better, including
the #1 loan, Villagia Retirement Homes (7.1%), and the #9 loan, The
Opus Hotel (3.3%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 13.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to REAL-T
2016-2 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in which NCF
declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the senior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could
result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Deloitte LLP. The third-party due diligence described
in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of certain
characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans. Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and it did not have an
impact on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.

Fitch has assigned the following ratings and Rating Outlooks:

   -- $141,625,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $219,791,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,537,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13,171,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $13,171,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5,269,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,741,000 class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,742,000 class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

All currencies are in Canadian dollars (CAD).

Fitch does not rate the $421,477,036 (notional balance)
interest-only class X or the non-offered $8,430,036 class H
certificates.


SDART 2016-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-3
(SDART 2016-3). This is the third SDART auto loan transaction of
the year for Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC; unrated). The notes
will be backed by a pool of retail automobile loan contracts
primarily originated by SC, who is also the servicer and
administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-3

   -- Class A-1 Notes, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

   -- Class A-2-A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Class A-2-B Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

   -- Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

   -- Class E Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of SC as the servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2016-3 pool
is 17.0% and the Aaa level is 49.0%. The Aaa level is the level of
credit enhancement consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating. Moody's based
its cumulative net loss expectation and Aaa level on an analysis of
the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the historical
performance of similar collateral, including securitization
performance and managed portfolio performance; the ability of SC to
perform the servicing functions; and current expectations for the
macroeconomic environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes, Class
D notes, and Class E notes benefit from 49.70%, 37.45%, 24.25%,
17.00% and 12.00% of hard credit enhancement, respectively. Hard
credit enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, a non-declining reserve account, and
subordination, except for the Class E notes, which do not benefit
from subordination. The notes will also benefit from excess
spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such as the one in
this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes.
Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note principal
payments will accelerate this build of enhancement. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a lower
number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud. Additionally, Moody's
could downgrade the Class A-1 short-term rating following a
significant slowdown in principal collections that could result
from, among other things, high delinquencies or a servicer
disruption that impacts obligor's payments.


TCI-SYMPHONY 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by TCI-Symphony CLO 2016-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$57,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$3,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$6,250,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Assigned A2
      (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned A2
      (sf)

   -- US$28,750,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class D Notes and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

TCI-Symphony is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 48% ramped as of the closing
date.

TCI Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") and Symphony Asset
Management LLC (the "Sub-Advisor"), as sub-advisor to the Manager,
will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the
assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager and the Sub-Advisor
may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales
of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $500,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2903

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's and the
Sub-Advisor's investment decisions and management of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2903 to 3338)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

    -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2903 to 3774)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -3
  
   -- Class C-1 Notes: -4

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


THL CREDIT 2012-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to THL Credit
Wind River 2012-1 CLO Ltd.'s $514.33 million replacement notes.
This is a proposed refinancing of its December 2012 transaction.
The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Oct. 17, 2016, refinancing date, proceeds from the issuance
of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the original notes,
upon which S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on the original
notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes. However, if
the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the ratings on the
original notes and withdraw its preliminary ratings on the
replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

   -- The replacement class D-R notes are expected to be issued at

      a lower spread than the original notes.  The replacement
      class A-R and E-R notes are expected to be issued at a
      higher spread than the original notes.

   -- The replacement class B-R and C-R notes are expected to
      replace the current pari-passu class B-1 and B-2 notes and
      pari passu class C-1 and C-2 notes, respectively.  All
      replacement notes will have a floating spread over LIBOR.

   -- The existing combination notes will be removed.

   -- The stated maturity, reinvestment period, and weighted
      average life test date will all be extended approximately
      two years.  The overcollateralization levels and
      subordinated management fee will be amended.  The
      transaction will incorporate the formula version of Standard

      & Poor's CDO Monitor tool.

   -- The transaction will incorporate the recovery rate
      methodology and updated industry classifications as outlined

      in S&P's August 2016 CLO criteria update.

Replacement and issuances

Class                Amount    Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)        
A-R                  316.30    3ML plus 1.45
B-R                   60.20    3ML plus 1.85
C-R                   30.10    3ML plus 2.65
D-R                   30.10    3ML plus 4.10
E-R                   24.50    3ML plus 7.38
Subordinated notes    53.13   

Original notes

Class                Amount    Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)        
A                     303.0    3ML plus 1.40
B-1                    56.0    3ML plus 2.10
B-2                    10.0    3.31
C-1                    34.5    3ML plus 3.05
C-2                     5.0    4.31
D                      26.0    3ML plus 5.00
E                      26.0    3ML plus 5.25
Combination notes      13.0    Pass through of interest
                               received on each component
Subordinated notes    53.10    N/A

3ML--Three-month LIBOR.
N/A--Not applicable.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

THL Credit Wind River 2012-1 CLO Ltd./THL Credit Wind River 2012-1
CLO LLC
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-R                  AAA (sf)      316.30
B-R                  AA (sf)        60.20
C-R                  A (sf)         30.10
D-R                  BBB (sf)       30.10
E-R                  BB (sf)        24.50
Subordinated notes   NR             53.13

NR--Not rated.


THL CREDIT 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by THL Credit Wind River 2016-2 CLO
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $57,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

  $30,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A1(sf)

  $32,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                      RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

THL 2016-2 CLO is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 60%
ramped as of the closing date.

THL Credit Advisors LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2650
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.0%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.5%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2650 to 3048)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2650 to 3445)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -3
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


TOWD POINT 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Prov. B2 Rating on Cl. B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust ("TPMT")
2016-4.

The certificates are backed by one pool of seasoned, performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans.  The collateral pool is
comprised of 3,383 first lien, fixed-rate and adjustable rate
mortgage loans, and has a non-zero updated weighted average FICO
score of 672 and a weighted average current LTV of 91.5%.
Approximately 71.1% of the loans in the collateral pool have been
previously modified.  Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and Wells
Fargo Bank, NA ("WFB"), are the servicers for the loans in the
pool.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4
  Cl. A1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A2, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B2, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses on TPMT 2016-4's collateral pool average
14.00% in our base case scenario.  Moody's loss estimates take into
account the historical performance of Prime, Alt-A and Subprime
loans that have similar collateral characteristics as the loans in
the pool, and also incorporate an expectation of a continued strong
credit environment for RMBS, with improving home prices over the
next two to three years.

Collateral Description

TPMT 2016-4's collateral pool is primarily comprised of seasoned,
re-performing mortgage loans.  Approximately 71.1% of the loans in
the collateral pool have been previously modified.  The majority of
the loans underlying this transaction exhibit collateral
characteristics similar to that of seasoned Alt-A mortgages.

Moody's based its expected losses on a pool of re-performing
mortgage loans on our estimates of 1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and 2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances.  The two factors that most strongly
influence a re-performing mortgage loan's likelihood of re-default
are the length of time that the loan has performed since
modification, and the amount of the reduction in monthly mortgage
payments as a result of modification.  The longer a borrower has
been current on a re-performing loan, the less likely they are to
re-default.  Approximately 60.3% of the borrowers of the loans in
the collateral pool have been current on their payments for the
past 24 months at least.

Moody's estimated expected losses using two approaches -- (1)
pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level analysis.  In
the pool-level approach, Moody's estimates losses on the pool by
applying our assumptions on expected future delinquencies, default
rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed from our
surveillance of similar collateral.  Moody's projected future
annual delinquencies for eight years by applying annual default
rates and delinquency burnout factors.  The delinquency burnout
factors reflect our future expectations of the economy and the U.S.
housing market.  Moody's analysis indicates that weighted by pre
and post 2005 vintage of the pool, approximately 11% of Alt-A loans
that have re-performed for 24 months since modification will
re-default within the next year.  As such, Moody's applied an
expected annual delinquency rate of 11% to calculate the
delinquencies on the collateral pool for year one.  Moody's then
calculated future delinquencies using default burnout and voluntary
conditional prepayment rate (CPR) assumptions.  Moody's aggregated
the delinquencies and converted them to losses by applying
pool-specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity
assumptions.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on TPMT 2016-4's
collateral pool.  Moody's applied loan-level baseline lifetime
propensity to default assumptions, and considered the historical
performance of seasoned Prime, Alt-A and Subprime loans with
similar collateral characteristics and payment histories.  Moody's
then adjusted this base default propensity up for (1)
adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans that have the risk of coupon
step-ups and (3) loans with high updated loan to value ratios
(LTVs).  Moody's applied a higher baseline lifetime default
propensity for interest-only loans, using the same adjustments.  To
calculate the final expected loss for the pool, Moody's applied a
loan-level loss severity assumption based on the loans' updated
estimated LTVs.  Moody's further adjusted the loss severity
assumption upwards for loans in states that give super-priority
status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to account for
potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage.

For loans with deferred balances, we assumed that 50% all modified
loans' deferred principal balance will be forgiven and not
recovered.  The final expected loss for the collateral pool
reflects the due diligence findings of three independent third
party review (TPR) firms as well as our assessment of TPMT 2016-4's
representations & warranties (R&Ws) framework.

Transaction Structure

TPMT 2016-4 has a sequential priority of payments structure, in
which a given class of notes can only receive principal payments
when all the classes of notes above it have been paid off.
Similarly, losses will be applied in the reverse order of priority.
The Class A1, A2, M1 and M2 notes carry a fixed-rate coupon
subject to the collateral adjusted net WAC and applicable available
funds cap.  The Class B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 are Variable Rate Notes
where the coupon is equal to the lesser of adjusted net WAC and
applicable available funds cap.  There are no performance triggers
in this transaction.  Additionally, the servicers will not advance
any principal or interest on delinquent loans.

With the exception of TPMT 2016-3 and 2015-1, in other previously
issued TPMT transactions, the monthly excess cash flow can leak out
after paying any net WAC shortfalls and previously unpaid expenses.
However, the monthly excess cash flow in this transaction, after
payment of such expenses, if any, will be fully captured to pay the
principal balance of the bonds sequentially, allowing for a faster
paydown of the bonds.

Moody's modeled TPMT 2016-4's cashflows using SFW, a cashflow tool
developed by Moody's Analytics.  To assess the final rating on the
notes, we ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios through
SFW.  The scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss timing
curves, and four prepayment curves.  The structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review

Three independent third party review (TPR) firms conducted due
diligence on 100% of the loans in TPMT 2016-4's collateral pool.
The three TPR firms -- JCIII & Associates, Inc. (subsequently
acquired by American Mortgage Consultants), Clayton Holdings LLC.,
and American Mortgage Consultants -- reviewed compliance, data
integrity and key documents, to verify that loans were originated
in accordance with federal, state and local anti-predatory laws.
The TPR firms also conducted audits of designated data fields to
ensure the accuracy of the collateral tape.

Based on Moody's analysis of the third-party review reports, it
determined that a portion of the loans had legal or compliance
exceptions that could cause future losses to the trust.  Moody's
incorporated an additional hit to the loss severities for these
loans to account for this risk.  FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, the asset
manager for the transaction, retained WestCor and American Mortgage
Consultants to review the title and tax reports for the loans in
the pool, and will oversee WestCor and monitor the loan sellers in
the completion of the assignment of mortgage chains. 100% of the
loans are in first lien position.  In addition, FirstKey expects a
significant number of the assignment and endorsement exceptions to
be cleared within the first three months following the closing date
of the transaction.  The representation provider has deposited
collateral of $1.0 million in the Assignment Reserve Account to
ensure that the asset manager completes the clearing of these
exceptions.

Representations & Warranties

Moody's ratings also factor in TPMT 2016-4's weak representations
and warranties (R&Ws) framework.  The representation provider,
FirstKey Mortgage, LLC and the responsible party, Cerberus Global
Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund, L.P., are unrated by
Moody's.  Moreover, FirstKey's obligations will be in effect for
only thirteen months (until October 2017).  The R&Ws themselves are
weak because they contain many knowledge qualifiers and the
regulatory compliance R&W does not cover monetary damages that
arise from TILA violations whose right of rescission has expired.
While the transaction provides for a Breach Reserve Account to
cover for any breaches of R&Ws, the size of the account is small
relative to TPMT 2016-4's aggregate collateral pool ($649.2
million).  An initial deposit of $1.2 million will be remitted to
the Breach Reserve Account on the closing date, with an initial
Breach Reserve Account target amount of $2.3 million.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from a strong servicing arrangement.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. will service 95% and Wells Fargo
will service 5% of TPMT 2016-4's collateral pool.  Moody's assess
SPS (SQ2) and Wells Fargo (SQ2) higher compared to their peers.
Furthermore, FirstKey Mortgage, LLC, the asset manager, will
oversee the servicers, which strengthens the overall servicing
framework in the transaction.  Wells Fargo Bank National
Association and U.S. Bank National Association are the Custodians
of the transaction.  The Delaware Trustee for TPMT 2016-4 is
Wilmington Trust, National Association. TPMT 2016-4's Indenture
Trustee is U.S. Bank National Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting
or deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


TRINITAS CLO V: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Trinitas CLO V
Ltd./Trinitas CLO V LLC's $370.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Trinitas CLO V Ltd./Trinitas CLO V LLC

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                  2.00
A                       AAA (sf)                256.00
B-1                     AA (sf)                  42.00
B-2                     AA (sf)                   6.00
C                       A (sf)                   24.00
D                       BBB (sf)                 22.00
E                       BB (sf)                  18.00
Subordination notes     NR                       39.00

NR--Not rated.


UNITED AUTO 2016-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of
subordinated notes from United Auto Credit Securitization Trust
(UACST) 2014-1 and 2015-1 and affirmed its ratings on five classes
from UACST 2016-1.  The transactions are backed by subprime retail
auto loans originated and serviced by United Auto Credit Corp.
(UACC).

The rating actions reflect collateral performance to date and S&P's
expectations regarding future collateral performance, as well as
each transaction's structure and credit enhancement. Additionally,
S&P incorporated secondary credit factors, including credit
stability, payment priorities under various scenarios, and sector-
and issuer-specific analysis.  Considering these factors, S&P
believes the notes' creditworthiness is consistent with the raised
and affirmed ratings.

For UACST 2014-1, S&P raised its loss expectation to 20.50%-21.50%
from its January 2016 revised loss expectation of 20.00%-21.00%.
S&P's initial loss expectation for this transaction was
16.75%-17.25%.

For UACST 2015-1, S&P also raised its loss expectation to
21.50%-22.50% from its initial expectation of 18.50%-19.00%.
Although losses are trending higher for this transaction, each
class' credit support has increased as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance since the transaction closed.  In S&P's
opinion, the total credit support, as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance, compared with S&P's revised loss
expectation, is adequate for the raised ratings.

For UACST 2016-1, S&P maintained its initial loss expectation
ending further collateral performance, given this transaction's
short performance history.  However, since UACST 2016-1 closed, the
credit support for each class has increased as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance and in S&P's view, is adequate to support
the affirmed ratings.

Table 1
Collateral Performance
As of the Sept. 15, 2016, distribution date

                      Pool      Current            60+ day
Series       Mo.    factor          CNL      delinquencies
2014-1        26    17.57%       19.89%              4.74%
2015-1        18    35.69%       16.69%              4.32%
2016-1         8    70.08%        4.23%              3.47%

CNL--Cumulative net loss.
Mo.--Month.

Table 2
CNL Expectations (%)

         Initial/former              Revised
               lifetime             lifetime
Series         CNL exp.           CNL exp.(i)
2014-1      20.00-21.00          20.50-21.50
2015-1      18.50-19.00          21.50-22.50
2015-1      20.00-21.00                  N/A

(i)As of Sept. 8, 2016.
CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.  
N/A--Not applicable.

Each transaction has a sequential principal payment structure and
was structured with credit enhancement consisting of
overcollateralization and a nonamortizing reserve account.  The
more senior tranches also benefit from subordination.

The credit enhancement for UACST 2014-1 and 2016-1 is at its
specified overcollateralization and reserve target.  Both
transactions' reserve account is at 2.00% of the initial collateral
balance, which currently equals 11.38% and 2.85% of the current
receivables balance for UACST 2014-1 and UACST 2016-1,
respectively.  The overcollateralization for UACST 2014-1 is at its
target level of 12.50% of the current collateral balance, and the
overcollateralization for UACST 2016-1 is at its target level of
16.90% of the initial collateral balance.

For UACST 2015-1, while the reserve is at its target (2.00% of the
initial collateral balance, which currently equals 5.60% of the
current receivables balance), the overcollateralization at 14.73%
of the current receivables balance is slightly below its target
level of 15.00%.

Table 3
Hard Credit Support
As of the September 2016 distribution date

                          Total hard        Current total hard
                       credit support           credit support
Series     Class   at issuance (%)(i)        (% of current)(i)

2014-1     D                    18.17                    81.74
2014-1     E                     8.00                    23.88

2015-1     C                    32.00                    80.57
2015-1     D                    19.00                    44.14
2015-1     E                    10.50                    20.33

2016-1     A                    61.80                    89.24
2016-1     B                    48.40                    70.12
2016-1     C                    35.10                    51.14
2016-1     D                    21.70                    32.03
2016-1     E                    13.10                    19.75

(i)Calculated as a percentage of the total receivable pool balance,
consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization, and, if
applicable, subordination.

S&P incorporated a cash flow analysis to assess the loss coverage
level, giving credit to excess spread.  S&P's various cash flow
scenarios included forward-looking assumptions on recoveries,
timing of losses, and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that S&P
believes is appropriate given each transaction's performance to
date.  Aside from S&P's break-even cash flow analysis, it also
conducted sensitivity analyses for these series to determine the
impact that a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have on S&P's
ratings if losses begin trending higher than S&P's revised
base-case loss expectations.  For UACST 2015-1, given that the
overcollateralization is currently below its target level and
losses are trending higher than S&P's initial expectations, it also
ran an additional sensitivity analysis.

In S&P's view, the results demonstrated that all of the classes
have adequate credit enhancement for the current ratings.  S&P will
continue to monitor the performance of the transactions to ensure
that the credit enhancement remains sufficient, in S&P's view, to
cover its cumulative net loss expectations under its stress
scenarios for each of the rated classes.

RATINGS RAISED
United Auto Credit Securitization Trust

                          Rating
Series      Class    To             From
2014-1      D        AAA (sf)       BBB (sf)
2014-1      E        AA- (sf)       BB (sf)

2015-1      C        AAA (sf)       A (sf)
2015-1      D        AA- (sf)       BBB (sf)
2015-1      E        BBB-(sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
United Auto Credit Securitization Trust

Series      Class         Rating
2016-1      A             AAA (sf)
2016-1      B             AA (sf)
2016-1      C             A (sf)
2016-1      D             BBB (sf)
2016-1      E             BB (sf)


VOYA CLO 2012-4: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R,
C-R, and D-R notes from Voya CLO 2012-4 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Voya Alternative Asset
Management LLC.  S&P withdrew its ratings on the original class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes after they were fully redeemed.

On the Sept. 22, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuances were used to redeem the original notes
as outlined in the transaction documents.  Therefore, S&P is
withdrawing the ratings on the original notes in line with their
full redemption and assigning final ratings to the replacement
notes.  The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Voya CLO 2012-4 Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating
A-1-R                AAA (sf)
A-2-R                AA (sf)
B-R                  A (sf)
C-R                  BBB (sf)
D-R                  BB (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN
Voya CLO 2012-4 Ltd.

                           Rating
Original class       To              From
A-1                  NR              AAA (sf)
A-2                  NR              AA+ (sf)
B                    NR              A+ (sf)
C                    NR              BBB+ (sf)
D                    NR              BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C24: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-J and B
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C24, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its rating on class C certificates from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans in the pool,
the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-J and B to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral and available liquidity
support.

The affirmation on the class C certificates reflects the class'
interest shortfall history as well as S&P's view of the class'
susceptibility to future interest shortfalls.  The affirmations
also reflect our views regarding the current and future performance
of the transaction's collateral, the transaction's structure, and
liquidity support available to the class.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes A-J and B and positive rating movement
on class C, S&P's analysis considered the susceptibility of the
classes to reduced liquidity support from the three specially
serviced assets ($22.8 million, 28.1%) and the potential maturity
default risk of the Bank of America - Pasadena CA loan ($49.2
million, 60.5%), which has passed its anticipated repayment date in
September 2015 and currently has a final maturity date of December
2019.  The loan is secured by a 345,945 sq.-ft. office property
located in Pasadena, Calif. that is leased 100% to Bank of America
until October 2019.  The loan has a reported debt service coverage
(DSC) of 0.85x as of year-end 2015.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Sept. 16, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $81.0 million, which is 4.0% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes seven loans, down from
119 loans at issuance.  Three of these loans are with the special
servicer, and four ($58.4 million, 71.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for all the loans in the pool, of
which 68.2% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was year-end
2014 data.

Excluding the three specially serviced loans, S&P calculated a
0.31x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and a 128.8% S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value ratio using a 7.80%
S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate for the
remaining loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $187.8 million in
principal losses, or 9.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.6% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the three specially serviced loans.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Sept. 16, 2016, trustee remittance report, three loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of the loans are:

   -- The Oxford Marketplace loan ($10.2 million, 12.5%) is the
      second-largest loan in the pool and has a total reported
      exposure of $10.3 million.  The loan is secured by a 90,328
      sq.-ft. retail center in Oxford, Miss.  The loan, which has
      a reported nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was

      transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 19, 2016, due to

      maturity default.  This was because the borrower was unable
      to pay off the loan by the Feb. 11, 2016, maturity date.  
      LNR stated that the lender has engaged counsel and is
      proceeding with enforcement of remedies.  The reported
      occupancy as of October 2015 was 94.5%.  S&P expects a
      minimal loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The Union Square loan ($6.3 million, 7.8%) is the third-
      largest loan in the pool and has a total reported exposure
      of $6.8 million.  The loan is secured by a 74,753 sq.-ft.
      retail property located in Monroe, N.C.  The loan, which has

      a reported nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was

      transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 20, 2016, due to

      maturity default.  This was because the borrower was unable
      to pay off the loan by the maturity date of Feb. 11, 2016.
      LNR stated that the lender has engaged counsel and is
      proceeding with enforcement of remedies.  The reported DSC
      and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2015, were 1.14x and 71.3%,
      respectively.  An appraisal reduction amount of $2.4 million

      is in effect against this loan.

   -- S&P expects a moderate loss upon this loan's eventual
      resolution.

   -- The 131 Danbury loan ($6.3 million, 7.8%) is the fourth-
      largest loan in the pool has a total reported exposure of
      $6.7 million.  The loan is secured by a 52,641 sq.-ft.
      office building located in Wilton, Conn.  The loan was
      transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 12, 2016, due to

      maturity default.  This was because the borrower was unable
      to pay off the loan by the maturity date of Feb. 11, 2016.
      The reported DSC and occupancy as of March 31, 2016, were
      0.72x and 96.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss
      upon this loan's eventual resolution.

With respect to the specially serviced loans noted above, a minimal
loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C24
                                 Rating
Class             Identifier     To                   From
A-J               92976BFU1      BBB- (sf)            B+ (sf)
B                 92976BFV9      BB+ (sf)             B (sf)
C                 92976BFW7      CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C26: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-M Debt Rating to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes and downgraded the ratings on five classes in Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C26 as:

  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 15, 2015,
    Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes A-1A, A-3 and A-3FL were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.  The ratings on eight P&I classes, Classes D
through L, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on four P&I classes were downgraded due to higher
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced as well as
interest shortfall concerns.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.9% of the
current balance, compared to 17.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 99.5% of the pool is in
special servicing.  In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs.  Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior classes.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure and property type.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Sept. 16, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 71% to $517 million
from $1.73 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 23 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 75% of
the pool.  One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, is
defeased and is secured by US government securities.  The remaining
22 mortgage loans are in special servicing.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $39 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%).  Twenty-two loans, constituting 99.5% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Eastern Shore Centre ($67.4 million -- 13.2%
of the pool), which is secured by a lifestyle center in Spanish
Fort, Alabama, which is part of the Mobile metropolitan area.
Anchors include Dillard's and Belk, though Dillard's is not part of
the loan collateral.  Other large retailers include Bed Bath and
Beyond, Barnes & Noble.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in August 2014 due to payment default and became REO in June 2015.
As of July 2016, the property was 81% leased, compared to 80% as of
July 2015.  The special servicer indicated they intend to lease up
the property and stabilize performance.  As of the most recent
remittance report, the servicer has recognized a $37 million
appraisal reduction on this loan.

The remaining 21 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Eleven of the special serviced assets,
representing 48% of the pool, are currently REO.  Moody's estimates
an aggregate $219 million loss for the specially serviced loans
(43% expected loss on average).

As of the Sept. 16, 2016, remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $36 million and have hit up to Class AJ.  Moody's
anticipates interest shortfalls will continue because of the
exposure to specially serviced loans, non-recoverable loans and
modified loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.


WELLS FARGO 2014-TISH: S&P Affirms BB Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on eight classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-TISH, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and the
current and future performance of the lodging collateral securing
the two loans that are not cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted
in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

The affirmations on the pooled certificates also reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings and S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral.

The affirmations on the class WTS-1 and WTS-2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's re-evaluation of the Westin New York at Times Square
loan.  These certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a
subordinate nonpooled component of the loan.

The affirmations on the class SCH-1 and SCH2 raked certificates
reflect S&P's re-evaluation of the Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers
loan.  These certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a
subordinate nonpooled component of the loan.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-2 interest-only (IO)
certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on
class X-2 references classes A, B, and C.

The analysis of large-loan transactions is predominantly a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, S&P's property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the two lodging properties that secure the two mortgage loans in
the trust.  S&P's analysis also considered the volatile collateral
performance, specifically the significant declines in revenue per
available room (RevPAR) and net cash flow (NCF) during the economic
downturn in 2009, as well as the slight declines since issuance in
reported RevPAR and NCF for both properties as of the year-ended
Dec. 31, 2015, and trailing 12 months ended
June 30, 2016.

According to the Sept. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of two floating-rate IO loans that are not
cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted with a $381.0 million
aggregate trust balance that is divided into a $272.6 million
aggregate pooled trust component and a $108.4 million aggregate
nonpooled trust component.  According to the transaction documents,
the borrowers will pay the special servicing, work-out, and
liquidation fees, as well as costs and expenses incurred from
appraisals and inspections conducted by the special servicer.  To
date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

We based our analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NCF for the trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2016, and
years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, and 2013 that the master servicer
provided to determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for
the lodging properties.

The Westin New York at Times Square loan, the larger of the two
loans in the trust, has a $210.0 million whole loan balance that is
divided into a $150.0 million senior pooled trust component (55.0%
of the pooled trust balance) and a $60.0 million subordinate
nonpooled trust component that supports the class WTS-1 and WTS-2
raked certificates.  In addition, the borrower's equity interest
secures a $40.0 million mezzanine loan.  The whole loan is IO,
accrues interest at a rate of one-month LIBOR plus 2.01% per annum,
and has an initial two-year term with three one-year extension
options.  The borrower has exercised one of its three extension
options, and the loan's maturity is currently
Feb. 9, 2017.  The loan is secured by a 46-story, 873-key,
full-service hotel in the Times Square area of Manhattan, built in
2002 and renovated between 2013 and 2016.  The master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a 5.11x debt service coverage (DSC)
for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2016.  S&P's expected
case value, using an 8.50% capitalization rate, yielded an S&P
Global Ratings' loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and DSC of 71.2% and
1.81x (based on the maximum LIBOR cap plus spread), respectively,
on the whole loan trust balance.

The Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers loan, the smallest loan in the
trust, has a $171.0 million whole loan balance that is divided into
a $122.6 million senior pooled trust component and a $48.4 million
subordinate nonpooled trust component that supports the class SCH-1
and SCH-2 raked certificates.  The whole loan is IO, pays interest
at a rate of one-month LIBOR plus 1.86% per annum, and has an
initial two-year term with three one-year extension options.

The borrower exercised one of its three extension options, and the
loan's maturity is currently Jan. 9, 2017.  The loan is secured by
a 34-story, 1,214-key, full-service hotel in downtown Chicago,
built in 1992 and renovated between 2013 and 2016.  Wells Fargo
Bank N.A. reported a 6.90x DSC for the trailing 12 months ended
March 31, 2016.  S&P's expected case value, using a 9.00%
capitalization rate, yielded a 73.1% S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio
and 1.51x S&P Global Ratings' DSC (based on the maximum LIBOR cap
plus spread) on the whole loan trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-TISH
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-TISH
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A                94988WAA6             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-2              94988WAE8             A- (sf)       A- (sf)
B                94988WAG3             AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                94988WAJ7             A- (sf)       A- (sf)
WTS-1            94988WAL2             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
WTS-2            94988WAN8             BB (sf)       BB (sf)
SCH-1            94988WAQ1             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
SCH-2            94988WAS7             BB (sf)       BB (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-NXS3 (the Certificates)
issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-NXS3 as
follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-E at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-FG at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-H at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C
Certificates may be exchanged for the Class PEX Certificates (and
vice versa). DBRS does not rate the first loss piece, Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has experienced a collateral reduction of
0.4% since closing as the result of scheduled loan amortization. At
issuance, the pool consisted of 56 fixed-rate loans secured by 59
commercial and multifamily properties. As of the September 2016
remittance, all of the original 56 loans remain in the pool with an
aggregate outstanding principal balance of $811.1 million. There
are 30 loans, representing 71.4% of the current pool balance, that
reported YE2015 financials. These loans reported a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.84 times (x) and a WA
debt yield of 10.4%. At issuance, the DBRS WA DSCR and debt yield
for the pool was 1.69x and 9.2%, respectively. The 12 loans in the
top 15 that reported YE2015 financials had a WA DSCR of 1.93x and a
WA net cash flow increase of 10.6% over the DBRS underwritten (UW)
cash flows.

As of the September 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and three loans on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 2.2% of the current pool balance. None of the loans on
the watchlist are being monitored for significant
performance-related concerns. The largest loan on the watchlist,
Fresh Market Plaza (Prospectus ID#20, 1.3% of the pool), was
flagged for a low DSCR of 0.69x at YE2015; however, rental income
is skewed because it does not include a full year of rents from
in-place tenants, as four of the five in-line tenants at the
subject took occupancy throughout 2015. The two other loans were
flagged for a resolved rollover concern and failure to submit
financials by the borrower. One loan in the top 15 is highlighted
below.

The Cooper’s Crossing loan (Prospectus ID#12, 2.7% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a 25-building apartment complex
totalling 727 units in Landover Hills, Maryland, built in 1966 and
partially renovated between 2000 and 2008. The property was
affected by a fire that broke out in one of the buildings in August
2015; however, per the July 2016 inspection report, all repairs
have been completed, with no fire damage visible. Additionally, the
borrower is undertaking full renovations of all units at the
property, with 289 units (39.8% of the total count) completed to
date, as buildings are being taken offline one at a time. According
to the borrower, the renovated units are being leased quickly and
are achieving a rental premium of $140 above standard units. As a
result of the fire and ongoing renovations at the property,
occupancy decreased to 82.7% as of March 2016 from 90.5% in June
2015 with an average rental rate of $1,193/unit. In comparison, the
Landover submarket of suburban Maryland reports an average asking
rent for properties of similar vintage of $1,255/unit, according to
Reis. The YE2015 amortizing DSCR for the loan is 1.33x,
representing a decline from the DBRS UW figure of 1.43x. This
decline in cash flows is attributed to the lower occupancy at the
property since issuance as a result of the fire and the ongoing
renovations at the property. Performance is expected to rebound in
the medium term as all units are renovated and occupancy
stabilizes.

At issuance, DBRS assigned investment-grade shadow ratings to two
loans: 11 Madison Avenue (Prospectus ID#6, 4.3% of the current
pool) and The Parking Spot LAX (Prospectus ID#15, 1.9% of the
current pool). DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of the
loans remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

The rating assigned to Class F materially deviates from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction in its Monthly CMBS
Surveillance Report with additional information on the DBRS
viewpoint for this transaction, including details on the largest
loans in the pool. The September 2016 Monthly CMBS Surveillance
Report for this transaction will be published shortly. If you are
interested in receiving this report, contact us at info@dbrs.com.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Hikes Class SJ-D Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and upgraded the ratings on four classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2014-C24 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015 Affirmed

      A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. PEX, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. SJ-A*, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. SJ-B*, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. SJ-C*, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015

      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. SJ-D*, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

* Non-pooled trust certificates associated with St Johns Town
Center Loan. These classes will not provide credit support to any
class of trust certificates

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the non-pooled rake classes, Classes SJ-A, SJ-B,
SJ-C and SJ-D, were upgraded based on improvement in the loan's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR). The rake classes are
supported by the subordinate debt associated with the St. John's
Town Center loan.

The ratings on nine P&I classes, Classes A-1 through C, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the PEX class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
exchangeable classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.0% of the
current pooled balance.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29, the same as at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 16, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 0.5% to
$1.079 billion from $1.088 billion at securitization. The pooled
certificates are collateralized by 86 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to just under 10% of the pool, with the top
ten loans constituting 46% of the pool. One loan, constituting 9.6%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Seven loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. One loan, constituting
0.3% of the pool, is currently in special servicing. It is the
Williston Meadows Apartments Loan ($3.0 million -- 0.3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 24-unit multifamily property located
in Williston, North Dakota. It was transferred to special servicing
on August 12, 2016 due to payment default as a result of a decline
in both occupancy and rental income.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 90% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 93% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 113.1%, the same
as at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 1.52X and 0.95X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the St. Johns Town
Center Loan ($103.5 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 981,000 SF component of a 1.4 million SF super-regional mall
located in Jacksonville, Florida. The loan represents a 51%
pari-passu interest in a $203.5 million senior loan. The property
is also encumbered by a $146.5 million B-note which contributes to
the transaction as non-pooled rake bonds. The loan sponsor is a
joint venture between subsidiaries of Simon Property Group (SPG),
Inc. and Deutsche Bank Asset & Wealth Management. SPG manages the
property. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, Target, Dick's
Sporting Goods, Ashley Furniture, and Nordstrom. Dillard's, Target
and Ashely Furniture are not part of the collateral and own their
own spaces. The mall was developed in three phases from 2005-2014.
As of June 2016, the property was 98% occupied. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR for the pooled portion are aaa
(sca.pd) and 1.61X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Two Westlake Park Loan ($91 million -- 8.4% of
the pool), which is secured by a 450,000 SF office building located
in Houston, Texas. The property represents part of the larger
58-acre Westlake Park office complex. The property was developed in
1982 and primarily consists of a 17-story office tower and seven
story parking garage. The parking garage contains additional office
space in a portion of the top two floors. As of June 2016, the
property was 91% occupied. The two largest tenants are
ConocoPhilips (46% of the NRA, leased through November 2019) and BP
(36% of the NRA, leased through 2017 and 2019). The property is
located approximately one half mile from I-10 in Houston's Energy
Corridor/West Katy Freeway market. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 132% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 125% and 0.82X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Gateway Center Phase II Loan ($75
million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 602,000 SF
power center located in Brooklyn, New York. The property was
recently constructed in 2014 and sits adjacent to the Gateway
Center Phase I which was developed by the sponsor and completed in
2002. As of June 2016 the property was 100% occupied. The anchor
tenants include JC Penney, ShopRite and Burlington Coat Factory. JC
Penney is not part of the collateral. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 114% and 0.78X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Crossing at Corona Loan ($70 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by an 834,000 SF component
of an approximately 962,200 SF power center located 50 miles
south-east of Los Angeles in Corona, California. The center is
anchored by a Kohl's, Edwards Cinemas (Regal) and Toys/Babies R Us.
The center is shadow anchored by a Target. The property was
developed from 2004-2008. As of March 2016, the property was 99%
occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.80X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.


[*] DBRS Confirms 123 Classes in Six U.S. RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed 123 classes from six U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions.

The confirmations come as a result of current asset performance and
credit support levels being consistent with the current rating.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of Reperforming and Prime Jumbo
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
higher rating(s) implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers
this difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the lack of transaction
seasoning and performance history.

   -- WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-5, Mortgage Pass-Through
      Certificates, Series 2015-5, Class B-2

   -- WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-5, Mortgage Pass-Through
      Certificates, Series 2015-5, Class B-3

   -- WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-5, Mortgage Pass-Through
      Certificates, Series 2015-5, Class B-4

A full text copy of the table of ratings is available free at:

                       https://is.gd/WsdCAq


[*] DBRS Confirms 26 Ratings on 7 U.S. ABS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed 26 ratings from seven U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. All 26 outstanding publicly
rated classes were confirmed as performance trends are such that
credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected
losses at their current respective rating levels.

The following seven transactions were confirmed:

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-1

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-2

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-1

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-2

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-3

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1

   -- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

Notes:

All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodology is the DBRS Master U.S. ABS Surveillance
Methodology, which can be found on our website under
Methodologies.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the
rating process. DBRS had access to the accounts and other relevant
internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities.

A full text copy of the table of ratings is available free at:

                   https://is.gd/w5O24l


[*] DBRS Reviews 20 Ratings From 3 ABS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 20 ratings from three U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 20 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, six were confirmed, 12 were
upgraded and two were discontinued. For the ratings that were
confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses at their
new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

A full text copy of the company's press release is available at:

                       https://is.gd/FEO9yz





[*] DBRS Reviews 42 Ratings From 8 ABS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 42 ratings from eight U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 42 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, 38 were confirmed and four were
upgraded. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating levels.
For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

A list of the ratings is available at:

                    https://is.gd/voFkdy


[*] DBRS Reviews 9 Ratings From 2 ABS Deals
-------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed nine ratings from two U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the nine outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, one was confirmed, six were
upgraded and two were discontinued. For the ratings that were
confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses at their
new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodology is the DBRS Master U.S. ABS Surveillance
Methodology, which can be found on our website under
Methodologies.

The rated entity or its related entities did participate in the
rating process. DBRS had access to the accounts and other relevant
internal documents of the rated entity or its related entities.

The complete press release is available free at:

                      https://is.gd/xNlBie




[*] Moody's Cuts $27MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2006-2007
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches from two transactions, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-5 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-5

  Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2010,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2010,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 22, 2012,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-6

  Cl. IA-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 24, 2015,

   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 21, 2012,

   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools.  The
ratings downgraded from Banc of America Funding 2006-5 Trust,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-5 are due to the
weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds.  The downgrade of Class IA-IO
from Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-6 is the
result of the realignment of this bond with the highest current
rating on the outstanding bonds backed by Group I.  The downgrade
of Class IIA-IO from Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series
2007-6 is due to the erosion of enhancement available to this
bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 48 Classes From 8 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 48 classes from eight
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions
issued between 2003 and 2010.  The review yielded 22 upgrades (six
of which S&P removed from CreditWatch negative), four downgrades,
16 affirmations (one of which S&P removed from CreditWatch
negative), and six discontinuances (one of which S&P removed from
CreditWatch negative).

The rating actions resolve some of the CreditWatch negative
placements made on Jan. 20, 2016.  The CreditWatch negative
placements concerned the application of our loan modification and
imputed promises criteria.  S&P believes the current ratings are
consistent with the credit support available to these classes.

The transactions in this review are supported by underlying classes
backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo,
Alternative-A, reperforming, and nonperforming mortgage loans,
which are secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.  Of the transactions reviewed Structured
Asset Securities Corp. Trust 2008-1 is backed by underlying
securities that are insured by U.S. government affiliated entities,
including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades include 10 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

                             DOWNGRADES

The four lowered ratings remain at an investment-grade level.  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover S&P's
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
The downgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends; and/or
   -- Projected interest shortfalls.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

On Jan. 20, 2016, S&P placed the ratings on eight classes from CSMC
Series 2010-15R and LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1 on
CreditWatch negative.  The CreditWatch negative placements
reflected S&P's pending review of its loan modification criteria.
Following S&P's review, it has determined that these classes are
not affected by the application of its loan modification criteria.
Accordingly, all of these ratings have been removed from
CreditWatch negative, and S&P has raised its ratings on six
classes, affirmed one, and discontinued one.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 12 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support on these classes remained relatively consistent with its
prior projections and is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses
for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued our ratings on six classes that were paid in full
during recent remittance periods.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/2dIU0Z8




[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 56 Tranches From 20 CDO Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 23, 2016, discontinued its ratings on
49 classes from 14 cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transactions, three classes from three CF collateral debt
obligations (CDO) transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), one class from one CF CDO transaction
collateralized by project finance securities, one class from one CF
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction, and two classes
from one transaction guaranteed by National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) in its capacity as a U.S. government agency.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydowns of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Atrium V (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down; other
      rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Baker Street Funding CLO 2005-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in September 2016.

   -- Cannington Funding Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- COMM 2004-RS1 (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- CT CDO IV Ltd. IV (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- EIG Global Project Fund III Ltd. (CF CDO of project
      finance): all rated tranches paid down.

   -- Franklin CLO V Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      September 2016.

   -- Gale Force 4 CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      August 2016.

   -- Kingsland III Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in August
      2016.

   -- MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Madison Park Funding VII Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption
      in September 2016.

   -- Nantucket CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2010-C1 (guaranteed by NCUA):
      all rated tranches paid down.

   -- OCP CLO 2012-2 Ltd. (CF CLO): class X notes(i) paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Pacifica CDO VI Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Putnam Structured Product CDO 2001-1 Ltd. (CF CDO): senior-
      most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Sands Point Funding Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      July 2016.

   -- St. James River CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      September 2016.

   -- Stone Tower CLO VII Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Atrium V
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a                NR                  AAA (sf)

Baker Street Funding CLO 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Cannington Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

CIFC Funding 2006-II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)

COMM 2004-RS1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B-2                 NR                  B- (sf)

CT CDO IV Ltd. IV
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  B- (sf)

EIG Global Project Fund III Ltd.

                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Franklin CLO V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Gale Force 4 CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1B                NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA (sf)/Watch pos
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch pos
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)/Watch pos

Kingsland III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C-1                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D-1                 NR                  BB+ (sf)
D-2                 NR                  BB+ (sf)

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
L                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Madison Park Funding VII Ltd.

                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA- (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Nantucket CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2010-C1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A2                  NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-PT                NR                  AA+ (sf)

OCP CLO 2012-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1c                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
B                   NR                  AA- (sf)

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2001-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Sands Point Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C (deferrabable)    NR                  AAA (sf)
D (deferrabable)    NR                  AAA (sf)

St. James River CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-T                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Stone Tower CLO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


                            *********

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