TCR_Public/160925.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, September 25, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 268

                            Headlines

ACA ABS 2004-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to Ba3
ACIS CLO 2013-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
AIR 2: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Series A EENs
ARCH STREET CLO: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
ASCENTIUM EQUIPMENT 2015-2: Moody's Ups Cl. F Notes Rating to Ba1

ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D4: Moody’s Affirms Cl. PS-1 Debt Rating
ATRIUM X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
BALLYROCK CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
BALLYROCK CLO 2016-1: Moody's Rates 2 Note Classes 'Ba3'
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class A-J Debt

BANC ONE 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X Debt
BCC FUNDING XIII: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Debt
BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. M Debt to CC
BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP16: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 3 Certs.
BRIDGEPORT CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes

CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Debt
CANYON CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Debt
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
CD COMMERCIAL 2007-CD5: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. H Debt to 'Csf'
CITICORP MORTGAGE 2006-5: Moody's Ups Cl. IIIA-1 Debt Rating to B1

CLAREGOLD TRUST 2007-2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. J Certs to BB
COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. F Notes
COLT 2016-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class M-1X Notes
COLT 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on 3 Tranches
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 2012-2: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Cl. C Certs Rating

COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.8B Securitizations
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class F Debt
DEUTSCHE BANK 2012-CCRE5: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. F Debt
DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Debt
EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class C Debt

EMERSON PARK: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2016-HQA3: Fitch Assigns 'B+sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
FREDDIE MAC: Fitch Rates 3 STACR Tranches 'B+sf'
GALAXY CLO XVI: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes

GALLATIN V 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. N Notes to B3
GS MORTGAGE 2007-GKK1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A-1 Debt
GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS3: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'B-sf'
HARBOR LLC 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Class D Notes Rating to Ca

HOME PARTNERS 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certs
JAMESTOWN CLO IX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Debt
JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Debt
JP MORGAN 2014-C23: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. X-D Certs
JP MORGAN 2016-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs. 'BBsf'

JP MORGAN 2016-JP3: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BBsf'
JPMORGAN CHASE 2006-LDP7: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to D
KEYCORP STUDENT 2004-A: Fitch Affirms CCsf Rating on Cl. II-D Debt
KKR CLO 15: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Moody's Ups Class H Debt Rating to Ba3

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba3
MACH ONE 2004-1: Fitch Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to BB
MAGNETITE VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to Ba1
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-C2: Moody's Hikes Class AJ Debt Rating to Ba1

MORGAN STANLEY 1999-FNV1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. L Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. N Debt to 'Dsf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C30: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
MOUNTAIN VIEW 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2003-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. A-7 Debt

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2006-1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 4 Tranches
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 6 Tranches
NAVITAS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
NEUBERGER BERMAN XIV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on B-4 Notes

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
OCP CLO 2013-4: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
OCP CLO 2016-12: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
OHA CREDIT VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ORCHARD PARK: Moody's Hikes Class A-1 Notes Rating to B3

PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A Certificate to B2
PRIME MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to Ba2
REALT 2016-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class F Debt
REGATTA VII: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
RESOURCE REAL 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba2

STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class D Debt
TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2006-4: Fitch Cuts Class H Notes Rating to 'D'
TIAA CHURCHILL I: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Debt
UNITED AIRLINES 2012-3: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Certs
UNITED AUTO 2016-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

VENTURE XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
VOYA CLO 2016-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C5: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-C Debt
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2014-C22: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes

WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs. 'B-'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-UBS1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Certs
ZAIS CLO 5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
[*] Moody's Confirms $665MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-2005

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $232.4MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Actions on 31 Navient FFELP Securitizations
[*] S&P Discontinues 33 'D' Ratings From 25 US CMBS Deals

                            *********

ACA ABS 2004-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by ACA ABS 2004-1, Limited:

  $47,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   July 16, 2039, (current outstanding balance of $18,735,922),
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2014, Upgraded to
   Caa3 (sf).

ACA ABS 2004-1, LIMITED, issued in May 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and CRE
CDOs originated in 2003 and 2004.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

This rating action is due primarily to deleveraging of the senior
notes and an increase in the transaction's over-collateralization
("OC") ratio since January 2016.  The Class B notes have been paid
down by approximately 30.7%, or $13.0 million, since that time.
Based on the trustee's August 2016 report, the OC ratio for the
Class B notes is reported at 105.21%, versus 61.15% in January
2016.  The paydown of the Class B notes is partially the result of
cash collections from certain assets treated as defaulted by the
trustee in amounts materially exceeding expectations.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since January 2016.  Based on
the trustee's August 2016 report, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 1031, compared to 1135 in January 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The prinicpal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs," published in July 2015.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Primary causes of uncertainty about assumptions are the
     extent of any deterioration in either consumer or commercial
     credit conditions and in the commercial and residential real
     estate property markets.  Commercial real estate property
     market is subject to uncertainty about general economic
     conditions including commercial real estate prices,
     investment activities, and economic performances.  The
     residential real estate property market's uncertainties
     include housing prices; the pace of residential mortgage
     foreclosures, loan modifications and refinancing; the
     unemployment rate; and interest rates.

  2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries
     from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will
     continue and at what pace.  Faster than expected deleveraging

     could have a significantly positive impact on the notes'
     ratings.

  3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries
     received from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and
     those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the

     timing of these recoveries create additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted assets assuming limited
     recoveries, and therefore, realization of any recoveries
     exceeding Moody's expectation in the future would positively
     impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes.  Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches (1226):
Class B: +2
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches (2777):
Class B: -1
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0


ACIS CLO 2013-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C-1, C-2,
Combo, D, and E notes from ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and F notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction's performance using data from the Aug.
6, 2016 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $207.8 million in collective
paydowns to the class A and Combo notes since S&P's October 2013
rating actions.  These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the November 2013 trustee
report, which S&P used for its effective date review:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 161.235% from 135.620%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 132.957% from 121.526%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 120.587% from 114.563%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio improved to 111.859% from 109.309%.

The collateral portfolio's credit quality has slightly deteriorated
since S&P's last rating actions.  Collateral obligations with
ratings in the 'CCC' category have increased, with $60.52 million
reported as of the August 2016 trustee report, compared with $19.05
million reported as of the November 2013 trustee report.  Over the
same period, the par amount of defaulted collateral has increased
to $2.3 million from $0.  However, despite the slightly larger
concentrations in the 'CCC' category and defaulted collateral, the
deal has benefited from the overall seasoning of the underlying
collateral portfolio.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a higher rating on the class F notes.  However, because
the transaction currently has some exposure to 'CCC' rated
collateral obligations and loans from companies in the energy and
commodities sectors (which have come under significant pressure
from falling oil and commodity prices in the past year), S&P
decided to affirm the class F notes at their current rating level
to offset future potential credit migration in the underlying
collateral.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From

B             AAA         AA
C-1           AA+         A
C-2           AA+         A
Combo         AA+         A
D             A+          BBB
E             BB+         BB

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Class         Rating

A             AAA
F             B


AIR 2: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Series A EENs
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on the
enhanced equipment notes (EENs) issued by AIR 2 US:

   -- Series A EENs affirmed at 'BB+/RR1';

   -- Series B EENs affirmed at 'B+/RR5''.

AIR 2 US is a special purpose Cayman Islands company created to
issue EENs; use the proceeds to purchase Permitted Investments; and
enter into a risk transfer agreement. AIR 2 US entered into the
risk transfer agreement (the Payment Recovery Agreement), with a
subsidiary of Airbus. The primary provision of the Payment Recovery
Agreement states that if United Airlines, Inc. (rated
'BB-'/Positive Outlook) fails to pay scheduled rentals under
existing subleases of aircraft with subsidiaries of Airbus, AIR 2
US will pay these rental deficiencies to a subsidiary of Airbus.
These deficiency payments will come from the cash flows created by
the Permitted Investments. As such, the greatest risk of the
transaction is the bankruptcy risk of the lessee airline.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

AIR 2 US is not covered effectively by Fitch's EETC ratings
criteria because aircraft cannot be sold and liquidated in the
event of lease rejection of Airbus A320 aircraft sub-leased by
United. In addition, the underlying subleases are not
cross-defaulted or cross-collateralized. Applying a framework
similar to that employed in analysis of corporate obligations,
Fitch expects recoveries for series A noteholders to be very strong
in a lease rejection scenario. Discounted lease cash flows,
applying heavy stresses to current A320 lease rates, cover series A
principal and a full liquidity facility draw. The 'BB+/RR1' rating,
two notches above United's 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating (IDR),
reflects the high level of projected recovery.

Expected recoveries for series B noteholders may be weak, in the
'RR5' range, reflecting a high probability of lease payment
shortfalls in a post-rejection scenario. The one-notch differential
between the 'B+/RR5' rating of the series B notes and United's
'BB-' corporate IDR captures this weak recovery potential.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Air 2 US
include:

   -- A stress scenario where the underlying releases are rejected

      in the near- to intermediate-term;

   -- Lease rates come under pressure, falling below current
      market rates;

   -- The collateral aircraft experience a re-leasing period of
      six months.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings are primarily driven by Fitch's recovery expectations
and by the IDR of the underlying airline. Therefore changes in
either of those factors could lead to rating actions on the Air 2
US notes.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

AIR 2 US

   -- Series A enhanced equipment notes affirmed at 'BB+/RR1';

   -- Series B enhanced equipment notes affirmed at 'B+/RR5'.


ARCH STREET CLO: Moody's Assigns B3(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Arch Street CLO, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Arch
Street").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2028 (the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$22,750,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$21,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- US$5,500,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes
are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Arch Street is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and first-lien last-out loans. The portfolio is approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

NewStar Capital LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2725

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2725 to 3134)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -1

   -- Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2725 to 3543)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

    -- Class D Notes: -2

    -- Class E Notes: -1

    -- Class F Notes: -3


ASCENTIUM EQUIPMENT 2015-2: Moody's Ups Cl. F Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded seven securities and
affirmed five additional securities issued from the Ascentium
Equipment Receivables 2015-1 LLC and 2015-2 Trust.  The
transactions are the securitizations of small-ticket equipment
leases serviced by Ascentium Capital LLC.  The back-up servicer is
US Bank National Association (Aa1, P-1, Stable).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ascentium Equipment Receivables 2015-1 LLC

  Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
  Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,

   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,

   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Ascentium Equipment Receivables 2015-2 Trust

  Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,

   Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,

   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 7,
   2016, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Class F Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2016,

   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                           RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions were prompted by the build-up of credit enhancement due
to the full-turbo sequential structures of the transactions and
non-declining overcollateralization and reserve accounts.

The lifetime remaining cumulative net loss (CNL) expectation for
both the 2015-1 and 2015-2 transactions is 2.50% of the remaining
pool balance.  When projecting the lifetime remaining CNL, we took
into consideration the amount of delinquent contracts to date -
2.12% of the 2015-1 transaction's original balance and 0.78% of the
2015-2 transaction's original balance -- and an average realized
recovery rate for the small-ticket collateral.  To date, the issuer
has been substituting the delinquent contracts with performing,
seasoned collateral, however when projecting our remaining lifetime
CNL we assume that no such substitutions will occur in the future.
The substitution limit for the delinquent contracts in both pools
is 5.0%.

The unrated servicer and originator was rebranded as Ascentium in
2011.  Ascentium's strong but limited securitized pool performance
to date is a positive, however its limited history introduces
performance uncertainty that Moody's incorporates in its analysis.
The upgrades consider such uncertainty.

Below are key performance metrics (as of August 2016 distribution
date) and credit assumptions for each affected transaction.  The
credit assumptions include Moody's lifetime remaining CNL
expectation as a percentage of the current pool balance.
Performance metrics include the pool factor (the ratio of the
current collateral balance and the original collateral balance at
closing); total hard credit enhancement (expressed as a percentage
of the outstanding collateral pool balance), which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, reserve fund as
applicable; and excess spread per annum.

Issuer -- Ascentium Equipment Receivables 2015-1 LLC
  Lifetime remaining CNL expectation --2.50% of the remaining pool

   balance
  Pool Factor -- 58.75%
  Total Hard credit enhancement -- Cl. A -- 64.45%, Cl. B –
   44.45%, Cl. C -- 37.39%, Cl. D -- 31.60%, Cl. E -- 27.85%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 0.8%

Issuer -- Ascentium Equipment Receivables 2015-2 LLC
  Lifetime remaining CNL expectation --2.50% of the remaining pool

   balance
  Pool Factor -- 76.92%
  Total Hard credit enhancement -- Cl. A -- 40.80%, Cl. B –
   25.72%, Cl. C -- 20.52%, Cl. D -- 17.46%, Cl. E -- 14.93%, Cl.
   F -- 13.04%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 1.1%

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating.  Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of
payment.  The US macro economy and the equipment markets are
primary drivers of performance.  Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the leases.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings.  Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment.  The US macro economy and the
equipment markets are primary drivers of performance.  Other
reasons for worse performance than Moody's expected include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transactional governance and fraud.


ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D4: Moody’s Affirms Cl. PS-1 Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
Asset Securitization Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1997-D4 as follows:

   -- Cl. PS-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO Class (PS-1) was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, the same as Moody's prior review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.4% of the original
pooled balance, the same as Moody's prior review.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 16 August, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97.7% to $32.4
million from $1.40 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $33.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 22.4%).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for the pool's sole
remaining loan. The K-Mart Distribution Center Loan ($32.4 million
-- 100% of the pool), which is secured by a 2.8 million SF,
two-property, warehouse portfolio. The properties, which are
located in Brighton, Colorado and Greensboro, NC, are 100% leased
to K-Mart through March 2022. Moody's analysis incorporated a
Lit/Dark analysis to account for the single-tenant risk. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.14X, respectively, compared to
57% and 1.90X at the last review.


ATRIUM X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1 and B-2
notes from Atrium X, a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
that closed in June 2013 and is managed by Credit Suisse Asset
Management LLC.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
A, C, D, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Aug. 4, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction documents.
The upgrades reflect increased credit support available to the
class B-1 and B-2 notes.  The affirmations reflect S&P's view that
the available credit support is consistent with the current rating
levels.

Since the September 2013 trustee report, which S&P used for its
effective date analysis, the transaction has benefited from both
seasoning and improvement of the underlying collateral's credit
quality, which were the main drivers for the rating actions.  

According to the August 2016 monthly trustee report, the
portfolio's weighted average life is 4.31 years, down from 5.52
years as of the September 2013 trustee report.  In addition, the
number of obligors in the portfolio has increased during this
period, which has helped to diversify the portfolio.  Also, the
portfolio's credit quality has improved during this period as the
percentage of 'BB-' and higher rated assets has increased.  These
factors have improved the credit risk profile, which in turn, has
provided more cushion to the tranches' ratings.

However, defaults and assets rated 'CCC+' and below have increased
since the September 2013 report.  Specifically, the amount of
defaulted assets has increased to $4.88 million from zero.  The
level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below has increased to
$39.50 million from $3.49 million.  Par gain in the underlying
portfolio since the effective date has led to increased
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios from the August 2016 trustee
report:

   -- The class A/B O/C test was 136.02%, up from the 134.86%
      reported in September 2013.
   -- The class C O/C test was 122.50%, up from 121.46%.
   -- The class D O/C test was 115.44%, up from 114.46%.
   -- The class E O/C test was 110.12%, up from 109.18%.

Although negative developments in the transaction have been offset
by its overall seasoning and positive portfolio credit quality
migration, any significant deterioration in these metrics could
negatively affect the transaction, especially the junior tranches.
As a result, although S&P's cash flow analysis suggests higher
ratings for the class C, D, and E notes, it considered the above
factors, loans from companies in the energy and commodities sectors
(which have come under significant pressure from falling oil and
commodity prices in the past year), and also other stress tests to
allow for volatility in the underlying portfolio, given that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Atrium X

                 Rating
Class       To          From
B-1         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Atrium X

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


BALLYROCK CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D,
and E notes from Ballyrock CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May 2013 and is
managed by Ballyrock Investment Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
May 2017.

Since the transaction's Oct. 18, 2013, effective date, the
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.75
years from 5.56 years.  This seasoning has decreased the
portfolio's overall credit risk profile.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the effective date report.
Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets has increased to $7.64
million (1.97% of the aggregate principal balance) as of August
2016 from $0.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below has
increased to $17.51 million (4.5% of the aggregate principal
balance) from $5.37 million over the same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio decreased to 132.60% from 137.07%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 118.42% from 122.42%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 110.75% from 114.49%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 105.82% from 109.39%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life.  However, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such,
the affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis points to higher ratings for the
class B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers the increase
in the defaults and decline in the portfolio's credit quality.  In
addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs that
considered the exposure to specific distressed industries and
allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio given that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.  

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ballyrock CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Class    Rating
A        AAA (sf)
B        AA (sf)
C        A (sf)
D        BBB (sf)
E        BB (sf)


BALLYROCK CLO 2016-1: Moody's Rates 2 Note Classes 'Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes to be issued by Ballyrock CLO 2016-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $224,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $31,750,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $5,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $19,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf)
  $22,050,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $4,125,000 Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)
  $15,125,000 Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E-1 Notes and the Class
E-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Ballyrock 2016-1 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of loans other than senior
secured loans.  The portfolio is required to be at least 71% ramped
as of the closing date.

Ballyrock Investment Advisors LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $350,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E-1 Notes: -1
Class E-2 Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E-1 Notes: -1
Class E-2 Notes: -1


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class A-J Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-4 (BACM 2007-4).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
and overall stable performance of the underlying collateral since
Fitch's last review. Loans representing 94.8% of the remaining pool
are scheduled to mature in 2017, including 10 defeased loans
(14.3%) and three anticipated repayment date loans (1.6%). Fitch
expects the majority of these loans will pay off at maturity;
however, Fitch's stressed analysis indicates some of the more
highly leveraged loans may have trouble refinancing and could
default.

Fitch modeled losses of 11.4% for the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 11.5%, including $114.4
million (5.1% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 17 loans (23.6%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes three specially serviced assets (1.1%).

As of the September 2016 remittance report, the transaction has
paid down 44.1%% to $1.25 billion, down from $2.2 billion at
issuance. Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $5.8
million are currently affecting classes J through S.

The three largest contributors to Fitch-modeled losses remain the
same since the last rating action.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is an interest-only loan
(8.5%) secured by a 231,512 square foot (sf) office tower located
in La Jolla, CA. According to the March 2016 rent roll, the
property was 95.5% occupied, a significant improvement from the
property's trough performance in 2009, when occupancy bottomed out
at 55% as the commercial real estate sector struggled through the
recession. While occupancy has recovered, these gains are partially
offset by rent concessions which have limited the ability of rental
income to increase in-step with occupancy.

The property continues to operate with debt service shortfalls,
though it is noted that the sponsor, Irvine Company, has come out
of pocket to fund all shortfalls since loan closing. The cash flow
underperformance is also partially mitigated by the average
in-place rent at the tower relative to market rates; rents at the
property are approximately 29% below market. As there is additional
rollover prior to loan maturity, there is potential to negotiate
higher rents as leases expire. For the trailing nine months ending
March 31, 2016, the net operating income debt service coverage
ratio (NOI DSCR) was 0.70x, compared to 0.35x in 2012, 0.46x in
2010, 0.76x in 2008, and 1.29x underwritten at issuance.

The second largest contributor to losses is an interest-only loan
(5.1%) secured by a 256,670 sf office property located in
Scottsdale, AZ. Loan performance has recovered somewhat from
recessionary lows; however, the loan remains highly levered based
on stressed analysis of the current NOI. As of March 2016 rent
roll, property was 95.3% leased, compared to 98% at YE2015 and
93.8% at issuance. Per the servicer, the physical occupancy at the
property is 87.5%. The second largest tenant, which leases 8.4%
until March 2017, has vacated but is still paying rent. The
servicer is marketing the vacant space. In addition, the largest
tenant, which occupies 11% of the property, has indicated they will
remain at the property for an additional six months after their
current lease expiration (May 2017), and will vacate thereafter.
The servicer-reported first quarter 2016 (1Q16) DSCR was 1.26x,
compared to 1.3x at YE2015, 1.17x at YE2014 and 1.50x at issuance.


The third largest contributor to losses is an interest-only loan
(1.5%) secured by a 248,900 sf industrial property located in
Phoenix, AZ. The property had been vacant for two years since
February 2012 after the former single tenant vacated upon lease
expiration. Effective October 2014, a new tenant signed a 10-year
triple-net lease to occupy the entire property. The
servicer-reported 1Q16 DSCR was 1.10x, compared to 0.78x at YE2014,
-0.33x at YE2014 and 1.16x at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-4 through A-J reflect sufficient
credit enhancement (CE) and expected continued paydown. Although CE
on these classes has increased since the last rating action, a
significant percentage of the pool matures in 2017 (over 94%), with
the second largest loan having its sponsor cover debt service.
Class A-J may be subject to negative rating migration should loans
not refinance at maturity as expected; however, upgrades may also
be possible for this class should CE increase as paydowns continue
without further significant defaults. The distressed classes (those
rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

   -- $537.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $155.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $223.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $178.5 million class A-J at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.3 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 45%;

   -- $19.5 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $22.3 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $22.3 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $13.9 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $16.7 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $27.9 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

   -- $8.4 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate class S. Class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-SB notes
are paid in full. The rating on class XW was previously withdrawn.


BANC ONE 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class in
Banc One/FCCC Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the interest only class, Class X, was affirmed at C
(sf) due to the fact that it is not currently, nor expected to,
receive monthly interest payments. Class X is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by over 99% to $423,488
from $857 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 18% to
40% of the pool. The loans are secured by a mix of residential and
retail properties, all located in the greater Chicago, Illinois
area. The four remaining loans are all fully amortizing loans and
have a Moody's LTV of less than 40%.

The pool contains no loans with investment grade credit assessments
and no defeased loans.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist and no
specially serviced loans.


BCC FUNDING XIII: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by BCC Funding XIII LLC (the Issuer):

   -- $65,000,000, Series 2016-1, Class A-1 Notes rated R-1 (high)

      (sf)

   -- $135,537,000, Series 2016-1, Class A-2 Notes rated AAA (sf)

   -- $17,490,000, Series 2016-1, Class B Notes rated AA (sf)

   -- $8,942,000, Series 2016-1, Class C Notes rated A (sf)

   -- $11,704,000, Series 2016-1, Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)

   -- $7,101,000, Series 2016-1, Class E Notes rated BB (sf)
   
   -- $5,786,000, Series 2016-1, Class F Notes rated B (sf)

Provisional ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Form and sufficiency of available credit enhancement and its

      ability to withstand the expected losses under various
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios.

   -- The presence of a replenishable (subject to availability of
      funds) and non-declining amount on deposit in the Reserve
      Account.

   -- The expected asset pool does not contain any significant
      concentrations of obligors, vendors or geographies and
      consists of a diversified mix of the industries similar to
      those included in other small-ticket lease and loan
      securitizations rated by DBRS.

   -- While the structure allows for approximately three-month
      Prefunding Period, during which the acquisition by the
      Issuer of new contracts into the asset pool will be
      permitted, the proposed concentration limits will mitigate
      the risk of material migration in the asset pool's    
      composition or risk profile.

   -- Balboa Capital Corporation's management team is experienced
      and has a long track record of origination and servicing in
      the small-ticket equipment space.

   -- The presence of Portfolio Financing Services Company, an
      experienced servicer of equipment lease backed
      securitizations, as the back-up servicer for this
      transaction.


BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. M Debt to CC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded one, and affirmed three
classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series
2003-TOP 10.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the high credit enhancement of the senior
classes as a result of principal pay down, stable loss expectations
from Fitch's previous rating action, as well as the low leverage of
the remaining non-specially serviced loans.  Two loans totaling
$2.5 million (11.4%) are defeased, one of which matures in 2017
(9.1%) and the other in 2018 (2.3%).

The downgrade to class M reflects the higher likelihood of losses
associated with the transaction's specially serviced loan, Power
Plaza Shopping Center (34.2%), which is the transaction's largest
asset and currently real estate owned (REO).

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.1% (including 0.7% of
realized losses) to $23.3 million from $1.212 billion at issuance.
Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $37,346 are
currently affecting class O.

Of the original 171 loans, 13 remain.  The non-specially serviced
loans have maturity dates in 2017 (15.2%), 2018 (8.6%), 2022 (9.9%)
and 2023 (27.6%), with 55.6% being fully amortizing.

Fitch modeled losses of 42.3% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool are 1.5% including losses already
incurred to date (0.7%).  The non-specially serviced, non-defeased
loans have a weighted average LTV of 58% and DSCR of 1.7x.

The specially serviced asset, Power Plaza Shopping Center is a
112,155 sf retail center located in Vacaville, CA.  The property is
shadow anchored by a Sam's Club and Wal-Mart.  The loan was
previously modified in late 2013 after the property experienced a
drop in occupancy after a new center opened in close proximity to
the subject.  The loan was scheduled to mature in September 2014
but was unable to refinance and extension was approved.  The
special servicer foreclosed on the property during late 2015 after
borrower was not able to refinance the loan at the modified
maturity date.  The foreclosure was completed in April 2016 and the
property became REO.  The occupancy is reported to be 73%; however,
actual occupancy is approximately 35% as a result of the vacancy of
the 43,000 sf former anchor space.  The special servicer has
reported that a letter of intent has been signed for the vacant
anchor space.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's loss assumptions assumed a stressed value on the specially
serviced loan as occupancy remains low and ultimate recovery or
timing of recovery is unknown.  The ratings outlooks are expected
to remain stable as additional upgrades may not be warranted due to
the deal's concentrations.  The ratings on classes M and N may be
downgraded when losses are realized.  Downgrades could occur if
losses are greater than expected from the specially serviced loan,
pool performance deteriorates, or maturing loans default at
maturity.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded this class:

   -- $6.1 million class K to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $3.1 million class J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4.5 million class L at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.0 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

Fitch has downgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $3.0 million class M to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 20%;

Fitch does not rate class O.  The ratings on class X-1 and X-2 were
previously withdrawn.  Class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H have
paid in full.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP16: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed nine classes of Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP16 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class G reflects an increase in credit enhancement
from paydown and stable performance since Fitch's last rating
action.  The pool is concentrated with only 17 loans remaining,
which includes two specially serviced assets (33.2% of the pool).
Four loans (22.7%) are defeased.  New York City Cooperative loans
make up 23.1% of the remaining pool.  Fitch ran an additional
sensitivity due to the concentration and quality of the remaining
collateral.

Fitch modeled losses of 9.9% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 1.5%, including
$12.1 million (1.1% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.2% to $55.1 million from
$1.16 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes K through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Wal-Mart-Carlyle Plaza loan (7.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a 126,846 square foot (sf) single-tenant retail
center located in Belleville, IL, approximately 20 miles southwest
of St. Louis.  The loan transferred to special-servicing in August
2013 for maturity default.  The sole tenant, Wal-Mart, vacated the
property in 2010 and continued paying rent until their lease
expiration, which was coterminous with the loan maturity.
Additionally, the special servicer reports that there are
environmental issues and is waiting on the state's position to
determine its course of action.

The largest loan in the pool, 110 West 32nd street, is a
specially-serviced asset (25.5%), comprising of an eight-story
office and retail and a connecting seven-story office and retail
building located in New York, NY.  The loan transferred to Special
Servicing in November 2014 for maturity default.  The borrower's
prior efforts to refinance the loan or sell the property have been
unsuccessful.  The borrower has continued to make monthly payments
of debt service.  As of September 2016, the loan-to-value is 55%.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes E through H are Stable.  Despite high
credit enhancement further upgrades are not expected due to the
adverse selection of the remaining collateral.  Downgrades may
occur to the already distressed classes as losses are realized.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $11.6 million class G to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises REs as indicated:

   -- $9.5 million class E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.1 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.1 million class H at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.9 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $4.3 million class K at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $5.8 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 35%;
   -- $892,528 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, B, C and D and X-2
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-1 certificates.


BRIDGEPORT CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Bridgeport CLO II Ltd.:

  $26,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due

   2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due

   2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $390,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
   (current outstanding balance of $188,559,336.60), Affirmed
    Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 8, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $21,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 8, 2015, Upgraded to
   Aaa (sf)

  $19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due

   2021 (current outstanding balance of $14,319,673.80), Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf); previously on Sept. 8, 2015, Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Bridgeport CLO II Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
September 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of recent deleveraging
of the senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since January 2016.  The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 22.5% or $54.7 million
since that time.  Based on the trustee's August 2016 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class
C and Class D notes are reported at 137.60%, 122.41%, 111.96% and
106.06%, respectively, versus January 2016 levels of 130.46%,
118.78%, 110.41% and 105.57%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.

  7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

  8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
     liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
     outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
     Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
     exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
     default.  The historical default rate is higher than average
     for these assets.  Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

     which constitute around $7.4 million of par, Moody's ran a
     sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2222)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3334)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -3
Class C: -2
Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $289.0 million, defaulted par
of $0.4 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.93%
(implying a WARF of 2778), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.14%, a diversity score of 57 and a weighted average
spread of 3.47% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Cantor Commercial Real
Estate (CFCRE) Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C2 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect overall stable pool performance since
issuance. Credit enhancement has increased due to paydown and
defeasance, although the pool has become more concentrated. All of
the remaining loans in the pool are amortizing. As of the August
2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 32.4% to $523.2 million from $774.1 million at
issuance. The paydown is primarily the result of five-year loans
paying off at maturity in 2016. The pool has experienced minimal
realized losses ($1,144) to date as result of an adjustment with
respect to a specially serviced loan which paid off in 2014.

There were variances to criteria related to classes B through D
whereby the surveillance criteria indicated rating upgrades were
possible. Fitch determined that upgrades were not warranted due to
the pool's concentration; the top 15 loans represent 72.2% of the
pool and several of these loans have major tenant lease expirations
prior to the loan maturity date. Additionally, 44.0% of pool is
secured by retail properties and 71.2% of the pool matures in 2021.
Concentrations are expected to increase in 2017 as maturing loans
pay off.

Fitch has designated seven (13.1%) Fitch Loans of Concern due to
declining performance or upcoming rollover risk, including two
specially serviced loans (2.7%). Four loans (15.5%) are defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class.

The largest loan in the pool (17.7%) is the RiverTown Crossings
Mall, a 637,814 square foot (sf) interest in a 1.3 million sf
regional mall located in Grandville, MI. Anchors include: Macy's,
Younkers, Sears, JC Penney and Kohl's (non-collateral), all of
which expire in August 2019. As of March 31, 2016 the collateral
was 95.1% occupied, slightly down from 97.5% as of YE 2015.
However, occupancy has remained above 90% since issuance when
collateral occupancy was 90.6%. Net operating income debt service
coverage ratio (NOI DSCR) remained relatively flat at 2.13x as of
YE 2015 and YE 2014 compared to 1.99x at YE 2013. Upcoming rollover
is as follows: 6.1% for the remainder of 2016, 5.6% in 2017 and
3.6% in 2018. The largest rollover during the loan term was Dick's
Sporting Goods in 2016; however, the tenant renewed with a new
expiration of 2020. Sales have remained relatively stable the last
two years but as of YE 2015 have declined approximately 3% since
issuance. This balloon loan matures in 2021.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (4.6%) is Hanford Mall, a 331,080
sf interest in a 488,833 sf regional mall located in Hanford, CA.
The mall is anchored by JC Penney (expires March 31. 2018), Sears
(expires July 31, 2019) and Kohl's (non-collateral). Occupancy has
fluctuated over the past several years, but has remained at least
90% since issuance. As of March 31, 2016, collateral occupancy was
94.2% compared to 92.1% at YE 2015, 96.8% at YE 2014 and 89.8% at
issuance. NOI DSCR increased to 1.38x as of YE 2015 compared to
1.15x at YE 2014, as income increased 4.3% and operating expenses
decreased 4.9%. The non-collateral anchor tenant Forever 21 vacated
in April 2016, prior to its 2061 lease expiration. While a cash
trap was triggered, the master servicer indicated it was not aware
of prospective tenants interested in re-leasing the vacant space,
and provided no guidance on possible co-tenancy triggers. The
balloon loan, maturing in 2021, continues to perform but is on the
master servicer's watch list.

The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern (2%) is a specially
serviced 150-key limited service hotel located near Harrah's
Louisiana Downs Racetrack/Casino in Bossier, LA. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2015 due to imminent
default as the counterparty for its room guaranty agreement filed
for bankruptcy. The property became real estate owned (REO) in
September 2015. The hotel is currently in the process of completing
renovations required by Marriott. Fitch will continue to monitor
the property as renovation updates are received. Per the special
servicer, there are no plans to sell the property as this time.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks remain Stable. Although credit enhancement has
increased, the pool is becoming more concentrated. The collateral
has a Fitch stressed weighted average Loan to Value (LTV) of 74.3%.
While continuing concentration risk may limit upgrades, they are
possible should the pool continue to delever and stable performance
continue; all loans are amortizing. Downgrades are possible if
there were increased delinquencies or loans transferred to special
servicing.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

   -- $142.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $34.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $114 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $369.4 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $78.4 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $28.1 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $31.9 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.4 million class D at 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $28.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $10.6 million class F at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $9.7 million class G at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $27.1 million class NR certificates or the
$153.8 million X-B interest-only class. Class A-1 is paid in full.


CANYON CLO 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Canyon CLO 2016-2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$288,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$57,800,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
      (sf)

   -- US$20,700,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$26,200,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$21,300,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Canyon 2016-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is over 90% ramped as of the closing date.

Canyon CLO Advisors LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $450,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2016-3, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $323,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $62,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned A2 (sf)
  $30,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $20,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CGMS 2016-3 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans.  The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing
date.

Carlyle GMS CLO Management L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the Rated Notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -2
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -3
Class B Notes: -4
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1



CD COMMERCIAL 2007-CD5: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. H Debt to 'Csf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one, upgraded two, and affirmed 18
classes of CD Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-CD5.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect increased credit enhancement to the senior
classes due to paydown and defeasance.  The downgrade reflects
greater certainty of losses due to the disposition of six
previously specially serviced assets since Fitch's last rating
action.  Fitch modeled losses of 6.5% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 10.7%, including
$109.9 million (5.2% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date. Fitch has designated 47 loans (28.5%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes eight specially serviced assets
(7.3%).  All of the loans in the pool will reach their scheduled
maturities within the next year.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 37.1% to $1.32 billion from
$2.09 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, 10 loans
(27.4% of the pool) are defeased including the two largest loans in
the pool.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes J
through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Copper Beech
Townhomes - Statesboro, GA loan (2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 246-unit student housing property located near Georgia
State University.  The property has had historically strong
performance; however, occupancy began to suffer in 2013, falling to
77%, as a result of new competition in the market.  As of March
2016, occupancy has rebounded to 94% but net operating income (NOI)
has suffered due to significant rental rate concessions.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Parkway Plaza loan (2%), which is secured by a
262,583 square foot (sf) power retail center located Norman, OK.
The subject is anchored by Toys R Us, Ross Dress for Less, Bed Bath
& Beyond, Barnes and Noble, and PetSmart and is currently 73%
physically occupied.  The lender is dual tracking foreclosure while
discussing a possible workout with the borrower.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Versar Center Office Building loan (2%), which
is secured by two office properties totalling 217,396 sf located in
Springfield, VA.  The loan transferred to the special servicer in
October 2014 due to imminent default.  The property has struggled
with occupancy issues since the economic downturn and the borrower
has indicated that it can no longer fund shortfalls.  Additionally,
the parent company of the borrower has been working to restructure
its debt and divest certain holdings.  The special servicer is
pursuing foreclosure while discussions with the borrower are
ongoing.  The property is 65% occupied.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all non-distressed classes are Stable due
to increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown.  Further
upgrades to the A-J classes are possible with continued paydown or
defeasance.  Downgrades to the distressed classes will occur as
losses are realized.  Other rating changes are not anticipated
unless a material economic or asset-level event changes the
transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades this class as indicated:

   -- $23.6 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch upgrades these classes and assigns or revises Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

   -- $111.8 million class AJ to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Positive;
   -- $27 million class A-JA to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Positive.

Fitch affirms these classes but assigns or revises REs as
indicated:

   -- $18.3 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $20.9 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 20%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $672.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $126.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $168.7 million class AM at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40.7 million class A-MA at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.9 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.9 million class B at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.9 million class D at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.3 million class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23.6 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $2.5 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-AB have paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate the class S certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class XP and XS certificates.


CITICORP MORTGAGE 2006-5: Moody's Ups Cl. IIIA-1 Debt Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of fifteen
tranches and downgraded the ratings of two tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by Citicorp Mortgage Securities.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2006-5

   -- Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2006-7

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-2

   -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22,
      2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-4

   -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22,
      2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-9

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015

      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2008-2

   -- Cl. IIA-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2012
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  
   -- Cl. IIA-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2014
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. IIA-IO, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-5

   -- Cl. IA-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-7, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-8, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-10, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-11, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-12, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. IA-13, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pool, as well as the correction of a prior error. The rating
upgrades on CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2007-9 IIA-1,
CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST, SERIES 2008-2 Cl. IIA-IO, and
CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2005-5 IA-3, IA-6, IA-7, IA-8,
IA-10, IA-11, IA-12, and IA-13 are primarily a result of total
credit enhancement available to the bonds, while the rating
downgrades on two interest-only classes CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST 2007-2 IIA-IO and CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2007-4
IIA-IO are due to the erosion of enhancement available to the
bonds. The rating upgrades on CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-5
IIIA-1, CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-7 IIA-1 and IIIA-1, and
CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST, SERIES 2008-2 IIA-1 and IIA-2
are primarily due to correction of the senior percentage
calculation in the cash flow models used by Moody's in rating these
transactions. In prior rating actions, the post-credit support
depletion date (CSDD) senior percentage of each transaction was
calculated as the total senior bond balance of each group divided
by each group's total collateral balance, instead of the total
senior bond balance of each group divided by each group's total
bond balance. The error has now been corrected, and today's rating
actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



CLAREGOLD TRUST 2007-2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. J Certs to BB
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Claregold
Trust's series 2007-2, a Canadian commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on five other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on seven classes to reflect its expectation
of the available credit enhancement for these classes, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrades
also reflect S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance and the reduced trust balance.  In addition,
S&P's analysis considered that the transaction has not incurred any
principal losses to date and no loans are currently reported with
the special servicer, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings, as well as S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes C, D, E, F, and J and positive rating
movements on classes K and L, S&P's analysis considered the
transaction's structure, available liquidity support, and the
maturity profile of the remaining loans (55.2% maturing in late
2016 and the remainder in 2017).  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered potential liquidity interruptions on classes K and L
from the Grandview Mall loan ($6.8 million, 3.1%) because of
environmental issues and S&P's concerns regarding the loan's
ability to refinance by its December 2016 maturity.  The loan,
secured by a 77,064-sq.-ft. retail property in Thunder Bay, Ont.,
is on the master servicer's watchlist because of groundwater
contamination.  According to the master servicer, the environmental
issue is being monitored.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was C$220.2 million, which is 46.3% of the pool
balance at issuance.  The pool currently includes 31 loans
(reflecting cross-collateralized loans), down from 69 loans at
issuance.  Two of these loans (reflecting cross-collateralized
loans; C$38.0 million, 17.3%) are defeased and eight (C$23.6
million, 10.7%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The master
servicer, Midland Loan Services--Canada, reported financial
information for 100.0% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 88.3% was year-end 2015 data and the remainder was
partial-year 2016 or 2015 data.

Excluding the two defeased loans, S&P calculated a 1.45x S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average debt service coverage (DSC) and 62.2% S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a
7.63% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate.
The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool
trust balance of C$113.5 million (51.5%).  Using servicer-reported
figures, S&P calculated a S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.48x and 61.2%, respectively, for the top 10
nondefeased loans.  To date, the transaction has not experienced
any principal losses.

RATINGS LIST

Claregold Trust Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2007-2
                                   Rating
Class        Identifier            To                  From
A-2          180100AB5             AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
X            180100AP4             AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B            180100AC3             AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
C            180100AD1             AA+ (sf)            AA (sf)
D            180100AE9             AA (sf)             A- (sf)
E            180100AF6             AA- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
F            180100AG4             A+ (sf)             BBB- (sf)
G            180100AH2             A (sf)              BB (sf)
H            180100AJ8             A- (sf)             BB- (sf)
J            180100AK5             BB (sf)             B+ (sf)
K            180100AL3             B (sf)              B (sf)
L            180100AM1             B- (sf)             B- (sf)


COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
in Colony Multifamily Mortgage Trust 2014-1 as:

  Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed

   Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   B3 (sf)
  Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.3% of the
current balance, compared to 9.5% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 144, compared to 166 at Moody's last review.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Aug. 22, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to
$213.4 million from $315.9 million at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 216 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 14.1% of the pool.  There are no loans that have
defeased.

Thirty-three loans, constituting 14.9% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $0.18 million (for an average loss
severity of 16.9%).  Ten loans, constituting 5.1% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Elm Grove Garden Apartments ($2.4 million -- 1.1% of
the pool), which is secured by an 84 unit apartment complex located
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  The special servicer indicated that the
loan transferred to special servicing in November 2014 due to
delinquent payments from the borrower allegedly diverting funds to
pay for HUD mandated repairs.  The property operates under the
Louisiana Housing Finance Authority Housing Assistance Payment
Contract.  The borrower was successful in renewing their HAP
contract, and is in the process of negotiating a
modification/forbearance agreement to allow time for a sale.

The remaining 9 specially serviced loans are secured by multifamily
and manufactured housing properties.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $2.9 million loss for the specially serviced loans (26.9%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 38 poorly
performing loans, constituting 15.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $8.3 million (a 25% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 70% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 16% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100.7%, compared
to 102.2% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 5.4% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Kelton Manor Loan ($4.2 million -- 2.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a 30 unit multifamily complex located in
the Westwood section of Los Angeles, California.  The property is
located near UCLA's campus, and is occupied by mostly students.
The loan is fully amortizing and is full recourse to the borrower.
The loan has amortized almost 13% since origination and as of March
2016, the property was 100% occupied the same as in June 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90.8% and 1.01X, respectively,
compared to 109% and 0.84X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Avanti Garden Apartments Loan
($3.8 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 68 unit
multifamily apartment complex located in the El Cajon submarket of
San Diego.  The collateral includes five garden-style apartment
buildings with gated access.  The loan is floating rate with an
interest rate cap of 12.2% and has amortized almost 9.2% since
origination.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121.7% and 0.84X,
respectively, compared to 124% and 0.83X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cedar Ridge Apartments Loan
($3.6 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 117-unit
multifamily complex located in Waynesburg, PA, which is a tertiary
market approximately 52 miles south of Pittsburgh.  The collateral
includes eight garden-style apartment buildings.  As per the August
2016 rent roll, the property was 94% occupied.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91.8% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 94.3%
and 1.12X at the last review.


COLT 2016-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class M-1X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-2 (the Certificates) issued
by COLT 2016-2 Mortgage Loan Trust (the Trust):

   -- $130.2 million Class A-1 at A (sf)

   -- $59.7 million Class A-2 at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.8 million Class M-1 at BB (sf)

   -- $130.2 million Class A-1X at A (sf)

   -- $59.7 million Class A-2X at BBB (sf)

   -- $130.2 million Class A-3 at A (sf)

   -- $59.7 million Class A-4 at BBB (sf)

   -- $8.8 million Class M-1X at BB (sf)

   -- $8.8 million Class M-1E at BB (sf)

Classes A-1X, A-2X and M-1X are interest-only (IO) certificates.
The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-3, A-4 and M-1E are exchangeable certificates. These
classes can be exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable
certificates as specified in the offering documents.

The A (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 40.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the pool. The
BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 12.50% and 8.45% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, prime and non-prime, first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 501 loans with a total
principal balance of $216,966,529 as of the Cut-Off Date (September
1, 2016).

Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber) is the originator and servicer
for 84.7% of the portfolio. The Caliber mortgages were originated
under the following five programs:

   -- Jumbo Alternative (21.3%) – Generally made to borrowers
with
      unblemished credit seeking larger balance mortgages. These  

      loans may have IO features, higher debt-to-income (DTI) and
      loan-to-value (LTV) ratios or lower credit scores compared
      with those in traditional prime jumbo securitizations.

   -- Homeowner’s Access (50.2%) – Made to borrowers who do not

      qualify for agency or prime jumbo mortgages for various
      reasons, such as loan size in excess of government limits,
      alternative or insufficient credit, or prior derogatory
      credit events that occurred more than two years prior to
      origination.

   -- Fresh Start (9.0%) – Made to borrowers with lower credit
and
      significant recent credit events within the past 24 months.

   -- Investor (3.8%) – Made to borrowers who finance investor
      properties where the mortgage loan would not meet agency or
      government guidelines because of such factors as property
      type, number of financed properties, lower borrower credit
      score or a seasoned credit event.

   -- Foreign National (0.4%) – Made to non-resident borrowers
      holding certain types of visas who may not have a credit
      score.

Sterling Bank and Trust, FSB (Sterling) is the originator and
servicer for 15.3% of the portfolio. The Sterling mortgages were
originated under Sterling’s Advantage Home Ownership Program
(Advantage), which focuses on high-quality borrowers with clean
mortgage payment histories and substantial equity in their
properties who seek alternative income documentation products.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as the Master
Servicer, Securities Administrator and Certificate Registrar. U.S.
Bank National Association will serve as Trustee.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ability to repay (ATR) rules,
they were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for
agency, government or private-label non-agency prime jumbo products
for various reasons described above. In accordance with the CFPB
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.2% of the loans are designated as
QM Safe Harbor, 40.5% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 52.8% as
non-QM. Approximately 6.5% of the loans are not subject to the QM
rules.

The servicers will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent and are obligated to make advances in respect of taxes,
insurance premiums and reasonable costs incurred in the course of
servicing and disposing of properties.

On or after the two-year anniversary of the Closing Date, the
Depositor has the option to terminate the Issuing Entity by
purchasing all of the mortgage loans (or real estate-owned (REO)
properties) at a price equal to the outstanding class balance plus
accrued and unpaid interest (or fair market value of the REO
properties) as well as any related fees and expenses of the
transaction parties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

   -- ATR Rules and Appendix Q Compliance: All of the mortgage
      loans were underwritten in accordance with the eight
      underwriting factors of the ATR rules. In addition,
      Caliber’s underwriting standards comply with the Standards

      for Determining Monthly Debt and Income as set forth in
      Appendix Q of Regulation Z with respect to income
      verification and the calculation of DTI ratios.

   -- Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-
      prime mortgages, underwriting standards have improved
      significantly from the pre-crisis era. The Caliber loans
      were underwritten to a full documentation standard with
      respect to verification of income (generally through two
      years of Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statements or tax returns),
      employment and asset. Generally, fully executed Form 4506-T,
  
      Request for Transcript of Tax Returns are obtained and tax
      returns are verified with Internal Revenue Service
      transcripts if applicable. Although loans in the Sterling
      Advantage program were underwritten to limited documentation

      standards, borrowers are required to have strong credit
      profiles, substantial equity in their properties and
      generally no delinquencies in the past 12 months. The
      Sterling loans were all originated through the retail
      channel and have a weighted-average original combined LTV of

      59.5%.

   -- Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:

      -- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have
         robust loan attributes as reflected in combined LTV
         ratios, borrower household income and liquid reserves,
         including the loans in Homeowner’s Access and Fresh
         Start, the two programs with weaker borrower credit.

      -- The pool contains low proportions of cash-out and
         investor properties.

      -- LTVs gradually reduce as the programs move down the
         credit spectrum, suggesting the consideration of
         compensating factors for riskier pools.

      -- The pool comprises 31.1% fixed-rate mortgages, which have

         the lowest default risk because of the stability of
         monthly payments. The pool comprises 63.8% hybrid
         adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with an initial fixed
         period of five to seven years, allowing borrowers
         sufficient time to credit cure before rates reset. Only
         5.1% of the pool are hybrid ARMs with an initial fixed
         period of three years.

   -- Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party

      due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
      compliance reviews on 100.0% of the loans in the pool. Data
      integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

   -- Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short):    
      Caliber began originating loans under the five programs in
      Q4 2014. Of the approximately 1,392 mortgages originated to
      date, only 20 were ever 30 days delinquent, which generally
      self-cured shortly after, and one loan has been 60 days
      delinquent. Sterling’s Advantage portfolio has experienced

      no delinquencies since October 2011 and Sterling’s
servicing
      portfolio maintains low delinquency rates of 0.08% through
      June 2016. Approximately 2.6% of the loans in the COLT 2016-
      2 portfolio have had prior 30-day delinquencies, but have
      all self-cured. In addition, voluntary prepayment rates have

      been relatively high as these borrowers tend to credit cure
      and refinance into lower-cost mortgages.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

   -- Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:

      The R&W framework is considerably weaker compared with that
      of a post-crisis prime jumbo securitization. Instead of an
      automatic review when a loan becomes seriously delinquent,
      this transaction employs an optional review only when
      realized losses occur (unless the alleged breach relates to
      an ATR or TRID violation). In addition, rather than engaging

      a third-party due diligence firm to perform the R&W review,
      the Controlling Holder (initially the Sponsor or a majority-
      owned affiliate of the Sponsor) has the option to perform
      the review in house or use a third-party reviewer. Finally,
      the R&W providers (Caliber and Sterling) are unrated
      entities, have limited performance history of non-prime,
      non-QM securitizations and may potentially experience
      financial stress that could result in the inability to
      fulfill repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following
      mitigating factors:

      -- The holders of Certificates representing 25.0% interest
         in the Certificates may direct the Trustee to commence a
         separate review of the related mortgage loan, to the
         extent that they disagree with the Controlling Holder’s

         determination of a breach.

      -- Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100.0% of the
         loans included in the pool. A comprehensive due diligence

         review mitigates the risk of future R&W violations.

      -- DBRS conducted on-site originator (and servicer) reviews
         of Caliber and Sterling and deems them to be
         operationally sound.

       -- The Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor will retain
          the Class M-2 Certificates, which represent at least
          5.0% of the fair value of all the Certificates, aligning

          Sponsor and investor interest in the capital structure.

       -- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator
          scores downward to account for the potential inability
          to fulfill repurchase obligations, the lack of
          performance history as well as the weaker R&W framework.

          A lower originator score results in increased default
          and loss assumptions and provides additional cushions
          for the rated securities.

   -- Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans:
      Compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this
      portfolio contains some mortgages originated to borrowers
      with weaker credit and prior derogatory credit events as
      well as QM-rebuttable presumption or non-QM loans.

   -- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
      factors as required by the ATR rules. The Caliber loans were

      also underwritten to comply with the standards set forth in
      Appendix Q.

   -- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the

      pre-crisis era.

   -- DBRS RMBS Insight Model incorporates loss severity penalties

      for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans as explained
      in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the related
      report.

   -- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the

      Homeowner’s Access and Fresh Start programs, borrower
credit
      events had generally happened 45 months and 33 months,
      respectively, prior to origination, on average.

   -- Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest
      (P&I): The servicers will advance scheduled P&I on
      delinquent mortgages until such loans become 180 days
      delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss severities

      to the transaction because advanced P&I will not have to be
      reimbursed from the trust upon the liquidation of the
      mortgages, but will increase the possibility of periodic
      interest shortfalls to the Certificateholders. Mitigating
      factors include that principal proceeds can be used to pay
      interest shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding
      senior Certificates are paid in full as well as the fact
      that subordination levels are greater than expected losses,
      which may provide for payment of interest to the
      Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated

      P&I advancing up to 180 days for delinquent loans; the cash
      flow scenarios are discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow

      Analysis section of the related report.

   -- Servicers’ Financial Capability: In this transaction, the
      servicers, Caliber and Sterling, are responsible for funding

      advances to the extent required. The servicers are unrated
      entities and may face financial difficulties in fulfilling
      its servicing advance obligation in the future.
      Consequently, the transaction employs Wells Fargo, rated AA
      (high) by DBRS, as the Master Servicer. If a servicer fails
      in its obligation to make advances, Wells Fargo will be
      obligated to fund such servicing advances.

The DBRS ratings of the Certificates address the ultimate payment
of interest and full payment of principal (excluding interest-only
classes) by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Certificates.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the related report. Please see the related
appendix for additional information regarding sensitivity of
assumptions used in the rating process.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COLT 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings to the COLT 2016-2
Mortgage Loan Trust (COLT 2016-2):

   -- $130,180,000 class A-1 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $130,180,000 notional class A-1X certificates 'Asf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $130,180,000 exchangeable class A-3 certificates 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $59,666,000 class A-2 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $59,666,000 notional class A-2X certificates 'BBBsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $59,666,000 exchangeable class A-4 certificates 'BBBsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,787,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,787,000 notional class M-1X certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $8,787,000 exchangeable class M-1E certificates 'BBsf';
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating these certificates:

   -- $18,333,529 class M-2 certificates.

This is the second Fitch-rated RMBS transaction issued post-crisis
that consists primarily of newly originated, non-prime mortgage
loans.  The most notable difference between COLT 2016-2 and COLT
2016-1 (which closed June 2016) is that not all of the loans in
2016-2 were originated by Caliber Home Loans, Inc.  Roughly 15% of
the COLT 2016-2 pool was originated by Sterling Bank and Trust, FSB
(Sterling).  Whereas the credit quality of the 85% of the pool
originated by Caliber in 2016-2 is consistent with the credit
quality of the loans in 2016-1, the loans originated by Sterling
have a different borrower credit profile, with higher credit
scores, lower loan-to-values and, notably, the use of bank
statements to document the borrower's income rather than
traditional income documentation.  Despite projected loss penalties
to reflect the weaker income documentation, Fitch projects
meaningfully lower loan losses on the Sterling loans than for
Caliber loans due to the relative strength of the remaining loan
attributes.

In addition, Fitch made one change to its loss modelling approach
for 2016-2 related to its Ability to Repay (ATR) claim probability.
For 2016-1, Fitch doubled its standard ATR claim probability for
all non-qualified (non-QM) and Higher Priced-QM (HPQM) loans in the
pool.  For 2016-2, Fitch did not double its standard ATR claim
probability for non-QM and HPQM borrowers with Appendix Q income
documentation, credit scores above 700 and household income above
$100,000.  Consequently, for 2016-2 only roughly 20% of the pool
received double the standard ATR claim adjustment, while the
remaining non-QM and HPQM borrowers received the standard
adjustment.  Fitch believes this adjustment more appropriately
reflects the risk of ATR claims in the pool.

The combination of the higher credit quality loans from Sterling
and a reduced ATR claim probability on a portion of the pool
resulted in lower pool loss expectations for 2016-2 relative to
2016-1.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is collateralized with 53% non-QM mortgages as
defined by the ATR rule while 41% is designated as HPQM and the
remainder either meets the criteria for Safe Harbor QM or ATR does
not apply.  Due to the limited non-prime performance of the asset
manager, Hudson Americas L.P. (Hudson), and originators, Fitch
capped the highest possible initial rating at 'Asf'.

The certificates are supported by a pool of 501 mortgage loans with
credit scores (702) similar to legacy Alt-A collateral. However,
unlike legacy originations, many of the loans were underwritten to
comprehensive Appendix Q documentation standards and 100% due
diligence was performed confirming adherence to the guidelines.
The weighted average loan-to-value ratio is roughly 76% and many of
the borrowers have significant liquid reserves. The transaction
also benefits from an alignment of interest, as LSRMF Acquisitions
I, LLC (LSRMF) or a majority-owned affiliate, will be retaining a
horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not less than 5% of
the aggregate fair market value of all the certificates in the
transaction.

Fitch applied a default penalty to 47% of the pool to account for
borrowers with a mortgage derogatory as recent as two years prior
to obtaining the new mortgage, and increased its non-QM loss
severity penalty on lower credit quality loans to account for a
potentially greater number of challenges to the ATR Rule.  Fitch
also increased default expectations by 258 basis points at the
'Asf' rating category to reflect variances from a full
representation and warranty (R&W) framework.

Initial credit enhancement (CE) for the class A-1 certificates of
40.00% is substantially above Fitch's 'Asf' rating stress loss of
16.75%.  The additional initial CE is primarily driven by the pro
rata principal distribution between the A-1 and A-2 certificates,
which will result in a significant reduction of the class A-1
subordination over time through principal payments to the A-2.  The
certificate sizing also reflects the allocation of collateral
principal to pay only principal on the certificates and collateral
interest to pay only certificate interest.  Both of these features
resulted in higher initial subordination to ensure that principal
and ultimate interest (with interest accrued on deferred amounts)
are paid in full by maturity under each class's respective rating
stress scenario.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

New Asset Class (concern): Due to the limited non-prime performance
of the asset manager, Hudson Americas L.P. (Hudson), and Caliber
(as originator), Fitch capped the highest possible initial rating
at 'Asf'.  As Caliber and Hudson further develop a track record and
more non-prime performance is established while upholding the same
controls, Fitch will consider a higher rating.

Non-Prime Credit Quality (concern): The credit scores for the
Caliber loans average 701, which resemble legacy Alt-A collateral,
while the 760 average score for the Sterling loans more closely
resembles recent prime quality loans.  The pool was analyzed using
Fitch's Alt-A model with positive adjustments made to account for
the improved operational quality for recent originations, due
diligence review, and presence of liquid reserves.  Negative
adjustments were made to reflect the inclusion of borrowers (47%)
with recent credit events, increased risk of ATR challenges and
loans with TILA RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) exceptions.

Bank Statement Loans Included (concern): While Sterling has an
established track record in originating both agency and non-agency
mortgage loans, 65 of the non-QM loans included in this pool were
underwritten to its Advantage Program where a 30-day (1-month) bank
statement was used to verify income, which is not consistent with
Appendix Q documentation standards.  While employment and assets
are fully verified, the limited income verification resulted in
application of a probability of default (PD) penalty of
approximately 1.4x for the Sterling loans and an increased
probability of ATR claims.

Appendix Q Compliant (positive): Of the 435 loans contributed by
Caliber, roughly 97% or 423 loans were underwritten to the
comprehensive Appendix Q documentation standards defined by ATR.
While a due diligence review identified roughly 2.8% of the Caliber
loans as having minor variations to Appendix Q, Fitch views those
differences as immaterial and all loans as having full income
documentation.

Operational and Data Quality (positive): Fitch reviewed Caliber's,
Sterling's and Hudson's origination and acquisition platforms and
found them to have sound underwriting and operational control
environments, reflecting industry improvements following the
financial crisis that are expected to reduce risk related to
misrepresentation and data quality.  All loans in the mortgage pool
were reviewed by a third party due diligence firm, and the results
indicated strong underwriting and property valuation controls.

Alignment of Interests (positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors.  LSRMF, as
sponsor and securitizer, or an affiliate will be retaining a
horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not less than 5% of
the aggregate fair market value of all the certificates in the
transaction.  As part of its focus on investing in residential
mortgage credit, as of the closing date, LSRMF will retain the
class M-2 certificates, which represent 8.45% of the transaction.
Lastly, for the 435 Caliber-originated loans, the representations
and warranties are provided by Caliber, which is owned by LSRMF
affiliates, and therefore aligns the interest of the investors with
those of LSRMF to maintain high-quality origination standards and
sound performance, as Caliber will be obligated to repurchase loans
due to rep breaches.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until both
class A notes have been reduced to zero.  To the extent that either
the cumulative loss trigger event or the CE trigger event occurs in
a given period, principal will be distributed sequentially to the
class A-1 and A-2 bonds until they are reduced to zero.

R&W Framework (concern): Caliber and Sterling, as originators, will
be providing loan level reps and warranties to the trust. While the
reps for this transaction are substantively consistent with those
listed in Fitch's published criteria and provide a solid alignment
of interest, Fitch added 258 bps to the projected defaults at the
'Asf' rating category to reflect the non-investment-grade
counterparty risk of the providers and the lack of an automatic
review of defaulted loans.  The lack of an automatic review is
mitigated by the ability of holders of 25% of the total outstanding
aggregate class balance to initiate a review.

Servicing and Master Servicer (positive): Servicing will be
performed on 85% of the loans by Caliber and on 15% of the loans by
Sterling.  Fitch rates Caliber 'RPS2-'/Negative Outlook, due to its
fast-growing portfolio and regulatory scrutiny, and reviewed
Sterling to be acceptable.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo;
'RMS1'/Stable Outlook, will act as master servicer and securities
administrator.  Advances required but not paid by Caliber and
Sterling will be paid by Wells Fargo.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level.  The implied rating sensitivities
are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 8.3%.  The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

    USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC).  The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on three areas: a
compliance review; a credit review; and a valuation review; and was
conducted on 100% of the loans in the pool.  Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and believes the overall results of the
review generally reflected strong underwriting controls. Fitch made
the following adjustment(s) to its analysis: A total of 10 loans
were identified as having material exceptions which are potentially
at risk for statutory damages and were subject to an increase in
Fitch's loss severity (LS) of $15,500 to account for the possible
maximum statutory damage awarded to a borrower ($4,000); borrower
legal costs associated with the TRID violation ($10,000); and the
trust's incremental legal costs associated with the error ($1,500).
Fitch received certifications indicating that the loan-level due
diligence was conducted in accordance with its published standards
for reviewing loans and in accordance with the independence
standards outlined in its criteria.


CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 2012-2: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Cl. C Certs Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for several series of
enhanced equipment trust certificates issued by United Airlines.
Fitch currently rates United 'BB-'/Outlook Positive. The following
ratings have been affirmed:

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2016-1

   -- Class AA Certificates at 'AA'

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2014-2

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2014-1

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2013-1

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

Continental Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2012-2

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

Continental Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2012-3

   -- Class C Certificates at 'BB'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's senior EETC tranche ratings are primarily based on a
top-down analysis of the level of overcollateralization (OC)
featured in the transaction. Fitch's stress analysis uses an
approach assuming the rejection of the entire pool of aircraft in a
severe global aviation downturn. The stress scenario incorporates a
full draw on the liquidity facility, an assumed 5%
repossession/remarketing cost, and various stresses to the value of
the collateral. Fitch also utilizes its top-down approach for the
UAL 2016-1 'A' tranche, which is the subordinated tranche in that
transaction. The ratings approach in that transaction is supported
by levels of OC that are similar to other, previously issued senior
tranches.

Based on updated appraisal information incorporated into Fitch's
analysis, the level of OC in each of these transactions has
weakened slightly since the ratings were last reviewed, with the
exception of UAL 2016-1, which was just launched in May of this
year. Weaker levels of collateral coverage are a result of aircraft
values that have depreciated slightly faster than the levels that
were incorporated into Fitch's previous analysis. Faster rates of
depreciation were broad-based, including all of the aircraft types
that are featured in these transactions, namely the 737-900ER, the
ERJ-175, and the 787-8 and 787-9. Despite slightly weaker
loan-to-values (LTVs), all of the transactions continued to pass
Fitch's stress tests that correspond to their current rating
levels.

The B and C tranche ratings are notched from the 'BB-' IDR of the
underlying airline. The 'BBB-' rating for the B tranches reflects a
high affirmation factor (+2 notches) and the presence of an
18-month liquidity facility (+1 notch). The 'BB' rating for the
2012-3 C tranche reflects a high affirmation factor (+2 notches)
partially offset by recovery expectations (-1 notch).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Ratings for these transactions are driven by a harsh downside
scenario in which United declares bankruptcy, chooses to reject the
collateral aircraft, and where the aircraft are remarketed in the
midst of a severe slump in aircraft values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative rating actions for the senior tranches could be driven by
unexpected declines in collateral values. For the 737-900ERs in
these transactions, values could be affected by the entrance of the
737-9 MAX, or by an unexpected bankruptcy by one of its major
operators. Likewise the Embraer 175s could also be affected by the
entrance of the 175 E-2. Concerns for the 787 values largely
revolve around the potential for production issues on a scale above
and beyond what has already been experienced.

Subordinated tranche ratings are based off of the underlying
airline IDR. As such, Fitch would likely upgrade the B tranches to
'BBB' if United's IDR were upgraded to 'BB'. Fitch's criteria allow
for greater ratings uplift for lower rated carriers, therefore if
United were downgraded to 'B+', the subordinated tranche ratings
would likely not change.

Variation from Criteria:

Fitch looks to its Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance
dated Sept. 1, 2016 for guidance on rating requirements for direct
counterparties including liquidity facility providers. Criteria
stipulate that in cases where the senior-most tranche of rated debt
is rated in the 'AA' category, the liquidity provider should
maintain an IDR of at least 'A-'. The transaction documents that
govern the United 2016-1 EETC stipulate a downgrade threshold for
the 'AA' tranche liquidity facility provider of 'BBB+',
representing a variation from Fitch's criteria.

The variation recognizes that this aspect of the counterparty
criteria does not directly apply to EETC ratings. In particular,
Fitch's EETC criteria stipulate that in order to maintain a senior
tranche rating in the 'AA' rating category, the underlying airline
must be rated at least 'B'.

However, if the liquidity facility were to be drawn due to
non-payment of interest, the airline would be rated below the 'B'
rating level. Thus, the ratings on the senior tranche would have
already been downgraded below the 'AA' category, at which point,
the threshold rating of 'A-' stipulated in Fitch's counterparty
criteria is not applicable.


COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $1.8B Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 30 tranches,
downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches and confirmed ratings of 127
tranches from 22 transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS
loans, issued by Countrywide Mortgage (CW). The tranches that were
placed on review for upgrade on July 22, 2016, are due to the
distribution of funds related to the $8.5 billion settlement
related to CW's pre-crisis servicing practices and alleged breaches
of representations and warranties, between Bank of America, N.A.,
parent of CW, and Bank of New York Mellon as trustee.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-15

   -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-20

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-23

   -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB6

   -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2011
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB2

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB3

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB4

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB6

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-10CB

   -- Cl. A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-15

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-17CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-22CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Caa1

      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-25CB

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-27CB

   -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-32CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2004-36CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2005-1CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
   
   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-6, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO-B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series  

   2005-2

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2005-7CB

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-7, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-8, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2005-J10

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-10, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-14, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-16, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-17, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2005-J11

   -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-15, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-16, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-A-17, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 1-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 3-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 4-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 6-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 7-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
      2016 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. 7-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO-B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO-C, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2005-J14

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016

      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
      Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions consider the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools together with changes in tranche level credit
enhancement.

The rating upgrades primarily reflect the receipt of approximately
$83.9 million from the $8.5 billion CW settlement that was applied
to the bonds. The rating upgrades incorporate the positive effect
of recoveries and reduction of loss on the affected bonds as well
as any increases in credit enhancement related to recoveries or
otherwise, on subordinated bonds.

The rating downgrades primarily reflect the worsening of bond level
credit enhancement which outweighs the positive impact from receipt
of $6.6 million from the $8.5 billion CW settlement that was
applied to the bonds.

The rating confirmations primarily reflect losses incurred and
outstanding on the bonds after settlement recoveries, Moody's
updated loss expectation on the bonds and related pools, and bond
specific credit enhancement in the transactions

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on five classes in CSFB Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C4 as follows:

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015 Upgraded

      to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class (Class E) was upgraded based primarily
on an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 19% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class (Class D) was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on one P&I class (Class F) was affirmed because the
rating is consistent with current and expected interest shortfalls.
The rating on one P&I class (Class G) was affirmed because the
rating is consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO class (Class A-Y) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced loans. The rating on one IO class (Class A-X) was
affirmed based on the credit performance (or the weighted average
rating factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, compared to 3.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.0% at the last review.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, compared to a Herf of three at Moody's last
review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $31.7 million
from $1.14 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 44% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 83% of
the pool. Eleven residential cooperative (co-op) loans,
constituting 40% of the pool, have aaa (sca.pd) structured credit
assessments. Ten loans are located in New York and one is located
in New Jersey. Of these ten loans, one is interest-only, three have
balloon payments and seven are fully amortizing. Three loans,
constituting 46% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $44.0 million (for an average loss
severity of 25%).

As of the August 17, 2016 remittance statement, cumulative interest
shortfalls were $813,291. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls
will continue because of master servicer fees and special servicer
fees.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 58% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 46%, compared to 47%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 27% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 3.62X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 3.02X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the AYTS Industrial Building Loan ($2.7 million --
8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 98,150 square foot (SF)
industrial building located in Centerville, Tennessee. The property
is 100% leased to Agrana Fruit US, Inc. through a triple net lease
that expires in February 2019. Due to the single tenant exposure,
Moody's stressed the value of this property utilizing a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.50X,
respectively, compared to 67% and 1.45X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Diamond Bar Plaza Loan
(approximately $897,000 -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
36,450 SF retail center located in Diamond Bar, California. The
property is located almost 30 miles east of downtown Los Angeles.
This loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
18% and 5.78X, respectively, compared to 26% and 3.95X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is The Village Apartments Loan
(approximately $757,000 -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
multifamily property located in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, roughly 45
miles north of Tulsa. The property was 99% leased as of December
2015 and has been well leased for the past five years. This loan is
fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 11% and 8.74X,
respectively, compared to 15% and 6.51X at the last review.


DEUTSCHE BANK 2012-CCRE5: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s (COMM) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2012-CCRE5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to stable performance of the underlying
pool collateral. As of the September 2016 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 10.7% to $1
billion from $1.13 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting,
seven loans (7.8% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting class H. The pool has experienced no
realized losses to date.

There was a variance from criteria related to class D where Fitch's
surveillance criteria would indicate that an upgrade is possible.
However, an upgrade was not warranted as overall performance
remains in-line with issuance with limited paydown and
amortization. As of year-end 2015, aggregate pool-level net
operating income (NOI) was 2% lower than NOI at issuance.
Additionally, concerns related to the Holiday Village Mall (2.6%)
which has seen deterioration in performance as a result of an
anchor vacancy remain.

Four loans appear on the servicer watchlist (9.6% of the pool) due
to declines in debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
occurrence of a servicing trigger event due to an upcoming
termination option. In particular, the Holiday Village Mall loan
(2.6%), which is secured by a 576,987-square foot (sf) (494,928 sf
of collateral) regional mall located in Great Falls, MT is on the
watchlist due to Sears (15% of the net rentable area [NRA])
vacating in 2014. As of year-end 2015, NOI was 4% below NOI at
issuance with reported DSCR of 1.97x.

The largest loan in the pool (8.8%) is the Eastview Mall and
Commons loan, which is secured by two adjacent retail properties
located in Victor, NY. The Eastview Mall is a 1.37 million sf
regional mall (725,303 sf of collateral) and the Eastview Commons
is a 341,871-sf (86,368 sf of collateral) power center. The
transaction interests represent the A-2 note, which is pari passu
to the A-1 note that is securitized in COMM 2012-CR4. Per servicer
reporting, the year-end (YE) 2015 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 2.03x remains in-line with 2.14x at YE2014 and 2.19x at
issuance. The combined occupancy at the properties was 95% as of
YE2015.

The second largest loan, Harmon Corner (6.8% of the pool), is
secured by a 66,833-sf portion of a 110,000-sf retail center
located along the Strip in Las Vegas, NV. The transaction interest
represents the A-1 note, which is pari passu with the A-2 note that
is securitized in transaction COMM 2013-LC6. The A-1 note
represents the controlling piece. Performance has declined with
YE2015 NOI 4.4% below 2014 and remains 31.8% lower than issuance.
The NOI decline is driven by the largest tenant, Goretorium (22%),
vacating in late 2013. The tenant was replaced by Rainforest Cafe
which opened in September 2015.

The third largest loan, 200 Varick Street (6.3% of the pool), is
secured by a 12-story, 430,397-sf office property located in the
southern portion of the Greenwich Village neighborhood of New York
City. Performance remains stable as the property is 100% occupied
and YE2015 NOI has improved 13% from issuance. Revenue has
increased 16% from issuance, but is outpaced by expense inflation,
which has grown 20% from issuance. According to Reis'
second-quarter 2016 report, the Broadway submarket of NY had a
vacancy rate of 5.3% with average asking rents of $51.15 psf. The
subject underperforms the submarket with respect to in-place rent.


RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades may
occur with improved pool performance and significant paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline. Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of the Holiday Village Mall and the impact of the Sears
store closing.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

   -- $135.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $90.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $100 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $357.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $807.1 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52.4 million class X-B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $123.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52.4 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $211.1 million class PEZ at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35.4 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.7 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32.6 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18.4 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class H certificates.

The class A-M, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for the class
PEZ certificates, and the class PEZ certificates may be exchanged
for the class A-M, B, and C certificates. Fitch rates the class PEZ
equivalent to the first loss of the lowest rated class C
exchangeable certificates.


DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Dryden 45 Senior Loan Fund (the "Issuer" or "Dryden
45").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$403,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$88,400,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1
      (sf)

   -- US$46,150,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$32,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$27,950,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Dryden 45 Senior Loan Fund is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and up to 7.5% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and non-senior
secured loans. Moreover, based on the portfolio's WARF and the
percentage of the portfolio that consists of covenant-lite loans,
the minimum percentage of senior secured loans could be as high as
96.0%. The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as of the closing
date.

PGIM, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's 4.75 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest collateral principal collections constituting
unscheduled principal payments or the sale proceeds of credit risk
obligations or, if the Class A Notes that were issued on the
closing date are no longer outstanding, credit improved
obligations, in additional collateral debt obligations, subject to
certain conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $650,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.75%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class C Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Eastland CLO, Ltd.:

   -- US$81,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to
      Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of
      $34,703,986), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$825,600,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of
      $152,006,319), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015

      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$206,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
      Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$78,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
      Dec 10, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- US$68,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Ba1
      (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- US$48,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current
      outstanding balance of $37,636,187), Affirmed B1 (sf);
      previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Eastland CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with significant exposure to CLO tranches. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in May 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2015. The Class
A-1 and A-2a notes have been paid down by approximately 38.3% or
$56.3 million and 59.4% or $222.6 million, respectively, since that
time. Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the OC ratios for
the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are now 136.06%,
119.37%, 108.21%, and 102.92%, respectively, versus December 2015
levels of 130.36%, 117.02%, 107.76%, 103.27%, respectively. The
trustee's July 2016 OC ratios do not reflect the recent aggregate
payment of $111.5 million to the Class A-1 and Class A-2a notes in
August 2016.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since December 2015. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2761 compared to 2554 in
December 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

   -- Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a number of
      securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
      through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
      necessary information to update its credit estimates in a
      timely fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected

      by any default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in
      lieu of updated credit estimates.

   -- Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
      liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative

      outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
      Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
      exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
      default. The historical default rate is higher than average
      for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

      which constitute around $27 million or 4% of the portfolio,
      Moody's ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2209)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2a: 0

   -- Class A-2b: 0

   -- Class A-3: 0

   -- Class B: +3

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +1

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3313)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2a: 0

   -- Class A-2b: 0

   -- Class A-3:-1

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $638.5 million, defaulted par of
$79.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 17.45%
(implying a WARF of 2761), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.42%, a diversity score of 30 and a weighted average
spread of 3.17% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


EMERSON PARK: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1a, A-1b,
A-2R, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, E, and F notes from Emerson Park CLO
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
closed in August 2013 and is managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds
Management.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Aug. 6, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date in November 2013, the
trustee-reported collateral portfolio weighted average life
decreased to 4.70 years from 5.36 years.  This seasoning, combined
with the stable credit quality, has decreased the overall credit
risk profile, which, in turn, has provided more cushion to the
tranche ratings.  In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio increased during this period, contributing to the
portfolio's increased diversification.

Both defaults and assets rated 'CCC+' and below also increased over
the same period.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $4.09 million (0.83% of the aggregate principal
balance) as of August 2016 from zero as of the November 2013
effective date report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below
increased to $14.75 million (3.00% of the aggregate principal
balance) from zero.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 132.94%, down from 134.57%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 119.47%, down from 120.94%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 112.29%, down from 113.67%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 106.61%, down from 107.92%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life.  However, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such,
the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, and D notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

Although the cash flow results indicated a lower rating for the
class E notes, S&P views the overall credit seasoning as an
improvement and also considered that the O/C ratios are above their
minimum requirements.  However, any increase in defaults and/or par
losses could lead to potential negative rating actions on the class
E notes in the future.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Emerson Park CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1a          AAA (sf)
A-1b          AAA (sf)
A-2R          AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C-1           A (sf)
C-2           A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Four Corners CLO II, Ltd.:

   -- US $9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 1, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US $232,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
      (current outstanding balance of $8,521,858.31), Affirmed Aaa

      (sf); previously on June 1, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US $10,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 1, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
      (sf)

   -- US $21,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 1, 2016 Upgraded

      to Aaa (sf)

   -- US $11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on June 1, 2016 Affirmed
      to B1 (sf)

Four Corners CLO II Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2016. The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately 69% or $18.6 million
since that time. Based on the trustee's September 2016 report, the
OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are
reported at 333.75%, 156.67%, 126.92% and 104.04%, respectively,
versus June 2016 levels of 217.22%, 138.27%, 119.14% and 102.68%,
respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's September 2016
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 34% of the portfolio. These investments could expose
the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes
mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets      

      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light
      of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which
      increases its sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in
      the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios using a range of
      liquidation value assumptions. However, actual long-dated
      asset exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions
      at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual losses,
      if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1845)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: 0

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2767)

   -- Class A: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: -1

   -- Class E: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $63.7 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 11.54% (implying a WARF of
2306), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.12%, a
diversity score of 18 and a weighted average spread of 2.87%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


FREDDIE MAC 2016-HQA3: Fitch Assigns 'B+sf' Rating on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Freddie Mac's risk-transfer
transaction, Structured Agency Credit Risk Debt Notes Series
2016-HQA3 (STACR 2016-HQA3) as follows:

   -- $143,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $148,500,000 class M-2 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $148,500,000 class M-2F exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

      Stable;

   -- $148,500,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'BBB-
      sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $203,500,000 class M-3 exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $101,750,000 class M-3A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $101,750,000 class M-3AF exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $101,750,000 class M-3AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';

      Outlook Stable;

   -- $101,750,000 class M-3B notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $14,845,386,255 class A-H reference tranche;

   -- $61,222,244 class M-1H reference tranche;

   -- $63,576,947 class M-2H reference tranche;

   -- $43,561,982 class M-3AH reference tranche;

   -- $43,561,982 class M-3BH reference tranche;

   -- $87,123,964 class M-3H reference tranche;

   -- $20,000,000 class B notes;

   -- $137,094,034 class B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBBsf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 4.20%
subordination provided by the 1.35% class M-2 notes; the 0.93%
class M-3A notes; the 0.93% class M-3B; and the 1.00% class B
notes. The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-2 notes reflects the 2.85%
subordination provided by the 0.93% class M-3A notes, the 0.93%
class M-3B notes and the 1.00% class B notes. The notes are general
unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac ('AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject
to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Freddie Mac-guaranteed
MBS.

STACR 2016-HQA3 represents Freddie Mac's fifth risk transfer
transaction applying actual loan loss severity to a reference pool
of over 80% and less than 95% loan-to-value (LTV) loans issued as
part of the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship
Strategic Plan for 2013 - 2017 for each of the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types
of risk-transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $15.7 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Freddie Mac where principal repayment of the notes is
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding
principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual
loan's loss severity (LS) percentage related to those credit
events, which includes borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors. Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1, M-2, M-2F, M-2I,
M-3A, M-3AF, M-3AI, M-3B and M-3 notes will be based on the lower
of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement (CE) available through subordination, and Freddie Mac's
Issuer Default Rating. The M-1, M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B notes will be
issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will carry a 12.5-year
legal final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference pool consists
of 68,900 30-year, fixed-rate fully amortizing loans totaling
$15.709 billion with strong credit profiles and low leverage,
acquired by Freddie Mac between Oct. 1, 2015 and Dec. 31, 2015. The
pool has a weighted average (WA) original combined LTV (CLTV) of
91.8%, WA debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 35.3% and credit score of
748. Third-party, loan-level due diligence was conducted on
approximately 31% of Freddie Mac's quality control sample of 2,731
loans (the sample represents about 1.2% of the total reference
pool). Fitch believes the results of the review generally indicate
strong underwriting controls.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Freddie Mac's fifth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule on loans with LTVs of over 80%. The notes in this
transaction will experience losses realized at the time of
liquidation, which will include both principal and delinquent
interest.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): M-1, M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any
credit events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are
borne by Freddie Mac and do not affect the transaction. In
addition, credit events that occur prior to maturity with losses
realized from liquidations that occur after the final maturity date
will not be passed through to noteholders. This feature more
closely aligns the risk of loss to that of the 10-year, fixed LS
STACRs where losses were passed through when a credit event
occurred: i.e. loans became 180 days delinquent with no
consideration for liquidation timelines. Fitch accounted for the
12.5-year maturity in its analysis and applied a reduction to its
lifetime default expectations. The credit ranged from 8% at the
'Asf' rating category to 12% at the 'BBsf' rating category.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its lender
approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty risk
and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Freddie Mac to be an above-average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. The lower risk was accounted for by Fitch
by applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
the M-1 class will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro-rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 class can receive a full pro-rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained, the cumulative net loss is within a certain
threshold and the delinquency test is within a certain threshold.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B classes will not receive any
scheduled or unscheduled principal allocations until the M-1 class
is paid in full. The B class will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-3B class is paid in
full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 5.50% of
loss protection, as well as a minimum of 50% of the first-loss B
tranche. Initially, Freddie Mac will retain an approximately 30%
vertical slice/interest in the M-1, M-2, M-3A and M-3B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) assets are less
than its obligations for longer than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Freddie Mac if it is determined that such action
would promote an orderly administration of the GSE's affairs. Fitch
believes that the U.S. government will continue to support Freddie
Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE. However, if, at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be downgraded,
and ratings on M-1, M-2, M-3A and M-3B notes, along with their
corresponding MAC notes, could be affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 32.8% at the 'AAsf' level, 28.1% at the 'Asf' level
and 23.3% at the 'BBBsf' level. As shown in the table at right, the
analysis indicates that there is some potential rating migration
with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


FREDDIE MAC: Fitch Rates 3 STACR Tranches 'B+sf'
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
seven previously unrated notes from seven Freddie Mac Structured
Agency Credit Risk (STACR) transactions issued between 2013 and
2014:

   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2013-DN2
      class M-2 notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN2
      class M-3 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN3
      class M-3 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN4
      class M-3 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ1
      class M-3 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ2
      class M-3 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ3
      class M-3 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Ratings are also assigned to these previously unrated exchangeable
classes:

   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2013-DN2
      class M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2013-DN2
      class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2013-DN2
      class MA exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN2
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN2
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN2
      class MA exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN3
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN3
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN3
      class MA exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN4
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN4
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-DN4
      class MA exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ1
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ1
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ1
      class MA exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ2
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ2
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ2
      class MA exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ3
      class M-3F exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ3
      class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk, series 2014-HQ3
      class MA exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch had previously only rated the M-1 class in STACR 2013-DN2 and
both the M-1 and M-2 classes in the remaining transactions. All of
the rated M-1 classes have either paid in full or have had their
ratings upgraded, reflecting strong performance to date.

Fitch's reference mortgage pool loss assumptions for Freddie Mac
STACR transactions were recently published as part of a periodic
review of all Fitch rated GSE Credit Risk Transfer transactions.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Performance to Date: All of the reference pools have
performed well since issuance.  None of the reference pools has
experienced more than 25 basis points (bps) of pre-defined credit
events with half of the deals experiencing credit events less than
15bps.  Using the pre-determined loss severity schedule, none of
the transactions have incurred 3bps or more of loss to date.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Since issuance, the M-3 classes have
had a steady increase in their credit enhancement percentage, as
the reference pool has paid down and losses have been minimal.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes: Based on its review
of Freddie Mac's aggregator platform, Fitch believes that Freddie
Mac has a well-established and disciplined credit-granting process
in place and views its lender approval and oversight processes for
minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan quality
acquisitions as positive.  Loan quality control (QC) review
processes are thorough and indicate a tight control environment as
is most evidenced by the very few findings noted by the third-party
due diligence results.  Tight controls lower operational risk and
improve overall loan quality.  The lower risk was accounted for by
Fitch by applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool
of 5%.

Legal Maturity Credit: All of the new ratings are assigned to
transactions with a legal final maturity of 10 years.  The hard
maturity limits the timeframe in which losses can be realized.  As
the transactions season, and as the legal maturity nears, Fitch
adjusts its loss expectations to account for the reduced loss
exposure window.

Home Price Appreciation: Property values in the reference pools
have benefitted from home price appreciation since issuance.  Since
2013, home prices have increased 19% nationally and 31% in
California.  The reference pools have experienced an average gain
in property values of nearly 16%.

Counterparty Dependence on Freddie Mac: The notes are general
unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac and are subject to the
performance of the reference pool.  Freddie Mac will be responsible
for making monthly payments of interest and principal to investors
based on the payment priorities of the transaction. Due to the
counterparty dependence, Fitch's rating is based on the lower of:
1) the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement available through subordination, and 2) Freddie Mac's
Issuer Default Rating (IDR).

                     RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'.  The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario.  Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are
increasingly more stressful and less likely to occur.  Although
many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary
driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption.
In the 'Bsf' scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below
their long-term sustainable level.  The home price decline
assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to
a 35% decline in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behaviour, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements.  Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level.  While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.


GALAXY CLO XVI: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes from Galaxy XVI CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
2013 and is managed by PineBridge Investments LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 16, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
November 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue
to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

Since the transaction's effective date in March 2014, the trustee
reported collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased
to 4.60 years from 5.65 years.

The transaction has experienced credit deterioration in the form of
an increase in both defaults and assets rated 'CCC+' and below
since the March 2014 effective date report.  Specifically, the
amount of defaulted assets increased to $0.60 million reported as
of June 2016, from zero reported as of effective date.  The level
of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to $22.13 million from
$1.00 million over the same period.

In addition, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios reported for
each class in June 2016 have exhibited mild declines since the
values reported as of the effective date, as shown below:

   -- The senior O/C ratio was 134.87%, down from 135.14%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 120.65%, down from 120.89%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.67%, down from 113.89%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 108.26%, down from 108.47%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all O/C ratios are
currently above the minimum requirements and considered passing.

Overall, the increases in defaulted and 'CCC+' and below rated
assets have been largely offset by the decline in the weighted
average life.  However, any significant deterioration in these
metrics could negatively affect the deal in the future, especially
the junior tranches.

This transaction has exposure to loans from companies in the energy
and commodities sectors, which have come under significant pressure
from falling oil and commodity prices in the past year. As of June
2016, the trustee reports a combined 7.32% of the aggregate
principal balance in the oil and gas and nonferrous metals/minerals
sectors.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis points to higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes, its rating actions considers the
increase in the defaults and decline in the portfolio's credit
quality.  In addition, the ratings considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and reflect additional sensitivity
runs that allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio given
that the transaction is still in its reinvestment period.  

As such, the affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Galaxy XVI CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)


GALLATIN V 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C, D-1, D-2, E, and F notes from Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
July 2013 and is managed by MP Senior Credit Partners L.P.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the August 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.58
years from 5.48 years.  Because time horizon weighs heavily into
default probability, a shorter weighted average life positively
affects the collateral pool's creditworthiness.  In addition, the
number of obligors in the portfolio has increased during this
period, which contributed to the portfolio's increased
diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the September 2013 effective date report.  The
level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to $11.70 million
from $8.49 million over the same period.

According to the August 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
exhibited slight declines since the September 2013 trustee report,
which S&P used for its January 2014 rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 133.7%, down from 134.1% in
      September 2013.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 120.7%, down from 121.1% in
      September 2013.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.5%, down from 113.8% in
      September 2013.

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 108.1%, down from 108.40% in
      September 2013.

   -- The Class F O/C ratio was 105.8%, down from 106.1% in
      September 2013.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life and positive credit
migration of the collateral portfolio.  However, any significant
deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect the deal in
the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such, the affirmed
ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Gallatin CLO V 2013-1 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D-1           BBB (sf)
D-2           BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. N Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C2 as:

  Cl. L, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. N, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Affirmed Ca (sf)
  Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 98% since securitization and
2% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class O was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.2% of the
current balance, compared to 43.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of three, unchanged from Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Sept. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97.7% to
$31.9 million from $1.38 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by six mortgage loans.  Two loans,
constituting 5.1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

One loan, constituting 55% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.74 million (for an average loss
severity of 3.9%).  Two loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Brentmoor Place Loan ($4.2 million -- 13.2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 72-unit, age restricted multifamily
complex in St. Louis, Missouri.  The property consists of studio,
one and two bedroom units within a four-story building.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2013 for imminent
default and became REO as of August 2013.  As of March 2016, the
property was 70% leased, compared to 83% at year-end 2015.

The second loan in special servicing is the Bayshore Plaza Loan
($2.9 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 28,000
square foot (SF) retail property in Gilbert, Arizona.  The property
is part of a larger neighborhood shopping center and is shadow
anchored by ACE Hardware.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2012 for payment default and became REO in
2013.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $11.2 million loss for specially
serviced and troubled loans (87% expected loss on average).

The only non-defeased and non-specially serviced loan is the
Continental Centre Loan ($23.1 million -- 55% of the pool), which
is secured by a 26-story, 477,259 SF Class B office building
located in the CBD of Columbus, Ohio.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in December 2012 due to imminent monetary default
and was modified into a $17.5 million A Note and $5.6 million B
Note with the loan term increased by an additional 60 months.  The
interest rate on the A Note was reduced to 3% through March 2016,
increasing to 4% through March 2017, 5% through March 2018, and
then 5.75% thereafter.  These rates are effective through February
each year, changing March 1.  The interest rate on the B note will
accrue through the balance of the extended loan term.  Moody's has
identified the $5.6 million B Note as a troubled loan.


GS MORTGAGE 2007-GKK1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A-1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
certificate issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-GKK1.
("GSMS 2007-GKK1"):

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

GSMS 2007-GKK1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the
collateral pool balance) issued between 1998 and 2005. As of the
August 22, 2016 trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance
of the transaction, including preferred shares, is $20.6 million,
compared to $633.7 million at issuance. This is a result of
realized losses to the underlying collateral applied to certain
classes of certificates. Class A-1 has received payments in the
form of pre-payments and regular amortization of the underlying
collateral, as well as partial realized losses.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5088,
compared to 5558 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (23.4% compared to 3.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.0%, same as that at last review); Baa1-Baa3 (0.0%
compared to 33.7% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (0.0%, same as that at
last review); B1-B3 (24.3% compared to 11.7% at last review); and
Caa1-Ca/C (52.3%, compared to 51.3% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years, compared to 2.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about the loan within the
underlying look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.8%, compared to 1.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 4.4%, compared to 7.1% at securitization.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant, reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool to 0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificates of zero notches downward (e.g., one notch
down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by 10% would result in
an average modeled rating movement on the rated certificates of two
notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS3: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the GS Mortgage
Securities Trust (GSMS) 2016-GS3 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates series 2016-GS3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $28,475,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $77,052,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $265,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $320,243,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,066,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $841,316,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $98,821,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $93,480,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $53,417,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $192,301,000c class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,404,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $53,417,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $53,417,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,038,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,683,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   --$40,063,502a class G 'NR'.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest only.
  (c) Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
   PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged
   for class A-S, B and C certificates.

These expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 13, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$40,063,502 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 34 loans secured by 152
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.07 billion as of the cut-off date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.6% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 92.9% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.30x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 97.2%, and
a Fitch debt yield of 9.9%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 11.4% to issuer cash flows.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The Fitch stressed DSCR on the trust-specific
debt is 1.30x, higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 1.18x
and 1.18x, respectively.  The Fitch stressed LTV ratio on the
trust-specific debt is 97.2%, lower than the 2015 and YTD 2016
averages of 109.3% and 106.5%, respectively, for the other
Fitch-rated deals.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
comprise 62.1% of the pool by balance.  Compared to other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this
transaction is higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 average
concentrations of 49.3% and 55.3%, respectively.  The pool's
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 486,
which is higher than the 2015 average of 367 and 2016 YTD average
of 428.

Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans in the pool, representing 21.5%
of the total pool balance, received investment-grade credit
opinions.  The largest loan in the pool, 10 Hudson Yards (8.2% of
the pool), received an investment-grade credit opinion of 'AAAsf'
on a fusion basis.  The second largest loan, 540 West Madison (8.1%
of the pool), received an investment-grade opinion of 'A+sf' on a
fusion basis.  Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 (5.2% of the pool)
received an investment-grade credit opinion of 'AAAsf' on a fusion
basis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 5.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to GSMS
2016-GS3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.  


HARBOR LLC 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Class D Notes Rating to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following note issued by Harbor Series 2006-1 LLC:

   -- Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the rating on one class of notes due to
deterioration of the underlying reference pool as evidenced by
weighted average rating factor (WARF) and weighted average recovery
rate (WARR). Moody's has affirmed the ratings of three classes of
notes because the key transaction metrics are commensurate with the
existing ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Harbor Series 2006-1 LLC is a static synthetic transaction backed
by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the reference obligation pool
balance). As of the August 22, 2016 trustee report, the aggregate
issued note balance of the transaction has decreased to $80 million
from $160 million at issuance, with the reference pool amortization
being paid to the notes on a pro-rata basis. This transaction
features a pro-rata to senior-sequential and vice-versa waterfall
switch which is based upon certain thresholds. Since the last
review, the transaction has switched to senior sequential pay.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3551, compared to 1298 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa1(0.7%
compared to 37.6% at last review); A1-A3(13.1% compared to 17.1% at
last review); Baa1-Baa3(5.2% compared to 8.7% at last review);
Ba1-Ba3(23.0% compared to 11.4% at last review); B1-B3(17.3%
compared to 16.0% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (40.7% compared to
9.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.6 years, compared to 2.4 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through loans within the reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 6.3%, compared to 26.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 27.1%, compared to 11.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying reference obligations and credit
estimates. Notching down 100% of the reference obligations pool by
one notch would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of zero notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Notching 100% of the reference
obligations pool by one notch would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch upward
(e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


HOME PARTNERS 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of certificates backed by one floating rate loan secured by
a pool of 1,407 single-family rental properties (1,145 properties
owned by the Borrower and 262 mortgage loans on single-family
properties in Texas which are owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the Borrower).

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Home Partners of America 2016-2 Trust

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Overview

Moody's advance rate for this transaction at stresses consistent
with a Aaa rating level is 47.2%.  This rate is the ratio of the
maximum size of senior certificates that would be consistent with a
Aaa (sf) rating to our estimate of the initial value of the
portfolio (the Moody's Value).  To determine this advance rate, we
took into account the transaction's key features and analyzed the
recovery value of the portfolio under stressed market conditions
and the sufficiency of the expected rental cash flow.

Key transaction features

Multiple-property pool: The loan is secured by multiple properties.
A loan secured by multiple properties benefits from lower cash
flow volatility because excess cash flow from one property can
augment the cash flow of another to meet the debt service
requirements.  The loan also benefits from the pooling of equity
from each underlying property.  The loan is secured by a pool of
1,407 single-family rental properties (1,145 properties owned by
the Borrower and 262 mortgage loans on single-family properties in
Texas which are owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Borrower)
located in 42 MSAs in 18 states.

Right to Purchase (RTP) Program: Nearly all of the properties
(95.2%) are rented by residents who have a right to purchase the
property in the future at an agreed upon exercise price.  In the
Right to Purchase Program, residents have identified a home that is
within the resident's rental and acquisition budget and meets HPA's
investment criteria.  Renters with right to purchase options are
therefore incentivized to maintain their properties well, and
consumer-chosen properties may be in better school districts than
properties otherwise acquired, which could benefit property
recovery values in a liquidation scenario.

Also, when renters exercise the right to purchase, the property
will be released from the securitization at a premium which leads
to faster deleveraging of the transaction, a credit positive.

For this transaction, an interest reserve account of $250,000 will
be funded at closing of the transaction.  Subsequently on each
Payment Date, the Borrower will deposit an amount equal to the
excess of $250,000 (the "Required Interest Reserve Amount") over
the amount on deposit therein on such Payment Date after giving
effect to any withdrawals therefrom, to the extent of available
funds.  This reserve account will be used to pay delinquent
interest payments on the class A to E certificates and any
shortfalls to the $250,000 will be paid from rent prior to paying
lender fees and prior to excess funds being returned to the
Borrower.  In an event of a default, the servicer can use the funds
in the account to pay delinquent interest and principal owed on the
bonds.  Moody's views this account as credit neutral because
although the inclusion of the reserve fund may be positive for the
transaction, in a default scenario in which interest payments are
not being made, there is a potential that the reserve fund will be
depleted or underfunded.  In this situation, there could
potentially be no excess funds from the reserve to pay interest or
principal payments.

Effective property manager: The day to day property manager for
this transaction, Home Partners of America LLC ("Manager") is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Loan Sponsor, Home Partners of
America, Inc.  The property sub-manager, is Pathlight Property
Management ("Existing Sub Manager", which became wholly owned by
Home Partners of America on April 29, 2016.  The Manager has
approximately 66 full-time personnel as of June 30, 2016, dedicated
to property management, marketing, leasing, financial and
administrative functions, and acquisition and renovation functions.
The Manager has demonstrated its ability to effectively handle the
day to day business of managing a disperse single family rental
platform.  The Existing Sub Manager has approximately 60 full-time
personnel as of June 30, 2016 dedicated to various property
management related activities.

Servicing: Midland Loan Services (Midland), a division of PNC Bank,
National Association (long-term deposit rating of Aa2) will be the
master servicer and special servicer of this transaction. The
master servicer will be responsible for the servicing of the loan
and advancing of principal and interest.  Also in a default
scenario, the special servicer will be responsible for
administrating/working out the loan.  The master servicer and
special servicer have experience servicing and managing commercial
and multi-family mortgage loans and real estate assets.  Midland
has the resources and experience to manage and dispose of the
assets in the event of a borrower default.  The responsibilities of
the master, primary and special servicer are similar to those in a
typical commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
The defined and active role of the special servicer is a credit
positive.

Legal Issues: Due to the presence of Right to Purchase Agreements,
the transaction included certain structural features to comply with
consumer laws in Texas which could limit the servicer's options to
liquidate the Texas properties in a default scenario. We have made
some adjustments to our Texas foreclosure timeline assumption, but
we believe that overall the impact of these additional structural
features is minimal.  Furthermore, the mortgages backing the
transaction are subject to the leases and tenant right to purchase
options which may make it more difficult to dispose of the
properties than properties that are not subject to a right to
purchase option.  However, we believe the impact will be minimal
because the tenant can only exercise the right to purchase option
at a price that is in excess of allocated loan amount for any given
property and that an investor considering whether to purchase the
property would likely view having an existing rent-paying resident
as a positive.

For more information on this transaction and certain unique aspects
such as the Right to Purchase Program, please refer to our Presale
Report.

Recovery Analysis

The Final Recovery Value, which varies by rating levels, is
calculated through the following steps.

  1. The cumulative value (based predominantly on Broker Price
     Opinions) of the properties is approximately $437,335,303.  
     Moody's determined the initial Moody's Value to be
     $371,825,701 after considering 1) the sponsor's acquisition
     cost adjusted for 50% of our estimate of home price
     appreciation (excluding lower-value properties) since
     acquisition, plus 48.7% of the rehabilitation cost; and 2)
     85% of the most recent value.

  2. Moody's assumed that a limited percentage of these properties

     will be purchased out of the transaction at full market value

     before the borrower defaults, netting proceeds equal to the
     allocated loan amounts plus a pre-determined premium on those

     properties.
  3. For the remaining properties, we applied a home price
     depreciation factor to the properties' values ranging from
     30% to 50% of the Moody's Value at a Aaa-stress level,
     depending on the MSA.

  4. Under Moody's Aaa stress scenario, it assumed that the total
     cost required to maintain all the properties remaining in the

     pool after default, including real estate taxes, property
     management fees, vacancy, home owners association fees,
     insurance, repairs, and sales and marketing, would stretch
     for months while a portion of the properties would generate
     income for months.  Moody's stresses for foreclosure timeline

     for this transaction is lower than a typical RMBS transaction

     because Moody's expects the foreclosure process to be quicker

     since the trust does not have to foreclose on individual
     borrowers; instead, it will foreclose either on the special
     purpose vehicle borrower itself or the properties owned by a
     single entity.

  5. Moody's estimated additional foreclosure costs, which
     included fixed legal costs, special servicing fees of 0.25%
     of the loan amount, special servicing liquidation fees of
     0.75% of the property value, and transfer taxes .

  6. Finally, Moody's assumed that the master servicer will
     continue to advance the interest (to the extent deemed
     recoverable) on the certificates until the properties are
     liquidated, and estimated the interest accrued on the
     servicer advances.

Cash flow analysis

To account for a sustainable level of income and expenses, Moody's
adjusted the sponsor's underwritten net cash flow by -20.1%, on a
weighted average basis.  Using Moody's adjusted net cash flow and
assumed starting interest rate, its debt service coverage ratio was
1.66x.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

                                UP

Moody's would consider upgrading the transaction or some of its
tranches if, for example, properties underlying the portfolio were
to appreciate substantially and the property conditions were to
remain well maintained.

                                DOWN

Moody's would consider downgrading the transaction if the
transaction were to breach its debt yield trigger.  Additionally,
breaches of certain loan covenants could lead to an event of
default in the transaction and, if unremedied, a downgrade. Moody's
will also monitor the transaction's portfolio mix for any
unexpected changes.  Unexpected negative changes could result from
unusual patterns in the properties that are released by a sponsor
as contemplated by the transaction documents.  Also, where
available, changes in rent renewal and lease turnover rates and
time to re-rent could indicate performance issues.


JAMESTOWN CLO IX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to seven classes of notes issued by Jamestown CLO
IX Ltd:

   -- US$150,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$110,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$41,600,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$19,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$12,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$15,100,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$20,100,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes and the
Class D Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to the noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Jamestown IX is a managed cash-flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The underlying portfolio is expected to be approximately 85%
ramped as of the closing date.

3i Debt Management US LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer, and it may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
collateral principal collections constituting unscheduled principal
payments or the sale proceeds of credit risk obligations in
additional collateral debt obligations, subject to certain
conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes an increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1A Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1B Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1A Notes: -1

   -- Class A-1B Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


JP MORGAN 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes E and F were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as improved pool
performance. The pool has paid down by 4% since Moody's last
review. In addition, loans constituting 86% of the pool have either
defeased or have debt yields exceeding 12.0%.

The rating on Class G was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected and realized loss. Class G has
already experienced a 73% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 8.6% of the original pooled balance.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure and property type. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $24.1 million
from $1.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
48% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 11% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $91 million (for an
average loss severity of 69%). One loan, constituting 11% of the
pool, is currently in special servicing. The specially serviced
loan is the Blue Ash Corporate Center Loan ($2.6 million -- 10.9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 57,000 square foot (SF) office
property located in Blue Ash, Ohio. The loan transferred to the
Special Servicer in December 2012 for payment default and then
subsequently maturity default. A receiver was appointed in
September 2015. As of June 2016, the property was 74% leased.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 51%, compared to
61% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.18X and 1.99X,
respectively, compared to 1.00X and 1.73X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 69% of the pool balance. Each
of the top three loans are fully amortizing, have amortized between
52% and 54% since securitization and have a January 2023 loan
maturity. The largest performing loan is the Mark IV Las Vegas Loan
($11.5 million -- 47.7% of the pool), which is secured by three
adjoining industrial properties totaling 451,000 SF. The collateral
is located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The collateral is 99% leased as of
September 2015, compared to 84% in 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 53% and 1.95X, respectively, compared to 61% and 1.68X at
the last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Ocoee Crossing Shopping
Center Loan ($2.7 million -- 11.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 63,000 SF grocery-anchored retail center located in Cleveland,
Tennessee. The property was 100% leased as of December 2015,
compared to 97% as of January 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 42% and 2.45X, respectively, compared to 44% and 2.34X at the
last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Walgreens-Lyndon Lane Loan
($2.4 million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000 SF
retail property. Walgreens leases the entire property via a long
term triple net lease expiring in October 2061. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 49% and 2.11X, respectively, compared to 52% and
2.00X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-C23: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. X-D Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust (JPMBB), series 2014-C23 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to the overall stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  There have been no material changes to
the pool since issuance.

Fitch modeled losses of 4.5% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 4.4%.  The pool has experienced
no realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated four loans (1.9%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes two specially serviced
assets (0.7%).

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 0.9% to $1.38 billion from
$1.39 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class NR.

The largest loan in the pool, 17 State Street, (7.8% of the pool),
is secured by a 564,893 square foot (sf) class A office building
located in New York.  The 42-story building was constructed in 1988
and is situated adjacent to Battery Park, on the southern tip of
Manhattan's Financial District.  The largest tenants include IP
Soft Inc. (17%), expiry 2022, Fidessa Corporation (15%), expiry
2017; Alphadyne Asset Management LLC (5%), expiry 2026.  The
property is 97.3% occupied as of June 2016 with an average rent of
$54.29 per square foot (psf).  There is approximately 8% upcoming
rollover in 2016 and 17% in 2017.  Per Reis as of the second
quarter (2Q) 2016, the downtown New York office market vacancy is
10.8% with average asking rent $53.38 psf.  The most recent
servicer-reported debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 3.18x as
of June 2016.

Two loans (0.7%) were transferred to special servicing in July 2016
due to payment default.  The loans are not crossed but have a
related borrower.  The properties are both Microtel Inn & Suites
consisting of 85 rooms each located in St. Clairsville, OH and
Triadelphia, WV.  Both properties are located within the Marcellus
Shale Formation oil and gas market in West Virginia and Ohio areas.
The special servicer is in the process of reviewing the file to
determine the appropriate workout strategy.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (1.2%) is secured by two
multifamily properties totaling 440 units located in Longview, TX
and Tyler, TX. properties have a combined occupancy of 91.4% as of
June 2016.  The Longview property has suffered a decline in
occupancy from 93% at issuance to 75% as of June 2016 and the Tyler
property is 91% occupied as of June 2016.  The portfolio's most
recent DSCR, as of the (trailing 12 month) TTM June 2016, has
declined to 1.26x from 1.64x at issuance.  The decline in
performance is due to higher vacancies and tenant concessions.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Fitch assumed
conservative losses on the specially serviced assets as updated
appraisal values are not yet available.  Given the smaller size of
these assets, losses are not expected to impact the rated classes.
Due to the recent issuance of the transaction and stable
performance, Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset-level event changes
the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $36.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $241 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $235 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $307.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $79.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $86.4 million class A-S* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $62.7 million class B* at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $52.5 million class C* at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $201.6 million class EC* at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $96.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-B at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.3 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Class A-S, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for class. A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $62.7 million class NR certificates or the
interest-only class X-E.  Fitch does not rate the $12.2 million
class UH5, which will only receive distributions from, and will
only incur losses with respect to, the non-pooled component of the
U-Haul Self-Storage Portfolio mortgage loan.  Fitch does not rate
the $10.5 million class WYA, which will only receive distributions
from, and will only incur losses with respect to, the non-pooled
component of the Wyvernwood Apartments mortgage loan.  Fitch does
not rate the $15 million class RIM, which will only receive
distributions from, and will only incur losses with respect to, the
non-pooled component of the Residence Inn Midtown East mortgage
loan.  Such class will share in losses and shortfalls on the
related componentized mortgage loan.


JP MORGAN 2016-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs. 'BBsf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-3
(JPMMT 2016-3) as:

   -- $235,513,000 class 1-A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $235,513,000 class 1-A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $176,635,000 class 1-A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $176,635,000 class 1-A-4 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $58,878,000 class 1-A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,878,000 class 1-A-6 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,443,000 class 1-A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,443,000 class 1-A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $12,435,000 class 1-A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $12,435,000 class 1-A-10 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $235,513,000 class 1-AX-1 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $235,513,000 class 1-AX-2 notional exchangeable certificates

      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $176,635,000 class 1-AX-3 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,878,000 class 1-AX-4 notional exchangeable certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,443,000 class 1-AX-5 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $12,435,000 class 1-AX-6 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,092,000 class 1-A-M certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $110,417,000 class 2-A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $110,417,000 class 2-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $110,417,000 class 2-AX-1 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $110,417,000 class 2-AX-2 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $110,417,000 class 2-AX-3 notional exchangeable certificates

      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,013,000 class 2-A-M certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25,105,000 class A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,291,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,325,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3,756,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,977,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating these certificates:

   -- $2,965,364 class B-5 certificates;
   -- $19,769,964 class RR exchangeable certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of high-quality 30-year and 15-year fixed-rate, fully amortizing
loans to borrowers with strong credit profiles, low leverage and
large liquid reserves.  The pool has a weighted average (WA) FICO
score of 765 and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of
66.9%.  The collateral attributes of the subject pool are largely
consistent with recent JPMMT transactions issued in 2015 and 2016.

Geographically Diverse Pool (Positive): The pool's primary
concentration risk is in California, where approximately 44% of the
collateral is located.  Approximately 54% of the pool is located in
the top five regions in the subject pool (San Francisco, Los
Angeles, New York, Boston, and Washington D.C.). However, these
concentrations show significant improvement over many of the JPMMT
deals rated by Fitch in 2015, in which over 50% of the pool was
concentrated in California and over 80% in the top five regions.
As a result, no geographic concentration penalty was applied.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years.  The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal.  The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 1.25% of the
original balance will be maintained for the certificates.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Negative): The trust is obligated
to reimburse the breach reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha), each month for any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred if the company is requested to participate in any
arbitration, legal or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings.
These expenses include Pentalpha's legal fees and other expenses
incurred outside its annual fee schedule and are not subject to a
cap or certificateholder approval.

Furthermore, certificateholders are obligated to pay Pentalpha a
termination fee of $140,000 to terminate the contract.  While Fitch
accounted for the potential additional costs by upwardly adjusting
its loss estimation for the pool, it views this construct as adding
potentially more ratings volatility than those that do not have
this type of provision.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Negative): Extraordinary
expenses, which include loan file review costs, arbitration
expenses for enforcement of the reps and additional fees of
Pentalpha, will be taken out of available funds and not accounted
for in the contractual interest owed to the bondholders.  This
construct can result in principal and interest shortfalls to the
bonds, starting from the bottom of the capital structure.  To
account for the risk of these noncredit events reducing
subordination, Fitch adjusted its loss expectations upward by 35
bps at the 'AAAsf' level.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch
believes the value of the rep and warranty framework is diluted by
the presence of qualifying and conditional language in conjunction
with sunset provisions, which reduces lender breach liability.
While Fitch believes the high credit-quality pool and clean
diligence results mitigate these risks, it considered the weaker
framework in the analysis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level.  The implied rating sensitivities
are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 6.5%.  The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


JP MORGAN 2016-JP3: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Securities Trust 2016-JP3 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $45,932,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $97,274,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $16,726,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $300,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $342,359,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49,955,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $970,952,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,309,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $118,706,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,309,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,222,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $105,009,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54,787,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $22,828,000b class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,219,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

These classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $47,177,696a class NR.

  a) Notional amount and interest only.
  b) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 7, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 52 loans secured by 62
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,217,494,697 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, Benefit
Street Partners CRE Finance LLC, and Starwood Mortgage Funding VI
LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 89.4% of the properties
by balance, asset summary reviews on 100.0% of the pool, and cash
flow analysis of 81.4% of the pool.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.25x and
101.2%, respectively, are better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.18x and 106.5%, respectively.  Excluding
credit-opinion loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV are 1.20x
and 108.1%, respectively.  Comparatively, the YTD 2016 average DSCR
and LTV of Fitch-rated deals excluding credit-opinion and co-op
loans is 1.14x and 110.2%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: The largest loan in the pool
and the sixth largest loan in the pool, 9 West 57th Street (8.2% of
the pool) and Westfield San Francisco Centre (4.9% of the pool),
have investment-grade credit opinions.  The 9 West 57th Street
senior note contributed to the trust has an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'AAAsf*' on a stand-alone basis.  Westfield San
Francisco Centre has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'Asf*'
on a stand-alone basis.  The two loans have a weighted average
Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.60x and 55.5%, respectively.

More Diverse Pool by Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise
49.8% of the pool, as compared to the YTD 2016 average of 55.3%.
The pool's loan concentration index (LCI) is 356, which is below
the YTD 2016 average of 428.  However, the resulting sponsor
concentration index (SCI) delta compared to the LCI is 30.3%, which
is above the YTD 2016 average delta of 16.8%.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 7.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMCC
2016-JP3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could occur.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could occur.


JPMORGAN CHASE 2006-LDP7: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class A-J and B
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP7, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)'.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its rating on class A-M from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions, which
included a review of the credit characteristics and performance of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's structure, the
liquidity available to the trust, as well as the application of
S&P's temporary interest shortfall criteria to address accumulated
interest shortfalls currently affecting the downgraded classes.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes A-J and B to 'D (sf)' because it
expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding
for the foreseeable future.  Classes A-J and B have accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for four and nine consecutive
months, respectively.  According to the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee
remittance report, the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$1,309,687 and resulted primarily from:

   -- Net appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts
      totaling $1,044,536;

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $156,249; and

   -- Interest not advanced due to nonrecoverability
      determinations totaling $30,624.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class A-J.

S&P affirmed its rating on class A-M to reflect its expectation
that the available credit enhancement for the class is within our
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating, as well as S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction’s collateral.  S&P's
analysis also considered that 19 assets, comprising 87.2%
($489.8 million) of the pool balance, are currently with the
special servicer.

Should the class experience reduced liquidity support from the
specially serviced assets because of increases in appraisal
reduction amounts, nonrecoverable determination, and/or claw back
of past advances, S&P may re-evaluate and adjust its rating on this
class, if necessary.
                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $562.8 million (while the collateral asset balance
was $561.9 million), which is 14.3% of the pool balance at
issuance.  The pool currently includes 22 loans and seven real
estate owned (REO) assets (reflecting crossed loans), down from 269
loans at issuance.  Nineteen of these assets are with the special
servicer, one ($32.6 million, 5.8%) is on the master servicers'
combined watchlist, and there are no defeased loans. The master
servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N. A. and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC, reported financial information for 98.6% of the loans in the
pool, of which 56.2% was partial-or year-end 2015 data, and the
remaining 43.8% was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.02x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 88.9% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.50% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 19 specially serviced
assets and one subordinate B hope note ($13.6 million, 2.4%).  The
top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of
$502.6 million (89.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of
0.97x and 125.4%, respectively, for three of the top 10 assets. The
remaining assets are specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $266.9 million in
principal losses, or 6.8% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 11.8% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 19 specially serviced assets.

                         CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, 19 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of the three largest specially serviced assets, all of
which are top three assets, are:

   -- The Westfield Centro Portfolio REO asset ($240.0 million,
      42.7%) is the largest asset in the pool and has a current
      reported total exposure of $259.0 million.  The asset is
      comprised of five anchored retail properties totaling
      2,364,136 sq. ft. in various U.S. states.  The loan was
      transferred to the special servicer on May 23, 2014, due to
      imminent default, and the properties became REO on Feb. 1,
      2016.  The reported combined occupancy and DSC for the nine
      months ended Sept. 30, 2015, were 95.0% and 0.37x
      respectively.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
      $146.6 million is in effect against the asset, and S&P
      expects a significant loss upon the asset's eventual
      resolution.

   -- The JQH Hotel Portfolio loan ($127.9 million, 22.8%) is the
      second-largest asset in the pool and has a total reported
      exposure of $128.7 million.  The loan is secured by five
      full-service and one limited-service hotel properties
      totaling 1,431 rooms in various U.S. states.  The loan,
      which has a nonperforming matured balloon payment status,
      was transferred to the special servicer on April 15, 2016,
      for imminent maturity default.  The loan matured on
      April 11, 2016.  An ARA of $25.7 million is currently in
      effect against this loan.  According to the special
      servicer, LNR, the borrowers, along with the parent and
      affiliates, filed for bankruptcy on June 26, 2016.  The
      reported combined DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were

      1.69x and 72.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss
      upon this loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The Hilton - Lisle/Naperville loan ($35.4 million, 6.3%) is
      the third-largest asset in the pool and has a reported total

      exposure of $37.1 million.  The loan is secured by a
      309-room full-service hotel in Lisle, Il.  The loan, which
      has a nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was
      transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 12, 2016, due to

      imminent default because the borrower indicated that it will

      not qualify for financing to pay off the loan at maturity
      due to insufficient cash flows.  The loan matured on June 1,

      2016.  An ARA of $16.7 million is in effect against this
      loan.  LNR stated that the Hilton franchise agreement
      expired at maturity and the borrower is in discussions to
      secure an extension.  LNR stated that it is exploring
      various liquidation strategies including foreclosure and
      restricting options.  The reported DSC and occupancy for
      the three months ended March 31, 2016, were 0.08x and 46.8%,

      respectively.

   -- S&P expects a moderate loss upon this loan’s eventual
      resolution.

The 16 remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 3.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 19 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 40.2%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-LDP7
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To          From
A-M               46628FAM3              A- (sf)     A- (sf)
A-J               46628FAN1              D (sf)      CCC (sf)
B                 46628FAP6              D (sf)      CCC- (sf)


KEYCORP STUDENT 2004-A: Fitch Affirms CCsf Rating on Cl. II-D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades the rating of the class II-B notes and
affirms the classes II-A-2, II-C and II-D notes of KeyCorp Student
Loan Trust 2004-A (Group II). The Rating Outlook for the class
II-A, class II-B and class II-C notes is Stable. The Recovery
Estimate for the class II-D notes was increased to 35% from 0%.

The upgrade of class II-B is based on a sufficient loss coverage
multiple commensurate with a 'AAAsf' rating. The class II-B parity
level has increased to 255.0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$152 million private student loans as of June 2016. The loans were
originated primarily by KeyBank, NA. The projected remaining
defaults are expected to range between 15%-20% as a percentage of
current principal balance. A recovery rate of 10% was applied which
was determined to be appropriate based on data provided by the
issuer.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by overcollateralization,
excess spread and subordination for the class A and B notes.
Additionally, the trust can receive excess from its bifurcated KSLT
2004-A Group I pool. As of the June 2016 distribution, the reported
total parity without including funds in the reserve account is
93.8%. Fitch gives credit to the reserve balance and calculated the
class A, B, C and D parity ratios as 780.4%, 255.0%, 122.8%, and
97.5% respectively.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support for the trust is provided by a
debt service reserve fund which is currently at $6 million,
representing approximately 3.5% of aggregate beginning outstanding
principal amount of the group II notes. .

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
KeyBank, NA (master servicer), Pennsylvania Higher Education
(sub-servicer) Assistance Agency, and Great Lakes Educational Loan
Services, Inc. (sub-servicer). Fitch believes the servicing
operations are acceptable servicers of student loans due to their
long history.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of the permitted investment for
this deal allows possibility of using investments that do not meet
Fitch's criteria, this represents a criteria variation. Since the
only available funds to invest in are those held in the Collection
Account, and the funds can only be invested for a short duration of
three months given the payment frequency of the notes, Fitch
doesn't believe such variation has a measurable impact upon the
ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the bonds and may make certain
bond ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch takes the following rating actions:

   KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2004-A (Group II)

   -- Class II-A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class II-B upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class II-C affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Class II-D affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE35%.


KKR CLO 15: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes and one class of loans issued by KKR CLO 15 Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "KKR 15").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2028 (the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
      (sf)

   -- US$206,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Up to US$50,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1L Loans maturing 2028 (the "Class A-
      1L Loans"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
      (sf)

   -- US$24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the
Class A-1L Loans, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D
Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Debt." The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes,
and the A-1L Loans are referred to herein, together, as the "Class
A Debt."

On the closing date, the Class A-1B Notes have a zero principal
balance. At any time, the Class A-1L Loans may be converted in
whole or in part to Class A-1B Notes thereby decreasing the
principal balance of the Class A-1L Loans and increasing, by the
corresponding amount, the principal balance of the Class A-1B
Notes. The aggregate principal balance of the Class A Debt will
never exceed $256,000,000, less the amount of any principal
repayments on the Class A Debt and plus any proportional additional
issuance of Class A Debt.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected losses posed
to debtholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on
the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

KKR 15 is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as
of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.1 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3191)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1A Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1B Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1L Loans: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1A Notes: -1

   -- Class A-1B Notes: -1

   -- Class A-1L Loans: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Moody's Ups Class H Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed C

      (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 42% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on one P&I class was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with expected recovery of principal and interest from
liquidated and troubled loans.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.8% of the
current balance, compared to 39.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.9% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $39.1 million
from $1.52 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 20%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 16% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $57 million (for an average loss
severity of 37%).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 20% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 94% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 72% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 51%, compared to 53% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.14X and 2.27X,
respectively, compared to 2.07X and 2.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three largest loans represent 55% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Route 30 Mall Loan ($7.9 million -- 20.2% of
the pool), which is secured by a retail property located in
Framingham, Massachusetts, approximately 20 miles west of the
Boston city center. The property was 33% leased as of December
2015. Moody's has identified this loan as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the Bellflower Loan ($7.7 million --
19.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 154,000 square foot (SF)
Kmart anchored retail strip located in Bellflower, California, 15
miles west of Anaheim. The property was 97% leased as of June 2016.
The loan maturity date is November 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 61% and 1.69X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.52X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the Allentown Towne Center Loan ($5.7
million -- 14.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 160,000 SF
Kmart anchored retail strip located in Allentown, Pennsylvania
approximately 60 miles north of Philadelphia. The property was 95%
leased as of December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34%
and 2.98X, respectively, compared to 35% and 2.97X at the last
review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the ratings on seven classes in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C6 as follows:

  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2016,

   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-M was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on six P&I classes were downgraded due to higher
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-CL, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 32.1% of the
current balance, compared to 8.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.0% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

               METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of eight, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type.  Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Aug. 17, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 81% to
$573.2 million from $3.047 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 33 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 24% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 87% of the pool.  Three loans, constituting 2.3% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Nineteen loans, constituting 42% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $221 million (for an average loss
severity of 54%).  Ten loans, constituting 55% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Chesterfield Loan ($140 million -- 24.4% of the pool),
which is secured by 641,800 square feet (SF) of retail space at the
Chesterfield Mall in Chesterfield, Missouri.  The mall is anchored
by Dillards, Macy's and Sears, none of which are part of the
collateral.  The property was 93% leased as of year-end 2015,
compared to 95% at yearend 2014.  Dillards recently suffered a
water main break that caused significant flooding and the fire
marshal expects the store to remain closed for several months.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in March 2016 for imminent
maturity default in regards to the September 2016 loan maturity
date.  The Borrower has indicated that declining tenant sales and
increased competition within the market have affected rental rates,
cash flow and occupancy.  Moody's anticipates a significant loss on
this loan.

The remaining nine specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types, including two additional malls.  Moody's estimates
an aggregate $168.9 million loss for the specially serviced loans
(53% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.3% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4.6 million (a 25% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 82% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100%, compared
to 94% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 5% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.09X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.36X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans as of the August 2016 remittance date
represent 29% of the pool balance.  The largest exposure is the Dr
Lee Portfolio ($68.4 million -- 11.9% of the pool), which is
secured by three cross-collateralized cross-defaulted office
properties located in Dallas, Plano and Los Angeles.  All three
loans matured this month and paid in full on Sept. 6, 2016.

The second largest loan is the Redwood Portfolio I Loan
($51.4 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured by 15 mobile
home properties located across seven states.  The loan matured this
month and paid in full on Sept. 6, 2016.

The third largest loan is the Eagle Road Shopping Center Loan
($46.4 million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 242,000
SF anchored retail center in Danbury, Connecticut.  As of March
2016, the property was 100% leased to three tenants.  The loan is
on the watchlist for low DSCR as the real estate taxes have tripled
since securitization due to a new tax assessment.  The loan is
current and matures in September 2021.  The borrower has not
indicated any issues with maintaining the loan for the foreseeable
future.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.76X,
respectively, compared to 122% and 0.80X at the last review.


MACH ONE 2004-1: Fitch Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to BB
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed three classes of MACH
ONE 2004-1, LLC as a result of increased credit enhancement to the
notes from principal paydowns.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement from principal
paydown.  Since the last rating action in October 2015, the class H
notes have paid-in-full and the class J notes have received $8.6
million in paydowns.  Over this period, none of the collateral has
been downgraded or upgraded.  Currently, 83.5% of the portfolio has
a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 14.9% has a
rating in the 'CCC' category and below, compared to 64% and 11.8%,
respectively, at the last rating action.  In addition,
approximately 6.6% of the pool has a Fitch derived rating of 'AAA'.
As of the Aug. 30, 2016, payment date, the class J through O notes
are current on interest.  Since issuance the transaction has
experienced approximately $552 million in paydowns.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Surveillance Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'
using the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future
default levels for the underlying portfolio.  However, while the
PCM output was used as a reference point, due to the concentration
of the pool a look-through analysis of the underlying obligors was
the final determining factor in the rating recommendations (see
'Global Surveillance Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs': Obligor
Concentrations).  The look-through analysis included a review of
each asset to determine the collateral coverage for the remaining
liabilities.  Based on the analysis, classes J through M pass at or
above the assigned ratings.  The ratings reflect these results as
well as the risk of adverse selection as the portfolio continues to
amortize.

For the class N notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to the
default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below).  Given the
probability of default of the underlying assets, the class N notes
have been affirmed at 'CCCsf', indicating that default is possible.
The class O notes have been affirmed at 'Dsf' due to incurred
principal losses (approximately $2.6 million since issuance).

The Stable Outlook on the class J through M notes reflects Fitch's
expectation that the transaction will continue to delever and that
recoveries are likely from the distressed collateral.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

In addition to the sensitivities discussed above, additional
negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM
and the look-through analysis as well as increasing concentration
of weaker credit quality assets could lead to downgrades for the
more junior classes.  The senior notes are expected to continue to
amortize as 31% of the collateral are senior positions in their
respective underlying transactions.  Further upgrades may be
limited due to concentration of the underlying collateral.

    USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these classes and revised Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $9,135,000 Class J Notes to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Positive;
   -- $8,040,000 Class L Notes to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $8,844,000 Class M Notes to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $8,844,000 Class K Notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,432,000 Class N Notes at 'CCCsf';
   -- $3,809,334 Class O Notes at 'Dsf'.

The class A-1 through H notes have all paid in full.  Classes P-1
through P-6 are NR.  The rating on class X was previously
withdrawn.

MACH ONE is a static Re-REMIC backed by CMBS B-pieces that closed
July 28, 2004.  The transaction is collateralized by five assets
from four obligors from the 1998 and 1999 vintages.


MAGNETITE VII: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R floating-rate replacement notes
from Magnetite VII Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2012 that is managed by Blackrock Financial
Management Inc.  The replacement notes will be issued via a
proposed supplemental indenture.

S&P previously raised its ratings on the class A-2A, A-2B, and B
notes from Magnetite VII Ltd. in May 2016 to reflect improved
overcollateralization ratios and stable portfolio credit quality.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 29, 2016, trustee report.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  With the exception of the class D-R notes, the
floating-rate replacement notes are generally expected to be issued
at a lower spread over LIBOR than the original notes.

On the Oct. 17, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning final ratings to the
replacement notes.  In addition, at that time, the rating on
current unfunded class A-1 senior notes will be withdrawn, as the
class will no longer be able to fund following the refinancing of
the transaction.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the rating on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

   -- Extend the reinvestment period to Jan. 15, 2019;
   -- Extend the non-call period to Jan. 15, 2018;
   -- Extend the weighted average life test to Oct. 17, 2022;
   -- Adopt the non-model version of the CDO Monitor application;
      and
   -- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated
      industry classifications outlined in S&P's August 2016 CLO
      criteria update.

There is no anticipated change to the transaction's legal final
maturity date.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS
Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate(%)          (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1-R     372.00   LIBOR + 1.35   70.72   57.79     12.93
A-2-R      75.00   LIBOR + 1.75   66.74   52.40     14.33
B-R        47.40   LIBOR + 2.33   55.91   45.70     10.21
C-R        28.80   LIBOR + 3.75   49.67   39.05     10.62
D-R        28.80   LIBOR + 7.00   38.88   32.75      6.13

Effective date
Class     Amount   Interest         BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate(%)          (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1A      360.00   LIBOR + 1.37   69.73   64.49      5.23
A-1B       12.00   LIBOR + 1.37   67.94   64.49      3.45
A-2A       35.00   LIBOR + 2.25   62.96   56.67      6.29
A-2B       40.00   3.50           62.96   56.67      6.29
B          47.40   LIBOR + 3.15   52.68   50.74      1.94
C          28.80   LIBOR + 4.50   46.60   44.72      1.88
D          28.80   LIBOR + 5.25   38.39   37.69      0.70

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Magnetite VII Ltd.
Class            Rating
A-1-R            AAA (sf)
A-2-R            AA+ (sf)
B-R              A+ (sf)
C-R              BBB (sf)
D-R              BB (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class and
affirmed the ratings on four classes in Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-CIP1 as follows:

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Upgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class (C) was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down by 24% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on three P&I classes (D, E, F) were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 49.9% of the
current balance, compared to 42.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $89.1 million
from $2.06 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 40% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 2.6% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $134.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). Four loans, constituting 67% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Residence Inn Hotel Portfolio 1 Loan (for $36 million -- 40%
of the pool), which was originally secured by four limited service
hotels located in New York, Florida and Texas. The Marriott flags
expired on March 28, 2014 and were not renewed, causing the loan to
be transferred to special servicing for imminent default. All four
of the properties became REO; three have since been sold, leaving
the Hawthrone Suites at Orlando as the lone remaining asset.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $43.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (73% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 68%, compared to 69%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.89X and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.83X and 1.48X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 32% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Malibu Country Mart -- 3835 Loan ($19.7
million -- 22.1% of the pool), which is secured by an outdoor
lifestyle center located in Malibu, California. The property was
93% leased as of December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
62% and 1.56X, respectively, compared to 65% and 1.51X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Malibu County Mart - 3900 Loan ($6.9
million -- 7.7% of the pool), which is secured by an outdoor
lifestyle center located in Malibu, California. The property was
100% leased as of December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
75% and 1.30X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.68X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Texarkana Apartments Phase II Loan
($2.3 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by Chapel
Ridge Apartments, a low income housing project located in
Texarkana, Arkansas. The property was 78% occupied as of yearend
2015, compared to 89% as of yearend 2014 and 72% as of yearend
2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 0.94X at the last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-C2: Moody's Hikes Class AJ Debt Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on three classes, and downgraded the rating on
one class in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2006-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. AJ, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
      Affirmed B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class AJ was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 93% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes, B, C and D, were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class X was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 31.3% of the
current balance compared to 4.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $58.9 million
from $1.54 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 91% of
the pool.

One loan, constituting 11% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool with losses,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $147 million (for an
average loss severity of 55%). Six loans, constituting 39% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Windmill Lakes Loan ($7.8 million -- 13.2% of
the pool), which is secured by a 70,949 square-foot (SF) anchored
retail center located in Batavia, Illinois. The largest tenant is
Sears, occupying 29% of NRA, with the lease expiration in December
2019. The borrower did not pay off the loan at maturity on July
5th, 2016. The loan is currently in maturity default. The remaining
five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $8.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (38% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three B Notes,
constituting 16.2% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss
of $9.5 million (a 100% expected loss an average) from these
loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 and 2014 operating results for 100%
of the pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool, excluding specially serviced loans. Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 78%, compared to 92% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14.4% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 34% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is The Shops of Fairlawn -- A Note Loan
($9.0 million -- 15.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 133,334
SF anchored retail center located in Fairlawn, Ohio. The loan
returned from special servicing in December 2009 after being
modified. The B Note of $6 million was created and the loan term
was increased by 38 periods with new maturity as of July 2019. The
principle forgiveness of $2,155,098 was also reported. As of March
2016, the property was 100% leased with reported NOI DSCR of 2.37X
for the A Note. At this review 100% loss severity was assumed for
the B Note. The A Note Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and
1.44X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.31X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Yorktown -- A Note Loan
($6.3 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 72,687
mixed-use (office/retail) property located in Elkins Park,
Pennsylvania. The loan returned from special servicing in July 2015
after being modified. The loan was split into A Note and B Note.
The borrower makes the monthly payments on the A Note, while
interest on the B Note will be deferred to maturity. The loan
maturity date was extended to July 2017. As of December 2015, the
property was 98% leased compared to 95% at the prior year. At this
review 100% loss severity was assumed for the B Note. The A Note
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.04X, respectively, the
same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cochise Plaza Loan ($4.5 million --
7.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 96,619 SF retail center
located in Sierra Vista, Arizona. The property was 91% leased as of
March 2016. Performance has been stable. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized by 36% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 52% and 2.17X, respectively, compared to
54% and 2.1X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-FNV1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. L Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1999-FNV1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class K reflects stable performance since
Fitch's last rating action, including the high concentration of
defeased collateral as two (90.2% of the pool) of the remaining
three loans are defeased. The remaining non-defeased loan and one
defeased loan (41.7%) mature in 2018. The other defeased loan
(58.3%) has an anticipated repayment date in 2018 and final
maturity in 2023.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down over 99% to $3.2 million from $632.1 million
at issuance. The pool has incurred 4% in losses to date. In
addition, there are $4 million in outstanding unpaid interest
shortfalls to classes L through O. No classes are currently
incurring interest shortfalls; however, the remaining classes have
at total of $4 million in accrued interest shortfalls.

The remaining non defeased, $315,453 fully-amortizing loan is
collateralized by a mixed use property located in Houston, TX. The
collateral includes and small grocery store and mobile home park.
As of year-end (YE) 2015, the debt service coverage ratio was
4.30x. The loan matures in May 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlook for class K remains stable as it is fully covered by
defeased collateral and is expected to be fully repaid. The
remaining classes rated 'D' will be affirmed in the future as
losses have been incurred.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

   -- $2.3 million class K at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $938,603 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 90%.

Classes M and N also are affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0% due to full
losses already incurred. Class O, also reduced to zero due to
realized losses, was not rated by Fitch. Classes A-1 through J have
paid in full, and class X was previously withdrawn.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. N Debt to 'Dsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded three and affirmed two
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust's (MSCI) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-IQ4.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects an increase in credit enhancement due to five
loan pay offs since Fitch's previous rating action, as well as
continued amortization and paydown.  Of the original 119 loans, 20
remain.  Fitch has applied additional stresses in its base case
scenario to reflect the adverse selection as the pool becomes more
concentrated.  Fitch identified 2 Fitch Loans of Concern (33.2%).
Additionally, four loans (12.1%) are backed by single-tenant
properties.  These concerns increase the pool's exposure to single
event risk, which can cause a significant loss and/or interest
shortfalls in the future.  The downgrade to classes L through M
reflects the higher likelihood of losses associated with the
transaction's specially serviced asset, North Mayfair (25.3% of the
pool), which is the transaction's largest asset and currently real
estate owned (REO).

Fitch modeled losses of 18.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 1.6%, including $8.4
million (1.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 97.3% to $19.4
million from $727.8 million at issuance.  One loan is defeased
(1.5%).  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes M
through O.

The North Mayfair asset (25.3%), is a 101,286 square foot (sf)
office building located in Wauwatosa, WI.  The loan transferred to
special servicing upon maturity default in December 2012 and became
REO in December 2014.  The special servicer plans to list and
market the property for sale fourth quarter 2016.  Occupancy
increased to 66% as of August 2016 from 61% at year-end (YE) 2014.

The second largest loan is secured by Timber Sound II Apartments, a
160-unit apartment complex built in 1998 located in Orlando, FL.
Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) fell below the threshold in 2014
due to low occupancy combined with increased expenses. However, the
property has since recovered.  Occupancy increased by 6% to 98% as
of June 2016 from 92% at YE 2014.  DSCR for YE 2015 increased to
2.05x from 1.09x at YE 2014.  The loan has been current since
issuance.

The third largest loan is secured by Plainview Commons, a 33,517 sf
unanchored retail center located in Plainview, NY.  The property is
occupied by 14 tenants, none of which occupy more than 12% of net
rentable area (NRA).  Occupancy declined by 17% to 83% as of YE
2015 from 100% at YE 2014.  DSCR was reported at 1.83x as of YE
2015, which is below 1.99x reported at YE 2014. The loan has been
current since issuance.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes H through K are expected to remain
Stable as near-term upgrades may not be warranted due to the deal's
increasing concentrations.  Fitch's loss assumptions included a
stressed value on the specially serviced loan as occupancy remains
low and ultimate recovery or timing of recovery is unknown.
Downgrades to classes L and M would occur as losses are realized.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class as indicated:

   -- $5.9 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades these classes as indicated:

   -- $5.5 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
   -- $1.8 million class M to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $752,852 thousand class N to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $3.6 million class J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.8 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E F and G certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate class O certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C30: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust Series 2016-C30 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $34,300,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4,400,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47,200,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $230,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $293,517,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $622,417,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $163,385,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $80,026,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,235,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41,124,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38,901,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,452,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38,901,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,452,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

These classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $10,004,000a class F 'NR';
   -- $30,009,448a class G 'NR';
   -- $10,004,000ab class X-F 'NR';
   -- $30,009,448ab class X-G 'NR'.

  a - Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b - Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 14, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 49 loans secured by 59
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$889,168,449 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Bank of
America, National Association, Starwood Mortgage Funding III LLC
and CIBC Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.8% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews, and cash flow analysis of
85.5% of the pool.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans representing
21.65% of the pool are credit opinion loans.  Vertex
Pharmaceuticals (8.72%) has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis.  Easton Town Center (8.43%) has
an investment-grade credit opinion of 'A+sf*' on a stand-alone
basis.  The Shops at Crystals (2.25%) has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'BBB+sf*' on a stand-alone basis.  International
Square (2.25%) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'AA-sf*'
on a stand-alone basis.

Above-Average Fitch Leverage: The transaction overall has lower
leverage than other recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.29x is greater than both the YTD 2016 average of 1.18x and the
2015 average of 1.18x.  The pool's WA Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of
97.8% is better than both the YTD 2016 average of 106.5% and the
2015 average of 109.3%.  Excluding the credit opinion loans, the
Fitch DSCR falls to 1.23x and the Fitch LTV increases to 108.5%.

Sponsor Concentration: The sponsor concentration for the pool is
703, significantly higher than the recent averages of 428 and 367
for YTD 2016 and 2015, respectively.  The largest sponsor within
this transaction is Simon Property Group, LP ('A/F1'/Stable
Outlook), with four loans representing 19.7% of the pool.

Higher Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans make up 56.5% of the
pool, which is higher than the recent averages of 55.3% and 49.3%
for YTD 2016 and 2015, respectively.  Additionally, the loan
concentration index (LCI) index is 433, more than the YTD 2016
average of 428 and the 2015 average of 367.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period.

Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSBAM
2016-C30 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


MOUNTAIN VIEW 2013-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the A, B-1, B-2, C-1,
C-2, D, and E notes from Mountain View CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May
2013 and is managed by Seix Investment Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 29, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.31
years from 5.60 years.

This seasoning has decreased the overall credit risk profile,
which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the July 31, 2013, effective
date report.  Specifically, as of the July 2016 trustee report,
both the amount of defaulted assets and the level of assets rated
'CCC+' and below increased to $9.39 million and $12.74 million,
respectively, from none as of the July 31, 2013, effective date
report.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in the par coverage ratios:

   -- The senior par ratio was 129.49%, down from 132.26%.
   -- The class C par ratio was 117.86%, down from 120.38%.
   -- The class D par ratio was 111.20%, down from 113.58%.
   -- The class E par ratio was 105.82%, down from 108.08%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life.  However, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such,
the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes, its rating actions consider
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Mountain View CLO 2013-1 Ltd.

                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To            From
A                 62431UAC6              AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1               62431UAE2              AA (sf)       AA (sf)
B-2               62431UAL6              AA (sf)       AA (sf)
C-1               62431UAG7              A (sf)        A (sf)
C-2               62431UAN2              A (sf)        A (sf)
D                 62431UAJ1              BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
E                 62431VAA8              BB (sf)       BB (sf)


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2003-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. A-7 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on the following
outstanding notes issued by National Collegiate Trusts 2003-1,
2004-1, and 2004-2. Fitch has also revised some recovery estimates
(RE) as indicated.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1:

   -- Class A-7 affirmed at 'BBsf', Outlook revised to Stable from

      Negative;

   -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'Csf', RE revised to 20% from 0%;

   -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'Csf', RE revised to 20% from 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1:

   -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'CCsf', RE 85%;

   -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'CCsf', RE 85%;

   -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'Csf', RE 0%;

   -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'Csf', RE 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2/NCF Grantor Trust
2004-2:

   -- Class A-4 upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook revised to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- Class A-5-1 upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- Class A-5-2 upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;

   -- Class B affirmed at 'Csf', RE revised to 45% from 0%;

   -- Class C affirmed at 'Csf', RE 0%.

The outlook revision for 2003-1 class A-7 notes and upgrade of
2004-2 class A-4 and A-5 notes are due to the trusts steady
performance, Fitch's revised default projections and improved
parities. Current loss coverage multiples are commensurate with the
current ratings for trusts 2003-1 and 2004-2. Although Fitch's
analysis indicates a higher rating for 2004-2 class A notes, Fitch
decided to upgrade the notes only to 'BB' due to concerns for
higher expenses in the future that could erode excess spread.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: All trusts are collateralized by private
student loans originated by various financial institutions and
lenders and securitized by First Marblehead Corporation. At deal
inception all loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources
Institute (TERI); however, no credit was given to the TERI guaranty
since TERI filed for bankruptcy on April 7, 2008. The projected
remaining defaults for all trusts range from 13% to 16% of the
current balance.

Credit Enhancement: Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by the
generation of excess spread. Additionally, the senior notes will
benefit from subordination of junior notes. As of July 2016, senior
parity ratios for the series 2003-1, series 2004-1 and series
2004-2 were 125.3%, 101.0% and 124.3%, respectively, and total
party ratios were 76.3%, 70.1% and 85.5%.

Liquidity Support: Support for the notes is provided by a reserve
account for each trust.

Servicing Capabilities: The portfolio is serviced by American
Education Services (AES), ACS Education Services (ACS), Firstmark
Services LLC, Great Lakes Educational Loan Services Inc., and
Nelnet for series 2003-1 and series 2004-2, only. Additionally,
U.S. Bank National Association acts as special servicer. Fitch
believes these servicers are acceptable servicers of private
student loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of these trusts.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2006-1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 4 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the following outstanding
notes issued by National Collegiate Trusts 2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3
and 2006-4. Fitch has also revised some recovery estimates (RE).

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1

   -- Class A-4 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 75% from 70%;

   -- Class A-5 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 75% from 70%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2

   -- Class A-3 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 65% from 55%;

   -- Class A-4 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 65% from 55%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3

   -- Class A-3 at 'CCsf'; RE revised to 80% from 70%;

   -- Class A-4 at 'CCsf'; RE revised to 80% from 70%;

   -- Class A-5 at 'CCsf'; RE revised to 80% from 70%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4

   -- Class A-2 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-3 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-4 at 'Csf'; RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

   -- Class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: All trusts are collateralized by private
student loans originated by various financial institutions and
lenders and securitized by First Marblehead Corporation. At deal
inception all loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources
Institute (TERI); however, no credit was given to the TERI guaranty
since TERI filed for bankruptcy on April 7, 2008.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by the generation of excess
spread. Additionally, the senior notes will benefit from
subordination from lower notes. The projected remaining defaults
for all trusts range from 26% to 29% of the current balance.
Current loss coverage multiples are commensurate with the current
ratings for each transaction.

Liquidity Support: Support for the notes is provided by a reserve
account for each trust.

Servicing Capabilities: The portfolio is serviced by American
Education Services (AES), ACS Education Services (ACS), Firstmark
Services LLC, Great Lakes Educational Loan Services Inc., and
Nelnet for Series 2006-3, only. Fitch believes these servicers are
acceptable servicers of private student loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 6 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following ratings on the outstanding
notes issued by National Collegiate Trusts 2007-1 and 2007-2. Fitch
has also revised some recovery estimates (RE).

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1

   -- Class A-2 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-3 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-4 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf', RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;

   -- Class D at 'Csf', RE 0%.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2

   -- Class A-2 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-3 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class A-4 at 'Csf', RE revised to 70% from 65%;

   -- Class B at 'Csf', RE 0%;

   -- Class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;

   -- Class D at 'Csf', RE 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: All trusts are collateralized by private
student loans originated by various financial institutions and
lenders and securitized by First Marblehead Corporation. At deal
inception all loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources
Institute (TERI); however, no credit was given to the TERI guaranty
since TERI filed for bankruptcy on April 7, 2008.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by the generation of excess
spread. Additionally, the senior notes will benefit from
subordination from lower notes. The projected remaining defaults
for all trusts range from 29% to 31% of the current balance.
Current loss coverage multiples are commensurate with the current
ratings for each transaction.

Liquidity Support: Support for the notes is provided by a reserve
account for each trust.

Servicing Capabilities: The portfolio is serviced by American
Education Services (AES), ACS Education Services (ACS), Firstmark
Services LLC, and Great Lakes Educational Loan Services Inc. Fitch
believes these servicers are acceptable servicers of private
student loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


NAVITAS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings and Rating Outlooks to the
Navitas Equipment Receivables LLC, Series 2016-1 notes:

   -- $60,100,000 class A-1 asset-backed notes 'NRsf';

   -- $109,968,000 class A-2 asset-backed notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $25,489,000 class B asset-backed notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $6,319,000 class C asset-backed notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $3,213,000 class D asset-backed notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
      Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Capped at 'Asf': The ratings for 2016-1 are capped at 'Asf'
given that this is the first Navitas ABS transaction rated by
Fitch, a relatively limited operating history of managed portfolio
performance through a full economic cycle, and no paid in full
(PIF) ABS transactions.

Diversified Equipment Types: Equipment types are highly diversified
within 2016-1, with the highest concentration being titled
equipment (primarily trucks) at 14.61%.  The next two largest
concentrations are industrial and medical laser at 8.17% and 6.91%,
respectively.  This diversification is consistent with Navitas'
managed portfolio.

Prefunding Account: The 2016-1 transaction includes a prefunding
account sized to 20% of the total collateral balance.  As this
introduces uncertainty regarding the final makeup of the collateral
pool, a prefunding stress was incorporated into Fitch's CGD proxy
derivation.

Improving but Limited Asset Performance: Despite limited
performance data, Navitas' managed static performance has improved
in recent years.  As such, Fitch reflected the use of proxy data
from comparable small-ticket equipment originators in the
derivation of its CGD proxy, which is 3.60% after incorporating the
prefunding stress mentioned above.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: All classes benefit from a cash
reserve account and overcollateralization (OC).  Total initial hard
credit enhancement (CE) is 21.85%, 9.95%, 7.00% and 5.50% for the
class A, B, C and D notes, respectively.

Quality of Origination, Underwriting and Servicing: Navitas has
demonstrated adequate abilities as originator, underwriter and
servicer as evidenced by historical delinquency and loss
performance of securitized trusts and the managed portfolio.

Integrity of Legal Structure: The legal structure of the
transaction should provide that a bankruptcy of Navitas would not
impair the timeliness of payments on the securities.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce CNL levels higher
than the base case and could result in potential rating actions on
the notes.  Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned
to Navitas Equipment Receivables LLC, Series 2016-1 to increased
CNL over the life of the transaction.  Fitch's analysis found that
the transaction displays varying sensitivity to increased CNL for
different classes.

The class A notes display little to no sensitivity under Fitch's
severe (2.5x base case) loss scenario and would likely retain their
initial rating.  The class B notes display increased sensitivity
under Fitch's severe loss scenario and would likely be downgraded
into the 'Bsf' category.  The class C and D notes display the most
sensitivity to Fitch's severe loss scenario, which would likely
result in them being downgraded into a distressed rating category.


NEUBERGER BERMAN XIV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, B-1,
B-2, C, D, and E notes from Neuberger Berman CLO XIV Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May
2013 and is managed by Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 19, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.6
years from 5.9 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to some
of the tranches.  In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio has increased during this period, which contributed to
the portfolio's increased diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the August 2013 effective date report.
Specifically, the amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased
to $16.9 million (4.25% of the aggregate principal balance) from
$5.0 million.  There are currently no defaults in the underlying
collateral pool.

According to the July 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
exhibited declines due to par loss since the August 2013 trustee
report, which S&P used for its February 2014 rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 130.70%, down from 132.27%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 118.57%, down from 119.99%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 111.87%, down from 113.21%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 106.74%, down from 108.02%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.  Other factors S&P considered include the
decline in O/C ratios as well as lack of improvement in the cash
flow cushions at current rating levels since our effective date
rating actions.

The cash flow results indicated a lower rating for the class E
notes.  However, S&P views the overall credit seasoning as an
improvement and also considered that the transaction will enter its
amortization period in April 2017.  In addition, the transaction
currently exhibits below-average exposure to 'CCC' rated collateral
obligations and no exposure to defaulted assets. As a result, S&P
affirmed the rating on the class E notes to remain in line with its
credit stability framework.  However, any increase in defaults
and/or par losses could lead to potential negative rating actions
on the class E notes in the future.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Neuberger Berman CLO XIV Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on B-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2016-3 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3 (the Trust):

   -- $241.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)

   -- $241.9 million Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.9 million Class B1-IO at AAA (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B-2 at A (high) (sf)

   -- $14.3 million Class B2-IO at A (high) (sf)

   -- $8.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)

   -- $4.5 million Class B-4 at BB (high) (sf)

   -- $3.9 million Class B-5 at B (high) (sf)

Classes A-IO, B1-IO and B2-IO are interest-only notes. The class
balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A and B are exchangeable notes. These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 14.90% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The A
(high) (sf), BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf) and B (high) (sf) ratings
reflect 10.15%, 7.30%, 5.80% and 4.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 2,719 loans with a total principal balance of
$301,770,767 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2016).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted average age of
157 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 91.5% of the pool is current,
6.9% is 30 days delinquent and 1.7% is in bankruptcy (all
bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 69.6% and 77.1% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent for the past 24 months and 12 months,
respectively, under both the Office of Thrift Supervision and
Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency methods. The portfolio
contains 23.4% modified loans. The modifications happened more than
two years ago for 57.4% of the modified loans. Because of the
seasoning of the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans prior to
the Closing Date in connection with the termination of 86
securitization trusts that had acquired the mortgage loans from
various underlying sellers. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2016-3 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the loans to
the Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp.,
through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
(other than the residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 63.9% of the pool is serviced by Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 32.2% by Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and
3.9% by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC. Nationstar will also act as
the Master Servicer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.


Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, but was limited with respect to payment
history, data integrity, title and servicing comments. Updated Home
Data Index and/or broker price opinions were provided for the pool;
however, a reconciliation was not performed on the majority of
updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 35
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-3.  The NRMLT 2016-3 transaction is a securitization of $301.7
million of first lien, seasoned performing and re-performing
mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of approximately 158
months, weighted average updated LTV ratio of 55.5% and weighted
average updated FICO score of 694. Approximately 80.4% of the loans
have been always current in the past 24 months.  Approximately
23.4% of the loans in the pool were previously modified.  Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and Specialized Loan
Servicing, LLC, will act as primary servicers and Nationstar
Mortgage LLC will act as master and successor servicer.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3

  Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-1A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-1B, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-1C, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-IO, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A1-IOA, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A1-IOB, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A1-IOC, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1C, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-3A, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-3B, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-3C, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IO, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IOA, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IOB, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IOC, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IO, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IOA, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IOB, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IOC, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Cl. B3-IOA, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B3-IOB, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B3-IOC, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Our losses on the collateral pool average 3.50% in an expected
scenario and reach 18.40% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes.  Moody's based its expected losses
on the pool on our estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances.  The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and our assessment of
the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework for this
transaction.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to our surveillance approach.  Under this approach, Moody's
applies expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool.  Moody's assumptions on these variables
are based on the observed rate of delinquency on seasoned modified
and non-modified loans, the collateral attributes of the pool
including the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past
24 months, and the observed performance of recent New Residential
Mortgage Loan Trust issuances rated by Moody's.  For this pool, we
used default burnout and voluntary CPR assumptions similar to those
detailed in our "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans
originated before 2005.  Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies
and converted them to losses by applying pool-specific lifetime
default frequency and loss severity assumptions.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2016-3 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor V LLC, has previously purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts.  The transaction
consists primarily of 30-year fixed rate loans. 76.6% of the loans
in this pool by balance have never been modified and have been
performing while approximately 23.4% of the loans were previously
modified but are now current and cash flowing.  The weighted
average seasoning on the collateral is approximately 158 months.

Property values were updated using home data index (HDI) values or
broker price opinions (BPOs).  HDIs were obtained for all but 185
properties contained within the securitization.  In addition,
updated BPOs were obtained from a third party BPO provider for 753
properties.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties
("R&W")

A third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review on a sample of 828 loans proposed to be included in the
mortgage pool. The regulatory compliance review consisted of a
review of compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in
Lending Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement
Protection Act/Regulation X (RESPA), and federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations. The TPR identified 420 loans with
compliance exceptions, the majority of which were due to missing
HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charges, missing
right to cancel disclosures, or missing FACTA disclosures. Although
the diligence provider's report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages.

The third party due diligence provider also conducted reviews of
data integrity, pay history, and title/lien on selected samples to
confirm that certain information in the mortgage loan files matched
the information supplied by the servicers.  Any issues identified
during the data integrity review were corrected on the data tape,
and the pay history analysis indicated there were no material pay
history issues on the data tape.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files.  To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer, depositor or
custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage
loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding
the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the
mortgage loan documents, and such missing document, defect or
breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization
against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or
similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title
claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such
actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the related seller, indenture
trustee, depositor, master servicer, related servicer and
custodian.  Upon notification of a missing or defective mortgage
loan file, the related seller will have 120 days from the date it
receives such notification to deliver the missing document or
otherwise cure the defect or breach.  If it is unable to do so, the
related seller will be obligated to replace or repurchase the
mortgage loan.

Despite this provision, Moody's increased its loss severities to
account for loans with missing title policies (according to both
the title/lien review and a custodial file review),mortgage notes,
or mortgage/deed/security agreements.  This adjustment was based on
both the results of the TPR review and because the R&W provider is
an unrated entity and weak from a credit perspective.  In Moody's
analysis it assumed that 2.3% of the projected defaults will have
missing documents' breaches that will not be remedied and result in
higher than expected loss severities.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association.  The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.  The paying agent and cash management functions
will be performed by Citibank, N.A.  In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers.

Ocwen has experienced significant losses over the past two years
due to regulatory issues and limited opportunities in its core
market.  A further weakening of Ocwen's financial profile could
adversely impact its ability to service the loans serviced by it
adequately.  However, having Nationstar Mortgage LLC as a master
servicer mitigates this risk due to the performance oversight that
it will provide.  Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the named successor
servicer for the transaction and we assess Nationstar Mortgage
LLC's servicing quality assessment at SQ3+ as a master servicer of
residential mortgage loans.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met.  To pass the first test,
the delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50%
of the subordinate bonds outstanding.  To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool.  The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 3.25% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 19.85%.  These
provisions mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up
Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from our original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above our original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment.  Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


OCP CLO 2013-4: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-2 notes and
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, B, C, D, and E notes
from OCP CLO 2013-4 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in October 2013 and is managed by
Onex Credit Partners LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Aug. 14, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

The transaction has benefited from collateral seasoning, with the
reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.37 years from 5.55
years in December 2013.  This seasoning, combined with the improved
credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk profile,
which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche ratings.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased from the Dec. 17, 2013, effective date report
used for S&P's previous review.

Though there has been a modest increase in assets rated in the
'CCC' category, this is offset by the decline in the weighted
average life and positive credit migration of the collateral
portfolio.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, C, and D notes, our rating actions consider
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a lower rating on the class E notes than the rating
action reflects.  However, S&P affirmed the rating on class E after
considering the margin of failure, its overcollateralization ratio,
which, despite a relatively minor decline since the transaction's
effective date, is still well-above its trigger, and that the
transaction will soon enter its amortization phase.  Based on the
latter, S&P expects the credit support available to all rated
classes to increase as principal is collected and paydowns to the
senior notes occur.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, B, C, D,
and E notes reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available
is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATING RAISED

OCP CLO 2013-4 Ltd.
Class         Rating
        To               From
A-2     AA+ (sf)         AA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OCP CLO 2013-4 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1A          AAA (sf)
A-1B          AAA (sf)
B             A (sf)
C             BBB- (sf)
D             BB- (sf)
E             B (sf)


OCP CLO 2016-12: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to OCP CLO
2016-12 Ltd./OCP CLO 2016-12 LLC's $500.50 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 16,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2016-12 Ltd./OCP CLO 2016-12 LLC

Class                           Rating           Amount
                                               (mil. $)
A-1                              AAA (sf)        341.00
A-2                              AA (sf)          71.50
B (deferrable)                   A (sf)           38.50
C (deferrable)                   BBB (sf)         27.50
D (deferrable)                   BB (sf)          22.00
Subordinated notes (deferrable)  NR               57.25

NR--Not rated.


OHA CREDIT VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C,D, E,
and F notes from OHA Credit Partners VIII Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May
2013 and is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Aug. 1, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported that
the collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to
4.78 years from 5.51 years.  This seasoning has decreased the
overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion
to the tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the September 2013 effective date report.
Specifically, the level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased
to $15.65 million from $1.39 million as of the effective date
report.  The transaction does not hold any defaulted assets.

According to the Aug. 1, 2016, trustee report that S&P used for
this review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class
have exhibited a mild decline since the Sept. 1, 2013, trustee
report, which S&P used for its effective date rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 132.99%, down from 133.30%.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 121.30%, down from 121.59%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.88%, down from 114.15%.

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 108.33%, down from 108.59%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B, C, D, and E notes, its rating actions consider additional
sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to specific
distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.  The affirmation of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

OHA Credit Partners VIII, Ltd.
OHA Credit Partners VIII Ltd./OHA Credit Partners VIII Inc.
floating-rate notes
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To           From
A                 67104CAA5              AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B                 67104CAB3              AA (sf)      AA (sf)
C                 67104CAC1              A (sf)       A (sf)
D                 67104CAD9              BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)
E                 67104GAA6              BB (sf)      BB (sf)
F                 67104GAB4              B (sf)       B (sf)


ORCHARD PARK: Moody's Hikes Class A-1 Notes Rating to B3
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Orchard Park Ltd.:

   -- US $120,000,000 Class A-1 (Series 1) First Priority Senior
      Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding
      balance of $6,865,845.33), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously
      on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- US $120,000,000 Class A-1 (Series 2) First Priority Senior
      Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding
      balance of $6,276,734.68); Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously
      on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Orchard Park Ltd., issued in December 2002, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS, ABS, or
CDOs originated in 2000 - 2003.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are due primarily to deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since September 2015. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down collectively by approximately 44.8%, or
$10.7 million, since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the
over-collateralization ratio of the Class A notes is currently
218.8% versus 169.8% in September 2015. The paydown of the Class A
notes is partially the result of interest payments and principal
prepayments from certain assets treated as defaulted by the trustee
in amounts materially exceeding expectations. Moody's said,
“Accordingly, we have assumed the deal will continue to benefit
from potential recoveries on defaulted securities.”

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since September 2015. Based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2805, compared to 3302 in September 2015.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in July 2015.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty
      about assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in
      either consumer or commercial credit conditions and in the
      residential real estate property markets. The residential
      real estate property market's uncertainties include housing
      prices; the pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
      modifications and refinancing; the unemployment rate; and
      interest rates.

   -- Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
      is whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries
      from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will
      continue and at what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging

      could have a significantly positive impact on the notes'
      ratings.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries
      received from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and
      those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as
      the timing of these recoveries create additional
      uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted assets assuming
      limited recoveries, and therefore, realization of any
      recoveries exceeding Moody's expectation in the future would

      positively impact the notes' ratings.

   -- Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
      portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions

      of a few large obligors Moody's rates non-investment-grade,
      especially if they jump to default.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM™ to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge™ cash flow
model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

   Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (1747):

   -- Class A-1 (Series 1): +2

   -- Class A-2 (Series 2): +2

   -- Class A-2: 0

   Caa ratings notched down by two notches (3097):

   -- Class A-1 (Series 1): -1

   -- Class A-2 (Series 2): -1

   -- Class A-2: 0


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A Certificate to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series RRD-1:

  Class A Trust Certificates, Downgraded to B2; previously on
   Feb. 4, 2016, Downgraded to B1

  Class B Trust Certificates, Downgraded to B2; previously on
   Feb. 4, 2016, Downgraded to B1

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the change in the rating of the
Underlying Securities, the 6.625% Senior Debentures due April 15,
2029 issued by R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, which was downgraded
to B2 on Sept. 14, 2016.  The transaction is a structured note
whose ratings are based on the rating of the Underlying Securities
and the legal structure of the transaction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings will be sensitive to any change in the rating of the
6.625% Senior Debentures due April 15, 2029, issued by R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Company.


PRIME MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by Prime Mortgage
Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2003-1

   -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013

      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013

      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013

      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action is a result of the recent performance of the underlying
pool and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on the pool. The
ratings downgraded are due to the weaker performance of the
underlying collateral and the erosion of enhancement available to
the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


REALT 2016-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-2
(the Certificates) issued by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust,
Series 2016-2:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (sf)

   -- Class G at B (sf)

   -- Class X at AAA (sf)

Class X is notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO)
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers the IO
certificates' position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral for the transaction consists of 47 fixed-rate loans
secured by 72 properties. All loans in the transaction amortize for
the entire term, 72.2% of the pool by loan balance amortizes on
schedules that are 25 years or less, while 27.8% of the pool by
loan balance will amortize on schedules that are between 25 years
and 30 years. Seventeen loans (39.9% of the pool by loan balance)
were modelled with Strong sponsor strength and 30 loans (55.3% of
the pool by loan balance) were considered to have meaningful
recourse to the respective sponsor; all else being equal, recourse
loans typically have lower probability of default and were modelled
as such.

The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow and their
respective actual constants, DBRS identified four loans,
representing 6.4% of the pool, based on the trust A-note balances,
as having a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times
(x), indicating a higher likelihood of mid-term default. In
addition, 38.9% of the loans in the pool by loan balance have DBRS
Refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, based on the trust A-note balance. The
DBRS weighted-average (WA) Term DSCR and Going-In Debt Yield are
1.38x and 8.6%, respectively, and the DBRS WA Refinance DSCR and
Exit Debt Yield are 1.13x and 10.9%, respectively, based on the
trust A-note balance.

DBRS sampled 32 loans, representing 86.1% of the pool by loan
balance, and site inspections were performed on 50 properties,
representing 83.9% of the pool by loan allocated balance. Of the
sampled loans, eight loans, representing 33.1% of the pool balance,
was considered to be of Above Average property quality.

The rating assigned to Class G differs from the higher ratings
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation and, in this case, the ratings reflect
expected dispersion of loan-level cash flows post issuance and
qualitative loan-level factors that are not precisely captured in
the quantitative model (to account for borrower concentration).

The ratings that DBRS assigned to the Certificates are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


REGATTA VII: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Regatta VII Funding Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $256,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $48,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned
   (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $24,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                      RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Regatta VII is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments
representing principal proceeds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may
consist of first-lien last-out loans, second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

Regatta Loan Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.1 year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes, Class S1 Notes, Class S2 Notes and Class P Notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2760
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2760 to 3174)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2760 to 3588)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


RESOURCE REAL 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2007-1 Ltd.:

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015  
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of five classes of notes due to
materially greater than expected recoveries on high credit risk
assets, credit quality of the CMBS collateral, and amortisation
profile of the assets. This was more than enough to offset the
negative migration in the collateral pool as evidenced by WARF and
WARR. The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Resource 2007-1 is a cash transaction whose reinvestment period
ended in June 2012. The transaction is backed by a portfolio of: i)
whole loans (72.6% of the pool balance); ii) commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (18.3%); and iii) mezzanine interests
(9.1%). As of the trustee's August 19, 2016 report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, is
$173.9 million, compared to $500.0 million at issuance with the
paydown directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes, as
a result of regular amortization and prepayments.

The pool contains four assets totaling $14.7. million (8.1% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as impaired securities as
of the trustee's August 19, 2016 report. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the impaired
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
7889, compared to 7112 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa (3.9% compared to 0.8% at last review)
A1-A3 (1.1% compared to 4.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (4.5%
compared to 8.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to 2.5% at
last review), B1-B3 (3.0% compared to 4.0% at last review) and
Caa1-Ca/C (87.4% compared to 79.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.8 years, as compared to 2.8 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying collateral; and look-through loan assumptions on the
CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 34.5%, as compared to 36.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, same as last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by 10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch downward (e.g.,
one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).
Increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by 10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to seventeen notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class D Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Stratford CLO Ltd.:

   -- US$41,300,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
      on August 19, 2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$417,200,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
      $113,402,510.69), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August
      19, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$104,300,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
      August 19, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- US$37,100,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Baa1

      (sf); previously on August 19, 2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- US$16,100,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Ba2
      (sf); previously on August 19, 2015 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- US$21,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured
      Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current
      outstanding balance of $14,676,786), Affirmed B1 (sf);
      previously on August 19, 2015 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Stratford CLO Ltd., issued in October 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
November 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2015. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 58% or $155.8 million
since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
135.42%, 118.45%, 112.34% and 107.30%, respectively, versus August
2015 levels of 123.38%, 113.25%, 109.36% and 106.03%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since August 2015. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 3048 compared to 2624 in August
2015. Additionally, based on Moody's calculations, which include
adjustments for ratings with a negative outlook and ratings on
review for downgrade, assets with a Moody's default probability
rating of Caa1 or below currently make up 19.6% of the portfolio,
compared to 11.6% in August 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

   -- Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a number of
      securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
      through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
      necessary information to update its credit estimates in a
      timely fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected

      by any default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in
      lieu of updated credit estimates.

   -- Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
      liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative

      outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
      Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
      exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
      default. The historical default rate is higher than average
      for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

      which constitute around $7.2 million of par, Moody's ran a
      sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2438)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: +1

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +1

   -- Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3658)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: -1

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D: -1

   -- Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $339.7 million, defaulted par of
$43.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.04%
(implying a WARF of 3048), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.45%, a diversity score of 35 and a weighted average
spread of 3.17% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 4.5% of the collateral pool.



TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2006-4: Fitch Cuts Class H Notes Rating to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades one class of Talmage Structured Real
Estate Funding 2006-4 Ltd./LLC (Talmage 2006-4).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

No assets remain in the transaction. Since the last rating action,
all assets have been sold or paid off. The realized losses of $33.2
million were in line with Fitch's expectations.

The downgrade of the class H note follows the resolution of the
last assets held by the CDO, an August 2016 sale of three $33.2
million B-notes secured by Resorts International for a de mininis
recovery, as expected. Approximately $200,000 remains in an expense
reserve, which will be applied towards the discharge of the
Indenture to cover any additional expenses, any remaining funds
will be paid to the notes.

The remaining obligation to class H is $608,067. There are
insufficient funds available to pay the balance of this note; as
the maximum amount available from the expense reserve would be
$200,000.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The defaulted rating will be automatically withdrawn within 11
months of the date of this rating action.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided in relation to this
rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following rating:

   -- $608,067 class H notes to 'D' from 'C'.

Classes S and A-1 through G have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
classes J, K, and the Preferred Shares.


TIAA CHURCHILL I: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by TIAA Churchill Middle Market CLO I Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "Churchill CLO I").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$212,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$36,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$30,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$24,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$16,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- US$23,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Churchill CLO I is a managed cash flow SME CLO. The Rated Notes
will be collateralized primarily by small and medium enterprise
senior secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans. The
portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

The Issuer will be managed by TIAA-CREF Alternatives Advisors, LLC
in its capacity as collateral manager and will be sub-advised by
Churchill Asset Management LLC (the "Sub-Advisor"). The Sub-Advisor
will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the
assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $375,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 30

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3460

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3460 to 3979)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: -1

   -- Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3460 to 4498)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1

   -- Class F Notes: -3


UNITED AIRLINES 2012-3: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for several series of
enhanced equipment trust certificates issued by United Airlines.
Fitch currently rates United 'BB-'/Outlook Positive. The following
ratings have been affirmed:

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2016-1

   -- Class AA Certificates at 'AA'

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2014-2

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2014-1

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

United Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2013-1

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

Continental Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2012-2

   -- Class A Certificates at 'A'

   -- Class B Certificates at 'BBB-'.

Continental Airlines Pass Through Trust Series 2012-3

   -- Class C Certificates at 'BB'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's senior EETC tranche ratings are primarily based on a
top-down analysis of the level of overcollateralization (OC)
featured in the transaction. Fitch's stress analysis uses an
approach assuming the rejection of the entire pool of aircraft in a
severe global aviation downturn. The stress scenario incorporates a
full draw on the liquidity facility, an assumed 5%
repossession/remarketing cost, and various stresses to the value of
the collateral. Fitch also utilizes its top-down approach for the
UAL 2016-1 'A' tranche, which is the subordinated tranche in that
transaction. The ratings approach in that transaction is supported
by levels of OC that are similar to other, previously issued senior
tranches.

Based on updated appraisal information incorporated into Fitch's
analysis, the level of OC in each of these transactions has
weakened slightly since the ratings were last reviewed, with the
exception of UAL 2016-1, which was just launched in May of this
year. Weaker levels of collateral coverage are a result of aircraft
values that have depreciated slightly faster than the levels that
were incorporated into Fitch's previous analysis. Faster rates of
depreciation were broad-based, including all of the aircraft types
that are featured in these transactions, namely the 737-900ER, the
ERJ-175, and the 787-8 and 787-9. Despite slightly weaker
loan-to-values (LTVs), all of the transactions continued to pass
Fitch's stress tests that correspond to their current rating
levels.

The B and C tranche ratings are notched from the 'BB-' IDR of the
underlying airline. The 'BBB-' rating for the B tranches reflects a
high affirmation factor (+2 notches) and the presence of an
18-month liquidity facility (+1 notch). The 'BB' rating for the
2012-3 C tranche reflects a high affirmation factor (+2 notches)
partially offset by recovery expectations (-1 notch).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Ratings for these transactions are driven by a harsh downside
scenario in which United declares bankruptcy, chooses to reject the
collateral aircraft, and where the aircraft are remarketed in the
midst of a severe slump in aircraft values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative rating actions for the senior tranches could be driven by
unexpected declines in collateral values. For the 737-900ERs in
these transactions, values could be affected by the entrance of the
737-9 MAX, or by an unexpected bankruptcy by one of its major
operators. Likewise the Embraer 175s could also be affected by the
entrance of the 175 E-2. Concerns for the 787 values largely
revolve around the potential for production issues on a scale above
and beyond what has already been experienced.

Subordinated tranche ratings are based off of the underlying
airline IDR. As such, Fitch would likely upgrade the B tranches to
'BBB' if United's IDR were upgraded to 'BB'. Fitch's criteria allow
for greater ratings uplift for lower rated carriers, therefore if
United were downgraded to 'B+', the subordinated tranche ratings
would likely not change.


UNITED AUTO 2016-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to United Auto Credit
Securitization Trust 2016-2's $150.415 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 58.7%, 51.3%, 42.6%,
      33.2%, and 27.6% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit
      support levels provide coverage of approximately 2.90x,
      2.50x, 2.05x, 1.55x, and 1.27x S&P's expected net loss range

      of 19.50%-20.50% for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- The likelihood of timely interest and principal payments by
      the assumed legal final maturity dates under stressed cash
      flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the
      assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      not decline by more than one rating category and the rating
      on the class D notes would not decline by more than two
      rating categories.  Under this scenario, the preliminary
      'BB (sf)' rated class E notes would not decline by more than

      two rating categories in the first year, but would
      ultimately default in a 'BBB' stress scenario, as expected.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of
      credit deterioration as a one-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities, a two-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'A' through
      'BB' rated securities under moderate stress conditions, and
      default for 'BB' rated securities over a three-year period.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized.  The pool is approximately two-and-a-half
      months seasoned, with a weighted average original term of
      approximately 40 months and an average remaining term of
      about 37 months.  As a result, S&P expects the pool will pay

      down more quickly than many other subprime pools with longer

      weighted average original and remaining terms.

   -- S&P's analysis of five years of static pool data following
      the credit crisis and after United Auto Credit Corp. (UACC)
      centralized its operations and shifted toward shorter loan
      terms.  S&P also reviewed the performance of UACC's three
      outstanding securitizations, as well as its seven
      securitizations from 2004 to 2007.  UACC's 20-plus-year
      history of originating, underwriting, and servicing subprime

      auto loans.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2016-2

Class      Rating       Type           Interest           Amount
                                       rate             (mil. $)

A          AAA (sf)     Senior         Fixed              79.290
B          AA (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed              18.380
C          A (sf)       Subordinate    Fixed              18.710
D          BBB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed              20.020
E          BB (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed              14.015


VENTURE XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eleven classes of
notes and one class of loans to be issued by Venture XXIV CLO,
Limited.

Moody's rating action is:

  $129,000,000 Class A-1D Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $79,000,000 Class A-1P Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $30,000,000 Class A-F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $50,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Loans
   maturing 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $36,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $14,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $58,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,

   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $22,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  $12,000,000 Class C-F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  $15,000,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
  $12,000,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $25,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

The Class A-1D Notes, the Class A-1P Notes, the Class A-FNotes, the
Class A-2a Loans, the Class A-2a Notes, the Class A-2b Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-F Notes, the Class
D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Debt."  The Class A-2a Loans
and the Class A-2a Notes are referred to herein, together, as the
"Class A-2a Debt."

On the closing date, the Class A-2a Notes have an aggregate
outstanding amount of $36,000,000.  At any time, the Class A-2a
Loans may be converted in whole or in part to Class A-2a Notes
thereby decreasing the aggregate outstanding amount of the Class
A-2a Loans and increasing, by the corresponding amount, the
aggregate outstanding amount of the Class A-2a Notes.  The
aggregate outstanding amount of the Class A-2a Debt will never
exceed $86,000,000, less the amount of any principal repayments on
the Class A-2a Debt and plus any proportional additional issuance
of Class A-2a Debt.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected losses posed
to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Venture XXIV is a managed cash flow CLO.  The Rated Debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

MJX Asset Management LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $525,000,000
Diversity Score: 70
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1D Notes: 0
Class A-1P Notes: 0
Class A-F Notes: 0
Class A-2a Loans: 0
Class A-2a Notes: 0
Class A-2b Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C-1 Notes: -2
Class C-F Notes: -2
Class D-1 Notes: -1
Class D-2 Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1D Notes: -1
Class A-1P Notes: -1
Class A-F Notes: -1
Class A-2a Loans: 0
Class A-2a Notes: 0
Class A-2b Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C-1 Notes: -4
Class C-F Notes: -4
Class D-1 Notes: -2
Class D-2 Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -2


VOYA CLO 2016-3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Voya CLO 2016-3, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $372,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  $84,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $36,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  $36,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $24,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Voya CLO 2016-3 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  Subject to a cov-lite matrix, at least
92.5% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash,
and eligible investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may
consist of underlying assets that are unsecured loans and second
lien loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Voya Credit Advisers LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's 4.75 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000
Diversity Score: 65
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -3
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C5: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2003-C5 as follows

   -- Cl. O, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 14% since Moody's last review.
Furthermore, defeasance comprises 13% of the pool balance.

The rating on the IO class, class X-C, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.0% of the
current balance, compared to 14.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $15.8 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 12.7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%). One loan, constituting 19% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Randhurst Crossings Shopping Center Loan ($3 million), which is
secured by an approximately 17,000 square foot (SF) retail center
located in Mount Prospect, IL. As of December 2015, the property
was 86% leased, compared to 65% as of March 2012. The loan
transferred into special servicing in November 2012 due to a
maturity default. Moody's expects a significant loss for this
loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 47%, compared to 53%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.17X and 2.13X,
respectively, compared to 1.17X and 1.89X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 45% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Brandon Oaks Loan ($2.6 million -- 16.6% of the
pool), which is secured by a 160-unit multifamily property located
in Brandon, FL. As of December 2015, the property was 97% leased,
compared to 88% as of June 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
34% and 2.86X, respectively, compared to 41% and 2.36X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the 1815 East Flamingo Road Loan ($2.2
million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
17,000 SF single tenant retail property in Las Vegas, NV. The
property is 100% leased to Dollar General through July 2024.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 1.78X, respectively,
compared to 60% and 1.58X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Forest Hill Centre Loan ($2.2 million
-- 14.0% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 53,000
SF grocery anchored retail center in Lexington, NC. As of December
2015, the property was 82% leased, the same as of year-end 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.77X, respectively,
compared to 63% and 1.60X at the last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes,
downgraded one class, and affirmed six classes in Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C25 as follows:

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Affirmed
      B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Affirmed
      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Affirmed C
  
      (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Affirmed C

      (sf)

   -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 90% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes D & E were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges, in addition to the risk of future interest shortfalls.

The ratings on the P&I Classes, F, G, H and J were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the fact that it
is not currently, nor expected to, receive monthly interest
payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42% of the
current balance compared to 5% at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS
" published in October 2015.

Please note that on June 30, 2016, Moody's released a "Request for
Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on potential
clarifications to its methodology for rating IO securities called
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities," dated October 20, 2015. Moody's said, “If the
revised Credit Rating Methodology is implemented as proposed, we
would withdraw the Credit Rating on the interest only class as this
bond has expected future excess interest payments of zero and the
obligation has in effect matured.” Please refer to Moody's
Request for Comment, titled "Interest-Only (IO) Securities" for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed Credit
Rating Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

Due to the very low Herf, Moody's used the excel-based Large Loan
Model in formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan model
derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV
ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage,
loan structure, property type and sponsorship. Moody's also further
adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $194 million
from $2.86 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 34%
of the pool. The pool contains no loans with investment-grade
structured credit assessments and no defeased loans.

One loan, constituting 15% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $147 million (for an average loss
severity of 39%). Eight loans, constituting 83% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
(Hercules Plaza -- $65 million) is the also the largest loan in the
pool and constitutes 34% of the total deal balance. The loan is
secured by a 518,000 square foot office property in downtown
Wilmington, Delaware. The loan was previously modified in 2014 to
include a two-year maturity extension plus an extension of the
interest-only period. Following the lease expiration and departure
of the former largest tenant in May 2016, the loan returned to
special servicing in July for imminent monetary default. The
property was 73% occupied as of December 2015 before the departure
of the largest tenant which had occupied 24% of the property's net
rentable area (NRA). The servicer is currently evaluating workout
strategies.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the Hampton Inn --
Las Vegas, NV Loan ($25 million -- 13% of the pool), which is
secured by a 319-key limited service hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The loan transferred to special servicing in 2009 and became REO in
2010. The property has since undergone renovations and has seen a
steady increase in occupancy in recent years. The hotel's occupancy
rate in 2015 was 78%. The property is currently REO and is under
contract for sale.

The third loan in special servicing is the Quantum Buildings A/B
Loan ($24 million -- 12% of the pool) and is secured by two flex /
R&D properties located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
properties are 100% leased through February 2021 to a single
tenant, however the tenant no longer occupies the space. The space
is partially subleased and the majority of the space is currently
dark.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $81 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
performing pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 50% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%, compared to
85% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 20.8% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.27X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The two performing conduit loans represent 16.6% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Shoppes at North Village Loan ($30
million -- 15% of the pool), which is secured by a 226,000 square
foot open-air community retail center in Saint Joseph, Missouri.
The property was 93% leased as of December 2015, down from 99% the
prior year. The loan has passed its anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of November 11, 2015 and is currently on the watchlist. The
loan benefits from amortization Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
105% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 110% and 0.85X at prior
review.

The second largest performing loan is secured by a retail property
in Charlotte, North Carolina. The loan represents 1% of the pool.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.25X, respectively,
compared to 83% and 1.17X at the last review.



WELLS FARGO 2014-C22: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative
four classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s WFRBS Commercial Trust
series 2014-C22 commercial mortgage trust pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are due to expected losses associated with the
transaction's specially serviced loan (1.8% of the pool). Fitch
applied a conservative value estimate in its analysis as an updated
valuation was not available. Given the class positions within the
capital structure, potential erosion in credit enhancement is not
sufficient to maintain the ratings at their current levels. There
were variances to criteria related to classes B and C, indicating
upgrades were possible; Fitch determined that upgrades were not
warranted due to limited improvement in credit enhancement and
potential for higher losses on the specially serviced loan.

Fitch modeled losses of 5.2% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 5.1%. The pool has experienced
no realized losses to date. Fitch has designated four loans (3.5%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the one specially
serviced asset (1.8%).

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1.2% to $1.47 billion from
$1.49 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class G. Full interest-only
loans comprise 17.2% of the outstanding transaction; partial
interest-only loans comprise 48.7%. All but 9.7% of the loans
mature in 2024.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced States Addition Apartments loan, which is
secured by a portfolio of three apartment complexes containing 235
units located in Dickinson, ND. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2016 for payment default. The property is
located on the Bakken shale formation, and local employment has
been severely impacted as a result of high dependency on oil and
gas exploration. The property's occupancy declined to 52% as of
August 2016 with average rent of $843 per unit compared to 100% and
$1,496 per unit, respectively, at issuance. The most recent
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of December 2015 declined to
0.60x from 1.35x. An updated valuation was not available from the
special servicer.

The largest loan (10.2%) is the Bank of America Plaza loan, which
is collateralized by 1,432,285-sf office building located in
downtown Los Angeles. The property was constructed in 1974. The
property is a class A, LEED Gold, 55-story office tower located in
downtown Los Angeles. The property is 92.4% occupied as of March
2016 up from 89% at issuance. The property historically has
averaged occupancy above 90% since issuance. The subject location
serves as the global headquarters for the two largest tenants at
the property, The Capital Group Companies and Shepard, Mullin,
Richter, & Hampton LLC, which have maturities past the loan term in
February 2033 and December 2024, respectively. Approximately 56% of
the space rolls during the loan term with 7% rolling in 2018, 14%
in 2019, 8% in 2020, 23% (which includes the 3rd largest tenant) in
2022. The most recent DSCR as of year-end (YE) 2015 is 2.45x up
from 2.27x YE 2014. NOI has improved approximately 8% since
issuance due to improved occupancy and increased income.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through C remain Stable due to
expected continued paydown and sufficient credit enhancement.
Upgrades are not likely as the Negative Outlook on Class D reflects
the potential for credit enhancement to erode should expected
losses from the specially serviced loan increase. The Rating
Outlook on class E is Stable following the downgrade. Further
downgrades to classes E and F are possible should expected losses
increase.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative the
following classes and assigns Recovery Estimates (REs) as
indicated:

   -- $31.6 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $14.9 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%.

   -- Interest-only X-C to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Interest-only X-D to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $40.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $75.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $59.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $360 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $386 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $102.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $104.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $68.8 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $52.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

   -- $111.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf''; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B, interest-only
class X-E, interest-only class X-Y, or the class G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs. 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-NXS6.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $27,042,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $115,788,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $150,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $206,019,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,139,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,267,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $529,988,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $120,194,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,964,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,963,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43,535,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,821,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43,535,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,821,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.
   -- $8,518,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Notional amount and interest-only.
  (b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 21, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$19,875,000 class X-FG, $22,713,952 class X-H, $11,357,000 class G
or the $22,713,952 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 63
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $757.1 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC,
Silverpeak Real Estate Finance LLC, UBS AG, by and through its
branch office located at 1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY,
and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.9% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 86.3% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.25x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 106.8%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 8.93%.  Fitch's aggregated net cash flow
represents a variance of 10.04% to issuer cash flows.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The Fitch stressed DSCR on the trust-specific
debt is 1.25x, higher than the 2015 and year-to-date (YTD) 2016
averages of 1.18x and 1.18x, respectively.  The Fitch stressed LTV
ratio on the trust-specific debt is 106.8%, lower than the 2015
average of 109.3% and in line with the YTD 2016 average of 106.5%
for the other Fitch-rated deals.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
comprise 57.7% of the pool by balance.  Compared to other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this
transaction is higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 average
concentrations of 49.3% and 55.3%, respectively.  The pool's
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 456,
which is higher than the 2015 average of 367 and 2016 YTD average
of 428.

Interest-Only Loans: Ten loans that make up 50.0% of the pool are
interest only.  This is higher than the average of 23.3% for 2015
and 30.6% for YTD 2016.  Overall, the pool is scheduled to pay down
by 9.0%, less than the averages of 11.7% for 2015 and 10.4% YTD for
2016 for the other Fitch-rated U.S. deals.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.7% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-NXS6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C17: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-C17 pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 2.9% to $878.6 million from
$904.4 million at issuance.  Currently, there are no specially
serviced loans and there is one Fitch Loan of Concern (1.1% of the
pool).  Three loans totaling 10.5% of the pool are defeased,
including the second largest loan in the pool.

The largest loan in the pool, Hilton Sandestin Beach Resort & Spa
(8.4%), is a 10-year interest-only (I/O) loan secured by a 598-room
full-service beachfront hotel located within the 2,400-acre
Sandestin Resort in Destin, Florida.  The loan is performing better
than expected with net operating income (NOI) approximately 24.2%
above bank underwriting levels.  The increase in NOI is largely due
to increased room revenue with RevPAR at the subject increasing
15.4% to $163 as of July 2016 TTM from $141 as of August 2013 TTM.
Notably, a 198-room tower, which was under renovation at issuance,
came back online in 2014. The servicer reported 4.85x debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for year-end 2015 compared with 4.34x for
year-end 2014.  Occupancy was 68.2% as of year-end 2015 compared
with 69.4% at year-end 2014.

The third largest loan (6.3%) is secured by 997,549 square feet
(sf) of the 1.6 million sf Westfield Mission Valley Mall in San
Diego, CA.  The property is well-located just north of San Diego,
immediately off of Interstate 8.  The Westfield Mission Valley Mall
has 115 stores and is anchored by Macy's (non-collateral), Target,
Bed Bath & Beyond and Nordstrom Rack.  The loan has a companion
$100 million pari passu note which is part of the WFRBS 2013-C16
transaction.  The collateral is performing roughly in line with
underwritten expectations with NOI down 2.5% from issuance.  As of
year-end 2015 the property was 99.4% occupied versus 98.8% at
issuance.  Servicer reported year-end 2015 DSCR was 3.16x, compared
with year-end 2014 DSCR of 3.04x.  Notably, one of the tenants at
the property, Sports Chalet (4.7%), recently filed for bankruptcy
protection and is no longer in its space.

The Fitch Loan of Concern, Staybridge Suites - Minot, is a 102-room
hotel located in Minot, North Dakota.  The property has exhibited
significantly weaker financial performance as a result of the
floundering oil and gas exploration in North Dakota.  Year-end 2015
DSCR was 1.30x, down from 1.66x at year-end 2014 and 2.41x at
year-end 2013.  Occupancy also declined to 74.8% as of year-end
2015 compared to 79.7% in 2014 and 85% in 2013.  The borrower noted
that the decline in operating performance was partially the result
of rate reductions granted to top corporate accounts in an effort
to remain competitive with the local market. According to a Smith
Travel Research report, the hotel is the top performer in RevPAR in
its competitive set and has been since 2014.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $22.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $166.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $125 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $236.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $58.8 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $31.6 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $47.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.8 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $9 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest - Only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
   -- Interest - Only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G or class X-C certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-UBS1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class B commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-UBS1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on class B to reflect its expectation of the
available credit enhancement for this class, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating level.  The upgrade also
follows S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of
the transaction's collateral and available liquidity support.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-A interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
in which the rating on the IO bond would not be higher than that of
the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on class
X-A references classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, and A-S.

                          TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Aug. 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $713.2 million, which is 98.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 57 loans, the same at
issuance.  Two of these loans ($77.9 million, 10.9%) are defeased,
five ($67.7 million, 9.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
and there are no loans with the special servicer.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 98.8% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 98.5% was partial or year-end 2015 data and 0.2% the
remainder was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.76x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 79.5% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.7% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the two defeased loans.
The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool
trust balance of $336.0 million (47.1%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.97x and 77.0%, respectively, for all of the top 10
nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced no principal losses.

RATINGS LIST

WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-UBS1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-UBS1
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To              From
A-1              92938JAA0             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
A-2              92938JAB8             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
A-3              92938JAD4             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
A-4              92938JAE2             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
A-SB             92938JAF9             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
A-S              92938JAG7             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
X-A              92938JAH5             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
B                92938JAK8             AA (sf)         AA- (sf)
C                92938JAL6             A- (sf)         A- (sf)
D                92938JAN2             BBB- (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E                92938JAQ5             BB (sf)         BB (sf)
F                92938JAS1             B+ (sf)         B+ (sf)


ZAIS CLO 5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by ZAIS CLO 5, Limited (the "Issuer"
or "ZAIS CLO 5").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$260,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$42,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$25,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$21,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$18,400,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

ZAIS CLO 5 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's said, “We expect the portfolio to be
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.”

ZAIS Leveraged Loan Master Manager, LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2615

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2615 to 3007)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2615 to 3400)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


[*] Moody's Confirms $665MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Sept. 16, 2016, confirmed the ratings
of 56 tranches from 7 transactions, backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS
loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S1

  Cl. 1-A-P, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A-P, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A-P, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A-P, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A-4, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A-9, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-B-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-B-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-F

  Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  CL. A-3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. B-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. X-A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. X-B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-3

  Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IV-A, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IV-A-IO, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. V-A, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. V-A-IO, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-N Trust

  Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-6, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust

  Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR12 Trust

  Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-5, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-6, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-11, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR9 Trust

  Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IV-A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions conclude the review actions on these bonds announced on
June 17, 2016, relating to apparent inconsistences between the
prepayment shift percentage value calculated per the transaction
documents and the distributions being made by the administrator
according to the remittance reports.  After review with the
administrators, Moody's has concluded that no model changes were
required for these transactions.  The rating actions also reflect
the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated
loss expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in August 2016 from 5.1% in
August 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $232.4MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
and confirmed ratings of 40 tranches from 6 transactions, backed by
Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM1

  Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PO-4, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM2

  Cl. PO-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PO-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PO-3, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. XS-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. XS-2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. XS-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IA-CB1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IA-CB-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IA-CB-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IIA-CB-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
  2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IIA-CB-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IIA-CB-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IIIA-CB-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. IIIA-CB-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2004-FA1

  Cl. I-A-PO, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-PO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,

   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-PO, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17,
   2016, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-A2, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1-AX, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 5-A, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-31A

  Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A7, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-40A

  Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 5-A, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions on Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM1
conclude the review actions on these bonds announced on June 17,
2016 relating to the existence of an error in the prepayment shift
percentage input to the cashflow waterfalls.  The confirmations of
the ratings on these two bonds reflect the corrected prepayment
shift input and the appropriate allocation of principal prepayments
in our cashflow model per the most recent remittance report for
this transaction, as well as the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools
in tandem with bond specific credit protection.

Today's actions on Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-NCM2,
First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-FA1,
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2 and
Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-31A conclude the review
actions on these bonds announced on June 17, 2016, relating to
apparent inconsistences between the prepayment shift percentage
value calculated per the transaction documents and the
distributions being made by the administrator according to the
remittance reports.  Due to lack of response from the
administrators, Moody's updated the prepayment shift percentage
value inputs for these four deals per its understanding of each
transaction's documents and the most recent remittance report to
resolve the apparent inconsistency.  These updates did not have an
impact on the ratings on the bonds.  During the course of the
review, Moody's discovered an error in the cashflow models used in
rating the SARM 2004-2 and SASCO 2003-31A transactions; this error
has been corrected to lock senior prepayment percentage instead of
senior accelerated distribution percentage to accurately reflect
the transaction documents.  The correction of this error did not
impact the ratings on the bonds.  No model changes are required for
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NCM2 and First Horizon
Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-FA1.  The upgrades on
Cl. 2A-1 and Cl. 2A-7 from SASCO 2003-31A are due to improvement of
credit enhancement available to the bonds.  These rating actions,
as well as the confirmations of other tranches of all four
transactions, reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools in tandem
with bond specific credit protection.

The actions on Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-40A
conclude the review actions on these bonds announced on June 17,
2016 relating to the existence of an error in the prepayment shift
percentage input to the cashflow waterfalls, and an apparent
inconsistency between the prepayment shift percentage value
calculated per the transaction documents and the distributions
being made by the administrator according to the remittance
reports.  Due to lack of response from the administrators, we
updated the prepayment shift percentage value inputs for this deal
per our understanding of each transaction's documents and the most
recent remittance report to resolve the apparent inconsistency.
During the course of the review, we discovered an error in the
cashflow model used to rate this transaction; this error has been
corrected to lock senior prepayment percentage instead of senior
accelerated distribution percentage to accurately reflect the
transaction documents.  The confirmations on these six bonds
reflect the corrected prepayment shift input and the appropriate
allocation of principal prepayments in our cashflow model for this
transaction, as well as the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools in tandem
with bond specific credit protection.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in Aug 2016 from 5.1% in Aug
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Actions on 31 Navient FFELP Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 14 classes
of notes, upgraded the ratings of 15 classes of notes, and
downgraded the ratings of 14 classes of notes issued in 31 student
loan securitizations sponsored or administered by Navient
Solutions, Inc.  The securitizations are backed by student loans
originated under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP)
that are guaranteed by the US government for a minimum of 97% of
defaulted principal and accrued interest.

The completed rating actions are:

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-1

  Floating Rate Class A-3 Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously

   on June 14, 2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade
  Floating Rate Class A-4 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously

   on June 14, 2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade
  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-2

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   Aug. 14, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-3

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-4

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-5

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-6

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-7

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-8

  Floating Rate Class A-3 Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously

   on June 14, 2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on

   Nov. 25, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2015-1

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2015-2

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2015-3

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: Navient Student Loan Trust 2016-1

   Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
    on June 14, 2016, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Upgrade

Issuer: SLC Student Loan Trust 2009-1

  Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLC Student Loan Trust 2009-3

  Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2009-2

  Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2009-3

  Cl. A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-2

  Class A Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2011-1

  Class A-2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2011-2

  Class A-2 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2011-3

  Floating Rate Cl. B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-1

  Class A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,

   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-2

  Class A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-4

  Class B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2016
   A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-7

  Class A-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2014,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2012-8

  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14,
   2016, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2013-2

  Class B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2013-3

  Class A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  Class B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2016,
   Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2013-4

  Floating Rate Class A Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously

   on June 14, 2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2013-6

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2014-1

  Floating Rate Class A-3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);
   previously on June 14, 2016, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade
  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
   on June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2014-2

  Floating Rate Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on

   June 14, 2016, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Today's actions conclude review actions on the 43 classes that were
announced on June 22, 2015, and June 14, 2016.  The downgrades are
the result of Moody's analysis that indicates that the tranches
will not pay off by their final maturity dates under some or all of
28 cash flow scenarios, as outlined in Moody's methodology, Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans,
published on Aug. 11, 2016.  Therefore, Moody's expects that these
tranches will incur losses that are higher than the benchmark
levels set in Moody's Idealised Cumulative Expected Loss Rates
table for the current ratings.  The low payment rates on the
underlying securitized pools of FFELP student loans are driven
primarily by persistently high levels of loans to borrowers in
non-standard payment plans, including deferment, forbearance and
Income-Based Repayment (IBR), as well as by the relatively low
rates of voluntary prepayments.

The downgrades of some lowest payment priority Class A notes result
in these notes being rated lower than the subordinated Class B
notes in the affected securitizations.  Although transaction
structures stipulate that Class B interest is diverted to pay Class
A principal upon default on the Class A notes, Moody's analysis
indicates that the cash flow available to make payments on the
Class B notes will be sufficient to make all required payments to
Class B noteholders by the Class B final maturity dates, which
occur much later than the final maturity dates of the downgraded
Class A notes.

The upgrades and confirmations are primarily the result of Moody's
analysis that indicates that these tranches are either likely to
successfully pay off by their maturity dates, or that the expected
loss for each such tranche is lower than or consistent with,
respectively, the expected loss benchmark levels set in Moody's
Idealised Cumulative Expected Loss Rates table for the current
ratings.

The upgrades and confirmations also reflect Moody's assumption that
the events giving rise to non-recurring fees and expenses that the
Indenture trustee might sustain, as a result of litigation or other
unforeseen circumstances, are not likely to occur during the term
of the transactions, as evidenced by historical experience in the
transactions backed by FFELP student loans.  Therefore, Moody's has
not included such fees and expenses in its cash flow modeling
analysis.  To account for a small probability of such events,
however, Moody's qualitatively assessed sufficiency of the cash
flows to pay the trustees' non-recurring fees and expenses.  This
analysis focused in particular on estimating the amount of residual
cash flows generated by the pools of student loans after their
balance declines to 10% of the initial balance (10% pool factor),
at which time the pools are expected to generate significantly
diminished amounts of cash to cover those non-recurring fees and
expenses.

In its rating actions Moody's also considered Navient's
demonstrated willingness and ability to protect the securities from
being in default as of their final maturity dates. Specifically,
Navient has consistently exercised its option to purchase all
remaining student loans from the trusts at or below the 10% pool
factor and pay off the notes.  It has also amended 34 transactions
to add the ability to purchase an additional 10% of the initial
pool balance.  In the event that Navient does not exercise the
option to purchase the loans at 10% pool factor, the Indenture
trustee may initiate a sale of the underlying student loan pools,
which will take place only if proceeds from the sale will be
sufficient to pay off all outstanding notes.  Navient has also
amended some transactions to establish a revolving credit facility
that enables the trust to borrow money from Navient Corporation on
a subordinated basis in order to pay off the notes. Finally,
Navient amended 24 transactions to extend maturity dates for
tranches that appeared to have significant risk of not paying off
within the previous final maturities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in August 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the loan
pool increases as a result of declining borrower usage of
deferment, forbearance and IBR, increasing voluntary prepayment
rates, or prepayments with proceeds from sponsor repurchases of
student loan collateral.  Moody's could also upgrade the rating
owing to a build-up in credit enhancement.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the paydown speed of the
loan pool declines as a result of low voluntary prepayments, and
high deferment, forbearance and IBR rates, which would threaten
full repayment of the classes by their final maturity dates.  In
addition, because the US Department of Education guarantees at
least 97% of principal and accrued interest on defaulted loans,
Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if it were to
downgrade the rating on the United States government.


[*] S&P Discontinues 33 'D' Ratings From 25 US CMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on 33 classes
from 25 U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

S&P discontinued these ratings according to its surveillance and
withdrawal policy.  S&P had previously lowered the ratings to 'D
(sf)' on these classes because of principal losses and/or
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P believed would remain
outstanding for an extended period of time.  S&P views a subsequent
upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the
relevant criteria for the classes within this review.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

           http://bit.ly/2dhKi3q


                            *********

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