TCR_Public/160904.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, September 4, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 248

                            Headlines

AGATE BAY 2016-3: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B-4 Debt
AGATE BAY 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class B-4 Certificates
APIDOS CLO XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
ARES XXV CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
BABSON CLO 2016-II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes

BAKER STREET CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba1
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP18: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Tranches
BERNOULLI CDO I: Moody's Hikes Class A-1B Notes Rating to Caa2
BHMS 2014-ATLS: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F-FL Debt

CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CATAMARAN CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
CD MORTGAGE CD 2016-CD1: Fitch Rates Class X-E Certificates B-
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: DBRS Assigns B Rating to Cl. G-1 Debt
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Rates Cl. F Certificates 'B-sf'

COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
COMM 2013-LC6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Debt
COMM 2014-CCRE14: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
CROWN POINT: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes

CSMC TRUST 2016-BDWN: S&P Assigns B Rating on 7 Tranches
CWCAPITAL COBALT II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
FANNIE MAE: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating on 3 Note Tranches
FLAGSHIP CLO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to CC

GMAC COMMERCIAL 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. J Certs
GSAMP TRUST 2006-SD1: Moody's Hikes Class M-2 Notes Rating to B1
GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating to Class D Notes
HILT 2014-ORL: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
ICG US 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes

JP MORGAN 1997-C5: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to 'Caa3'
JP MORGAN 2016-2: Fitch Assigns BBsf Rating on Class B-4 Certs
KINGSLAND VI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
LANDMARK VIII CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
MADISON PARK XXI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes

MIDLAND LOAN: Fitch Cuts Special Servicer Rating to 'CSS2+'
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ9: Fitch Cuts Class G Rating to CCCsf
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class B Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS11: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates B-
NOMURA CRE CDO 2007-2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 12 Tranches

OCEAN TRAILS CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
OCEAN TRAILS IV: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 28: Moody's Rates Class E-1 Debt 'Ba3'
RBSGC MORTGAGE 2007-A: Moody's Assigns Ca Rating on Cl. 3-A-2 Debt
REALT 2014-1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Certificates

TACSEE FUNDING: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class C Notes
[*] Moody's Hikes $352 Million of Option ARM RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $46 Million of Second Lien RMBS
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $2.4BB of Subprime RMBS
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $29MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2003

[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $641MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $152.4MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $211.5MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $373MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $76MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS

[*] Moody's Upgrades $57 Million of Subprime RMBS
[*] S&P Affirmed Ratings on 34 Classes From 3 US Prime RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Raises 7 Ratings and Affirms 10 Ratings on 4 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 14 RMBS Alt-A and HELOC Deals
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 49 Classes From 11 RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 RMBS Transactions

                            *********

AGATE BAY 2016-3: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B-4 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Agate Bay Mortgage Trust
2016-3 as follows:

   -- $246,318,000 class A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $82,106,000 class A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,109,000 class A-10 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $352,533,000 class A-X-1 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,318,000 class A-X-4 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $82,106,000 class A-X-5 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,109,000 class A-X-6 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $8,287,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $6,026,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,519,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2,260,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Exchangeable Certificates:

   -- $352,533,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $352,533,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $328,424,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $328,424,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,318,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $82,106,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,109,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $352,533,000 class A-X-2 exchangeable notional certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $328,424,000 class A-X-3 exchangeable notional certificates
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The $3,013,837 class B-5 certificates and $376,638,837 class A-IO-S
notional certificates will not be rated.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of
high-quality 30-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans to
borrowers with strong credit profiles, low leverage and large
liquid reserves. The pool has a weighted average (WA) FICO score of
772 and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 69%. The
collateral attributes of the subject pool are largely consistent
with recent ABMT transactions issued in 2015 and 2016.

Geographic Concentration Risk: The pool's primary concentration
risk is in California, where approximately 34.5% of the collateral
is located, 27.3% of which is located in the metropolitan areas
encompassing Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Jose. This
distribution shows strong improvement in geographic diversification
over previous ABMT transactions. As a result, no penalty was
applied to the pool's probability of default (PD) to account for
geographic concentration risk.

Tier 1 Framework with Possible Counterparty Risk: Fitch considers
the transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan R&W, as well as a backstop
by the seller, TH TRS, in case of insolvency or dissolution of the
related originator. However, Fitch increased its loss expectations
to account for the closure of the mortgage conduit operations by TH
TRS's parent, Two Harbors Investment Corp., and the possibility
that TH TRS may be unable to fulfill future repurchase
obligations.

Originators with Limited Performance History: Many of the loans
were originated by lenders with a limited non-agency performance
history. However, this is mitigated by Fitch's assessment of Two
Harbors as an above-average aggregator. With the exception of
Movement Mortgage, LLC (4% of the pool), whose loans were
originated and reviewed according to its own guidelines, all loans
were originated to meet TH TRS's purchase criteria and were
reviewed by a third-party due diligence firm to TH TRS's
guidelines, with no material findings. TH TRS is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Two Harbors. In addition, Fitch conducted an onsite
review or in-depth call with four of the top five originators,
which account for approximately 38% of the pool.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment: The trust provides for expenses,
including indemnification amounts and costs of arbitration, to be
paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which does not affect the
contractual interest due on the certificates. Furthermore, the
expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at $300,000 per annum
($125,000 for the trustee), which can be carried over each year,
subject to the cap until paid in full.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation. The due
diligence review for ABMT 2016-3 was conducted prior to the June
2016 publication of Fitch's report "U.S. RMBS Master Rating
Criteria". While the final due diligence grades were calibrated to
Fitch's updated grading matrix as described in its criteria, the
TRID reporting detail expected to be provided to Fitch under the
updated criteria had not been established by the TPR firm at the
time it conducted the loan-level review for this transaction.
Therefore, the reports generated by the TPR for this transaction
are not consistent with Fitch's updated criteria for TRID, but will
be going forward for loans reviewed after July 2016. There was no
impact on Fitch's ratings given the due diligence grading results
and additional documentation provided to clear any exceptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

After Fitch determines credit ratings through a rating stress
scenario analysis, additional sensitivity analyses are considered.
The analyses provide a defined stress sensitivity to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at issuance as well as a defined sensitivity that
demonstrates the stress assumptions required to reduce a rating by
one full category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

The defined stress sensitivity analysis focuses on determining how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 6.2% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivity analyses which
determine the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one
full category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For
example, additional MVDs of 7%, 32% and 53% could potentially lower
the 'AAAsf' rated class one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Clayton
Services LLC and American Diligence, LLC. The due diligence focused
on a compliance, credit, valuation and data integrity review. Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and the findings did
not have an adverse impact on our analysis.

Fitch received certifications indicating that the loan-level due
diligence was conducted in accordance with Fitch's published
standards for credit, property valuation and legal/regulatory
compliance. The certifications also stated that the company
performed its work in accordance with the independence standards,
per Fitch's criteria.


AGATE BAY 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class B-4 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Agate Bay Mortgage Trust
2016-3's $373.625 million mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by first-lien, fixed residential
mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family residential
properties, condominiums, cooperatives, and planned unit
developments to primarily prime borrowers.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the:

   -- High-quality collateral in the pool;
   -- Available credit enhancement; and
   -- The transaction's associated structural mechanics.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2016-3

Class           Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A-1             AAA (sf)             352.533
A-2             AAA (sf)             352.533
A-3             AAA (sf)             328.424
A-4             AAA (sf)             328.424
A-5             AAA (sf)             246.318
A-6             AAA (sf)             246.318
A-7             AAA (sf)              82.106
A-8             AAA (sf)              82.106
A-9             AAA (sf)              24.109
A-10            AAA (sf)              24.109
A-X-1           AAA (sf)             352.533
A-X-2           AAA (sf)             352.533
A-X-3           AAA (sf)             328.424
A-X-4           AAA (sf)             246.318
A-X-5           AAA (sf)              82.106
A-X-6           AAA (sf)              24.109
B-1             AA (sf)                8.287
B-2             A (sf)                 6.026
B-3             BBB (sf)               4.519
B-4             BB (sf)                2.260
B-5             NR                     3.013

NR--Not rated.


APIDOS CLO XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Apidos CLO XXIV.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$248,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$32,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$18,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes
and Class D Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Apidos XXIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments (including cash),
and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 85% ramped as of
the closing date.

CVC Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four and a half year reinvestment
period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2788

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2788 to
   3206)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2788 to
   3624)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


ARES XXV CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from Ares XXV CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation managed by Ares Management LLC.

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.  The proposed supplemental indenture also includes
language to make the deal Volcker-compliant, updates to match S&P
Global Ratings' current recovery rate methodology, and an increase
in the maximum allowable covenant-lite obligations.

The class A-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes are expected to
be issued at a floating spread over LIBOR that is lower than the
current floating spread on the original notes.  The class B-1 and
B-2 notes are being combined into one class of floating-rate notes,
and the class E-R notes are expected to be issued at a floating
spread over LIBOR that is higher than the current floating spread
on the original notes.  The cash flow analysis demonstrates, in
S&P's view, that the replacement notes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the current rating levels.

Although the cash flow results indicate a modest failure at the
current rating level for the existing class E notes, the
transaction has experienced overall stable performance since the
effective date.  All coverage ratios are well above the minimum
triggers, and the post-refinance structure passes at the 'BB'
rating level.

On the Sept. 8, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes, upon which S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings
on the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement
notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm
the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its preliminary
ratings on the replacement notes.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing

Class      Amount   Interest            BDR     SDR   Cushion
         (mil. $)   rate(%)             (%)     (%)       (%)
A-R        339.50   LIBOR plus 1.22   69.99   56.96     13.03
B-R         68.75   LIBOR plus 1.75   65.65   49.52     16.13
C-R         45.25   LIBOR plus 2.50   53.93   43.71     10.22
D-R         29.00   LIBOR plus 3.90   45.60   38.35      7.25
E-R         24.75   LIBOR plus 7.00   33.22   32.09      1.13

Current date before proposed refinancing

Class     Amount   Interest               BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate(%)                (%)     (%)       (%)
A         339.50   LIBOR plus 1.39      70.71   56.96     13.75
B-1        45.00   LIBOR plus 2.25      64.53   49.52     15.01
B-2        23.75   3.3815               64.53   49.52     15.01
C          45.25   LIBOR plus 3.15      52.05   43.71      8.34
D          29.00   LIBOR plus 4.65      43.25   38.35      4.90
E          24.75   LIBOR plus 5.75      31.45   32.09    (0.64)

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Ares XXV CLO Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating
A-R                  AAA (sf)
B-R                  AA (sf)
C-R                  A (sf)
D-R                  BBB (sf)
E-R                  BB (sf)


BABSON CLO 2016-II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-II.

Moody's rating action is:

  $2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $252,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $22,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $23,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Junior Term Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-II is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans.  The portfolio is approximately 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Babson Capital Management LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 55
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2845
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the Rated Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2845 to 3272)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2845 to 3699)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


BAKER STREET CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Baker Street CLO II Ltd.:

  $15,900,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due October
   2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016, Upgraded

   to A2 (sf)

  $12,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due October
   2019 (current outstanding balance of $11,402,275), Upgraded to
   Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $270,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due October 2019,
   (current outstanding balance of $59,900,612), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $30,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
   October 2019 (current outstanding balance of $6,655,624),
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $20,100,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due October 2019,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $21,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due October
   2019, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

Baker Street CLO II Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2012.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and/or an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2016.  The Class
A-1 and A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 45% or
$53.2 million since that time.  Based on Moody's calculations, the
OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are
170.48%, 137.23%, 119.57% and 109.47%, respectively, versus
February 2016 levels of 144.34%, 125.50%, 114.22% and 107.30%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since February.  Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) is currently 2897 compared to 2475 in February
2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.

  6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively. Due
     to the large amount of cash the deal currently holds in its
     Principal Collection account, some of which can be reinvested

     in new collateral by the end of the next due period, Moody's
     tested different sensitivity scenarios assuming different
     levels of paydowns to the rated notes.

  7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
     liquidity:
     The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook,
     Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's
     speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the
     notes to additional risks if these assets default.  The
     historical default rate is higher than average for these
     assets.  Due to the deal's exposure to such assets, which
     constitute around $5.2 million of par, Moody's ran a
     sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2318)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3476)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -2
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $146.3 million, defaulted par
of $8.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 11.26%
(implying a WARF of 2897), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.82%, a diversity score of 21 and a weighted average
spread of 3.29% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

The collateral pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality
Moody's assesses through credit estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects adjustments with respect to the default probabilities
associated with credit estimates.  Specifically, Moody's applied a
two-notch equivalent assumed downgrade to a credit estimate whose
related exposure constitutes approximately 5.3% of the pool.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. (BACM 2004-4) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2004-4.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect stable performance of the pool.  Although
the transaction is highly concentrated, the four remaining loans
are reporting stable performance with a weighted average NOI DSCR
of 1.84x.  None of the loans have been in special servicing.  Three
of the four remaining loans (85.4% of the pool) have maturities in
2018 and 2019; however, uncertainty remains related to the
refinance of the fourth largest loan (14.6%) which is scheduled to
mature in September 2016.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.7% to $16.6 million from
$1.3 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class J.

The two largest loans in the pool representing 70.3% of the pool
are secured by retail properties.  The largest loan (44.3%) is
secured by a 48,282 sf retail property in Studio City, CA.  As of
March 2016, the property was 99% occupied with a NOI DSCR of 1.98x.
The second largest loan (26%) is secured by a 103,674 sf grocery
anchored retail property in Harrisburg, PA.  As of March 2016, the
property was 97% occupied with a NOI DSCR of 2.07x.

The third largest loan in the pool (15.1%) is secured by a 93 pad
manufactured home community located in Fairview, OR.  As of YE
2015, occupancy was 100% with NOI DSCR of 1.86x.  The fourth
largest loan (14.6%) is secured by a 100-unit multifamily property
located in Wilmington, NC.  As of March 2016, occupancy was 92%
with NOI DSCR of 1.30x.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Losses are not expected on the distressed class H; however, should
any loan transfer to special servicing, downgrades to the class are
possible.  The distressed class may also be subject to further
rating actions as losses are realized.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $16.2 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $0.4 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-1A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
DM-A, DM-B, DM-C, DM-D, DM-E, DM-F and DM-G certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P and BC certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
X-C and X-P certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP18: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 10 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TOP18 (BSCMSI
2005-TOP18).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class E reflects sufficient credit enhancement and
continued paydown of the transaction.  The affirmations reflect
stable performance since Fitch's last rating action.  The pool is
concentrated with only 16 loans remaining, which includes one
specially serviced asset (3.1% of the pool).  One loan is defeased
(3.8%).  Fitch modeled losses of 7.9% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 2.5%, including
$24 million (2.1% of the original pool balance) in realized losses
to date.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.9% to $45.5 million from
$1.12 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 91,609
square foot (sf) mixed-use property located Akron, OH (18.8%).  The
office component, which accounts for 98% of the net rentable area,
is leased to a healthcare company through November 2016. There have
been discussions regarding an extension between the tenant and the
borrower, but nothing has been agreed upon.  There is also
ground-level retail space that is leased through July 2017.  The
servicer reports that the borrower is also attempting to refinance
the loan prior to its anticipated repayment date in March 2017.
The debt service coverage ratio DSCR was reported to be 1.20x as of
YE 2014 which is in-line with the 1.18x reported at YE 2013.  Due
to the uncertainty regarding the lease with the largest tenant,
Fitch applied a conservative analysis to account for the potential
of the tenant vacating.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced asset (3.1%), which is secured by a 14,063 sf
retail property located in Indianapolis, IN.  The subject was
transferred to special servicing in October 2014 for imminent
payment default. A receiver was appointed by the court in July 2015
and foreclosure was completed in April 2016.  Per the servicer, the
asset is under contract for sale with an anticipated closing date
in September 2016.  According to the June 2016 rent roll, the
property is 67% occupied.

The largest loan in the pool (21.9%) is secured by a portfolio of
two properties: a 160,120 sf industrial property in Allen, TX and a
91,868 sf office property in Sunnyvale, CA.  The properties are
100% occupied by a publicly traded communications company.  Leases
at both properties expire in February 2020. As of YE 2015, the DSCR
was reported to be 2.41x.

                           RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks of classes D through G remain Stable due to high
levels of credit enhancement and continued paydown.  Fitch
anticipates that class D will be repaid from amortization in one
year, after which class E will be most senior.  Further upgrades
for classes F and G may be warranted based on the performance of
the remaining loans.  Downgrades are not expected unless a material
economic or asset level event negatively impacts the transaction's
metrics.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $11.2 million class E to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $3.6 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.8 million class F at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.8 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.4 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
   -- $2.7 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-4FL, A-J, B and C
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


BERNOULLI CDO I: Moody's Hikes Class A-1B Notes Rating to Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Bernoulli High Grade CDO I, Ltd.:

   -- US$360,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes due July 5, 2042 (Current outstanding
      balance of $61,889,804.66), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
      previously on September 25, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Bernoulli High Grade CDO I, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
RMBS originated between 2005 and 2006.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the A-1B
Notes and an increase in its over-collateralization ratio since
September 2015. The Class A-1B Notes have been paid down by
approximately 32.5%, or $29.9 million since that time. Based on
Moody's calculation, the over-collateralization ratio for the Class
A-1B is currently 318.6% versus 207.7% in September 2015. The
paydown of the Class A-1B notes is partially the result of interest
and principal collections from certain assets treated as defaulted
by the trustee in amounts materially exceeding expectations.
Moody's said, "Accordingly, we have assumed the deal will continue
to benefit from potential recoveries on defaulted securities."

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The prinicpal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs," published in July 2015.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty
      about assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in
      either consumer or commercial credit conditions and in the
      residential real estate property markets. The residential
      real estate property market's uncertainties include housing
      prices; the pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
      modifications and refinancing; the unemployment rate; and
      interest rates.

   -- Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
      is whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries
      from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will
      continue and at what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging

      could have a significantly positive impact on the notes'
      ratings.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries
      received from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and
      those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as
      the timing of these recoveries create additional
      uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted assets assuming
      limited recoveries, and therefore, realization of any
      recoveries exceeding Moody's expectation in the future would

      positively impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge™ cash flow
model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

   Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (2572):

   -- Class A-1A: 0

   -- Class A-1B: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0

   Caa ratings notched down by two notches (4400):

   -- Class A-1A: 0

   -- Class A-1B: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0


BHMS 2014-ATLS: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F-FL Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by BHMS 2014-ATLS Mortgage Trust
as follows:

   -- Class A-FX at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-FL at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-CPFX at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-CPFL at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-EXTFX at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-EXTFL at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B-FX at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class B-FL at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C-FX at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class C-FL at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D-FX at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class D-FL at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E-FX at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E-FL at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F-FX at B (low) (sf)

   -- Class F-FL at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
since issuance. This transaction closed in August 2014 and is
interest only for the entire term. The underlying loan is secured
by the Atlantis Resort (Atlantis) located on Paradise Island, near
the City of Nassau, in the Bahamas. The collateral includes four
unique hotel towers (Royal, Coral, Beach and The Cove) consisting
of 2,917 rooms and an on-site amenity package, including 39
restaurants and bars; a 60,000 square feet (sf) casino; a 141-acre
waterpark; 73,391 sf of retail space; and 458,000 sf of meeting and
group space. Resort components not included in the collateral are a
condominium tower and a timeshare, together representing an
additional 887 rooms. However, as timeshare guests also frequent
the amenities, the income generated from those activities is
included in the collateral’s revenue stream. Approximately 32.0%
of resort revenues were generated from the room nights at YE2015,
consistent with YE2014. The majority of revenue is generated by the
restaurants and bars, casino and water attractions. Resort
amenities are also sold as packages to travellers aboard cruise
ships, which dock at the cruise ship terminal near the subject
throughout the year, creating consistent demand.

According to the year-end financials, the YE2015 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 2.21 times (x), representing an increase
from the YE2014 DSCR of 1.97x. According to the Smith Travel
Research report, the trailing 12 months (T-12) ending December 2015
occupancy for the Royal, Coral and Beach Towers was 69.0%, the
average daily rate (ADR) was $250.35 and revenue per available room
(RevPAR) was $172.70. In comparison, the T-12 ending December 2014
showed the occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 69.7%, $243.83 and
$169.84, respectively. The remaining hotel tower, The Cove, which
consists of 600 rooms and is considered the luxury tower, reported
T-12 ending December 2015 occupancy of 71.1%, ADR of $445.62 and
RevPAR of $316.72. All metrics have improved when compared with the
prior-year figures showing occupancy of 69.9%, ADR of $422.20 and
RevPAR of $295.00.

Overall, performance of the subject has stayed consistent, showing
a slight improvement year over year. However, the completion of the
Baha Mar resort is expected to create competition to the subject
and temporarily affect cash flows. The Baha Mar is located
approximately 7.3 miles away from the subject, on the main island
of New Providence, and was originally scheduled to open in December
2014. As a result of disputes and stalled construction as of June
2015, the property is currently reported to be 97.0% complete. News
reports indicate that, as of August 22, 2016, an agreement was
reached between the Bahamas government and Export-Import Bank of
China that would allow for the construction to resume beginning
September 2016. The expected completion date of the resort is
scheduled for the end of the 2016–2017 winter season. The Baha
Mar would feature a 100,000 sf casino and an extensive golf course.
Although the casino would overtake the Atlantis’ casino in size
and become the island’s largest casino, the borrower reports that
Atlantis is comfortable with the current size and does not intend
to expand. DBRS notes the Atlantis offers a more extensive amenity
package as compared with the Baha Mar, catering to a wider range of
guests. The Baha Mar will likely target affluent couples,
casino-goers and international visitors from Asia, increasing
tourism to the island overall. Such demand increases will serve to
benefit the entire economy of the island, with Atlantis well
situated to retain demand at or near current levels in the near
term following the Baha Mar’s delivery. Additionally, as the
YE2015 net cash flow figure represents an improvement of 37.1% over
the DBRS underwritten figure, any short-term cash flow disruptions
over the next few years should be minimally impactful.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2A, A-2B, B,
and C notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
from Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
February 2013 and is managed by Carlyle Investment Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the August 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
February 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect credit quality improvement in the
underlying collateral and an increase in credit support since S&P's
effective date rating affirmations in January 2014.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased significantly from the September 2013
effective date report used in S&P's January 2014 affirmations.  The
purchasing of this higher-rated collateral has caused the
portfolio's weighted average rating to rise to 'B+' from 'B', a
decrease in reported weighted average spread to 4.09% from 4.50%,
and a corresponding increase in the weighted average S&P Global
Ratings' recovery rate.

The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.40 years from
5.44 years in September 2013.  This seasoning, combined with the
improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.  In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has
increased during this period, and the resulting diversification of
the portfolio also contributed to the credit quality improvement.

Additionally, par gain in the underlying portfolio since the
effective date has led to an increase in the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios from the

September 2013 trustee report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio increased to 137.55% from 136.84%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio increased to 123.47% from 122.83%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 116.64% from 116.04%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 110.06% from 109.49%.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers additional
sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to specific
distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2A          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2B          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
D             BB (sf)


CATAMARAN CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class B notes and
affirmed its ratings on the class A, C, D, E, and F notes from
Catamaran CLO 2013-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in 2013 and is managed by Trimaran
Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 15, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.39
years from 5.44 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the December 2013 effective date report, which S&P
used for its January 2014 rating affirmations.  Specifically, the
par amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to
$14.15 million as of July 2016 from $3.98 million as of the
effective date report.  However, the increase in collateral rated
'CCC+' and below has been offset by an increase in the
concentration of collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit
rating of 'BB-' or higher since the effective date.  The
portfolio's weighted average rating has remained at 'B+' over the
same period.  In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio
has increased during this period, resulting in improved portfolio
diversification.

The upgrade reflects credit quality improvement and seasoning of
the underlying collateral.  The affirmations of the ratings reflect
S&P's belief that the credit support available is commensurate with
the current rating levels.

The transaction does not currently have any exposure to long-dated
or defaulted assets.

According to the July 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have remained
relatively stable since the effective date report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio has increased to 133.20% from
      133.16%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio has increased to 121.14% from 121.09%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio has increased to 113.99% from 113.95%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio has increased to 108.59% from 108.55%.
   -- The class F O/C ratio has increased to 105.86% from 105.83%

All coverage tests are currently passing and are above the minimum
requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C, D, and E notes, its rating actions considers additional
sensitivity runs that allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a lower rating on the class F notes than the rating
action suggests.  However, S&P believes that as the transaction
enters its amortization period following the end of its
reinvestment period, the transaction may begin to pay down the
rated notes sequentially, starting with the class A notes, which,
all else remaining equal, will begin to increase the O/C levels. In
addition, because the transaction currently has minimal exposure to
'CCC' rated collateral obligations and no exposure to long-dated
assets (i.e., assets maturing after the CLO's stated maturity), S&P
believes it is not currently exposed to large risks that would
impair the current rating on the notes.  In line with this, S&P
affirmed the rating on the class F notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Catamaran CLO 2013-1 Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Catamaran CLO 2013-1 Ltd.

Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


CD MORTGAGE CD 2016-CD1: Fitch Rates Class X-E Certificates B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
German American Capital Corp.'s CD Mortgage Securities Trust
2016-CD1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

   -- $30,826,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,236,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $168,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $207,191,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $566,092,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $73,839,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,644,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,129,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $59,773,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,645,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,823,000ab class X-D ' BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,153,000ab class X-E ' B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,645,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,823,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,153,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

These classes were not rated:

   -- $23,733,985ab class X-F;
   -- $23,733,985a class G.

  a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 32 loans secured by 58
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$703,219,986 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by German American Capital Corporation and Citigroup
Global Markets Realty Corp.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.5% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
90.5% of the pool.

                            KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Fitch Leverage: The transaction has significantly lower
leverage than other recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR of 1.25x is better than both the
YTD 2016 average of 1.16x and the 2015 average of 1.18x.  The
pool's WA Fitch LTV of 95.5% is better than both the YTD 2016
average of 107.5% and the 2015 average of 109.3%.  Excluding the
credit opinion loans (27.7% of the pool), the Fitch DSCR and LTV
are 1.17x and 108.9%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four of the 10 largest loans
in the pool, representing 27.7%, have investment-grade credit
opinions, this is well above the YTD 2016 average of 5.0% credit
opinion loans.  10 Hudson Yards (9.2% of the pool) is the largest
loan in the pool and has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone basis.  Westfield San Francisco Centre
(8.5%), the third largest loan in the pool, has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'Asf*' on a stand-alone basis.  Further, Gas
Company Tower (5.7%) and Vertex Pharmaceuticals (4.3%) have
investment grade credit opinions of 'Asf*' and 'BBB-sf*',
respectively.  The implied credit enhancement levels for the
conduit portion of the transaction for 'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are
25.875% and 8.750%, respectively.

High Pool Concentration: The pool is more conc entrated than other
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.  The top 10 loans
comprise 66.6% of the pool, which is greater the YTD 2016 average
of 54.6% and the 2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's loan
concentration index (LCI) of 543 is above the YTD 2016 average of
420 and the 2015 average of 367.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9% below the
most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CD
2016-CD1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: DBRS Assigns B Rating to Cl. G-1 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-C2 (the Certificates) issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2016-C2. The trends are Stable.

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class X-D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E-1 at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class E-2 at BB (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F-1 at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F-2 at B (high) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (high) (sf)

   -- Class EF at B (high) (sf)

   -- Class G-1 at B (sf)

   -- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)

   -- Class G at B (low) (sf)

   -- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)

Classes D, X-D, E-1, E-2, E, F-1, F-2, F, EF, G-1, G-2, G and EFG
have been privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional. DBRS ratings on
interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers
the IO certificates’ position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of 44 fixed-rate loans secured by 53
commercial properties, comprising a total transaction balance of
$609,165,022. Six of the loans are cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted into three separate portfolios or crossed groups.
The DBRS analysis of this transaction incorporates these crossed
groups, resulting in a modified loan count of 41, and the loan
number references within the presale report reflect this total. The
conduit pool was analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, two loans, representing 12.5% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 19
loans, representing 55.1% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x; however, the DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCRs for these loans are
based on a weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of
9.85%, which implies an interest rate of 9.31% amortizing on a
30-year schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.8% over
the WA contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The
loans’ probability of default (POD) is based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

The largest loan in the pool, Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ, exhibits
credit characteristics consistent with an investment-grade shadow
rating. The loan represents 9.8% of the pool and has credit
characteristics consistent with an AA shadow rating. Overall, the
pool exhibits a relatively strong DBRS WA Term DSCR of 1.72x based
on the whole loan balances, which indicates moderate term default
risk. In addition, 18 loans, representing 53.4% of the pool, have a
DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. Even when excluding Vertex
Pharmaceuticals HQ, which represents 9.8% of the pool and is shadow
rated AA, as well as Opry Mills, which represents another 9.8% of
the pool and has a high DBRS Term DSCR of 2.04x, the deal continues
to exhibit a good DBRS Term DSCR of 1.46x. Seven loans,
representing 28.2% of the pool, are located in urban markets, which
benefit from consistent investor demand and increased liquidity
even in times of stress. Urban markets represented in the deal
include New York, Boston and Huntington Beach. Only eight loans,
totaling 12.0% of the transaction balance, are considered to be
located in tertiary/rural markets.

In total, seven loans, representing 19.9% of the pool, are secured
by hotel properties, including three of the largest ten loans.
Hotels have the highest cash flow volatility of all major property
types as their income, which is derived from daily contracts rather
than multi-year leases, and their expenses, which are often mostly
fixed, are quite high as a percentage of revenue. These two factors
cause revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to
fall even faster as a result of high operating leverage. DBRS cash
flow volatility for such hotels, which ultimately determines a
loan’s POD, assumes between a 31.4% and 92.8% cash flow decline
for a BBB stress and a 55.6% and 97.6% cash flow decline for a AAA
stress. To further mitigate hotels’ more volatile cash flow, the
loans in the pool secured by hotel properties have a WA DBRS Debt
Yield and WA DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 11.3% and 13.1%, respectively,
which compare quite favorably with the WA DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS
Exit Debt Yield of 8.8% and 9.6%, respectively, for the non-hotel
properties in the pool.

The DBRS sample included 28 of the 41 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 32 of the 54 properties in the pool
(84.9% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS average
sample NCF adjustment for the pool was -7.0% and ranged from -20.4%
to +2.1%. Furthermore, the pool is concentrated based on loan size
with a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 20
equal-sized loans. The largest five and ten loans total 39.6% and
59.3% of the pool, respectively. A concentration penalty was
applied given the pool’s lack of diversity, which increases each
loan’s POD. While the transaction is concentrated in the largest
ten loans, one of these loans (Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ), totaling
9.8% of the pool, is shadow rated AA by DBRS.

The ratings assigned to Classes F-2, F and EF differ from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers
this difference to be a material deviation, and in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to
occur post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Rates Cl. F Certificates 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2016-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2016-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) are 1.15x and 108.4%, respectively.
This is slightly worse than the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average
Fitch DSCR of 1.16x and the YTD 2016 average Fitch LTV of 107.5%.
Excluding the credit opinion loan (9.8% of the pool), the Fitch
DSCR and LTV are 1.10x and 111.3%, respectively.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loan Represents: One loan, Vertex
Pharmaceuticals HQ (9.8% of the pool) has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 17.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-C2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under 'Related Research'
below. The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to
those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in
the Special Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and
Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions'
(May 2016).

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

   Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C2, Commercial
   Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C2

   -- $20,227,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $15,097,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $170,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $189,298,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $31,793,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $456,873,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $68,531,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $30,458,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $35,027,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $33,504,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,743,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,743,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,137,500ac class E-1 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $9,137,500ac class E-2 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $18,275,000ac class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $5,330,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $23,605,000ac class EF 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.
c) Maximum principal amount that may be outstanding. The class E-1
and E-2 certificates (in the applicable proportions) may be
exchanged for a related amount of class E certificates, and class E
certificates may be exchanged for a ratable portion of each class
of class E-1 and E-2 certificates. The class F-1 and F-2
certificates (in the applicable proportions) may be exchanged for a
related amount of class F certificates, and class F certificates
may be exchanged for a ratable portion of each class of class F-1
and F-2 certificates. The class E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2 certificates
(in the applicable proportions) may be exchanged for a related
amount of class EF certificates, and class EF certificates may be
exchanged for a ratable portion of each class of class E-1, E-2,
F-1 and F-2 certificates. The class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1 and G-2
certificates (in the applicable proportions) may be exchanged for a
related amount of class EFG certificates, and class EFG
certificates may be exchanged for a ratable portion of each class
of the class E-1, E-2, F-1, F-2, G-1 and G-2 certificates. The
class H-1 and class H-2 certificates (in the applicable
proportions) may be exchanged for a related amount of class H
certificates, and class H certificates may be exchanged for ratable
portion of each class of class H-1 and H-2 certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $2,665,000 class F-1, $2,665,000 class F-2,
$5,330,000 class G-1, $5,330,000 class G-2, $10,660,000 class G,
$34,265,000 class EFG, $8,376,511 class H-1, $8,376,511 class H-2,
or the $16,753,022 class H certificates.


COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certificates to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class J commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2005-FL10, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D
(sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its temporary interest shortfall methodology, as well as
S&P's criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the remaining asset in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P lowered its rating on class J to 'D (sf)' primarily because of
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P believes will remain
outstanding in the near term.  Class J has had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for 10 consecutive months. According to the
Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the trust incurred
$53,535 of monthly interest shortfalls due to an appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amount.  As a result, classes
subordinate to and including class J experienced interest
shortfalls.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $36.9 million, which is 2.1% of the pool trust
balance at issuance.  The trust currently consists of the specially
serviced Berkshire Mall real estate-owned (REO) asset, 589,146 sq.
ft. of a 715,415-sq.-ft. regional mall in Lanesboro, Mass., down
from 22 loans at issuance.

To date, the transaction has experienced $7.0 million in principal
losses, or 0.4% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 2.5% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
Berkshire Mall REO asset.

The Berkshire Mall REO asset has a trust balance of $36.9 million
and a total reported exposure of $40.0 million.  The loan was
transferred back to the special servicer on Jan. 31, 2014, because
of pending expiration of the forbearance agreement, which expired
on March 9, 2014.  The property became REO on June 10, 2014.
According to the special servicer, Strategic Asset Services, the
property is currently 80.6% leased, and it is working with a
property manager to lease up vacant spaces.  The special servicer
informed S&P that it plans to liquidate the asset by year-end 2016.
An appraisal reduction amount of $31.7 million is in effect against
the asset.  The reported appraisal value dated June 4, 2015, was
$8.0 million.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of the REO asset.

RATINGS LIST

COMM 2005-FL10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-FL10

                                          Rating
Class              Identifier             To           From
J                  126169AQ4              D (sf)       B+ (sf)


COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2012-CCRE4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2012-CCRE4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. The pool's aggregate principal balance
has been reduced by 4.5% to $1.06 billion from $1.11 billion at
issuance. Three loans (6.4% of the pool) are defeased, two of which
are top 15 loans. There is one specially serviced loan (1.1%) as of
the August 2016 distribution date. There are two Fitch Loans of
Concern (1.8%), one of which is the aforementioned specially
serviced loan.

There was one variance from criteria related to class C. The
surveillance criteria indicated that a rating upgrade above the
recommended rating was possible for the class. Fitch has determined
an upgrade is not warranted at this time, although the Positive
Outlook indicates future upgrades are likely.

Previously in December 2014, three specially serviced loans
liquidated; the loans were cross-collateralized and minimal losses
($87 thousand) were incurred relative to the overall pool balance.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially serviced
loan, TownePlace Suites Odessa (1.1%). The loan is securitized by a
108-room extended stay hotel located in Odessa, TX (West Texas).
The loan transferred to special servicing in April 2016 due to
payment default. In conjunction with the significant decline in oil
prices, the property, which is located in a region of West Texas
that has a strong presence of oil related businesses, has
experienced far less room demand over the last year than in
previous years. Revenues declined substantially in 2015 resulting
in a 1.10x DSCR as of year-end (YE) 2015, down from 2.51x as of YE
2014. The servicer is currently discussing a potential resolution
with the borrower.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses (#3 loan in the
pool) is the Fashion Outlets of Las Vegas (6.5%). The loan is
securitized by a 375,722 square foot (sf) enclosed outlet center
located in Primm, NV (Las Vegas MSA) roughly 40 miles south of the
Las Vegas Strip in close proximity to the NV/CA border. As of YE
2015, occupancy and DSCR were 90% and 1.80x, respectively; however,
occupancy declined to 77% as of March 2016. Neiman Marcus Last Call
was the largest tenant at issuance (previously 6.7% NRA) but
vacated upon lease expiration in January 2016. Per the servicer,
the borrower has executed a lease with H&M for the space formally
occupied by Neiman Marcus Last Call, but to date an updated rent
roll has not been received. Near-term 2016/2017 rollover risk
remains from smaller in-line tenants. Fitch will continue to
monitor. The loan is scheduled to mature in November 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Positive Outlooks on classes B, C, and X-B reflect improvement
in cash flow performance for several of the larger loans,
anticipated paydown from amortization, and an increase in
defeasance. Additionally, should the loans with 2017 maturities,
particularly the Fashion Outlets of Las Vegas loan payoff at
maturity, upgrades are likely. Given the overall stable to
improving performance across the pool, negative ratings migration
is not expected in the near term unless a material economic or
asset level event changes the transactions overall stable metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

   -- $9.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $148.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $70.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $499.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $839,084,138* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104,156,000* class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $111.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $62.3 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $38.9 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $45.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.4 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.


COMM 2013-LC6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
COMM 2013-LC6 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-LC6 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015 Affirmed

      A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2015
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the three IO classes were affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22, the same as at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4.3% to $1.43
billion from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 51% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Four loans,
constituting 3.7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Three loans, constituting 1.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest loan in special servicing is the Z New York
Hotel Loan ($17.6 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which is secured by
a 100-room boutique hotel in Long Island City, New York. The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2014 due to litigation
arising from the loan sponsor's use of the borrowing entity to
secure a residential lease in New York City. Two additional
defaults were discovered in July 2015 and certain defaults have yet
to be fully resolved. The Lender and Borrower are continuing
settlement discussions and the loan is currently paid through the
July 2016 payment.

The other loan in special servicing is the Pathmark -- Baldwin Loan
($12.2 million), which is secured by a vacant retail property in
North Baldwin, New York. The loan transferred to special servicing
in June 2016 after the grocery tenant filed bankruptcy and vacated
the property. The special servicer has indicated that they are in
discussion with the Borrower to resolve this asset through a
negotiated payoff. Moody's estimates an aggregate $8.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (29% expected loss on average).
Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool.

Moody's received full or partial year 2015 operating results for
86% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91%,
compared to 95% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 8% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.84X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Glades Plaza
and Commons at Town Center Loan ($27 million -- 2% of the pool),
which is secured by a Class A retail property in Boca Raton,
Florida. The property was built in the 1970s but was extensively
renovated in 2011. Property performance has stabilized following
post-renovation lease up of the property. The property was 87%
leased as of December 2015, compared to 91% leased in December
2014. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1
(sca.pd) and 1.70X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Moffett Towers Loan ($173 million -- 12% of the
pool), which represents a participation interest in a $331 million
senior mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a Class A office
property in Sunnyvale, California. The loan collateral consists of
three, eight-story, LEED Gold certified buildings with nearly 1
million square feet of net rentable area (NRA). The property was
100% leased as of March 2016 compared to 96% in June 2014 and 89%
at securitization. Top tenants include Motorola Mobility (a Lenovo
subsidiary), Microsoft, and Rambus, Inc. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 104% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.92X
at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 540 West Madison Loan ($135 million
-- 10% of the pool), which represents a participation interest in a
$235 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 31-story,
Class A office tower in the West Loop section of downtown Chicago,
Illinois. The property was constructed in 2003 and is located
across the street from the Ogilvie Transportation Center, a major
terminal for Chicago's commuter rail network. Lead tenant Bank of
America exercised early lease termination options which reduced the
bank's space by approximately 400,000 square feet, down from
757,000 square feet leased by the bank at securitization. Bank of
America has one remaining contraction option to give back more of
the bank's space at the end of 2016. As a result of the termination
options, property occupancy fell to 68% as of April 2015, down from
79% as of June 2014, however, as of March 2016, the occupancy has
rebounded to 87% due to recent leasing activity. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.85X, respectively, the same as at the
previous review.

The third largest loan is the Coastland Center Loan ($121 million
-- 9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a portion of a 926,000
square foot regional mall located in Naples, Florida. The mall's
anchors include JC Penney, Sears, and Macy's. JC Penney is the sole
collateral anchor. The mall was 96% leased as of December 2015 the
same as at last review. The loan sponsor is GGP. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.09X at the last review.


COMM 2014-CCRE14: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in COMM 2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015 Affirmed

      A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-1 through F were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class X-A was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

The rating on class PEZ was affirmed due to the credit performance
(or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.35 billion
from $1.38 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 56% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 27% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Five loans,
constituting 3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

The pool does not include any loans on the watchlist or liquidated
loans. Two loans, constituting less than 1% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Tioga Apartments loan ($7.9 million -- 0.6% of the pool),
which is secured by an 84-unit multifamily property located in
Tioga, North Dakota. The primary tenants at this property are
corporate tenants as well as direct leases to oil workers. Due to
this exposure to the oil industry, property performance has
declined as many tenants have vacated due to loss of employment.
The property is 51% occupied as of March 2016, compared to 98%
occupied at securitization.

The other special serviced loan is the Dakota Apartments B Loan,
which is also secured by a multifamily property located on the
Bakken Formation in Stanley, North Dakota. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $10 million loss for specially serviced loans (85%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 1% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $4 million (a 30% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 94% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 98% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 107%, compared to
105% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 0.99X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 60
Hudson Street Loan ($155 million -- 11.5% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $280 million mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by a 24-story, mission critical
telecommunications and data center building located in the TriBeCa
neighborhood of New York City. The property is widely regarded as
one of the world's most connected telecommunications and data
center buildings. The property was 76% leased as of August 2016,
compared to 79% leased as of June 2015. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.81X,
respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
625 Madison Avenue Loan ($110 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $195 million mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by the fee interest in a 0.81-acre parcel
of land located at 625 Madison Avenue between East 58th and East
59th Street in New York City. The fee interest is subject to a
ground lease pursuant to which the ground tenant constructed,
developed and owns the improvements that sit on top of the ground.
The improvements consist of a 17-story, mixed-use building, and the
ground tenant's interest in the improvements is not collateral for
the 625 Madison Avenue loan. The collateral is also encumbered with
$195 million of mezzanine debt. Moody's structured credit
assessment and actual DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.03X,
respectively.

The third largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Saint Louis Galleria Loan ($95 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $215 million mortgage
loan. The Loan is componentized in to three notes: (i) Note A-1,
having a par balance of $100 million; (ii) Note A-2, having a par
balance of $95 million; and (iii) Note A-1B, having a par balance
of $20 million. Note A-1 sits pari passu to Note A-2. Note A-1B
sits subordinate to both Note A-1 and Note A-2. Only Note A-2 has
been contributed to the rated transaction. The loan is secured by a
467,440 square foot (SF) component of a 1.18 million SF Class A
super-regional mall located in St. Louis, Missouri. Dillard's,
Macy's, and Nordstrom anchor the mall, but none of them are part of
the collateral for the loan. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 1.29X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 18.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Google and Amazon Office Portfolio Loan
($155 million -- 11.5% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $452.2 million mortgage. The loan is
also encumbered by $67.8 million of mezzanine debt. The loan is
secured by an office portfolio located in Sunnyvale, California.
The Moffett Towers Building D (Amazon Building) is a newly
constructed eight-story, Class A office building containing 357,481
SF. It is part of a seven-building campus. A2Z Development, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Amazon, will use the space for design
and product development for the Kindle e-reader. The Google Campus
is comprised of four, four-story, Class A office buildings totaling
700,328 SF, which is part of a six-building office campus known as
Technology Corners. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and
0.91X, respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Highland Hills Apartments Loan ($53
million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 826-unit
student housing property located in Mankato, Minneapolis. The
property was constructed in three separate phases between 1963 and
2011, consisting of Class B/C quality. The property is located
directly across from Minnesota State University. As of March 2016,
the property was 86% occupied compared to 99% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 1.02X, respectively,
compared to 92% and 1.05X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the City Square Loan ($46 million -- 3.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a mixed-use property located
within Oakland City Center complex in Oakland, California. The
asset is also encumbered with $7.5 million of mezzanine financing
held outside the trust. Improvements include three, three-story
buildings totaling 123,561 SF of Class A-/B+ office space, 38,581
SF of retail space and a subterranean parking garage with 1,156
parking spaces. As of June 2016, the property was 98% leased,
compared to 82% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 107% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.93X at
Moody's last review.



CROWN POINT: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2L, A-3L, and
combination notes from Crown Point CLO Ltd.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1La, A-1Lb, B-1L, and B-2L
notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $66.87 million in collective
paydowns to the class A-1La and A-1Lb notes since S&P's January
2014 rating actions.  These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for senior class A and class A,
but a decline in the class B-1L and B-2L O/C ratios since the July
2013 trustee report, which S&P used for its January 2014 rating
actions:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio improved to 142.70% from
      134.02%.
   -- The class A O/C ratio improved to 125.04% from 122.87%.
   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio decreased to 112.74% from 114.46%.
   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio decreased to 104.98% from 108.88%.

The collateral portfolio's credit quality has slightly deteriorated
since S&P's last rating actions.  Collateral obligations with
ratings in the 'CCC' category have increased, with $18.15 million
reported as of the July 2016 trustee report, compared with none
reported the July 2013 trustee report.  Over the same period, the
par amount of defaulted collateral has increased to $8.70 million
from zero.  However, despite the slightly larger concentrations in
the 'CCC' category and defaulted collateral, the transaction has
benefited from a drop in the weighted average life due to the
underlying collateral's seasoning, with 4.11 years reported as of
July 2016 compared with 5.27 years reported in July 2013.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class A-3L, B-1L, and combination notes, its rating actions
considers the increase in the defaults, a decline in the
portfolio's credit quality, and exposure to loans from companies in
distressed sectors, so S&P's limited the upgrades on some classes
to offset future potential credit migration in the underlying
collateral.

S&P expects the credit support available to all rated classes to
increase as principal is collected and paydowns to the senior notes
continue to occur.  However, any increase in defaults and/or par
losses could lead to potential negative rating actions on one or
more notes in the future.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows us to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Crown Point CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class                   To          From
A-2L                    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-3L                    AA- (sf)    A (sf)
Combination notes       AA- (sf)    A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Crown Point CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1La         AAA (sf)
A-1Lb         AAA (sf)
B-1L          BBB (sf)
B-2L          BB- (sf)


CSMC TRUST 2016-BDWN: S&P Assigns B Rating on 7 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CSMC Trust 2016-BDWN's
$180.8 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2016-BDWN.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by a $180.8 million trust mortgage loan,
secured by a first lien on the borrower's leasehold interest in a
portfolio of 58 suburban office and industrial/flex properties
totaling 3.9 million sq. ft.  The properties are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted and are located in
Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina.
Additionally, as part of the loan collateral, the lender has
received a pledge of 100% of the equity interests in the borrower.

Since S&P assigned its preliminary ratings on Aug. 5, the issuer
has converted the class E and F certificates into exchangeable
certificates.  The class E exchangeable certificates can be
exchanged for E-1 and E-2 replacement certificates with
corresponding EX-1 and EX-2 interest-only certificates.  The class
F exchangeable certificates can be exchanged for F-1, F-2, and F-3
replacement certificates with corresponding FX-1, FX-2, and FX-2
interest-only certificates.  The replacement certificates carry the
same ratings as the exchangeable certificates.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CSMC Trust 2016-BDWN

Class       Rating(i)           Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)            89,280,000
B           AA- (sf)            19,840,000
C           A- (sf)             14,880,000
D           BBB- (sf)           18,253,000
E           BB- (sf)            24,800,000
F           B (sf)              13,747,000
X-CP        AA- (sf)           19,840,000(ii)
X-EXT       AA- (sf)           19,840,000(ii)
E-1         BB- (sf)                     0
E-2         BB- (sf)                     0
F-1         B (sf)                       0
F-2         B (sf)                       0
F-3         B (sf)                       0
EX-1        BB- (sf)                     0(ii)
EX-2        BB- (sf)                     0(ii)
FX-1        B (sf)                       0(ii)
FX-2        B (sf)                       0(ii)
FX-3        B (sf)                       0(ii)

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-EXT certificates will be equal to the class B certificates'
balance.


CWCAPITAL COBALT II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class B notes from
CWCapital COBALT II Ltd., a U.S. commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1AR, A-1B, and
A-2B notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.

Since S&P's January 2014 rating action, the class A-1A, A-1AR, and
A-2B notes have been paid down by $124.65 million in total, and
their current outstanding balance is about 9.12%, 9.12%, and
36.42%, respectively, of its original balance.  The transaction is
structured such that some of the tranches within class A can
receive paydowns ahead of others and hence can support a higher
rating.  S&P expects class A-1B to start receiving paydowns once
class A-1A and A-1AR notes are paid down completely.

Following the paydowns, only 13 securities serve as underlying
collateral.  Out of these, one is a CDO tranche, and the remaining
are commercial mortgage-backed securities.  S&P's rating actions on
the classes reflect both the credit quality of these assets backing
the tranches and the credit support available to them.

As per the monthly trustee report as of July 10, 2016, all coverage
tests continue to fail, and the class A/B overcollateralization
(O/C) ratio decreased to 76.11% from the 87.01% as of our last
rating actions.  Though the class B note receives its current
interest, the July 26, 2016, payment date report indicates that it
has been paid for from the available principal proceeds as interest
proceeds were not sufficient to pay the class B interest.  The
class B notes are currently backed by assets that do not carry a
performing rating.  Its rating was lowered to reflect the declines
in both its credit support and the credit quality of the assets
that currently back the note.

The affirmed ratings on the class A1A, A-1AR, A-1B, and A-2B notes
remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to support
them and reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's liability
structure, the continuing paydowns, and the underlying collateral's
credit characteristics.  Though the class A-1B and A-2B notes are
backed by assets with a performing rating, S&P notes that as per
the July 26, 2016 payment report, a portion of their interest was
paid for using the principal proceeds.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATING LOWERED

CWCapital COBALT II Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CWCapital COBALT II Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1A        BB- (sf)
A-1AR       BB- (sf)
A-1B        CCC- (sf)
A-2B        CCC- (sf)


FANNIE MAE: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating on 3 Note Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following Ratings and Rating
Outlooks to eight previously unrated notes from five Fannie Mae
Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) transactions issued between
2013 and 2015:

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2013-C01
      class M-2 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2014-C01
      class M-2 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2014-C02
      class 1M-2 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2014-C02
      class 2M-2 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2014-C03
      class 1M-2 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2014-C03
      class 2M-2 notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2015-C01
      class 1M-2 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2015-C01
      class 2M-2 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch had previously only rated the M-1 classes in the five
transactions. All of the M-1 classes have either paid in full or
have had their ratings upgraded, reflecting strong performance to
date. Fitch's reference mortgage pool loss assumptions for Fannie
Mae CAS transactions were recently published as part of a periodic
review of all Fitch rated GSE Credit Risk Transfer transactions.
The published report references loss expectations as of the June
2016 remittance period and may have minor differences from the
August 2016 remittance period expected losses used in this rating
analysis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong performance to date: All of the reference pools have
performed well since issuance. None of the reference pools has
experienced more than 20 basis points (bps) of pre-defined credit
events with half of the deals experiencing credit events less than
10bps. Using the pre-determined loss severity schedule, none of the
transactions have incurred 2bps or more of loss to date.

Build-up of Credit Enhancement: Since issuance, the M-2 classes
have had a steady increase in their credit enhancement percentage,
as the reference pool has paid down and losses have been minimal.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes: Based on its review
of Fannie Mae's acquisition platform, Fitch believes that Fannie
Mae has a well-established and disciplined credit-granting process
in place and views its lender approval and oversight processes for
minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan quality
acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control (QC) review
processes are thorough and indicate a tight control environment as
is most evidenced by the very few findings noted by the third-party
due diligence results. Tight controls lower operational risk and
improve overall loan quality. The lower risk was accounted for by
Fitch by applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool
of 5%.

Legal Maturity Credit: All of the new ratings are assigned to
transactions with a legal final maturity of 10 years. The hard
maturity limits the timeframe in which losses can be realized. As
the transactions season, and as the legal maturity nears, Fitch
adjusts its loss expectations to account for the reduced loss
exposure window.

Home Price Appreciation: Property values in the reference pools
have benefitted from home price appreciation since issuance. Since
2013, home prices have increased 19% nationally and 31% in
California. The reference pools have experienced an average gain in
property values of nearly 25%.

Counterparty Dependence on Fannie Mae: The notes are general
unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae and are subject to the
performance of the reference pool. Fannie Mae will be responsible
for making monthly payments of interest and principal to investors
based on the payment priorities of the transaction. Due to the
counterparty dependence, Fitch's rating is based on the lower of:
1) the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement available through subordination, and 2) Fannie Mae's
issuer default rating (IDR). Fannie Mae's IDR is currently
'AAA'/Stable Outlook, reflecting a direct link to the U.S.
sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Third party due diligence was reviewed as part of Fitch's rating of
the M-1 classes at deal issuance. The due diligence focused on
credit and compliance reviews, desktop valuation reviews and data
integrity. Fitch received certifications indicating that the
loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with Fitch's
published standards. The certifications also stated that the
company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.
No additional due diligence was considered in rating of the M-2
classes.


FLAGSHIP CLO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Flagship CLO VI:

  $22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Upgraded to
   Aa1 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Upgraded to
   Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $319,500,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021 (current
   outstanding balance of $71,180,075), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $35,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021 (current
   outstanding balance of $3,005,073), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on December 17, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $33,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021
   (current outstanding balance of $19,195,475), Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Flagship CLO VI, issued in June 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in June 2014.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since December 2015.  The Class A-1a
notes have been paid down by approximately 47.2% or $63.6 million
and the Class A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 37.4%
or $1.8 million since then.  Based on the Trustee's August 2016
report, the OC Ratios for the Class B, Class C and Class D Notes
are reported at 151.25%, 130.74% and 116.68%, respectively, versus
December 2015 levels of 135.28%, 122.99% and 113.81%, respectively.
The deal currently holds approximately $44.6 million of principal
proceeds which, if not reinvested, will be paid to the Class A-1a
and A-2 notes on the next payment date in October 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2023)
Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3034)
Class A-1a: 0
Class A-1b: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -1
Class D: -2
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $216.8 million, defaulted par
of $2.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 13.38%,
(implying a WARF of 2528), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.10%, a diversity score of 35 and a weighted average
spread of 3.06% (before accounting for LIBOR Floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to CC
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class B notes from
G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC, a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P lowered its
rating on the class D notes and affirmed our rating on the class C
notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  Per the
July 22, 2016, payment report, all three tranches have received
their current interest.  Only 12 commercial mortgage-backed
securities assets support the three tranches.

The class B notes are currently the senior-most tranche and
continue to receive paydowns.  Since S&P's October 2013 rating
actions, the class B notes have received about $27 million, which
have reduced its outstanding amount to about 33% of its original
balance.  In addition, the credit quality of a few of the
underlying assets has also improved during this period.  This,
combined with the paydowns, has now allowed the class B notes to be
backed by higher-quality assets.  S&P raised its rating on the
notes to reflect this increase in credit support.

The class D notes are backed by assets that do not carry a
performing rating, and the nonperforming assets need to recover
significantly more than their anticipated recovery rates to enable
the class D notes to be repaid in full.  Because of the poor credit
quality of the assets that back the class D notes, S&P lowered the
rating on this class.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class C notes to reflect its belief
that the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows us to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATING RAISED

G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
                  Rating
Class         To            From
B             BBB- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

RATING LOWERED

G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
                  Rating
Class         To            From
D             CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
Class        Rating
C            CCC- (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. J Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. 1999-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class H is due to the class being fully covered
by defeasance.  The pool is highly concentrated with 13 loans
remaining, four of which are defeased (17%), three are fully
amortizing (7.3%) and one is designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern
(15.1%).  None of the loans are in special servicing.

Expected losses on the original pool balance total 3.1%, including
$39 million (2.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses
to date.  As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 99% to
$11.5 million from $1.33 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting classes J through K-2.

The Loan of Concern is the River Walk - Uniprop NCII loan (15% of
the pool), which was originally secured by a 197-pad mobile home
park located in Raleigh, NC.  The property ceased operations in
September 2008 and has been vacant ever since.  The master servicer
reports that the property has been rezoned for multifamily use and
is currently under contract.  The loan has remained current since
issuance.

Five loans are secured by single-tenanted properties (31.3%).  Four
are leased by Rite Aid (31%), with lease expirations in 2018(3)
2017(1) and one by Family Dollar, with a lease expiration in
November 2016.

                     RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class H remains Stable as the class is
covered by defeasance.  Class J will remain at 'Dsf' due to
incurred losses.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $459,706 thousand class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 70%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class K-1 and K-2 certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


GSAMP TRUST 2006-SD1: Moody's Hikes Class M-2 Notes Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of two
tranches from two deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-SD1

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

   -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2015
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating upgraded is primarily a result of increase in
credit enhancement available to the bond. The rating downgraded is
a result of interest shortfalls which are unlikely to be
reimbursed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to the notes issued on
the Third Funding Date by Guggenheim Private Debt Fund Note Issuer
2.0, LLC (Guggenheim PDFNI 2):

   -- $65,000,000 Class A, Series A-3, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $25,000,000 Class B, Series B-3, 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $16,500,000 Class C, Series C-3, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $8,375,000 Class D, Series D-3, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the leverage tranche, class E notes, and
limited liability company membership interests.

In addition, the note issuance will not result in any rating action
on the existing notes issued on April 12, 2016 (the first funding
date) and the Series 2 notes issued on July 8, 2016 (the second
funding date).

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch assigned ratings to the notes issued on the third funding
date, occurring on Aug. 30, 2016. Pursuant to the third funding
date, the issuer has drawn an aggregate of $160 million from the
commitments plus $90 million from the leverage tranche (not rated
by Fitch). Of the $160 million, $45.125 million was issued in the
form of first-loss class E notes and LLC membership interests, both
of which are also not rated by Fitch.

The first and second funding dates had occurred on April 12, 2016
and July 8, 2016, respectively, achieving a total capitalization of
$750 million through the second funding date. This amount consisted
of $397.1 million of rated notes, $202.9 million of unrated
first-loss class E notes and LLC interests, and $150 million from
the leverage tranche. All notes from each series are
cross-collateralized by the entire collateral portfolio, which is
expected to consist of approximately $161.9 million of broadly
syndicated loans, $758.4 million of private-debt investments (PDIs)
and approximately $91.1 million in cash.

Guggenheim PDFNI 2.0 is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that invests in a portfolio composed of a combination
of broadly syndicated loans and middle-market PDIs. The manager,
Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC (GPIM) may raise up
to $2 billion of commitments from investors to fund the
transaction. Investors earn class-specific commitment fees on the
undrawn portions of their commitments. The commitments are expected
to be fully drawn through a maximum of seven separate funding dates
during the investment period. At each funding date, notes and the
leverage tranche will be issued in proportions that may decrease
the level of credit enhancement (CE) available for each class. CE
levels at each funding date are further described in Fitch's report
'Guggenheim Private Debt Fund Note Issuer 2.0, LLC' dated Sept. 25,
2015.

Fitch expects to assess the creditworthiness of the notes at each
funding date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: CE for each class of rated notes, in
addition to excess spread, is sufficient to protect against
portfolio default and recovery rate projections in each class's
respective rating stress scenario. The degree of CE available to
each class of rated notes exceeds the average CE levels typically
seen on like-rated tranches of recent CLO issuances backed by
middle-market loans.

'B-/CCC+' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the Fitch
stressed portfolio is 'B-/CCC+', which is below that of recent
CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly
speculative credit quality while issuers in the 'CCC' rating
category denote substantial credit risk. When analyzing the capital
structure for the third funding date, class A, B, C and D notes are
projected to be able to withstand default rates of up to 85.5%,
77.9%, 73.9% and 72.7%, respectively.

Fitch's cash flow modelling results for each class of notes
indicated higher passing ratings than the assigned rating levels.
However, Fitch will not be assigning ratings higher than the
current ratings due to the provision for additional funding dates
resulting in a more leveraged capital structure, per the
transaction's documents.

Strong Recovery Expectations: In determining the rating of the
notes, Fitch created a stressed portfolio and assumed recovery
prospects consistent with a Fitch Recovery Rating of 'RR3' in line
with the collateral quality test limit for asset recoveries.

FITCH ANALYSIS

Analysis was conducted on a Fitch-stressed portfolio which was
created by Fitch and designed to address the impact of the most
prominent risk-presenting concentration allowances and targeted
test levels to ensure that the transaction's expected performance
is in line with the ratings assigned. The Fitch-stressed portfolio
and notable portfolio concentration limitations are described in
the press release 'Fitch Rates Guggenheim Private Debt Fund Note
Issuer 2.0, LLC' dated April 12, 2016.

In the indicative portfolio Fitch had received for the third
funding date, Fitch classified 24% of the loan assets as business
services. This exceeds the maximum 20% limitation for the top
industry, per the transaction documents. To address this excess
exposure, the industry concentration for business services in the
Fitch-stressed portfolio was increased to 24%.The remaining top
five industries were increased to 20%, 15%, 15%, 15% and 11%,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the third funding date structure's sensitivity to
the potential variability of key model assumptions including
decreases in recovery rates and increases in default rates or
correlation. Fitch also analyzed the impact of a failure to fund
commitments beyond the third funding date. Further details on
additional rating sensitivities conducted at the first funding date
can also be found in Fitch's press release 'Fitch Rates Guggenheim
Private Debt Fund Note Issuer 2.0, LLC' dated April 12, 2016.

Fitch expects each class of notes to remain within one rating
category of their original ratings even under the most extreme
sensitivity scenarios. Some notes were able to withstand rating
stresses within two rating categories in certain scenarios. Results
under these sensitivity scenarios ranged between 'AA+sf' and
'BBBsf' for the class A notes; 'BBB+sf' and 'BBsf' for the class B
notes; 'BBBsf' and 'B+sf' for the class C notes; and 'BB+sf' and
'B-sf' for the class D notes.

The results of the sensitivity analysis also contributed to Fitch's
assignment of Stable Outlooks for each class of notes.

VARIATIONS FROM CRITERIA

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its CLO rating
criteria, as described in its July 2016 report, 'Global Rating
Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs', with the following
variations.

The Fitch stressed portfolio for this transaction represents an
entirely hypothetical portfolio constructed by Fitch. This stressed
portfolio contained a total of 39 obligors, each representing the
maximum covenanted exposure permissible for the portfolio. Fitch's
typical analysis of middle-market CLOs in the U.S. assumes a
maximum covenant exposure for the largest 10 obligors only. The
variation is a more conservative assumption and has a minor impact
versus the standard application of criteria.

Fitch accounted for the maximum allowable industry concentration in
the top five industries (as opposed to three, as highlighted in the
CLO criteria) in its construction of the Fitch-stressed portfolio,
given the expectation of a concentrated portfolio of debt and
preferred equity from middle-market entities. This is a more
conservative assumption and has a minor impact versus the standard
application of criteria.

Fitch assumed 15% of the portfolio was able to defer interest
payments in its cash flow model analysis, in line with the
permissible exposure to deferrable items under the concentration
limitations. According to the indenture, if these items have been
deferring for over a year they will not be given par credit for
certain tests. Fitch assumed these assets deferred their interest
payments for one year to account for the period in which such asset
would be deferring yet still be given par credit. This is a more
conservative assumption and has a minor impact versus the standard
application of criteria, which does not indicate a specific stress
for deferrable assets.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under "Related Research"
below. The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to
those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in
the Special Report titled "Representations, Warranties and
Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,"
dated May 31, 2016.

PERFORMANCE ANALYTICS

Surveillance analysis is conducted on the basis of the then-current
portfolio. Fitch expects to have credit views, via either public
ratings or credit opinions, on all of the PDIs that will be
purchased for the portfolio. Fitch will rely on the issuer to
provide it with relevant financial information on such borrowers on
an ongoing basis so that Fitch may maintain its ratings on the
transaction.

The third funding will not result in a rating action on the
following notes, which are currently rated as follows:

   -- $149,000,000 Class A, Series A-1, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $50,000,000 Class B, Series B-1, 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $45,000,000 Class C, Series C-1, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,000,000 Class D, Series D-1, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $76,000,000 Class A, Series A-2, 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $25,000,000 Class B, Series B-2, 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,000,000 Class C, Series C-2, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,125,000 Class D, Series D-2, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.


HILT 2014-ORL: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from HILT 2014-ORL
Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the 1,417-room hybrid
resort/convention hotel property located adjacent to the Orange
County Convention Center in Orlando, Fla., which secures the $345.0
million seven-year, interest-only (IO), floating-rate mortgage loan
that backs the stand-alone transaction.  The loan consists of an
original two-year term with five one-year extension options.  S&P
also considered the deal structure and liquidity available to the
trust.  The affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity that
are consistent with the current rating levels.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest rated reference
classes.  The notional balance on class X-EXT references class A.

S&P's analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the hotel property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the
servicer-reported net operating income and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) for the past three years.  S&P's analysis considered
that the property-generated RevPAR has increased by an average of
5.0% annually since 2012.  S&P derived its sustainable in-place net
cash flow (NCF), which S&P divided by a 9.00% capitalization rate,
to determine its expected-case value. This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 86.1% and 2.06x, respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the Aug. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan's trust and whole-loan balance is $345.0 million, and
it matures in July 2017.  With the remaining extension options, the
loan has a final maturity in July 2021.  The loan pays a floating
interest rate calculated using a one-month LIBOR and 2.01% spread,
and the borrower has entered into an interest rate cap agreement
with a strike price of 3.00%.  According to the transaction
documents, the borrowers will pay the special servicing fees,
work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs and expenses incurred
from appraisals and inspections conducted by the special servicer.
To date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical RevPAR and RevPAR penetration rates provided by Smith
Travel Research for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, and 2014, and
the trailing-12-month (TTM) period ending March 31, 2016, to
determine our opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the lodging
property.  The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital,
reported a DSC of 4.80x on the trust balance for the TTM period
ended March 31, 2016, compared with 4.99x for year-end 2015.  This
decline is primarily due to the recent increases in LIBOR.  The
servicer reported RevPAR of $123.5 and $127.4 in 2014 and 2015,
respectively.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

HILT 2014-ORL Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         A- (sf)
D         BBB- (sf)
E         BB- (sf)
F         B (sf)
X-EXT     AAA (sf)


ICG US 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by ICG US CLO 2016-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $256,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $51,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $18,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  $26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $17,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

ICG US CLO 2016-1 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC (the "Manager") and Intermediate Capital
Managers Limited, acting as sub-manager (the "Sub-Manager"), will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager and Sub-Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:
The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -2
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -3
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1


JP MORGAN 1997-C5: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on one class in
J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp 1997-C5 as follows:

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, compared to 0.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the
current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's said,
"Our ratings reflect the potential for future losses under varying
levels of stress." Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 2.5% of the original pooled balance, the same as at last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 1 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.9% to $1.5
million from $1.03 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 4 mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to 64%
of the pool. There are no loans that have defeased or have an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.

One loan, constituting 14.6% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $25.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 47.4%). There are no loans that are currently in
special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 21.1%, compared to 25.2% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.1% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 9.73X,
respectively, compared to 2.22X and 4.44X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 93.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Whitehall Apartments Loan ($0.93 million --
64.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 68-unit multifamily
complex located in Clarksville, Tennessee, approximately 45 miles
northwest of Nashville. The property is located near Fort Campbell
and military personnel occupy a majority of the units. As per the
January 2016 rent roll, the property was 100% occupied. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 29.8% and 3.45X, respectively, compared to
32.3% and 3.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Clopper II Research & Development
Loan ($0.21 million -- 14.9% of the pool), which is secured by
which is secured by a 78,955 square foot (SF) industrial property
located in Gaithersburg, Maryland, which is approximately 20 miles
outside of Washington, DC. As per the January 2016 rent roll the
property was 83.7% occupied; compared to 86% leased as of December
2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 5.0% and >4.0X,
respectively, compared to 11.4% and >4.0X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Shady Grove Industrial Park -- Bldgs.
A,B&D Loan ($0.21 million -- 14.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 75,000 square foot (SF) low rise office/warehouse complex
comprised of three commercial buildings. As per the January 2016
rent roll the property was 92.7% occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 6.5% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 16.7% and
6.48X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2016-2: Fitch Assigns BBsf Rating on Class B-4 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust
2016-2 (JPMMT 2016-2) as follows:

   -- $96,570,700 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $20,101,000 class A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $78,947,400 class 1-A-1A certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $45,403,600 class 1-A-1B certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9,451,000 class 1-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $140,136,000 class 2-A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $10,650,000 class 2-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $6,045,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,232,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2,569,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1,512,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

   -- $3,325,053 class B-5 certificates;

   -- $15,113,753 class RR exchangeable certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of very high-quality prime loans to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, low leverage and large liquid reserves. Of the loans in
the pool, 100% were originated by FRB, which Fitch considers to be
an above-average originator of prime jumbo product. The pool has a
weighted average (WA) FICO score of 766 and an original combined
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 60%.

High Geographic Concentration (Concern): The pool's primary
concentration risk is in California, where approximately 50% of the
collateral is located, followed by New York at 30%. Approximately
80% of the pool is located in the top-five regions in the subject
pool (New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Boston).
Given the pool's significant regional concentrations, an additional
penalty of approximately 23% was applied to the pool's lifetime
default expectation.

Payment Shock Exposure (Concern): The pool consists entirely of ARM
loans, while approximately 32% also have interest-only (IO)
features. Loan products that result in periodic changes in a
borrower's payment, such as ARMs and IOs, expose borrowers to
payment reset risk. Future increases in interest rates and payment
re-amortization after the expiration of IO periods can raise
monthly payments considerably. To account for this risk, Fitch
applied a probability of default (PD) penalty of approximately 1.8x
to the pool.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 2.50% of the
original balance will be maintained for the certificates.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Concern): The trust is obligated to
reimburse the breach reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha), each month for any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred if the company is requested to participate in any
arbitration, legal or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings.
These expenses include Pentalpha's legal fees and other expenses
incurred outside its annual fee schedule and are not subject to a
cap or certificateholder approval.

Furthermore, certificateholders are obligated to pay Pentalpha a
termination fee of $140,000 from year two to five, $80,000 from
year five to eight, and $25,000 after year eight to terminate the
contract. While Fitch accounted for the potential additional costs
by upwardly adjusting its loss estimation for the pool, Fitch views
this construct as adding potentially more ratings volatility than
those that do not have this type of provision.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Concern): Extraordinary expenses,
which include loan-file review costs, arbitration expenses for
enforcement of the reps, and additional fees of Pentalpha, will be
taken out of available funds and not accounted for in the
contractual interest owed to the bondholders. This construct can
result in principal and interest shortfalls to the bonds, starting
from the bottom of the capital structure. To account for the risk
of these noncredit events reducing subordination, Fitch adjusted
its loss expectations upward by 40 bps at the 'AAAsf' level.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Concern): Fitch
believes that the value of the rep and warranty framework is
diluted by the presence of qualifying and conditional language in
conjunction with sunset provisions, which reduces lender breach
liability. While Fitch believes the high-credit-quality pool and
clean diligence results mitigate these risks, the weaker framework
was considered in the analysis.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation. The due
diligence review for JPMMT 2016-2 was conducted prior to the June
2016 publication of Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria."
While the final due diligence grades were calibrated to Fitch's
updated grading matrix as described in the criteria, the TRID
reporting detail expected to be provided to Fitch under the updated
criteria had not been established by the third-party review (TPR)
firm at the time it conducted the loan-level review for this
transaction. Therefore, the reports generated by the TPR for this
transaction are not consistent with Fitch's updated criteria for
TRID, but will be, going forward, for loans reviewed after July
2016. This is only applicable to the loans reviewed by Opus, as
there were no loans in the AMC sample with application dates after
TRID was introduced. There was no impact on Fitch's ratings given
the due diligence grading results and additional documentation
provided to clear any exceptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 6%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), and Opus Capital Markets
Consultants (Opus). The third-party due diligence described in Form
15E focused on a compliance review, credit review and valuation
review. The due diligence companies performed a review on 100% of
the loans. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it
did not have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch
believes the overall results of the review generally reflected
strong underwriting controls.


KINGSLAND VI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A loans and
the class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F notes from Kingsland VI, a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in September 2013 and is managed by Kingsland Capital Management
LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 14, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.92
years from 5.40 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the November 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $4.95 million (1.45% of the aggregate principal
balance) as of July 2016, from zero as of the November 2013
effective date report.  The amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below
increased to $26.53 million (7.77% of the aggregate principal
balance) from $10.99 million over the same period.

According to the July 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
experienced modest increases since the November 2013 trustee
report, which S&P used for its January 2014 rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio increased to 134.00% from 132.90%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 122.40% from 121.40%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 114.90% from 113.90%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio increased to 109.50% from 108.60%.
   -- The class F O/C ratio increased to 106.90% from 106.00%.

All coverage tests are currently passing and are above the minimum
requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted and 'CCC' rated assets has been
largely offset by the decline in the weighted average life and O/C
improvements.  However, any significant deterioration in these
metrics could negatively affect the deal in the future, especially
the junior tranches.  As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.  Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated
higher ratings for the class A loans and the class B, C, D, E, and
F notes, its rating actions considers the increase in defaults and
decline in the portfolio's credit quality.  In addition, the
ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs that considered the
exposure to specific distressed industries and allowed for
volatility in the underlying portfolio given that the transaction
is still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Kingsland VI

Class     Rating
A loans   AAA (sf)
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)
B         AA (sf)
C         A (sf)
D         BBB (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         B (sf)


LANDMARK VIII CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.:

  $26,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Upgraded

   to A2 (sf)
  $20,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Affirmed

   Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $317,875,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2020 (current outstanding balance of $62,294,187.14), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  $35,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)
  $36,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,

   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  $34,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

Landmark VIII CLO Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
October 2012.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since May 2016.  The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 40% or $41.1 million
since that time.  Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are
reported at 175.87%, 140.23%, 121.42% and 110.06%, respectively,
versus May 2016 levels of 157.97%, 132.26%, 117.62% and 108.39%,
respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Realization
     of higher than assumed recoveries would positively impact the

     CLO.

  6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively. In
     particular, Moody's tested for a possible extension of the
     actual weighted average life in its analysis given that the
     post-reinvestment period reinvesting criteria has loose
     restrictions on the weighted average life of the portfolio.

  7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
     liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
     outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
     Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
     exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
     default.  The historical default rate is higher than average
     for these assets.  Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

     which constitute around $10.9 million of par, Moody's ran a
     sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1997)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +2
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (Insert WARF level)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -2
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $231.8 million, defaulted par
of $15.3 million, a weighted average default probability of 13.22%
(implying a WARF of 2496), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.27%, a diversity score of 39 and a weighted average
spread of 3.39% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


MADISON PARK XXI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Madison Park Funding XXI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$516,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2029 (the
      "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$84,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2029 (the
      "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$66,700,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$29,300,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Madison Park XXI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans (including participation interests with
respect to senior secured loans), and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of second lien loans or senior unsecured loans. The
portfolio is at least 65% ramped as of the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes and combination securities.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $800,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to
   3105)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to
   3510)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


MIDLAND LOAN: Fitch Cuts Special Servicer Rating to 'CSS2+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following actions on Midland Loan
Services' (Midland), a division of PNC Bank, National Association,
commercial mortgage servicer ratings:

   -- Commercial master servicer rating affirmed at 'CMS1';
   -- Commercial primary servicer rating affirmed at 'CPS1';
   -- Commercial special servicer rating downgraded to 'CSS2+'
      from 'CSS1'.

The master and primary servicer ratings reflect the continued
strength of Midland's commercial loan servicing operations; in
particular, Fitch highlights the experience and tenure of the
management and staff, modest turnover, strong internal control
environment with dedicated internal compliance and audit functions,
as well as its ongoing commitment to servicing technology. Fitch
further notes the diversity and the robust growth of the servicing
portfolio.

The downgrade of the special servicer rating is primarily driven by
the aging of Midland's asset management system, which compares less
favorably to other Fitch rated special servicers and is no longer
consistent with the highest standards of servicing ability and for
managing large volumes of defaulted loans.

The special servicer rating reflects the strong experience and
tenure of asset managers, proactive surveillance of performing
loans, effective internal controls, as well as the presence of
policies and procedures to mitigate potential conflicts of interest
with third-party clients. Midland's special servicing portfolio
consists exclusively of third party appointments as neither Midland
nor its parent company purchase controlling class positions in CMBS
transactions. As a third party servicer, Midland's special
servicing portfolio changes due to control shifts in legacy CMBS
transactions as losses are incurred. Each of the ratings
incorporates Fitch's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) for PNC
Bank N.A. of 'A+'/Stable Outlook as of Oct. 23, 2015.

In addition to its core CMBS servicing portfolio of $158.7 billion
as of March 31, 2016, Midland services $129.9 billion of commercial
real estate loans on behalf of institutional clients, $76.2 billion
of multifamily agency loans, $30.4 billion of specialty finance
servicing, $42.7 billion for government agencies, and $14.8 billion
of single family rental securitizations.

As of March 31, 2016, Midland's U.S. commercial mortgage loan
servicing portfolio consisted of 28,535 loans totaling
approximately $402.1 billion. As of the same date, Midland's U.S.
CMBS primary servicing portfolio totaled $164.9 billion and
non-CMBS totaled $202.8 billion for an additional 16,615
non-securitized loans. Also, as of March 31, 2016, Midland was
named master servicer for 8,444 loans in 285 transactions totaling
$162.1 billion and responsible for the oversight of 40 primary
servicers.

Also as of March 31, 2016, Midland was named special servicer on
236 U.S. CMBS transactions totaling $133.5 billion, and was
actively specially servicing 53 CMBS loans totaling $575 million
and was responsible for 16 CMBS real estate owned assets totaling
$227 million. CMBS represents the vast majority of Midland's named
special servicing portfolio.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ9: Fitch Cuts Class G Rating to CCCsf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 10 classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-IQ9.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect the concentration of the pool and potential
for future losses. The affirmations of the remaining Fitch rated
classes reflect sufficient credit enhancement to the classes. Fitch
modeled losses of 26.9% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 5.8%, including $29.8 million (2%
of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Currently
there are no specially serviced loans; however there are six Fitch
Loans of Concern (54.2% of the pool) that exhibit current and/or
potential performance declines including the largest loan, the
Central Mall Portfolio, which accounts for 51.6% of the pool.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 85.5% to $222.4 million from
$1.53 billion at issuance. There are currently 58 loans remaining
in the pool with the top 10 loans accounting for 74.3%; the largest
loan represents 51.6% of the pool. One loan is defeased (0.5%).
Remaining maturities are concentrated in 2017 (19.7% of the pool),
2018 (55.2%), and 2019 (15.1%). Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes K through P.

The Central Mall Portfolio is secured by three malls (1,752,673
square feet [sf]) located in tertiary markets (Lawton, OK,
Texarkana, TX, and Port Arthur, TX); anchor tenants in each mall
include Sears, JC Penney, and Dillard's. The loan had previously
transferred to special servicing in October 2014 for imminent
maturity default after the borrower expressed concerns over its
ability to refinance the portfolio, prior to its December 2014
maturity date. While in special servicing the loan maturity date
was extended three times: first to June 2015, second to June 2016
and third to June 2018, with an option to extend to June 2019.
Pursuant to the third modification agreement the borrower will make
interest-only payments until February 2017 and will resume making
principal and interest payments in March 2017. The loan returned to
the master servicer in August 2016. As of year-end (YE) 2015
reported portfolio occupancy and NOI DSCR was 92% and 1.28x,
respectively, but as of May 2016 portfolio-wide sales are on a
declining trend.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of classes A-J and class B are expected to remain
stable as credit enhancement is sufficient relative to the ratings
and classes will pay down through loan payoffs and amortization.
Future upgrades to class B are unlikely due to the possibility of
interest shortfalls to occur as the pool becomes more concentrated.
Additionally, concerns remain with the largest loan. Fitch applied
stresses to the Central Mall Portfolio, which indicated that
classes B and below are sensitive to fluctuations in loan
performance. Rating Outlooks on classes C, D, E, and F are Negative
as they may be subject to future rating actions should realized
losses, particularly on the Central Mall Portfolio, be greater than
expected.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:


   -- $26.8 million class D to 'BBBsf' from 'BBB+sf', Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $15.3 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $15.3 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $11.5 million class G to 'CCCsf', RE 0% from 'Bsf'.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

   -- $76 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.6 million class B at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.5 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;
   -- $17.2 million class H at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $5.7 million class J 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $7.7 million class K 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $2.8 million class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-AB and A-5 certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1, X-2
and X-Y certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-RR6: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class B
notes from Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2005-RR6, a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction.

The rating action follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.

Since S&P's October 2013 rating actions, classes A-3FL, A-3FX, and
A-J have paid down in full and the class B notes have started to
receive paydowns, as they are currently the senior-most tranche in
the transaction.

The class B notes have received about $3.46 million in aggregate
paydowns (as of the July 25, 2016, payment date), which have
reduced its outstanding balance to about 87% of its original
balance.  Following the paydowns, only 10 commercial
mortgage-backed securities serve as underlying collateral, and the
class B notes are current on their interest.

The affirmed rating on the class B notes remains consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support it and reflects S&P's
analysis of the transaction's liability structure and the
underlying collateral's credit characteristics.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the rating
assigned to the notes remains consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support it, and will take rating actions
as S&P deems necessary.



MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS11: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2016-UBS11 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates:

   -- $42,100,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60,300,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55,900,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $170,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $175,531,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $503,831,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $128,657,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60,280,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,189,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,188,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,888,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,994,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,198,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,888,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,994,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,198,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $25,191,662 class X-G or the $25,191,662
class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 38 loans secured by 75
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $719.8 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc.,
KeyBank National Association, Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC, and
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 89.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.30x and
99.8%, respectively, are better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.16x and 107.5%, respectively. Excluding the
credit-opinion loan, the pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV is 1.29x
and 103.7%, respectively.

High Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 65.6% of the
pool, which is greater than the YTD 2016 average of 54.6% and the
2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's loan concentration index (LCI)
is 553, which is greater than the YTD 2016 and the 2015 averages of
420 and 367, respectively.

High Lodging Exposure: Approximately 36.0% of the pool by balance,
including eight of the top 20 loans, is comprised of hotel
properties.  Hotel concentration in the pool is greater than the
YTD 2016 and 2015 averages of 16.3% and 17.0%, respectively.  Two
of the top 10 loans, 132 West 27th Street (9.5% of the pool) and
Fairfield Inn Time Square Fee (6.8% of the pool), are classified as
hotels but are collateralized by a net lease and leased fee
interest, respectively.  Excluding these two loans, the hotel
concentration is 19.7%, which is higher than the YTD 2016 and 2015
averages, respectively.  Hotels have the highest probability of
default in Fitch's multiborrower CMBS model.

                     RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 20.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSC
2016-UBS11 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.


NOMURA CRE CDO 2007-2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 12 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2,
Ltd. /LLC (Nomura 2007-2).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the delevering of the capital structure
which offsets the increasing concentration and expected losses.
Since the last rating action, the transaction has paid down by
$12.8 million from two full loan payoffs as well as scheduled
amortization and interest diversion.  Class A-2 was paid down by
35.5% (61.6% of its original balance).  There were no realized
losses over the same period.

The CDO is very concentrated with only 14 assets remaining.  The
percentage of defaulted assets increased to 42.3% compared to 37.7%
at the last rating action primarily due to the pool's balance
reduction, as no new assets have defaulted since the last rating
action.  Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) increased to 37.7% compared
to 20.4% at last review, as three new loans were added: one loan
has 30% NRA expiring in 2017 and two loans did not pay off at their
2016 scheduled maturities with both receiving an extension to allow
the borrower additional time to sell their respective properties.

Per Fitch categorizations, the CDO is substantially invested as
follows: whole loans/A-note (52%), B-notes (28.9%), CRE CDO (16.7%)
and cash (2.4%).  The CDO exited its reinvestment period in
February 2013.

As of the July 2016 trustee report, the CDO is failing all
overcollateralization tests.  The transaction is
undercollateralized by approximately $208 million.  Classes D and
below are not receiving any interest payments.  Interest is being
capitalized on these classes.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 85.7% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the
'B' stress.  Fitch modeled average recoveries of 46.1%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is the
B-note of the Beacon DC and Seattle Portfolio (28.9%), which was
originally secured by a portfolio of 20 office properties located
in Washington, D.C. and Seattle, WA.  The pool currently consists
of 13 properties after a modification which allowed for the release
of properties over time.  The senior loan and B-note were both
transferred to special servicing in April 2010 for imminent default
and was returned to the master servicer on May 7, 2012 after the
modification.  Given the post-modification waterfall, the B-note
will not receive any payments until the A-notes are paid in full.
Fitch modeled a full loss on this B-note position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
Llikai Waikiki Hotel A-note (15.1%), which is secured by a 353-room
hotel property located in Honolulu, HI.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in 2011, and back to the master servicer in
October 2012 after a loan modification.  The
$5 million interest reserve created at the closing of the
modification has been depleted.  Cash flow remains low but has
improved since the Fitch's last rating action.  Fitch modeled a
significant loss on this overleveraged position.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is the modeled losses on the rated securities, which have a
Fitch-derived weighted average rating of 'CC/C'.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs', which applies stresses to property
cash flows and debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
defaults timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in
the report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
The breakeven rates for class A-2 generally pass the cash flow
model at the rating listed below.  The 'CCCsf' and below ratings
for classes B through O are based on a deterministic analysis that
considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the pool and the
current percentage of defaulted assets, and Fitch assets of concern
factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to each classes credit
enhancement.  Further, classes G through O have negative credit
enhancement.  Nomura 2007-2 is a commercial CRE CDO managed by
C-III Investment Management LLC.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Upgrades to class A-2 may be limited due to the increasing
concentration of the portfolio and significant percentage of
defaulted loans and assets of concern.  Should the two FLOCs, which
are past their maturity dates repay, pay off of class A-2 is
possible.  The distressed classes B through O are subject to
downgrade as losses are realized or if realized losses exceed
Fitch's expectations.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $23.3 million class A-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      positive;
   -- $70.5 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $26.6 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28.6 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $21.6 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $23 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $26.9 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $22.1 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28.6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $11.4 million Class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $7.7 million Class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $11.6 million Class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $20.2 million Class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the $48.5 million preferred shares.  Classes
A-1 and A-R were paid in full.


OCEAN TRAILS CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Ocean Trails CLO I:

   -- US$13,250,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on October 15, 2015
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$259,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
      (current outstanding balance of $39,680,959), Affirmed Aaa
      (sf); previously on October 15, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 15, 2015 Affirmed
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$16,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 15, 2015
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- US$13,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
      2020, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on October 15, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ocean Trails CLO I, issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
October 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015. The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 54.5% or $47.5
million since that time. Based on the trustee's August 2016 report,
the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes
are reported at 184.53%, 145.08%, 123.82% and 108.00%,
respectively, versus October 2015 levels of 139.92%, 124.21%,
113.93% and 105.23%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since October 2015. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2592 compared to 2497 in
October 2015.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's August 2016
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately $9.3 million or 8.66% of the portfolio. These
investments could expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation when the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC
ratio of the Class D notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the
Class D notes owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to
these long-dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on
      the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
      Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive
      impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
      payment priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light
      of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which
      increases its sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in
      the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios using a range of
      liquidation value assumptions. However, actual long-dated
      asset exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions
      at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual losses,
      if any, from long-dated assets.

   -- Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
      liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative

      outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst
      Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4,
      exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets
      default. The historical default rate is higher than average
      for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

      which constitute around $5.2 million of par, Moody's ran a
      sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2073)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +1

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3110)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $109.5 million, defaulted par of $5.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.31% (implying
a WARF of 2592), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.34%, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average spread of
3.14% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


OCEAN TRAILS IV: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes from Ocean Trails CLO IV.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A, E, and F notes from the same transaction.
S&P also withdrew its rating on the class X notes following its
full redemption as per the August 2016 trustee report.  Ocean
Trails CLO IV is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in August 2013 and is managed by West Gate
Horizons Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Aug. 5, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
August 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect credit quality improvement in the
underlying collateral since the transaction's effective date in
November 2013.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased significantly from the effective date, which
has caused the portfolio's weighted average rating to rise to 'B+'
from 'B'.  The transaction has also benefited from collateral
seasoning, with the reported weighted average life decreasing to
4.39 years from 5.52 years in November 2013.

This seasoning, combined with the improved credit quality, has
decreased the overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided
more cushion to the tranche ratings.  In addition, the number of
obligors in the portfolio has increased significantly during this
period resulting in increased portfolio diversification.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'CCC+' or
lower has increased to $15.25 million (about 3.9% of the aggregate
principal balance) per the Aug. 5, 2016, trustee report, from $7.48
million at the effective date.  In addition, over the same time
period, the defaulted balance increased to $2.81 million from zero.
These negative aspects were offset by the overall seasoning and
positive portfolio credit quality migration.

According to the August 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
exhibited mild declines since the effective date:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 133.32%, down from 133.45%
      reported in November 2013.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 122.57%, down from 122.69%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 115.26%, down from 115.37%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 109.91%, down from 110.02%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C, D, and E notes, its rating actions considered additional
sensitivity runs and allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

In addition, while the cash flow results indicated a lower rating
for the class F notes, S&P views the overall credit seasoning as an
improvement to the transaction and also considered the relatively
stable O/C ratios that currently have significant cushion over
their minimum requirements.  However, any increase in defaults
and/or par losses could lead to potential negative rating actions
on the notes in the future.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the June
2016 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with
S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deem necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Ocean Trails CLO IV
                    Rating
Class         To             From
B             AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)
C             A+ (sf)         A (sf)
D             BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ocean Trails CLO IV
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)

RATING WITHDRAWN

Ocean Trails CLO IV
                    Rating
Class         To             From
X             NR             AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 28: Moody's Rates Class E-1 Debt 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Octagon Investment Partners 28,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$372,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$66,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$18,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
      2027 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$42,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$30,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$12,000,000 Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Junior Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class E-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3

      (sf)

   -- US$12,000,000 Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Junior Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3

      (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E-1 Notes and the Class
E-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Octagon 28 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's said, “We expect the portfolio to be
approximately 75% ramped as of the closing date.”

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.5 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $600,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2625

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2625 to 3019)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

   -- Class E-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class E-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2625 to 3413)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class E-2 Notes: 0


RBSGC MORTGAGE 2007-A: Moody's Assigns Ca Rating on Cl. 3-A-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating of Ca (sf) to Class
3-A-2 from RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A.  The transaction is
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A

  Cl. 3-A-2, Assigned to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 16, 2012,
   Withdrawn (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action corrects the mistaken withdrawal of the rating
previously assigned to Class 3-A-2 from RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust
2007-A.  Due to an administrative error, the rating on Class 3-A-2,
an Interest-Only bond linked to the Principal and Interest bond
Class 3-A-1, was not correctly linked to its reference bond; as a
result, in October 2012 the rating on Class 3-A-2 was mistakenly
withdrawn.  This error has now been corrected, and the rating of
Class 3-A-2 now reflects the current outstanding rating of Class
3-A-1.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


REALT 2014-1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. G Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust's (REAL-T) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2014-1.  All currencies are in Canadian
dollars (CAD).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of REAL-T 2014-1 are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral since issuance.  The
Negative Outlook reflects a decline in performance of the hotel
assets within the pool which represent 8.3% of the transaction
balance.  As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 4.1% to $269
million from $280.6 million at issuance.  There are currently no
delinquent or specially serviced loans.

Three loans appear on the servicer watchlist (6.7% of the pool) due
to declines in debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).  In particular,
the Four Points Kamloops (2.6%), which is a 78-key limited service
hotel in Kamloops, British Columbia, has exhibited a decline in
performance with trailing 12 months (TTM) September 2015 RevPAR
decreasing to $84.71 from $95.21 at issuance.  As of September
2015, TTM net operating income (NOI) DSCR was reported to be 1.03x
as compared to 1.76x at issuance.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 34 loans secured by 46 commercial
properties located in five provinces of Canada.  The loans were
originated or acquired by Royal Bank of Canada, IMC Limited
Partnership, and Trez Commercial Mortgage Limited Partnership.

Additionally, the ratings reflect strong historical Canadian
commercial real estate loan performance, including a low
delinquency rate and low historical losses of less than 0.1%, as
well as positive loan attributes, such as short amortization
schedules, recourse to the borrower, and additional guarantors.

There are no partial or full interest-only loans.  The pool's
scheduled maturity balance represents a paydown of 12.7% of the
August 2016 balance.  Approximately 91% have full or partial
recourse to the sponsor and/or guarantor.

The largest loan in the pool is the Skyline Industrial Montreal
(10.1%), which is secured by a portfolio of six industrial
properties totaling 562,045 square feet (sf) in the Montreal,
Quebec area.  The loan is full recourse to the borrower and
sponsor.  As of YE 2015, occupancy was 96% with NOI DSCR of 1.76x
as compared with YE 2014 occupancy and DSCR of 96% and 1.57x,
respectively.

The second largest loan in the pool consists of two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans (8.9%) secured by
two anchored retail properties located in Ancaster and Barrie,
Ontario.  The reported occupancy as of YE 2015 was 96% in-line with
YE 2014 with NOI DSCR improving to 1.76x from 1.57x in the same
period.  The loan is full recourse to the borrower and 50% recourse
to the sponsor.

The Strongco Building Fort McMurray loan (4.3%) which is secured by
a 25,024 sf single-tenant industrial property in Fort McMurray,
Alberta was previously being monitored due to exposure to the oil
and gas sector and wildfires in the immediate vicinity.  The
servicer has confirmed that the property has not sustained damage
or loss due to the wildfires and performance remains stable.  The
loan is full recourse to the borrower and sponsor.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class G reflects declining performance of
the hotel assets within the pool coupled with slow growth forecasts
for the hotel sector.  Stable Outlooks reflect overall stable
performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades may
occur with improved pool performance and significant paydown or
defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $230.1 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.1 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.7 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.5 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.2 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.8 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X or the non-offered
$5.6 million class H certificate.


TACSEE FUNDING: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, and C
notes from TACSEE Funding Co. Ltd., a transaction originally backed
by the $451.332 million class E notes issued by Aircraft Lease
Securitisation Ltd.'s series 2007-1.

The affirmation reflects the stable performance of the ALS
portfolio and also the fact that there can be uncapped special
indemnity paid before the ALS' class E note interest and principal
payments, and, thus, before TACSEE's class A, B, and C note
interest and principal payments.  Two major parties in the ALS
transaction that can have special indemnity separately entered into
a side letter with ALS to subordinate their special indemnity to
TACSEE's class A, B, and C notes.  For the remaining parties that
did not make similar arrangements, S&P analyzed the potential
indemnity and modeled a $25 million special indemnity paid before
ALS' class E notes.

As of August 2016, the collateral backing Aircraft Lease
Securitisation Ltd.'s series 2007-1 consisted of 37 aircraft: 39
Airbus and eight Boeing.  The 37 aircrafts are leased to 23 lessees
operating in 16 countries.  As of a Sept. 30, 2015, appraisal, the
collateral had a value of $690.229 million.

The class G-3 notes issued by ALS have been paid down quickly, with
over $267 million in pay downs since our March 2014 review; this
has led to a significant reduction in the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, to 4.70%.  This has subsequently resulted in the reduction
of the LTV ratio for TACSEE's class A (28.09%), B (42.58%), and C
(53.45%) notes as well.  The LTV ratio is calculated based on the
September 2015 lower of the mean and median appraisal values for
ALS' aircraft.

For S&P's analysis, it projected the cash flow for the transaction
by stressing each aircraft's future depreciated value and lease
rates; the repossessed aircraft's time off lease; the lessees'
default frequency and default patterns; remarketing,
reconfiguration, and repossession costs; maintenance expenses; and
interest rate risk.  In addition, the class G-3 notes issued by ALS
has a floating-rate coupon, and, currently, there are no interest
rate hedge agreements (expired in May 2016).  In S&P's analysis, it
considered both rising and falling interest rate scenarios.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

TACSEE Funding Co. Ltd.
Class       Rating
A           BB+ (sf)
B           BB- (sf)
C           B (sf)


[*] Moody's Hikes $352 Million of Option ARM RMBS Issued 2005-2007
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 25, 2016, upgraded the rating of
five tranches from four transactions, backed by Option ARM RMBS
loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10

   -- Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015
      Upgraded to B1 (sf)

   Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FLX1

   -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-7N

   -- Cl. 1-A1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015

      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2006-AR3

   -- Cl. II-3A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 12,
      2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. II-3X, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools. The rating upgrades are generally due to the stronger
collateral performance of the related underlying pools backing the
bonds and the stable to improving credit enhancement available to
the bonds. In the case of Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II
Trust 2006-AR3, the upgrades are attributed solely to the stable
credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $46 Million of Second Lien RMBS
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of five tranches
from four deals backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE3

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
      Confirmed at B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2006-HLTV1

   -- Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2015  

      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct  

      27, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

   Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-A

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2012
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL2

   -- Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2014
      Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions are a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $2.4BB of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 26, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 52 tranches issued by 21 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R7

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-RFC1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-A

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE3

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-NC1

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2005-A

  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2005-D

  Cl. A-I-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. A-I-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-II-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-3

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015, z
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-A

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 28, 2010,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 28, 2010,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-3D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-1, Mortgage Loan Asset
Backed Certificates, Series 2007-1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 16, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-3

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-EQ1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT2

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-NS1, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2007-NS1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-11ABS

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. I-A-2b, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. I-A-2c, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-6HE

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-1
Trust

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 3, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-3
Trust

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $29MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2003
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 30, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of eight tranches, from five transactions issued by various issuers
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W10

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2001-CB4

  Cl. IA-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C

  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2013,
   Downgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2013,
   Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-B

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-3

  M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Upgraded

   to Ba3 (sf)
  M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of total credit enhancement available to
the bonds.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $641MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 30, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 22 tranches from 11 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans,
and issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-ASAP2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB8

  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 25, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH2

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-FF6

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE1

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-HE3

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  Cl. AV, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 8, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WLL1

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-FRE1

  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Speciality Underwriting and Residential Finance 2005-AB3

  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-HE3

  Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $152.4MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and downgraded the ratings of 13 tranches from six
transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-7

  Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 15,
   2011, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-WIO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 21, 2012,

   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC4

  Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2004-AA5

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-1

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at A1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 19,

   2013, Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

  Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7AR

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 9, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,

   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS15 Trust

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 30, 2011,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 30, 2011,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 30, 2011,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and / or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, as well as the sequential
waterfall structure.  The rating downgrades are due to the weaker
performance of the underlying collateral and / or the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $211.5MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 15 tranches
from three transactions, downgraded ratings of two tranches from
one transaction and confirmed ratings of 33 tranches from 5
transactions, backed by Alt-A and RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust (SASCO) 2003-33H

  Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1A-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1A-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 1B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2A1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2A-IO, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2B1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ca (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-35

  Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A3, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-AP, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. AX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PAX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-38

  Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-AP, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. AX, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PAX, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-15

  Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-AP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A3, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A4, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A5, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A6, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A7, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A8, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-AP, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-AX, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-PAX, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. AX, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. PAX, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-1

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 2-A-2-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain
  Cl. 5-M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2016,
   B2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions on Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-35,
Series 2003-38, Series 2004-15 and CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage
Trust 2005-1 conclude the review actions on these bonds announced
on June 17th 2016, relating to apparent inconsistences between the
prepayment shift percentage value calculated per the transaction
documents and the distributions being made by the administrator
according to the remittance reports.  After review with the
administrator, Moody's has corrected its cashflow models for the
SASCO 2003-35, 2003-38 and 2004-15 transactions to lock senior
prepayment percentage instead of senior accelerated distribution
percentage to accurately reflect the transaction documents.  These
changes have no impact on the ratings for these transactions.  No
model change was required for the CSFB 2005-1 transaction.  The
upgrades on the bonds from three of the four transactions were
driven by improving credit enhancement.  These rating actions, as
well as the confirmations of other tranches of all four
transactions, reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools.

Today's actions on Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-33H
conclude the review actions on these bonds announced on June 17th,
2016 relating to the existence of an error in the prepayment shift
percentage input to the cash-flow waterfalls, and an apparent
inconsistency between the prepayment shift percentage value
calculated per the transaction documents and the distributions
being made by the administrator according to the remittance
reports.  The rating actions on these seven bonds reflect the
corrected prepayment shift input and the appropriate allocation of
principal prepayments in our cashflow model for this transaction.
These corrections were credit positive for one of the tranches, CL.
1A1; this impact was offset, however, by the erosion of credit
enhancement and the thin support for this tranche compared to the
expected loss, which led to a downgrade for CL. 1A1.  The rating
downgrade on CL.1A-PO was also due to the erosion of credit
enhancement and the thin support for this tranche compared to the
expected loss.  These rating actions, as well as the confirmations
of other tranches of this transaction, also reflect a review with
the administrator which resolved the apparent inconsistency, as
well the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's
updated loss expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $373MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 41 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from nine
transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers. Moody's Investors Service has also upgraded the ratings of
two tranches from two resecuritization transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: FNBA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1

   -- Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2015
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2015
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   Issuer: Lehman ABS Corpration 2004-1 Trust

   -- Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015
      Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M1-IO, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015

      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M2-IO, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6AR

   -- Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015
      Upgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2015

      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
      Confirmed at C (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 6-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

   Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QS13 Trust

   -- A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2012
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- A-9, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2012
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- A-10, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2012
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS16 Trust

   -- Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-12

   -- Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 3-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 3-A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 5-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 6-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 7-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 7-A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 7-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 8-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. 9-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1

   -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2014
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2015
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR2

   -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
      Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
   CB1

   -- Cl. V-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
      Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QR13 Trust

   -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   Issuer: RALI Series 2003-QR24 Trust

   -- Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are due
to erosion of enhancement available to the bonds and/or declining
performance of the related pools. The rating upgrades on RALI
Series 2003-QR24 Trust and RALI Series 2003-QR13 Trust are due to
upgrade actions on their underlying bonds from RALI Series
2003-QS13.

The principal methodology used in rating the Alt-A transactions was
"US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. The
principal methodology used in rating the resecuritization
transactions was "Moody's Approach to Rating Resecuritizations"
published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $76MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 29, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of eight tranches and downgraded the ratings of eleven tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-D Trust

  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 10, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2004-F Trust

  Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 5, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-60

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 21, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 21, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR2

  Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-II-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  CL. A-III-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2015,

   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-IV-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 9, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A2

  Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 27,
   2015, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-2-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 27,
   2015 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 30, 2013,

   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 30,
   2013, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 30, 2013,

   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4-IO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 30,
   2013, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-7 Trust

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and, or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The ratings downgraded are due
to the weaker loss performance of the underlying collateral and, or
the erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $57 Million of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 25, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 9 tranches from 4 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-4

   -- Cl. B1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
      Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
      Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-2

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R12

   -- Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Series 2003-7

   -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Affirmed Ratings on 34 Classes From 3 US Prime RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 34 classes from three
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued in 2013: Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2013-1, CSMC Trust 2013-7,
and Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-11.  These transactions are backed
by first-lien fixed-rate residential prime mortgage loans
originated between 2011 and 2013.  Each class of rated certificates
in these transactions receives credit support from the
subordination of the certificates that are lower in the payment
priority.

S&P analyzed the current structural and performance characteristics
and performed collateral analysis to project the losses and cash
flow analysis to apply these losses under different rating
scenarios.  S&P's collateral analysis entailed an assessment of the
transactions' collateral performance by reviewing historical
delinquency behavior and projecting losses for the remaining loans
in the pools by applying S&P's criteria, "Methodology And
Assumptions For Rating U.S. RMBS Prime, Alternative-A, And Subprime
Loans," published Sept. 10, 2009, and using S&P's Loan Evaluation
and Estimate of Loss System (LEVELS) model.

S&P analyzed the surviving loans using original loan
characteristics with updated loan balances and Federal Housing
Finance Agency Index-adjusted property values.  S&P also used the
FICO scores provided at the applicable transaction's closing and
applied additional adjustments to S&P's projected defaults for
loans that have exhibited what it considers to be adverse payment
performance (i.e., currently delinquent or delinquent more than
once since the transaction's closing) in accordance with S&P's
published criteria.

The table below lists the number of loans remaining that have been
delinquent in each of the three transactions during the respective
transaction's life.  It excludes instances where loans may have
been delinquent, but did not demonstrate adverse performance
behavior according to S&P's criteria (i.e., they were 30 days
delinquent no more than once since the transaction's closing and
are current).

DELINQUENCIES
Transaction                       Delinq    No. of     Portion of
                                  status    loans(i)   outst pool

Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2013-1   30 days     12         2.50%
                                  60 days      1         0.18%
                                  90 days      0

CSMC Trust 2013-7                 30 days      0              
                                  60 days      1         0.27%
                                  90 days      1         0.22%

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-11    30 days      3         0.77%
                                  60 days      0              
                                  90 days      0              
(i)Including prior and current delinquencies.

Although the current pools in these three transactions have
experienced some delinquencies, the pools are performing according
to S&P's initial base-case loss projections.

For all of these pools, the overall characteristics have not varied
significantly since the transactions' closings; however, the
pool-level loan-to-value ratios have decreased because of
amortization and national property price appreciation since
closing, which is driving a reduction in S&P's projected losses on
these pools.

S&P applied a cash flow analysis based on its loss projections.
Although the projected ratings under S&P's cash flow analysis
showed several upward rating movements, it affirmed all ratings
because of a combination of these factors:

   -- The transactions are still relatively young and are within
      their unscheduled subordinate principal lockout period.

   -- The transactions utilize an amortizing subordination feature

      in which they can begin allocating greater principal amounts

      to more subordinate classes over time, thus reducing credit
      support.

   -- S&P expects prepayment rates for these pools to decline,
      which could leave the transactions more prone to back-ended
      losses.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- An inflation rate of 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- An average 30-year fixed mortgage rate of 3.7% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes that RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure will cause GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in
      2016;
   -- Home price momentum will slow as potential buyers are not
      able to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate will remain a low 3.7%

      in 2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home
      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2013-1
Series 2013-1

Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        008414AA2   AAA (sf)
A-IO       008414AD6   AAA (sf)
B-1        008414AB0   AA (sf)

CSMC Trust 2013-7
Series 2013-7

Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        12647PAA6   AAA (sf)
A-2        12647PAB4   AAA (sf)
A-3        12647PAM0   AAA (sf)
A-4        12647PAN8   AAA (sf)
A-5        12647PAF5   AAA (sf)
A-6        12647PAK4   AAA (sf)
A-7        12647PAP3   AAA (sf)
A-8        12647PAQ1   AAA (sf)
A-10       12647PAJ7   AAA (sf)
A-11       12647PAL2   AAA (sf)
A-12       12647PAZ1   AAA (sf)
A-X-1      12647PAE8   AAA (sf)
A-X-2      12647PAC2   AAA (sf)
A-X-3      12647PAD0   AAA (sf)
A-X-4      12647PAG3   AAA (sf)
A-X-5      12647PAH1   AAA (sf)
B-1        12647PAR9   A (sf)
B-2        12647PAS7   BBB (sf)
B-3        12647PAT5   BB (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-11
Series 2013-11

Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        81745JAA6   AAA (sf)
A-2        81745JAB4   AAA (sf)
A-3        81745JAC2   AAA (sf)
A-4        81745JAD0   AAA (sf)
A-5        81745JAE8   AAA (sf)
A-6        81745JAF5   AAA (sf)
A-7        81745JAG3   AAA (sf)
A-8        81745JAH1   AAA (sf)
A-IO       81745JAJ7   AAA (sf)
A-IO1      81745JAK4   AAA (sf)
A-IO2      81745JAL2   AAA (sf)
A-IO3      81745JAM0   AAA (sf)


[*] S&P Raises 7 Ratings and Affirms 10 Ratings on 4 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 17 classes from three
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions and
one U.S. RMBS resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
(re-REMIC) transaction issued between 2004 and 2009.  The review
yielded seven upgrades (two of which S&P removed from CreditWatch
positive and one of which S&P removed from CreditWatch negative)
and 10 affirmations.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime jumbo, negatively amortizing, and
Alternative-A mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.

                                 ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                               UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on seven classes, including six ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- Bank of America Settlement payments.

Bank Of America Settlement

On July 29, 2016, S&P placed its ratings on classes 2-A-1 and
2-A-2 from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB9 on CreditWatch
with positive implications.  The CreditWatch positive placements
reflected a potential increase in credit support available to these
classes because of payments made as part of Bank of America Corp.'s
$8.5 billion settlement with certain RMBS investors.

The related loan group for these classes received $1.64 million on
account of the Bank of America Corp. settlement in its June 2016
distribution.  The payments to these senior classes and the
comparable write-up on the mezzanine class 2M have increased the
class 2-A-1's credit support to 19.6% from 13.8% and the class
2-A-2's credit support to 16.05% from 9.89%.  The credit support
for both classes has continued to increase as of the August 2016
distribution.  As a result of this increased credit support, S&P
raised its ratings on classes 2-A-1 and 2-A-2 from CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB9 to 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)',
respectively, from 'CCC (sf)' and removed them from CreditWatch
positive.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

On Jan. 20, 2016, S&P also placed its rating on class V1-A-5 from
BCAP LLC 2009-RR13 on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
CreditWatch negative placement reflected S&P's pending review of
this class under its loan modification criteria.  Following S&P's
review, it has determined that this tranche is a fixed interest
paying class and is not affected by the application of S&P's loan
modification criteria.  Accordingly, and because of increased
credit support available for this class, S&P has raised its rating
on this class to 'A (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and removed it from
CreditWatch negative.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on seven classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remains relatively
consistent with its prior projections and is sufficient to cover
S&P's projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of S&P's upgrade or affirmed its ratings
on those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
      and/or

   -- Delinquency trends.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' reflect S&P's belief that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its 'B'
expected case projected losses for these classes.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 14 RMBS Alt-A and HELOC Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Aug. 26, 2016, completed its review of 84
classes from 14 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2003 and 2006.  The review yielded
various upgrades (including one correction), downgrades,
affirmations, and CreditWatch placements.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate Alternative-A (Alt-A) and HELOC mortgage loans,
which are secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class
without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P
relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  As
discussed in S&P's criteria, "The Interaction Of Bond Insurance And
Credit Ratings," published Aug. 24, 2009, the rating on a
bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the rating on the
bond insurer and the rating of the underlying obligation, without
considering the potential credit enhancement from the bond
insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, this is insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 class
      VII-A ('B- (sf)'), insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('CCC').

The reviewed transactions also have one other class that was
insured by a rated insurance provider when the deal was originated,
but S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn the rating on the
insurance provider of those classes.

                      ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                            CORRECTION

While the internal model S&P uses in connection with its
determination of U.S. RMBS ratings typically applies S&P's criteria
assumptions, third-party data provider Intex Solutions Inc., in
many cases, provides the collateral composition and structural
modeling used as inputs into S&P's analysis.  Therefore, the
resulting collateral characteristics and structural mechanics that
use S&P's input assumptions depend on the modeling and data
provided by Intex.

S&P corrected its rating on class 3-A-3 from Banc of America
Funding 2006-G Trust by raising it to 'B+ (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.
Intex had previously reported interest shortfalls on this class
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion and, consequently, S&P
lowered the rating to 'D (sf)' on Dec. 14, 2015, pursuant to its
interest shortfall criteria in effect at that time.  Intex has
since revised its reporting on this transaction, indicating that
this class has not experienced any interest shortfalls resulting
from credit or liquidity erosion.  The revised rating reflects
S&P's current view of this class' credit risk.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include 18 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect increased credit support relative to
S&P's projected losses for these classes.

S&P raised its ratings on the following classes from 'CCC (sf)'
because it believes these classes are no longer vulnerable to
default:

   -- Class 3-M-1 from Banc of America Funding 2005-B Trust;
   -- Classes 3-A-1-1 and 3-A-1-2 from American Home Mortgage
      Assets Trust 2005-1; and
   -- Classes 1-A-1, 2-A-4, and 2-A-5 from Banc of America Funding

      2006-G Trust.

S&P also raised one rating to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because it
believes this class is no longer virtually certain to default,
primarily owing to the improved performance of the collateral
backing this transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' rating indicates
that S&P believes that its projected credit support will remain
insufficient to cover its projected losses for these classes and
that this class is still vulnerable to defaulting.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include one rating that was lowered three or more
notches.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected
credit support for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover its projected losses for the related transactions at a higher
rating.  The downgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends, and/or
   -- A virtual certainty of default.

The downgrades on the following classes reflect the impact of the
passing of the transaction's cumulative loss and delinquency
triggers, resulting in eroded credit support due to the payment of
principal to subordinate classes.  These subordinate classes will
now be receiving full scheduled principal payments, further
decreasing the credit support of the senior classes.  In addition,
certain transactions did not include any cumulative loss or
delinquency triggers, which would similarly cause credit support
erosion:

   -- Classes A-1 and A-2 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed
      Securities I Trust 2004-AC3;
   -- Classes A-1 and A-2 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed
      Securities I Trust 2004-AC5; and
   -- Class II-A-1 from Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-7.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
for these classes remains relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover our projected losses for
these rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and to promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics, which limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
      and/or

   -- Delinquency trends.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

                        CREDITWATCH PLACEMENTS

S&P placed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on classes II-A-3 and III-A-3
from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3 on CreditWatch
with negative implications because the trustee reported potential
interest shortfalls on these classes in recent remittance periods.
While the shortfalls are currently de minimis, S&P's ratings on the
classes could be negatively affected if the interest shortfalls
become material.  After verifying these possible interest
shortfalls--and if the shortfalls become material-- S&P will adjust
its ratings as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- An inflation rate of 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- An average 30-year fixed mortgage rate of about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure will cause GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in
      2016;
   -- Home price momentum will slow as potential buyers are not
      able to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

             http://bit.ly/2bLzoml



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 49 Classes From 11 RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Aug. 26, 2016, completed its review of 49
classes from 11 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2001 and 2006.  The review yielded 27
upgrades, nine downgrades, and 13 affirmations.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.

Of the classes reviewed, these are insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-2's class 2-A3A ('CCC (sf)'),
      insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('CCC');

   -- CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE20's class A-1 ('AA (sf)'),
      insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. ('AA'); and

   -- Soundview Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-1's class A
      ('AAA (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.

The reviewed transactions also have four other classes that were
insured by a rated insurance provider when the deal was originated,
but S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn the rating on the
insurance provider of those classes.

S&P lowered its rating on class A-IO from CSFB ABS Trust Series
2001-HE20 to reflect the application of S&P's interest-only (IO)
criteria, which provide that S&P will maintain the current rating
on an IO class until all of the classes that the IO security
references are either lowered to or below 'AA- (sf)' or have been
retired--at which time S&P will withdraw its ratings on these IO
classes.  The rating on this class has been affected by the rating
action on the reference class upon which its notional balance is
based.

S&P issued a criteria interpretation for our IO criteria to clarify
that when the criteria state "we will maintain the current
ratings," it means that we will maintain active surveillance of
these IO classes using the methodology applied before the release
of this criteria.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include 17 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends; and/or
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include four ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  Seven of the lowered ratings remain at an
investment-grade level ('BBB- (sf)' or higher), while the remaining
two ratings were speculative-grade before the rating actions.  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover its
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
Eight of the downgrades were due to the erosion of credit support,
and the remaining downgrade reflects S&P's IO criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remains relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of S&P's upgrade or affirmed its ratings
on those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would erode the credit support
available for the more-senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its
ratings on certain classes in these transactions even though these
classes may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected base-case projected losses for these
classes.  Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And
'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/2c1etcL



[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 87 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1999 and 2006.  The review yielded 23 upgrades, one
downgrade, and 63 affirmations.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 1999 and
2006 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
subprime mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first liens
on one- to four-family residential properties.

ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                            UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 23 classes, including 14 ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more
of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- A change in payment allocation due to failing performance
      triggers; and/or The class' expected short duration.

                             DOWNGRADES

S&P downgraded the rating on class M-2 from Morgan Stanley ABS
Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-NC1 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'.  The
downgrade reflects S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected class will be insufficient to cover its projected
losses for the related transaction at a higher rating.  The
downgrade of S&P's rating on class M-2 is due to eroded credit
support.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 21 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remains relatively
consistent with S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover
its projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed S&P's ratings
on those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's
view that these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect its view that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

S&P also affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on class S from Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2003-OPT1.  The rating action
reflects the application of S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria,
which provide that S&P will maintain the current rating on an IO
class until all of the classes that the IO security references are
either lowered to below 'AA- (sf)' or have been retired--at which
time, S&P will withdraw these IO ratings.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/2cgcH5m


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

                   *** End of Transmission ***