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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, August 21, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 234

                            Headlines

A10 SECURITIZATION 2013-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
ACRE COMMERCIAL 2014-FL2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
ANNISA CLO: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
APIDOS CLO XIV: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
ARCAP 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3(sf)

ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to D
AVERY STREET: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class E Notes
BABSON CLO 2013-I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-ISQR: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to BB

BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Debt
CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class C Loans
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
CFHL-2 2015: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt

CIFC FUNDING 2012-I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating Class B-2R Notes
CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
CITIGROUP 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
CITIGROUP 2016-C2: DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Ratings to Class E Debt
CMLS ISSUER 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Debt

CMLS ISSUER 2014-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Confirms CCC(sf) Rating on Class K Debt
COMM 2013-CCRE11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certificates

CSFB MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to B3(sf)
CWABS INC 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Class 3-A Debt Rating to B1(sf)
DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C3: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. E Certs
DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOTIVE: DBRS Reviews 33 Ratings From 9 Securities Deals

FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1997-C2: S&P Raises Rating on J Certs to BB+
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
GE BUSINESS 2006-2: Fitch Rates Class C Debt 'BBsf', Outlook Neg.
GE COMMERCIAL 2002-2: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. X-1 Debt
GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to BB

GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C4: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class D Certs
GE-WMC 2006-1: Moody’s Hikes Class A-1a Debt Rating to Ba3
GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C2: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. H Debt
GOLUB CAPITAL 22: Amended Articles No Impact on Moody's B Ratings
GRANT GROVE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. A Debt
GSMPS TRUST 2004-2R: Moody's Cuts Class A Debt Rating to Caa2
INCAPS FUNDING: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC7: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Certs to B
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to B-

JP MORGAN 2011-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class H Certs to BB
JP MORGAN 2013-C16: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
JP MORGAN 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Ratings on Cl. B-4 Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C31: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
KKR CLO 15: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2002-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. Q Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C7: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on SP-6 Certs
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs to CCC-
LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Tranches
MAPS CLO FUND II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes

MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on 3 Tranches
MILL CITY 2016-1: DBRS Assigns B Ratings on Class B2 Debt
MILL CITY 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Debt
MILL CITY 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class B1 Notes

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to B
MORGAN STANLEY 2002-IQ3: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. G Certs to BB
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. C Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: DBRS Confirms C(sf) Ratings on 3 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C17: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt

MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-3: Moody's Rates Class M2 Loan 'Ba2'
NEUBERGER BERMAN XXII: Moody’s Assigns Ba3 Ratings to Class E
Notes
OZLM FUNDING IV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
SORIN REAL I: Moody's Hikes Class A2 Notes to Ba1

SORIN REAL III: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
SOUND POINT XII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on for Class D Notes
SYMPHONY CLO: Moody’s Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
TCP CLO III: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class D Loans & Notes

TRINITAS CLO V: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
TRYON PARK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
VIBRANT CLO II: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
VOYA CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
VOYA CLO V: Moody’s Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class D Debt

WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. F Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
WHITEHORSE VII: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B-3L Notes
[*] DBRS Reviews 33 Ratings From 7 Securities Transactions

[*] Fitch Says Quiet July for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
[*] Fitch Says Quiet July for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 12 Tranches From 8 2nd-Lien RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 18 Tranches From 8 RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $112.8MM of Subprime RMBS

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $47.2MM of RMBS Issued 2001-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $67.3MM Subprime RMBS Issue 2007-2009
[*] S&P Completes Review of 74 Classes From 14 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 79 Classes From 34 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 19 US RMBS Deals Issued 2004-2007

[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 52 Classes From 28 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

A10 SECURITIZATION 2013-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
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DBRS, Inc. upgraded the following Fixed Rate Notes issued by A10
Securitization 2013-1, LLC.

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from A (high) (sf)
-- Class C to A (low) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes in the
transaction as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to the
transaction as a result of successful loan repayment. The
transaction’s collateral consists of two loans secured by two
traditional commercial real estate assets, including office and
retail property types. According to the July 2016 remittance, the
pool had an outstanding principal balance of approximately $18.9
million, representing a collateral reduction of 80.7% since
issuance, as 19 of the original 21 loans have fully repaid, three
of which were repaid in the last 12 months, contributing
approximately $17.0 million (16.5% collateral reduction) in
principal repayment. The transaction is concentrated, as the
largest loan, City Centre Square (Prospectus ID#1), represents
94.6% of the pool based on the current loan amounts.

All loans were originated by A10 Capital, LLC (A10). A10
specializes in mini-perm loans, which typically have two- to
five-year terms and are used to finance properties until they are
fully stabilized. The borrowers are typically new equity sponsors
of fairly well-positioned assets within their respective markets.
A10’s initial advance is the senior debt component, typically for
the purchase of a real estate-owned acquisition or discounted
payoff loans. Most loans are structured with three-year terms and
include built-in extensions and future funding facilities meant to
aid in property stabilization, both of which are at the lender’s
sole discretion. According to the most recent reporting, the two
remaining assets in the subject pool have not yet reached
stabilization, with one loan extended past the initial maturity and
the other under evaluation for extension. As such, DBRS has modeled
both loans on an as-is scenario based on the current loan balances
and in-place cash flows, giving no credit to future funding and/or
lease-up.

The City Center Square loan is secured by a 650,070 square foot
(sf) located in Kansas City, Missouri. The building was constructed
in 1977 and acquired by the sponsor in 2013. The property had been
in default with the previous lender after a major tenant vacated in
2010. The subject is well-situated within the downtown Kansas City
business district, but suffers from a low parking ratio (0.5 spaces
per 1,000 sf) and a dated design. The property was 51.2% occupied
as of the Q1 2016 rent roll, with vacancy improving after hovering
near 60% between late 2013 and late 2015. The occupancy improvement
is largely attributable to the signing of new tenant Synergy in Q3
2015. Synergy has taken occupancy of approximately two-thirds of
its leased space, with full occupancy to take place in early 2017
for a total of 10.9% of the NRA on a lease through 2025. The
submarket has remained relatively soft since issuance, with CoStar
reporting an overall vacancy rate of 12.7% for Class B properties
in the Kansas City CBD, with an availability rate of 19.0% as of
August 2016.

At issuance, the appraiser’s estimated as-is value was $27.5
million ($42 psf), but an updated appraisal dated February 2016
obtained by A10 shows an as-is value improvement to $37.5 million
($57 psf). The value improvement is driven by the occupancy
increase with the Synergy lease signing and improving rental rates
at the property over the past several years. The implied LTV of
50.1% and trust exposure at $29 psf is healthy, with debt yield of
approximately 10.6%, as based on the current loan balance and an
updated as-is DBRS UW NCF figure. The initial maturity date is
scheduled for September 2016 and A10 reports the borrower’s
request to exercise the first of two available one-year extension
options is under review.

The rating assigned to Class D differs from the higher rating
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation, and in this case, the ratings reflect
the uncertain loan level event risk.


ACRE COMMERCIAL 2014-FL2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of three Floating Rate Notes (the
Notes) issued by ACRE Commercial Mortgage 2014-FL2 Ltd. as
follows:

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to AAA (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the ratings of the following
Notes:

-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Classes E and F are non-offered classes.

The rating upgrades to Class B, Class C and Class D reflect the
increased credit support to the bonds as a result of successful
loan repayment and the improved performance outlook for the
remaining loans in the pool. At issuance, the collateral consisted
of 15 floating-rate mortgage loans secured by 26 transitional
commercial and multifamily properties. As of the July 2016
remittance, five loans remain with a total outstanding trust
balance of $150.2 million. Since issuance, ten loans have repaid
from the trust, representing approximately $228.6 million in
repayments and contributing to a collateral reduction of 60.4%.
Four of the remaining five loans are pari passu participations that
have future funding components, which are being used for
renovations and future leasing costs to aid in property
stabilization.

As of July 2016, four loans in the pool, representing 82.4% of the
fully funded loan balance, had reached stabilization. The Kansas
City Industrial Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#1, 22.5% of the
current pool) is secured by three industrial parks totalling 37
buildings in the Kansas City MSA. The portfolio has maintained a
stabilized occupancy rate of 93.0% and reported a YE2015 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.84 times (x) and
11.6%, respectively. The loan matures in January 2017 and,
according to the servicer, will be marketed for sale in Q3 2016.
The Great Lakes Industrial Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#4, 19.7%
of the current pool) is secured by eight industrial properties in
the Cleveland, Ohio, MSA. The loan had originally been secured by
nine assets; however, the sponsor sold one 32,000-square foot (sf)
building, reducing the principal balance of the loan by $920,000.
The remaining assets are a combined 93.2% occupied, as the sponsor
renewed a major tenant that occupied 28.0% of the net rentable area
(NRA) for three years through June 2019. The loan reported a YE2015
DSCR and debt yield of 1.86x and 11.9%, respectively. The loan does
not initially mature until May 2018, and the borrower’s plan is
to continue to maintain the stable occupancy rate with the
assistance of $768,000 in available leasing reserves at its
disposal if necessary. The Pointe at Lenox Park loan (Prospectus
ID#10, 14.1% of the current pool) is secured by a multifamily
property in Atlanta, Georgia. As part of the borrower's
stabilization plan, the property underwent a $2.4 million
renovation plan that was completed in Q4 2015. As of May 2016, the
property was 94.0% occupied, and according to updated financials,
the loan reported a DSCR and debt yield of 2.23x and 9.9%,
respectively. While the loan does not initially mature until May
2017, the servicer expects the loan to be paid out of the Trust in
the near term. As of the July 2016 remittance, there are no loans
in special servicing and one loan on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 17.6% of the pool balance. The largest loan in the
pool and the loan on the servicer’s watchlist are detailed below.


The One Financial Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#5, 26.1% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a Class A office building located in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The loan is structured with a future
funding commitment of $11.3 million for a lobby renovation ($6.3
million) and general TI/LC reserves ($5.0 million). As of August
2016, $2.3 million of future funding had been advanced to the
borrower. In the July 2016 update, the sponsor noted plans to start
the facade work and lobby renovation by the end of September 2016,
with an expected completion date in February 2017. The sponsor had
completed the fitness centre and conference facilities on the sixth
floor as of January 2016, with a cost to date of $559,539,
representing 8.9% of the original $6.3 million capital expenditure
budget. As of July 2016, the property was 74.0% occupied and has
maintained similar occupancy levels since issuance, when the
subject was 75.7% occupied. The largest three tenants collectively
represent 18.0% of the NRA with leases that are scheduled to expire
between October 2017 and January 2021. The third-largest tenant,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, representing 3.9% of NRA, had an
original lease expiration in October 2016 and recently exercised
its lease renewal option to extend for an additional 12 months. The
tenant will be paying a rental rate that is the greater of $26 psf
triple net (NNN) or the market rate, compared with the $25 psf
rental rate the tenant was paying prior to the renewal. According
to CoStar, the subject’s average rental rate of $20.46 psf as of
December 2015 is below the average of comparable Class A office
properties within a two-mile radius of the subject, which reported
an average rental rate and vacancy rate of $32.95 psf and 18.5%,
respectively. In addition, the borrower has gained leasing
traction, with negotiations underway for two prospective tenants
representing 8.8% of the NRA in total, at rental rates of $26 psf
NNN. Both tenants are also being offered tenant improvement (TI)
allowances of $55 psf and $60 psf, of which approximately half will
be funded via the future funding reserve, with the borrower being
responsible for funding the remaining portion. The property
reported a YE2015 DSCR and debt yield of 2.57x and 10.3%,
respectively, which are inflated figures, as TI/leasing commission
and capex costs were excluded. Despite the occupancy rate’s
remaining consistent with issuance levels, the loan benefits from a
$5.5 million holdback for future capex and a $3.5 million holdback
for future leasing costs, which should enable further leasing
activity as vacant units are leased up.

The 361 East 50th Street loan (Pros ID#8, 17.6% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 43-unit multifamily apartment with 9,765
sf of retail space located in the Turtle Bay neighbourhood of
Manhattan, New York City. The loan is structured with a future
funding component of $4.0 million, which the borrower used to
renovate free market units and to recapture rent-stabilized units,
which it also intended to renovate. As of August 2016, the reserve
had a remaining balance of $691,580. The loan was added to the
watchlist in February 2015 because of ongoing unit renovations at
the property, resulting in a temporary decline in occupancy and
performance. As of July 2016, the sponsor was ahead of the physical
plan, with renovations now completed for 26 units, 23 of which have
been leased at an average of $4,338 per unit, which is 7.5% above
the issuer’s underwritten rent targets. The borrower intends to
renovate another three to five units. The renovations include
installation of granite countertops, stainless steel appliances and
lobby and hallway upgrades. As a result of the completed unit
renovations, the occupancy rate for the multifamily portion of the
collateral improved to 88.0% as of May 2016 compared with the March
2015 occupancy rate of 55.8%. As of the December 2015 rent roll,
the average rental rate was $3,504 per unit, which is a
considerable improvement compared with the $2,277 per unit average
in March 2015 and $2,243 per unit at issuance. In addition, CoStar
is reporting average rental rates for one-bedroom and three-bedroom
units for the subject at $3,396 per unit and $5,202 per unit,
respectively, as of August 2016, which are in line with the DBRS
underwritten post-renovation rent projections. The subject's rental
rates for one-bedroom units are above comparable multifamily
properties in the New York midtown east submarket, which reported
average rental rates of $3,157 per unit, according to CoStar. As of
May 2016, occupancy for the retail portion of the collateral has
remained unchanged at 72.0% compared with the March 2015 occupancy
rate of 71.8%, with tenants generally on longer-term leases. There
is an outstanding letter of intent to a restaurant tenant, which,
if executed, would increase retail occupancy to 97.0%. As a result
of the renovation, the YE2015 DSCR has remained low at 0.62x and
relatively unchanged from the YE2014 DSCR of 0.59x. Despite the
temporary decline in performance, the loan benefits from an
interest reserve holdback totalling $300,000, which to date has
never been drawn by the borrower. DBRS anticipates that property
performance will stabilize once cash flow growth from the renovated
units has been realized, with the property approaching
stabilization by YE2016.


ANNISA CLO: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Annisa CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $46,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2028,

   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $24,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $24,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Annisa CLO, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 95% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments purchased
with principal proceeds, and up to 5% of the portfolio may consist
of senior unsecured loans, second lien loans and first lien last
out loans.  The portfolio is approximately 92% ramped as of the
closing date.

Invesco RR Fund L.P. will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four year reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.  The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.2 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -3
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


APIDOS CLO XIV: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, C-1,
and C-2 notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A, D, E, and F
notes from Apidos CLO XIV, a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in 2013 and is managed by CVC Credit
Partners LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 7, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect improved credit quality in the
underlying collateral since S&P's effective date rating
affirmations in December 2013.

The concentration of the underlying portfolio with an S&P Global
Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or higher has increased
significantly from the September 2013 effective date report used
for our previous rating action.  This higher-rated collateral has
resulted in a decrease in reported weighted average spread to 3.86%
from 4.37% and a corresponding increase in the weighted average S&P
Global Ratings recovery rate.  The portfolio's weighted average
rating remains 'B+'.

The transaction has benefited from collateral seasoning, with the
reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.55 years from 5.46
years in September 2013.  This seasoning, combined with the
improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile. In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has
increased during this period, resulting in improved portfolio
diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the September 2013 effective
date.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets increased to
$4.21 million as of July 2016 from zero as of the effective date.
The par balance of underlying collateral rated 'CCC+' and below
increased to $22.01 million from $11.89 million over the same
period.  Overall, the increase in defaulted assets and assets rated
'CCC+' and below has been largely offset by the decline in the
weighted average life and positive portfolio credit migration of
the collateral portfolio.

The increase in defaulted assets, a par loss on the underlying
collateral of $2.85 million, and other factors have affected the
level of credit support available to all tranches, as seen by the
mild decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the
effective date:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 128.32%, down from the 129.74%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 120.30%, down from 121.63%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.01%, down from 114.26%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 107.51%, down from 108.70%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C-1, C-2, D, and E notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
pointed to a lower rating on the class F notes than the rating
action suggests.  However, S&P believes that as the transaction
enters its amortization period following the end of its
reinvestment period, the transaction may begin to pay down the
rated notes sequentially, starting with the class A notes, which,
all else remaining equal, will begin to increase the O/C levels. In
addition, because the transaction currently has minimal exposure to
'CCC' rated collateral obligations and no exposure to long-dated
assets (i.e., assets maturing after the CLO's stated maturity), S&P
believes it is not currently exposed to large risks that would
impair the current rating on the notes.  In line with this, S&P
affirmed the rating on the class F notes.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A, D, E, and F notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Apidos CLO XIV
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B-1           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C-1           A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C-2           A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Apidos CLO XIV
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


ARCAP 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation Certificates, Series 2004-1. ("ARCap 2004-1"):

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Affirmed
      Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Affirmed C

      (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings on three classes of notes due to
materially greater than expected recoveries on defaulted and high
credit risk assets resulting in full amortization of the Class A
notes and over 15% amortization of the Class B notes. This is in
combination with improvements in the credit quality distribution of
the remaining collateral pool as evidenced by WARF -- over 43% of
the collateral pool experienced ratings upgrades or improved
assessments of credit quality of non-Moody's rated assets. Moody's
has affirmed the ratings on the notes due to key transaction
metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The affirmation is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO ReRemic)
transactions.

ARCap 2004-1 is a cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the
portfolio). As of the trustee's July 18, 2016 report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, is
$278.4 million from $340.9 million at issuance with paydowns
directed to the senior most outstanding class. The paydowns are a
result of regular amortization on the underlying collateral.

The pool contains 11 CMBS assets totaling $45.1 million (34.6% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's July 18, 2016 report. There have
been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date
and Moody's does expect low/moderate losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
4981, compared to 5167 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (4.5%, compared to 3.1% at last
review); Baa1-Baa3 (4.1%, compared to 15.2% at last review);
Ba1-Ba3 (11.0%, compared to 15.9% at last review); B1-B3 (12.5%,
compared to 13.1% at last review); Caa1-Ca/C (53.8%, compared to
52.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.0 years, the same as that at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 14.2%, compared to 17.% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral
pool by 5% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero to two notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to D
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class B and C notes
from ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc., a U.S. resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.
S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class A-2 notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.

Since S&P's October 2013 rating action, the class A-2 notes have
been paid down by $106.7 million, and their current outstanding
balance is about 21% of their original balance.  The affirmed
rating on the class A-2 notes remains consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and reflects S&P's analysis
of the transaction's liability structure and the underlying
collateral's credit characteristics.

However, following the paydowns, only 12 commercial mortgage-backed
securities serve as underlying collateral.  S&P's rating actions on
the class B and C notes reflect both the credit quality of these
assets backing the tranches and the decline in their credit support
at the previous rating levels.

The class C notes continue to defer a portion of their interest.
Based on the July 21, 2016, trustee report, the aggregate balance
of the total assets is less than the aggregate outstanding balance
of the class A-2, B, and C notes (including class C's outstanding
interest shortfall).  As a result, S&P downgraded the class to
'D (sf)'.

Although the class B notes receive their current interest, the
notes are currently backed by assets that do not carry a performing
rating.  The rating was lowered to reflect the credit quality of
the assets that currently back the note.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS LOWERED

ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)
C             D (sf)      CC (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc.

Class       Rating
A-2         B (sf)


AVERY STREET: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B fixed, B
floating, and C notes from Avery Street CLO Ltd.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes from the same
transaction.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $117.4 million in collective
paydowns since S&P's December 2013 rating actions.  The remaining
balance of the class A and A-2 notes was paid in the recent July
2016 payment date, and the class B fixed and B floating notes are
now senior in the structure.  In addition, due to failure of the
class E junior notes direct-pay test earlier this year, interest
was diverted to pay down $1.23 million in principal to the class E
notes because of a turbo feature.

S&P's rating on the class C notes was driven by the application of
the largest obligor default test from S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation criteria.  The test is intended to
address event and model risks that might be present in rated
transactions.  Despite cash flow runs that suggested higher
ratings, the largest obligor default test constrained S&P's ratings
on the classC notes at 'A+ (sf)'.  The top five-largest obligors in
the transaction currently account for more than 31% of the
portfolio's performing collateral balance

The affirmations reflect the transaction's significant exposure to
long-dated assets (assets maturing after the CLO's stated
maturity).  Due to restructurings of the underlying assets, nearly
two-thirds of the balance of the remaining performing collateral
has a maturity date after the transaction's stated maturity.  Even
though the results of the cash flow analysis indicated a higher
rating on the class D notes, S&P's analysis, especially for the
class D and E notes, considered the potential market value risk and
settlement-related risk arising from the possible liquidation of
the remaining securities on the transaction's legal final maturity
date.

Although the cash flow results indicated a lower rating for the
class E notes, S&P believes the credit support available is
commensurate with its current 'CCC+(sf)' rating level, as well as
in line with the typical scenarios associated with 'CCC+' ratings
as outlined in "General Criteria: Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+',
'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to S&P's May 8, 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Avery Street CLO Ltd.

                          Rating
Class        Identifier   To          From
B Floating   053643AE2    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
B Fixed      053643AL6    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
C            053643AG7    A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
D            053643AJ1    BB (sf)     BB (sf)
E            053642AA2    CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)


BABSON CLO 2013-I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, E,
and F notes from Babson CLO Ltd. 2013-I, a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in June 2013 and is
managed by Babson Capital Management LLC (see list).

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported the
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.38
years from 5.84 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the
tranche ratings.  In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio has increased during this period, which contributed to
the portfolio's increased diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the August 2013 effective date
report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets increased to
$5.98 million from none as of the August effective date report. The
level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to
$23.94 million (5.17% of the aggregate principal balance) from none
over the same period.  In addition, the weighted average rating has
declined to 'B' from 'B+'.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the modest decline in the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 133.27%, down from 133.86%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 120.60%, down from 121.13%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.62%, down from 114.12%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 108.07%, down from 108.55%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets and assets rated 'CCC+'
and below has been largely offset by the decline in the weighted
average life.  However, any significant deterioration in these
metrics could negatively affect the deal in the future, especially
the junior tranches.  As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P's review of the transaction also relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's
Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSROs for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.  The criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of
corporate assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the
interpretation outlines treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Babson CLO Ltd. 2013-I
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
B             AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-ISQR: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to BAMLL Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ISQR's $370.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-ISQR.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $370.0 million trust loan, which is part of
a whole mortgage loan structure in the aggregate principal amount
of $450 million and secured by a first lien on the borrower's fee
interest in the 1.16 million-sq.-ft., 12-story class A office
complex located in Washington, D.C.'s Central Business District
office market.  The mortgage loan seller is retaining $80 million
in pari passu non-trust companion loans, all of which is pari pasu
to class A.  Both the trust loan and the companion loans are
collectively secured by the same mortgage on the property and will
be serviced and administered according to the trust and servicing
agreement for this securitization.

The ratings reflect view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the mortgage loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ISQR

Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)       166,700,000
B           AA- (sf)        50,800,000
C           A- (sf)         33,900,000
D           BBB- (sf)       53,600,000
E           BB- (sf)        65,000,000
X-A         AAA (sf)    166,700,000(i)
X-B         A- (sf)      84,700,000(i)

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be equal to the principal amount of the class A
certificates.  The notional amount of the class X-B certificates
will be equal to the principal amount of the class B and class C
certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust (BACM) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-3.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are due to additional paydown, defeasance, and
increased credit enhancement since Fitch's last rating action.  The
affirmations are due to continued stable performance of the
underlying collateral.  Fitch modeled losses of 8.9% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
10.2%, including $175.4 million (5% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 29 loans (24.5%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes eight specially serviced
assets (7.5%).

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 41.5% to $2.06 billion from
$3.52 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, six loans
(1.7% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through S.

There was a variance from criteria related to classes A-M, A-MF,
and A-MFL.  The surveillance criteria indicated that rating
upgrades were possible for these classes.  However, Fitch has
determined that rating upgrades are not warranted at this time due
to upcoming maturity concentration risk and the junior position and
thickness of the three A-M classes relative to the more senior
classes.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Pacifica Tower
loan (8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 326,384 square foot
(sf) office tower that is part of the Plaza at La Jolla office
development, a six-building property that features 825,000 sf of
office space spread over 17 acres located in the Golden
Triangle/University Town Center (UTC) submarket of San Diego, CA.
The largest tenants are DLA Piper LLP (14%) with lease expiration
in June 2020, Wells Fargo Bank (12%; November 2018), and CB Richard
Ellis, Inc. (10%; August 2016).  Although, occupancy remains
stable, the property is very highly leveraged at $509 per square
foot (psf).  The most recent servicer-reported debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) as of March 2016 is 0.81x with occupancy of
98.9% and average rental rates at $38.25 psf.  Per REIS, as of the
second quarter of 2016, the La Jolla submarket vacancy is 10.7%
with average asking rent $37.63 psf.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Stonecrest
Marketplace loan (1.7%), which is secured by a 264,609 sf retail
property located in Lithonia, GA, an eastern suburb of Atlanta. The
largest tenants include Big Lots (lease expiry 2019), Babies R Us
(2018), Ross Stores (2018), Marshalls (2018), and DSW (2018). As of
December 2015, the property's occupancy has improved to 93.7%.
There is approximately 27% upcoming rollover in 2017 and 44% in
2018.  Although occupancy has improved, the servicer-reported
year-end 2015 DSCR remains low due to two tenants with free-rent
periods.  The most recent servicer-reported DSCR as of year-end
2015 is 1.04x.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced North Park Business Park Portfolio 3 loan
(0.7%), which is secured by two office buildings (with an aggregate
rentable area of 173,501 sf) located within the North Park Business
Park in Omaha, NE.  Building 4A and 4B (contiguous structures which
share a common lobby) consist of 102,072 sf and Building 5 consists
of 71,429 sf.  The asset remains specially serviced since 2012 and
is currently real estate owned (REO).  The largest tenants are
Chicago Title Insurance Co and United Healthcare Services with
respective lease expirations in 2020 and 2022.  The property is 87%
occupied as of June 2016.  The most recent servicer-reported DSCR
as of June 2016 is 0.89x.  Per the special servicer, the asset is
anticipated to be marketed for sale in the near term.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 through A-J remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown.  Upgrades may
occur on the A-M classes should additional paydown and defeasance
continue without further significant defaults.  Ratings on the
distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades as losses
are realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgraded and assigned Rating Outlook to these classes:

   -- $241.7 million class A-J to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $35.2 million class B to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48.3 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirmed and revised REs to the following classes as
indicated:

   -- $716.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $410.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $116.6 million class A-M at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $100 million class A-MF at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $135 million class A-MFL at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $26.4 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $26.4 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 40%;
   -- $35.2 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.
   -- $30.8 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $48.3 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $35.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $451,972 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class S certificates.  Classes A-1, A-2,
A-2FL, A-3, and A-AB certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class XW
certificates.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and C
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, D, and E
notes from BlueMountain CLO 2012-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by BlueMountain Capital Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction using
data from the June 30, 2016, trustee report.  The transaction is
scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until Nov. 21,
2016.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the February 2013 effective date report, though
this has been partially offset by a significant increase in assets
rated 'BB-' and above.  Additionally, par gain in the underlying
portfolio since the effective date has led to a small increase in
the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios according to the June 2016
trustee report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 134.51%, up slightly from
      134.44%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 121.33%, up slightly from 121.27%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 114.43%, up slightly from 114.37%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 109.22%, up slightly from 109.16%.
   -- The reinvestment O/C ratio was 109.22, up slightly from
      109.16%.

The upgrades primarily reflect the transaction's relatively stable
performance as it approaches its amortization phase after November
2016.  The affirmations on the class A-1, A-2, D, and E notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action," S&P said.

S&P Global Ratings will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

BlueMountain CLO 2012-2 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To            From
B-1         AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)       A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

BlueMountain CLO 2012-2 Ltd.

Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)
D         BBB (sf)
E         BB (sf)


CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-3 issued
by Canadian Commercial Mortgage Origination Trust 2015-3 (the
Trust):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

The trends on all classes remain Stable, excluding Class G, to
which DBRS has assigned a Negative trend because of the long-term
concerns surrounding the Clearwater Suites loan (Prospectus ID#7,
3.9% of the current pool balance), which is located in Fort
McMurray, Alberta. This loan will be highlighted in detail below.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction since issuance in September 2015. The collateral
consists of 42 loans secured by 59 properties. As of the July 2016
remittance, the pool has experienced collateral reduction of 2.3%
since issuance as a result of loan amortization with all of the
original 42 loans remaining in the pool. The pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.48
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 8.8% based on 85.4% of the pool
that reported YE2015 financials. The WA DBRS Term DSCR and debt
yield were 1.41x and 8.3%, respectively.

This transaction benefits from its geographic diversification with
properties located in six provinces. The largest concentration of
properties are located in Ontario (48.2% of the current pool
balance) followed by Alberta (20.8% of the current pool balance).
There are six loans secured by properties located in Alberta,
including four loans among the largest ten loans of the pool.
Including the aforementioned Clearwater Suites loan, the YE2015 WA
DSCR and debt yield for these loans were 1.50x and 9.6%,
respectively. Despite the economic downturn which has affected the
region, the loans within this transaction reported healthy net cash
flow (NCF) and occupancies and are located in more urban locations.
In addition, 26 loans, representing 50.9% of the current pool
balance, have some form of meaningful recourse to their respective
sponsors, seven of which were determined to have strong sponsors.

As of the July 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and one loan on the servicer’s watchlist, representing
3.9% of the current pool balance.

The Clearwater Suites loan is a 150-unit limited-service hotel
located in Fort McMurray, approximately 17 kilometres from the Fort
McMurray International Airport within the city’s downtown core.
The subject loan represents the $21.7 million A-2 controlling pari
passu note of the $31.2 million current whole loan balance; the
$9.5 million A-1 non-controlling note is secured in the CMLS 2014-1
transaction, also rated by DBRS. The area has recently sustained
widespread damage as a result of a wildfire that broke out in early
May 2016. According to an update provided in May 2016, the servicer
indicated that the hotel had not been physically affected by the
wildfire and, as of June 3, 2016, a press release published by the
sponsor, Temple Hotels Inc., confirmed that the property was open
and fully operational. The servicer reported that the property is
currently participating in Wood Buffalo’s municipal Urban
Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program, which will involve the
rehabilitation and/or replacement of water mains, sanitary mains
and storm water systems as well as general road and sidewalk
resurfacing, mill and overlay, edging and landscape repair. This
project commenced in mid-July 2016 and has a target completion date
in October 2016.

In addition to issues caused by the wildfire, the property’s
performance has shown a steady decline since YE2014 as revenues
have been adversely affected by the downturn in the oil industry,
upon which the area is heavily reliant for jobs and residents. When
the subject transaction was issued in September 2015, it was noted
that the cash flows had declined compared with the issuance of the
CMLS 2014-1 transaction in December 2014. As a result, the DBRS
underwritten (UW) NCF was updated in conjunction with the analysis
for this transaction. The updated DBRS UW NCF for the loan was $3.0
million compared with $4.1 million in December 2014. The updated
cash flow is reflective of a DSCR of 1.15x compared with the
previous figure of 1.61x. According to YE2015 financials, cash
flows declined further as the year-end DSCR was reported at 0.86x.
As of December 2015, the property had a year-to-date occupancy rate
of 54.1%, an average daily rate (ADR) of $193.89 and a revenue per
available room rate (RevPAR) of $104.88, respectively, compared
with 61.1%, $205.95 and $125.86 as of the trailing 12 months at
June 2015, respectively. As of July 27, 2016, the borrower provided
monthly operating metrics with occupancy at 75.3%, ADR at $193.09
and RevPAR at $145.46. Although these operating metrics exhibit
improvement from December 2015, it is not DBRS’s opinion that
this indicates long-term stability. DBRS believes that there will
be a short-term to mid-term benefit to the property as displaced
residents and workers in the area will need temporary and transient
housing. Sustaining improved occupancy rates, however, will be
dependent on the ability of the oil industry to rebound. DBRS has
modelled this loan with an elevated probability of default, given
the concerns and uncertainties surrounding the long-term stability
of the property’s performance.


CASTLELAKE AIRCRAFT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class C Loans
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Castlelake Aircraft
Securitization Trust 2016-1's $916 million fixed-rate series
2016-1's class A, B, and C loans.

The note issuance an ABS transaction backed by the AOE issuers'
series A, B, and C loans, which are in turn backed by aircraft- and
engine-related leases, and shares or beneficial interests in
entities that directly and indirectly receive aircraft portfolio
lease and residual cash flows, among others.

The ratings are based on information as of Aug. 16, 2016.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The likelihood of timely interest on the class A loans
      (excluding the step-up amount) on each payment date, the
      timely interest on the class B loans (excluding the step-up
      amount) when they are the senior-most loans outstanding on
      each payment date, and the ultimate interest and principal
      payment on the class A, B, and C loans on the legal final
      maturity at the respective rating stress.

   -- The 67.80% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (based on the lower of
      the mean and median [LMM] of the half-life base values and
      the half-life current market values) on the class A loans;
      the 80.16% LTV ratio on the class B loans; and the 86.89%
      LTV ratio on the class C loans.

   -- The initial asset portfolio comprises 39 narrow-body
      passenger planes (25 A320 family, two B737-700, 11 B737-800,

      one B757-200), four A330-200 wide-body passenger planes,
      eight CRJ-900 regional jets, one B747-400F freighter, and
      one CFM56-7B22 engine.  The 53 assets have a weighted
      average age of approximately 12 years and remaining average
      lease term of approximately 4.5 years.  Of the 53 assets,
      4.8% by value is out of production.  The initial assets in
      the portfolio are in mid-life, with a 12-year weighted
      average age (by value).  Currently, all 53 assets are on
      lease, with a 4.5-year weighted average remaining maturity.

   -- Some of the lessees are in emerging markets where the
      commercial aviation market is growing.  The class A and B
      loans follow a 12-years-to-zero amortization profile for the

      first seven years, followed by a 15-year amortization
      profile afterward.  The class C loans follow a five-years-
      to-zero amortization profile for the first two years,
      followed by a seven-year amortization profile afterwards.  
      Five years after the initial closing date but before year
      six, if no rapid amortization event has occurred and is
      continuing, the transaction will pay 50% of the available
      collections first to the class A loans and second to the
      class B loans.  Six years after the initial closing date but

      before year seven, if no rapid amortization event has
      occurred and is continuing, the transaction will pay 75% of
      the available collections first to the class A loans and
      second to the class B loans.  After seven years, if no rapid

      amortization has occurred and is continuing, the transaction

      will pay 100% of available collections to the class A loans
      and second to the class B loans.  Three years after the
      initial closing date, the transaction will pay 30% of the
      available collections to the class C loans; and seven years
      after the initial closing date, the transaction will pay
      100% of the available collections to the class C loans.

   -- If a rapid amortization event (the debt service coverage
      ratio or utilization triggers have been breached or seven
      years after the initial closing date) has occurred and is
      continuing, the transaction will pay the class A loans'
      outstanding principal balance.  If no rapid amortization
      event has occurred and is continuing but a disposition
      deficit has occurred, the class A loans will receive a
      disposition deficit amount.  A similar arrangement applies
      to the class B loans after the class A loans are paid.

   -- A portion of the end-of-lease payments will be paid to the
      class A, B, and C loans according to a percentage based on
      the targeted outstanding principal amount.

   -- There is a liquidity facility that equals nine months of
      interest on the class A and B loans.  Morten Beyer & Agnew
      (MBA) will provide a maintenance analysis at closing.  After

      closing, Castlelake L.P. (Castlelake) will perform the
      maintenance analysis, which will be confirmed for
      reasonableness and achievability in an opinion letter from
      MBA.  Maintenance reserve accounts are required to keep a
      balance to meet the higher of $1 million in the aggregate
      and the sum of forward-looking maintenance expenses (up to
      12 months).  The excess maintenance over the required
      maintenance amount will be transferred to the payment
      waterfall.  Additionally, there will be a heavy maintenance
      account specifically to address the expectation of higher
      near-term maintenance expenses related to a certain portion
      of the portfolio.

   -- The senior indemnification (capped at $10 million) is
      modeled to occur in the first 12 months.

   -- The junior indemnification (uncapped) is subordinated to the

      rated classes' principal payment.

   -- Castlelake, a private investment firm focusing on distressed

      assets, is the servicer for this transaction.  Castlelake's
      in-house aircraft assets and aviation finance team is
      experienced in managing mid-life and older aircraft assets.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1

Class       Rating                  Interest            Amount
                                    rate (%)          (mil. $)
A loans     A (sf)                      4.45            715.00
B loans     BBB (sf)                    6.15            130.00
C loans     BB (sf)                     8.00             71.00


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in CFCRE Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2011-C2 as
follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015 Upgraded

      to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015 Upgraded

      to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.7% of the
current balance, compared to 3.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $524 million
from $774 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 53% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 14% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Nine loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans, constituting 2.7% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the LAD
SpringHill Suites Loan ($10.2 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which
is secured by a limited service four-story hotel built in 2008 and
located in Bossier City, Louisiana. The loan transferred to special
servicing in February 2015 for imminent default and became real
estate owned through a deed-in-lieu in August 2015. The other
specially serviced loan is the Horizon Village Loan ($3.9 million
-- less than 1% of the pool), which is secured by a mixed use
property consisting of a total of 24 multifamily units and 16,000
square feet (SF) of ground floor retail space.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 64% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 76%, compared to 83% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.71X and 1.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.29X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 31.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall Loan ($92.7
million -- 17.7% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion of a $144.6 million loan. The loan is secured by a 635,769
SF of net rentable area contained within a 1.2 million SF regional
mall located in Grandville, Michigan. The property was built in
2000 and is anchored by Macy's, Younkers, Sears, Kohl's, J.C.
Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods and Celebration Cinemas; though, only
Dick's and Celebration Cinemas are part of the collateral. The
other loan portion is held in COMM 2012-CCRE1 Mortgage Trust.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.42X, respectively,
compared to 73% and 1.29X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Solaris Loan ($41.4 million
-- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 70,023 SF retail
property located in Vail, Colorado. The property was built in 2010.
As of December 2015, the property was 100% occupied. There is
limited rollover and more than 60% of the tenant leases extend
beyond the loan term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and
1.54X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.39X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the DC Mixed Use Portfolio A Loan ($30.8
million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by nine cross
collateralized, cross defaulted properties totaling 95,844 SF
located in Washington DC (8 properties) and northern Virginia (1
property). The nine properties contain a mix of retail, office and
mixed-use buildings which the Sponsor acquired between 1988 and
2008. Collectively, the properties were 94% occupied as of December
2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.16X at the last review.



CFHL-2 2015: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the ratings of the notes issued by
CFHL-2 2015 as follows:

-- Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

The rating actions are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies and defaults.

-- Portfolio probability of default (PD) rate, loss given default

    (LGD) and expected loss assumptions for the remaining
    collateral pool.

-- Current credit enhancement (CE) available to the rated notes
    to cover the expected losses at their respective rating
    levels.

CFHL-2 2015 closed in August 2015 and is a securitisation of French
home loans originated and serviced by Crédit Foncier de France SA
(Crédit Foncier). The home loans are fully drawn fixed-rate loans
for home purchase or construction financing. The construction
projects were completed before their loans were sold to the
transaction. In addition, as of 31 May 2016, 30.65% of the
outstanding loans were guaranteed by Crédit Logement SA (rated AA
(low), with a Stable trend by DBRS).

The asset portfolio is performing within DBRS’s expectations. As
of 31 May 2016, loans more than 90 days delinquent as a percentage
of the outstanding collateral pool balance were at 0.35%, and loans
more than 30 days delinquent were at 1.41%. The outstanding default
ratio was 0.10%. DBRS has maintained the base case PD and LGD
assumptions for the remaining collateral pool at 3.53% and 16.84%,
respectively.

The CE available to all the rated notes has increased as the
transaction deleverages. The sources of CE to each note are the
overcollateralisation, the subordinated notes and the General
Reserve Fund. The overcollateralisation is building up through the
payments of the Turbo Amortisation Amount to the junior notes and
is currently in the amount of EUR 15 million. The General Reserve
Fund is currently at its non-amortising target amount of EUR 6.8
million. As of the 28 June 2016 payment date, the CEs available to
Class A1, A2-A, B, C, D and E are 17.64%, 17.64%, 10.53%, 7.32%,
4.66% and 2.15%, respectively.


CIFC FUNDING 2012-I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating Class B-2R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned a rating of 'AAA (sf)' to the class
A-1R2 replacement notes from CIFC Funding 2012-I Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by CIFC
Asset Management LLC.  S&P withdrew its rating on the transaction's
class A-1R notes after they were fully redeemed.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the transaction's class A-2R, A-3R, B-1R,
B-2R, and B-3R notes that were not a part of the refinancing.

On the Aug. 15, 2016 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance were used to redeem the original notes,
as outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew the rating on the transaction's original A-1R notes in
line with their full redemption and assigned a rating to the
transaction's replacement notes.  The rating reflects S&P's opinion
that the credit support available is commensurate with the
associated rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CIFC Funding 2012-I Ltd.

Replacement class       Rating

A-1R2                   AAA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CIFC Funding 2012-I Ltd.

Original class           Rating

A-2R                     AA (sf)
A-3R (deferrable)        A (sf)
B-1R (deferrable)        BBB (sf)
B-2R (deferrable)        BB- (sf)
B-3R (deferrable)        B (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

CIFC Funding 2012-I Ltd.

Original class               Rating
                          To          From
A-1R                      NR          AAA (sf)


CITIGROUP 2012-GC8: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-GC8 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on generally stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the July 2016 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 4.6% to
$0.99 billion from $1.04 billion at issuance.  Full year 2015
financials were available for all of the remaining loans in the
pool.  The pool has no realized losses to date.  Historically one
loan (0.7% of balance) has been delinquent but has since become
current.  There is $12,854 of interest shortfalls currently
affecting class G.

There was one variance from the surveillance criteria related to
class C.  The surveillance criteria indicated that rating upgrades
were possible for class C.  However, Fitch determined that upgrades
are not warranted as an upgrade may result in rating volatility as
Fitch has noted deterioration in financial performance among
several loans in the top 15.

The largest loan of the pool (10.9%) is the Miami Center, which is
secured by a 786,836 square foot (sf), Class A office tower located
on Biscayne Bay in downtown Miami.  The property, the second
largest office building in the state of Florida, is 35-stories and
includes an attached nine-story parking garage with 918 spaces.
The servicer-reported occupancy as of first-quarter 2016 was 73.6%
compared to 86.3% as of first-quarter of 2015. Decreased occupancy
is the result of one of the largest tenants in the building, Shutts
& Bowen (8.6% NRA), vacating at their lease expiration.  According
to the servicer, two additional tenants, BNP Paribas (3.5% NRA) and
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. (2.9% NRA), have also vacated since first
quarter of 2016.  This loan is on the servicer watch list as the
March 2016 YTD NOI DSCR of 1.07x is less than 1.10x.

The second largest loan, 222 Broadway (10.1%), is secured by a
786,552 sf office tower located in Manhattan's Financial District.
Occupancy has increased from 79.1% at issuance to 97.5% as of first
quarter 2016. YE 2015 NOI DSCR was 2.62x, which compares favorably
with YE 2014 DSCR of 1.16x.  The low DSCR from 2014 was primarily
due to rent abatements, which have since expired.

Notably, the fourth largest loan in the pool, Pinnacle at Westchase
(7.6%), is at risk for higher vacancy as a result of the relocation
of the second largest tenant to a newly constructed headquarters
nearby.  The tenant, Phillips 66 (44.7% NRA), has a lease that
expires at the end of July in 2019, but is actively seeking to
sublease its space beginning in August of 2016, which coincides
with the completion of their new headquarters.  The other tenant,
Frontica Business Solutions (53.1% of NRA), recently exercised a
contraction option and will vacate the third floor (11.4% of NRA)
in November 2016.  The parent companies of both tenants are oil and
gas related.  This asset will be closely monitored for any changes
in leasing status, which could materially impact this loan.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook remains Stable for the rated classes.  Further
upgrades may occur with improved pool performance and significant
paydown or defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are possible
should overall pool performance decline.  Downgrades may occur or
Negative Outlooks may be assigned depending on the uncertainty
surrounding the Pinnacle at Westchase loan.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $10.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $181.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $379.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $80.3 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $93.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $61.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $39 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $773.5 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G and X-B certificates.

*Notional and interest only.


CITIGROUP 2013-GC15: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2013-GC15 (CGCMT 2013-GC15).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool's underlying collateral since issuance.  Fitch modeled losses
of 3.2% of the remaining pool; expected losses based on the
original pool balance are 1.4%.

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 2.8% to $1.08 billion from $1.12
billion at issuance.  The pool has experienced no realized losses
to date.  One loan (0.4% of pool) is defeased.  Fitch has
designated six loans (3.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes two specially serviced loans (1%).  Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting the non-rated class G.

Five loans (22.2% of pool) are interest-only for the full term.
Additionally, 15.4% of the current pool consists of loans that
still have a partial interest-only component during their remaining
loan term, compared to 25.5% of the original pool at issuance.
Upcoming loan maturities consist of 22% of the pool in 2018, with
the remaining 78% in 2023.

The largest specially serviced loan (0.5% of pool), which is
secured by a 510-unit self-storage facility located in the South
Loop neighborhood of Chicago, IL, transferred to special servicing
in April 2016 due to imminent default.  The special servicer
indicated the borrower was unable to make the March 2016 debt
service payment due to the use of property funds to pay for tenant
build-out overages.  The loan has since been brought current
through the July 2016 payment date.  Fitch expects the loan will be
returned to the master servicer.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.5%), which is secured
by a 33,093 square foot (sf) mixed-use office and retail property
located in Kissimmee, FL, transferred to special servicing in
December 2015 due to imminent default.  Property occupancy declined
significantly to 48.5% from 100% when the largest tenant vacated
due to an involuntary bankruptcy filing in August 2014, causing the
property to negatively cash flow.  The borrower covered the debt
service payment shortfalls until December 2015.  As of the March
2016 rent roll, the property was 51.8% leased, with 32.1% of the
net rentable area (NRA) rolling prior to the end of 2016.  The
special servicer is moving forward with foreclosure and putting a
receiver in place.

The largest loan (6%) is secured by a 236-room full service
beachfront hotel located in South Beach, Miami, FL.  The hotel
underwent a $9.8 million renovation that was completed in February
2014, which included soft and case goods replacement, flooring
replacement and bathroom upgrades.  Additionally, in 2015, the
sponsor completed the renovation of common areas at an estimated
cost of $4 million.  As of the trailing 12 months ended May 2016,
the occupancy, average daily rate and revenue per available room
was 77.7%, $275.46, and $214.11, respectively.  The
servicer-reported year-end (YE) 2015 debt service coverage ratio
declined to 2.08x from 3.06x at YE 2014, primarily due to increased
expenses during the renovations and special promotional discounts
offered to customers throughout 2015.  Occupancy fell slightly to
75% from 77% during the same period.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to increasing
credit enhancement and continued stable performance of the pool
since issuance.  Fitch does not foresee positive or negative
ratings migration until a material economic or asset level event
changes the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.  Future upgrades
are possible as credit enhancement improves when 22% of the pool is
expected to pay off at their scheduled 2018 maturities.  Downgrades
may be possible should overall performance decline significantly.

    USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $26.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $236.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $264.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $72.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $94.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $844.5 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million* class X-C at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $54.4 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $204.9 million** class PEZ at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.8 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $16.7 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.
**Class A-S, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
certificates, the class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for up to
the full certificate principal amount of the class A-S, B, and C
certificates.


CITIGROUP 2016-C2: DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Ratings to Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C2 (the
Certificates) to be issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2016-C2. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F-1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class EF at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)

Classes D, X-D, E-1, E-2, E, F-1, F-2, F, EF, G-1, G-2, G and EFG
will be privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional. DBRS ratings on
interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers
the IO certificates’ position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of 44 fixed-rate loans secured by 53
commercial properties, comprising a total transaction balance of
$609,165,022. Six of the loans are cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted into three separate portfolios or crossed groups.
The DBRS analysis of this transaction incorporates these crossed
groups, resulting in a modified loan count of 41, and the loan
number references within the presale report reflect this total. The
conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and
their respective actual constants, two loans, representing 12.5% of
the total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 19
loans, representing 55.1% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x; however, the DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCRs for these loans are
based on a weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of
9.85%, which implies an interest rate of 9.31% amortizing on a
30-year schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.8% over
the WA contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The
loans’ probability of default (POD) is based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

The largest loan in the pool, Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ, exhibits
credit characteristics consistent with an investment-grade shadow
rating. The loan represents 9.8% of the pool and has credit
characteristics consistent with an AA shadow rating. Overall, the
pool exhibits a relatively strong DBRS WA Term DSCR of 1.72x based
on the whole loan balances, which indicates moderate term default
risk. In addition, 18 loans, representing 53.4% of the pool, have a
DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. Even when excluding Vertex
Pharmaceuticals HQ, which represents 9.8% of the pool and is shadow
rated AA, as well as Opry Mills, which represents another 9.8% of
the pool and has a high DBRS Term DSCR of 2.04x, the deal continues
to exhibit a good DBRS Term DSCR of 1.46x. Seven loans,
representing 28.2% of the pool, are located in urban markets, which
benefit from consistent investor demand and increased liquidity
even in times of stress. Urban markets represented in the deal
include New York, Boston and Huntington Beach. Only eight loans,
totaling 12.0% of the transaction balance, are considered to be
located in tertiary/rural markets.

In total, seven loans, representing 19.9% of the pool, are secured
by hotel properties, including three of the largest ten loans.
Hotels have the highest cash flow volatility of all major property
types as their income, which is derived from daily contracts rather
than multi-year leases, and their expenses, which are often mostly
fixed, are quite high as a percentage of revenue. These two factors
cause revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to
fall even faster as a result of high operating leverage. DBRS cash
flow volatility for such hotels, which ultimately determines a
loan’s POD, assumes between a 31.4% and 92.8% cash flow decline
for a BBB stress and a 55.6% and 97.6% cash flow decline for a AAA
stress. To further mitigate hotels’ more volatile cash flow, the
loans in the pool secured by hotel properties have a WA DBRS Debt
Yield and WA DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 11.3% and 13.1%, respectively,
which compare quite favorably with the WA DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS
Exit Debt Yield of 8.8% and 9.6%, respectively, for the non-hotel
properties in the pool.

The DBRS sample included 28 of the 41 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 32 of the 54 properties in the pool
(84.9% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS average
sample NCF adjustment for the pool was -7.0% and ranged from -20.4%
to +2.1%. Furthermore, the pool is concentrated based on loan size
with a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 20
equal-sized loans. The largest five and ten loans total 39.6% and
59.3% of the pool, respectively. A concentration penalty was
applied given the pool’s lack of diversity, which increases each
loan’s POD. While the transaction is concentrated in the largest
ten loans, one of these loans (Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ), totaling
9.8% of the pool, is shadow rated AA by DBRS.

The ratings assigned to Classes F-2, F and EF differ from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers
this difference to be a material deviation, and in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to
occur post issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


CMLS ISSUER 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-1 issued
by CMLS Issuer Corp., Series 2014-1 (the Trust):

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

The trends on all classes remain Stable, excluding Class G, to
which DBRS has assigned a Negative trend because of the weak
performance of select loans within the Top 15 and the long-term
concerns surrounding the Clearwater Suites loan (Prospectus ID#9,
3.5% of the current pool balance), which is located in Fort
McMurray, Alberta.

The transaction’s collateral consists of 36 fixed-rate loans
secured by 40 commercial and multifamily properties. As of the July
2016 remittance, the pool had an outstanding principal balance of
approximately $269.7 million, representing a collateral reduction
of approximately 5.0% since issuance because of scheduled
amortization and one loan repayment. The Lethbridge Retail
(Prospectus ID#29) loan fully repaid along with the July 2016
remittance, contributing approximately $2.9 million in principal
repayment. This loan was secured by a 19,106 square foot (sf)
unanchored retail shopping centre located in Lethbridge, Alberta.
There are three loans (representing 10.6% of the pool) remaining in
the transaction secured by properties (one limited-service hotel
and two retail properties) located in Alberta. Excluding the
Clearwater Suites loan, both the Manning Crossing (Prospectus ID#4,
5.4% of the pool) and Grand Prairie Retail (Prospectus ID#24, 1.7%
of the pool) loans exhibited positive net cash flow (NCF) growths
as of YE2015 financials, reflective of an approximate 5.0% increase
over the DBRS underwritten (UW) figures, respectively. As of the
July 2016 remittance, 32 loans (representing 93.1% of the pool)
reported YE2015 NCFs, while the remaining five loans (representing
6.9% of the pool) reported YE2014 NCFs. According to the most
recent financials, the deal had a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.42 times (x)
and 10.1%, respectively, compared with the DBRS UW figures of 1.39x
and 9.3%, respectively. Pool-wide, 20 loans (representing 61.1% of
the pool) had some form of meaningful recourse to their respective
sponsors, including the three loans mentioned above with exposure
to Alberta.

As of the July 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and three loans on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 5.9% of the current pool balance. The largest loan is
discussed below.

The Clearwater Suites loan is a 150-unit limited-service hotel
located in Fort McMurray, approximately 17 kilometers from the Fort
McMurray International Airport within the city’s downtown core.
The subject loan represents the $9.5 million A-1 non-controlling
pari passu note of the $31.2 million whole loan balance; the $21.7
million A-2 controlling note is secured in the CCMOT 2015-3
transaction, also rated by DBRS. The area has recently sustained
widespread damage as a result of a wildfire that broke out in early
May 2016. According to an update provided in May 2016, the servicer
indicated that the hotel had not been physically affected by the
wildfire and, as of June 3, 2016, a press release published by the
sponsor, Temple Hotels Inc., confirmed that the property was open
and fully operational. The servicer has reported that the property
is currently participating in Wood Buffalo’s municipal Urban
Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program, which will involve the
rehabilitation and/or replacement of water mains, sanitary mains
and storm water systems as well as general road and sidewalk
resurfacing, mill and overlay, edging and landscape repair. This
project commenced in mid-July 2016 and has a target completion date
in October 2016.

In addition to issues caused by the wildfire, the property’s
performance has shown a steady decline since YE2014 as revenues
have been adversely affected by the downturn in the oil industry,
upon which the area is heavily reliant for jobs and residents. In
November 2015, DBRS confirmed all ratings for the subject
transaction, noting that the cash flow declines for the subject
property were taken into account with an updated DBRS UW NCF
derived in conjunction with the analysis for the CCMOT 2015-3
transaction, which closed in late September 2015. The updated DBRS
UW NCF figure declined to $3.0 million from the previous UW figure
of $4.1 million, representing a 39.8% decline and a 1.15x DSCR
compared with the previous UW coverage of 1.61x. According to the
YE2015 financials, cash flows fell even further by the end of the
year with a DSCR of 0.86x, down from 1.69x at YE2014. As of
December 2015, the property had a year-to-date occupancy rate of
54.1%, an average daily rate (ADR) of $193.89 and a revenue per
available room rate (RevPAR) of $104.88, respectively, compared
with 70.1%, $212.17 and $148.67, respectively, as of December 2014.
As of July 27, 2016, the borrower provided monthly operating
metrics with occupancy at 75.3%, ADR at $193.09 and RevPAR at
$145.46. Although these operating metrics exhibit improvement from
December 2015, it is not DBRS’s opinion that this indicates
long-term stability. DBRS believes that there will be a short-term
to mid-term benefit to the property as displaced residents and
workers in the area will need temporary and transient housing.
Sustaining improved occupancy rates, however, will be dependent on
the ability of the oil industry to rebound. DBRS has modelled this
loan with an elevated probability of default, given the concerns
and uncertainties surrounding the long-term stability of the
property’s performance.

The pool is relatively concentrated by loan size as the Top 10 and
Top 15 loans represent 53.5% and 69.0% of the pool, respectively.
Based on the most recent year-end cash flows for the Top 15 loans,
the WA amortizing DSCR was 1.45x compared with the DBRS UW figure
of 1.41x, reflective of a WA 4.2% NCF growth from the DBRS UW
figures. Excluding the Clearwater Suites loan, the Top 15 loans had
a WA DSCR of 1.48x, reflective of 5.8% NCF growth over the DBRS UW
figures; however, there are six loans in the Top 15, representing
23.3% of the pool, exhibiting NCF declines compared with the DBRS
UW figures, ranging from 4.2% to 25.3%. Based on the most recent
year-end cash flows for these six loans, the WA amortizing DSCR was
1.22x compared with the WA DBRS UW figure of 1.27x, reflective of a
WA NCF decline of 10.8% from the DBRS UW figures. Excluding the
Clearwater Suites loan, these five loans had a WA DSCR of 1.27x
compared with the WA DBRS UW figure of 1.29x, reflective of a WA
8.6% NCF decline from the DBRS UW figure. For the loans showing
cash flow declines that are likely to continue through the near to
medium term, stressed cash flow figures were modelled to capture
the increased credit risk to the Trust. DBRS has highlighted the
Galeries Quatre Saison loan (Prospectus ID#12, 3.4% of the pool)
below, which has experienced a -13.4% NCF decline compared with the
DBRS UW figure.

The Galeries Quatre Saison loan is secured by a 162,452 sf anchored
retail property located in Sherbrooke, Québec, approximately 155
kilometres east of Montréal. Originally built in 1974, the
shopping centre was acquired by the borrower in 1977 and was fully
renovated in 1984. The subject represents the only enclosed
shopping centre within the immediate area. As of the YE2015
financials, the loan had a DSCR of 1.59x, down from the DBRS UW
figure of 1.83x. The decline is a result of both a decrease in
rental rates and an assortment of existing abatements, which the
borrower has historically offered. According to the August 2016
rent roll, the property was 97.8% occupied with an average rental
rate of $10.11 psf compared with 96.7% occupied and an average
rental rate of $10.38 psf in September 2014. The largest three
tenants include Walmart Canada Corp. (37.5% of the NRA), Hart Inc.
(Hart; 16.0% of the NRA) and Ardene (5.5% of the NRA) with lease
expirations in October 2022, August 2017 and April 2020,
respectively. Within the next 12 months, eight tenants,
representing 23.6% of the NRA, have upcoming lease expirations. The
largest tenant with a near-term lease expiration is Hart, which has
been at the property since August 2007. During DBRS’s last annual
review in November 2015, DBRS was informed that Dollarama was
considering an expansion and would possibly assume a portion of
Hart’s space; however, it has been confirmed that Dollarama will
not expand. The borrower has indicated that Dollarama will sign a
five-year lease extension through 2020, but negotiations regarding
the new rental rate are ongoing. No leasing update has been
provided for Hart at this point in time. Reitmans Ltd. (2.3% of the
NRA) recently signed a one-year lease extension, extending through
May 2017. The loan has full recourse to the sponsor, the Toulon
Development Corporation (Toulon), which has owned the property
since 1977. At issuance, Toulon had a net worth of over $67.0
million. Toulon is a real estate group involved in both the
construction and management of commercial real estate with
operations in Canada and in the United States for over 50 years.


CMLS ISSUER 2014-1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of CMLS Issuer Corp.'s
(CMLSI) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2014-1, including class G, which has been removed from Rating Watch
Negative.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and the removal of class G from Rating Watch
Negative reflect the overall stable performance of the pool in
addition to the Clearwater Suites property being fully operational
after the Fort McMurray, Alberta area was evacuated due to
wildfires in May 2016.  There have been no delinquent or specially
serviced loans since issuance.  The certificates represent the
beneficial ownership in the trust, primary assets of which are 36
Canadian loans secured by 40 commercial properties having an
aggregate principal balance of approximately C$269.7 million as of
the July 2016 distribution.

The pool has a weighted average amortization term of approximately
25 years, which represents faster amortization than U.S. conduit
loans.  There are no full-term interest-only loans.  The pool's
scheduled maturity balance represents a paydown of 21.1% of the
July 2016 balance and 24.1% from the original issuance balance.  Of
the pool, 82.5% of the loans feature full or partial recourse to
the borrowers and/or sponsors.  The ratings reflect strong
historical Canadian commercial real estate loan performance,
including a low delinquency rate and low historical losses of less
than 0.1%, as well as positive loan attributes, such as short
amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower, and additional
guarantors.

The largest loan in the pool is the Zzen Portfolio (16% of the
pool), which is secured by five cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans, secured by three industrial properties, one
hotel, and an unanchored shopping center in Vaughan, ON.  The loans
are full recourse to the borrower.  The loan is sponsored by Vic De
Zen, Dominic D'Amico, and Fortunato Bordin.  The hotel is a 152-key
Westin Element that was developed in 2013.

The second largest loan is the Royal Henley Retirement Residence
(8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 118-unit senior housing
community in St. Catharines, ON.  The subject, which was
constructed in 2010, is composed of an 80%/20% split between
independent living and assisted living units.  Common area
amenities include dining rooms, lounge areas, a fitness center,
pool, cafe, and a salon and spa.  As of the servicer-provided June
2016 rent roll, the property was approximately 90% occupied.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable as the pool
seasons and the Fort McMurray property recovers.  If there are
significant performance declines or prolonged impact on loan
performance and property values from the downturn in energy prices,
downgrades could be possible.  However, any potential losses could
be mitigated by loan recourse provisions.

Fitch affirms and removes the following class from Rating Watch
Negative and assigns a Stable Outlook as indicated:

   -- C$2.8 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these ratings:

   -- C$122.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$109.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$8.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$8.5 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$3.5 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- C$2.8 class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X or the C$5.3 million
non-offered class H.


COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Confirms CCC(sf) Rating on Class K Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. upgraded the rating of one class of COMM 2004-LNB2 as
follows:

-- Class J to AAA (sf) from BBB (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes in the
transaction as listed below:

-- Class C at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at AAA (sf)
-- Class E at AAA (sf)
-- Class F at AAA (sf)
-- Class G at AAA (sf)
-- Class H at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class K at CCC (sf)

All trends are Stable, except for Class K, which carries no trend.


The rating upgrade reflects the current composition of the
remaining collateral in the transaction. Three loans, representing
94.4% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased, and the
Walgreen’s College Station loan, representing 2.4% of the current
pool balance, is fully occupied by Walgreen’s Co. (Walgreen’s),
an investment-grade-rated tenant. The loan is fully amortizing, and
Walgreen’s original lease expires at loan maturity in April 2028.
The loan had a YE2015 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.16
times (x), which has remained stable over the years. Walgreen’s
has five ten-year extension options. The remaining loan, Alta Mesa,
representing 3.2% of the current pool balance, is in special
servicing and is discussed in greater detail below.

Since issuance, the transaction has experienced collateral
reduction of 92.0% as a result of successful loan repayment,
scheduled amortization, realized losses from liquidated loans and
principal recoveries from liquidated loans. Only five loans remain
out of the original 90 as of the July 2016 remittance.

The Alta Mesa loan (Prospectus ID#54) is secured by a strip retail
center in Fort Worth, Texas, that was built in 1982. This loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2014 because of a
maturity default, and it became real estate owned in February 2016.
The property was formerly shadow-anchored by a Sack N Save grocery
store; however, that space has been vacant since 2010. Performance
of the loan has declined since YE2013 after four tenants,
representing approximately 28.0% of the net rentable area (NRA),
vacated the property, including the former largest tenant, Sam’s
One Dollar Store (14.9% of NRA). According to the most recent OSAR
provided (T-12 ending August 31, 2014), the DSCR was 1.03x, a
decrease from the YE2013 DSCR of 1.32x. As of the May 2016 rent
roll, the collateral was 60.3% occupied, down from 65.4% at April
2015, 73.0% at YE2013 and 100.0% at YE2012. According to the
servicer, the property manager is in preliminary discussions with
prospective tenants, including a beauty school, a day care, a
personal trainer, and a restaurant; however, no leases have yet
been executed.

According to the most recent appraisal completed in April 2016, the
property was valued at $3.1 million ($51.72 psf) down from $4.0
million ($66.24 psf) in May 2014 and $5.1 million ($84.26 psf) at
issuance. Six comparable sales highlighted in the appraisal in the
Fort Worth and Dallas area ranged from $48.31 psf to $159.39 psf.
The property that sold for $48.31 psf appears to be similar to the
subject, as it is a strip retail property that was 47.0% occupied
at the time of sale. According to Real Capital Analytics, sales for
comparable properties within the past three years within 15 miles
of the subject ranged from $61 psf to $199 psf. While DBRS expects
the Trust to experience a loss with the resolution of the loan, the
loss is currently expected to be contained to the defaulted Class
L. If this scenario comes to fruition, it can be expected to have
positive rating implications to Class K.



COMM 2013-CCRE11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE11 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2013-CCRE11.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  The pool has had no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance and a top 10 loan (3.2%) is
defeased.  The pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced
by 1.3% to $1.26 billion from $1.25 billion at issuance. There are
seven loans on the servicer watchlist, but only two small loans
(0.2% of the pool) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern.  The
Loans of Concern are multifamily properties in Brooklyn, NY, with
reported debt service coverage ratios less than 1.1x.  Limited
near-term pay-down is anticipated and six loans (36.7% of pool)
have partial IO loan terms due to expire between now and 2019.

The largest loan in the pool (11.5%) is secured by Miracle Mile
Shops, a 448,835 square foot (sf) retail mall in Las Vegas, NV. The
property is centrally located off of the Las Vegas strip at the
base of the Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino.  The mall, built in
2000 as Desert Passage, underwent a $130 million renovation and in
2007 was renamed Miracle Mile Shops.  The property has a diverse
tenant mix with approximately 140 national and locally based
tenants.  Performance has remained stable since issuance; as of
year-end (YE) 2015, the subject was 94% occupied with a 1.45x DSCR.
The loan has a partial IO term due to expire in 2018.

The second largest loan in the pool (8.9%) is secured by a
portfolio of three industrial buildings encompassing 2,853,175 sf
and a 40.0-acre (1,742,400 sf) land parcel.  The three industrial
properties are located in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, and the
land parcel is located in northern New Jersey adjacent to the New
York/New Jersey port.  The portfolio has near-term rollover between
now and 2018; however, the loan was structured with an up-front
rollover reserve and annual ongoing rollover reserves.  As of YE
2015 the portfolio was 94% occupied with a 1.73x DSCR. The loan has
a partial IO term due to expire in 2016.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks reflect stable performance of the pool and
defeasance of a top 10 loan.  Due to the recent issuance of the
transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee positive
or negative ratings migration until a material economic or asset
level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-level
metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $26 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $90 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $275 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $411.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $986,900,271* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $186,130,000* class X-B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $114.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $76.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $63.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17.5 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or interest-only class X-C
certificates.


COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to COMM 2016-GCT Mortgage
Trust's $264.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-GCT.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $264.0 million loan, which is part of a
$319.0 million whole mortgage loan, secured by the fee interest in
a 50-story office and retail building, known as the Gas Company
Tower, and the associated 1,186-space World Trade Center parking
garage in Los Angeles.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a beginning and ending
loan-to-value ratio of 92.9%, based on S&P Global Ratings' value.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2016-GCT Mortgage Trust

Class      Rating                     Amount ($)(i)
A          AAA (sf)               90,971,000
X-A(i)     AA- (sf)              125,318,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)               34,347,000
C          A- (sf                 25,760,000
D          BBB- (sf)              31,598,000
E          BB- (sf)               42,933,000
F          B- (sf)                38,391,000

(i) There is also $55.0 million in companion loans, which will be
repaid pro rata and pari passu with the senior trust loan ($89.0
million of class A).  S&P Global Ratings' LTV, market value
decline, and debt yield reflect the entire debt balance, including
the companion loans.

(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the class A and B
certificates.

LTV--Loan-to-value ratio, based on S&P Global Ratings' values.



COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to COMM 2016-GCT Mortgage
Trust's $264.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-GCT.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $264.0 million loan, which is part of a
$319.0 million whole mortgage loan, secured by the fee interest in
a 50-story office and retail building, known as the Gas Company
Tower, and the associated 1,186-space World Trade Center parking
garage in Los Angeles.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a beginning and ending
loan-to-value ratio of 92.9%, based on S&P Global Ratings' value.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2016-GCT Mortgage Trust

Class      Rating                     Amount ($)(i)
A          AAA (sf)                      90,971,000
X-A(i)     AA- (sf)                     125,318,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)                      34,347,000
C          A- (sf)                       25,760,000
D          BBB- (sf)                     31,598,000
E          BB- (sf)                      42,933,000
F          B- (sf)                       38,391,000

(i) There is also $55.0 million in companion loans, which will be
repaid pro rata and pari passu with the senior trust loan ($89.0
million of class A).  S&P Global Ratings' LTV, market value
decline, and debt yield reflect the entire debt balance, including
the companion loans.
(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the class A and B
certificates.  LTV--Loan-to-value ratio, based on S&P Global
Ratings' values.


CSFB MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to B3(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in CS First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1998-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. I, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. AX, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 11, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 28% since Moody's last review
and defeasance now represents 79% of the pool balance.

The rating on Class F was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The rating
Class I was affirmed because the rating is consistent with realized
losses. Class I has already experienced a 94% loss as a result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class AX, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current balance, compared to 4.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Commercial Real Estate Finance: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Financings" published in May
2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

In evaluating the Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component, Moody's used
a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating
model CDOROM to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $79 million
from $1.92 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 44 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 2.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 12.8% of the pool. Eighteen loans,
constituting 79% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities. The pool includes a credit tenant lease
(CTL) component that includes 25 loans, representing 18% of the
pool.

One loan, constituting 2.7% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $56.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%).

Moody's received full year 2015 and partial year 2016 operating
results for the one remaining conduit component loan in the pool.

The sole performing loan that is neither defeased nor part of the
CTL component is the Derrer Field Estates Apartments Loan ($2.15
million -- 2.7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 151-unit
apartment building located in Columbus, Ohio. The loan has passed
its initial anticipated repayment date (ARD) in July 2008 and has a
final maturity date in July 2028. Property performance has improved
year-over-year for the last three years due to an increase in
rental revenue. The property was 80% leased compared to 86% leased
as of July 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 49% and 2.11X,
respectively, compared to 53% and 1.94X at the last review.

The CTL component consists of 25 loans, constituting 18% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to four tenants. The largest
exposures are CVS Health ($7.6 million -- 9.6% of the pool; senior
unsecured rating: Baa1 -- Stable outlook) and Shopko (formerly
Pamida Discount Center) ($4.1 million -- 5.2% of the pool). Three
of the tenants have a Moody's rating and Moody's has completed
updated credit assessments for the non-Moody's rated tenants. The
bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool
is 2789, compared to 2730 at the last review. WARF is a measure of
the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of default probability.


CWABS INC 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Class 3-A Debt Rating to B1(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 4 tranches,
from 3 transactions issued by various issuers backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-1

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2

Cl. 3-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ2 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insured Ratings
Withdrawn Apr 7, 2011)


DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C3: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
DBJPM Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2016-C3:

   -- $33,545,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,084,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,000,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $250,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $279,987,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $700,467,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $74,851,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44,687,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,867,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44,687,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $82,671,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,804,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,874,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $8,938,000a class F, the $10,054,000a class
G or the $29,047,404a class H.  Fitch has withdrawn the expected
rating on the interest-only class X-D certificates as they are no
longer being offered.  The final rating for the interest-only class
X-C differs from the expected rating published on July 21, 2016 due
to a change in class X-C's referenced classes.  Class X-C's
notional balance initially referenced class. Subsequent to the July
21, 2016 expected rating, class X-C's notional balance was updated
to reference both class C and class D.

  a)Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b)Notional amount and interest-only.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 32 loans secured by 54
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$893,738,404 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and German
American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.7% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of 91%
of the pool.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage Lower than Recent Deals: The transaction has lower
leverage than other recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is better than both the
YTD 2016 average of 1.16x and the 2015 average of 1.18x.  The
pool's WA Fitch LTV of 104.8% is better than both the YTD 2016
average of 107.5% and the 2015 average of 109.3%.  Excluding the
credit opinion loans (15% of the pool), the Fitch DSCR and LTV are
1.15x and 112.3%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two of the six largest loans
in the pool have investment-grade credit opinions.  Westfield San
Francisco Centre (9.4% of the pool) is the largest loan in the pool
and has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'Asf' on a standalone
basis.  The Shops at Crystals (5.6% of the pool) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf' on a standalone basis.
The implied credit enhancement levels for the conduit portion of
the transaction for 'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are 24.250% and 8.625%,
respectively.

High Pool Concentration: The pool is more concentrated than other
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.  The top 10 loans
comprise 64% of the pool, which is greater the YTD 2016 average of
54.8% and the 2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's loan concentration
index (LCI) of 518 is above the YTD 2016 average of 422 and the
2015 average of 367.  Additionally, the pool's sponsor
concentration index (SCI) of 831 is significantly higher than the
YTD 2016 average of 482 and the 2015 average of 410.  Two sponsors,
CIM Commercial Trust Corporation and Simon Property Group, each
represent more than 10% of the pool with 17.2% and 14.5%,
respectively.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11% below the
most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to DBJPM
2016-C3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Dryden 45 Senior Loan Fund (the
"Issuer" or "Dryden 45").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$310,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$68,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$35,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$21,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3
      (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Dryden 45 Senior Loan Fund is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and up to 7.5% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and non-senior
secured loans. Moreover, based on the portfolio's WARF and the
percentage of the portfolio that consists of covenant-lite loans,
the minimum percentage of senior secured loans could be as high as
96.0%. "We expect the portfolio to be approximately 90% ramped as
of the closing date," Moody's said.

PGIM, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's 4.75 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest collateral principal collections constituting
unscheduled principal payments or the sale proceeds of credit risk
obligations or, if the Class A Notes that were issued on the
closing date are no longer outstanding, credit improved obligations
in additional collateral debt obligations, subject to certain
conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $500,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.75%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years


EXETER AUTOMOTIVE: DBRS Reviews 33 Ratings From 9 Securities Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 33 ratings from nine U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions within Exeter Automotive
Receivables Trust. Of the 33 outstanding publicly rated classes
reviewed, DBRS has confirmed 18 classes and upgraded 13 classes.
For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their current respective rating levels. For the
ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such that credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses
at their new respective rating levels. Additionally, two classes
were discontinued due to full repayment.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the company's press release is available at:

                         https://is.gd/i8ui8B




FIRST UNION-LEHMAN 1997-C2: S&P Raises Rating on J Certs to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)'
on the class J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
First Union-Lehman Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
1997-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P's upgrade on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using our criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans in the pool,
the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.  The raised rating also reflects our expectation of the
available credit enhancement for this class, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels and the reduced trust
balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class J, S&P's analysis also considered the
susceptibility of the class to interest shortfalls given the low
expected liquidity support ($6,819).  In addition, S&P also
considered the transaction's exposure to primarily
single-tenant-occupied properties securing the loans, three ($5.2
million, 13.1%) of which faces upcoming maturity in 2017.  They are
the Ralphs 67th Street, Rite-Aid Pharmacy - Manhattan Blvd, and
Rite-Aid Pharmacy – Main Street loans.

                          TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $40.1 million, which is 1.8% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 19 loans, down from 422
loans at issuance.  One of these loans ($11.4 million, 28.5%) is
defeased, seven ($4.3 million, 10.8%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, and no loans are reported with the special servicer. The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 87.8% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which81.7% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was year-end
2014 data.

Excluding the defeased loan, S&P calculated a 1.08x S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average debt service coverage (DSC) and 42.0% S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a
7.76% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate for
the remaining loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $26.6 million (66.4%).
Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.10x and 39.6%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $64.7 million in principal
losses, or 2.9% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

First Union-Lehman Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1997-C2
                                        Rating
Class             Identifier            To             From
J                 33736LBA2             BB+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Flagship Credit Auto
Trust 2016-3's $440 million auto receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect these key strengths and concerns:

   -- The availability of approximately 47.93%, 40.81%, 30.72%,
      23.80%, and 19.76% credit support (including excess spread)
      for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based
      on stressed cash flow scenarios.  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of approximately 3.55x, 3.10x,
      2.40x, 1.75x, and 1.50x S&P's 11.50%-12.00% expected
      cumulative net loss (CNL) range for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively.  The timely interest and
      principal payments made under stressed cash flow modeling
      scenarios that are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, S&P's ratings on the class A

      and B notes would remain within one rating category of
      'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' within the first year, and S&P's
      ratings on the class C, D, and E notes would remain within
      two rating categories of 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and
      'BB (sf)', respectively, within the first year.  This is
      within the one-category rating tolerance for 'AAA' and 'AA'
      rated securities, and within the two-category rating
      tolerance for 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rated securities, as
      outlined in S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The characteristics of the collateral pool being
      securitized.  The transaction's payment and legal
      structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2016-3

Class   Rating       Type              Interest        Amount
                                       rate(i)       (mil. $)

A-1     AAA (sf)     Senior            Fixed           199.05
A-2     AAA (sf)     Senior            Fixed            70.34
B       AA (sf)      Subordinate       Fixed            48.26
C       A (sf)       Subordinate       Fixed            60.62
D       BBB (sf)     Subordinate       Fixed            42.65
E       BB (sf)      Subordinate       Fixed            19.08


GE BUSINESS 2006-2: Fitch Rates Class C Debt 'BBsf', Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In Fitch Ratings' opinion, the swap counterparty amendment to GE
Business Loan Trust Series 2006-2 is not expected to impact its
ratings. The current ratings are as follows:

   -- Class A 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- Class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- Class C 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- Class D 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not believe there is any rating impact due to the SWAP
counterparty amendment. Under the existing SWAP counterparty
agreement, GE Capital Services (currently provided by GE Capital
Treasury Services U.S. LLC [GECTS]) is the current SWAP
counterparty. The amendment would result in Goldman Sachs Bank USA
(Goldman) acting as the replacement swap counterparty. Currently,
the ratings of Goldman Sachs exceed the threshold for a swap
counterparty per Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured
Finance and Covered Bonds,' dated July 2016.

Furthermore, as protection for the certificateholders, a prepayment
provision has been included in the SWAP counterparty agreement. If
Goldman were to be downgraded below 'A'/'F1', Goldman would be
required to prepay the following month's Net Swap Amount to the
trust. As Goldman's position in the SWAP is significantly 'in the
money', it is unlikely they would need to prepay in a downgrade
event.

For these reasons, Fitch does not expect any rating impact on the
2006-2 trust. However, as detailed in Fitch's April 7, 2016 press
release, the notes remain on Negative Outlook. This reflects
Fitch's concern with growing obligor concentrations as the
transaction continues to amortize. As the number of obligors
decline, the risk exposure increases for a single-obligor default
within the pool, further limiting the outstanding credit support's
ability to sustain the default of a large obligor. Given current
amortization and current concentrations, Fitch believes the trust
to have an increasing risk exposure to additional obligor defaults.


GE COMMERCIAL 2002-2: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. X-1 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
GE Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-2 as
follows:

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO Class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by over 99% to $4
million from $972 million at securitization. The Certificates is
collateralized by one mortgage loan which is in special servicing.
The Oakwood Shopping Center Loan ($4.0 million -- 100% of the
pool), which is secured by a 103,000 square foot (SF) anchored
retail center located in Rocky Mount, North Carolina approximately
60 miles east of Raleigh. The loan went into special servicing in
July 2012 due to maturity default and the property became REO in
April 2014. Moody's estimates a moderate loss for this specially
serviced loan.




GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed the remaining 11
classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation (GECMC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentration remains a key driver of the ratings as only three
loans remain in the pool.  While credit enhancement continues to
increase for the senior-most classes, two of the three outstanding
loans, or 90.8% of the pool, are in special servicing.  The
smallest loan (9.2% of the pool) is the only performing loan and
has a maturity date of Feb. 1, 2020.

Lakeside Mall (76.5% of the pool) is the largest loan and is
secured by the inline space and one of five anchors (Macy's Men's &
Home) within a two-level 1.5 million square foot (sf) regional
mall.  The property is located in the northern Detroit suburb of
Sterling Heights.  Additional non-collateral anchors include JC
Penney, Sears, Macy's and Lord & Taylor.  The trust loan is
pari-passu to a $71.5 million notes securitized in COMM 2005-LP5
and is sponsored by GGP.  The net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported to be 1.24x for year-end
(YE) 2015, up from 1.12x at YE2014, and the May 2016 occupancy was
80.1%, up from 79.6% in February 2015.

The loan was previously in special servicing in relation to GGP's
bankruptcy filing, and the original five-year term was extended an
additional five years to June 2016.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2016 for imminent default and failed to
repay at maturity.  While performance has improved slightly in the
last year, the transfer to special servicing and missed maturity
deadline indicate the uptick is not likely to be sustained.

Skytop Pavillion (14.3% of the pool) is a 133,631 sf grocery
anchored retail property built in 2000 and is located in
Cincinnati, Ohio.  The asset, which transferred to special
servicing in May 2012 for imminent default, has been real estate
owned (REO) since January 2014.  Occupancy has been static in the
60%-62% range for the last two years.  According to Reis,
availability in the submarket has been increasing since 2014, when
the year-end vacancy rate averaged 12.7%.  The special servicer
commentary indicates that an offer to purchase the property has
been approved, and Fitch expects that the loss associated with the
disposition of this asset will be significant.

Versatile Warehouse (9.2% of the pool) is the smallest loan
remaining in the pool.  The collateral comprises 20 mixed-use
buildings utilized for self-storage, auto repair, manufacturing and
retail.  They are located in an industrial area in Davie, Florida,
immediately west of the Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International
Airport.  The rent roll is granular with over 700 tenants,
minimizing the risk of any upcoming tenant rollover.  The loan has
never been delinquent and is in Lockout until November 2019.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class E has been revised to Stable from
Negative.  The Negative Outlook was previously driven by
uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of refinance for the largest
loan in the pool.  Based on the loan's recent transfer to special
servicing and maturity default, the class has been downgraded and
the Outlook revised to Stable.  The Rating Outlook on class D was
revised to Negative from Stable, which is also driven by the
transfer of the largest loan to special servicing and uncertainty
regarding disposition timing.  The Rating Outlook for class C
remains Stable.  Further upgrades are unlikely given the
susceptibility for these classes to be shorted interest payments,
especially now that the largest loan is in default.  The distressed
bonds may be subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.


   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded this class and revised the Rating Outlook as:

   -- $14.7 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as follows:

   -- $3.3 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $27.2 million class D at 'BBBsf', Outlook revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $23 million class F at 'CCCsf', RE 95%;
   -- $14.7 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $10.6 million class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-AB, A-1A, A-J and B
certificates have been paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class
P certificate.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-P and X-C certificates.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C4: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class D Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on five classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GE Commercial
Mortgage Corp.'s series 2005-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which
included a review of the credit characteristics and performance of
the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movements on classes A-M and A-J, S&P's analysis considered the
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the 15 specially
serviced assets ($312.0 million, 64.2%), as well as uncertainty
surrounding the tenancy for the third-largest asset in the pool,
the Fireman's Fund loan ($68.8 million, 14.2%).  It is S&P's
understanding from the master servicer that the sole tenant at the
property vacated in December 2015 but is expected to continue to
make its rental payments until 2018.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-W interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                           TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 11, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $486.7 million, which is 20.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes seven loans (including a
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loan) and 11 real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 168 loans at issuance. Fifteen
of these assets are with the special servicer, one loan ($87.7
million, 18.0%) is on the master servicer's watchlist, and no loans
are defeased.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported
financial information for 90.8% of the loans in the pool, of which
76.6% was partial- or year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was
year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 0.85x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 130.5% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.46% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 15 specially serviced
assets and a subordinate B note ($7.2 million, 1.5%).  The top 10
assets have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of
$445.6 million (91.6%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of
0.88x and 128.8%, respectively, for four of the top 10 assets.  The
remaining top 10 assets are specially serviced.

To date, the transaction has experienced $131.2 million in
principal losses, or 5.5% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 10.8% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on loss incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
15 specially serviced assets.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 11, 2016, trustee remittance report, 15 assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of the two largest specially serviced assets, both of which
are a top 10 asset, are:

   -- The 123 North Wacker REO asset ($120.6 million, 24.8%), is
      the largest asset in the pool and has a total reported
      exposure of $128.5 million.  The asset is a 540,646-sq.-ft.
      office property in the central business district of Chicago.

      The loan was transferred to special servicing on Oct. 18,
      2013, due to imminent default that later became a default as

      a result of a bankruptcy filing and payment default.  The
      property became REO as of May 11, 2016.  The special
      servicer stated that one new lease was signed for 5,694-sq.-
      ft. (1% of gross leasable area [GLA]).  The reported DSC as
      of year-end 2015 was 0.73x.  An appraisal reduction amount
      (ARA) of $16.9 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P

      expects a minimal loss upon this asset's eventual
      resolution.

   -- The Lakeside Loudoun Tech REO asset ($38.3 million, 7.9%) is

      the fourth-largest asset in the pool and has a total
      reported exposure of $40.4 million.  The asset is a 203,750-
      q.-ft. suburban office building in Sterling, Va.  The loan
      was transferred to special servicing on May 27, 2011,
      because the borrower requested a loan modification due to
      anticipated decline in occupancy and net cash flow.  The
      property became REO as of Nov. 13, 2012.  The special
      servicer indicated that three new and renewal leases
      comprising 31,524-sq.-ft. (31% GLA) were signed.  An ARA of
      $30.5 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P expects
      a significant loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

The 13 remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 7.4% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P's estimated weighted average loss severity for
the 15 specially serviced assets is 41.0%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4
                                  Rating
Class            Identifier       To            From
A-M              36828QQG4        AA (sf)       AA (sf)
A-J              36828QQH2        BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
B                36828QQJ8        B (sf)        B (sf)
C                36828QQK5        CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)
D                36828QQL3        D (sf)        D (sf)
X-W              36828QQN9        AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)


GE-WMC 2006-1: Moody’s Hikes Class A-1a Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by GE-WMC Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
   2006-1

   -- Cl. A-1a, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. A-1b, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2010
      Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades for GE-WMC Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1 are primarily due to principal proceeds
related to a representations and warranties settlement. The Class
A-1a and Class A-1b received approximately $20 million in
settlement funds. The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 1997-C2: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. H Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc 1997-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed

      Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed C

      (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class G was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. Defeasance
represents 47% of the pool and fully covers the balance of Class
G.

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class H has
already experienced a 65% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance. Moody's does not anticipate losses from the
remaining collateral in the current environment. However, over the
remaining life of the transaction, losses may emerge from macro
stresses to the environment and changes in collateral performance.
Our ratings reflect the potential for future losses under varying
levels of stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 5.4% of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16 million
from $1.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 47%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $58 million (for an average loss
severity of 20%). There are currently no loans in special servicing
or on the watchlist.

The three remaining non-defeased loans represent 53% of the pool
balance. The largest non-defeased loan is the Kmart- Laredo Loan
($4.5 million -- 28% of the pool), which is secured by a 112,000
square foot (SF) single-tenant retail property located in Laredo,
Texas. The property is 100% leased to Kmart through October 2022.
The loan fully amortizes during its term and has amortized 52%
since securitization. The loan is co-terminus with the lease
maturity. Due to the single tenant nature, Moody's utilize a
lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.68X,
respectively, compared to 64% and 1.69X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Kmart- Lafayette Loan ($3.8 million
-- 24% of the pool), which is secured by a 119,000 SF retail
property located in Lafayette, Indiana, which is 100% leased to
Kmart through October 2022. The property is part of a larger strip
center which is not part the collateral. The loan fully amortizes
during its term and has amortized 52% since securitization. The
loan is co-terminus with the lease maturity. Due to the single
tenant nature, Moody's utilize a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.46X, respectively, compared to 81% and
1.34X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the CVS Drugstore Loan ($269,713 -- 2% of
the pool), which is secured by a 9,400 SF single-tenant retail
property located in a suburban retail corridor in Media,
Pennsylvania, 12 miles east of Philadelphia. The property is 100%
leased to CVS through January 2018. The loan fully amortizes during
its term and has amortized 87% since securitization. The loan is
co-terminus with the lease maturity. Due to the single tenant
nature, Moody's utilize a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 12% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 19% and
4.00X at the last review.


GOLUB CAPITAL 22: Amended Articles No Impact on Moody's B Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Golub
Capital Partners CLO 22 (B), Ltd. into an amendment to the
Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Issuer dated as of
August 17, 2016, and performance of the activities contemplated
therein, will not in and of themselves and at this time result in
the immediate withdrawal or reduction with respect to the current
rating by Moody's of any Class of Secured Notes issued by the
Issuer. Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the
Amended Articles could have non-credit-related effects.

The Amended Articles and the related First Supplemental Indenture,
also dated as of August 17, 2016, permit the Issuer to elect to be
treated as a corporation rather than as a partnership for US
federal income tax purposes. Moody's is advised that the proposed
changes contained in the Amended Articles and in the First
Supplemental Indenture will not in and of themselves cause the
Issuer to be subject to entity level tax for US federal income tax
purposes.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in December 2015 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by
the Issuer. Any change in the ratings will be publicly disseminated
by Moody's through appropriate media.


GRANT GROVE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Grant Grove CLO, Ltd.

  $14,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 21, 2015, Upgraded to
   A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021 (current z
   outstanding balance of $14,059,650.50), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 21, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $15,750,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 21, 2015 Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $9,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due 2021
   (current outstanding balance of $7,413,396.26), Affirmed Ba3
   (sf); previously on Oct. 21, 2015 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Grant Grove CLO, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2013.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015.  The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately $37.4 million and are no
longer outstanding, while the Class B Notes have been paid down by
approximately 22% or $3.9 million since that time.  Based on
Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E notes are currently at 396.73%, 187.12%,
126.60% and 108.37%, respectively, versus October 2015 levels of
175.87%, 136.95%, 114.10% and 104.99%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since the October 2015.  Based on Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2681 compared to
2486 in October 2015.  The portfolio also includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the notes do
(long-dated assets), which currently make up approximately 7.9% of
the portfolio based on Moody's calculations.  These investments
could expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation
when the notes mature.  Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class E notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class E notes
owing to credit deterioration in the portfolio and market risk
stemming from the exposure to long-dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher
     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.  However, actual long-dated asset
     exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions at the
     CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual losses, if any,
     from long-dated assets.

  7) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with low credit
     quality and weak liquidity: The presence of assets rated Caa3

     with a negative outlook or the worst Moody's speculative
     grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to
     additional risks if these assets default.  The historical
     default rate is higher than average for these assets.  Due to

     the deal's high exposure to such assets, which constitute
     around $0.8 million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2145)
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +3
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3217)
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $54.3 million, defaulted par
of $4.32 million, a weighted average default probability of 15.53%
(implying a WARF of 2681), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.07%, a diversity score of 27 and a weighted average
spread of 3.41%(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. A Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms ratings of one class of
certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-CC1
("GSMS 2006-CC1"):

   -- Cl. A, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015 Affirmed

      Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

GSMS 2006-CC1 is a static cash transaction backed solely by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the current pool balance). As of the July 21, 2016 trustee report,
the aggregate certificate balance of the transaction has decreased
to $155.1 million from $406.2 million at issuance, with the pay
down directed to the senior most outstanding class of certificates
as a result of amortization of the underlying collateral and
recoveries from defaulted collateral. Partial losses have been
applied to Class A as a result of realized losses on the underlying
collateral; and Classes B through M have been fully written down.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5697,
compared to 5656 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (12.6% compared to 12.3% at last
review), A1-A3 (4.3% compared to 3.5% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(5.3% compared to 7.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (15.6% compared to
11.1% at last review), B1-B3 (4.6% compared to 8.7% at last
review), Caa1-Ca/C (57.6% compared to 57.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 3.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on the look-through extension assumptions
about extensions on the loans backing the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 7.1%, compared to 7.5% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by 10% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificates of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GSMPS TRUST 2004-2R: Moody's Cuts Class A Debt Rating to Caa2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches issued by GSMPS Pass-Through Trust 2004-2R.

The re-securitization is backed by various residential
mortgage-backed securities, backed by pools of FHA-VA mortgages
insured by the Federal Housing Administration, an agency of the
U.S. Department of Urban Development, or guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration.

Complete rating actions is as follows:

   Issuer: GSMPS Pass-Through Trust 2004-2R

   -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2016
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

One underlying transaction security that represents a large
component of the re-securitization incurred a rating downgrade due
to higher severity associated with a large aged delinquency
pipeline, thus negatively affecting the re-securitization bonds.
Class A downgrade is also the result of the depletion of credit
enhancement, due to losses from the underlying FHA-VA
transactions.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014 and "FHA-VA US
RMBS Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers on the underlying transactions or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


INCAPS FUNDING: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class B-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on all four classes of notes
of InCapS Funding II, Ltd./Corp. (InCaps II).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Since Fitch's last rating action in August 2015, the transaction
has performed stable with one new cure, representing 7% of the
total portfolio, offset by a new deferring issuer comprising 6% of
the total collateral. Fitch observed two partial redemptions
totalling $261,181 over the past 12 months that marginally
increased credit enhancement (CE) levels for the senior-most notes.
Upgrades in either public ratings or Fitch's rating equivalent
insurance scores, outpaced downgrades, but the average credit
quality of the portfolio remained at 'BB'. There were no new
defaults since the last review.

The underlying portfolio remains very concentrated with a total of
19 issuers, of which 17 are performing. All coverage tests continue
to pass and the reverse turbo feature diverts 55% of additional
interest proceeds to pay down the class C notes, with the remaining
45% paid to the income note holders. The additional CE from the
excess spread analysis did not provide a meaningful uplift to the
passing ratings given the haircuts applied to the baseline of
excess spread levels for various rating stresses and the outsized
interest rate swaps in these three CDOs.

In evaluating the notes, Fitch applied the analytical framework
described in the 'Surveillance Criteria for Trust Preferred CDOs'.
The ratings and outlooks for all classes of notes reflect the range
of passing ratings and application of the analytical framework.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Given the high degree of portfolio concentration in this
transaction, ratings are sensitive to the pace of transaction
deleveraging, credit quality migration in the underlying portfolio,
and any additional deferrals or defaults.

For non-deferrable notes, Fitch performs analysis of notes'
interest sensitivity to additional defaults and deferrals, as
described in the criteria. The outcome of this analysis is
considered in determining appropriate rating levels for
non-deferrable notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was reviewed in relation to this
rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

   -- $47,566,726 class A-2 notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $47,500,000 class B-1 notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $47,000,000 class B-2 notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $9,557,263 class C notes at 'CCCsf'.


JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC7: S&P Raises Rating on Class H Certs to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.’s series 2003-CIBC7, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ‘AAA (sf)’ rating on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates and discontinued S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating on class
C from the same transaction.

"Our upgrades on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
follow our analysis of the transaction, primarily using our
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which
included a review of the credit characteristics and performance of
the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's structure, and
the liquidity available to the trust.  The raised ratings also
reflect our expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes (which we believe is greater than our most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels), our views regarding the current and future performance of
the transaction's collateral, and the trust balance's significant
reduction.  Additionally, the upgrade of class H's rating to 'B
(sf)' from 'D (sf)' considers that this class was previously
lowered to 'D (sf)' due to accumulated interest shortfalls that we
expected to remain outstanding for a prolonged period of time.  We
raised our rating on this class because the interest shortfalls
have since been resolved in full and we do not believe, at this
time, that a further default of this class is virtually certain,"
S&P said.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes E through H, S&P's analysis also
considered the bonds' interest shortfall history and position in
the waterfall, as well as the magnitude of liquidity support
available to the bonds to insulate them from any future liquidity
interruptions.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-1 IO certificates
based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities, which provide
that we will maintain the current rating on such IO class until all
of the classes that the IO security references are either lowered
to below 'AA- (sf)' or have been retired--at which time S&P will
withdraw the IO rating.

S&P discontinued its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class C certificates
following the full repayment of its outstanding principal balance
as noted in the July 12, 2016, trustee remittance report.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $91.7 million, which is 6.6% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 34 loans (reflecting
crossed loans), down from 184 loans at issuance.  None of these
loans are with the special servicer, 10 loans ($31.1 million,
33.9%) are defeased, and five loans ($14.8 million, 16.2%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Midland Loan
Services, reported financial information for all of the nondefeased
loans in the pool, of which 92.8% was partial or year-end 2015
data, and the remainder year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.58x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 27.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.71% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 10 defeased loans. The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $44.4 million (48.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers,
we calculated a S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of
1.59x and 28.0%, respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $53.3 million in principal
losses (3.8% of the original pool trust balance).  S&P does not
expect any additional losses in the near term.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To               From
C                46625MP45             NR               AAA (sf)
D                46625MP52             AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)
E                46625MP60             AA+ (sf)         BBB+ (sf)
F                46625MQ44             A+ (sf)          BB (sf)
G                46625MQ51             BBB+ (sf)        BB- (sf)
H                46625MQ69             B (sf)           D (sf)
X-1              46625MP94             AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
lowered its ratings on three classes and affirmed its ratings on
four classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-M and A-J to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, available liquidity
support, and a significant reduction in the trust balance.

"The downgrades on classes E and F reflect susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support from the eight specially serviced assets
($239.6 million, 36.0%), two of which ($106.0, 15.9%) were
transferred to the special servicer after the July 2016 remittance
report.  We also considered four loans ($61.1 million, 9.2%) that
we believe are at a heightened risk of default and that we expect
will be transferred to the special servicer in the near term.  The
downgrades also considered the credit support erosion that we
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of these assets.
In addition, we lowered our rating on class G to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding
for the foreseeable future.  The class had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for seven consecutive months," S&P said.

According to the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $182,315 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Net appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts
      totaling $146,579; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $27,878.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class G.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings and our views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class A-J and positive rating movements on
classes B, C, and D, S&P's analysis also considered the
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the specially
serviced assets and the loans that S&P expects are at a heightened
risk of default in the near term.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                            TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $664.8 million, which is 21.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 56 loans and two real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 165 loans at issuance. Eight
of these assets are with the special servicer, eight ($105.9
million, 15.9%) are defeased, and 40 ($406.7 million, 61.2%) are on
the master servicers' combined watchlist.  The master servicers,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Midland Loan Services (Midland), reported
financial information for 96.4% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, of which 75.1% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was
year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.26x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 81.0% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.75% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude seven ($136.2 million,
20.5%) of the eight specially serviced assets, three
($38.8 million, 5.8%) of the four loans expected to be transferred
to special servicing, and the eight defeased loans. The top 10
nondefeased assets have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance
of $371.5 million (55.9%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of
1.25x and 82.8%, respectively, for five of the top 10 nondefeased
assets.  Four of the remaining top 10 assets are either
nonperforming assets or loans that S&P expects to be transferred to
special servicing (details below), while according to Midland, the
remaining top 10 asset was repaid in full before the July 2016
trustee remittance report.

To date, the transaction has experienced $96.6 million in principal
losses, or 3.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 6.2% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date,
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of seven
of the eight specially serviced assets, and three of the four loan
that S&P expects to be transferred to special servicing in the near
term.

                          CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, six loans
($133.6 million, 20.1%) were with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III).  C-III has reported that two additional
loans ($105.9 million, 15.9%) were transferred to special servicing
after the July 2016 trustee remittance report. In addition, the
master servicers indicated that three additional loans are in the
process of being transferred to special servicing.  S&P deemed the
Lincoln Town Center loan, secured by a 82,943-sq.-ft. retail
property in Lincolnton, N.C., to be credit-impaired because it has
a nonperforming matured balloon payment status and a low reported
DSC of 0.98x as of year-end 2015.  As a result, S&P considered this
loan to be at a heightened risk of default.  Details of the two
largest specially serviced assets, both of which are top 10
nondefeased assets, are:

The CNL/Welsh Portfolio Roll-Up loan ($103.4 million, 15.6%) is the
largest nondefeased asset in the pool and has a total reported
exposure of $103.4 million.  The loan is secured by a portfolio of
10 industrial properties totaling 2,144,750 sq. ft. and three
office properties totaling 232,690 sq. ft. located throughout the
U.S.  The loan, which has a performing matured balloon payment
status, was transferred to the special servicer on July 11, 2016,
because of imminent monetary default.  The loan matured on July 7,
2016.  The master servicer, Midland, stated that the borrower
informed that the portfolio was under contract for sale with an
expected closing date near the end of June 2016; however, that sale
never closed.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015
were 1.40x and 95.7%, respectively.

The Foothills Mall loan ($75.9 million, 11.4%) is the second
largest nondefeased asset in the pool and has a total reported
exposure of $78.4 million.  The loan is secured by a
501,514-sq.-ft. regional mall in Tucson, Ariz.  The loan, which has
a nonperforming matured balloon payment status, was transferred to
the special servicer on Dec. 8, 2015, because of monetary default.
The loan matured on July 1, 2016. C-III stated that the property's
leasing has struggled since a new outlet mall opened in the Tucson
market and other regional malls in the market were renovated.  The
reported DSC for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2015, was 0.91x,
and reported occupancy was 82.0% as of March 2016.  An appraisal
reduction amount totaling $19.1 million is in effect against this
loan.  Based on new valuation received on the property, S&P expects
a significant loss (60% or greater) upon this loan's eventual
resolution.

The remaining six specially serviced assets each have individual
balances that represent less than 4.8% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the seven of the eight specially
serviced assets, as well as three of the four loans expected to be
transferred to special servicing, arriving at a weighted average
loss severity of 52.6%.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-LDP8
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
X                46629MAJ4             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-M              46629MAL9             AAA (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
A-J              46629MAM7             BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)
B                46629MAN5             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
C                46629MAP0             B+ (sf)       B+ (sf)
D                46629MAQ8             B (sf)        B (sf)
E                46629MAT2             B- (sf)       B (sf)
F                46629MAU9             CCC- (sf)     B- (sf)
G                46629MAV7             D (sf)        CCC+ (sf)


JP MORGAN 2011-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class H Certs to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes and lowered
its ratings on two other classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes B and C to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the collateral's current
and future performance and available liquidity support.
The upgrades also reflect the reduction in trust balance.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes H and J to reflect credit
support erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the loan with the special servicer, as well as the
recent performance decline at two properties securing two of the
top 10 loans ($110.2 million, 10.0%).

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance, the transaction structure, and liquidity
support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-A interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
in which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than
the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on class
X-A references the aggregate principal balance of classes A-1, A-2,
A-3, and A-4.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.1 billion, which is 73.5% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 29 loans, down from 45
loans at issuance.  One of these loans ($19.1 million, 1.7%) is
with the special servicer, one ($10.3 million, 0.9%) is defeased,
and three ($233.1 million, 21.2%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported
financial information for 100% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, of which 95.1% was year-end 2015 data, 1.3% was partial year
2016 data, and the remaining was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.53x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 67.2% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a
7.56% S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate.  The
DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate calculations exclude the
specially serviced and defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased
loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $860.0
million (78.3%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an
S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.50x and 68.2%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased performing loans.

To date, the transaction has not experienced any principal losses.
S&P expects losses of approximately 0.3% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses S&P expects upon the
eventual resolution of the specially serviced loan.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, one loan in the
pool was with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services. Detail
of the specially serviced loan is:

The 13101-13105 Northwest Freeway loan ($19.1 million, 1.7%) is the
sole loan with the special servicer and has a total reported
exposure of $19.2 million.  The loan is secured by a 382,726-sq.ft.
office property in Houston.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Nov. 2, 2015, due to imminent default.  The
borrower indicated that the property will not be able to generate
sufficient cash flow to pay the debt service amount. Midland and
the borrower are negotiating a forbearance agreement, including a
potential short sale.  If the forbearance terms are not met, then a
foreclosure sale will be scheduled.  The reported DSC and occupancy
as of year-end 2015 were 0.43x and 40.7%, respectively.  S&P
expects a minimal loss, which is less than 25% of the loan balance,
upon the loan's eventual resolution.

In addition to the specially serviced loan, S&P's analysis
considered the recent decline in performance at the properties
securing two of the top 10 loans.  The Sangertown Square loan and
the 1400 K Street loan represent the fifth- and seventh-largest
loans in the transaction, respectively. Both loans appear on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low reported DSCs.  The
Sangertown Square loan reported a DSC of 0.83x as of year-end 2015,
while the 1400 K Street loan reported a DSC of 0.93x as of year-end
2015.

RATINGS LIST

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2011-C3
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A-2              46635TAD4             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3              46635TAK8             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-4              46635TCG5             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-A              46635TAN2             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B                46635TAU6             AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
C                46635TAX0             AA- (sf)      A+ (sf)
D                46635TBA9             A- (sf)       A- (sf)
E                46635TBD3             BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf
F                46635TBG6             BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
G                46635TBK7             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
H                46635TBN1             BB (sf)       BB+ (sf)
J                46635TBR2             BB- (sf)      BB (sf)



JP MORGAN 2013-C16: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMCC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2013-C16.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool.  The pool has had no delinquent or specially serviced loans.
Ten loans appear on the servicer watchlist (13.6% of the pool) for
decreases in the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), lease rollover
risk or tenant bankruptcy.  There is notable multi-family exposure
within the transaction; 23.8% of the pool is secured by
multi-family properties, including the largest loan in the pool.

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 10.4% to $1.02 billion from
$1.14 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased.

The largest loan in the pool (13.1%) is secured by The Aire located
on the upper west side of Manhattan.  The property is a 310-unit,
42-story luxury residential building constructed in 2010 that
features numerous amenities and high-end finishes.  Lincoln Center
and The Julliard School are located across the street from The
Aire, and Central Park, Riverside Park and The Shops at Columbus
Circle are within walking distance.  The loan is subject to a $90
million pari passu note which is part of the JPMCC 2013-C17
transaction.  The collateral is performing in line with
underwritten expectations with occupancy of 91% (as of March 2016)
and first quarter 2016 DSCR of 1.73x, compared to the 92% occupancy
and 1.16x DSCR at issuance.

The next largest loan (6.3%) is secured by the Energy Centre, a
39-story, 757,275-square foot (sf) office tower located in New
Orleans, LA.  Developed in 1984 and renovated in 2003 and 2009, the
property is located within walking distance of all of downtown New
Orleans and has convenient access to the city's federal buildings
and courthouses.  As of June 2016, occupancy increased to 92% from
88% at year-end (YE) 2015 and net operating income (NOI) DSCR
improved to 2.51x from 2.40x in the same period.  This compares
with occupancy of 89% and NOI DSCR of 1.94x at issuance. According
to Reis' second quarter report, the central submarket of New
Orleans had a vacancy rate of 11.8% with average asking rents of
$18.00 per square foot (psf).  The subject has average in-place
rents in-line with the submarket.

The third largest loan (5%) is secured by the Oracle &
International Centre, which is two adjacent office buildings
totaling 622,173 sf and located in the CBD of Minneapolis, MN.  The
20-story Oracle building and the 17-story International Center were
developed in the mid-1980's and are situated along the north/south
Skyway.  As of the first quarter 2016, occupancy was reported to be
90% and the DSCR was 2.51x, which is an increase from 1.94x at
issuance.  According to Reis' second quarter report, the Central
Business District submarket of Minneapolis had a vacancy rate of
12.9% with average asking rents of $24.34 psf. Average in-place
rents at the subject property are in-line with the submarket.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool.  Upgrades may occur with improved pool
performance and significant paydown or defeasance.  Downgrades to
the classes are possible should overall pool performance decline.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $175.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $145 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $276.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $80.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $83.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.8 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.4 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $198.8 million class EC* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $760.8 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.8 million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
a related amount of class EC certificates, and class EC
certificates may be exchanged for class A-S, class B and class C
certificates.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates or the interest only class X-C.


JP MORGAN 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Ratings on Cl. B-4 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-2
(JPMMT 2016-2) as follows:

   -- $96,570,700 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $20,101,000 class A-M exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $78,947,400 class 1-A-1A certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $45,403,600 class 1-A-1B certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $9,451,000 class 1-A-2 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $140,136,000 class 2-A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,650,000 class 2-A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $6,045,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,232,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $2,569,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1,512,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:

   -- $3,325,053 class B-5 certificates;

   -- $15,113,753 class RR exchangeable certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of very high-quality prime loans to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, low leverage and large liquid reserves. 100% of the loans
in the pool were originated by FRB, which Fitch considers to be an
above-average originator of prime jumbo product. The pool has a
weighted average (WA) FICO score of 766 and an original combined
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 60%.

High Geographic Concentration (Concern): The pool's primary
concentration risk is in California, where approximately 50% of the
collateral is located, followed by New York at 30%. Approximately
80% of the pool is located in the top five regions in the subject
pool (New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Boston).
Given the pool's significant regional concentrations, an additional
penalty of approximately 23% was applied to the pool's lifetime
default expectation.

Payment Shock Exposure (Concern): The pool consists entirely of ARM
loans, while approximately 32% also have interest-only (IO)
features. Loan products that result in periodic changes in a
borrower's payment, such as ARMs and IOs, expose borrowers to
payment reset risk. Future increases in interest rates and payment
re-amortization after the expiration of IO periods can raise
monthly payments considerably. To account for this risk, Fitch
applied a probability of default (PD) penalty of approximately 1.8x
to the pool.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the pool seasons and fewer
loans are outstanding, a subordination floor of 2.50% of the
original balance will be maintained for the certificates.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Concern): The trust is obligated to
reimburse the breach reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha), each month for any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred if the company is requested to participate in any
arbitration, legal or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings.
These expenses include Pentalpha's legal fees and other expenses
incurred outside its annual fee schedule and are not subject to a
cap or certificateholder approval.

Furthermore, certificateholders are obligated to pay Pentalpha a
termination fee of $140,000 from year two to five, $80,000 from
year five to eight and $25,000 after year eight, to terminate the
contract. While Fitch accounted for the potential additional costs
by upwardly adjusting its loss estimation for the pool, Fitch views
this construct as adding potentially more ratings volatility than
those that do not have this type of provision.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Concern): Extraordinary expenses,
which include loan file review costs, arbitration expenses for
enforcement of the reps and additional fees of Pentalpha, will be
taken out of available funds and not accounted for in the
contractual interest owed to the bondholders. This construct can
result in principal and interest shortfalls to the bonds, starting
from the bottom of the capital structure. To account for the risk
of these noncredit events reducing subordination, Fitch adjusted
its loss expectations upward by 40 bps at the 'AAAsf' level.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Concern): Fitch
believes that the value of the rep and warranty framework is
diluted by the presence of qualifying and conditional language in
conjunction with sunset provisions, which reduces lender breach
liability. While Fitch believes the high credit-quality pool and
clean diligence results mitigate these risks, the weaker framework
was considered in the analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 6%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in its
presale report released today 'J.P. Morgan Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-2', available at 'www.fitchratings.com' or by clicking on the
link.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), and Opus Capital Markets
Consultants (Opus). The third-party due diligence described in Form
15E focused on a compliance review, credit review and valuation
review. The due diligence companies performed a review on 100% of
the loans. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it
did not have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch
believes the overall results of the review generally reflected
strong underwriting controls.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under 'Related Research'
below. The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to
those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in
the Special Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and
Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,'
(May 2016).



JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C31: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C31
issued by JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C31:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class EC at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class EC certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS’s expectations
since issuance in August 2015. The collateral consists of 58 loans
secured by 155 properties. As of the July 2016 remittance, the pool
has experienced a collateral reduction of 0.8% since issuance as a
result of loan amortization with all of the original 58 loans
remaining in the pool. The transaction reported a weighted-average
(WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a WA debt yield of 1.36
times (x) and 8.4%, respectively, with 69.8% of the current pool
reporting YE2015 financials. At issuance, the pool reported a WA
DSCR and debt yield of 1.33x and 8.2%, respectively.

As of the July 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and three loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing
2.7% of the current pool balance. The largest loan on the watchlist
and a loan in the top 15 are discussed below.

The Dadeland at 9700 loan (Prospectus ID#21, 1.2% of the current
pool balance) is secured by the borrower’s fee interest in an
11-story Class B office property in Miami, Florida, located
approximately eight miles southwest of the Miami central business
district. The property was built in 1982 and renovated in 2015.
This loan was placed on the watchlist in June 2016 because the
YE2015 DSCR of -0.05x was well below the 1.10x threshold. Since
issuance, occupancy was at 68.6% as Eastern National Bank
(Eastern), currently the largest tenant occupying 31.7% of the net
rentable area, did not move into the subject until its lease start
date of April 2016. The subject now serves as the headquarters for
Eastern on a long-term lease, expiring in March 2026. As a result
of a period of low occupancy, the YE2015 effective gross income
declined by 30.7% from the DBRS underwritten (UW) figure. In
addition, the YE2015 capital expenditure (capex) figure of $326,177
was above the DBRS UW figure of $170,711, which may have been
attributed to renovations to common areas that occurred in 2015
and/or tenant improvement amounts given to Eastern. DBRS has
requested more detail regarding this increase in capex costs. At
closing, the borrower established an upfront rent and leasing
commission reserve of $727,410 for Eastern, as well as a letter of
credit of $500,000, which will be released for use only after all
renovation expenses are paid. Given the increase in occupancy at
the subject property, DBRS expects performance to improve in the
near term.

The Cumberland Apartments loan (Prospectus ID#10, 3.1% of the
current pool balance) is secured by the borrower's fee interest in
a 314-unit multifamily complex in Tyler, Texas, located
approximately 105 miles southeast of downtown Dallas. The loan is a
partial interest-only (IO) loan with 24 months of IO payments
remaining. The subject was constructed in two phases with 206 units
built in 2008 and the remaining units built in 2014. At issuance,
the property was 94.9% occupied; however, occupancy declined to
80.6% as of the March 2016 rent roll. Despite the decrease in
occupancy, the March 2016 average rental rate of $1,161 per unit
was above the in-place rent at issuance of $1,129 per unit.
According to Reis, as of August 2016, multifamily properties within
the Tyler submarket reported an average vacancy rate of 3.7% while
properties of similar vintage reported a vacancy rate of 7.1%. At
issuance, Reis reported the submarket vacancy rate at issuance of
3.1% for all multifamily properties and 3.6% for properties of
similar vintage. Reis also reported a five-year forecasted vacancy
rate of 3.6% for the submarket, which is below the DBRS UW vacancy
rate of 8.5%. Major employment industries in Tyler include
government, education, technology, energy and health care. The
property manager noted at issuance that the subject would not be
affected by oil price volatility given that its tenant employment
profile consisted of medical and educational employees; however,
the appraiser noted that the local market could feel ancillary
effects of low oil prices. According to the YE2015 financials, the
YE2015 amortizing DSCR was 1.02x and the IO DSCR was 1.37x compared
with the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.20x.

The rating assigned to Class F differs from the higher rating
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation and, in this case, the rating reflects
the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to occur as loans
season.

A full text copy of the company's press release is available free
at:

                        https://is.gd/iIhPbB



KKR CLO 15: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes and one class of loans to be issued by KKR CLO 15,
Ltd..

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$206,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa
      (sf)

   -- Up to US$50,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned
      (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1L Loans maturing 2028 (the "Class
      A-1L Loans"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2   
      (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3
      (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the
Class A-1L Loans, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D
Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Debt." The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes,
and the A-1L Loans are referred to herein, together, as the "Class
A Debt."

On the closing date, the Class A-1B Notes have a zero principal
balance. At any time, the Class A-1L Loans may be converted in
whole or in part to Class A-1B Notes thereby decreasing the
principal balance of the Class A-1L Loans and increasing, by the
corresponding amount, the principal balance of the Class A-1B
Notes. The aggregate principal balance of the Class A Debt will
never exceed $256,000,000, less the amount of any principal
repayments on the Class A Debt and plus any proportional additional
issuance of Class A Debt.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected
losses posed to debtholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

KKR 15 is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. “We expect the portfolio to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.” Moody’s said.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.1 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the debt in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3191)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1A Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1B Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1L Loans: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A-1A Notes: -1

   -- Class A-1B Notes: -1

   -- Class A-1L Loans: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2002-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. Q Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. Q, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class Q was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected plus realized loss. Class Q has
already experienced a 54% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-CL, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. The
certificates are collateralized by only one remaining loan that has
been fully defeased. Moody's base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 1.8% of the original pooled balance, the same as at
the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 25, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by almost 100% to
$95,875 from $1.21 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one remaining mortgage loan that has defeased and
is secured by US government securities. The remaining loan matures
in May 2017.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 21%).


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C7: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on SP-6 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three pooled classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C7, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven nonpooled SP raked certificates from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes D, E, and F to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the collateral's current
and future performance and reduced trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes E and F, S&P's analysis also considered
the concentration of loans secured by retail properties ($50.8
million or 65.1%) and geographic concentration in Texas ($30.6
million, 39.2%).

The affirmations on the nonpooled SP classes reflect S&P's analysis
of the Station Place I loan, which is the sole cash flow source for
these raked certificates.  S&P's analysis considered the property's
stable operating performance as well as market sale comparable
data.  Based on S&P's analysis, its expected-case value yielded a
S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 71.5% on the
whole-loan balance.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Pooled certificates:

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $78.0 million, which is 3.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes six loans, down from 135
loans at issuance.  There are no defeased loans and no loans are
with the special servicer or on the master servicer's watchlist.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported year-end 2015
financial information for 100.0% of the loans in the pool.

S&P calculated a 0.90x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 70.8% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average LTV ratio using a 7.07% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $128.9 million in
principal losses, or 5.5% of the original pool trust balance.

Non-pooled certificates:

The nonpooled SP raked certificates are solely backed by the
Station Place I loan.  The loan is secured by an 11-story,
707,483-sq.-ft. office building in Washington, D.C., that is 99.6%
leased to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission through April
2019.  As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the loan
has a whole-loan balance of $200.3 million that consists of a$137.3
million senior nontrust component and a $63.0 million subordinate
non-pooled trust component, down from a whole-loan balance of
$244.7 million at issuance.  The $63.0 million subordinate
component supports the nonpooled SP certificate classes.  A senior
pooled portion that had an original trust balance of $40.6 million
(pari passu with the senior nontrust component) was fully amortized
by October 2015, while the SP raked certificates receive no
principal amortization until they mature in September 2025.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C7
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C7
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To             From
D                52108MAM5             AAA (sf)       BB- (sf)
E                52108MAN3             AA- (sf)       B+ (sf)
F                52108MAP8             A- (sf)        B (sf)
SP-1             52108MBL6             AA (sf)        AA (sf)
SP-2             52108MBM4             A+ (sf)        A+ (sf)
SP-3             52108MBN2             A- (sf)        A- (sf)
SP-4             52108MBP7             BBB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
SP-5             52108MBQ5             BBB (sf)       BBB (sf)
SP-6             52108MBR3             BB+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)
SP-7             52108MBS1             B- (sf)        B- (sf)


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs to CCC-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

The downgrade on class D reflects credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of the 10
assets ($226.6 million, 72.8%) with the special servicer (discussed
below).  In addition, S&P expects the approved loan modification on
Triangle Town Center to generate near-term shortfalls to this
class.  S&P lowered its ratings on classes E and F to 'D (sf)'
because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.

According to the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $173,878 and resulted
from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $116,614; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $57,264.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class E.

The affirmations on the certificates reflect S&P's expectation that
the available credit enhancement for these classes will be within
our estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current ratings.  The affirmations also reflect S&P's views
regarding the collateral's current and future performance, the
transaction structure, and liquidity support available to the
classes.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movement on classes A-J, B, C, and D, S&P's analysis also
considered the susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
ten specially serviced assets ($226.6 million, 72.8%).

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $311.4 million, which is 12.5% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 10 loans and two real
estate owned (REO) assets (reflecting crossed loans), down from 145
loans at issuance.  Ten of these assets ($226.6 million, 72.8%) are
with the special servicer, none are defeased, and one ($2.5
million, 0.8%) is on the master servicer's watchlist.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information for
100.0% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 62.9% was
year-end 2015 data and the remainder was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 2.80x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 52.1% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.72% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude nine of the 10 specially
serviced assets.  The top 10 nondefeased assets have an aggregate
outstanding pool trust balance of $309.7 million (99.4%).

To date, the transaction has experienced $149.0 million in
principal losses to the pooled certificates, or 6.1% of the
original pool trust balance.  S&P expects losses to reach
approximately 8.0% of the original pool trust balance in the near
term, based on losses incurred to date and additional losses we
expect upon the eventual resolution of nine of the 10 ($118.1
million, 37.9%) specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, 10 assets
($226.6 million,72.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. (LNR).  Details of the three largest specially
serviced assets, all of which are top 10 nondefeased loans, are:

   -- The Triangle Town Center loan ($108.5 million, 34.8%) is the

      largest nondefeased loan in the pool and has a total
      reported exposure of $108.5 million.  The loan is secured by

      a retail property totaling 1.44 million sq. ft. (of which
      601,000 sq. ft. serves as collateral) in Raleigh, N.C.  The
      loan was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 11,
      2015, due to imminent default.  The loan failed to pay off
      by the original maturity date of Dec. 5, 2015.  LNR
      confirmed that a loan modification was completed Feb. 8,
      2016, and includes a maturity extension, interest rate
      reduction, and conversion to interest-only.  The reported
      DSC and occupancy as of March 31, 2016, were 1.14x and
      92.3%, respectively.  S&P has considered the terms of the
      loan modification, specifically regarding the interest rate
      reduction, in S&P's analysis.

   -- The DHL Center loan ($55.9 million, 17.9%) has a total
      reported exposure of $56.4 million.  The loan is secured by
      a 490,000-sq.-ft. industrial building in Breinigsville, Pa.
      The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 29,

      2015, due to imminent default.  The loan failed to payoff by

      its Jan. 11, 2016, maturity date.  LNR indicated that it has

      filed for foreclosure and expects the foreclosure sale to
      take place early next year.  The reported DSC and occupancy
      as of year-end 2015 were 1.36x and 100.0%, respectively.  An

      ARA of $17.6 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P
      expects a moderate loss upon this loan's eventual
      resolution.

   -- The River Valley Mall loan ($44.4 million, 14.3%) has a
      total reported exposure of $46.2 million.  The loan is
      secured by a retail property totaling 577,570 sq. ft. in
      Lancaster, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on Oct. 21, 2015, because the borrower stated that
      it would not be able to pay off the loan at its Jan. 11,
      2016, maturity date.

   -- LNR indicated that it is dual tracking foreclosure and work-
      out discussions.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-
      end 2015 were 1.32x and 91.0%, respectively.  An ARA of
      $18.6 million is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a

      moderate loss upon this loan’s eventual resolution.

The seven remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 3.0% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for nine of the 10 specially
serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of
40.3%.

For the specially serviced assets noted above, a minimal loss is
less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a significant loss
is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C1
                                  Rating
Class            Identifier       To                   From
A-J              52108MDK6        BB (sf)              BB (sf)
B                52108MDL4        BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)
C                52108MDM2        B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
D                52108MDN0        CCC- (sf)            B (sf)
E                52108MDP5        D (sf)               B- (sf)
F                52108MDQ3        D (sf)               CCC+ (sf)


LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO 2002-1 Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2002-1.:

   -- Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D-FX, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Cl. E-FXD, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating on the transaction due to at least
a 20% increase in defeasance coverage on the underlying CMBS
collateral. This combined with the prior defeasance collateral
provides a high coverage ratio for the Class D notes. The
transaction is highly bar-belled and concentrated, however, there
is sufficient coverage to the Class D notes should the high credit
risk collateral realize losses prior to the defeased collateral
repayments. Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction
because its key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing
ratings. The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO & Re-REMIC) transactions.

LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd. is a cash transaction solely back by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) issued
from 1998 through 2002. As of the July 21, 2016 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction has decreased to $523.2
million from $800.6 million at issuance.

The pool contains eight assets totaling $51.9 million (72.8% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted or impaired
securities as of the trustee's July 21, 2016 report. While there
have been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to
date, Moody's does expect high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
6044, compared to 6407 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 26.8% compared to 12.4% at
last review, A1-A3 and 0% compared to 16.0% at last review, B1-B3
and 0.0% compared to 1.4% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 73.2%
compared to 70.2% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, the same as that at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about look-through loan
extensions on the underlying CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.9%, as compared to 5.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 19%, compared to 0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments Increasing the recovery rates on 100% of the
collateral pool by 10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to five notches upward (e.g.,
one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).
Decreasing the recovery rates on 100% of the collateral pool by 10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


MAPS CLO FUND II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by MAPS CLO Fund II, Ltd.:

  $26,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 5,
   2015, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $186,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2022 (current outstanding balance of $61,787,523), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $50,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
   Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of $7,234,068),
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class A-1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2022 (current outstanding balance of $4,117,034), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $18,750,000 Class A-1J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  $16,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Upgraded
    to Ba1 (sf)

MAPS CLO Fund II, Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans, with exposure to CLO tranches.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in July 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015.

The Class A-1, A-1R and A1-S notes have been paid down by
approximately 59.7% or $108.2 million since then.  Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A, B, C and D Notes are
174.69%, 141.51%, 121.91%, and 110.76%, respectively, versus
October 2015 levels of 139.70%, 124.90%, 114.50%, and 108.00%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since October 2015.  Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2753 compared to 2532 in October
2015.  Additionally, the percentage of CLO collateral with lowest
credit quality, or Caa1 and below rated collateral (Caa
collateral), has increased since October 2015.  Based on Moody's
calculations, which include adjustments for ratings with a negative
outlook and ratings on review for downgrade, Caa collateral has
increased to 13.92% from 6.81% in October 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Exposure to assets with weak liquidity: The presence of
     assets with the worst Moody's speculative grade liquidity
     (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional risks

     if these assets default.  The historical default rate is
     higher than average for these assets.  Due to the deal's
     exposure to such assets, which constitute around $4.7 million

     of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case defaulting those
     assets.

  7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2202)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class A-1S: 0
Class A-1J: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3304)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class A-1S: 0
Class A-1J: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $193.2 million, defaulted par
of $2.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.60%
(implying a WARF of 2753), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.0%, a diversity score of 44 and a weighted average
spread of 2.99% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Mariner CLO 2016-3
Ltd./Mariner CLO 2016-3 LLC's $460.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

   -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of

      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Mariner CLO 2016-3 Ltd./Mariner CLO 2016-3 LLC Notes

Class                     Rating                   Amount
                                                  (mil. $)(i)
A                         AAA (sf)                 330.00
B                         AA (sf)                  55.00
C                         A (sf)                   30.00
D                         BBB (sf)                 25.00
E                         BB (sf)                  20.00
Subordinated notes        NR                       43.40

NR--Not rated.


MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed seven classes of notes issued by Mercury
CDO 2004-1, Ltd. as follows:

   -- $34,676,304 Class A-1NV notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $11,560 Class A-1VA notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $38,156,652 Class A-1VB notes at 'CCCsf';

   -- $25,000,000 Class A-2A notes at 'Csf';

   -- $31,050,000 Class A-2B notes at 'Csf';

   -- $38,880,000 Class B notes at 'Csf';

   -- $17,227,486 Class C notes at 'Csf'.

Fitch does not rate the preference shares.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The A-1NV, A-1VA, and A-1VB classes have been affirmed at 'CCCsf'.
The classes' current credit enhancement (CE) levels exceed the
losses projected at the 'CCCsf' rating stress under Fitch's
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) analysis, but
fall below the losses projected at the 'Bsf' rating stress.

The A-2A, A-2B, B, and C classes have been affirmed at 'Csf'. These
classes have credit enhancement (CE) levels that are exceeded by
the expected losses from the distressed collateral (rated 'CCsf'
and lower) of each portfolio. For these classes, the probability of
default was evaluated without factoring potential losses from the
performing assets. In the absence of mitigating factors, default
for these notes at or prior to maturity continues to appear
inevitable.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative migration, defaults beyond those projected, an extension
of the weighted average life for the underlying assets, and lower
than expected recoveries could lead to downgrades for classes
analysed under the SF PCM. Classes already rated 'Csf' have limited
sensitivity to further negative migration given their highly
distressed rating levels. However, there is potential for
non-deferrable classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they
experience any interest payment shortfalls. Continuing amortization
accompanied by better than expected cash flows from distressed
assets could lead to an upgrade.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The transaction
was not analysed through the cash flow model framework, as the
effect of structural features and excess spread available to
amortize the notes were determined to be minimal.

Mercury 2004-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed Nov. 3, 2004 and is managed by Dock Street Capital
Management, LLC. Mercury exited its substitution period in March
2007 and currently has a static portfolio composed of 84%
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and 16% CDOs.


MILL CITY 2016-1: DBRS Assigns B Ratings on Class B2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2016-1 (the Notes) issued by Mill City Mortgage
Loan Trust (the Trust):

-- $322.2 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.5 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $21.9 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $25.0 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $19.7 million Class B2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 36.15% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 29.70%,
24.20%, 19.85%, 14.90% and 11.00% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
seasoned, performing and re-performing residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 1,986 loans with a total principal balance of
approximately $504,545,264 as of the Cut-Off Date (July 31, 2016).


The loans are approximately 113 months seasoned and all are current
as of the Cut-Off Date, including 36 bankruptcy-performing loans.
Approximately 79.2% and 94.5% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent for the past 24 months under the Mortgage
Banker Associations and the Office of Thrift Supervision
delinquency methods, respectively.

The portfolio contains 70.1% modified loans. Within the pool, 520
loans have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates to
3.87% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 93.8% of the
modified loans. In accordance with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.3% of the loans
are designated as QM Safe Harbor, less than 0.1% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and 0.1% as non-QM. Approximately 99.5% of the loans
are not subject to the QM rules.

Mill City Holdings, LLC (Mill City) will acquire the loans from
four transferring trusts on the Closing Date. The transferring
trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and 2016 and are
entities of which the Representation Provider or an affiliate
thereof holds an indirect interest. Upon acquiring the loans from
the transferring trusts, Mill City, through a wholly owned
subsidiary, Mill City Depositor, LLC, will contribute loans to the
Trust. As the Sponsor, Mill City will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
(other than any residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market. As of the Cut-Off Date, the
loans are serviced by Resurgent doing business as Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (71.3%) and Fay Servicing, LLC (28.7%).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strength in that the underlying
assets have generally performed well through the crisis.
Additionally, a satisfactory third-party due diligence review was
performed on the portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance,
payment history, data capture as well as title and lien review.
Updated broker price opinions or exterior appraisals were provided
for 100.0% of the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed
on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
provider (CVI CVF III Lux Master S.à.r.l.), certain knowledge
qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS
criteria for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1)
significant loan seasoning and relative clean performance history
in recent years, (2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a
delinquency review trigger and a breach reserve account.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the related presale report. Please see the
related appendix for additional information regarding sensitivity
of assumptions used in the rating process.


MILL CITY 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Class B1 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1
as follows:

   -- $322,152,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,543,000 class M1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $27,750,000 class M2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $21,948,000 class M3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $24,975,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $19,677,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $34,057,000 class B3 notes;

   -- $21,443,264.44 class B4 notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as 'clean current' (79.2%), and
loans that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings, identified as 'dirty current' (20.8%). All loans were
current as of the cutoff date. 70.1% of the loans have received
modifications.

Due Diligence Findings (Concern): The third-party review (TPR)
firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 282 loans
(14%) graded 'C' and 'D', of which 122 were subject to a loss
severity adjustment for issues regarding high cost testing. In
addition, timelines were extended on 71 loans that were missing
final modification documents. Fitch also assumed a 100% loss on 12
loans that did not receive a compliance review to account for the
potential risk for high cost issues. The TPR firm did not review
the servicing comments for the 62 loans that experienced a
delinquency in the past 12 months. However, Fitch received and
reviewed the servicing comments for these loans and the comments
did not indicate any impending foreclosure.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severity
(LS) are less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf'
rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Mixed): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high investment
grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience long
periods of interest deferral that will generally not be repaid
until such note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions,' dated June 2016, the agency may
assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes that incur deferrals if such
deferrals are permitted under terms of the transaction documents,
provided such amounts are fully recovered well in advance of the
legal final maturity under the relevant rating stress.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): CVI CVF III Lux Master
S.a.r.l., as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in September 2017.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in September 2017. The rep provider for this
transaction is different from the prior two MCMLT transactions and
is an indirect owner of the sponsor, Mill City Holdings, LLC.

Tier 2 Representation Framework (Concern): Fitch generally
considers the representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism construct for this transaction to be generally consistent
with a Tier 2 framework due to the inclusion of knowledge
qualifiers and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result
of third-party due diligence findings. Thus, Fitch increased its
'AAAsf' loss expectations by approximately 235 basis points (bps)
to account for a potential increase in defaults and losses arising
from weaknesses in the reps.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): An
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the
relevant local jurisdiction, was also performed. The review
confirmed that all mortgages and subsequent assignments were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction or were in the process
of being recorded.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, the obligation of CVI CVF III Lux
Master S.a.r.l. to repurchase loans, for which assignments are not
recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment date in
September 2017, aligns the issuer's interests regarding completing
the recordation process with those of noteholders. While there will
not be an asset manager in this transaction, the indenture trustee
will be reviewing the custodian reports. The indenture trustee will
request CVI CVF III Lux Master S.a.r.l. to purchase any loans with
outstanding assignment and endorsement issues two days prior to the
September 2017 payment date.

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Fitch's analysis of loans that have
had clean pay histories for 24 months or more found that, for these
loans, its loan loss model projected a probability of default (PD)
that was more punitive than that indicated by actual delinquency
roll rate projections. To account for this difference, Fitch
reduced the pool's lifetime default expectations by approximately
20%.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $19.5 million (3.87% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 520 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Bulk Sale Rights: On the first payment date in which the aggregate
pool balance is less than 20% of the initial balance, the
controlling holder will have the option to have the issuer sell the
remaining loans in total as long as the proceeds are not less than
the minimum price. The minimum price is set as the greater of the
fair value price of all remaining loans (including any fees) and
the outstanding class principal balance.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Mill City
Holdings, LLC, will acquire and retain a 5% interest in each class
of the securities to be issued. In addition, the rep provider is an
indirect owner of the sponsor.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation. The TPR firm
did not conduct a BPO reconciliation on a sample of the loans as
described in the 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned and Re-performing Loan
criteria'. There is no rating impact as the review is a cursory
check to determine if the BPOs were conducted on the correct
property. This review is conducted by an appraisal company, which
Fitch reviewed, providing the BPOS as part of their quality control
process.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.6% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E ('Form 15E') as
prepared by JCIII & Associates (JCIII), AMC Diligence LLC (AMC) and
Meridian Asset Services (Meridian). The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history, the presence of key documents in the loan file and data
integrity. In addition, Meridian was retained to perform an updated
title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that the
mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdictions.

A pay history and data integrity review was competed on 100% of the
pool. A regulatory compliance review was conducted on 99% of the
pool. A servicing comment review was not performed.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and as a result,
Fitch made the following adjustment(s) to its analysis:

Fitch made an adjustment on 122 loans that were subject to federal,
state and/or local predatory testing. These loans contained
material violations including an inability to test for high cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability. These loans were marked as
'indeterminate.' Typically, the HUD issues are related to missing
the Final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing
pages, or only having estimated HUDs where the final HUD1 was not
used to test for high cost loans. To mitigate this risk, Fitch
assumed a 100% LS for loans in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's 'do not purchase' list of high cost or 'high risk.' 21 loans
were impacted by this approach.

For the remaining 101 loans, where the properties are not located
in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's "do not purchase" list,
the likelihood of all loans being high cost is lower. However,
Fitch assumes the trust could potentially incur additional legal
expenses. Fitch increased its LS expectations by 5% for these loans
to account for the risk.

There were 71 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.

The statute of limitations had not expired for one loan for TILA.
As a result, Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by 5%
for this loan to account for the risk of the possibility of
challenges to foreclosure and associated legal costs.

Twelve loans did not receive a compliance review due to incomplete
loan files. Fitch assumed a 100% loss on these loans due to the
potential risk for high cost issues and assignee liability.


MILL CITY 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class B1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes issued by Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1.

The certificates are backed by one pool of seasoned, performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans.  The collateral pool is
comprised of 1,986 first lien, fixed-rate and adjustable rate
mortgage loans, and has a non-zero updated weighted average FICO
score of 699 and a weighted average current LTV of 82.4%.
Approximately 70.1% of the loans in the collateral pool have been
previously modified.  Fay Servicing LLC and Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing, are the servicers for the loans in the pool.  The
servicers will not advance any principal or interest on the
delinquent loans.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1

  Cl. A1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. M1, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale
Moody's expected losses on MCMLT 2016-1's collateral pool average
11.00% in Moody's base case scenario.  Moody's loss estimates take
into account the historical performance of Prime, Alt-A and
Subprime loans that have similar collateral characteristics as the
loans in the pool, and also incorporate an expectation of a
continued strong credit environment for RMBS, supported by
improving home prices over the next two to three years.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitizations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016, and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013.

Collateral Description
MCMLT 2016-1's collateral pool is primarily comprised of seasoned,
re-performing mortgage loans.  Approximately 70.1% of the loans in
the collateral pool have been previously modified.  The majority of
the loans underlying this transaction exhibit collateral
characteristics similar to that of seasoned Alt-A mortgages.

Moody's based its expected losses on a pool of re-performing
mortgage loans on its estimates of 1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and 2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances.  The two factors that most strongly
influence a re-performing mortgage loan's likelihood of re-default
are the length of time that the loan has performed since a loan
modification, and the amount of the reduction in the monthly
mortgage payment as a result of the modification.  The longer a
borrower has been current on a re-performing loan, the less likely
the borrower is to re-default.  Approximately 79.2% of the
borrowers have been current on their payments for at least the past
24 months.

Moody's estimated expected losses for the pool using two approaches
-- (1) pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level
analysis.  In both approaches, Moody's calculates the pool's total
expected loss by adding the loans' non-deferred expected losses to
50% of the deferred principal amounts.

In the pool-level approach, Moody's estimates losses on the pool by
using a approach similar to our surveillance approach wherein
Moody's applies assumptions on expected future delinquencies,
default rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed from our
surveillance of similar collateral.  Moody's projects future annual
delinquencies for eight years by applying an initial annual default
rate and delinquency burnout factors.  Moody's analysis indicates
that post-2005 mortgage loans that have re-performed for 24 months
since modification have approximately 13%-19% re-default rate
across all asset types within the next year.  The post 2005 loans
that have not been modified show annualized default rate of 2%-14%
across all asset types.  Based on the loan characteristics of the
pool and the demonstrated pay histories, Moody's expects an annual
delinquency rate of 8.90% on the collateral pool for year one.
Moody's then calculated future delinquencies on the pool using our
default burnout and voluntary conditional prepayment rate (CPR)
assumptions.  The delinquency burnout factors reflect our future
expectations of the economy and the U.S. housing market.  Moody's
then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to losses by
applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity
assumptions.  Moody's loss severity assumptions are based off
observed severities on liquidated seasoned loans and reflect the
lack of principal and interest advancing on the loans.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on MCMLT 2016-1's
collateral pool.  Moody's applied loan-level baseline lifetime
propensity to default assumptions based on the historical
performance of seasoned Prime, Alt-A and Subprime loans with
similar collateral characteristics and payment histories.  Moody's
then adjusted this base default propensity up for (1)
adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans that have the risk of coupon
step-ups and (3) loans with high updated loan to value ratios
(LTVs).  Moody's applied a higher baseline lifetime default
propensity for interest-only loans, using the same adjustments.  To
calculate the final expected loss for the pool, Moody's applied a
loan-level loss severity assumption based on the loans' updated
estimated LTVs.  Moody's further adjusted the loss severity
assumption upwards for loans in states that give super-priority
status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to account for
potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage.

The final expected loss for the collateral pool reflects the due
diligence scope and findings of two independent third party review
(TPR) firms as well as our assessment of MCMLT 2016-1's
representations & warranties (R&Ws) framework.

Transaction Structure

MCMLT 2016-1 has a sequential priority of payments structure, in
which a given class of notes can only receive principal payments
when all the classes of notes above it have been paid off.  To the
extent that the overcollateralization amount is zero, realized
losses will be allocated to the notes in a reverse sequential order
starting with the lowest subordinate bond.  The Class A1, M1, M2,
and M3 notes carry a fixed-rate coupon subject to the collateral
adjusted net weighted average coupon (WAC) and applicable available
funds cap.  The Class B1, B2, B3 and B4 are Variable Rate Notes
where the coupon is equal to the lesser of adjusted net WAC and
applicable available funds cap.  There are no performance triggers
in this transaction.

In previously issued MCMLT transactions, the monthly excess cash
flow can leak out after paying any net WAC shortfalls and
previously unpaid expenses.  However, the monthly excess cash flow
in this transaction, after payment of such expenses, if any, will
be fully captured to pay the principal balance of the bonds
sequentially, allowing for a faster paydown of the bonds.

Moody's modeled MCMLT 2016-1's cashflows using SFW, a cashflow tool
developed by Moody's Analytics.  To assess the final rating on the
notes, Moody's ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios
through SFW.  The scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss
timing curves, and four prepayment curves.  The structure allows
for timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal
with respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review
Two independent third party review (TPR) firms conducted due
diligence on approximately 100% of the loans in MCMLT 2016-1's
collateral pool.  The two TPR firms -- JCIII & Associates, Inc.
(subsequently acquired by American Mortgage Consultants), and
American Mortgage Consultants -- reviewed compliance, data
integrity and key documents, to verify that loans were originated
in accordance with federal, state and local anti-predatory laws.
The TPR firms also conducted audits of designated data fields to
ensure the accuracy of the collateral tape.  Meridian Asset
Services Inc., reviewed the title and tax reports for all the loans
in the pool.

Based on its analysis of the third-party review reports, Moody's
determined that a portion of the loans had legal or compliance
exceptions that could cause future losses to the trust.  Moody's
incorporated an additional hit to the loss severities for these
loans to account for this risk.  The title review includes
confirming the recordation status of the mortgage and the
intervening chain of assignments, the status of real estate taxes
and validating the lien position of the underlying mortgage loan.
Once securitized, delinquent taxes will be advanced on behalf of
the borrower and added to the borrower's account.  The servicer
will be reimbursed for delinquent taxes from the top of the
waterfall, as a servicing advance.  The representation provider has
deposited collateral of $1.0 million in Assignment Reserve Account
to ensure one or more third parties monitored by the Depositor
completes all assignment and endorsement chains and record an
intervening assignment of mortgage as necessary.

Representations & Warranties

Moody's ratings also factor in MCMLT 2016-1's weak representations
and warranties (R&Ws) framework because they contain many knowledge
qualifiers and the regulatory compliance R&W does not cover
monetary damages that arise from TILA violations whose right of
rescission has expired.  While the transaction provides for a
Breach Reserve Account to cover for any breaches of R&Ws, the size
of the account is small relative to MCMLT 2016-1's aggregate
collateral pool ($504.5 million).  An initial deposit of $1.1
million will be remitted to the Breach Reserve Account on the
closing date, with an initial Breach Reserve Account target amount
of $1.8 million.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from an adequate servicing arrangement.
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service 71.3% of the pool and
Fay Servicing LLC will service 28.7% of the pool.  Moody's assess
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing ("Shellpoint") (SQ3+), higher
compared to their peers.  Deutsche Bank National Trust Company is
the Custodian of the transaction.  The Delaware Trustee for MCMLT
2016-1 is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, d/b/a, Christiana
Trust.  MCMLT 2016-1's Indenture Trustee is U.S. Bank National
Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting
or deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. B Certs to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed 12 classes of
ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust (MLCFC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-3.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the increase in credit enhancement due to
significant loan paydown since Fitch's last rating action.  Since
September 2015 the pool has paid down $1.47 billion (61% of the
original pool balance), of which 20 loans totaling $406.5 million
paid in full with the August 2016 remittance date.  The
affirmations on the distressed classes reflect the concentrated
nature and adverse selection of the remaining pool, with only 37 of
the original 213 loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 31% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 9.3%, including $144 million
(5.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. The
remaining pool contains a significant number of underperforming
assets in secondary markets, with performance volatility concerns.
Fitch has designated 24 loans (64% of the current pool balance) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 14 specially serviced assets
(34%).  The pool also faces near-term maturity risks, with the most
of remaining non-specially serviced loans scheduled to mature by
year end 2016 (16 loans 47.5%) and 2017 (two loans 12.2%).

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 89% to $258.8 million from
$2.43 billion at issuance.  There are currently no defeased loans.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes E through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 295,000
square foot (sf) retail center located in Woonsocket, RI (8.5%)
anchored by Sears (20.5% of the net rentable area).  The loan,
which is currently the third largest in the pool, transferred to
special servicing in June 2013 due to monetary default.  The
property had experienced cash flow issues due to the expiration of
an anchor tenant's lease in 2013 (Shaw's Supermarket, previously
18% of the net rentable area).  The special servicer had pursued
foreclosure, and the property became REO as of April 2014.
Occupancy was reported at 64% as of June 2016.  The servicer is
working to stabilize leasing at the property, but has reported
significant leasing challenges due to deteriorating market
conditions including large box vacancies expected at neighbouring
properties.  In addition, the subject properties' second largest
tenant, Savers (10% NRA), has indicated they would be vacating the
property prior to their November 2018 lease expiration.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is secured
by a portfolio of three retail centers totalling 98,902 sf, and all
shadow anchored by Walmart.  The properties are located in three
cities throughout PA (Shippensburg, Edinboro, and Bradford). The
portfolio has experienced cash flow issues due to occupancy
declines, in addition to amortization payments which began in
August 2009.  The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2010, and was eventually foreclosed on in August 2014.  The
servicer included the properties in a November 2015 auction.  None
of the offers received were accepted by the lender.  The servicer
continues to work on stabilizing leasing at the properties and
marketing them for sale.  Occupancy for the portfolio was reported
at 69% as of August 2016.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes AJ and B are considered Stable due
to sufficient credit enhancement.  Although credit enhancement on
these classes is high, Fitch remains concerned with the increasing
concentrations, the near term loan maturities, as well as
performance volatility and adverse selection of the remaining
collateral in the pool.  The classes are subject to downward rating
migration should realized losses exceed Fitch's expectation, or
should loans not refinance at maturity as expected.  Distressed
classes (those rated below 'B') may be subject to further
downgrades as additional losses are realized.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these ratings:

   -- $108.8 million class AJ to to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $48.5 million class B to to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Stable
      Outlook assigned.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $18.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $48.5 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 10%;
   -- $21.2 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $13.6 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 A-3, A-SB, A-4, A-1A, and AM certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q certificate or the
interest only class XR certificate.  Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class XP and XC certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2002-IQ3: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. G Certs to BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Capital I Trust 2002-IQ3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes F and G to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the available
liquidity support, and the significant reduction in trust balance.

Class G was previously lowered to 'D (sf)' because of accumulated
interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain outstanding for a
prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its rating on this class
because the interest shortfalls, which were primarily due to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts on two loans
that have since liquidated from the trust, have been repaid in
full, and S&P do not believe, at this time, a further default of
this class is virtually certain.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class G, S&P's analysis also considered the
absolute level of liquidity support for this class, as well as its
exposure to any future defaults, as this bond is expected to remain
outstanding until 2021.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $17.0 million, which is 1.9% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 29 loans (reflecting
cross-collateralized loans), down from 248 loans at issuance.  No
loans are with the special servicer, one loan ($0.3 million, 1.6%)
is defeased, and 11 loans ($5.5 million, 32.3%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC, reported financial information for 96.0% of the
non-defeased loans in the pool, of which 94.3% was year-end 2015
data, and the remainder was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.41x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 22.1% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.84% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the one defeased loan. The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $10.3 million (60.6%).  Using servicer-reported numbers,
S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV
of 1.44x and 22.3%, respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased
loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $43.6 million in principal
losses, or 4.8% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2002-IQ3
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To           From
F                 61746WXB1              AAA (sf)     B+ (sf)
G                 61746WXC9              BB (sf)      D (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. C Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 and downgraded three classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSC 2006-HQ9) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-HQ9.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect high loss expectations for the remaining
loans in the pool.  Affirmations reflect sufficient credit
enhancement relative to high expected losses in the pool.  The pool
has 22 assets remaining, 13 of which are in special servicing
(65.6%).  Ten assets in special servicing are real estate owned or
in foreclosure (28.7%).  The transaction has incurred $154.9
million (6.0% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.

As of the August 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.3% to $172.9 million from
$2.6 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased.

The largest loan in the pool (34.7%) is a 257,844 square foot (sf)
power center located in West Bloomfield, MI, outside of Detroit.
The property is anchored by a Kohl's, Whole Foods and Dunham's
Sports.  The center is experiencing anchor tenant turnover with the
closing of Staples in early 2016 and DSW being replaced by Stein
Mart with an anticipated opening in October 2016.  March 2016
occupancy of 100% is expected to decline to 92.5%.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2016 due to litigation
filed by the borrower.  The servicer is finalizing terms of a
forbearance agreement which would settle the recently filed
litigation and allow the borrower to complete a refinance of the
property.  The loan is current as of the August 2016 remittance.

The second largest loan in special servicing (7.5%) is a 236,105 sf
office property in Pittsburgh, PA.  The collateral is a commercial
condominium which includes a portion of the lobby and floors three
through nine of the building.  The remaining floors in the 21-story
structure are owned by a third-party and operated as the Pittsburgh
Marriot City Center Hotel.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in March 2014 due to the largest tenant vacating its
space.  As of May 2016, occupancy for the property was 15.3%.
According to Reis' second-quarter report, the central business
district (CBD) submarket of Pittsburgh had a vacancy rate of 15%
with average asking rents of $23.66 psf.  The subject underperforms
the submarket with respect to average in-place rents.

The third largest loan in special servicing (7.3%) is a 114,449 sf
retail property in Fairhaven, MA.  The property was formerly
anchored by grocery anchor, Shaw's Supermarket, which vacated 57%
of the net rentable area (NRA) at lease expiration in February
2016.  Current occupancy of the property is 20%.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2016 and is in
foreclosure.  According to Reis' second-quarter report, the South
Bristol County submarket of Boston had a vacancy rate of 9.2% with
average asking rents of $18.77 psf.  The subject underperforms the
submarket with respect to average in-place rents.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlook for the A-J class remains Stable based on continued
amortization and paydown from liquidated loans.  Negative Outlooks
on classes B, C and D reflect the potential for downgrade should
losses from loans in special servicing increase or pool performance
decline materially.  Upgrades are possible with additional paydown
and better than expected resolutions on loans in special servicing.
Downgrades to the distressed classes will occur as losses are
realized.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks as indicated:

   -- $35.3 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;
   -- $28.9 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable.

Fitch downgrades these classes:

   -- $22.4 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
   -- $25.7 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $24.6 million class G to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $16.8 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class B at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-4FL, A-M, X-RC, ST-A,
ST-B, ST-C, ST-D, and ST-E have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class S, ST-F and DP certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class X and X-MP certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: DBRS Confirms C(sf) Ratings on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ16
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Series 2007-IQ16 (the
Trust):

-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AA (sf)
-- Class A-MFL at AA (sf)
-- Class A-MA at AA (sf)
-- Class A-J at CCC (sf)
-- Class A-JFL at CCC (sf)
-- Class A-JA at CCC (sf)
-- Class B at C (sf)
-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)

Classes A-4, A-1A, X-1, A-M, A-MFL and A-MA have Stable trends.
Trends are not assigned for classes rated CCC (sf) and below. The
ratings on Classes E, F and G have been discontinued/withdrawn, as
they were downgraded to D (sf) over 30 business days ago.

The rating confirmations reflect the pool's overall performance.
Since issuance the pool has experienced 34.0% of collateral
reduction as a result of scheduled amortization, successful loan
repayment, principal recovered from liquidated loans and realized
losses from liquidated loans. There are 173 loans remaining in the
pool out of the original 234 loans. The transaction benefits from
defeasance collateral as 12 loans (including one in the top 15),
representing 5.0% of the current loan balance, are fully defeased.
Excluding the defeased loan, the top 15 loans, which represent
54.1% of the current pool balance, reported a YE2015
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.49
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.9%. The majority of the
transaction -- 171 loans representing 99.5% of the current pool
balance -- is expected to mature by the end of 2017.

Since issuance, 41 loans have been liquidated from the Trust,
resulting in realized losses of $209.4 million. As of the July 2016
remittance, there are six loans in special servicing and 46 loans
on the servicer’s watchlist, representing 2.4% and 27.0% of the
current pool balance, respectively. Five of the loans in special
servicing transferred at least one year ago. In its review of the
transaction, DBRS projected that each loan in special servicing
would be resolved with a realized loss to the Trust. One loan on
the servicer’s watchlist and the largest loan in special
servicing are highlighted below.

The Art Institute Student Housing loan (Prospectus ID#20,
representing 1.4% of the current pool balance) is secured by a
147-unit student housing property located in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The subject was converted from industrial to
multifamily for student housing purposes in 2003. The loan was
placed on the watchlist because of its upcoming lease expiration at
the property in June 2017 as the subject is currently 100% leased
to The Art Institute of Pittsburgh. A cash flow sweep was initiated
in June 2016 as the tenant did not provide its intent to renew the
lease one year prior to the expiration date. All excess cash flow
is being deposited into a restricted account; however, DBRS was not
able to confirm the current balance of the account. According to
the site inspection report dated June 2015, the property was in
Average condition; however, it was noted that three floors were
vacant for the fall 2015 semester, as the enrollment rates at the
school have declined. Pictures of the subject showed individual
rooms and common areas to be small, dimly lit and dated.
Furthermore, in May 2015, it was announced that 15 Art Institute
locations were being closed; however, the Pittsburgh location was
not included in the initial list. As of May 2016, there were 33
locations remaining out of the 50 locations reported in 2013.
Although The Art Institute of Pittsburgh is not on the list of
closures, the overall decline in occupancy for the school and the
noted vacancy at the property elevate the risk that the school will
not be renewing its lease for the subject student housing
property.

According to YE2015 financials, the loan reported a DSCR of 1.34x,
which is stable from the YE2014 DSCR of 1.31x. Loan performance is
expected to continue to be stable until the potential non-renewal
date of the lease. According to Reis, the current submarket of
Bellefield reported a vacancy rate of 4.6% for multifamily
properties with average asking rental rates of $1,119 per unit.
Real Capital Analytics reported that five multifamily properties
were sold since January 2015 within a 25-mile radius of the subject
at an average of $107,085 per unit. The current whole-loan per unit
for the loan is elevated at $162,608 per unit. It would likely take
significant capital and time to transform the subject into a
traditional multifamily property. Given the risk of a single tenant
with a lease expiration prior to loan maturity, the loan was
modelled with an elevated probability of default and loss severity
to capture the risk associated with a potential maturity default.

The largest specially serviced loan, Danbrook Realty Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#44, representing 0.6% of the current pool balance),
is secured by two unanchored retail properties totalling 187,122
square feet (sf). Mallory Brook Plaza is located in Barkhamsted,
Connecticut, with 117,038 sf and Lincoln Plaza is located in
Meriden, Connecticut, with 70,084 sf. This loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2012 for imminent default. An
environmental issue was found at the Mallory Brook Plaza property:
the treatment of waste water from the tenants was inadequate. A
receiver has been appointed for the property since January 2016.
Foreclosure was filed in April 2015, and the loan was placed for
sale in September 2015 and October 2015 on an auction website;
however, it did not trade. According to the most recent financials,
the Q1 2016 DSCR for the loan was 1.30x, in line with the YE2014
DSCR of 1.31x. Based on the March 2016 rent rolls, the Mallory
Brook Plaza property was 69.6% occupied and the Lincoln Plaza
property was 73.1% occupied. The most recent appraisal from October
2015 valued the properties at a combined total of $5.9 million,
which is an increase from the September 2014 combined value of $5.5
million but well below the issuance appraised combined value of
$16.2 million. Given the outstanding loan balance of $11.2 million,
the outstanding advances of $3.4 million and the uncertainty
surrounding the environmental issue at the Mallory Brook property,
DBRS expects this loan to be resolved with a significant loss to
the Trust.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated four loans, representing 0.1% of the
current pool balance, as investment grade. These loans include
Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Canal Studio Corp., 283 6th Ave. Corporation
and Seventh Housing Corp. DBRS has today confirmed that the
performance of these loans remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C17: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed all classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C17 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class PST certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stability of the
transaction, as performance has remained in line with expectations
since issuance in August 2014. Since issuance, the transaction has
experienced a collateral reduction of 1.2% as a result of scheduled
loan amortization. At issuance, the pool consisted of 67 loans
secured by 72 commercial properties. As of the July 2016
remittance, all loans remain in the pool with an aggregate
outstanding principal balance of $1,024.5 million. The pool is
geographically diverse, as loans within the top 15 are located
across 12 states. The transaction has a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a WA debt yield of 1.60 times (x)
and 9.7%, respectively, with 90.56% of the current pool reporting
YE2015 financials.

There are no loans in special servicing and five loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, representing 5.3% of the current pool
balance; however, only one of these loans is in the top 15. Three
of these loans have been flagged for non-performance-related
reasons limited to deferred maintenance. The largest loan on the
servicer’s watchlist (Marlboro Commons) and one additional loan
in the top 15 are discussed below.

The Marlboro Commons loan (Prospectus ID#7, 3.21% of the current
pool balance) is secured by the borrower’s fee interest in a
100,499-square foot (sf) Class A grocery-anchored retail center
located in Marlboro Township, New Jersey. Construction of the
subject was recently completed in 2014, and the subject is anchored
by a Whole Foods Market (Whole Foods). This loan is on the
servicer’s watchlist because of a decline in property performance
mainly driven by high repairs and maintenance expenses from
excessive snow removal in 2015. As of YE2015, repairs and
maintenance expenses had increased by 83.8% over the DBRS
underwritten (UW) figure, which has driven net cash flow down by
8.6%. As a result of the high expenses, the YE2015 DSCR was 1.09x,
below the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.19x. As of March 2016, the property was
95.5% occupied with an average rental rate of $26.51 per square
foot (psf), which compared favorably with the $25.91 psf average
rental rate at issuance. The property is occupied by seven tenants
representing a strong tenant mix comprising mainly national
retailers such as Ethen Allen and Petco Animal Supplies Stores in
addition to two investment-grade tenants, Walgreens and Whole
Foods. The property is still in its early stages of operation and
should experience improvements in performance in the near future
because of its strong tenant base and location within a retail
market.

The Highland Village loan (Prospectus ID#8, 3.22% of the current
pool balance) is secured by the borrower’s fee interest in a
217,504-sf grocery-anchored retail and office property located in
Jackson, Mississippi, approximately ten miles north of the Jackson
central business district. The 14.9-acre property consists of a
multi-tenant, mixed-use building and three outparcels, with the
retail portion anchored by the first Whole Foods grocery store in
the state of Mississippi. The 217,504-sf subject is divided into
170,191 sf of retail space and 47,313 sf of office space, which is
primarily located on the second story of the mixed-use building. At
issuance, DBRS noted a high concentration of tenant rollover within
the first two years of the loan term, including 49 tenants (21.8%
of the net rentable area (NRA)) that had lease expirations in 2014.
According to the May 2016 rent roll, the property was reported to
be 83.6% occupied compared with 86.5% at issuance. Since May 2016,
19 tenants (15.05% of the NRA) have had their respective leases
expire, and 12 tenants (8.06%of the NRA) have lease expirations
through YE2016. A more recent rent roll and leasing update was
requested from the servicer, but no response has been provided to
date. According to the property’s online directory, 27 of the
expired or expiring tenants are still listed as operating at the
property. Seven tenants (3.44% of the NRA) are no longer listed.
According to CoStar, the North Jackson submarket of Mississippi
reported an average retail vacancy and availability rate of 5.6%
and 7.3%, respectively. Class B office properties reported average
vacancy and availability rates of 3.6% and 6.4%, respectively.
Average rental rates for shopping center properties and Class B
office properties were reported at $9.15 psf and $13.66 psf,
respectively. The subject’s average rental rate of $18.45 psf for
the retail portion of the property was above the North Jackson
submarket average, which falls in line with the borrower’s plans
to move toward higher-end retail tenants and higher rental rates.
The addition of Whole Foods is expected to attract more higher-end
retailers, and this is evident with the addition of Lululemon, Kate
Spade and Red Square. The subject reported a YE2015 DSCR of 1.10x,
which compares similarly with the DBRS UW figure of 1.08x.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Courtyard King Kamehameha's Kona
Beach Hotel Loan (Prospectus ID#6, 3.6% of the current pool
balance) as investment grade. DBRS has today confirmed that the
performance of the loan remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics.

The ratings assigned to Classes E and F differ from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, and in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan level cash flows expected to
occur as loans season.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C18
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2014-C18 (the Trust):

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class PST at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

DBRS does not rate Class G, the first-loss piece. The Class A-S,
Class B, and Class C certificates may be exchanged for the Class
PST certificates (and vice versa). All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the pool's overall performance.
The transaction consists of 65 loans secured by 100 commercial and
multifamily properties. Since issuance, the pool has experienced
1.4% in collateral reduction as a result of scheduled amortization,
with all of the original 65 loans remaining in the pool. The pool
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.75 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 10.0% based on 97.2% of
the pool that reported YE2015 financials. At issuance, the DBRS
underwritten (UW) WA DSCR and debt yield were 1.64x and 9.4%,
respectively.

As at the July 2016 remittance, there is one loan in special
servicing, representing 1.8% of the current pool balance, and seven
loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 5.3% of the current
pool balance. Four of the loans on the servicer's watchlist are
flagged because of non-performance-related issues to do with
deferred maintenance items assessed on the most recent
site-inspection reports. All four loans are secured by multifamily
properties, and DBRS expects them to be removed from the servicer's
watchlist as the items are resolved. The specially serviced loan
and the largest loan on the servicer's watchlist are highlighted
below.

The Value Place Williston loan (Prospectus ID#14, representing 1.8%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a 248-key extended-stay
hotel in Williston, North Dakota, and was developed by the sponsor
in 2012. The area has been negatively affected by the fluctuating
oil prices, on which the regional economy is heavily reliant, as
the demand for the subject is attributable to the oil and gas
industry. This loan was transferred to the special servicer in
October 2015 for imminent default. A short-term forbearance
agreement was entered into that allowed the borrower to use the
furniture, fixtures and equipment reserve to fund operating
shortfalls. As at July 2016, the ending balance of the reserve
account is $3,679. The agreement expired on July 1, 2016, and the
borrower is negotiating an extension of the forbearance period;
however, no decision is imminent at this time. Although the
borrower has expressed interest in keeping the property, it is
likely that a loan modification would be required. According to
servicer commentary, the loan is expected to be resolved or
foreclosed by the end of 2016.

According to the January 2016 Smith Travel Research report, the
property reported a trailing 12-month (T-12) occupancy rate of
35.9%, an average daily rate (ADR) of $76.16 and revenue per
available room (RevPAR) of $27.33. This represents a large decline
since YE2014 when the occupancy rate was 71.7%, ADR was $85.14 and
RevPAR was $61.14. Overall, the subject's competitors are reporting
equally decreased metrics driven by market conditions.
Comparatively, the competitive set reported a T-12 figure for
occupancy of 41.9%, an ADR of $100.13 and RevPAR of $41.97. Based
on the most recent financials, the Q2 2015 DSCR for the loan was
1.59x, which is in line with the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.64x; however,
this was prior to the loan transferring to special servicing, and
given the deteriorating economic conditions over the last 12 months
and decreased operating metrics, the current financial performance
of the loan is expected to be much lower. The most recent appraisal
from February 2016 valued the property at $12.0 million, which is
well below the issuance appraised value of $31.9 million. Given the
outstanding loan balance of $18.3 million and the outstanding
advances of $1.3 million, DBRS expects this loan to be resolved
with a loss to the Trust.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist, the Louisiana and
Mississippi Retail Portfolio (Prospectus ID#11, representing 2.7%
of the current pool balance), is secured by a portfolio of 15
unanchored retail properties totalling 471,982 square feet located
across various markets throughout Louisiana and Mississippi. This
loan has been placed on the watchlist because it is delinquent for
the July 2016 payment. The loan has been regularly monitored for
late debt service payments since issuance, with the earliest
occurrence being in December 2014, shortly after the transaction
closed in October 2014. According to YE2015 financials, the DSCR
for the loan was 1.32x, which is in line with the DBRS UW DSCR of
1.32x; however, according to the December 2015 rent roll, occupancy
across the portfolio has declined to 88.6% from 97.1% at issuance,
with the average rental rate across the portfolio reported at $8.17
per square foot. The largest single space tenant is Stage Stores,
Inc. (Stage), which represents 4.9% of the total net rentable area.
Stage is a tenant at three properties within the portfolio with
individual lease expirations occurring between January 2018 and
April 2022. DBRS has requested an update from the servicer
regarding the delinquent status of the loan and, as of this review,
has not received an update.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated one loan, 300 North LaSalle
(Prospectus ID#2, representing 9.8% of the current pool balance),
as investment grade. DBRS has today confirmed that the performance
of this loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

A full text copy of the company's press release is available free
at https://is.gd/UTzNS0


NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-3: Moody's Rates Class M2 Loan 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to three
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-3 (NHLT 2016-3). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to Ba2 (sf). The definitive ratings on Class M1 and
Class M2 are higher than the provisional ratings assigned due to
the reduced coupon on the notes by 0.44% and 0.73% respectively.
Overall, the weighted average coupon on the notes is lower by
0.31%. Given the available funds waterfall, the lower coupon will
allow for a faster pay-down of principal on the notes.

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 817 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 168 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC. The complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-3

   -- Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. M1, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. M2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-3 consists
of first-lien inactive HECMs covered by Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) insurance secured by properties in the US
along with Real-Estate Owned (REO) properties acquired through
conversion of ownership of reverse mortgage loans that are covered
by FHA insurance. Nationstar acquired the mortgage assets from
Ginnie Mae sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations.
All of the mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the
repayment of principal up to certain amounts. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, sale of the property is used to recover the amount owed.

There are 985 mortgage assets with a balance of $251,013,616. Loans
are in either default, due and payable, referred, foreclosure or
REO status. Loans that are in default may move to due and payable;
due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and foreclosure
loans may move to REO. 19.41% of mortgage assets are in default, of
which 1.62% (of total pool) are in default due to non-occupancy,
17.74% (of total pool) are in default due to taxes and insurance
and 0.05% (of total pool) are in default for other reasons. 8.36%
of the mortgage assets are due and payable. 1.75% of the mortgage
assets are referred loans. 57.06% of the mortgage assets are in
foreclosure. Finally, 13.43% of the mortgage assets are REO and
were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure on
the associated loan. The pool includes 817 loans with an aggregate
balance of approximately $217,311,140 and 168 REO properties with
an aggregate balance of approximately $33,702,476. If the value of
the related mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount,
some of these loans may be settled by the borrower or their
estate.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst
three classes of notes with overcollateralization. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their mandatory call dates. The subordinate notes will not receive
principal until the beginning of their respective target
amortization periods (in the absence of an acceleration event). The
notes also benefit from overcollateralization as credit enhancement
and an interest reserve account funded with cash received from the
initial purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit
enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in August 2018. For the Class M1
notes, the mandatory call date is in February 2019. Finally, for
the Class M2 notes, the mandatory call date is in August 2019. For
each of the subordinate notes, there are six month target
amortization periods that conclude on the respective mandatory call
dates. The legal final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to come from the
liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance claims.
These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the event
that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve fund may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults. Also, while Nationstar is required
to pay to the trust any debenture interest due, a replacement
servicer will only remit debenture interest actually received.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
the presence of FHA insurance coverage, accurate recordation of
appraisals, accurate recording of occupancy status, borrower age
documentation, identification of loans in which foreclosure and
bankruptcy attorney fees, or property preservation fees have
exceeded FHA allowable limits, and identification of tax liens with
first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions (BPOs) were
ordered for 82 properties that had appraisals that were over one
year old.

The results of the third-party review (TPR) were comparable to that
of NHLT 2016-2 but weaker compared to NHLT 2015-2 and NHLT 2016-1
securitizations, indicating a number of exceptions related to the
accuracy of updated appraisals, corporate advances exceeding FHA
reimbursement thresholds, and pre-existing liens. NHLT 2016-3's TPR
results showed approximately 3.57% exceptions related to valuation,
12.50% exceptions related to excessive corporate advances, and
32.56% exceptions related to tax liens. This compares to 4.12%,
9.26% and 48.15% for NHLT 2016-2. The scope of the review was also
narrower compared to the NHLT 2015-2 and NHLT 2016-1
securitizations. The scope did not include a data integrity review
of the preliminary loan tape to the final loan tape, and did not
check for the presence of non-borrowing spouses. However, the TPR
firm did conduct a data integrity check on the loan tape versus
Nationstar's servicing system. Moody's said, "We adjusted our
collateral pool assumptions to account for the weaker TPR results
and scope."

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable)
and thus relatively weak from a credit perspective. Given the
nascent nature of their securitization program, Moody's has limited
insight as to their ability to serve in this capacity. This risk is
mitigated by the fact that Nationstar is the equity holder in the
transaction and there is therefore a significant alignment of
interests. Another factor mitigating this risk is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is qualified and is made only as to the
initial mortgage loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws.

Upon the identification of a breach in R&W, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. Moody's believes the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

Trustee

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2016-3 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB ("WSFS Bank"), d/b/a
Christiana Trust ("Christiana Trust"). The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from our original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans," published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Moody's quantitative asset analysis was based on a loan-by-loan
modeling of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA
insurance and with various stresses applied to model parameters
depending on the target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: Funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO property and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. Specifically, the amount of
insurance proceeds received depends on whether a sales based claim
(SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is filed.

If the property is sold within six months of the receipt of
marketable title, the claim is for the unpaid principal balance
(UPB) minus net sales proceeds. This is a SBC. If the REO property
has not been sold by the end of six months after receipt of
marketable title, the servicer must file an ABC for the UPB minus
the most recent appraisal. An additional claim will be filed with
the FHA for allowable foreclosure costs, debenture interest,
mortgage insurance premiums, and escrow advances.

ABCs are expected to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6% ordinarily.
Moody's base case expectation of 13.5% losses on ABCs is based on
the historical experience of Nationstar. Moody's stressed these
losses at higher credit rating levels.

In its asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit at lower levels. With an SBC, FHA insurance
will only protect against losses to the extent that the REO
property is sold at 95% of the latest appraised value or greater
(and claim amounts are lower than the MCA). Sales at prices below
this level will suffer losses. Based on historical performance, we
assumed that SBCs would suffer 1% losses in the base case scenario.
Moody's stressed these losses at higher rating levels.

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario Moody's assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels.

Liquidation process: "Each mortgage asset is categorized into one
of four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO.
In its analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status
to be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed
to move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Depending on the reason for default, a loan may be in default
status for one to six months. Due and payable status is expected to
last six to twelve months. Foreclosure status is based on the state
in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and twelve
months with respect to ABCs," Moody's said.

Debenture interest: "The receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment. Our
base case assumption is that all debenture interest will be
received. This is also based on the historical experience of
Nationstar. We stressed the amount of debenture interest that will
be received at higher rating levels," Moody's said.

Additional Model Features:

Moody's said, "We incorporated certain additional considerations
into its analysis, including the following:

  "In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in our analysis. However, for seasoned appraisals we
applied a 15% haircut to account for potential home price
depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the cut-off
date.

  "Mortgage loans with significant positive equity are likely to be
bought out of the trust or otherwise cured and therefore will not
transition to REO status. We estimated which loans would be bought
out of the trust by comparing each loans' appraisal value (post
haircut) to its UPB.

  "We assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per loan,
two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA.

  "We estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

  "We ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar is no longer the
servicer. We assume the following in the situation where Nationstar
is no longer the servicer:

a) Foreclosure costs, servicing fees, and advances: Nationstar
subordinates their collection of foreclosure costs (from insurance
claims) and servicing fees and advances (effectively also from
insurance claims). A replacement servicer will not subordinate
these.

b) Nationstar also indemnifies the trust for lost debenture
interest. A replacement servicer may not do this.

c) A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus we
assume a 25bps strip will take effect if the servicer changes.

d) One third of foreclosure costs may be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse replacement servicer. This is typically in
the order of $1,500."



NEUBERGER BERMAN XXII: Moody’s Assigns Ba3 Ratings to Class E
Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Neuberger Berman CLO XXII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- US$52,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due

      2027 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$26,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2
      (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$17,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3
      (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Neuberger Berman CLO XXII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. “We expect the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.” Moody's said.

Neuberger Berman Investment Advisers LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.5 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 50

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2828

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:
  
   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2828 to
   3252)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

   Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2828 to   
   3676)

   Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


OZLM FUNDING IV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, and C
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, D, and E notes
from OZLM Funding IV Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in 2013 and is managed by Och-Ziff
Loan Management LP.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 14, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect credit quality improvement in the
underlying collateral since S&P's rating affirmations in January
2014 following the transaction's effective date.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased significantly since the September 2013
effective date report, which S&P used for its previous rating
actions.  The higher-rated collateral has caused the portfolio's
weighted average rating to rise to 'B+' from 'B'.  In addition, the
higher-rated collateral has resulted in a decrease in weighted
average spread to 4.20% reported in July 2016 compared with 4.46%
reported in the effective date report, and has resulted in an
increase in the reported weighted average S&P Global Ratings'
recovery rate over the same period.

The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.71 years from
5.65 years in September 2013.  This seasoning, combined with the
improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile.  In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has
increased during this period resulting in improved portfolio
diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the September 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $4.66 million as of July 2016 from zero as of the
effective date report.  The par balance of assets rated 'CCC+' and
below increased to $16.27 million from zero over the same period.
The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the mild decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
since the effective date report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 132.72% in July 2016, down from
      133.10%.

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 121.25% in July 2016, down from
      121.60%.  The class C O/C ratio was 113.82% in July 2016,
      down from 114.14%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.10% in July 2016, down from
      108.40%.

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 105.13% in July 2016, down from
      105.43%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and above
their minimum threshold values.  Overall, the increase in defaulted
assets and assets rated 'CCC+' and below has been largely offset by
the decline in the weighted average life and positive credit
migration of the collateral portfolio.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considered the increase
in defaults and decline in the portfolio's credit support.  In
addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs that
allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio given that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

On a stand-alone basis, the cash flow analysis results indicated a
lower rating for the class E notes.  However, S&P believes that as
the transaction enters its amortization period following the end of
its reinvestment period, the transaction may begin to pay down the
rated notes sequentially, starting with the class A-1 notes, which,
all else remaining equal, will begin to increase the O/C levels.
In addition, because the transaction currently has minimal exposure
to 'CCC' rated collateral obligations and no exposure to long-dated
assets (i.e., assets maturing after the CLO's stated maturity), S&P
believes it is not currently exposed to large risks that would
impair the current rating on the notes. In line with this, S&P
affirmed the rating on the class E notes.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1, D, and E notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

OZLM Funding IV Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OZLM Funding IV Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
D             BB (sf)
E             B (sf)


SORIN REAL I: Moody's Hikes Class A2 Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd.:

   -- Class A1 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Class A2 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Class D Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Class E Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);   
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Class F Fixed Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
      previously on Aug 20, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of three classes of notes due to
materially greater than expected recoveries on defaulted and high
credit risk assets. This is in combination with improvements in the
credit quality distribution of the remaining collateral pool as
evidenced by WARF -- over 50% of the collateral pool experienced
ratings upgrades or improved assessments of credit quality of
non-Moody's rated assets. The affirmations are due to the key
transaction metrics performing within levels commensurate with
existing ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and RE-REMIC) transactions.

Sorin Real Estate CDO I, Ltd. is a cash transaction whose
reinvestment period ended in September 2010. The transaction is
collateralized by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (48.4% of the pool balance); ii) asset backed
securities (ABS), primarily in the form of subprime residential
mortgage backed securities (44.5%); and iii) collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) (7.1%). As of the trustee's June 30, 2016 report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $121.5 million from $403.0 million at
issuance, with the pay-down directed to the senior most class of
notes, as a result of amortization, recoveries from defaulted
assets, and interest proceeds diverted to pay principal due to the
failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains 11 ABS assets totaling $28.1 million (31.8% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's June 30, 2016 report. There have
been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
and Moody's does expect low to moderate losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
2015, compared to 2322 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (22.5%, compared to 12.6% at last
review); Baa1-Baa3 (32.2%, compared to 48.5% at last review);
Ba1-Ba3 (10.8%, compared to 9.0% at last review); B1-B3 (18.8%,
compared to 10.0% at last review); Caa1-Ca/C (15.6%, compared to
19.8% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, compared to 2.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 8.0%, compared to 6.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.4%, compared to 12.3% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by 5% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero notches downward (e.g., one notch down
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery
rates of 100% of the collateral pool by 5% would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one
notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SORIN REAL III: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Sorin Real Estate CDO III:

   -- Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015  
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed
by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(54.7% of the pool balance); ii) asset backed securities (ABS)
(40.5%) primarily in the form of subprime residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS); and iii) CRE CDO securities (4.9%). As of
the July 8, 2016 payment date, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $595.3 million from $1 billion at
issuance, as a result of the principal paydown directed to the
senior most outstanding class of notes. The paydown was the result
of the combination of regular amortization the failure of certain
tests, and reclassification of interest proceeds from defaulted
securities as principal proceeds.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5012,
compared to 4876 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.3% compared to 2.8% at last
review; A1-A3 and 4.9% compared to 5.9% at last review; Baa1-Baa3
and 10.4% compared to 10.8%; Ba1-Ba3 and 9.1% compared to 13.0% at
last review; B1-B3 and 22.8% compared to 17.4% at last review; and
Caa1-Ca/C and 50.5% compared to 50.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.0 years, compared to 2.7 years at last
review. The WAL is based on the look-through extension assumptions
on the loans backing the underlying bond collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 3.7%, compared to 3.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.7%, compared to 6.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral. Holding all other key
parameters static, reducing the recovery rate to 0% would result in
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero notch downward
(e.g. one notch down implies a rating movement from Baa3 to Ba1).
Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral by +10%
would result modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to
one notch upward (e.g. one notch up implies a rating movement from
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SOUND POINT XII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Sound Point CLO XII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $5,250,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $451,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $55,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $42,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf)
  $35,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $35,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class
E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Sound Point CLO XII is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, senior unsecured loans and first-lien last-out loans.
The portfolio is approximately 65% ramped as of the closing date.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 4.2-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $700,000,000
Diversity Score: 50
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2600
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -1
Class B-2 Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on for Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Symphony CLO V, Ltd.:

   -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015

      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$16,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      March 12, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   -- US$14,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded Baa2 (sf); previously on March

      12, 2015 Affirmed to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$311,300,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2024 (current outstanding balance of $279,428,486),
      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa

      (sf)

   -- US$12,240,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2024, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Symphony CLO V, Ltd., issued in December 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily due to improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio and the reduction of the portfolio
weighted average life (WAL) since October 2015. Based on the
trustee's July 2016 report, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) is reported at 2512, compared to 2641 in October 2015. Based
on the same trustee report, portfolio WAL is reported at 3.68 years
compared to 4.42 years in October 2015. Additionally, the Class A-1
notes have been paid down by $22.0 million or 7.3% and the
over-collateralization ratios have been relatively stable since
then.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

   This transaction is subject to a number of factors and    
   circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade

   of the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will commence and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
      requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
      the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
      has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
      metrics to the covenant levels. Such reinvestment could
      affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2086)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: +1

   -- Class B: +3

   -- Class C: +3

   -- Class D: +2

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3128)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: -2

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -1

   -- Class D: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $377.7 million, defaulted par of $1.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.37% (implying
a WARF of 2607), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.25%, a diversity score of 47 and a weighted average spread of
3.44% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.



SYMPHONY CLO: Moody’s Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Symphony CLO II, Ltd:

   -- US$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on January 12, 2016
      Affirmed A1 (sf)

   -- US$ 16,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
      Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on January 12, 2016 Upgraded

      to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$ 40,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Revolving Notes Due 2020
      (current balance $25,842,224.14), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
      previously on January 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$ 205,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Notes Due 2020 (current
      balance $114,390,234.40), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
      January 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$ 51,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
      Aaa (sf); previously on January 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$ 33,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa

      (sf); previously on January 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$ 14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on January 12, 2016 Upgraded
      to Ba1 (sf)

Symphony CLO II, Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
November 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since January 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately $2.6 million or 9%
and the Class A-2a notes have been paid down by approximately $16.7
million or 13% since January 2016. Based on the trustee's July 2016
report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
notes are reported at 136.5%, 124.30%, 116.4% and 110.5%,
respectively, versus January 2016 levels of 133.4%, 122.3%, 115.1%
and 109.7%, respectively. Additionally, based on the July 2016
trustee report, the deal holds approximately $57.5 million of
principal proceeds which, if not reinvested, will be paid to the
Class A-1 and Class A-2a notes on the August 2016 payment date.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio since January 2016. Based on Moody's
calculations, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2366
compared to 2511 in January 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

   This transaction is subject to a number of factors and   
   circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade

   of the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

   -- Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
      requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after  
      the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
      has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
      metrics to the covenant levels. Such reinvestment could
      affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1893)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2a: 0

   -- Class A-2b: 0

   -- Class A-3: 0

   -- Class B: +1

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +2

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2839)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2a: 0

   -- Class A-2b: 0

   -- Class A-3: 0

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $300.6 million, defaulted par of $6.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 12.75% (implying
a WARF of 2366), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.18%, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average spread of
3.11% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


TCP CLO III: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class D Loans & Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following ratings to the Class A-R Loans,
the Class A-T Loans, the Class B Loans and Notes, the Class C Loans
and Notes, the Class D Loans and Notes and the Combination Notes
(collectively, the Loans and Notes) issued by TCP CLO III, LLC:

-- Class A-R Loans rated AA (sf)
-- Class A-T Loans rated AA (sf)
-- Class B Loans and Class B Notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class C Loans and Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Loans and Class D Notes rated BB (sf)
-- Combination Notes rated BBB (low) (sf)

The ratings on the Loans are being assigned pursuant to the Credit
Agreement dated as of August 9, 2016, among TCP CLO III, LLC as
Borrower; Natixis, New York Branch as Administrative Agent; U.S.
Bank National Association as Collateral Agent, Collateral
Administrator, Information Agent and Custodian; and the Lenders
party thereto. The ratings on the Notes are being assigned pursuant
to the Note Purchase Agreement dated as of August 9, 2016, among
TCP CLO III, LLC as Issuer; U.S. Bank National Association as
Collateral Agent and Note Agent; and the Purchasers party thereto.


The ratings on the Class A-R Loans and Class A-T Loans address the
timely payment of interest (excluding any Capped Amounts, as
defined in the Credit Agreement referred to above) and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Stated Maturity (as defined
in the Credit Agreement referred to above). The ratings on the
Class B Loans and Notes, Class C Loans and Notes and Class D Loans
and Notes address the ultimate payment of interest (excluding the
additional 2% of interest payable at the Post-Default Rate, as
defined in the Credit Agreement referred to above) and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Stated Maturity (as defined
in the Credit Agreement referred to above). The rating on the
Combination Notes addresses the ultimate repayment of the
Combination Note Rated Principal Balance (as defined in the Note
Purchase Agreement referred to above) on or before the Stated
Maturity.

The Loans and Notes issued by TCP CLO III, LLC will collateralized
primary by a portfolio of U.S. middle-market corporate loans. TCP
CLO III, LLC will be managed by SVOF/MM, LLC Series I, a subsidiary
of Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC.

The rating reflects the following:

(1) The Credit Agreement dated August 9, 2016.
(2) The Note Purchase Agreement dated as of August 9, 2016.
(3) The integrity of the transaction structure.
(4) DBRS’s assessment of the portfolio quality.
(5) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios.
(6) DBRS’s assessment of the origination, servicing and
collateralized loan obligation management capabilities of SVOF/MM,
LLC Series I.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS provides a credit estimate
or internal assessment for each non-financial corporate obligor in
the portfolio, not rated by DBRS. Credit estimates are not ratings;
rather they represent a model-driven default probability for each
obligor that is used in assigning a rating to the facility.


TRINITAS CLO V: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Trinitas CLO
V Ltd./Trinitas CLO V LLC's $370.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 12,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Trinitas CLO V Ltd./Trinitas CLO V LLC

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                  2.00
A                       AAA (sf)                256.00
B                       AA (sf)                  48.00
C                       A (sf)                   24.00
D                       BBB (sf)                 22.00
E                       BB (sf)                  18.00
Subordination notes     NR                       40.00

NR--Not rated.


TRYON PARK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, D, and E notes from Tryon Park CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in June 2013 and is
managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported the
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.73
years from 5.61 years.  This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the
tranche ratings.  In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio has increased during this period, which contributed to
the portfolio's increased diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the September 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $0.89 million from none as of the September effective
date report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased
to $19.09 million (3.88% of the aggregate principal balance) from
none over the same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 132.57%, down from 133.67%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio was 121.11%, down from 122.11%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 113.58%, down from 114.52%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 107.72%, down from 108.62%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets and assets rated 'CCC+'
and below has been largely offset by the decline in the weighted
average life.  However, any significant deterioration in these
metrics could negatively affect the deal in the future, especially
the junior tranches.  As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, C, and D notes, its rating actions considers
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.  

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Tryon Park CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AA (sf)
B             A (sf)
C             BBB (sf)
D             BB (sf)
E             B (sf)


VIBRANT CLO II: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2a, A-2b, B,
and C notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, D, and E
notes from Vibrant CLO II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in September 2013 and is
managed by DFG Investment Advisors Inc.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect an increase in credit support, as
well as collateral seasoning since our rating affirmations in
January 2014 following the transaction's effective date.

Additionally, par gain in the underlying portfolio since the
effective date has led to an increase in the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios from the December 2013 trustee report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio increased to 137.13% from 134.69%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio increased to 123.41% from 121.21%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 115.87% from 113.80%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 110.00% from 108.04%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio increased to 106.26% from 104.37%.

During the same period, the reported weighted average life has
decreased to 4.97 years from 5.54 years.  In addition, the number
of issuers in the portfolio has increased, and this diversification
has contributed to the portfolio's credit quality. The collateral
seasoning, combined with the increase in credit support, has
decreased the overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided
more cushion to the tranche ratings.

Although there has been a modest increase in both defaulted assets
and assets rated in the 'CCC' category, this factor is offset by
the decline in the weighted average life and increase in the
collateral portfolio's credit support, both of which have lowered
the credit risk profile.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B, D, and E notes, its rating actions considered the cushion
at the higher ratings and additional sensitivity runs that
reflected the exposure to specific distressed industries and
allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio because the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the class A-1, D, and E notes reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Vibrant CLO II Ltd.

                 Rating
Class       To          From
A-2a        AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2b        AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B           A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Vibrant CLO II Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
D           BB (sf)
E           B (sf)


VOYA CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2a, A-2b, and
B notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, C, D, and E
notes from Voya CLO 2013-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in 2013 and is managed by
Voya Alternative Asset Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 14, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017.

The upgrades primarily reflect credit quality improvement in the
underlying collateral since S&P's November 2013 rating affirmations
following the transaction's effective date.  The underlying
collateral of the portfolio with an S&P Global Ratings' credit
rating of 'BB-' or higher has increased significantly since the
July 2013 effective date report, which S&P used for its previous
rating actions.  The purchasing of this higher-rated collateral by
the collateral manager has caused the portfolio's weighted average
rating to rise to 'B+' from 'B'.

The transaction has also benefited from portfolio seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.72 years in July
2016 from 5.42 years in July 2013.  This seasoning, combined with
the improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile.  In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has
increased during this period as a result of increased portfolio
diversification.

Defaults and assets rated 'CCC+' and below have increased slightly
since the effective date report.  Specifically, the amount of
defaulted assets reported increased to $2.86 million as of July
2016 from zero reported as of the effective date.  The reported par
balance of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to
$14.43 million from only $1.69 million over the same period.

The level of credit support available to all tranches has remained
stable and has only declined slightly, as observed in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios as of July 2016 compared with
the July 2013 effective date:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 131.51%, down from 132.31%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio was 119.35%, down from 120.07%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 112.93%, down from 113.62%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 107.77%, down from 108.42%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 105.22%, down from 105.86%.

The current coverage test ratios are also all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets and assets rated 'CCC+'
and below has been largely offset by the decline in the weighted
average life and positive credit migration of the collateral
portfolio.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C and D notes, its rating actions considers the increase in
defaults and slight decline in the credit support available to the
notes. In addition, the ratings reflect additional sensitivity runs
that allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio because the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1, C, D, and E notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

There have been no paydowns to the rated notes since S&P's last
rating actions.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Voya CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2a          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2b          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Voya CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
C             BBB (sf)
D             BB (sf)
E             B (sf)


VOYA CLO V: Moody’s Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Voya CLO V, Ltd.:

   -- US$26,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- US$21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$300,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes due 2022      

      (current outstanding balance of $69,534,686), Affirmed Aaa
      (sf); previously on October 6, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- US$80,000,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 6, 2015 Affirmed
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 6, 2015 Upgraded to

      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$10,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2022, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on October 6, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Voya CLO V, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015. The Class
A-1a notes have been paid down by approximately 62.6% or $116.3
million since then. Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are
reported at 137.7%, 122.5%, 112.5% and 108.2%, respectively, versus
October 2015 levels of 127.2%, 116.8%, 109.5% and 106.3%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since the October 2015. Based on the trustee's July 2016 report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2565 compared to
2389 on October 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

   This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
   circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade

   of the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected   
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2186)

   -- Class A-1a: 0

   -- Class A-1b: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +2

   -- Class D: +2

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3278)

   -- Class A-1a: 0

   -- Class A-1b: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: -2

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $252.1 million, defaulted par of $1.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.03% (implying
a WARF of 2732), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
51.12%, a diversity score of 51 and a weighted average spread of
3.28% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2003-C9.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the distressed ratings indicate minimal changes
in expected losses since the last rating action.  Losses to class F
continue to be considered inevitable and losses on the remaining
classes have already been incurred.

There are nine loans remaining in the pool, the three largest of
which are specially serviced assets.  Fitch modeled losses of 66.3%
of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 7.8%, including $79.6 million (6.9% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  As of the July 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 98.7% to $15.3 million from $1.15 billion at issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes F through P.

The largest specially serviced asset c is the Southwest Commons
Shopping Center (39.5% of the pool), an 84,983 square foot (sf)
retail center located in Worcester, MA, approximately 45 miles west
of Boston.  The loan transferred to special servicing in February
2012 due to imminent default after the grocery anchor vacated and
became real estate owned (REO) in February 2013.  The property
recently sold at auction and the closing is scheduled for the first
week of September 2016.  As of June 2016, occupancy was 35%.

The second largest loan is the specially-serviced Swan Creek MHC
loan (22.3%), which is secured by a 201 pad mobile home community
located in New Boston, MI, approximately 27 miles southwest of
Detroit.  The loan has been in special servicing since December
2013 for maturity default.  The servicer reports that the property
is 49% occupied.  The loan is categorized as non-performing matured
and foreclosure is expected.

The third largest asset is the South Shades Crest Station (14.5%),
a 25,500 sf shadow anchored retail center located in Hoover, AL.
The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2013 for
maturity default.  The loan became REO in November 2014.  The
special servicer reports the property was 69% occupied as of June
2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Class F is expected to remain at 'Csf' due to the expectation of
losses.  Once losses are incurred the class will be downgraded to
'D.'  The remaining classes have all experienced principal losses
and are rated 'Dsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings and revises RE as indicated:

   -- $11.6 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 45%.
   -- $3.7 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D, E and X-P certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-C
certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C9: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust (WFRBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2012-C9.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of the stable performance of the
underlying pool collateral since issuance.  As of the July 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 6.4% to $985 million from $1.05 billion.  Per the
servicer reporting, five loans (6.4% of the current balance) are
defeased.  There are no loans in special servicing.  Fitch has
designated two loans (2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.

There were variances from criteria related to classes B, C, D, E
and F.  The surveillance criteria indicated that rating upgrades
were possible for these classes.  However, Fitch determined that an
upgrade was not warranted at this time as there has been no
material improvement to the performance of the pool since issuance
and minimal increase in credit enhancement.

The largest loan in the pool (10.7%) is secured by a 1 million
square foot (sf) regional mall with an adjacent strip shopping
center located in North Chesterfield, VA.  The property is anchored
by Sears (non-collateral), JC Penney (non-collateral) and Macy's.
As of year-end (YE) 2015, the property was 96% occupied. The
servicer reported net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) decreased slightly to 1.65x as of YE 2015 from 1.79x
YE 2014.

The next largest loan (5.8%) is secured by a 38-story office tower,
three office buildings and two parking garages located in Kansas
City, MO.  The property is one of only a handful of Class-A office
buildings within the downtown area and contains 844,456 sf. Per the
March 2016 rent roll, the property was 95% occupied.  The property
continues to perform above its underwritten NOI DSCR with a ratio
of 2.36x as of YE 2015.

The third largest loan (4.8%) is secured by a 302,779 sf retail
center located in Newark, DE.  The subject property is 10 miles
southwest of Wilmington, DE and 40 miles southwest of Philadelphia.
The center is anchored by Costco, which is 47% of net rentable
area (NRA) with a lease expiration of September 2018, Dick's
Sporting Goods (17% of NRA, expiry November 2023), and HH Gregg
(11% of NRA, expiry May 2020).  The subject has been 100% occupied
since issuance.  Servicer reported NOI DSCR increased to 1.53x as
of YE 2015 from 1.39x YE 2014.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for classes B, C, and X-B have been revised to
Positive to reflect the defeased collateral and increased credit
enhancement.  An upgrade may be warranted if additional loans are
defeased and the transaction continues to pay down.  The Rating
Outlooks for classes A-1 through A-S, D, E, F, and X-A remain
Stable due to overall stable pool performance.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $18.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $110.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $444.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $96.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $93.4 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $801.9 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $101.3 million* class X-B at 'A-sf', Outlook to Positive
      from Stable;
   -- $64.5 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $36.8 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $42.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.1 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.7 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C21 (the Certificates),
issued by WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C21 (the Trust) as
follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SBFL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SBFX at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class PEX certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance, with cash flows remaining
generally in line with the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. The
collateral consists of 121 fixed-rate loans secured by 145
commercial properties. As of the July 2016 remittance, all 121
loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate balance of
approximately $1.4 billion, representing collateral reduction of
approximately 1.5% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization. To date, 75 loans (58.9% of the pool) have reported
partial-year 2016 net cash flows (NCF; all Q1 2016), while 29 loans
(36.5% of the pool) reported YE2015 NCF and the remaining 17 loans
(4.6% of the pool) reported YE2014 NCF. According to the most
recent financials, the deal had a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.80 times (x)
and 10.6%, respectively, compared with the DBRS UW figures of 1.66x
and 9.6%, respectively. The pool is relatively diverse based on
loan size, as the largest loan, Fairview Park Drive (Prospectus
ID#1), only represents 6.4% of the pool, whereas the Top Ten and
Top 15 loans only represent 42.6% and 52.6% of the pool,
respectively.

Based on the most recent available cash flows (both annualized 2016
and year-end 2015 cash flows), the Top 15 loans had a WA amortizing
DSCR of 1.78x, an improvement from the DBRS UW figure of 1.63x,
reflecting a positive NCF growth over the DBRS UW figure of 10.2%.
There are five loans in the Top 15, representing 16.2% of the pool,
exhibiting NCF declines, compared with the DBRS UW figures, ranging
from 3.8% to 20.7%. Based on the most recent cash flows (both
annualized 2016 and year-end 2015 cash flows) for these six loans,
the WA amortizing DSCR was 1.90x, compared with the WA DBRS UW
figure of 2.07x, reflective of a WA NCF decline of 9.0% from the
DBRS UW figures. For the loans showing cash flow declines that are
likely to continue through the near to medium term, stressed cash
flow figures were modelled to capture the increased credit risk to
the Trust.

The largest loan in the pool, Fairview Park Drive (Prospectus ID#1,
6.4% of the pool) is secured by a 12-story Class A office building
located in Falls Church, Virginia, approximately ten miles west of
Washington, D.C. The 360,864 square foot (sf) property is located
within Fairview Park, a large business park that includes 11 Class
A office buildings and a 450-key Marriott hotel. The subject
property serves as the global headquarters for General Dynamics
(General; 47.2% of the net rentable area (NRA)), one of the
world’s largest aerospace and defense companies. General has been
in occupancy at the property since it was built in 2004 and has
invested over $50.0 million to date in capital improvements into
its space, which includes its own two-storey auditorium, cafeteria,
gym, personal security and elevator bank. General’s lease expires
during the loan term in March 2019, and according to a January 2016
press release, the firm will move its headquarters to a new
build-to-suit located in Reston, Virginia. The loan is structured
with a full cash flow sweep, initiating 24 months prior to
General’s lease expiration. There is also an ongoing TI/LC
reserve equivalent to $144,000 annually that will be capped at $5.5
million ($33.16 per square foot (psf) on the General Dynamics
space) that can be used to re-tenant the space. According to the
December 2015 rent roll, the property was 82.1% occupied with an
average rental rate of $39.10 psf, compared to 82.7% occupied with
an average rental rate of $37.07 psf at issuance. Other notable
tenants at the property include Axiom Resource (7.5% of the NRA)
and Deloitte, LLP (6.3% of the NRA), which also have lease
expirations within the loan term in April 2020 and September 2018,
respectively. Within the next 12 months, three tenants,
representing 3.3% of the NRA, have upcoming lease expirations. As
of Q1 2016, the loan reported an annualized DSCR of 1.92x, an
increase from the YE2015 DSCR of 1.87x and the DBRS UW figure of
1.76x, reflective of a positive 7.0% NCF growth over the DBRS UW
figure.

As of the July 2016 remittance, there were no loans in special
servicing and 13 loans on the servicer’s watchlist, representing
8.6% of the pool. One loan, The Bluffs (Prospectus ID#10, 2.5% of
the pool), which is secured by a 602-unit, Class A, garden-style
apartment complex located in Junction City, Kansas, was placed on
the watchlist in June 2016 as a result of fire damage that occurred
in April 2016. The servicer reports that 28 units are down;
however, the borrower has replacement cost coverage included in its
insurance policy and has filed an insurance claim. After permits
are approved, construction is estimated to take approximately 14 to
16 months, with a rebuild cost of approximately $2.1 million.
Otherwise, the loan was performing strong with a YE2015 DSCR of
2.87x and an occupancy rate of 90.0%. Of the remaining loans on the
watchlist, three loans (3.2% of the pool) were flagged due to
deferred maintenance, one loan (0.4% of the pool) for a low YE2015
DSCR of 0.64x (co-op property – adjusted YE2015 DSCR of 4.78x)
and one loan (0.2% of the pool) had no comment available to date,
but was performing strong with a Q1 2016 annualized DSCR of 2.45x.
The remaining seven loans (2.3% of the pool) were flagged as a
result of either near-term tenant rollover or increased vacancy.
Based on the most recent cash flows (annualized 2016, YE2015 and
YE2014 cash flows), these seven loans had a WA DSCR of 1.39x, down
from the DBRS UW figure of 1.42x. DBRS has briefly highlighted one
of these loans below.

The RiverPlace Athletic Club loan (Prospectus ID#49, 0.5% of the
current pool balance) is secured by a three-story, freestanding
athletic club, which was original constructed in 1986 and renovated
in 2007. The 55,462 sf property is located within the RiverPlace
district in Portland, Oregon. The loan was added to the watchlist
in March 2015 due to a low DSCR, which as of YE2015 was 0.38x, down
from the DBRS UW figure of 1.40x. In March 2014, the single tenant,
RiverPlace Athletic Club, was evicted from its space. The courts
have assigned a receiver, which is selling the tenant’s assets in
order to satisfy creditors’ claims. According to the servicer,
the borrower will be pursuing a $9 million guaranty under the
lease, though it remains unclear if any funds will be recovered,
given the insolvent status of the former tenant. To date, there
have been interested prospective tenants; however, no tenant is
willing to take the space as is, with specific tenant improvement
costs estimates ranging between $3.0 million ($54 psf) to $5.0
million ($90 psf); however, the borrower seems unwilling to offer
such improvements. As of the July 2016 remittance, the loan is
current and the borrower reports that they intend to continue
making their monthly debt service payments while searching for
prospective tenants.

The ratings assigned to Classes E and F differ from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, and in this case, the
ratings reflect the dispersion of loan level cash flows expected to
occur as loans season.


WHITEHORSE VII: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B-3L Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1L, A-2L,
A-3L, B-1L, B-2L, and B-3L notes from WhiteHorse VII Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
October 2013 and is managed by HIG WhiteHorse Capital LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 13, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
November 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.29
years from 5.53 years.  In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio has increased during this period, which contributed to
the portfolio's increased diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the November 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $5.59 million (1.42% of the aggregate principal
balance) as of July 2016, from zero as of the effective date
report.  In addition, the level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below
increased to $34.75 million (8.84% of the aggregate principal
balance) from zero over the same period.  As per the transaction's
documents, the trustee, for purpose of calculating
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios, haircuts the portion of the
'CCC' rated collateral in excess of the prescribed limit.  The
current haircut of $2.40 million is about 0.61% of the performing
assets.  These factors contributed to a decline in the O/C ratios
since the effective date:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio was 134.73%, down from 137.56%.
   -- The class A O/C ratio was 121.69%, down from 124.25%.
   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 114.58%, down from 116.99%.
   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 108.20%, down from 110.29%.
   -- The class B-3L O/C ratio was 105.46%, down from 107.68%.

However, even with the decline in credit support, all coverage
tests are currently passing and are above the minimum
requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis points to higher ratings for the
class A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, B-2L, and B-3L notes, its rating actions
consider the decline in the portfolio's credit quality and increase
in defaults.  In addition, the ratings reflect additional
sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to specific
distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

WhiteHorse VII Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1L        AAA (sf)
A-2L        AA (sf)
A-3L        A (sf)
B-1L        BBB (sf)
B-2L        BB- (sf)
B-3L        B (sf)


[*] DBRS Reviews 33 Ratings From 7 Securities Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 33 ratings from seven U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 33 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, 18 were confirmed and nine were
upgraded. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS’s expected losses at their current respective rating levels.
For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s
expected losses at their new respective rating levels.
Additionally, six classes were discontinued due to full repayment.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the company's press release is available at:

                     https://is.gd/BMCG28



[*] Fitch Says Quiet July for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
-----------------------------------------------------
U.S. CMBS delinquencies remained steady last month, according to
Fitch Ratings in its latest weekly U.S. CMBS newsletter dated
August 15, 2016.

Loan delinquencies increased two basis points (bps) in July to
3.20% from 3.18% a month earlier. The portfolio runoff of $7.6
billion exceeded Fitch-rated new issuance volume of $4.1 billion
from four transactions in June, causing a decrease in the overall
index denominator.

There was no significant activity in terms of resolutions or new
delinquencies in July. In terms of loan count, 76 loans were
resolved in July, slightly above the year to date average of 71.
New delinquencies of $440 million in July reached the lowest level
in 2016 after averaging $755 million per month year to date.

The largest resolution in July was the $31.6 million Lakeside
Market asset (MLCFC 2007-6; Retail; Plano, TX), which was disposed
with no losses. The largest new delinquency was the $27 million
Yankee Candle Company (MLCFC 2007-5; mixed-use property in South
Deerfield, MA).

Current and previous delinquency rates by property type are as
follows:

   -- Retail: 4.73% (from 4.64% in June);
   -- Office: 4.56% (from 4.59%);
   -- Hotel: 4.30% (from 4.22%);
   -- Multifamily: 0.86% (from 0.83%);
   -- Industrial: 3.98% (from 4.13%);
   -- Mixed Use: 4.03% (from 3.94%);
   -- Other: 0.76% (from 0.79%).


[*] Fitch Says Quiet July for U.S. CMBS Delinquencies
-----------------------------------------------------
U.S. CMBS delinquencies remained steady last month, according to
Fitch Ratings in its latest weekly U.S. CMBS newsletter dated Aug.
15, 2016.

Loan delinquencies increased two basis points (bps) in July to
3.20% from 3.18% a month earlier. The portfolio runoff of $7.6
billion exceeded Fitch-rated new issuance volume of $4.1 billion
from four transactions in June, causing a decrease in the overall
index denominator.

There was no significant activity in terms of resolutions or new
delinquencies in July. In terms of loan count, 76 loans were
resolved in July, slightly above the year to date average of 71.
New delinquencies of $440 million in July reached the lowest level
in 2016 after averaging $755 million per month year to date.

The largest resolution in July was the $31.6 million Lakeside
Market asset (MLCFC 2007-6; Retail; Plano, TX), which was disposed
with no losses. The largest new delinquency was the $27 million
Yankee Candle Company (MLCFC 2007-5; mixed-use property in South
Deerfield, MA).

Current and previous delinquency rates by property type are as
follows:

   -- Retail: 4.73% (from 4.64% in June);
   -- Office: 4.56% (from 4.59%);
   -- Hotel: 4.30% (from 4.22%);
   -- Multifamily: 0.86% (from 0.83%);
   -- Industrial: 3.98% (from 4.13%);
   -- Mixed Use: 4.03% (from 3.94%);
   -- Other: 0.76% (from 0.79%).


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 12 Tranches From 8 2nd-Lien RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 16, 2016, upgraded the rating of
twelve tranches from eight deals backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-HE4
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23,

   2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE2
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23,

   2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)
  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23,

   2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV1
  Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV2
  Cl. A-I, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2002-HLTV1
  Cl. A-I, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: GreenPoint Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-2
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-S2
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 7, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-1
  Cl. IIB-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. IIM-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2010,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. IIM-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE
The upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The actions are a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 18 Tranches From 8 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 15, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 18 tranches from 8 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT2
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 26, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2001-AQ1
  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 30, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-3
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-5
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-AR2
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-FR1
  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 14, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R11
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R3
  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions are a result of the
recent performance of the underlying pools and reflects Moody's
updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $112.8MM of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 16, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 10 tranches from 5 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Company (CHEC) Loan Trust 2004-1
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-D
  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23, 2013,
   Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-AR2
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-6
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-4
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions are a result of the
recent performance of the underlying pools and reflects Moody's
updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $47.2MM of RMBS Issued 2001-2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 16, 2016, downgraded the rating
of 1 tranche from 1 transaction and upgraded the ratings of 17
tranches from 7 transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans, and
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2004-1

  Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC5

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC6

  Cl. A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 18, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE2
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 25, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC6
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 16, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012,
   Confirmed at A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4, Asset Backed
Certificates, Series 2001-4
  Cl. II-M1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 26, 2013,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgraded is due to a weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism which caps the rating at A3 according to
Moody's US RMBS Surveillance Methodology.  Under a weak
reimbursement mechanism, an interest shortfall is typically
reimbursed from excess interest only after overcollateralization
builds to a pre-specified target amount.  The ratings upgraded are
due to the total credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The
rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $67.3MM Subprime RMBS Issue 2007-2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 1 tranche
issued by Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-4.  Moody's has also
placed on review the rating of 1 tranche for possible downgrade
from the resecuritization, RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11
  Cl. 4-A2, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Aug. 28, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-4
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgraded on class A-1 from Saxon Asset Securities Trust
2007-4 is due to the total credit enhancement available to the
bond.  The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of
the underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation
on these pools.

Moody's has placed on review for possible downgrade the rating on
class 4-A2 from RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11 pending
clarification from the trustee regarding the reimbursement
mechanism for credit interest shortfalls imposed on this bond.  The
underlying tranche to 4-A2 is Class A-2 from Saxon Asset Securities
Trust 2007-4.  When A-2 has an interest shortfall reimbursed, Class
4-A2 should mimic this reimbursement. Accordingly, the remittance
reports for the underlying tranche shows that this tranche has
incurred interest shortfalls that have been reimbursed in the
following month, however, the resecuritization tranche has not had
any of its interest shortfalls reimbursed since October 2011.
Moody's plans to take final action once we receive clarification on
how credit interest shortfalls will be distributed to the class
4-A2.

The principal methodology used in rating RBSSP Resecuritization
Trust 2009-11 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Resecuritizations"
published in February 2014.  The principal methodology used in
rating Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-4 was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in July 2016 from 5.3% in July
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review of 74 Classes From 14 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Aug. 12, 2016, completed its review of 74
classes from 14 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2001 and 2007.  The review yielded 28
upgrades, 41 affirmations, four withdrawals, and one
discontinuance.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2001 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
Alternative-A mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.  As discussed in our criteria, "The Interaction Of Bond
Insurance And Credit Ratings," published Aug. 24, 2009, the rating
on a bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the rating on
the bond insurer and the rating of the underlying obligation,
without considering the potential credit enhancement from the bond
insurance.

The classes listed below are insured as:

   -- TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust 2006-6's class A-4 ('CCC (sf)')
      and class A-5A ('CCC (sf)'), insured by MBIA Insurance Corp.

      ('CCC');

   -- Impac Secured Assets Corp.'s series 2001-8 class A-6
      ('AA+ (sf)'), insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('CCC'); and

   -- TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust 2007-2's class A-4-B ('AA (sf)'),
      insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. ('AA').

Seven other classes in this review were insured by a rated
insurance provider when the deal was originated, but S&P Global
Ratings has since withdrawn the rating on the insurance provider of
those classes.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 28 classes, including 21 ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more
of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- A change in payment allocation due to failing performance
      triggers; and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 24 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remains relatively
consistent with S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

S&P also affirmed the 'AA+ (sf)' rating on class A-IO from Impac
Secured Assets Corp. series 2001-8.  The rating action reflects the
application of S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria, which provide
that S&P will maintain the current rating on an IO class until all
of the classes that the IO security references are either lowered
to below 'AA- (sf)' or have been retired--at which time S&P' will
withdraw these IO ratings.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on classes 3-A1, 3-A2, 3-PO, and 3-B1 from
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. series 2005-1 because the
related pool has a small number of loans remaining.  Once a pool
has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there is a high
degree of credit instability that is incompatible with any rating
level.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on class 1-A3 from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4XS because this class
has been paid in full as of June 2016.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/2bjXXEO



[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 79 Classes From 34 CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings Services discontinued its ratings on 75 classes
from 31 cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions, three classes from two CF collateral debt obligations
(CDO) backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and
one class from one retranche of a CF CLO transaction (SC
retranche).

The discontinuances follow the notes' complete paydowns as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- AMAC CDO Funding I (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Apidos CDO V (CF CLO): optional redemption in July 2016.

   -- Ares XI CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July 2016.

   -- Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-I (CF CLO): class X notes(i) paid down;

      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Babson CLO Ltd. 2007-I (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      July 2016.

   -- Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006 (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.

   -- Fore CLO Ltd 2007-1 (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I (CF CLO):

      senior-most tranche paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Golden Knight II CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Goldman Sachs Asset Management CLO PLC (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.

   -- Grant Grove CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.

   -- Inwood Park CDO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid  
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Landmark IX CDO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Liston Funding 2010-1 Ltd. (CF SC retranche): senior-most
      tranche paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Marlborough Street CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- MSIM Peconic Bay Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.

   -- Nautique Funding Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Neuberger Berman CLO XXI Ltd. (CF CLO): class X notes(i)
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- One Wall Street CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): last remaining rated
      tranches paid down.

   -- Pangaea CLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Rampart CLO 2007 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.

   -- Rosedale CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Shasta CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Sorin Real Estate CDO IV Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
      tranche paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Spring Road CLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): last remaining rated
      tranche paid down.

   -- Symphony CLO VII Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.

(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

AMAC CDO Funding I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  B (sf)
C                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Apidos CDO V
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1--J              NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1-S               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Ares XI CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)

Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X                   NR                  AAA (sf)


Babson CLO Ltd. 2007-I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a                NR                  AAA (sf)

Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From

B-2L                NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Fore CLO Ltd. 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Golden Knight II CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Goldman Sachs Asset Management CLO PLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Grant Grove CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1B                NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Inwood Park CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)

JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)

Landmark IX CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1 Notes           NR                  AAA (sf)

Liston Funding 2010-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2B                NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

MSIM Peconic Bay Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-B               NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Nautique Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2A Notes          NR                  AAA (sf)

Neuberger Berman CLO XXI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X                   NR                  AAA (sf)

One Wall Street CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Pangaea CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)

PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a Notes          NR                  AAA (sf)


Rampart CLO 2007 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Rosedale CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1D                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1J                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)

Shasta CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1LV               NR                  AAA (sf)

Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1 Notes           NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2 Notes           NR                  AAA (sf)

Sorin Real Estate CDO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  NR                  BB+ (sf)

Spring Road CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
E notes             NR                  AA (sf)


Symphony CLO VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C (def)             NR                  AAA (sf)
D (def)             NR                  AAA (sf)
E (def)             NR                  A+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 19 US RMBS Deals Issued 2004-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Aug. 16, 2016, completed its review of 85
classes from 19 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 2004 and 2007.  The review yielded
various upgrades, downgrades, affirmations, and discontinuances.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades include 18 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

S&P raised its ratings on seven classes from 'CCC (sf)' because it
believes these classes are no longer vulnerable to default.  S&P
also raised six ratings to 'CCC (sf)' and one to 'B- (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)' because S&P believes these classes are no longer virtually
certain to default, primarily owing to the improved performance of
the collateral backing this transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)'
ratings indicate that S&P believes that its projected credit
support will remain insufficient to cover S&P's projected losses
for these classes and that the classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting.

                            DOWNGRADES

Of the four downgrades, two of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining two downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that its projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
deteriorated credit performance trends and/or decreased credit
support.

The downgrades on classes A1 and A5 from Structured Asset
Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-BC2 reflect the
impact of the failure of the transaction's cumulative loss trigger,
resulting in permanent sequential principal payments to all
classes.  These classes will now be locked out from receiving
principal payments until the more senior classes have been paid
down to zero, extending these subordinate classes' lives and making
them more susceptible to back-end losses.

The downgrades on class A3 from Structured Asset Investment Loan
Trust 2004-3 and class A3 from Structured Asset Investment Loan
Trust 2004-6 reflect the impact of the passing of the payment
allocation triggers, allowing principal payments to be made to more
subordinate classes, eroding projected credit support for the
affected senior classes.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that our projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
      or

   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though these classes
may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on two classes that were paid in full
during recent remittance periods.

S&P discontinued three 'D (sf)' ratings on classes with zero
balances.  These classes have been written down to zero as a result
of realized losses that remain outstanding.  S&P discontinued these
ratings according to its surveillance and withdrawal policy, as S&P
views a subsequent upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be
unlikely under the relevant criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/2byTgnQ



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 52 Classes From 28 US RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 52 classes from 28 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2001 and 2006.  The review yielded 45 downgrades, which
reflected the application of S&P's interest shortfall criteria.
S&P also placed seven ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The CreditWatch placements reflect that the trustee
reports cited interest shortfalls on the affected classes in recent
remittance periods, which could negatively affect S&P's ratings on
those classes.  After verifying these possible interest shortfalls,
S&P will adjust the ratings as it considers appropriate pursuant to
our criteria.

All of the transactions in this review are backed by a mix of
fixed- and adjustable-rate loans secured primarily by one- to
four-family residential properties.

A combination of subordination, overcollateralization (when
available), excess interest, and bond insurance (as applicable)
provide credit enhancement for all of the tranches in this review.
Where the bond insurer is no longer rated, S&P solely relied on the
underlying collateral's credit quality and the transaction
structure to derive the ratings.

             APPLICATION OF INTEREST SHORTFALL CRITERIA

In reviewing these ratings, we applied our interest shortfall
criteria, "Structured Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall
Methodology," Dec. 15, 2015, which impose a maximum rating
threshold on classes that have incurred interest shortfalls
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.  In applying the
criteria, S&P looked to reimbursement provisions within each
payment waterfall for the applicable class to determine whether the
reimbursement must be made immediately.  In instances where
immediate reimbursement is required, S&P used the maximum length of
time until full interest is reimbursed as part of its analysis.

In instances where reimbursement may be delayed by other factors
within the payment waterfall, S&P used its cash flow projections in
determining the likelihood that the shortfall would be reimbursed
under various scenarios.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include three ratings that were lowered three or
more notches.  One of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining 44 downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings.  For those classes that
feature delayed reimbursement provisions, S&P projected the
transactions' cash flows to assess the likelihood of the interest
shortfalls' reimbursement.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                   http://bit.ly/2bkDnFz



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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