TCR_Public/160807.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, August 7, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 220

                            Headlines

ACE SECURITIES 2005-HE4: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-5 Debt Rating to B1
AMERICAN HOME 2005-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. I-A-1 Debt Rating to B1
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
APIDOS CLO XII: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Hikes Class C Notes Rating to 'Bsf'

ARES ENHANCED: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
ARES XXXIX: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Ratings to Class E Notes
BABSON CLO 2016-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Ratings to Class D Debt
BAMLL 2015-HAUL: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
BAMLL 2016-ISQR: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Certs

BAYVIEW 2006-SP1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B-2 Debt to CCC
BBCMS 2016-ETC: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
BEAR STEARNS 1999-WF2: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Caa3
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR17: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 11 Tranches

C BASS VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to B3
CALIFORNIA COUNTY TSA: Moody's Ups Cl. 2006A-1 Debt Rating to B1
CANNINGTON FUNDING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. D Notes
CANYON CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2

CENT CLO 18: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Notes
CGWF COMMERCIAL 2013-RKWH: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. M-4 Certs
CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Cl. M-4 Debt
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Ups Cl. C Debt Rating to Ba2

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P4: Fitch Rates Class E Certs 'BB-'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2005-WF1: Moody's Ups M-1 Debt Rating to Caa1
COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class X-C Debt
COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2016-C04: Moody's Rates Class 1M-2 Debt 'B1'

CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 6 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Hikes $361MM of Subprime RMBS
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-7: Moody''s Hikes Cl. M-5 Debt Rating to B3
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-CF2: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. II-M-1 Debt to B2
CWABS REVOLVING 2004-D: Moody's Hikes Cl. 1-A Debt Rating to B3

CWHEQ REVOLVING 2006-RES: Moody's Hikes Rating on 4 Tranches to B3
DORAL CLO III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
FANNIE MAE 2016-C05: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'BB+sf'
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
FOUR TIMES 2006-4TS: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Certs

FREDDIE MAC 2016-SC01: Moody's Rates Class M-2 Debt 'Ba2'
FREMONT HOME 1999-3: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to Ba3
GOLDENTREE LOAN XII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
GOLDMAN SACHS 2011-GC5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
INWOOD PARK CDO: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Debt

JASPER CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes to B1
JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Debt Rating to B2
JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class F Certs
JP MORGAN 2016-JP2: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings to Class E Notes
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2016-JP2: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on F Certs

KATONAH 2007-I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
KKR FINANCIAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
KKR FINANCIAL 2013-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba2
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 13 Certs
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Tranches

MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CA20: Moody's Hikes Class K Debt Rating to B1
MERRILL LYNCH 2007-F1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to Caa3
MONROE CAPITAL 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on A-J Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. H Certs

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Debt Rating to Ba
NEUBERGER BERMAN XII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
RFMSII HOME 2003-HS3: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-II-B Debt Rating to Ba1
SASCO 2001-SB1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
SASCO 2004-GEL2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M3 Debt to B3

SHACKLETON 2013-III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
TOWD POINT 2016-3: Fitch Rates Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
UBS-CITIGROUP 2011-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X-B Debt
VNDO 2013-PENN: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C21: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt

WELLS FARGO 2011-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. G Certs
WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch to Rate Cl. F Certificates 'B-sf'
WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
WINWATER MORTGAGE 2015-3: Moody's Rates Cl. B-4 Debt 'Ba1'
[*] Moody's Hikes $358MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2004-2007

[*] Moody's Lowers $611.8MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued 1999-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $176.3MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 78 Classes From 17 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 53 Classes From 46 RMBS Deals to 'D'
[*] S&P Puts 310 Ratings From 11 RMBS Transactions on Watch Pos.

[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 110 Classes From 16 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 21 RMBS 2nd-Lien Deals

                            *********

ACE SECURITIES 2005-HE4: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-5 Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches
from 9 transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE6

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE4

Cl. M7, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE7

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE2

Cl. A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series OOMC 2006-HE5

Cl. A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-3

Cl. AV1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AV2-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF8

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of the total amount of credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. Please see
the Ratings Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


AMERICAN HOME 2005-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. I-A-1 Debt Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of four tranches
from two transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by
American Home.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools. The rating upgrades are primarily due to the stable or
stronger collateral performance of the underlying pools for both
transactions, the faster amortization and high level of collateral
backing Classes II-A-2, IV-A-1, and IV-A-2 from American Home
Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2, and the credit enhancement
available to Class I-A-1 from American Home Mortgage Investment
Trust 2005-4.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Anchorage Capital CLO 8, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $1,200,000 Class X Amortizing Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes

   due 2028, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $225,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $30,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $14,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $21,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf)
  $26,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $25,750,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Anchorage 8 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 55% ramped as of the closing date.

Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue Class F Notes
and subordinated notes.  The transaction incorporates interest and
par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and
principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 50
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3010
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3010 to 3462)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: -1
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3010 to 3913)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: -1
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


APIDOS CLO XII: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C, D, E, and F notes from Apidos CLO XII, a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in April 2013 and is
managed by CVC Credit Partners.  The transaction is scheduled to
remain in its reinvestment period until April 2017.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  Since
the July 2013 trustee report, the amount of 'CCC' rated assets has
increased to $18.95 million from $6.91 million, and defaults in the
portfolio have increased to $4.54 million from zero.  There has
also been a slight decline in the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios during this time.  The July 2016 trustee report indicated
these O/C changes compared with the July 2013 report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio decreased to 130.63% from 131.78%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 120.09% from 121.15%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 113.21% from 114.21%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 108.05% from 109.01%.

The class F notes do not pass S&P's cash flow stresses with cushion
at their current rating level.  But despite the increase in 'CCC'
and defaulted assets and the subsequent decline in O/C ratios, S&P
did note the increase in exposure to assets rated
'BB-' and above and the increase in obligor diversity within the
portfolio.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its rating on the class F notes
given the overall stable performance of the transaction.

The class A through E notes pass S&P's cash flow stresses with
cushion.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to maintain the
rating cushion as this transaction will continue reinvesting until
2017 and also to reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels. S&P will
continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings assigned to
the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Apidos CLO XII
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)


ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Hikes Class C Notes Rating to 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed seven classes of ARCap
2004-1 Resecuritization, Inc. (ARCap 2004-1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are the result of increased credit enhancement (CE)
through principal amortization and positive credit migration of the
underlying collateral.

Since Fitch's last rating action in August 2015, the class A notes
have been repaid in full and the class B notes have received $9.2
million in principal paydowns; total principal paydowns since
issuance have been $62.5 million. Over this period, approximately
51.5% of the collateral has been upgraded and only 2.3% has been
downgraded. Currently, 78.7% of the portfolio has a Fitch-derived
rating below investment grade, and 45.8% has a rating in the
'CCCsf' category and below, compared to 79.8% and 57.6%,
respectively, at the last rating action.

As of the July 21, 2016 payment date, the class B through D notes
remain current on interest, while the class E through K notes are
deferring their interest payments.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in
Fitch's 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the CE for classes B through D
is consistent with the rating actions below and also reflects
concerns of obligor concentration and adverse selection as the
portfolio continues to amortize.

For the class E through K notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCCsf' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class E and F notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating
that default is probable. Similarly, the class G through K notes
have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

ARCAP 2004-1 is backed by 31 tranches from eight commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a
CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred to as first-loss
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation CRE
CDO/ReREMIC) as it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS
transactions. The transaction closed April 19, 2004.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on the class B and C notes reflects Fitch's view
that the notes will continue to delever. In addition to the
sensitivities discussed above, additional negative migration and
defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM as well as increasing
concentration of weaker credit quality assets could lead to
downgrades for the more junior classes. If recoveries are better
than expected and if there is additional positive credit migration
of the underlying portfolio, there could be additional upgrades.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

-- $25,185,064 class B notes to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $26,500,000 class C notes to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
    Stable assigned.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $8,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $30,700,000 class E notes at 'CCsf';
-- $13,600,000 class F notes at 'CCsf;
-- $36,000,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
-- $13,000,000 class H notes at 'Csf';
-- $31,500,000 class J notes at 'Csf';
-- $20,500,000 class K notes at 'Csf'.

Fitch does not rate the preference shares.


ARES ENHANCED: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1B-R,
A-2B-R, and B-R notes from Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy
IR Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Ares Enhanced Loan Management IR L.P.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the class A-1B, A-2B, and B notes, which were fully
redeemed.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A,
A-2A, C, and D notes, which were not refinanced.

On the July 29, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuances were used to redeem the original notes
as outlined in the transaction documents.  Therefore, S&P withdrew
its ratings on the original notes following their full redemption,
and S&P assigned ratings to the replacement notes.  The ratings
reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available is
commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy IR Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating
A-1B-R               AAA (sf)
A-2B-R               AA (sf)
B-R                  A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy IR Ltd.

Class                Rating
A-1A                 AAA (sf)
A-2A                 AA (sf)
C                    BBB (sf)
D                    BB (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy IR Ltd.

                           Rating
Original class       To              From
A-1B                 NR              AAA (sf)
A-2B                 NR              AA (sf)
B                    NR              A (sf)

NR--Not rated.


ARES XXXIX: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Ratings to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Ares XXXIX CLO, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Ares
XXXIX").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$5,000,000 Class X Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$325,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,900,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$28,100,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Ares XXXIX CLO, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments purchased
with principal proceeds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist
of underlying assets that are not senior secured loans. The
portfolio is approximately 95% ramped as of the closing date.

Ares CLO Management II LLC (the "Manager" and a relying adviser on
Ares Management LLC) will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's 4.75 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.


BABSON CLO 2016-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Ratings to Class D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-II (the
Issuer or Babson 2016-II).

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028 (the
"Class X Notes "), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$252,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028 (the
"Class A Notes "), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Term Notes due 2028 (the
"Class B Notes "), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due
2028 (the  "Class C Notes "), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$23,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due
2028 (the  "Class D Notes "), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Junior Term Notes due 2028
(the  "Class E Notes "), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the  "Rated Notes. "

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Moody's said, "Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-II is a managed cash flow CLO.
The issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly
syndicated first lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 90%
of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and
eligible investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and unsecured loans. We expected the portfolio to
be approximately 75% ramped as of the closing date."

Babson Capital Management LLC (the Manager) will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions. "

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the  "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations " rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.


BAMLL 2015-HAUL: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Bank of America Merrill
Lynch BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-HAUL (BAMLL
2015-HAUL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect stable loan performance and no material
changes since issuance. Based on Fitch's surveillance analysis,
which uses the same framework that was set out at issuance, the
loan's performance metrics have remained relatively unchanged since
issuance.

The loan has paid down by 2.5% of the original balance since
issuance. Fitch reviewed the year-end (YE) 2015 OSARs and March
2016 rent rolls of the underlying properties in the portfolio. As
of YE 2015, the servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio, on a
net operating income basis, was 1.59x. As of the March 2016 rent
rolls, the overall portfolio was 89.7% occupied, compared to 88.2%
at issuance.

The transaction certificates represent the beneficial interests in
a 20-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgage loan secured by 60
self-storage properties located across six states. Fifty-six of the
properties are owned fee simple with four properties held in
leasehold. Loan proceeds were used to refinance prior mortgage
debt, repay prior subordinate debt and pay closing costs. The loan
is sponsored by Private Mini Storage, L.P. The sponsor is
indirectly wholly owned and controlled by Blackwater Investments,
Inc., which is controlled by Mark V. Shoen, the son of the original
founders of U-Haul and a significant shareholder in AMERCO, the
holding company of U-Haul. The portfolio is managed by U-Haul
through management agreements with U-Haul subsidiaries in each of
the states where the portfolio properties are located. The loan
matures in July 2035.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the loan's performance
metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $86.3 million(a) class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65 million(a) class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $151.3 million(ab) class X-A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.7 million(ab) class X-B notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.8 million(a) class B notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.9 million(a) class C notes 'A-sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.5 million(a) class D notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.4 million(a) class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a)Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b)Notional amount and interest-only.


BAMLL 2016-ISQR: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BAMLL
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ISQR's $370.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-ISQR.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $370.0 million trust loan, which is part of
a whole mortgage loan structure in the aggregate principal amount
of $450 million and secured by a first lien on the borrower's fee
interest in the 1.16 million-sq.-ft., 12-story class A office
complex located in Washington, D.C.'s Central Business District
office market.  The mortgage loan seller is retaining $80 million
in pari passu non-trust companion loans, all of which is pari pasu
to class A.  Both the trust loan and the companion loans are
collectively secured by the same mortgage on the property and will
be serviced and administered according to the trust and servicing
agreement for this securitization.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 26,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect view of the collateral's historical
and projected performance, the sponsor's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the mortgage loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ISQR

Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)       166,700,000
B           AA- (sf)        50,800,000
C           A- (sf)         33,900,000
D           BBB- (sf)       53,600,000
E           BB- (sf)        65,000,000
X-A         AAA (sf)    166,700,000(i)
X-B         A- (sf)      84,700,000(i)

(i)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be equal to the principal amount of the class A
certificates.  The notional amount of the class X-B certificates
will be equal to the principal amount of the class B and class C
certificates.


BAYVIEW 2006-SP1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B-2 Debt to CCC
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S&P Global Ratings completed its review of class B-2 from Bayview
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-SP1, a U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction backed by small
balance commercial loans, which include multifamily, mixed-use, and
commercial properties.  The review yielded a downgrade of the
rating to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)'.

                      ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporate various considerations into its decisions to raise,
lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                          UPDATED CRITERIA

The analysis of this class comes under S&P's updated surveillance
criteria "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For
Pre-2009 Originations," published March 2, 2016, where small
balance commercial transactions are now being evaluated similar to
Alternative-A transactions.

                           DOWNGRADE

The downgrade reflects S&P's belief that its projected credit
support for class B-2 will be insufficient to cover S&P's projected
losses for the transaction at a higher rating.  The downgrade
reflects higher projected losses based on the updated criteria, as
well as deteriorated credit performance trends as delinquencies
have remained elevated at around 20% of the collateral balance.

                        ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

RATING LOWERED

Bayview Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-SP1
Series 2006-SP1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP           To              From
B-2        07324MAJ4       CCC (sf)        B- (sf)


BBCMS 2016-ETC: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BBCMS
2016-ETC Mortgage Trust's $512.5 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2016-ETC.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $512.5 million portion of a $700.0 million
whole commercial mortgage loan secured by a first-priority mortgage
on the borrowers' fee-simple interest in Easton Town Center, a 1.8
million-sq.-ft. (1.3 million-sq.-ft. collateral) outdoor shopping
center located in Columbus, Ohio.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 3,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary rating S&P's view of the collateral's historical
and projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's experience,
the trustee-provided liquidity, the loans' terms, and the
transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the $700.0 million
whole loan balance has a beginning and ending loan-to-value of
93.3% based on our estimate for the long-term sustainable value of
the collateral backing the transaction.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BBCMS 2016-ETC Mortgage Trust

Class          Rating                     Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A              AAA (sf)              150,000,000
X              AA- (sf)           225,000,000(i)
B              AA- (sf)               75,000,000
C              A- (sf)                56,300,000
D              BBB- (sf)              69,000,000
E              BB- (sf)               93,700,000
F              B- (sf)                68,500,000

(i)Notional balance.  The notional amount will be equal to the
principal amount of the class A and B certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 1999-WF2: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Caa3
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Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one class in
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-WF2 as follows:

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was downgraded based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.2% of the
current balance and remains unchanged since last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7% of the original
pooled balance, also remains unchanged since last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Ratings of IO classes are based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to improved credit
quality of its reference classes. An IO class may be downgraded
based on a higher WARF due to declined credit quality of its
reference classes, paydowns of higher quality reference classes or
non-payment of interest. Classes that have paid off through loan
paydowns or amortization are not included in the WARF calculation.
Classes that have experienced losses are grossed up for losses and
included in the WARF calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the
rating.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $20.9 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool. Thirteen loans, constituting 74% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Four loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19 million (for an average loss
severity of 26%). There are no specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 30% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 21% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 12%, compared to 18% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.89X and 9.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.80X and 6.55X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 11.1% of the pool balance.
The largest is the Acorn Paper Products Loan ($1.05 million -- 5.0%
of the pool), totaling 189,166 square feet (SF) of industrial and
office space in Los Angeles, California. The property is currently
100% leased to Oak Paper Products Company, Inc. with a NNN lease
through August 2018. The loan is fully amortizing and matures in
December 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 14% and >4.00X,
respectively.

The second largest loan is the Sobol Apartments Loan ($745,708 --
3.6%), which is secured by a three multifamily communities located
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The property is within blocks of major
universities and is mainly occupied by college students. It was
100% occupied as of October 2015. The loan is fully amortizing and
matures in December 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 8% and
>4.00X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Artesia Senior Center Loan ($529,033
-- 2.5%), and is secured by a 3 story, 100 unit, seniors
independent living community located in Bellflower, California
approximately 14 miles west of Anaheim. The surrounding area is
well established and includes a mix of single and multifamily homes
as well commercial businesses. The loan is fully amortizing and
matures in December 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 8% and
>4.00X, respectively.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Certs
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Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on seven classes and downgraded the
rating on one class in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Top22 as:

  Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 24, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Upgraded

   to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Upgraded
   to B1 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Upgraded
   to B3 (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on March 24, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 24, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on March 24, 2016, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 33% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class was downgraded due to anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because it is not, nor
expected to, receive interest payments; however, it can receive
prepayment penalties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.7% of the
current balance, compared to 4.9% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were " Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 11, compared to 16 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $134 million
from $1.7 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 21 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 70% of
the pool.  Two loans, constituting 6% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments.  Four loans,
constituting 18% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $26 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%).  Three loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest loan is special
servicing is the Gateway Business Center Loan ($8.7 million -- 6.5%
of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 119,953 square foot office
property located in Melbourne, Florida.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2014 and is now real estate owned (REO).
As of June 2016, the property was 53% leased. The other two
specially serviced loans are secured by a hotel and industrial
property.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $6.6 million loss for specially
serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 74%, the same as at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.40X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The two loans with a structured credit assessment are both Co-op
Loans ($8.6 million --4.3% of the pool) which are secured by two
multifamily co-op buildings located in the New York City area.
Performance has remained stable. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 3.42X,
respectively, compared to aaa (sca.pd) and 3.48X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 35% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Sunrise Plaza Loan ($18.7 million -- 14% of the
pool), which is secured by a 119,200 SF retail property located in
San Jose, California.  As of April 2016, the property was 97%
leased.  The loan is on the watchlist due to Sports Authority
announcing the they intend to vacate their space in August 2016,
following corporate bankruptcy.  Sports Authority currently
occupies 35% of the NRA.  The second largest tenant, Pacific Sales,
occupying 21% of the NRA recently renewed their lease through June
2021.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.27X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Hopewell Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($17.9 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
grocery anchored shopping center.  The center is located
approximately ten miles southeast of Princeton in Pennington, New
Jersey.  The property is anchored by a Stop & Shop grocery store
with a lease through May 2025. As of October 2015, the property was
100% occupied.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.24X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.18X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Webster Square Loan ($10 million --
7% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored retail center
located eleven miles northeast of Rochester in Webster, New York.
Major tenants include a BJ's Wholesale, Kmart and Dollar Tree.  As
of April 2016, the property was 100% leased.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 55% and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.68X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR17: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 11 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2007-PWR17 (BSCMS 2007-PWR17)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the investment-grade classes are due to
sufficient credit enhancement to offset Fitch expected losses.
Fitch modeled losses of 5.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 10.7%, including $234 million
(7.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Current cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $4.5 million are
affecting classes C through J.

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been paid down by 37.52% to $2 billion from
$3.26 billion at issuance.  Fitch has identified 52 (25.8%) Fitch
Loans of Concern, of which 3 (1.72%) are specially serviced.  In
addition, there are 19 (11.3%) defeased loans within the pool.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 136,206 square foot
(sf) shopping center located in Tyngsboro, MA, approximately 40
miles northwest of Boston on the border of New Hampshire (0.9%).
The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2014 following
the loss of its largest tenant, TJ Maxx (18.3% of net rentable area
[NRA]), which vacated in May 2013.  More recently, the property
suffered further from the departure of Trader Joe's and several
other small tenants.  As of May 2016, the property was 62% occupied
as reported by the special servicer.  The asset became real estate
owned (REO) in July 2014.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 173,101 sf
office building located in Mobile, AL (0.6%).  Loan transferred to
Special Servicing in January 2013 due to imminent payment default.
The asset became REO in August 2014.  Common area improvements have
been completed and the special servicer is marketing the available
space in an effort to improve occupancy.  As of May 2016, occupancy
was 76%.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 and A-1A are expected to remain
Stable based on continued transaction paydown and the class' senior
positions within the capital structure.  Rating Outlooks on class
A-M and A-MFL remain Negative given the current pool metrics,
including specially serviced loans and Fitch Loans of Concern, and
the increased potential for adverse selection as the transaction
nears its 10-year maturity date (2017), when approximately 94% of
the pool matures.

                      DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises REs as indicated:

   -- $1.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $226 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $231 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $95 million class A-MFL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $269 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $28.5 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 75%;
   -- $44.8 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $24.5 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $20.4 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $18.2 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-AB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class S certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


C BASS VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to B3
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by C Bass CBO VIII Ltd.:

  $20,700,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
   Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance

   $1,807,352.63), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  $12,000,000 Class D-1 Fifth Priority Secured Floating Rate
   Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance

   $6,651,025.93), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  $4,950,000 Class D-2 Fifth Priority Secured Fixed Rate
   Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance

   $3,099,191.67), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 26,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd., issued in November 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of ABS and RMBS
assets originated in 2002 and 2003.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since August 2015.  The Class C notes
have been paid down by approximately 56.2% or $2.3 million, since
then.  Based on trustee's July 2016 report, the
over-collateralization ratio of the Class C and Class D notes are
reported at 963.7% and 137.4% versus 432.9 % and 116.5% in August
2015.  The paydown of the Class C notes is partially the result of
interest payments/principal prepayments from certain assets treated
as defaulted by the trustee in amounts materially exceeding
expectations.  Additionally, the credit quality of the underlying
assets remains stable.  Based on the trustee's July 2016 report,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the performing assets
is reported at 3900, compared to 3923 in August 2015.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in July 2015.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty
     about assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in
     either consumer or commercial credit conditions and in the
     residential real estate property markets.  The residential
     real estate property market's uncertainties include housing
     prices; the pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
     modifications and refinancing; the unemployment rate; and
     interest rates.

  2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries
     from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will
     continue and at what pace.  Faster than expected deleveraging

     could have a significantly positive impact on the notes'
     ratings.

  3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries
     received from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and
     those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the

     timing of these recoveries create additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted assets assuming limited
     recoveries, and therefore, realization of any recoveries
     exceeding Moody's expectation in the future would positively
     impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes.  Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (2883):
Class C: +1
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +2
Caa ratings notched down by two notches (4675):
Class A-1: 0
Class D-1: 0
Class D-2: 0


CALIFORNIA COUNTY TSA: Moody's Ups Cl. 2006A-1 Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eleven
tranches in seven tobacco settlement revenue securitizations and
has placed the ratings of two tranches in two tobacco settlement
revenue securitizations on review for downgrade.  The bonds are
backed by payments that tobacco companies owe to the counties and
the states pursuant to the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: California County Tobacco Securitization Agency (TSA) (Los
Angeles County Securitization Corporation) Series 2006A Convertible
Turbo Bonds

  Cl. 2006A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2014,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: California Statewide Financing Authority (Pooled Tobacco
Securitization Program), Series 2002

  Ser. 2002A Term Bonds 1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)
  Ser. 2002B Term Bonds 1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)
  Ser. 2002A Term Bonds 2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Ser. 2002B Term Bonds 2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Northern Tobacco Securitization Corporation, Series 2006
2006-A-1, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Feb 20, 2014 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)
Issuer: The California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
(Stanislaus County Tobacco Funding Corporation), Series 2002

  Ser. 2002A Term Bond 1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: The California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
(Alameda County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation), Series
2002

  Ser. 2002 Turbo Bond 3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Securitization Authority of Northern California
(Sacramento County)

  2005A-1-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2014,
   Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Securitization Authority of Southern California
(San Diego)

  2006A-1-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa), Series 2005

  2005A TNs, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

   previously on Feb 20, 2014, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation (New Jersey),
Series 2007-1

  2007-1A Serial Bond 11, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
   July 6, 2015, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  2007-1A Term Bond 1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 20, 2014, Confirmed at B1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades reflect several positive factors, including the 2015
cigarette shipment volume increase of 1.9%, the subsequent
increased principal payments made on the respective transactions,
and to a lesser extent Moody's upgrade of Altria Group Inc.'s
senior unsecured rating to A3 from Baa1 in March 2016.

The reviews for downgrade reflect the slower than expected pace of
the arbitration proceedings.  States that have not settled their
non-participating manufacturer (NPM) adjustment disputes with the
tobacco manufacturers (the "non-settling states") must go through
an arbitration proceeding for each sales year in dispute, in order
to recover any withheld amounts.  States that have settled their
NPM adjustment disputes with the tobacco companies will be a part
of the arbitration proceedings for the 2015 sales year and all
subsequent years.  Performance of the bonds, particularly those
issued by non-settling states, is sensitive to the timing of the
arbitration panel decisions and subsequent recoveries.  Given that
the arbitration proceedings are taking longer than our expectation
of 8-12 years, as per our 2014 Methodology, Moody's has considered
longer recovery timelines in its analysis.

In addition, the rating actions on the bonds issued by Tobacco
Settlement Financing Corporation (New Jersey), Series 2007-1,
reflect $8.8 million that was deposited into the senior liquidity
reserve account, bringing it back to its required amount of $214
million in 2015, as well as principal payment allocations of
$21.6 million in December 2015.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Tobacco Settlement Revenue Securitizations"
published in February 2014.

The analysis for today's rating actions included cash flow runs to
assess the impact on the bonds of a lag of more than 12 years for
the states to receive subsequent recoveries of their withheld NPM
adjustment amounts.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of ratings:

Up
Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the annual rate of cigarette
consumption decline continues to slow down, if future arbitration
proceedings and subsequent recoveries become more expeditious than
they currently are, or if there are future settlements of the NPM
adjustment disputes between the tobacco manufacturers and the
non-settling states.

Down
Moody's could downgrade the ratings if subsequent recoveries from
future arbitration proceedings take longer than the Moody's
assumption of 8-12 years, if an arbitration panel finds that a
state was not diligent in enforcing a certain statute, which could
lead to a significant decline in cash flow to that state, or if the
annual rate of decline in the volume of domestic cigarette
shipments increase beyond the 3% to 4% base case projection.


CANNINGTON FUNDING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Cannington Funding Ltd.:

  $20,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
   Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 16,
   2015, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $337,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020
   (current outstanding balance of 17,080,515), Affirmed Aaa (sf);

   previously on Nov. 16, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 16, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
   Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov. 16, 2015,

   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
   Due 2020 (current outstanding balance $13,729,460), Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 16, 2015, Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cannington Funding Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans, with some exposures to CLO
tranches.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in November
2013.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratio since November 2015.  The Class
A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 80.3% or $69.8 mil.
since then.  Based on the Trustee's June 2016 report, the Class A,
Class B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 265.7%, 165.7%, 128.5%, and 111.4%, respectively,
compared to November 2015 levels of 170.7%, 138.8%, 121.3%, and
111.6%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since November 2015.  Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 3072, compared to 2672 in
November 2015.

Moody's notes that this transaction has an 8.9% exposure to
obligors in the Midstream and Oilfield Services (OFS) sectors of
the Energy -- Oil & Gas industry.

Companies in the energy related industries face unfavorable market
conditions which have adversely impacted the credit quality and
liquidity profiles of obligors.  OFS companies, in particular, are
struggling with difficult industry fundamentals and operating
environments.  CLOs with large exposures to obligors in the energy
and commodity related industries face greater risk of defaults and
potential trading losses, putting negative pressure on par coverage
for the CLO notes.

Additionally, the portfolio includes a number of investments in
securities that mature after the notes do.  Based on the Trustee's
June 2016 report, securities that mature after the notes do have
increased to 3.98% of the portfolio from 2.5% in November 2015.
These investments could expose the notes to market risk in the
event of liquidation when the notes mature.

Finally, the percentage of CLO collateral with lowest credit
quality, or Caa1 and below rated collateral (Caa collateral), has
increased since November 2015.  Based on Moody's calculations,
which include adjustments for ratings with a negative outlook and
ratings on review for downgrade, Caa collateral has increased to
19.3%, compared to 16.1% in November 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with weak liquidity:
     The presence of assets with the worst Moody's speculative
     grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to
     additional risks if these assets default.  The historical
     default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-4 ratings
     than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the deal's high
     exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute around $7
     million or 6.8% of the portfolio, Moody's ran a sensitivity
     case defaulting those assets.

  7) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.  The deal's increased exposure owing to

     amendments to loan agreements extending maturities continues.

     In light of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets,

     which increases its sensitivity to the liquidation
     assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios
     using a range of liquidation value assumptions.  However,
     actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market
     prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the
     deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

  8) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
     portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions
     of a few large obligors Moody's rates non-investment grade,
     especially if they jump to default.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2458)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3686)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $121.2 million, defaulted par
of $2 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.57%
(implying a WARF of 3072), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.80%, a diversity score of 17 and a weighted average
spread of 3.02% (before accounting for LIBOR Floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


CANYON CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and C
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A, D, and E notes from
Canyon Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in January 2013 and is
managed by Canyon Capital Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the June 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
January 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect a general improvement in the
portfolio's credit quality, as well as collateral seasoning since
our rating affirmations following the April 2013 effective date.
Since then, the reported weighted average life has decreased to
4.53 years from 5.83 years.  Because time horizon factors heavily
into default probability, a shorter weighted average life
positively affects the creditworthiness of the collateral pool.  In
addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has increased
during this period, and this diversification has contributed to the
improved credit quality.  The collateral seasoning, combined with
the improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.

Although there has been a modest increase in assets rated in the
'CCC' category, this factor is offset by the decline in the
weighted average life and positive credit quality migration of the
collateral portfolio, both of which have lowered the credit risk
profile.

Additionally, par gain in the underlying portfolio since the
effective date has led to an increase in the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios from the April 2013 trustee report:

   -- The class A/B O/C increased to 132.47% from 131.56%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 120.80% from 119.97%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 114.70% from 113.91%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio increased to 109.36% from 108.61%.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class D and E notes, its rating actions considered the cushion at
the higher ratings and additional sensitivity runs that reflected
the exposure to specific distressed industries and allowed for
volatility in the underlying portfolio because the transaction is
still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the class A, D, and E notes reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to S&P's May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED
Canyon Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                 Rating
Class       To          From
B-1         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Canyon Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-3, Ltd:

US$90,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$34,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$42,300,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$6,700,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on August 26, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$359,400,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 26, 2014 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-3, Ltd, issued in August
2014, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in July 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of the collateral
pool's outperformance versus certain covenant requirements. In
particular, Moody's expects that the deal will continue to benefit
from a higher weighted average recovery rate (WARR) level compared
to its covenant level. Additionally, the deal is expected to
benefit from an increase in excess spread resulting from the
refinancing of the Class A-1B notes. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are stable.


CENT CLO 18: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, C-1,
C-2, and D notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A, E, and P
notes from Cent CLO 18 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in June 2013 and is managed by
Columbia Management Investment Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 15, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect an increase in assets rated 'BB-'
and higher since S&P's effective date rating affirmations in July
2013.  The transaction has also benefited from collateral
seasoning, with the reported weighted average life decreasing to
4.29 years from 5.34 years as of the effective date.  Because time
horizon factors heavily into default probability, a shorter
weighted average life positively affects the collateral pool's
creditworthiness.  This seasoning, combined with the improved
credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk profile,
which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche ratings.

Although there has been a modest increase in defaulted assets and
assets rated in the 'CCC' category, these factors are offset by the
reduced weighted average life and positive credit migration of the
collateral portfolio, which have lowered its credit risk profile.

According to the June 2016 trustee report, each class'
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio has mildly declined since S&P's
July 2013 rating affirmations.

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio decreased to 130.24% from 131.67%.  
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 119.78% from 121.09%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 112.95% from 114.19%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 106.58% from 107.74%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and are
above their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C-1, C-2, D, and E notes, its rating actions took into
account additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A, E, and P notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Cent CLO 18 Ltd.

              Rating        Rating
Class         To            From
B-1           AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
B-2           AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
C-1           A+ (sf)       A (sf)
C-2           A+ (sf)       A (sf)
D             BBB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Cent CLO 18 Ltd.
                
Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
E             BB- (sf)
P             AA+p (sf)

p--Principal only.


CGWF COMMERCIAL 2013-RKWH: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from CGWF Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-RKWH, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on three
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificate classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included revaluating the portfolio of
14 full-service, limited-service and extended stay hotels serving
as the collateral securing the $241.8 million, interest-only,
floating-rate mortgage loan.  Although the portfolio's
servicer-reported revenue per available room (RevPAR) and net cash
flow (NCF) have improved since issuance, S&P's analysis also
considered the potential for the portfolio's performance to
moderate as supply growth throughout the U.S. increases and/or if
economic conditions should weaken.  S&P also considered the deal
structure and liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings on classes B, C, and D reflect S&P's expectation
of the available credit enhancement for these classes, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrades
also follow S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance and reduced trust balance.

S&P raised its ratings on the class X-CP and X-NCP interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
the lowest rated reference class.  The notional balances on classes
X-CP and X-NCP reference classes A-2, B, and C.

The affirmations on classes A-1, A-2, and E reflect subordination
and liquidity that are consistent with the outstanding ratings.

S&P's analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging properties that secure the
trust's mortgage loan.  The transaction was originally secured by
16 hotels totaling 2,724 guestrooms; however, the Courtyard Naples
(102 rooms) and Sheraton Suites Key West hotels (184 rooms) were
released in January 2015 and June 2015, respectively.  The current
portfolio of 14 hotels (2,438 guestrooms) is located in coastal
markets throughout the eastern U.S., primarily in Florida (seven
properties) and New England (five properties).  S&P considered the
servicer-reported cash flows and occupancy for the past two years.
S&P then derived its sustainable in-place NCF, which S&P divided by
a 9.32% weighted average capitalization rate to determine S&P's
expected-case value.  This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 75.8% based on the trust balance and
an S&P Global Ratings debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.68x based on
a stressed rate plus the spread of 2.989%.

According to the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has a $241.8 million trust and whole-loan balance,
down from $295.0 million at issuance.  The mortgage loan had an
initial two-year term, which matured in November 2015, with three
successive one-year extension options.  In November 2015, the
borrower exercised one of the three extension options and now has
two one-year extension options remaining.  The loan is
interest-only for the entire term and has a floating rate equal to
LIBOR (according to the July 2016 trustee remittance report, LIBOR
is currently at 0.443%) plus 2.989% during the entire loan term.

At issuance, the borrowers entered into an interest rate cap
agreement, with a 3.50% strike price during the initial term.  The
interest rate cap agreement at issuance complied with S&P Global
Ratings' counterparty criteria.  S&P has requested and have not
received from the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the
extension interest rate cap agreement; as such, we’ve performed
an additional interest rate stress using the Cox-Ingersol-Ross
curve to account for the uncertainty around whether or not an
interest rate cap agreement is still in place.

In addition to the first-mortgage loan, there are two interest-only
mezzanine loans totaling $105 million in the form of a
$55.0 million senior mezzanine loan and a $50 million junior
mezzanine loan.  The weighted average interest rate on the
mezzanine loan is LIBOR plus 7.03%. The mezzanine loans are
coterminous with the mortgage loan.  Considering the mortgage loan
was extended in 2015, S&P assumes the mezzanine loan has been
extended as well.

According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections the special
servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NCF for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, trailing 12
months ended July 31, 2013, and three months ended March 31, 2016,
mainly provided by the master servicer to determine S&P's opinion
of a sustainable cash flow for the lodging properties. Wells Fargo
reported an overall DSC of 4.11x on the trust balance for the 12
months ended Dec. 31, 2015, and overall occupancy was 69.5% as of
March 31, 2016.

RATINGS LIST

CGWF Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-RKWH
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-RKWH
                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To                  From
A-1               125401AA7        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
A-2               125401AC3        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
X-CP              125401AN9        A+ (sf)             A- (sf)
B                 125401AE9        AA+ (sf)            AA- (sf)
C                 125401AG4        A+ (sf)             A- (sf)
D                 125401AJ8        BBB (sf)            BBB- (sf)
E                 125401AL3        BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)
X-NCP             125401AQ2        A+ (sf)             A- (sf)


CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Fitch Assigns BB Rating on Cl. M-4 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-2
(CMT 2016-2) as follows:

   -- $2,248,891,000 class A certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $125,673,000 class M-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $149,485,000 class M-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,269,000 class M-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $33,072,000 class M-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $38,364,323 class B certificates.

This is the second RMBS transaction rated by Fitch in which the
issuer intends to comply with the conditions set forth in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) Securitization Safe Harbor
Rule (the Rule).  The FDIC confirms legal isolation of the
securitized assets from the seller in the case of its insolvency if
the issuer complies with the conditions in the Rule.

The certificates are supported by 8,953 high quality prime jumbo
and agency conforming loans with a total balance of approximately
$2.65 billion as of the cutoff date.  Credit enhancement for the
'AAAsf' certificates of 10.25% reflects Fitch's loss expectations
of 7.25% plus additional enhancement needed due to structural
features such as the full pro rata pay structure, the lack of
principal and interest advancing, and the servicing incentive fees
paid from available funds.  Fitch believes that many of the Safe
Harbor Rule requirements align the interests of the sponsor and
originator with those of the certificate holders and are credit
positive for the transaction.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above-Average Originator: Based on its review of JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.'s (Chase) origination platform for agency and non-agency
loans, Fitch believes that the bank has strong processes and
procedures in place and views its ability to originate agency and
non-agency loans as above average.  Fitch reduced its probability
of default by 93 basis points (bps) at the 'AAAsf' stress scenario
to account for the strong operational quality of the loans.

High-Quality Fixed-Rate Mortgages: The transaction includes a mix
of conforming (55% by balance) and non-conforming collateral (45%)
made to prime quality borrowers.  All of the loans were originated
either by Chase or by one of its correspondents in accordance with
its relevant guidelines.  The collateral consists of up to 30-year
fixed-rate mortgage loans and is seasoned roughly 12 months.

Strong Due Diligence Results: Loan level due diligence was
performed on 100% of the non-conforming loans and a statistical
sample for the agency loans.  The diligence sample size and scope
for the agency loans are consistent with those of other
risk-sharing transactions referencing Chase mortgage collateral and
rated by Fitch.  All but 44 of the agency loans received an 'A' or
'B' grade, indicating strong underwriting practices and sound
quality control procedures.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The 10.25% initial credit enhancement
for the 'AAAsf' certificates is materially higher than Fitch's
'AAAsf' mortgage pool loss expectation of 7.25%, reflecting
structural features such as the lack of delinquent principal and
interest advances, pro rata principal distribution and the
servicing incentive fees and other expenses paid from available
funds.

No Servicer P&I Advances: While the Rule allows for servicing
advancing up to a maximum of 90 days, this transaction is not
incorporating any advancing of delinquent principal and interest
(P&I).  As P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become
delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to
the trust, the loan-level loss severities (LS) are less for this
transaction than for those where the servicers are obligated to
advance P&I.  Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' rated classes.

Pro Rata Structure: Unlike prime jumbo securitizations issued post
crisis, this transaction will incorporate a pro rata principal
distribution among all classes starting on the first payment date.
This allows for a larger amount of principal to be distributed to
the subordinate bonds and a faster depletion of credit enhancement
than a standard shifting interest structure.  However, the
transaction incorporates various performance triggers that can lock
the subordinate bonds out of principal, and a subordination floor
of 50 bps prevents distributions to the subordinate bonds to
protect against adverse selection risk as the collateral pool pays
down.  The initial credit enhancement reflects the probability of
subordinate balance paydowns over time.

Strong Alignment of Interests: Because the Rule requires the
sponsor, Chase, to retain an economic interest of at least 5% of
the credit risk of the securitized assets, Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from a strong alignment of interest in the
credit risk of the underlying collateral.  The sponsor intends to
retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of certificates (other
than the class A-R certificates).

Loan Compliance Representation and Warranty: The Rule requires that
the loan documents for an RMBS transaction contain an additional
representation regarding loan underwriting compliance with
supervisory guidance governing the underwriting of residential
mortgages, including the Interagency Guidance on Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products, Oct. 5, 2006, and the Interagency Statement on
Subprime Mortgage Lending, July 10, 2007, and such other or
additional guidance applicable at the time of loan origination,
which, in Fitch's view, provides additional assurances about the
sound quality of the underlying pool.

Rep and Warranty Qualifiers: While the Rule for RMBS requires that
5% of the cash proceeds due to the sponsor be held in a reserve
fund for 12 months for loan repurchases due to breaches of reps and
warranties, which further aligns the interests of the seller with
those of the certificateholders, many of the reps contain
qualifying or conditional language that could result in fewer loan
repurchases.  For this reason, Fitch increased the probability of
default for the 'AAAsf' class by 60 bps.

Servicing Framework to Benefit All Classes: The Rule requires that
RMBS loan servicing be conducted in accordance with best practices
for asset management; loss mitigation to commence when a loan
becomes 90 days delinquent; and that incentive fees be paid for
loan restructuring or other loss mitigation activities that
maximize the net present value of the loans.  This requirement,
which also mandates that records be kept for subsequent review by
the trustee or an investor representative, is intended to protect
all classes from potentially detrimental activities that benefit
one class of investors at the expense of another.  Servicing
incentive fees are paid from available funds.

Potential Expense Volatility: Extraordinary expenses, which include
loan file review costs, arbitration expenses for enforcement of the
reps and additional fees of the transaction reviewer and
calculation agent, will reduce the amount available, but not the
amount owed, to the bondholders.  Additionally, certain expenses
related to the breach reviewer are not subject to an annual expense
cap.  This construct can result in principal and interest
shortfalls to the bonds starting from the bottom of the capital
structure.  The 'AAAsf' subordination was increased by 0.80% to
account for the risk of these non-credit events.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level.  The implied rating sensitivities
are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected base-case 4.7%.  The analysis indicates that there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example, additional MVD
of 7%, 33% and 54% could potentially lower the 'AAAsf' rated class
one rating category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-2: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Cl. M-4 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-2 (Chase 2016-2). The ratings range from
Aaa (sf) to B1 (sf).

Chase 2016-2 is potentially the second residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transaction issued under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) securitization safe harbor rule that
went into effect September 30, 2010. Unlike other RMBS transactions
that structure the transfer of mortgage loans to the trust as legal
"true sales " to achieve de-linkage from the effects of a sponsor
insolvency, this transaction has been structured under the
securitization safe harbor rule to mitigate the risk of the FDIC's
exercise of its repudiation power in the unlikely event that the
FDIC becomes the receiver or conservator of JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (JPMCB or Chase) (LT/ST: Aa2/P-1). JPMCB has retained 5% of
each class of certificates to comply with FDIC safe harbor
provisions, effectively providing some risk retention and aligning
its incentives with investors incentives in the transaction.

Similar to the prior transaction, Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1
(Chase 2016-1), this transaction incorporates several features
unique to post-crisis RMBS that are credit positive for the
bondholders in the transaction. Specifically: 1) A pro-rata payment
structure with multiple and more stringent performance triggers
than other post-crisis transactions; these triggers redirect to the
more senior notes cash that would otherwise go to the junior notes
in the event of performance deterioration, 2) lack of principal and
interest (P&I) servicer advancing that will boost ultimate
liquidation recoveries on delinquent loans available for senior
bondholders. The lack of P&I advancing will also reduce the
unpredictability of cash flows driven by a servicer stop-advance
policies or practices and 3) immediate recognition of modification
losses which will allocate more cash to senior bonds because
written-down junior bonds accrue less interest.

Separately, the transaction protects against disruption of cash
flow to the bonds and resulting in interest shortfalls due to the
lack of P&I advancing by providing for interest payments (including
interest shortfalls if any) and principal payments to be paid from
aggregate available funds. Moreover, Chase is obligated to make
protective advances in respect of certain taxes, insurance premiums
and the cost of the preservation, restoration and protection of the
mortgaged properties and any enforcement or judicial proceedings,
including foreclosures.

The certificates are backed by one pool of 8,953 (55% conforming
and 45% non-conforming) prime quality, fixed rate, first-lien
residential mortgage loans, originated by Chase, who will also act
as the servicer for this transaction. Three loans were purchased
out of the pool between the date of the final private placement
memorandum and the closing date (the collateral statistics
presented in this press release are based on the final private
placement memorandum). U.S. Bank Trust National Association will
serve as the trustee.

Chase 2016-2 has a number of important structural and collateral
differences compared to Chase 2016-1. Collateral changes include a
lower percentage of conforming loans (55.0% by loan balance for
Chase 2016-2 compared to 74.2% for Chase 2016-1), higher percentage
of loans originated through the correspondent channel (73.1% for
Chase 2016-2 compared to 65.7% for Chase 2016-1) and less seasoning
of the loans (weighted average (WA) seasoning of 12 months for
Chase 2016-2 compared to 14 months for Chase 2016-1). Structural
changes include the redefinition of the Class M-1 certificate from
a subordinate certificate and to a senior certificate, a decrease
in credit enhancement for the subordinate certificates and an
increase in credit enhancement for the Class A certificate. Also,
there have been certain changes to the servicer's compensation
structure in the transaction as described in detail in our pre-sale
report.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-2

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the collateral pool average
0.50% in a base scenario and reach 5.30% at a stress level
consistent with the Aaa ratings on the senior certificate.

Moody's said, "We calculated losses on the pool using our US
Moody's Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model-implied losses included adjustments to
borrower probability of default for higher and lower borrower
debt-to-income ratios (DTIs), borrowers with multiple mortgaged
properties, self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of
HOA properties in super lien states. Our final loss estimates also
incorporate adjustments related to our originator assessment (we
assess Chase as a strong originator of prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans) and the third-party review (TPR) findings. For the
conforming loans, we modeled our severity estimate using conforming
loan-specific severity data published by Freddie Mac.

"Given the unique pro-rata pay structure, servicing fee structure
and the lack of P&I advancing in the transaction, we modeled the
cash flows under a range of loss timing, servicing fee and
stop-advance assumptions to evaluate the impact on the bonds and
the resulting ratings under the different scenarios. Our final
ratings on the bonds incorporate the results under the different
scenarios."

Key Collateral Characteristics

Chase 2016-2 is a securitization of a pool of 8,953 fixed-rate
prime conforming and non-conforming fully-amortizing loans with a
total balance of $2,645,754,324, a WA remaining term to maturity of
347 months, and a WA seasoning of 12 months. The borrowers in this
transaction have high FICO scores and sizeable equity in their
properties. The WA current FICO score is 768 and the WA original
combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is 79.0%. Although the majority
of the loans were originated through a correspondent lender
(73.1%), this is offset by the stronger property types (57.9%
single-family), occupancy (98.8% owner-occupied) and purpose (74.8%
purchase) of the loans. Moreover, the pool is geographically
diverse with 26.5% of the loans originated in California, 8.0% in
Illinois and 7.5% in New York. The characteristics of the loans
underlying the pool are comparable to that of Chase 2016-1 and
recent GSE credit risk transfer and prime deals that Moody's has
rated.

All of the mortgage loans in the pool were originated by Chase.
Chase is a strong originator based on Moody's originator assessment
for prime jumbo loans. Reflecting its assessment of Chase's prime
jumbo underwriting, Moody's reduced its loss expectations by a
relative 5% for the non-conforming portion of the pool.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC) and Opus Capital Markets Consultants LLC
(Opus), independent third-party diligence providers, conducted
reviews for the loans in the pool. 100% of the non-conforming pool
and a 15.9% random sample of the conforming loans in the initial
pool (certain loans were removed before the final securitization)
were reviewed. All loans were reviewed for credit, compliance,
appraisal and data integrity. None of the non-conforming loans
reviewed had any significant defects, while 15 of the 815
conforming loans reviewed by AMC and 30 out of 933 reviewed by Opus
received final Moody's overall grades of Cs or Ds. All but one of
these loans were removed from the pool (the one loan that was not
removed received a C grade for property valuation because the
origination appraisal was too low). Any data discrepancies
identified were repaired and updated on the loan tape. Moody's
said, "We increased our Aaa loss expectations marginally to reflect
the findings of the conforming loans' due diligence review because
only a sample of the conforming loans was reviewed. Specifically,
we extrapolated the findings from the sample review to the broader
pool that did not benefit from the due diligence review and then
applied adjustments to Aaa loss expectations."

All of the loans were originated prior to October 2015, thus no
loans were subject to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID)
rule, which became effective 3 October 2015. Moreover, all 1,592
non-conforming loans either adhere to the Ability-To-Repay
(ATR)/Qualified Mortgage (QM) rule or are QM not applicable because
they are investment properties or were originated before the rule
went into effect. Additionally, because the conforming loans were
underwritten to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines, they meet QM
standards.

Moody's said, "JPMCB, the originator and the seller, has provided
clear representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an
unqualified fraud R&W. There is a provision for binding arbitration
in the event of dispute between investors and the R&W provider
concerning R&W breaches. The breach review is objective, thorough,
transparent, consistent and independent, and will be conducted by
Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC who is an independent third-party with
expertise in forensic loan reviews. The securities administrator
has established and will maintain a repurchase reserve fund which
will be held for 12 months and is initially equal to 5% of the cash
proceeds from the securitization. Given the originator's business
practices and the sunset period for the reserve fund we don't
expect this fund to be utilized materially but it does provide
additional support to the R&W framework."

Servicing Arrangement

Moody's said, "We consider the overall servicing arrangement for
this pool to be adequate. We assess Chase at SQ2, indicating an
above average servicing ability as a primary servicer of prime
residential mortgage loans."

Servicing compensation for loans serviced by Chase in this
transaction is based on a fee-for-service incentive structure. The
fee-for-service incentive structure includes an initial base fee of
$20 per loan monthly for all performing loans and increases if the
loans default with monetary incentive fees for curing, modifying,
or liquidating non-performing loans. By establishing a base
servicing fee for performing loans that increases with the
delinquency of loans, the fee-for-service structure aligns payments
to the servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's
performance. Class B (NR) is first in line to absorb any increase
in servicing costs above the base servicing costs.

The institutional and reputational strength of the servicer,
alignment of costs with the monetary compensation for more
difficult tasks, and incentive alignment due to risk retention
requirements under FDIC safe harbor collectively mitigate the moral
hazard that the servicing arrangement will unduly influence the
servicer's behavior. By contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a
servicer can take actions, such as modifications and prolonged work
outs, which increase the value of its mortgage servicing rights.

The Transaction Structure

The transaction follows a simple pro-rata payment structure amongst
the certificates with reverse sequential loss allocation and strong
performance tests. High initial subordination relative to standard
shifting interest (SI) structures and the presence of strong
performance tests make the pro-rata transaction structure neutral
to SI structures. Moreover, the transaction allows for all funds
collected (defined as the available distribution amount), including
interest and principal payments, liquidation proceeds, subsequent
recoveries, insurance proceeds and repurchase amounts, to be used
to make interest payments and then principal payments to the senior
bonds and subordinate bonds on a pro-rata basis. However, any trust
expenses (subject to an annual expense cap of $500K) and other
expenses are deducted from available distribution. This will reduce
the funds available to pay the certificates.

By itself, the pro-rata structure is weaker than SI structures
since unlike SI structures that feature a blanket lock-out period
during which senior bonds amortize faster, the pro-rata structure
allows for depletion of subordination at the outset resulting in
exposure to the senior bonds to credit deterioration. However, this
transaction effectively mitigates against this risk through the
multiple and stringent performance tests that divert payments to
the bonds with higher payment priorities in the waterfall upon
performance deterioration. Also, it is potentially the second prime
transaction in the US (after Chase 2016-1) which recognizes and
incorporates, through certain performance tests, future losses that
may result from loans that are already seriously delinquent.

Performance Tests

The transaction will allocate 100% of prepayments to the senior
bonds if the current senior percentage exceeds the senior
percentage as of the closing date minus 25% of the non-performing
loan balance, defined as the percentage of loans that are more than
90 days delinquent, in foreclosure, subject to bankruptcy, or are
real-estate owned (REO). Although not strong as the lock-out
feature in SI deals, this test is a strong mitigant to the pro-rata
structure since it allows for faster amortization of the senior
bonds (and hence percentage increase in credit enhancement) in the
event of collateral under-performance.

The transaction provides for Class B lock-out amount of
$13,300,000, which mitigates tail risk by protecting both the
senior and subordinate bonds from eroding credit enhancement over
time.

Additionally, all principal collected will be used to pay down the
senior certificates if the aggregate class principal amount of the
subordinate certificates is less than or equal to 0.50% of the
cut-off date balance, or the aggregate class principle balance of
the Class M-4 and the Class B certificates is zero, or the six
months average 60 days or more delinquent (including foreclosure,
bankruptcy and REO) loans and all modified loans within 12 months
prior to distribution date equals or exceeds 25% of current
aggregate balance of subordinate certificates, or cumulative
realized loss amount exceeds 10% of original subordinate balance.
The delinquency and cumulative loss tests here are stronger than in
standard SI deals which set these triggers typically at 50% of
subordination balance and up to 40% of the original subordination
amount. The delinquency and cumulative loss tests are tighter in
Chase 2016-2 than in Chase 2016-1 given the lower initial
subordinate percentage for Chase 2016-2 (10.25%) compared to Chase
2016-1 (12.25%). This lower initial subordinate percentage is due
to the Class M-1 certificate being redefined as a senior
certificate in Chase 2016-2.

For each class of subordinate certificates (other than the
subordinate certificate then outstanding with the highest payment
priority), if the sum of the subordinate class percentage for such
class and that of the classes below is less than the sum of the
original credit support of that class and 25% of the non-performing
loan percentage, then the subordinate principal distribution will
be zero. Class M-1 no longer benefits from this test since it is
now a senior bond.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Ups Cl. C Debt Rating to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on two classes and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4 as
follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes B and C were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 83% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes D and E were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected. Seven loans,
representing 67% of the pool balance are currently in special
servicing.

The rating on Class F was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed because it does
not currently receive, nor is expected to receive, any interest
payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 31% of the
current balance, compared to 4.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $118.3
million from $2.26 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 26% of the pool. One loan, constituting 5.1% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 10% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $152.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 51%). Seven loans, constituting 67% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the DuBois Mall Loan ($30.3 million -- 26% of the pool), which
is secured by an enclosed mall and outparcels totaling 439,000
square feet (SF). The property is located in Dubois, Pennsylvania,
approximately 100 miles northeast of Pittsburgh. The mall is
anchored by Sears, JC Penney, Big Lots and Ross Dress for Less. As
of year-end 2015, the total property was 92% leased, unchanged from
the prior year. The loan transferred to special servicing in May
2016 for maturity default. The special servicer indicated that
negotiations with the borrower will be dual tracked with
foreclosure.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $35.3 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (45% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 86% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 14% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%, compared to
94% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.06X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the State & Perryville Shopping Center Loan ($12
million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 111,000 SF
anchored retail shopping center in Rockford, Illinois. The loan had
an Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) of May 11, 2016. The borrower
requested a short-term extension in connection with the sale of the
property. As of March 2016, the property was 100% leased, unchanged
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
0.94X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.90X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreen's -- Henderson, NV Loan
($7.04 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 14,500
SF single tenant retail building in Henderson, Nevada. The property
is 100% occupied by Walgreens through April 2079. Moody's
incorporated a lit/dark analysis to account for the single tenant
risk. The loan has amortized 11% since securitization and has an
ARD in January 2021. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and
0.85X, respectively, compared to 99% and 0.93X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the G4 Portfolio Loan ($5.1 million --
4.3% of the pool), which is secured by three single tenant retail
buildings located in Texas, Ohio and Michigan. Two properties are
100% leased by Advanced Auto Parts and the remaining property is
leased to United Supermarket. The loan has amortized 11% since
securitization and has an ARD in February 2021. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 102%
and 0.93X at the last review.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-P4: Fitch Rates Class E Certs 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-P4 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

-- $24,619,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,384,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $201,346,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,461,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $553,488,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,255,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,678,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,255,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,353,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,565,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73,918,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,931,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,113,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

    a - Notional amount and interest-only.
    b - Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $7,211,000b class G or $25,241,407b class
H. The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 45 loans secured by 64
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$721,157,407 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Macquarie US
Trading LLC d/b/a Principal Commercial Capital, Starwood Mortgage
Funding V LLC and Barclays Bank PLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.2% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
81.3% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are higher
than other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.13x is below the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average of 1.17x and
full-year 2015 average of 1.18x, respectively. The pool's Fitch
loan to value (LTV) of 111.1% is above the YTD 2016 and 2015
averages of 107.5% and 109.3%, respectively.

Average Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans make up 50.9% of the
pool, which is below the YTD 2016 average of 55.4%, but above the
2015 average of 49.3% for other Fitch-rated fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) of 389 is below the YTD 2016 average of 428, but above the
2015 average of 367.

High Lodging Exposure: Approximately 19.3% of the pool by balance,
including six of the top 20 loans, consists of hotel properties.
Hotel concentration in the pool is greater than the YTD 2016 and
2015 averages of 15.9% and 17.0%, respectively. Hotels have the
highest probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower CMBS
model.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-P4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP. The third-party due diligence information was provided on
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2005-WF1: Moody's Ups M-1 Debt Rating to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches from three transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM
RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FLX4

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2005-A2

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class X-C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in COMM 2005-C6 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the Classes E and F were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 25% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the Class G was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was affirmed at C (sf)
because it is not, nor expected to, receive interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.4% of the
current balance, compared to 18.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $61.9 million
from $2.27 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 50%
of the pool. Two loans, constituting 4.6% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

No loans are on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist
includes loans that meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $104 million (for an average loss
severity of 48%). Seven loans, constituting 35.9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
exposure is the Petco Portfolio ($11.7 million -- 19.0% of the
pool), which is secured by four cross-collateralized,
cross-defaulted loans backed by retail properties located in Kansas
and Ohio. All four properties are single tenant, stand-alone
buildings leased to Petco until October 2018. The loans transferred
to special servicing in August 2015 after they failed to payoff by
their June 2015 maturity date. The borrower has indicated that the
assets are in the judicial foreclosure process and awaiting final
judgment and scheduling of a sale.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.1 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (32% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 63%, compared to
66% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.3% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.63X and 1.76X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.63X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 58.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the MacArthur Portfolio Loan ($30.7 million --
49.6% of the pool), which is secured by seven condominium interests
of 68,000 SF of ground level retail and second floor professional
office units located on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. The
tenant mix at the properties is comprised of local and national
retail businesses. As of March 2016, the properties were 80% leased
compared to 86% at the prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 64% and 1.53X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.46X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens - Greenville Loan ($2.8
million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000 SF
single tenant retail property occupied by Walgreens in
Simpsonville, South Carolina. The Walgreen's lease expires in 2030,
which is co-terminus with the loan maturity. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 105%
and 0.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 9701 Apollo Drive Loan ($2.6 million
-- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 94,000 SF, four story,
class-A suburban office property located east of Washington D.C. in
Largo, Maryland. The location benefits from easy access to the
Capital Beltway, Metro Shuttle and bus. As of December 2015, the
property was 85% leased compared to 88% at the prior review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 17% and >4.00X, respectively,
compared to 23% and 4.27X at the last review.


COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2014-CCRE19 Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through
Certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool since issuance.  As of the July 2016, distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
1.8% to $1.154 billion from $1.174 billion at issuance.  Four loans
(2.2% of the pool) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern, one of
which is a specially serviced loan (0.4% of the pool).

The specially serviced loan is secured by Pheasant Ridge II
Apartments; a 42 unit apartment community built in 2013 and located
in Watford City, ND in the Bakken Shale region.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in February 2016 due to payment
default.  Property operations have been impacted by the oil crisis
and there has been a severe decline in occupancy at the property.
Occupancy declined to 29% as of April 2016, which is down from 50%
as of year-end (YE) 2015 and 100% as of YE 2014.  Net operating
income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 0.41x, 1.74x,
and 2.40x as of year-to-date (YTD) April 2016, YE 2015, and YE
2014, respectively.  The special servicer is working with counsel
to seek the appointment of a receiver.  Due to the size of the loan
relative to the pool, Fitch anticipates impact in the event of loss
to be minimal.  Fitch will continue to monitor.

The largest loan in the pool (6.6% of the pool) is Bridgepoint
Tower, a 273,764 square foot (sf) LEED-certified office building
located in San Diego, CA.  The 11-story tower was constructed in
2008 and is 100% occupied by Bridgepoint Education, Inc.
(expiration February 2020).  The sponsor developed the property as
a multitenant property in 2008.  Bridgepoint originally occupied 10
of 11 floors but ultimately expanded to take occupancy of the
entire building.  Performance has remained stable since issuance
with a 2.15x NOI DSCR as of YE 2015.

The second largest loan in the pool (5.5% of the pool) is The
Shoppes at Webb Gin, a 358,254 sf open air retail center consisting
of 10 buildings located in Snellville, GA (metro Atlanta).  The
property has two anchors including Sprouts Farmers Market (7.3% net
rentable area [NRA], expiration September 2029) and Barnes & Noble
(7.4% NRA, expiration January 2019). Performance is stable with
occupancy at 79% (in-line with issuance) and a 1.91x NOI DSCR as of
YE 2015.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks reflect stable pool performance since issuance.
Due to the recent issuance of the transaction and stable
performance, Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset level event changes
the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings as indicated:

   -- $49.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $168.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $94.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $190 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $283.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $890,816,932a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $108,610,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $89.5b million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.8b million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $52.8b million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $198.1b million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $64.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

  a. Notional amount and interest only.
  b. Class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
     PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged

     for class A-M, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class F, G, and H certificates or the
interest-only X-C and X-D certificates.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2016-C04: Moody's Rates Class 1M-2 Debt 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of notes on CAS 2016-C04, a securitization designed to
provide credit protection to the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) against the performance of a reference
pool of mortgages totaling approximately $42 billion. All of the
Notes in the transaction are direct, unsecured obligations of
Fannie Mae, and as such investors are exposed to the credit risk of
Fannie Mae (Aaa Stable).

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C04

$500.9 million of Cl. 1M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$701.2 million of Cl. 1M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

The Class 1M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$300.5 million of Cl. 1M-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

$400.7 million of Cl. 1M-2B, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class 1M-2A note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$300.5 million of Cl. 1M-2F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

$300.5 million of Cl. 1M-2I, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

CAS 2016-C04 is the thirteenth transaction in the Connecticut
Avenue Securities series issued by Fannie Mae. Unlike a typical
RMBS transaction, noteholders are not entitled to receive any cash
from the mortgage loans in the reference pool. Instead, the timing
and amount of principal and interest that Fannie Mae is obligated
to pay on the Notes is linked to the performance of the mortgage
loans in the reference pool.

CAS 2016-C04's note write-downs are determined by actual realized
losses and modification losses on the loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to pre-set tiered severity schedules. In addition, the
interest amount paid to the notes can be reduced by the amount of
modification loss incurred on the mortgage loans. CAS 2016-C04 is
also the fifth transaction in the CAS series to have a legal final
maturity of 12.5 years, as compared to 10 years in previous fixed
severity CAS securitizations.

Moody's rating on the transaction is based on both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. This included a quantitative evaluation of
the credit quality of the reference pool and the impact of the
structural mechanisms on credit enhancement. In addition, Moody's
made qualitative assessments of counterparty performance.

Moody's base-case expected loss for the reference pool is 1.10% and
is expected to reach 9.45% at a stress level consistent with a Aaa
rating.

Below is a summary description of the transaction and Moody's
rating rationale.

The Notes

The 1M-1 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The 1M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the 1M-2 notes can
exchange those notes for an 1M-2A exchangeable note and an 1M-2B
exchangeable note (together referred as the  "Exchangeable Notes
").

Additionally, the holders of the 1M-2A notes can exchange those
notes for the 1M-2F note and the 1M-2I note (together with the 1M-2
note referred as the  "RCR Notes "). The 1M-2I exchangeable notes
are fixed rate interest only notes that have a notional balance
that equals the 1M-2A note balance. The 1M-2F notes are adjustable
rate P&I notes that have a balance that equals the 1M-2A note
balance and an interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

Fannie Mae will only make principal payments on the notes based on
the scheduled and unscheduled principal payments that are actually
collected on the reference pool mortgages. Losses on the notes
occur as a result of credit events, and are determined by actual
realized and modification losses on loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to a pre-set loss severity schedule. Fannie Mae is
obligated to retire the Notes in January 2029 if balances remain
outstanding.

Credit events in CAS 2016-C04 occur when a short sale is settled,
when a mortgage note that is 12 or more months delinquent is sold
prior to foreclosure, when the mortgaged property that secured the
related mortgage note is sold to a third party at a foreclosure
sale, when an REO disposition occurs, or when the related mortgage
note is charged-off. This differs from previous CAS fixed severity
securitizations, where credit events occur as early as when a
reference obligation is 180 or more days delinquent.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

As part of its analysis, Moody's considered historic Fannie Mae
performance and severity data, the eligibility criteria of loans in
the reference pool, and the high credit quality of the underlying
collateral. The reference pool consists of loans that Fannie Mae
acquired between July 1, 2015 and October 31, 2015, and have no
previous 30-day delinquencies. The loans in the reference pool are
to strong borrowers, as the weighted average credit scores of 748
indicate. The weighted average CLTV of 76.70% is higher than recent
private label prime jumbo deals, which typically have CLTVs in the
high 60's range, but is similar to the weighted average CLTVs of
other CAS transactions.

Structural Considerations

Moody's took structural features such as the principal payment
waterfall of the notes, a 12.5-year bullet maturity, performance
triggers, as well as the allocation of realized losses and
modification losses into consideration in its cash flow analysis.
The final structure for the transaction reflects consistent credit
enhancement levels available to the notes per the term sheet
provided for the provisional ratings.

For modification losses, Moody's has taken into consideration the
level of rate modifications based on the projected defaults, the
weighted average coupon of the reference pool (4.21%), and compared
that with the available credit enhancement on the notes, the coupon
and the accrued interest amount of the most junior bonds. The Class
1B and Class 1B-H reference tranches colletively represent 1.00% of
the pool. The final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the
amount of interest available to absorb modification losses from the
reference pool. "

The ratings are linked to Fannie Mae's rating. As an unsecured
general obligation of Fannie Mae, the rating on the notes will be
capped by the rating of Fannie Mae, which Moody's currently rates
Aaa (stable).

Collateral Analysis

The reference pool consists of 183,335 loans that meet specific
eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first lien, fixed
rate, fully amortizing loans with an original term of 301-360
months and LTVs that range between 60% and 80% on one to four unit
properties. Overall, the reference pool is of prime quality. The
credit positive aspects of the pool include borrower, loan and
geographic diversification, and a high weighted average FICO of
748. There are no interest-only (IO) loans in the reference pool
and all of the loans are underwritten to full documentation
standards.

Reps and Warranties

Fannie Mae is not providing loan level reps and warranties (RWs)
for this transaction because the notes are a direct obligation of
Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae commands robust RWs from its
seller/servicers pertaining to all facets of the loan, including
but not limited to compliance with laws, compliance with all
underwriting guidelines, enforceability, good property condition
and appraisal procedures. To the extent that a lender repurchases a
loan or indemnifies Fannie Mae discovers as a result of an
confirmed underwriting eligibility defect in the reference pool,
prior months' credit events will be reversed. Moody's expected
credit event rate takes into consideration historic repurchase
rates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud. As an unsecured general obligation of Fannie Mae, the
ratings on the notes depend on the rating of Fannie Mae, which
Moody's currently rates Aaa.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 6 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes of Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2005-C1 (CSFB 2005-C1), commercial
mortgage pass-through securities.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The master servicer has been withholding all interest and principal
payments until approximately $851,000 of outstanding servicing
advances are recovered.  In the interim, no certificates will
receive interest or principal.

Despite missed interest and principal payments to the certificate
holders, the affirmation of class E reflects Fitch's expectation of
full recovery of interest and principal based on the recoverability
prospects of the remaining collateral pool relative to the small
remaining class size.

The affirmation of the remaining distressed classes (those rated
below 'Bsf') is based upon pool concentration and adverse
selection.  The pool is highly concentrated with only 13 loans
remaining, 10 of which are in special servicing (90% of the pool).
Six of the assets in special servicing are real estate owned (REO;
77.3%), two (8.2%) are classified as in foreclosure and two (4.9%)
are non-performing matured balloons.  The three non-specially
serviced loans are fully amortizing and scheduled to mature in 2024
(5.1%) and 2025 (4.5%), respectively.

Fitch modeled losses of 54.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.6%, including $53
million (3.5% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the July 2016 distribution report, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 96% to $57 million
from $1.51 billion at issuance.  Due to the master servicer
recovering outstanding advances, all classes are currently
experiencing interest shortfalls with cumulative shortfalls
totaling $9 million.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is The Mall at Yuba
City asset (55% of the pool), which is a 408,021 square foot (sf)
enclosed regional mall located in Yuba City, CA.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in March 2011 for imminent
default and became REO in January 2014.  The mall is anchored by
JCPenney (49,697 sf, maturing in 2020) and Sears (73,910 sf,
maturing in 2019).  The mall is the only regional mall in the trade
area; however, cash flow has been below break-even after the
bankruptcy and subsequent departure of former department store
Gottschalks in early 2009.  As of March 2016, the property was 89%
occupied.  The special servicer is currently working to stabilize
the property.

The next largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is The
Heritage Building asset (8.02%), a 94,945 sf stand-alone office
property built in 1906 located in downtown Jackson, MS.  The
property became REO in May 2014.  As of March 2016, the property
was 53% occupied.  The special servicer is completing required
elevator work prior to marketing the asset for sale by the end of
2016.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the 2230
Point Boulevard asset, a 36,472 sf single-story masonry office
building located in Elgin, IL.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in December 2014 for maturity default and became REO in
March 2016.  The special servicer is still in the process of
assessing a resolution strategy.  As of December 2015, the property
was 10% occupied.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on class E reflects high credit enhancement and
the expectation of full repayment of the small remaining class
balance once outstanding servicing advances are recovered.  An
upgrade of class E is not likely due to the concentrated nature of
the pool with the majority in special servicing.  The remaining
classes are distressed and downgrades are likely as losses are
incurred.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings and revises RE as indicated:

   -- $634,093 class E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.8 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $15.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 25%;
   -- $18.9 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $1.9 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-AB, A-3, A-4, A-J, B, C and D certificates
have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
A-X and A-SP certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Hikes $361MM of Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches,
from 7 transactions issued by CSFB backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2004-3

  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 26, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 9, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2004-5

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-6

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-9

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-2

  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AA1

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 9, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of stable or improving performance of the
related pools and/or total credit enhancement available to the
bonds.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-7: Moody''s Hikes Cl. M-5 Debt Rating to B3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
issued by Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-7.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2004-7

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of stable performance of the related
pools and total credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-CF2: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. II-M-1 Debt to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches and downgraded the rating of one tranche issued from three
deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-3

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Mtg Sec Inc 1996-06

  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 17, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CF2

  Cl. II-M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of an increase in
total credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating
downgraded is due to the depletion of credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CWABS REVOLVING 2004-D: Moody's Hikes Cl. 1-A Debt Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 5 tranches and
downgraded the rating of 2 tranches from five deals backed by
second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-D
  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 10, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 10, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-K
  Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 10, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series
2004-M
  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 10, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, INC., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-S1
  Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 17, 2014,
   Downgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-G
  Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2010,
   Confirmed at Ca (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are primarily the result of an
increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The ratings
downgraded are primarily the result of a decrease in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CWHEQ REVOLVING 2006-RES: Moody's Hikes Rating on 4 Tranches to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of four tranches
issued by CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
2006-RES.

The resecuritization is backed by various residential
mortgage-backed securities, backed by second-lien mortgage loans.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
2006-RES

  Cl. 04D-1a, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 04D-1b, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 04M-1a, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 04M-1b, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 11, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are the result of Moody's upgrades on
underlying transactions tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers on the underlying transactions or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


DORAL CLO III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-2 notes from
Doral CLO III Ltd.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class A-1, B, C, and D notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 8, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrade primarily reflects the underlying collateral's
seasoning since S&P's October 2013 effective date rating
affirmations, as well as $18.4 million in paydowns to the senior
notes.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased significantly from the October 2013 effective
date report used for S&P's previous review.  The purchasing of this
higher-rated collateral has resulted in a decrease in reported
weighted average spread to 3.87% from 4.72%, and a corresponding
increase in the weighted average S&P Global Ratings recovery rate.
The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 3.63 years from
5.22 years in October 2013.  Because time horizon factors heavily
into default probability, a shorter weighted average life
positively affects the collateral pool's creditworthiness.  This
seasoning has decreased the overall credit risk profile, which, in
turn, provided more cushion to the tranche ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in assets rated 'CCC+'
and below since the October 2013 effective date report.
Specifically, the level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased
to $34.2 million from $9.9 million.  Overall, the increase in
assets rated 'CCC+' and below has been largely offset by the
decline in the weighted average life and positive portfolio credit
migration of the collateral portfolio.  However, the increase in
assets rated 'CCC+' and below, as well as other factors, has led to
a mild decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios according
to the June 2016 trustee report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 128.85%, down from 130.83%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio was 117.70%, down from 119.63%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 111.84%, down from 113.74%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 105.96%, down from 107.81%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated higher ratings on the class B, C, and D notes.  However,
because the transaction currently has some exposure to 'CCC' rated
collateral obligations and loans from companies in the energy and
commodities sectors (which have come under significant pressure
from falling oil and commodity prices in the past year), S&P did
not upgrade these classes to offset future potential credit
migration in the underlying collateral.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATING RAISED

Doral CLO III Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AA+         AA

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Doral CLO III Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA
B             A
C             BBB
D             BB


FANNIE MAE 2016-C05: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'BB+sf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2016-C05:

-- $385,709,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $257,139,000 class 2M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $459,178,000 class 2M-2B exchangeable notes 'B'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $716,317,000 class 2M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $257,139,000 class 2M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $257,139,000 class 2M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $37,120,941,838 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $20,301,302 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $13,534,534 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $24,167,597 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $80,000,000 class 2B notes;
-- $306,676,477 class 2B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 2M-1 note reflects the 2.95%
subordination provided by the 1.95% class 2M-2 note and the 1.00%
2B note, and their corresponding reference tranches. The notes are
general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae (rated
'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment
risk of a pool of certain residential mortgage loans held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
loan-to-values (LTVs) greater than 80% and less than or equal to
97%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C05 (CAS 2016-C05) is
Fannie Mae's 14th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $38.67 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes is
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 2M-1 and
2M-2 notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the
mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available
through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default Rating. The
notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will
carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from July through December 2015. In this transaction,
Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with LTVs from
80%-97%. Overall, the reference pool's collateral characteristics
are similar to recent CAS transactions and reflect the strong
credit profile of post-crisis mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's sixth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in the pool are covered either by
borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI).
Fannie Mae will be guaranteeing the MI coverage amount, which will
typically be the MI coverage percentage multiplied by the sum of
the unpaid principal balance as of the date of the default, up to
36 months of delinquent interest, taxes and maintenance expenses.
While the Fannie Mae guarantee allows for credit to be given to MI,
Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI available due to the
automatic termination provision as required by the Homeowners
Protection Act when the loan balance is first scheduled to reach
78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 2M-1, 2M-2 and 2B notes
benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or
modification events on the reference pool that occur beyond year
12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. In
addition, credit or modification events that occur prior to
maturity with losses realized from liquidations or modifications
that occur after the final maturity date will not be passed through
to the noteholders. This feature more closely aligns the risk of
loss to that of the 10-year, fixed LS CAS deals where losses were
passed through at the time a credit event occurred (i.e. loans
became 180 days delinquent with no consideration for liquidation
timelines). Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year maturity in its
analysis and applied a reduction to its lifetime default
expectations.

Seller Insolvency Risk Addressed (Positive): A loan will be removed
from the reference pool if a lender has declared bankruptcy or has
been put into receivership and, per the quality-control (QC)
process, an eligibility defect is identified that could otherwise
have resulted in a repurchase. In earlier CAS deals, if a lender
declared bankruptcy or was placed into receivership prior to a
repurchase request made by Fannie Mae for a breach of a rep and
warranty, the loan would not be removed from its related reference
pool or treated as a credit event reversal if it became 180 days
past due. This enhancement reduces the loss exposure arising from
MI claim rescissions due to underwriting breaches by insolvent
sellers.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
second transaction in which Fitch received third-party due
diligence on a loan production basis, as opposed to a
transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that regular, periodic
third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are
sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's QC processes. The sample
selection was limited to a population of 7,262 loans that were
previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's post-purchase QC review
and met the reference pool's eligibility criteria. Of those loans,
1,998 were selected for a full review (credit, property valuation
and compliance) by third-party due diligence providers. Of the
1,998 loans, 552 were part of this transaction's reference pool.
Fitch views the results of the due diligence review as consistent
with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above-average aggregator; as a
result, no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss expectations based
on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
the 2M-1 notes will result in a shorter life and more stable CE
than mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a
relative credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do
not receive a full pro-rata share of the pool's unscheduled
principal payment until year 10, the 2M-1 notes can receive a full
pro-rata share of unscheduled principal immediately, as long as a
minimum CE level is maintained and the delinquency test is
satisfied.

Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the 2M-2 and 2B classes will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled allocations until their 2M-1 classes are paid in full.
The 2B classes will not receive any scheduled or unscheduled
principal allocations until the 2M-2 classes are paid in full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 2A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as at least 50% of the first loss
2B-H reference tranches, sized at 100 bps. Fannie Mae is also
retaining an approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 2M-1
and 2M-2 tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Fitch said, “Under the
Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it
determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations
for more than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as
well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any
contract entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the
termination of such contract would promote an orderly
administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the
U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in our current rating of Fannie Mae. However, if, at some
point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and receivership
likely, the ratings of Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1
notes' ratings affected.”

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 22% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 14% at the 'Bsf'
level. The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Clayton and
Adfitech, Inc. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance
reviews, desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Clayton and
Adfitech examined selected loan files with respect to the presence
or absence of relevant documents. Fitch received certifications
indicating that the loan-level due diligence was conducted in
accordance with Fitch's published standards. The certifications
also stated that the company performed its work in accordance with
the independence standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due
diligence analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of
minimum years of experience. Fitch considered this information in
its analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the
analysis.

The offering documents for CAS 2016-C05 do not disclose any
representations, warranties, or enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that
are available to investors and which relate to the underlying asset
pools.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Flagship
Credit Auto Trust 2016-3's $400 million auto receivables-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 29,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect these key strengths and concerns:

                          KEY STRENGTHS

   -- Flagship is led by a seasoned management team with many
      years of experience in consumer finance, particularly
      subprime auto lending.  Furthermore, Michael Ritter, the
      president, CEO, and founder, has over 37 years of experience

      and had been the CEO at Franklin Acceptance Corp.

   -- The company has completed the integration of two business
      platforms without servicing disruptions and while
      maintaining consistent performance on the Flagship Credit
      Auto Trust (FCAT) indirect portfolio.

   -- Flagship maintains a $1.0 billion warehouse credit facility
      provided by five syndicated banks with a two-year term
      (matures in May 2018).

   -- The company has completed 15 securitizations (10 under the
      Flagship name and five under CarFinance), the oldest of
      which has reached a 12% pool factor, and is performing
      better than S&P's initial expectations.  The FCAT
      transactions with at least 12 months of performance show
      very stable and consistent performance, and appear to be
      performing in line with or better than S&P's initial
      expectations.

   -- Flagship uses a proprietary scorecard model, and S&P
      believes this has contributed to its disciplined
      underwriting approach and consistent performance.

   -- The company has a centralized underwriting and collection
      process and, according to management, does verifications on
      100% of its loans.

   -- Approximately 15% of monthly auto loan origination volume is

      direct to consumers.  Direct lending is marketed through
      different channels, including targeted mailings, an online
      search function, website aggregators, and pass-through
      programs with banks.  Historical data show that direct loans

      have performed better than indirect loans.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A. will act as indenture trustee and
      backup servicer.  It had already data-mapped the company's
      servicing systems, and will receive monthly data tapes and
      confirm certain data on the monthly servicer reports during
      the life of the transaction.  Flagship uses a Shaw servicing

      platform, which is an industry standard.  Deutsche Bank
      National Trust Co. (DBNTC) is the custodian for all loans in

      this transaction.  DBNTC holds the original physical
      contracts for tangible chattel paper and has control of the
      electronic chattel paper (E-contracts).  

                            KEY CONCERNS

   -- Over the past year, the company has received additional
      equity to fund its business and achieve recent growth rates.

      Continued availability of capital may affect its 2016 growth

      rate trajectory.

   -- S&P expects subprime auto companies to face an increased
      competitive environment from banks, captives, and credit
      unions that can price loans aggressively, which will
      continue to put pressure on independent companies' profit
      margins and will make it more difficult to maintain their
      return on asset margins.

   -- While the company's loan loss provision increased in 2015
      following the merger of Flagship and CarFinance, we believe
      the combination of the two companies is likely to lead to
      improved economies of scale.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2016-3

Class   Rating       Type              Interest        Amount
                                       rate(i)       (mil. $)

A-1     AAA (sf)     Senior            Fixed           180.95
A-2     AAA (sf)     Senior            Fixed            63.95
B       AA (sf)      Subordinate       Fixed            43.88
C       A (sf)       Subordinate       Fixed            55.10
D       BBB (sf)     Subordinate       Fixed            38.77
E       BB- (sf)     Subordinate       Fixed            17.35

(i)The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


FOUR TIMES 2006-4TS: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on four classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Four Times
Square Trust's series 2006-4TS, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included its revaluation of the Four Times Square property
securing the mortgage loan that serves as collateral for the trust.
In addition, S&P's analysis included a review of the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The rating on class C reflects S&P's application of the CMBS
criteria, which applies a credit enhancement minimum equal to 1% of
the transaction or loan amount to address the potential for
unexpected trust expenses that may be incurred during the life of
the loan or transaction.  These potential unexpected trust expenses
may include servicer fees, servicer advances, workout or corrected
mortgage fees, and potential trust legal fees.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's IO criteria.

"Our analysis of this transaction is predominantly a recovery-based
approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this approach, our
property analysis included a revaluation of the Four Times Square
property, a 48-story 1.69 million sq.-ft. primarily office (with
some retail component) property located in Manhattan.  We based our
analysis on the servicer-reported financial performance for the
years ended 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, as well as the April 2016
rent roll.  Historically, the property reported stable net
operating income.  Our adjusted valuation, which considers the two
major tenants rolling in 2019 and 2020 as well as current market
data, using a 6.50% capitalization rate, yielded a whole-loan
loan-to-value ratio of 54.3%," S&P said.

As of the July 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the fixed-rate
mortgage loan has a whole-loan balance of $569.6 million that is
split into four promissory notes: A-1, A-2, B, and C.  The $3.5
million A-1 and $516.1 million A-2 notes are pari passu and senior
to the $25.9 million subordinate junior B note and $24.1 million
subordinate junior C note.  The A-2, B, and C notes, totaling
$566.1 million, are the sole source of cash flow for the
certificates in the trust.  The $3.5 million A-1 note is included
in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1, also a U.S. CMBS
transaction.  The mortgage loan has a 5.59% per annum fixed
interest rate, amortizes on a 33-year amortization schedule, and
matures on Dec. 11, 2020.

The property, Four Times Square, also generally known as the Conde
Nast Building, is located on 42nd Street, between Broadway and the
Avenue of the Americas.  According to the April 2016 rent roll, the
property was 99.2% leased.

The office space, consisting of approximately 1.6 million sq. ft.,
is majority leased to Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
(Skadden) (49.0% of the netrentable area [NRA]; May 31, 2020, lease
expiration) and Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. doing business as
The Conde Nast Publications (45.5% of NRA; April 30, 2019, lease
expiration).  It is S&P's understanding that the Conde Nast space
is currently dark as they have moved downtown to 1 World Trade
Center.  In addition, from media reports, Skadden is also expected
to leave the property before its lease expiration for 1 Manhattan
West in 2019.  S&P has considered the potential risk this poses to
the property in its analysis.  According to communications with the
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., there are considerable
interests for the dark Conde Nast space, while the Skadden space is
not being marketed at this time.

The 83,945 sq.-ft. retail space is majority leased to H&M Hennes
and Mauritz (2.5% of NRA; Jan. 31, 2034, lease expiration) and The
Nasdaq OMX Group (1.5% of NRA; July 31, 2025, lease expiration).
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. reported a 1.92x debt service coverage for
the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2015.  To date, the trust has not
incurred any principal losses.

RATINGS LIST

Four Times Square Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-4TS
                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To                  From
A                 350910AN5        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
X                 350910AQ8        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B                 350910AS4        AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
C                 350910AU9        BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)


FREDDIE MAC 2016-SC01: Moody's Rates Class M-2 Debt 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to two
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2016-SC01 (FWLS
2016-SC01).  The ratings range from Baa1 (sf) to Ba2 (sf).  The
certificates are backed by two pools of fixed-rate super conforming
prime residential mortgage loans.  The collateral pools consist of
loans acquired by Freddie Mac from four sellers (Caliber Home Loans
Inc. (43.3%), Quicken Loans Inc (38.2%), Fremont Bank (12.6%) and
PHH Mortgage Corp (5.9%) between August 2015 and May 2016 pursuant
to the terms of the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer
Guide.  Freddie Mac will serve in a number of capacities with
respect to the Trust.  Freddie Mac will be the Guarantor of the
Senior Certificates, Seller, Master Servicer, Master Document
Custodian and Trustee.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2016-SC01

  Cl. M-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale
Moody's expected loss on pool 1 is 0.45% in a base case scenario
and reaches 5.95% at a stress level consistent with our Aaa (sf)
ratings.  Moody's expected loss on pool 2 is 0.75% in a base case
scenario and reaches 9.85% at a stress level consistent with our
Aaa (sf) ratings.  Moody's aggregate expected loss on the
collateral is 0.60%, and reaches 7.70% at a stress level consistent
with Aaa rating on the senior classes.  Moody's arrived at these
expected losses using our MILAN model.

Moody's Aaa stress loss for pool 1 is consistent with prime jumbo
transactions we have recently rated.  The lower FICO scores and
slightly higher investor properties on pool 2 contributed to the
higher loss expectations on the pool.  In Moody's analysis, it
considered the observed loss severity trends on Freddie Mac loans.
Moody's did not make any adjustments related to servicers,
originators' assessment, or the representation and warranties
framework.

Collateral Description

The FWLS 2016-SC01 transaction is backed by a total of 661
fixed-rate super conforming prime residential mortgage loans with a
balance of $348,375,857.  Pool 1 is backed by 309 loans with a
balance of $161,325,571 and pool 2 is backed by 352 loans with a
balance of $187,050,286.  The collateral pools consist of loans
acquired by Freddie Mac from multiple sellers between August 2015
and May 2016 pursuant to the terms of the Freddie Mac Single-Family
Seller/Servicer Guide.  The weighted average CLTV is 70.0% for the
aggregate pool, and 69.6% and 70.5% for pool 1 and pool 2 loans
respectively.  The weighted average FICO is 759 and 738 for pool 1
and pool 2 loans respectively.

Third-Party Review(TPR)

Clayton Services LLC. conducted a review of credit, property
valuations, regulatory compliance (regulatory compliance was
conducted only for loans in the sample which were in states with
assignee liability laws and or regulations) and data accuracy
checks for a representative sample of the mortgage loans.  Moody's
reviewed the TPR reports and there were no exceptions for credit,
property valuations, and regulatory compliance.  The data accuracy
exceptions were minor and did not pose a material risk.

Representations & Warranties (R&Ws)
Freddie Mac will make certain representations and warranties with
respect to the mortgage loans and will be the only party from which
the trust may seek repurchase of a mortgage loan as a result of any
material breach that provides for repurchase as a remedy. Freddie
Mac's Aaa senior ratings are underpinned by strong government
support.  Moody's believes that the US Government will stand behind
obligations of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).  The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, meet the baseline set
of credit-neutral R&Ws we have identified for US RMBS.

Structural considerations

The securitization has a two-pool 'Y' structure that distributes
principal on a pro rata basis between the seniors and subordinate
classes subject to performance triggers, and sequentially amongst
the subordinate certificates.  The transaction has two distinct
features: recoupment of unpaid interest on stop advance loans and
shifting certain principal payments, subject to limits, to cover
interest shortfalls to the rated subordinate bonds due to interest
rate modifications and extra-ordinary expenses.

In this transaction, Freddie Mac will stop advancing principal and
interest on any real-estate owned (REO) property or loans that are
180 days or more delinquent.  This will decrease the amount of
interest remitted to the trust and could result in interest
shortfalls to the bonds.  However, interest accrued but not paid on
the stop advance loans will be recovered from the liquidation
proceeds (for liquidated loans), borrower payments, modification or
repurchases and added to the interest remittance amount.  This will
result in subsequent recoveries of any interest shortfalls on
subordinates bonds in the order of their payment priority.

Also, in this transaction, the certificates are exposed to interest
shortfalls due to interest rate modifications and extra-ordinary
expenses.  If the interest accrued on the class B certificate is
insufficient to absorb the reduction in interest amount caused by
modification and extra-ordinary expenses, and to the extent that
the class B certificate is outstanding, the transaction allows for
certain principal payments (up to subordinate percentage of
scheduled principal) to be re-directed to cover interest shortfall
to the rated bonds, with a corresponding write-down of Class B
principal balance.  As a result, before Classes M1 or M2 suffer any
unrecoverable interest shortfall, the Class B certificate balance
has to be reduced to zero.  The Class B certificate represents 1%
of the collateral.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Downgrade
Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.

Upgrade
Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


FREMONT HOME 1999-3: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
from two transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 1999-3

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov. 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

  Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. AV-1B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgrades on Popular ABS 2005-1 are primarily due to the
total credit enhancement available to the tranches, as well as the
expectation of faster amortization of these tranches due to
cross-collateralization from group 1 cash flows, after its own
related senior fully amortizes.  The ratings upgrades on Fremont
1999-3 are due to the total credit enhancement available to the
bonds, including overcollateralization.  The rating actions reflect
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


GOLDENTREE LOAN XII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service,   has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities XII, Limited (the
"Issuer" or  "GoldenTree Loan Opportunities XII").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$1,600,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the  "Class X Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$245,200,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the  "Class A-1 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

US$48,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the  "Class A-2 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$25,600,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the  "Class B Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the  "Class C Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,200,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the  "Class D Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the  "Rated Notes. "

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

GoldenTree Loan Opportunities XII is a managed cash flow CLO. The
issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
first lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 77%
ramped as of the closing date.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP (the  "Manager ") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.6 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.



GOLDMAN SACHS 2011-GC5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed eight classes of
Goldman Sachs Commercial Mortgage Capital, L.P., series 2011-GC5
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement driven by
substantial paydown from maturing five-year loans since Fitch's
last rating action.  The affirmations are the result of overall
stable performance.  The transaction continues to have a high
retail concentration of 68%, with 10 (56.6%) of the top 15 loans
being secured by retail properties.  The majority of remaining loan
maturities (96%) are concentrated in 2021.

There were variances from criteria related to classes B and C where
Fitch's surveillance criteria would indicate that additional
upgrades are possible.  However, further upgrades were not
warranted based on significant retail concentration (68% of pool),
including five regional malls representing 30% of the pool.
Additionally, Champlain Centre (2.6%) has seen a decline in
occupancy as a result of Sears vacating in March 2016.

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 29.7% to $1.23 billion from
$1.75 billion at issuance.  Fitch has designated four loans (4.3%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
asset (1.2%).  Per the servicer reporting, four loans (8.3% of the
pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
class G.

The transaction's largest contributor to expected losses is a
specially-serviced asset (1.2%), which is real estate owned (REO).
The asset is a 236,134 square foot (sf) office complex comprising
six single-story buildings located in North Richland Hills, TX. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April 2013, due to
imminent default following the largest tenant vacating the property
in early February 2013 without providing notice.  The asset became
REO in July 2013 through a non-judicial foreclosure. The servicer
has made capital improvements to the asset and continues to market
the vacant space; however, occupancy remains at 54.1% as of May
2016.

The largest loan in the pool (15%) is secured by 478,028 sf of a
1.1 million-sf regional mall in Tucson, AZ.  The property is
anchored by Sears, Dillard's, Macy's and Century Theaters, which is
the only anchor that is part of the collateral.  The
servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) improved
slightly to 1.65x at March 2016 compared to 1.58x at YE 2015.
March 2016 occupancy improved to 96% compared to 95% at YE 2015.

The largest loan of concern in the pool (1.5%) is secured by a
160,779-sf suburban office property located in Purchase, NY in
Westchester County.  The property was constructed in 1969 and
renovated in 1990.  As of YE 2015, occupancy declined to 73% from
80% in 2014 driving DSCR down to 0.71x from 1.13x in the same
period.  In addition to the performance decline, the property has
substantial lease rollover concerns in the next 12 months. As of
July 2016 the loan was current and has not been delinquent during
the loan term.  According to Reis March 2016 report, the
Harrison/Rye/East office submarket of Westchester had a vacancy
rate of 21.4% with average asking rents of $29.49 psf.  The subject
underperforms the market with respect to rents and vacancy.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool and continued paydown.  Upgrades reflect a
sensitivity analysis performed on the Harrison Executive Park due
to declining performance and upcoming rollover.  Further upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and significant paydown or
defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these classes as indicated:

   -- $96 million class B to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69.8 million class C to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $48.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $86.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $568.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $181.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $74.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28.4 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $884.2 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class G and
X-B certificates.


INWOOD PARK CDO: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Inwood Park CDO Ltd.:

US$50,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2015 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$141,375,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $90,607,709), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on July 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$177,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $22,752,068), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on July 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$90,625,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$68,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 14, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

US$50,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due 2021,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2015 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Inwood Park CDO Ltd., issued in January 11, 2007 is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since July 2015. The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately 67.3% or $233.7 million
since then. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for the
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
197.8%, 147.9%, 125.0% and 108.3% respectively, versus July 2015
levels of 155.9%, 132.4%, 119.4% and 108.7%, respectively.


JASPER CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes to B1
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Jasper CLO Ltd.:

  $33,500,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes (current outstanding balance of
   $17,984,317.580, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 23,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  $5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes (current outstanding balance of
   $2,673,147.04), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 23,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on these notes:

  $35,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes (current outstanding balance of
   $24,058,686.07), Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on July 23,
   2015, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Jasper CLO Ltd., issued in June 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
and senior unsecured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in November 2012.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades on the Class D-1 and D-2 notes are primarily
the result of an increase in Moody's calculated weighted average
rating factor (WARF), and an increase in assets that mature after
the maturity of the notes (long-dated assets) since March 2016.
Based on Moody's calculations, the portfolio WARF has worsened to
4101 from 3418 in March 2016, and long-dated assets have increased
to 45.7% of the portfolio, versus 23.2% in March 2016.  These
assets could expose the Class D-1 and D-2 notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the notes' impending maturity date in
August 2017.  In addition, the deal holds a material dollar amount
of thinly traded or untraded loans, whose lack of liquidity may
pose additional risks relating to the issuer's ultimate ability or
inclination to pursue a liquidation of such assets, especially if
the sales can be transacted only at heavily discounted price
levels.

The rating affirmation of the Class C notes reflects deleveraging
of the notes and an increase in the Class C overcollateralization
(OC) ratio, which offset deterioration in the portfolio.  The Class
C notes have been paid down by approximately $10.9 million or 31.3%
since March 2016.  Based on Moody's calculation, the Class C OC
ratio (after taking into account the Aug. 1, 2016, payment) has
improved to 244.4% from 155.8% in March 2016.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action
The principal methodology Moody's used in this rating was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Realization
     of higher than assumed recoveries would positively impact the

     CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.  The deal's increased exposure owing to

     amendments to loan agreements extending maturities continues.

     In light of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets,

     which increases its sensitivity to the liquidation
     assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios
     using a range of liquidation value assumptions.  However,
     actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market
     prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the
     deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

  7) Operational risk: The deal contains a large proportion of
     collateral assets that mature after the CLO's legal maturity
     date.  Repayment of the notes at their maturity will be
     highly dependent on the issuer's successful monetization of
     the long-dated assets which will be contingent upon issuer's
     ability and willingness to sell these assets.

  8) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large
     number of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has
     assessed through credit estimates.  If Moody's does not
     receive the necessary information to update its credit
     estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction could be
     negatively affected by any default probability adjustments
     Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

  9) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
     portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions
     of a few large obligors Moody's rates non-investment-grade,
     especially if they jump to default.  Because of the deal's
     low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's
     supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique
     analysis with a simulated default distribution using its
     CDOROM software or individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3281)
Class C: +2
Class D-1: 0
Class D-2: +1
Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4921)
Class C: -1
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."  In addition,
because of the collateral pool's low diversity, Moody's used CDOROM
to simulate a default distribution that it then used as an input in
the cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $51.6 million, defaulted par
of $39.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 12.6%
(implying a WARF of 4101), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.6%, a diversity score of 9 and a weighted average
spread of 3.20% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates.  Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 19.4% of the collateral pool.


JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Debt Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class,
affirmed fourteen classes and downgraded one class in J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C1 as:

  Cl. A-SB, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed

   Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   B3 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class, A-SB class, was upgraded due to
scheduled paydowns.

The ratings on three P&I classes, A-4, A-M and A-J, were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on eleven P&I classes, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L,
and M, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on X-1 IO class was downgraded based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.8% of the
current balance, compared to 12.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

               METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 15 at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                        DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29.8% to $822
million from $1.18 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 70% of
the pool.  Two loans, constituting 1.3% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Twelve loans, constituting 38% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ten loans been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $46.4 million (for an average loss severity of
51%).  Eight loans, constituting 29.2% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Westin Portfolio Loan (for $111.1 million -- 13.4% of the pool),
which is secured by two Westin Hotels -- the Westin La Paloma, a
487-key full-service hotel in Tucson, Arizona and the Westin Hilton
Head, a 412-key full-service ocean-front hotel in Hilton Head,
South Carolina.  The loan represents an approximately 50%
pari-passu interest in a $221 million loan.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2008 due to imminent
default.  The borrower filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in November
2010.  A bankruptcy court in Arizona modified the loan in May 2012
with the loan term extended and loan made principal-only for 21
years of $500,000 monthly payments split pro rata between the two
pari passu notes.  Various fees, interest, and other expenses were
capitalized into the loan balance as a part of the loan
modification.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $105.6 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (43.7% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 7.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $9.6 million (a 15.4% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2014 operating results for
100% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100%,
compared to 101% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the American Cancer Society Plaza Loan ($128.3
million -- 15.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 996,000 square
foot (SF) office building located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.
The largest tenant is the American Cancer Society, which leases
approximately 28% of the net rentable area (NRA) and expires in
June 2022.  As of March 2016, the property was 86% leased, compared
to 84% in March 2015.  Performance has remained steady over the
past two years, with limited near-term lease rollover.  The loan
also benefits from amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
118% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.86X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Gurnee Mills Loan ($75 million --
9.1% of the pool), which is a pari passu interest in a $321 million
first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.8 million SF regional mall located in Gurnee,
Illinois.  The mall's major tenants include: Sears, Bass Pro Shops
Outdoor World, and Kohl's.  As of December 2015, the property was
96% leased, the same as at last review, of 96% in December 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.8X, respectively,
compared to 119% and 0.8X at the last review.

The third largest loan is The Outlet Shoppes at El Paso Loan ($62.8
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 378,000 SF
outlet retail center.  As of March 2016 the property was 98%
leased, compared to 100% leased in May 2015.  The outlet's major
tenants include: Old Navy, Nike, and Gap.  Performance declined in
2014 due to an increase in real estate taxes, however in 2015 taxes
were reassessed and NOI was right sized.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 80% and 1.3X, respectively, compared to 88.0% and 1.2X at
the last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL1. Moody's rating
action is as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. RS-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. RS-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of the principal classes is based on Moody's
expected loss estimates. The affirmation of an interest only (IO)
class is based on the WARF of the referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance remains at $201 million. A total of 21 loans
have paid off, and the certificates are collateralized by the
Resorts International Loan only.

The Resorts International Loan ($113 million, 100% of pooled
balance plus $88 million of non-pooled, rake balance) is secured by
two hotel/casinos with a total of 439 rooms: the Bally's Tunica
(Robinsonville, Mississippi) and Resorts Tunica (Tunica,
Mississippi). There is pari passu interest of $61 million plus
junior debt held outside of the trust. In July 2009, the portfolio
was transferred to special servicing due to payment default. Both
the Bally's Tunica and the Resorts Tunica properties are REO as of
November 2011.

The loan's net cash flow (NCF) for the trailing twelve month period
ending April 2016 was $20.2 million, up from $15.6 million achieved
during the trailing twelve month period ending May 2015. Moody's
structured credit assessment on this loan is c (sca.pd), the same
as last review. Non-pooled Classes RS-1, RS-2, RS-3, RS-4, RS-5,
RS-6, and RS-7 are secured by the junior portion of the Resorts
International Loan.

Moody's pooled trust LTV ratio is significantly over 100%. The
trust has experienced a total of $53.5 million in cumulative losses
affecting Classes K and L. Outstanding interest shortfalls total
$12.4 million as of the current Payment Date.



JP MORGAN 2016-JP2: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2016-JP2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $31,322,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,213,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $301,524,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,379,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $734,921,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,134,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77,483,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,134,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41,090,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $86,876,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,786,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,306,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

-- $17,610,000a class F;
-- $29,349,708a class NR.

a - Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b - Notional amount and interest-only.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
July 28, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 47 loans secured by 78
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$939,196,709 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Benefit
Street Partners CRE Finance LLC, German American Capital
Corporation, and Starwood Mortgage Funding VI LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 72.9% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
83.5% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Leverage Lower than Recent Deals: The transaction has lower
leverage than other recent Fitch-rated transactions. The pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR of 1.20x is better than both the
YTD 2016 average of 1.17x and the 2015 average of 1.18x. The pool's
WA Fitch LTV of 103.5% is better than both the YTD 2016 average of
107.9% and the 2015 average of 109.3%. Excluding the credit opinion
loan, The Shops at Crystals, the Fitch DSCR is 1.18x and the Fitch
LTV is 105.8%, which are still slightly better than recent
averages.

High-Quality Collateral: Fitch assigned property quality grades of
'A-' or better to 22.4% of the pool and 30.8% of the portion of the
pool that was inspected. Properties assigned 'B+' or higher total
56.3% of the pool, or 77.2% of the pool that was inspected.
Additionally, no properties were assigned property quality grades
below 'B-'.

Concentrated Pool with High SCI: The 10 largest loans account for
54.4% of the pool by balance. This is in line with the YTD 2016
average of 55.4% and greater than the 2015 average of 49.3%. The
pool's average concentration resulted in a loan concentration index
(LCI) of 401, which falls between the YTD 2016 average of 428, and
the 2015 average of 367. The sponsor concentration index (SCI) is
697, which is much higher than the YTD 2016 average of 491 and 2015
average of 410. Two sponsors, Simon Property Group and CIM
Commercial Trust Corporation, each compose more than 10% of the
pool at 11.8% and 10.8%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMCC
2016-JP2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 13.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young, LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis. A
copy of the ABS Due Diligence Form-15E received by Fitch in
connection with this transaction may be obtained through the link
contained on the bottom of the related rating action commentary.



JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2016-JP2: DBRS Finalizes Prov. B Rating on F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-JP2 issued by JPMCC Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2016-JP2:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Class X-C, Class D, Class E and Class F will be privately placed.

The Class X-A, Class X-B and Class X-C balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood
of receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.
DBRS considers an IO certificate’s position within the
transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

The collateral consists of 47 fixed-rate loans secured by 78
commercial and multifamily properties comprising a total
transaction balance of $939,196,709. The conduit pool was analyzed
to determine the ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of
loan default within the loan term and its liquidity at maturity.
When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS
Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, there were seven loans, representing 17.0% of the pool,
with a DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15
times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of midterm
default. Additionally, to assess the refinance risk given the
current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance
constants to the balloon amounts.

This resulted in 20 loans, representing 52.8% of the pool, having
DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCRs below 1.00x; however, the DBRS Refi
DSCRs for the loans are based on a weighted-average (WA) stressed
refinance constant of 9.41%, which implies an interest rate of
8.72%, amortizing on a 30-year schedule. This represents a
significant stress of 4.15% over the WA contractual interest rate
of the loans in the pool. The loans’ probability of default (POD)
is based on the more constraining of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCRs.

Eleven loans, comprising 45.5% of the pool, are located in urban
markets with increased liquidity that benefit from consistent
investor demand, even in times of stress. In addition, there are
only five loans, representing 4.1% of the pool, that are either
fully or primarily leased to a single tenant. Loans secured by
properties occupied by single tenants have been found to have
higher loss severities in the event of default. As such, DBRS
modeled single-tenant properties with a higher POD and cash flow
volatility compared with multi-tenant properties. Overall, the pool
exhibits a relatively strong DBRS WA Term DSCR of 1.51x based on
the whole-loan balances, indicating moderate term default risk.

Five loans, representing 25.6% of the pool, are structured with
full IO payments for the full term, including four of the top 15
loans, which include the two largest loans in the pool (Opry Mills
and Center 21), representing 17.0% of the pool. An additional 20
loans, representing 46.8% of the pool, have partial IO periods
remaining, ranging from ten to 59 months, including seven of the
top 15 loans. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using the
amortizing debt service obligation, and the DBRS Refi DSCR is
calculated by considering the balloon balance and lack of
amortization when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines the
POD based on the lower of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCRs, so loans
that lack amortization will be treated more punitively. The pool
has a high concentration of properties that are securitized by
assets that are fully or primarily used as retail, representing
34.7% of the pool. The retail sector has generally underperformed
since the Great Recession because of declining consumer spending
power, store closures, chain bankruptcies and the rapidly growing
popularity of ecommerce. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
e-commerce sales represented 7.0% of total retail sales in 2015
compared with 3.9% in 2009. As the e-commerce share of sales is
expected to continue to grow significantly in the coming years, the
retail real estate sector may continue to be relatively weak. DBRS
considers 80.2% of the pool’s retail loans to be secured by
either anchored or regional mall properties, which are more
desirable and have shown lower rates of default historically.

The DBRS sample included 29 of the 47 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 31 of the 78 properties in the pool
(73.5% of the allocated loan balance). DBRS conducted meetings with
the on-site property manager, leasing agent or representative of
the borrowing entity for 65.4% of the pool. The DBRS average sample
NCF adjustment for the pool was -11.8% and ranged from 26.7% to
+8.9%. DBRS identified eight loans, representing 9.9% of the pool,
with unfavorable sponsor strength; however, none are in the top 15.
DBRS increased the POD for the loans with identified sponsorship
concerns.

One of the largest ten loans, The Shops at Crystals, exhibits
credit characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow
ratings. The Shops at Crystals has credit characteristics
consistent with a BBB (high) shadow rating. This loan represents
5.3% of the pool.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


KATONAH 2007-I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Katonah 2007-I CLO Ltd.:

  $18,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded
   to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 16, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $11,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded
   to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 16, 2015, Upgraded to Baa2
   (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $227,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022 (current
   outstanding balance of $146,070,582.61), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on March 16, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on March 16, 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $10,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf); previously on March 16, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Katonah 2007-I CLO Ltd., issued in January 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2014.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since July 2015.  The Class A-1L
notes have been paid down by approximately 20% or $36.0 million
since that time.  Based on the trustee's July 13, 2016 report, the
OC ratios for the Senior Class A, Class A-3L, Class B-1L, and Class
B-2L notes are reported at 134.31%, 122.88%, 116.80% and 111.54%,
respectively, versus July 2015 levels of 131.63%, 121.15%, 115.52%
and 110.62%, respectively.  Moody's notes that the OC ratios in the
July 13, 2016 trustee report do not reflect the $21.4 million of
payment distribution to the Class A-1L notes on July 25, 2016.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since July 2015.  Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2414 compared to 2250
in July 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
     the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
     could lengthen owing to the manager's decision to reinvest
     into new issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or
     participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for

     a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in
     its analysis.  Life extension can increase the default risk
     horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
     collateral.

  7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.  In
     particular, Moody's tested for a possible extension of the
     actual weighted average life in its analysis given that the
     post-reinvestment period reinvesting criteria has loose
     restrictions on the weighted average life of the portfolio.

  8) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with weak liquidity:
     The presence of assets with the worst Moody's speculative
     grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to
     additional risks if these assets default.  The historical
     default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-4 ratings
     than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the deal's high
     exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute around
     $5.7 million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2114)
Class A-1L: 0
Class A-2L: 0
Class A-3L: +2
Class B-1L: +3
Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3172)
Class A-1L: 0
Class A-2L: -1
Class A-3L: -2
Class B-1L: -2
Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $237.9 million, defaulted par
of $2.2 million, a weighted average default probability of 15.73%
(implying a WARF of 2643), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.90%, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted average
spread of 3.24% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


KKR FINANCIAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, and C
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1B, and D notes
from KKR Financial CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in December 2012 and is
managed by KKR Financial Advisors II LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
December 2016, and we anticipate that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect an increase in assets rated 'BB-'
and higher, as well as collateral seasoning since S&P's effective
date rating affirmations in April 2013.  Since then, the reported
weighted average life has decreased to 4.43 years from 5.32 years.
Because time horizon factors heavily into default probability, a
shorter weighted average life positively affects the
creditworthiness of the collateral pool.  In addition, the number
of issuers in the portfolio has increased during this period, and
this diversification has contributed to the improved credit
quality.  The collateral seasoning, combined with the improved
credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk profile,
which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche ratings.

Although there has been a modest increase in assets rated in the
CCC' category, this factor is offset by the decline in the weighted
average life and positive credit quality migration of the
collateral portfolio, both of which have lowered the credit risk
profile.

According to the July 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have remained
relatively stable since S&P's April 2013 rating affirmations.

   -- The class A O/C decreased to 134.98% from 135.02%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio decreased to 121.48% from 121.52%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 114.54% from 114.57%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 109.09% from 109.12%.

The current coverage test ratios are all passing and well above
their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B and D notes, S&P's rating actions considered the cushion at
the higher ratings and additional sensitivity runs that reflected
the exposure to specific distressed industries and allowed for
volatility in the underlying portfolio because the transaction is
still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the class A-1A, A-1B, and D notes reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

KKR Financial CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                 Rating
Class       To          From
A-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B           A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

KKR Financial CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1A        AAA (sf)
A-1B        AAA (sf)
D           BB (sf)


KKR FINANCIAL 2013-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by KKR Financial CLO 2013-2, Ltd.:

  $38,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2014, Definitive
   Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $18,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan, 23, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $27,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

KKR Financial CLO 2013-2, Ltd., issued in January 2014, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in January 2018.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of the collateral
pool's outperformance versus certain covenant requirements.  In
particular, Moody's expects that the deal will continue to benefit
from a higher weighted average recovery rate (WARR) level compared
to its covenant level.  Additionally, the deal is expected to
benefit from an increase in excess spread resulting from today's
refinancing of the Class A-1 and A-2B notes.  Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are
stable.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will commence and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): This transaction has a
     significant exposure to loans with LIBOR floors, and the
     inclusion of LIBOR floors in its determination of compliance
     with its WAS test can create additional ratings volatility.
     Even though LIBOR floors result in increased interest
     proceeds when LIBOR is below the floor, the net interest
     benefit of the floor disappears when the deal's floating rate

     liabilities re-price once LIBOR increases above the floor
     (unless the assets with floors are replaced by assets with
     comparable yields).  The WAS would also decrease if the
     assets with LIBOR floors mature, prepay, or are sold and are
     not replaced with assets with comparable yields.
     Additionally, the deal may find it necessary to replace such
     assets with those of lower credit quality in order to
     maintain the yield received by the replacement assets.  To
     test the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to LIBOR floors,
     Moody's ran an additional scenario which models WAS at a
     level below the WAS test covenant.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's ran an alternate
scenario based on a different point in the deal's collateral
quality test matrix to assess the impact of minimizing WARR at the
highest permissible weighted average rating factor (WARF) test
level of 3000.  Moody's also conducted sensitivity analyses to test
the impact of a number of default probabilities on the Class A-2A,
Class B, Class C and Class D notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on the
Class A-2A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes (by the difference
in the number of notches versus the current model output, for which
a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2400)
Class A-2A: +1
Class B: +3
Class C: +3
Class D: +1
Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3600)
Class A-2A: -2
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
WARF, weighted average life (WAL), diversity score and WARR, are
based on its published methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $369 million, no defaulted par, a weighted average
default probability of 24.53% (corresponding to a WARF of 3000), a
WARR upon default of 50.57%, a WAL of 5.67 years, a diversity score
of 45 and a WAS of 3.70%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 13 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2007-C2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement of the
remaining classes relative to Fitch's expected losses.  Fitch
modeled losses of 7.8% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 16.3%, including $426.8 million
(12% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 30 loans (16%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes eight specially serviced assets (3.9%).

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 44.3% to $1.98 billion from
$3.55 billion at issuance.  The pool is concentrated with the top
four loans representing 48% of the pool balance; these loans are
secured by iconic class-A office properties in strong office
submarkets of Washington D.C., and Chicago with investment grade
characteristics.  Office concentration in the pool remains high at
56.7%.  Loan maturities are also concentrated with over 98% of the
pool scheduled to mature within the next 12 months.  There are 17
defeased loans (12.7%).  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class A-J and classes K through T.

The largest contributors to expected losses are three loans secured
by office buildings located in Louisville, KY loan (1.7%),
McLeansville, NC (1.6%), and Meridian, ID (1.6%).  All three
properties are 100% leased to Citicorp North America/Citigroup Inc.
(rated 'A' by Fitch) through December 2019. Citigroup Inc. vacated
both the Louisville, KY and McLeansville, NC properties prior to
its lease expirations and now subleases the properties to Humana
Inc. and LabCorp, respectively.  Citigroup continues to occupy the
Meridian, ID property. The subject loans all mature in April 2017.
The year end (YE) 2015 net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) has reported at 1.17x for the three loans
since issuance.  The loans remain current as of the July 2016
payment date.  Fitch has further stressed the cap rates on the
subject properties in its analysis due to the properties' single
tenancy and tertiary office markets.  Fitch has calculated losses
based on in-place cash flow and stressed cap rates; however, losses
may be mitigated due to the credit leases expirations occurring
over 1.5 years past the loan maturities.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Watergate
600 loan, the third largest loan in the pool (6.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a 12-story, 289,286 square foot (sf) office
building in Washington, D.C. Occupancy has been stable, reporting
at 96% per the March 2016 rent roll, compared to 98% for June 2015
and 100% at issuance.  The two major tenants at the property
include Atlantic Media (65% net rentable area [NRA]) whose lease is
through 2023, and Blank Rome LLP (29% NRA) whose lease expires in
December 2018.  The subject loan matures in April 2017.

The NOI DSCR reported at 1.21x for year to date March 2016,
compared to 1.26x for YE December 2015.  As of July 2016, there is
over $1 million in tenant and leasing cost reserves.  The loan
remains current as of the July 2016 payment date.  Although Fitch
calculated losses based on in-place cash flow and a stressed cap
rate, losses may be mitigated given the strong location and stable
performance of the asset.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 and A-1A are Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement, continued paydown, and increased
defeasance.  The Negative Outlook on class A-M reflects
above-average loan concentration concerns, in addition to the
maturity concentrations over the next 12 months.  The Negative
Outlook also reflects concerns on several of the top 15 loans
including low DSCRs, plus major tenant vacancies and rollover
risks.  Class A-M was also previously impacted by interest
shortfalls, and due to the class' current position in the waterfall
the class is susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  Should
actual loses exceed Fitch expectations and/or future interest
shortfalls occur and continue for an extended period of time, class
A-M may be subjected to future downward rating actions.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $1 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $307 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $355.4 million class A-M at 'Asf', Outlook Negative;
   -- $284 million class A-J at 'Dsf', RE 50%;
   -- $0 class B at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class C at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class D at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-AB certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP,
X-W and X-CL certificates.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
Merrill Lynch Floating Trust Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-1 as follows:

Cl. X-1B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-3B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-3C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of interest-only (IO) Class X-1B was affirmed based on
non-payment of interest currently and the expectation that the
class will not receive interest payments in the future. The ratings
of IO classes Class X-3B and Class X-3C were affirmed based on the
credit performance of their referenced loan, the Royal Holiday
Portfolio loan.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 Payment Date, the certificate balance has
decreased by 98% to $65.0 million from $2.6 billion at
securitization from the payoff of 14 loans.

One specially-serviced loan remains in the pool, the Royal Holiday
Portfolio loan ($65.0 million), secured by six hotels located in
Mexico with a total of 1,501-keys. Two of the hotels are located in
Cancun, and the other four hotels are located in Cozumel, Ixtapa,
Acapulco and San Jose del Cabo. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2010 and is a non-performing matured loan.
The borrower had filed a Mexican bankruptcy petition for the
Cozumel Caribe Hotel in May 2010. The bankruptcy court terminated
the flow of funds into the lender's cash management system and
blocked the lender from pursuing remedies against the five other
assets or the guarantors. The borrower has not made debt service
payments since May 2010, nor has the borrower provided financials
for the hotel properties. Interest advances were terminated in late
2012. Currently, approximately $19.6 million in servicer advances
are outstanding, including $4.5 million in interest advances with
the balance primarily for legal and insurance expenses, cumulative
accrued unpaid advance interest and taxes and insurance. The $103.0
million whole loan includes $38.0 million in non-trust subordinate
debt. The special servicer is defending and pursuing multiple legal
actions and foresees a lengthy litigation. Moody's current
structured credit assessment is c (sca.pd), the same as at last
review.

The pool has experienced $1.0 million in cumulative bond losses,
affecting Class M. Interest shortfalls total $6.3 million and
affect principal and interest (P&I) Classes L and M, and IO Classes
X-3B, X-3C and X. Moody's does not rate Classes L, M and X.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions (ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CA20: Moody's Hikes Class K Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on nine classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-Canada 20 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on nine P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 37% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 62% to $229 million
from $595 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 64% of
the pool. Four loans, constituting 16% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by Canadian government securities.

Nineteen loans, constituting 56% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 66% of the
pool and full year 2015 operating results for 70% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 73%, compared to 78% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.59X and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.32X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 40% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Station Tower Loan ($34.7 million -- 15.1% of
the pool), which is secured by a 219,000 square foot (SF) office
building located in Surrey, a suburb of Vancouver, British
Columbia. As of March 2016, the property was 92% leased, compared
to 90% at last review. Property performance has been stable in
recent years and the loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.50X, respectively, compared to 63%
and 1.47X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Heritage Square Loan ($32.8 million
-- 14.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 319,000 SF office
building located in the Acadia suburb of Calgary, Alberta. The
largest tenant, AMEC, vacated the building upon its lease
expiration in August of 2015, and has since been replaced with a
new tenant, Worley Parsons, with a lease expiration in March of
2020. Moody's A Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.66X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.32X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Conundrum Commerce City Portfolio
($24.0 million -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five industrial buildings and one office property in
Ottawa, Ontario. The collateral consists of approximately 380,000
SF. This loan is full recourse to the borrower. As of April 2016,
the portfolio was 90% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73%
and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.20X at the last
review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2007-F1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 4 tranches
from one transaction, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by Bank of
America Merrill Lynch.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Alternative Note Asset Trust, Series 2007-F1

  Cl. 2-A1 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Jan. 21, 2011, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A2 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Jan. 21, 2011, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A3 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Jan. 21, 2011, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. IO-2 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Sept. 14, 2015, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating downgrades are due to the fast erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MONROE CAPITAL 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Monroe Capital MML CLO 2016-1, Ltd. (the  Issuer or
Monroe Capital MML CLO 2016-1).

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$158,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class A-1 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class A-2 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$30,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the  "Class B
Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the  "Class C Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$20,250,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the  "Class D-1 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$3,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the  "Class D-2 Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the  "Class E Notes "), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the  "Rated
Notes. "

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Monroe Capital MML CLO 2016-1 is a small to middle enterprise (
"SME ") managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by SME and broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 68% ramped as of
the closing date.

Monroe Capital Management LLC (the  "Manager ") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. After the end of the reinvestment period, the
Manager may sell assets, subject to certain conditions, but is not
permitted to purchase any assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the  "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations " rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $300,000,000

Diversity Score: 34

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3265

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 5.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on A-J Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on seven classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2007-TOP25 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-M was upgraded primarily due to an increase
in defeasance and an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 26% since
Moody's last review and loans constituting 49% of the pool that
have debt yields exceeding 12.0% are scheduled to mature within the
next 6 months. Additionally defeasance has increased to 19.7% of
the current pool balance from 8.4% at last review.

The ratings on P&I classes A-3 and A-1A were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the remaining four P&I classes, Classes A-J, B, C
and D, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current balance, compared to 4.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 43% to $885 million
from $1.55 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 139 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 33.7% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 4.8% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments and 25 loans,
constituting 19.7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Forty-one loans, constituting 29.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $92.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 69%). Four loans, constituting 3.4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Romeoville Towne Center ($18.8 million -- 2.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 108,000 square foot (SF) retail center
located in Romeoville, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2014 for imminent
default, in connection with the shuttering of Dominick's
Supermarkets as part of parent company Safeway's exit from the
greater Chicago market. Dominick's operated as the anchor tenant
and occupied 61% of the center's net rentable area (NRA). The
Dominick's lease runs through 2019, and the tenant continues to pay
rent.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $8.4 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (28% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4.7 million (a 15% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 34% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93.7%, compared
to 98.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is The London
NYC Hotel Land Interest Loan ($27 million -- 3.1% of the pool),
which is secured by the land beneath the 564-key London NYC hotel
in Midtown Manhattan. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 3.39X, respectively, the same as
at last review.

The other loan with a structured credit assessment is the 24 Fifth
Avenue Coop Loan ($15.5 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 419-unit residential cooperative in the Greenwich
Village section of Manhattan. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 2.64X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 17.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Shoppes at Park Place Loan ($71 million --
8% of the pool), which is secured by a 325,000 square foot (SF)
retail center in Pinellas Park, Florida, in the Tampa Bay region.
The property is located at a major intersection and includes Regal
Cinemas, American Signature and Marshall's as major tenants. The
property was 100% leased as of year-end 2015, similar to occupancy
reported at Moody's two prior reviews. The loan is interest only
for the full term and matures in January 2017. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 124.7% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to
127.9% and 0.76X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the One Thomas Circle Loan ($55 million
-- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 225,440 square foot
(SF) urban office property located in Washington, DC. The property
is interconnected to The Westin Hotel and has an on-site full
service restaurant. Per the March 2016 rent roll, the property was
89% occupied. The loan matures in September 2016 and Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 102.6% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to
108.4% and 0.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Shops at Kildeer Loan ($30.9 million
-- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 167,477 square foot
(SF) retail center, built in 2001 and located 34 miles northwest of
the Chicago CBD in Kildeer, Illinois. As per the March 2016 rent
roll, the property was 100% leased. The loan matures in December
2016 and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118.5% and 0.80X,
respectively, compared to 136% and 0.70X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. H Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes from Morgan Stanley Capital
I, Inc. MSBAM 2012-C6 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of MSBAM 2012-C6 is based on the stable performance
of the underlying collateral pool.  As of the July 2015
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 6.4% to $1.05 billion from $1.12 billion at issuance.
There are no loans in special servicing.  Fitch has designated one
loan (2%) as a Fitch Loans of Concern.  Per the servicer reporting,
two loans (4.8% of the pool) are defeased.

There were four variances from criteria related to classes B, C, D
and E.  The surveillance criteria indicated that rating upgrades
were possible for these classes.  However, Fitch has determined
that rating upgrades are not warranted at this time as there has
been no material improvement to the performance of the pool since
issuance and no significant increase in credit enhancement.

The Fitch Loan of Concern is The Ramada Plaza Beach Resort (2.0%),
a 335-room full service beachfront hotel located in Fort Walton
Beach, Fl, along the Gulf of Mexico.  The property is located
immediately south of the Eglin Air Force Base, nine miles west of
Destin, FL, and approximately 40 miles east of Pensacola.  The
servicer reported net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was -0.43x as of first quarter 2016 and 1.25x as of
year-end 2015.  According to the servicer, the property produced
$1.7 million in revenues for the first quarter 2016 which was
greater than the $1.1 million for first quarter 2015. Additionally,
according to the March 2016 STAR Report the running 12 month
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR are 52%, $158, and $82 which compares to
the competitive set at 74%, $161, and $119 respectively.  Fitch
will continue to monitor this loan.

The largest loan of the pool (11.9%) is collateralized by 1880
Broadway/15 Central Park West Retail, a 84,240 square foot (sf)
retail condominium unit located on the eastern side of Broadway
between West 61st Street and West 62nd Street in Manhattan's Upper
West Side neighborhood.  The property is 100% occupied and the
major tenants that occupy the space are Best Buy (54.4% of net
rentable area [NRA]), West Elm (30.3% of NRA), and JP Morgan Chase
(12.9% of NRA).  Above the ground floor retail collateral are
luxury residential units that are not part of the collateral.  As
of year-end 2015, the servicer reported NOI DSCR was 2.14x.

The second largest loan in the pool (7.1%) is collateralized by the
Chelsea Terminal Building, a 1,054,442 sf series of contiguous
mixed-use buildings located in Manhattan's Chelsea neighborhood.
The property is located two blocks west of the elevated Highline
Park and two blocks south of the Javits Convention Center and
Hudson Yards redevelopment project.  The building was mainly being
used as mini-storage for many years before being redeveloped to a
mixed-use office and retail product in recent years.  The loan
remains on the watchlist because Chelsea Mini Storage, the
sponsor's company, occupies 50.3% of the NRA and remains on a
month-to-month lease.  As of year-end 2014 the DSCR is 3.68x with
an occupancy of 94% at February 2016.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through H are Stable due to overall
stable pool performance.  Future upgrades are possible should loans
pay off at their scheduled maturities; 2017 maturities represent
20.5% of the pool.  Fitch does not foresee negative ratings
migration unless a material economic and/or asset level event
changes the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $230.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $411.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $98.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43.5 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class PST (Exchangeable) at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.1 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.8 million class F at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.7 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $12.6 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $811.2 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $94.1 million class X-B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

The class PST certificates are exchangeable for the class A-S,
class B, and class C certificates.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class J and
X-C certificates.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Debt Rating to Ba
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Class B notes issued in
the National Collegiate Trust 2005-GATE transaction. The underlying
collateral for this transaction includes private student loans,
which are not guaranteed by the US government.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: The National Collegiate Trust 2005-GATE

  Class B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19,
  2016 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade is a result of the increased risk that the tranche
will not pay off by its final maturity date in April 2023. As of
June 2016, the remaining weighted average term of the underlying
loans was 82.5 months, while the remaining number of months until
the final maturity date was 82. Therefore, if the pool continues
amortizing at the same rate that it has been over the last few
years, the tranche may not pay off by its maturity. Over the last
four years, the average note paydown rate was 4.7% per year, down
from the average paydown rate of 7% per year. Although Moody's
expects that the tranche will be eventual paid off in full,
non-payment by its maturity date is an event of default under the
transaction's documents.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions. The decision to take (or
not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range
of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the rating up is a higher
voluntary prepayment rate on the underlying loans.

Down

Increased delinquency and net loss rates and the resulting decline
in the available credit enhancement.


NEUBERGER BERMAN XII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the A-2R-R notes from
Neuberger Berman CLO XII, Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
originally issued in 2012.  S&P withdrew its rating on the class
A-2-R notes from this transaction after they were fully redeemed.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1-R, B-R, C-R,
D-R, and E-R notes.

On the July 25, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-2R-R replacement note issuance was used to redeem the original
A-2-R notes as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P is withdrawing the ratings on the original notes in
line with their full redemption, and assigning final ratings to the
replacement notes.  In addition, S&P is affirming all other classes
as the current class A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes were not
refinanced and were therefore not affected by the refinancing.

The assigned ratings and rating affirmations reflect S&P's opinion
that the credit support available is commensurate with the
associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATING ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XII, Ltd.
Replacement class    Rating
A-2R-R               AAA (sf)

RATING WITHDRAWN

Neuberger Berman CLO XII, Ltd.
                           Rating
Original class       To              From
A-2-R                NR              AAA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Neuberger Berman CLO XII, Ltd.
Class                Rating
A-1-R                AAA (sf)
B-R                  AA (sf)
C-R                  A (sf)
D-R                  BBB (sf)
E-R                  BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


RFMSII HOME 2003-HS3: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-II-B Debt Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from three deals backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HS3

  Cl. A-II-B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2002-HI2

  Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 11, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-II, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 11, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2002-HI3

  Cl. A-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are the result of an increase in total credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SASCO 2001-SB1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings erroneously
assigned to 14 underlying payment components and re-assigned
ratings on six certificates from two transactions issued by
Structured Asset Securities Corporation (SASCO).  The collateral
backing these transactions consists of loans originated by the
Small Business Administration to borrowers who have experienced
property losses in disasters recognized by the United States
federal government.  The loans are primarily backed by
single-family homes but are also backed by commercial properties,
manufactured homes, multi-family homes, townhomes, land and
developed lots, and prefabricated homes.  The vast majority of
these loans are junior liens.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-AL1
  Cl. A2, Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A3, Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. AIO, Assigned B3 (sf)
  Cl. A1, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. APO, Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. AIO(2), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to B3
  Cl. AIO(3), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to B3
  Cl. A2(1), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Ba2
  Cl. A2(2), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Ba2
  Cl. A3(2), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Ba2
  Cl. A3(3), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Ba2
  Cl. APO(3), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to Ba2
  Cl. AIO(1), Withdrawn; previously on Feb. 22, 2012, Downgraded
   to Ba3
  Cl. APO(1), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to Ba2
  Cl. APO(2), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to Ba2
  Cl. A1(B), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Baa3
  Cl. A3(1), Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016, Downgraded to

   Baa3

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation (SASCO) 2001-SB1

  Cl. A-2, Assigned B2 (sf)
  Cl. A2 Component 2, Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2
  Cl. A2 Component 1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan. 26, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are driven by the correction of an error.  At
closing Moody's assigned ratings on the following certificates
issued by Structured Asset Securities Corporation:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2002-AL1
  Class A1, Class A2, Class A3, Class AIO, and Class APO

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation., Series 2001-SB1
Trust
  Class A2

After the assignment of the initial ratings to these certificates,
Moody's erroneously stopped publishing the ratings on the
certificates and instead began publishing ratings only on the
underlying payment components that generate the cashflow supporting
the rated certificates.

Moody's has now corrected this error and has re-assigned a rating
to each of the certificates originally rated by Moody's and issued
by Structured Asset Securities Corp.  Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-AL1, and Structured Asset Securities Corporation
2001-SB1.  Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings on the underlying
payment components.  The rating history of the underlying payment
components will remain on moodys.com.  Hereafter, Moody's will only
publish the rating at the certificate level and will not publish
ratings for the related underlying payment components.

To derive the rating on each certificate, Moody's uses the weighted
average rating factors (WARF) of the related payment components;
the components are weighted by their outstanding balances.

For Structured Asset Securities Corp. Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-AL1, Class A1 benefits from the AI(A) and AI(B) payment
components; Class A2 benefits from the A2(1) and A2(2) payment
components; Class A3 benefits from the A3(1), A3(2) and A3(3)
payment components; Class AIO benefits from the AIO(I), AIO(2) and
AIO(3) payment components; Class APO benefits from the APO(1),
APO(2) and APO(3) payment components.  For Structured Asset
Securities Corporation 2001-SB1, Class A2 benefits from the A2
Component 1 and A2 Component 2 components.

The rating actions also reflect the recent performance of the
collateral and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SASCO 2004-GEL2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. M3 Debt to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche issued from eight deals
backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust (SASCO) 2004-GEL2
  Cl. M3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-TC1
  Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2005-GEL2
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2005-GEL3
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2006-GEL1
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2006-GEL2
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2006-GEL3
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2006-GEL4
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of an increase in
total credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating
downgraded is due to higher than expected loss severities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SHACKLETON 2013-III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C-1, C-2, D, E, and F notes from Shackleton 2013-III CLO Ltd, a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in March 2013 and is managed by Alcentra NY LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 1, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
March 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.87
years from 5.12 years.

Because time horizon weighs heavily into default probability, a
shorter weighted average life positively affects the collateral
pool's creditworthiness.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the September 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $5.4 million from none as of the effective date
report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to
$27.5 million from $12.1 million over the same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in the par coverage ratios:

   -- The class senior par ratio was 133.82%, down from 135.24%.

   -- The class C par ratio was 120.08%, down from 121.36%.

   -- The class D par ratio was 112.99%, down from 114.19%.

   -- The class E par ratio was 107.20%, down from 108.34%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life and positive credit
migration of the collateral portfolio.  However, any significant
deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect the deal in
the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such, the affirmed
ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E notes, its rating actions
consider additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure
to specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a lower rating on the class F notes than the rating
action reflects.  However, S&P affirmed the rating on class F notes
after considering the relatively minor decline in the
overcollateralization ratio since the transaction's effective date,
and that the transaction will soon enter its amortization phase.
Based on the latter, S&P expects the credit support available to
all rated classes to increase as principal is collected and
paydowns to the senior notes occur.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Shackleton 2013-III CLO Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A       81881QAC0    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B-1     81881QAE6    AA (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2     81881QAL0    AA (sf)    AA (sf)
C-1     81881QAG1    A (sf)     A (sf)
C-2     81881QAN6    A (sf)     A (sf)
D       81881QAJ5    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)
E       81881TAA8    BB (sf)    BB (sf)
F       81881TAC4    B (sf)     B (sf)


TOWD POINT 2016-3: Fitch Rates Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Towd Point Mortgage Trust
2016-3 (TPMT 2016-3) as follows:

-- $656,051,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,489,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,691,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,892,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,741,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,169,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,489,000 class A2A exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $58,489,000 class X1 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $58,489,000 class A2B exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $58,489,000 class X2 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $50,691,000 class M1A exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $50,691,000 class X3 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $50,691,000 class M1B exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $50,691,000 class X4 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $42,892,000 class M2A exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $42,892,000 class X5 notional exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $42,892,000 class M2B exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $42,892,000 class X6 notional exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $42,891,000 class B3 notes;
-- $42,892,896 class B4 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consisted of
5,356 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $974.82 million (which includes $22.25
million, or 2.28%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the cut-off
date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1 notes reflects the 32.70%
subordination provided by the 6.00% class A2, 5.20% class M1, 4.40%
class M2, 5.00% class B1, 3.30% class B2, 4.40% class B3 and 4.40%
class B4 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicers, Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS),rated 'RPS1-' and JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (Chase), rated 'RPS2+', and the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings and the
sequential pay structure.

A customized version of the cash flow assumptions workbook was
created to account for the lack of servicer advancing. The
delinquency timing scenarios are consistent with the pool's
stressed projected default scenarios.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as 'clean current' (80%) and loans
that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings are identified as 'dirty current' (20%). All loans were
current as of the cutoff date; 81.1% of the loans have received
modifications.

Due Diligence Compliance Findings (Concern): The third-party review
(TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 11% 'C'
and 'D' graded loans. For 59 loans, the due diligence results
showed issues regarding high cost testing -- the loans were either
missing the final HUD1 or used alternate documentation to test --
and therefore a slight upward revision to the model output loss
severity (LS) was applied. In addition, timelines were extended on
38 loans which were missing final modification documents.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest
(P&I), which reduces liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I
advances made on behalf of loans that become delinquent and
eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the
loan-level LS are less for this transaction than for those where
the servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf'
rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Mixed): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high investment
grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience long
periods of interest deferral that will generally not be repaid
until such note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions,' dated June 2016, the agency may
assign ratings up to 'Asf' on notes that incur deferrals if such
deferrals are permitted under terms of the transaction documents,
provided such amounts are fully recovered well in advance of the
legal final maturity under the relevant rating stress.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey), as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in August 2017.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in August 2017. If FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
does not fulfill its obligation to repurchase a mortgage loan due
to a breach, Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P. (the responsible party) will repurchase the loan.

Tier 2 Representation Framework (Concern): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism
construct for this transaction to be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. Thus, Fitch increased its
'AAAsf' loss expectations by roughly 218 bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses
in the reps.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): An
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the
relevant local jurisdiction, was also performed. Per the
representations provided in the transaction documents all loans
have either all been recorded in the appropriate jurisdiction, are
in the process of being recorded, or will be sent for recordation
within 12 months of the closing date.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, Fitch believes that FirstKey's
oversight for completion of these activities serves as a strong
mitigant to potential delays. In addition, the obligation of
FirstKey Mortgage, LLC or Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage
Opportunity Fund, L.P. to repurchase loans, for which assignments
are not recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment
date in August 2017, aligns the issuer's interests regarding
completing the recordation process with those of noteholders.

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Fitch's analysis of loans that have
had clean pay histories for 24 months or more found that, for these
loans, its loan loss model projected a probability of default (PD)
that was more punitive than that indicated by actual delinquency
roll rate projections. To account for this difference, Fitch
reduced the pool's lifetime default expectations by approximately
11%.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $22.25 million (2.28% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 693 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative
to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Third-Party Loan Sale Provisions (Neutral): The transaction permits
nonperforming loans and loans classified as real estate-owned (REO)
serviced by SPS to be sold to unaffiliated third parties to
maximize liquidation proceeds to the issuer. FirstKey as asset
manager is responsible for arranging such sales. To ensure that
loan sales do not result in losses to the trust that exceed Fitch's
expectations, the sale price is floored at a minimum value equal to
59.27% of the unpaid principal balance, which approximates Fitch's
'Bsf' LS expectation. Loans serviced by Chase are not permitted to
be sold out of the trust.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): FK Investments WS, LLC (FK
Investments), a majority-owned affiliate of FirstKey Mortgage, LLC,
will acquire and retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of the
securities to be issued.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.2% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information, as well as the
final Form 15E, from WestCor Land Title Insurance Company
(WestCor), Clayton Holdings LLC, and American Mortgage Consultants
(AMC)/JCIII & Associates, Inc. (JCIII). The due diligence focused
on regulatory compliance, pay history, servicing comments, the
presence of key documents in the loan file and data integrity. In
addition, Westcor, AMC, and JCIII were retained to perform an
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgages were recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction and
the related assignment chains.

A regulatory compliance and data integrity review was competed on
100% of the pool. A pay history review was conducted on 99% of the
pool, and a servicing comment review was completed on approximately
12% of the loans.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and based on the
findings, Fitch made minor adjustments to its analysis.

Fitch made an adjustment on 59 loans that were subject to federal,
state, and/or local predatory testing. These loans contained
material violations including an inability to test for high cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability. These loans were marked as
'indeterminate'. Typically the HUD issues are related to missing
the Final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing
pages, or only having estimated HUDs. The final HUD1 was not used
to test for High Cost loans. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a
100% loss severity for loans in the states that fall under Freddie
Mac's do not purchase list of 'high cost' or 'high risk'. Six loans
were impacted by this approach.

For the remaining 53 loans, where the properties are not located in
the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not purchase list, the
likelihood of all loans being high cost is lower. However, Fitch
assumes the trust could potentially incur notable legal expenses.
Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by 5% for these
loans to account for the risk.

There were 38 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


UBS-CITIGROUP 2011-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X-B Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in UBS-Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the two IO classes, classes X-A and X-B, were
affirmed based on the credit performance (or the weighted average
rating factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $588.7
million from $673.9 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 54.9%
of the pool. Four loans, constituting 15.4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. There are no
loans with an investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Four loans, constituting 17.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no losses to the trust and currently there is one
loan constituting 3.2% of the pool in special servicing. The loan
in special servicing is the Chicago Portfolio Loan ($18.8 million
-- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by three commercial
properties totaling 124,750 square feet (SF) and 246 parking spaces
located in Chicago, Illinois. The loan transferred to special
servicing on April 25, 2016. A Notice of Default and Right to Cure
was sent to the borrower due to their failure to provide property
financials. A default letter was sent to obligors on May 10, 2016
and a pre-negotiation letter has been executed. The Special
Servicer has visited the assets and is in the process of obtaining
updated collateral financials.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 2.2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $5.2 million (a 16% expected loss on average)
from these troubled and specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 81% of the
pool, and full year 2015 operating results for 94% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 82.2%, compared to 85% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.9% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.28X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Poughkeepsie Galleria Loan ($66.5 million --
11.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 691,000 square foot (SF)
portion of the 1.2 million square foot (SF) regional mall located
about 70 miles north of New York City in Poughkeepsie, New York.
The property attracts visitors from across the Hudson River and
east into Connecticut. Mall anchors include J.C. Penney, Regal
Cinemas, and Dick's Sporting Goods as part of the collateral.
Anchors not part of the collateral include Macy's, Best Buy, Target
and Sears. As per the March 2016 rent roll the property was 93%
occupied compared to the June 2015 total mall occupancy of 95%. The
loan represents a pari passu portion of a total $147.7 million
mortgage loan. The asset is also encumbered by $21 million of
mezzanine debt. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93.7% and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 94.5% and 1.06X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Portofino at Biscayne Loan ($51.9
million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by five, ten story
high rise apartments located in North Miami, Florida. The property
was constructed in phases between 1974 to 1980 and includes a
fitness center, swimming pool, tennis courts and staffed gated
security. As per the March 2016 rent roll the property was 96%
occupied, compared to 97% leased in July 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to 79.1%
and 1.16X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 333 North Bedford Road Loan ($40.5
million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 604,095 square
foot (SF) multi-tenant, mixed-use industrial facility in Mount
Kisco, New York approximately 36 miles north of New York City. As
per the March 2016 rent roll, the property was 100% occupied.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65.6% and 1.54X, respectively,
compared to 64.6% and 1.57X at the last review.


VNDO 2013-PENN: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on six classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from VNDO 2013-PENN
Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using its
criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions. S&P's
analysis included a review of the 1.1 million net-rentable-sq.-ft.
office property in Midtown Manhattan, which secures the $450.0
million seven-year, interest-only (IO), fixed-rate mortgage loan
that serves as collateral for the stand-alone transaction.  S&P
also considered the deal structure and liquidity available to the
trust.  The affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity that
are consistent with the outstanding ratings.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest rated reference
classes.  The notional balance on class X-A references class A.  

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the office property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
past three years.  S&P noted that the current occupancy rate has
remained near 95% since year-end 2013, which is comparable with the
current market vacancy.  S&P derived its sustainable in-place net
cash flow, which it divided by a 6.75% capitalization rate, to
determine S&P's expected-case value.  This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 79.4% and 1.99x, respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the July 14, 2016, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a $450.0 million trust and whole-loan balance,
pays a 3.95% annual fixed interest rate, and matures in December
2020.  According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will
pay the special servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well
as costs and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections
conducted by the special servicer.  To date, the trust has not
incurred any principal losses.

"We based our analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, and 2014, and the
Jan. 1, 2016, rent roll provided by the master servicer to
determine our opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the office
property.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a
1.56x DSC on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015,
compared with 2.02x for the year ended 2014, and occupancy was
93.6% according to the Jan. 1, 2016, rent roll.  The lower
servicer-reported DSC reflects Macy's Inc.'s rent abatements. Based
on the January 2016 rent roll, the two largest tenants, Macy's
(55.4% of net rentable area [NRA]) and AMC Networks (22.4% of NRA),
make up 77.8% of the collateral's total NRA.  In addition, 25.0% of
the NRA has leases that expire in 2017, 0.1% has leases that expire
in 2018, and no leases expire in 2019," S&P noted.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

VNDO 2013-PENN Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         A- (sf)
D         BBB- (sf)
E         BB- (sf)
X-A       AAA (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C21: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight
classes, upgraded the ratings on two classes and downgraded the
rating on one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C21 as:

  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded

   to Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded

   to A2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, Classes B and C were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization.  The deal has paid down 11% since
Moody's last review.

The rating on the P&I classes, Classes A-J and D were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes, Classes E through K were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class IO) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33% of the
current balance, compared to 31% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to 6 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to
$389.9 million from $3.25 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 32% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 99% of the pool.  One loan, constituting less than 1%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Four loans, constituting 44% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $62.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 24%).  Six loans, constituting 54% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the NGP Rubicon GSA Pool Loan ($67.8 million -- 17.4% of
the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest in a
mortgage loan secured by 1.2 million square foot portfolio of nine
properties located in various US states.  The portfolio was
originally secured by 14 properties with US government leases.  The
portfolio transferred to special servicing on April 23, 2015, for
imminent monetary default.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $105 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 32% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $22 million (an 18% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 82% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 116%, compared
to 115% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 19% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.1X,
respectively, compared to 0.81X and 1.0X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 44% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Metropolitan Square Loan
($124.1 million -- 32% of the pool), which is secured by a 43-story
office tower located in the central business district of Saint
Louis, Missouri.  The collateral is also encumbered by a $25.5
million B-note held outside the trust.  The property was 77% leased
as of March 2016, the same as at Moody's last review.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in August 2012 due to cash flow
shortfalls, and was modified and returned to master servicer in
March 2013.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 155% and 0.63X,
respectively, compared to 145% and 0.67X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Phillips Lighting Loan
($39.7 million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 199,900
SF suburban office building located in Franklin Township, New
Jersey.  This ARD loan had an initial maturity date of September
15, 2015 but is continuing to pay subject to additional 2.0%
interest with a final maturity date of September 2035. Phillips
Electronics occupies the entire building through 2021. Moody's used
a lit / dark analysis given the single tenant lease exposure.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.81X, respectively,
compared to 128% and 0.72X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Maywood Village Loan
($6.7 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 48,000 SF
retail center in Maywood, CA.  The property was built in 1991 and
is located five miles southeast of the Los Angeles central business
district.  The property was 90% occupied as of March 2016.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to
102% and 0.88X at the last review.


WELLS FARGO 2011-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2011-C5 (WFRBS 2011-C5).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool's underlying collateral since issuance.  Fitch modeled losses
of 2.2% of the remaining pool; expected losses based on the
original pool balance are 1.9%.            

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 13.7% to $942 million from $1.09
billion at issuance.  Since the last rating action and as of the
July 2016 distribution report, 10 loans totaling $86.9 million were
repaid at or prior to their 2016 scheduled maturity dates. The pool
has experienced no realized losses to date.  Seven loans (5.6%) are
defeased.  Fitch has designated six loans (3.6%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern.  There are currently no specially serviced loans, however,
since issuance, one loan (0.7%) had been in special servicing due
to a borrower bankruptcy, but was subsequently returned to the
master servicer in July 2013 following a change in ownership.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class H.

There were variances to criteria related to classes B, C, and D
whereby the surveillance criteria indicated rating upgrades were
possible.  However, Fitch determined that upgrades were not
warranted due to pool concentrations, tenant rollover concerns on
select loans in the top 15, Sports Authority tenant exposure and
limited upcoming loan maturities.

Of the original pool of 75 loans at issuance, 64 loans currently
remain.  With loan payoffs, the retail concentration has grown to
nearly 50% of the pool, which includes five of the top 15 loans
(39.9%).  The largest loan represents nearly 21% of the pool and
the top five loans are nearly 48% of the pool.  Upcoming loan
maturities are limited to 3.4% in 2016, 1.7% in 2018 and 1.3% in
2020, while the remaining 93.6% is concentrated in 2021.

Approximately 85% of the pool reported 2015 financials.  Based on
financial statements for the remaining loans in the pool, the
overall net operating income (NOI) improved 30.6% since issuance
and 7% over 2014 reported financials.

The largest loan (20.5% of the pool) is secured by an 878,974
square foot (sf) lifestyle center comprised of retail and office
space located in Austin, TX.  The center was 98.8% occupied as of
the March 2016 rent roll.  Non-collateral anchors include Dillard's
and Macy's and collateral anchors include Dick's Sporting Goods and
Neiman Marcus.  The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) improved to 2.18x at year-end (YE) 2015 from 1.94x at
YE 2014.  However, over this same period, property occupancy
declined slightly to 94% from 97%.  Total mall store sales were
$664 per square foot (psf) for 2015.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (1.5%) is secured by a 159,681 sf
shopping center located in Amarillo, TX.  The property is anchored
by Office Depot and includes national inline tenants such as
Starbucks, The UPS Store, Domino's Pizza, and GNC.  Property
occupancy declined to 66.2% as of March 2016 compared to 94% at YE
2014 due to the closing of the former anchor, Shepler's Boots and
Jeans (previously occupying 20% of the center's net rentable area),
in August 2015.  The annualized year-to-date March 2016
servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 1.15x, compared to 1.45x at YE 2015.
Fitch will continue to monitor the loan as leasing status updates
are received.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to increasing
credit enhancement and expected continued paydown.  Future upgrades
are possible as the pool continues to pay down and credit
enhancement increases.  Downgrades may be possible should overall
performance decline significantly.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $35.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $107.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $471 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $85.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $700.6 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.9 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17.7 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $16.4 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class H and
interest-only class X-B certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2016-BNK1: Fitch to Rate Cl. F Certificates 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-BNK1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2016-BNK1.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $36,136,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $230,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $267,018,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,766,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67,197,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $578,920,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,933,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,452,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,284,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,284,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,608,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,271,000ab class X-F ' B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,284,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,608,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,271,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

-- $31,013,795ab class X-G.
-- $31,013,795a class G.
-- $43,527,883ac RRI Interest.

a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b) Notional amount and interest-only.
c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
    pool balance (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Aug. 1, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 40 loans secured by 46
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$870,557,680 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Bank of
America, National Association, and Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital
Holdings LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 85.6% of the properties
by balance, asset summary reviews on 100.0% of the pool, and cash
flow analysis on 88.7% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are lower than
those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.22x and
100.5%, respectively, are better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch
DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.16x and 107.5%, respectively. Excluding
credit-opinion loans, the pool's Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV is 1.18x
and 108.9%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: The two largest loans in the
pool, The Shops at Crystals (9.2% of the pool) and Vertex
Pharmaceutical HQ (9.2% of the pool), have investment grade credit
opinions. The Shops at Crystals has an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'BBB+sf*' on a stand-alone basis. Vertex Pharmaceutical
HQ has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis. The two loans have a weighted average Fitch DSCR
and Fitch LTV of 1.41x and 62.7%, respectively.

Higher Pool Concentration: The top ten loans comprise 58.7% of the
pool, which is greater than the YTD 2016 average of 54.6% and
49.3%. The pool's loan concentration index (LCI) is 471, which is
above the YTD 2016 average of 420. Additionally, the resulting
sponsor concentration index (SCI) delta compared to the LCI is
23.4%, which is above the YTD 2016 average delta of 16.7%. Simon
Property Group, L.P. (rated 'A'/F1') is the sponsor of two of the
top 10 loans, representing 13.5% of the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 19.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-BNK1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence information
was provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a
comparison and re-computation of certain characteristics with
respect to each of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and the findings did not have an impact
on the analysis.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to the
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Securities,
Series 2016-C35.

   -- $47,834,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,672,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $265,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $227,377,000c class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67,132,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69,045,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $785,060,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49,865,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,587,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,000,000ac class A-4FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $0ac class A-4FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,258,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,258,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21,736,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,508,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest-only.
  (c) The aggregate initial balance of class A-4, A-4FL, and A-4FX

  certificates will be $277,377,000.  Under certain circumstances,

  holders of the Class A-4FL Certificates may exchange all or a
  portion of their certificates for an equal certificate amount of

  the Class A-4FX Certificates having the same Pass-Through Rate
  as the Class A-4FX regular interest.

Fitch does not rate the $98,452,000 class X-B certificates or the
$49,865,609 class G certificates.

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on July 12, 2016, the
balance of the class A-4 has decreased from $277,377,000 to
$227,377,000.  The $50,000,000 class A-4FL certificates and $0
class A-4FX certificates were added to the structure.  The classes
above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 102 loans secured by 140
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.02 billion as of the cut-off date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC, Barclays
Bank PLC, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, UBS Real Estate
Securities Inc., C-III Commercial Mortgage LLC, National
Cooperative Bank, N.A., and Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 65.0% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 73.3%, and asset summary reviews on
73.3% of the pool.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch weighted
average DSCR and LTV are 1.32x and 105.2%, respectively. However,
excluding co-op and credit opinion collateral, the pool's weighted
average Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.12x and 112.2%, respectively.
This is higher than other recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The
2015 and YTD 2016 averages Fitch LTVs were 109.3% and 107.5%,
respectively.  The 2015 and YTD 2016 averages Fitch DSCRs were
1.18x and 1.17x, respectively.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 11 loans (5.6% of the pool)
secured by multifamily co-ops; 10 are in the New York City metro
area and one is in New Haven, CT.  The weighted average Fitch DSCR
and LTV of the co-op collateral in this transaction as rentals are
4.17x and 47.1%, respectively.

Pool Concentration Better than Recent Deals: The top 10 loans
comprise 40.4% of the pool, which is below the YTD 2016 and 2015
averages of 55.4% and 49.3%, respectively.  Additionally, the loan
concentration index (LCI) and sponsor concentration index (SCI) are
250 and 265, respectively, well below the YTD 2016 LCI and SCI
averages of 428 and 491 and the 2015 LCI and SCI averages of 367
and 410, respectively.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period.  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-C35 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


WINWATER MORTGAGE 2015-3: Moody's Rates Cl. B-4 Debt 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by WinWater Mortgage Loan
Trust 2015-3.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-3
  Class B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 27, 2015,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)
  Class B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 27, 2015,
   Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  Class B-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 27, 2015,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
  Class B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 27, 2015,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a reduction in our expected
pool losses.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pool and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $358MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2004-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on July 29, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of nineteen tranches backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by
miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-1

  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2012,
   Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 12, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-RM1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2014,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 28, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-A

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-FRE1

  Cl. 2-AV-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 18, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-OPT1

  Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 1, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec. 1, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades for Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1,
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1, C-BASS Mortgage
Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4, Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-A,
and Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-1 are primarily due to the total
credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The rating upgrades for ACE Securities Corp.  Home Equity Loan
Trust, Series 2004-RM1 are primarily due to the reduction in
seriously delinquent loans as well as the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The rating upgrades for Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-FRE1, and HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust
2007-OPT1 are primarily due to the expectation of greater total
principal payments to the upgraded tranches owing to a slower than
anticipated pace of mezzanine write-downs.  The tranches currently
have principal payment priority, but will pay pro-rata with certain
other senior tranches when all mezzanine tranches have been fully
written-down.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating action was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Lowers $611.8MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued 1999-2005
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 57 tranches
from 15 transactions issued from 1999 to 2005.

The collateral backing these deals consists of first-lien fixed and
adjustable rate mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban
Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
(VA).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWMBS Re-Performing Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series
2002-1

  Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016,
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series
2005-R2
  Cl. 1A-F1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2016,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1A-S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 22, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 24, 2009,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2001-W3
  Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W1
  Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W6
  Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W1
  Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W10
  Cl. 1M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W4
  Cl. IM, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 2, 2016,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. IB-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 18, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1
  Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4
  Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. AX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 22, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
  Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust 2004-R3
  Cl. AF, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 16, 2016,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. AS, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 16, 2016,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 16, 2016,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 24, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. PT, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 16, 2016,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
  Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 28,
   2016, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. I-F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. I-SB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 22, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. I-SF, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,

   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 1999-5
  Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-RP1 Tr
  Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26,
   2013, Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. I-F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. I-HJ, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. I-S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 26, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 1, 2015,

   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are a result of the high severity observed from
FHA-VA transactions with aged delinquency pipeline, and reflect
Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools and the structural
features of these transactions.  The current delinquency pipeline
includes loans that have been in foreclosure for over four years.
Moody's believes the severity on some of these loans could be much
higher than the FHA-VA expected severity.  Recent loss severities
on liquidated FHA-VA loans have increased to 25% from the expected
severity of 12% primarily due to the number of extremely aged
delinquent loans whose liquidation expenses greatly exceed what the
FHA or VA will reimburse.

The interest-only tranches are downgraded as a result of the rating
downgrades on tranches linked to the interest-only tranches.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults.  A VA guarantee
covers only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of
either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid
interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount.
HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers
submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties on
servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits.  This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty.  The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses they
deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $176.3MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 17 tranches
and downgraded the rating of two from seven transactions, backed by
Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-8

  Cl. 1-CB-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-NC-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-NC-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 17, 2014,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-NC-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 17, 2014,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-5

  Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR8

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 7-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2004-AA2

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-5

  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2014,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 3, 2013,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are primarily due to the stable
or stronger collateral performance of the underlying pools and the
credit enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrades
are primarily due to the depletion of credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

The rating action on CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-5
also reflects a correction to the cash-flow model used by Moody's
in rating this transaction.  In the prior model, excess interest
applied to collateral Group 5 from other collateral groups in the
structure was calculated incorrectly, resulting in lower payments
to Class 5-A-1 than called for in the transaction documents.  This
error has now been corrected, and today's rating action reflects
this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 78 Classes From 17 CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on July 29, 2016, discontinued its ratings on
66 classes from 14 cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transactions, 11 classes from two collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), and one class guaranteed by National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA) in its capacity as a U.S. government
agency.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Ares XI CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July 2016.
   -- Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd. (CF CLO): last remaining rated
      tranches paid down.
   -- Avery Street CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.
   -- Churchill Financial Cayman Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.
   -- CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.
   -- CIFC Funding 2011-I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      July 2016.
   -- COA Caerus CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.
   -- CT CDO III Ltd. (CF CMBS): optional redemption in July 2016.
   -- Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006(CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.
   -- GoldenTree Loan Opportunities V Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in July 2016.
   -- LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. (CF CMBS): last remaining rated tranches

      paid down.
   -- NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2011-R5 (guaranteed by NCUA):
      last remaining rated tranche paid down.
   -- Phoenix CLO III Ltd (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.
   -- Prospect Park CDO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.
   -- Stone Tower CLO V Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July

      2016.
   -- Symphony CLO IV Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in July
      2016.
   -- Veritas CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid down.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Ares XI CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Class A-1b Notes    NR                  AAA (sf)
Class A-1c Notes    NR                  AAA (sf)
Class A-2 Notes     NR                  AAA (sf)
Class B Notes       NR                  AA+ (sf)
Class C Notes       NR                  AA- (sf)
Class D Notes       NR                  BBB+ (sf)
Class E Notes       NR                  BBB- (sf)

Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
P1                  NR                  AA+p (sf)

Avery Street CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Class A Notes       NR                  AAA (sf)
Class A-2 Notes     NR                  AAA (sf)

Churchill Financial Cayman Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
D-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
E                   NR                  AAA (sf)

CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-S               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)

CIFC Funding 2011-I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)

COA Caerus CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

CT CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
E                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)
F                   NR                  CCC (sf)
G                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
H                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
J                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
K                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
L                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
M                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
N                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2B                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C-1                 NR                  A+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

GoldenTree Loan Opportunities V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
E-FX                NR                  CCC- (sf)
E-FL                NR                  CCC- (sf)

NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2011-R5
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Sr Notes            NR                  AA+ (sf)

Phoenix CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Prospect Park CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Stone Tower CLO V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C-1                 NR                  A+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Symphony CLO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Veritas CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA (sf)
E                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

NR -- Not rated.
P -- Principal only.


[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 53 Classes From 46 RMBS Deals to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 53 classes of mortgage
pass-through certificates from 46 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2003 and 2009 to 'D
(sf)'.  At the same time, S&P placed one additional rating on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the principal
write-downs' impact on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  All of the classes whose ratings were lowered
to
'D (sf)' were rated either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' before the
rating action.

S&P also placed its 'CCC (sf)' rating on class 2-1A1 from MASTR
Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-3 on CreditWatch with negative
implications because S&P is awaiting an explanation from the
trustee regarding the nature of the principal write-downs to this
class.

The 53 defaulted classes consist of these:

   -- 21 from prime jumbo transactions (38.89 %);
   -- 13 from Alternative-A transactions (24.07 %);
   -- Eight from subprime transactions;
   -- Seven from negative amortization transactions;
   -- Two from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transactions;
   -- One from RMBS outside the guidelines transactions; and
   -- One from a risk transfer transaction.

All of the transactions in this review receive credit enhancement
from a combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable).

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and S&P will further adjust its
ratings as it considers appropriate according to S&P's criteria.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://bit.ly/2aDKvx9


[*] S&P Puts 310 Ratings From 11 RMBS Transactions on Watch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on July 29, 2016, placed its ratings on 310
classes from 111 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.  The
transactions were issued between 2004 and 2006, and are backed by
various collateral types.

The positive CreditWatch placements reflect a potential increase in
credit support available to these classes due to payments made as
part of Bank of America Corp.'s $8.5 billion settlement with
certain Countrywide RMBS investors.  Pursuant to guidance from a
New York state court to Bank of New York (the trustee for the
related transactions), the payments were to be allocated either as
subsequent recoveries according to the governing documents or, if
subsequent recoveries are not defined in the documents, treated as
unscheduled principal payments.  The payments were realized in the
June 2016 remittance period.  The CreditWatch placements affect 48
subprime, 30 Alternative-A, 22 prime jumbo, four negative
amortization, three re-performing, and three document deficient
transactions, along with one closed-end second-lien transaction.

Over the next few weeks, S&P will review the payment information
and remittance report data on the transactions placed on
CreditWatch to determine the degree of additional credit support
available to, and the resulting ratings increase on, these
transactions.  S&P expects the majority of the ratings increases to
be within one rating category; however, some ratings may experience
ratings increases of greater than one category.

S&P also may place ratings on classes from 18 additional trusts
subject to the Bank of America settlement on CreditWatch with
positive implications once Bank of New York (the applicable
trustee) receives judicial guidance as to how the settlement
payments should be allocated for those transactions.

                        ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- An inflation rate of 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- An average 30-year fixed mortgage rate of about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

            http://bit.ly/2aXCLnV



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 110 Classes From 16 RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on July 22, 2016, took various rating actions
on 110 classes from 16 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions issued between 2002 and 2008.  Of the 110
ratings, we raised 19, lowered 10 (one of which S&P removed from
CreditWatch negative), affirmed 80, and withdrew one.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate subprime and prime jumbo mortgage loans, which are
secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

S&P removed its rating on class A-X from HarborView Mortgage Loan
Trust 2003-3 from CreditWatch negative, where S&P placed it on Jan.
29, 2016.  This class comprises one interest-only (IO) component
and two principal-only (PO) components that are paid through
different payment streams within the transaction.  The CreditWatch
negative placement reflected outstanding questions S&P had
regarding this class' deferred interest payments and their effect
on the future principal balance of one of the PO components.  S&P
believes the current rating is now consistent with the credit
support available to this class.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.

Of the classes reviewed, only class A ('AA (sf)') from ITLA
Mortgage Loan Securitization Corp., insured by Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. ('AA'), is insured by an insurance provider that is
currently rated by S&P Global Ratings.

The reviewed transactions also have two other classes that had the
benefit of a rated insurance provider at the time of deal
origination; however, S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn its
ratings on their insurance providers.

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

S&P raised its ratings on 19 classes, including six ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more
of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

S&P raised its ratings on classes 1-A2 and 2-A2 from Structured
Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-BC3 to 'BB+ (sf)'
from 'CCC (sf)' and classes M1 and M2 from Structured Asset
Securities Corp.  Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-TC1 to 'B- (sf)' and 'B
(sf)', respectively, from 'CCC (sf)' because S&P believes these
classes are no longer vulnerable to default.  S&P also raised eight
ratings to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because it believes these
classes are no longer virtually certain to default, primarily owing
to the improved performance of the collateral backing these
transactions.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' ratings indicate that S&P
believes that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its projected losses for these classes and that the
classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.

S&P lowered its ratings on 10 classes, including one rating that
was lowered six notches.  Of the 10 downgrades, six of the lowered
ratings remained at an investment-grade level, while the remaining
four downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings.  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover its
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
The downgrades reflect:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends; or
   -- Eroded credit support.

S&P affirmed its ratings on 37 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced -- or a complete stop of --
unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding credit
support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P
affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions even
though these classes may have passed at higher rating scenarios.

S&P affirmed 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings to reflect its belief
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes. According
to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's
view that these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

S&P withdrew its rating on class S from Saxon Asset Securities
Trust 2004-1 per S&P's IO criteria, which state that S&P will
maintain the rating on an IO class until the ratings on all of the
classes that the IO security references, in determining its
notional balance, are either lowered below 'AA-' or have been
retired.  The rating on the referenced class A was lowered to
'A+ (sf)' in this review.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/2aU4eEy


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 21 RMBS 2nd-Lien Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on July 29, 2016, completed its review of 48
classes from 21 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 1999 and 2007.  The review yielded 13
upgrades, three downgrades, 28 affirmations, and two
discontinuances.  S&P also placed two ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

All of these transactions are backed by second-lien residential
mortgage loan collateral (including home equity line of credit
collateral).

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class
without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, we
relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.  As
discussed in S&P's criteria, "The Interaction Of Bond Insurance And
Credit Ratings," published Aug. 24, 2009, the rating on a
bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the rating on the
bond insurer and the rating of the underlying obligation, without
considering the potential credit enhancement from the bond
insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, these are insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- SACO I Trust 2005-GP1's classes A-1 ('AA (sf)') and M-1
      ('AA (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.
      ('AA');

   -- CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-F's
      classes 1-A ('AA (sf)'), 2-A-1A ('AA (sf)'), and 2-A-1B
      ('AA (sf)'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.;

   -- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-10SL's classes A-1
      ('AA (sf)/Watch Neg') and A-2 ('AA (sf)/Watch Neg'), insured

      by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.; and

   -- Custody Receipt Evidencing Ownership Of CWHEQ Revolving Home

      Equity Loan Trust, Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed
      Notes Series 2007-G Class A ('AAA (sf)'), insured by Assured

      Guaranty Municipal Corp.

The reviewed transactions also have 13 other classes that were
insured by a rated insurance provider when the deal was originated,
but S&P Global Ratings has since withdrawn the ratings on the
insurance providers of those classes.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

UPGRADES

The upgrades include 11 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

  -- Increased credit support relative to S&P's projected losses;
     and/or

   -- The class' expected short duration.

Seven classes from CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series
2007-G were upgraded following a recent settlement paid out by Bank
of America Corp.  The settlement yielded $14.6 million dollar
payment to the trust, which was distributed to class A, increasing
its relative credit support and resulting in an upgrade to 'AAA
(sf)' from 'BBB (sf)'. Principal write-ups totaling the same amount
were made to classes M-7, M-8, and B; S&P affirmed these ratings at
'D (sf)'.  In addition to class A, the principal write-ups also
increased credit support available to other classes in the
transaction resulting in the following rating actions on class M-1
(upgraded to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'), class M-2 (upgraded to 'A+
(sf)' from 'B- (sf)'), class M-3 (upgraded to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'CCC
(sf)'), class M-4 (upgraded to 'BBB (sf)' from
'CCC (sf)'), class M-5 (upgraded to 'BBB (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'),
and class M-6 (upgraded to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'CC (sf)').

                           DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include two ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on one class to speculative-grade
('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher). Two of
the downgraded classes already had speculative-grade ratings.  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover its
projected losses for the related transactions at a higher rating.
The downgrades also reflect deteriorated credit performance
trends.

S&P lowered one rating, class I-B-3 from First Franklin Mortgage
Loan Trust 2003-FFA, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because of
principal write-downs incurred by this class.

The downgrades on classes I-B-1 and I-B-2 to 'B (sf)' from
'BBB+ (sf)' and to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)', respectively, from
First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFA reflect the increase in
our projected losses and S&P's belief that the projected credit
support for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover the
projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating levels.  The
increase in S&P's projected losses is because of higher reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods compared
with those reported during previous reviews.  Total delinquencies
increased to 13.87% during the June 2016 performance period from
4.26% during the January 2016 performance period.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that our projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover our projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- A high proportion of balloon loans in the pool that are
      approaching their maturity date;
   -- The application of an operational risk cap; and
   -- Deteriorating credit performance trends.

In addition, in accordance with S&P's second-lien criteria, some
classes are limited to a liquidity rating cap of 'A+' because they
have an estimated payoff of greater than 24 months or insufficient
hard credit enhancement for higher rating categories.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on two classes that were paid in full
during recent remittance periods.

                      CREDITWATCH PLACEMENTS

S&P placed its 'AA (sf)' ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 from Terwin
Mortgage Trust 2006-10SL on CreditWatch with negative implications
because the trustee reported potential interest shortfalls on these
classes, despite being insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp,
which could negatively affect S&P's ratings on these classes.
After verifying these possible interest shortfalls, S&P will adjust
the ratings as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/2aqyhGJ


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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                   *** End of Transmission ***