---

         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 31, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 213

                            Headlines

ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
ALM XVIII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D Notes
AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-C: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
BENEFIT STREET II: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Loan

BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
BROOKSIDE MILL: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Loan
CARLYLE MCLAREN: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to B+
CITIGROUP 2005-C3: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Certs to B2
CLEAR LAKE CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes

COBALT CMBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 14 Tranches
COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
CPS AUTO 2016-C: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes

DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C3: Fitch to Rate Cl. E Certs BB
GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Debt
JMP CREDIT II: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Ca(sf)
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 3 Tranches

JP MORGAN 2014-C22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C30: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Moody's Cuts Cl. K Debt Rating to Ca
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to BB+
LBUBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. X Debt

LNR CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 12 Tranches
LNR CDO IV: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 14 Tranches
LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-TOP17: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to C

MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
ONEMAIN FINC'L 2016-2: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL 2003-PWR1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Certs
SCHOONER TRUST 2006-5: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. K Certs to Ba1
TOWD POINT 2016-3: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'

WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C16: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
[*] Fitch Lowers 25 Distressed Classes in 9 U.S. CMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Hikes $30MM of Second Lien RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $567.3MM of Subprime RMBS

[*] S&P Completes Review of 47 Classes From 14 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 RMBS Transactions
[^] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 10 U.S. RMBS Transactions

                            *********

ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1B-R,
A-1C-R, and A-2B-R notes from ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation managed by American Capital CLO
Management LLC.  S&P withdrew its ratings on the class A-1B, A-1C,
and A-2B notes, which were fully redeemed.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-2A, B, C, D, and E notes,
which were not refinanced.

On the July 25, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuances were used to redeem the original notes,
as outlined in the transaction documents.  Therefore, S&P withdrew
its ratings on the original notes following their full redemption
and assigned ratings to the replacement notes.  The ratings reflect
S&P's opinion that the credit support available is commensurate
with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Replacement class       Rating
A-1B-R                  AAA (sf)
A-1C-R                  AAA (sf)
A-2B-R                  AA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A-1A                    AAA (sf)
A-2A                    AA (sf)
B (deferrable)          A (sf)
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)
E (deferrable)          B (sf)

RATINGS WITHDRAWN
ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Original class              Rating
                        To          From
A-1B                    NR          AAA (sf)
A-1C                    NR          AAA (sf)
A-2B                    NR          AA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


ALM XVIII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to ALM XVIII Ltd./ALM XVIII
LLC's $413.5 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM XVIII Ltd./ALM XVIII LLC

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)                275.00
A-2                     AA (sf)                  54.00
B                       A (sf)                   41.00
C                       BBB (sf)                 22.00
D                       BB- (sf)                 21.50
Preferred shares        NR                       36.55

NR--Not rated.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-3's $230.196 million
asset-backed notes series 2016-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 21,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 57.2%, 47.5%, 39.4%, and
      35.0% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.15x, 1.75x, 1.40x, and 1.25x S&P's 25.75%-
      26.75% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that

      S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.  The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB')
      stress scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes
      would remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary

      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the class

      C and D notes would remain within two rating categories of
      S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA' rated securities and a two-
      rating category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      through 'BB' rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,

      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-3  

Class       Rating       Type            Interest           Amount
                                         rate             (mil. $)
A           AA (sf)      Senior          Fixed             132.596
B           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed              42.404
C           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              36.346
D           BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed              18.850


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-C: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 18 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of 20 tranches from seven transactions,
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-B Trust

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-C Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7

Cl. 7-A-1-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-2-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-2-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-4

Cl. III-A-17, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-25, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. III-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2005-FA5

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are due
to the erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BENEFIT STREET II: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Loan
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2A, A-2B, and
B notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, C, and D notes
from Benefit Street Partners CLO II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in June 2013 and is
managed by Benefit Street Partners LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 5, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect improved credit quality in the
underlying collateral since S&P's effective date rating
affirmations in October 2013.

Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased significantly since S&P's previous review,
which referenced the August 2013 effective date report.  The
purchasing of this higher-rated collateral has resulted in a
decrease in reported weighted average spread to 4.18% from 4.50%
and a corresponding increase in the weighted average 'AAA' S&P
Global Ratings' recovery rate to 41.30% from 39.50%.

According to the July 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have remained
relatively stable since S&P's October 2013 rating affirmations.

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 134.88%, down from the 135.60%
      reported in August 2013.
   -- The class B O/C ratio was 121.70%, down from 122.36%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 113.89%, down from 114.50%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.32%, down from 108.90%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and well
above their minimum threshold values.

The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 4.52 years from
5.64 years.  Because time horizon factors heavily into default
probability, a shorter weighted average life positively affects the
collateral pool's creditworthiness.  This seasoning, combined with
the improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.  In addition, the number of issuers in the portfolio has
increased during this period, and the resulting diversification of
the portfolio also contributed to the improved credit quality.

Although there has been a modest increase in both defaulted assets
and assets rated in the 'CCC' category, these factors are offset by
the decline in the weighted average life and positive credit
migration of the collateral portfolio, both of which have lowered
its credit risk profile.

Furthermore, although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher
ratings for the class B, C, and D notes, its rating actions
consider additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure
to specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1, C, and D notes
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Benefit Street Partners CLO II Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2A          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2B          AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B             A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Benefit Street Partners CLO II Ltd.
                
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
C             BBB (sf)
D             BB (sf)


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
CLO 2016-2 Ltd./ BlueMountain CLO 2016-2 LLC's $458.80 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 21,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans (those rated 'BB+' or lower) that are governed by
      collateral quality tests.  The credit enhancement provided
      through the subordination of cash flows, excess spread, and
      overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2016-2 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-2 LLC

                        Prelim.         Prelim. amount
Class                   rating                (mil. $)

A-1                     AAA (sf)                304.90
A-2                     AA (sf)                  75.50
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                   30.00
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 28.40
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                  20.00
Subordinated notes      NR                       46.75

NR--Not rated.


BROOKSIDE MILL: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Loan
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, B-1, B-2,
C-1, C-2, D, and E notes from Brookside Mill CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May
2013 and is managed by Shenkman Capital Management.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 3, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
April 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

Since the transaction's August 2013 effective date, the trustee
reported the collateral portfolio's weighted average life has
decreased to 4.68 years from 5.87 years.  Because time horizon
weighs heavily into default probability, a shorter weighted average
life positively affects the collateral pool's creditworthiness.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since effective date.  Specifically,
the amount of defaulted assets increased to $6.07 million from zero
as of the effective date report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+'
and below increased to $59.69 million from $21.73 million over the
same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

   -- The senior O/C ratio has declined to 129.21% from 132.99%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio has declined to 118.28% from 121.74%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio has declined to 111.05% from 114.30%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio has declined to 105.41% from 108.49%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life.  However, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As such,
the affirmed ratings reflect our belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E notes, its rating actions
consider additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure
to specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Brookside Mill CLO Ltd.  
                
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C-1           A (sf)
C-2           A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)


CARLYLE MCLAREN: S&P Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to B+
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2L, A-3L,
B-1L, and B-2L notes from Carlyle McLaren CLO Ltd.  S&P also
removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with
positive implications on May 25, 2016.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1L and A-1LV notes
from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 15, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $175.18 million in
collective paydowns to the class A-1L and A-1LV notes since S&P's
October 2014 rating actions, which have left the notes with
approximately 31.21% remaining of their original balance at
issuance.  These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the September 2014 trustee
report, which S&P used for its previous rating actions:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio improved to 147.59% from
      123.39%;
   -- The class A O/C ratio improved to 125.92% from 113.94%;
   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio improved to 112.89% from 107.48%;
      and
   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio improved to 103.62% from 102.45%.

The collateral portfolio's credit quality has slightly deteriorated
since S&P's last rating actions.  Collateral obligations with
ratings in the 'CCC' category have increased, with $13.70 million
reported as of the June 2016 trustee report, compared with $1.46
million reported as of the September 2014 trustee report.  However,
despite the slightly larger concentration in the 'CCC' category,
the transaction has benefited from a drop in the weighted average
life due to underlying collateral's seasoning, with 3.17 years
reported as of the June 2016 trustee report, compared with 4.52
years reported at the time of our 2014 rating actions.  In
addition, over the same period, the trustee reported a drop in the
par amount of defaulted collateral to $5.67 million from $8.53
million.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a higher rating on the class B-2L notes.  However,
because the transaction currently has increased exposure to 'CCC'
rated collateral obligations, and has exposure to both long-dated
assets (i.e., assets that mature after the CLO's stated maturity)
and loans from companies in the energy and commodities sectors
(which have come under significant pressure from falling oil and
commodity prices in the past year), S&P limited the upgrade to
offset future potential credit migration in the underlying
collateral.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the June
2016 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with
S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Carlyle McLaren CLO Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2L          AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L          AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L          A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L          B+ (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Carlyle McLaren CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1L          AAA (sf)
A-1LV         AAA (sf)


CITIGROUP 2005-C3: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Certs to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C3 as:

  Cl. D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 30, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on July 30, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  C. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on July 30, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class D was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 76% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the P&I class E was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO class XC was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 25.2% of the
current balance, compared to 33.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.3% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 17, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.1% to
$12.4 million from $1.4 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in
size from 16% to 44% of the pool.  There are no defeased loans.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring
of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool with an
aggregate realized loss of $107.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%).  One loan, constituting 44% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing.  The loan in special servicing is
the Riverview Commons ($5.5 million -- 45% of the pool).  The loan
is secured by a 93,026 square foot (SF), multi-tenant neighborhood
shopping center located in Riverview, Michigan.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2015 due to imminent
maturity default.  The property is currently 66% occupied.  The
special servicer projects a disposition in the second half of
2016.

Moody's received full year 2014 and 2015 operating results for 100%
of the conduit pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 60%,
compared to 61% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 24% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.84X,
respectively, compared to 1.13X and 1.71X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top two conduit loans represent 56% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Roxy Stadium Loan ($4.9 million -- 39.9% of the
pool), which is secured by a 14-screen, two-story multiplex cinema
located in Santa Rosa, California.  The loan is fully amortizing
and has amortized 41% since securitization.  Given the specialized
property use and single tenant exposure, Moody's applied a lit dark
analysis for this asset.  Based on this dark lit analysis, Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 59% and 1.97X, respectively, compared to
70% and 1.67X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Eckerd Drug Store-Kutztown Loan
($1.9 million -- 15.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,824
SF Rite Aid occupied drug store in Kutztown, Pennsylvania.  The
tenant exercised a ten-year lease renewal option in February 2015.
The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 40% since
securitization.  Given the single tenant exposure, Moody's applied
a lit dark analysis for this asset.  Based on this dark lit
analysis, Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 69% and 1.40X at last review.


CLEAR LAKE CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Clear Lake CLO, Ltd.:

  $20,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
   Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 7,
   2015, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $343,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020
   (current outstanding balance of $32,422,906), Affirmed
    Aaa (sf); previously on December 7, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $21,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
   Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $15,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
   Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $14,747,398), Affirmed

   Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Clear Lake CLO, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans, with some exposure to corporate bonds.  The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in December 2013.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2015.  The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 66% or $63.2 million
since that time.  Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are
reported at 238.29%, 158.78%, 127.32% and 111.08%, respectively,
versus December 2015 levels of 165.78%, 134.71%, 118.29% and
108.54%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since December 2015.  Based on the trustee's July 2016 report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2593 compared to 2239
in December 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with weak liquidity
     and/or credit quality: The presence of assets with the worst
     Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4,
     and assets with Ca ratings after adjustments (those rated
     Caa3 with a negative outlook, or Caa2 on review for
     downgrade) exposes the notes to additional risks if these
     assets default.  The historical default rate is far higher
     for companies with SGL-4 ratings than those with other SGL
     ratings.  Due to the deal's high exposure to these assets,
     which constitute around $5.9 million of par, Moody's ran a
     sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2100)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3151)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:
Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."  The key model
inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ from
the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the collateral pool as having a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $129.7 million, defaulted par of $1.2 million,
a weighted average default probability of 13.71% (implying a WARF
of 2626), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.75%,
a diversity score of 30 and a weighted average spread of 2.95%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


COBALT CMBS 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 14 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Cobalt CMBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2006-C1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement (CE)
relative to Fitch-modeled loss expectations for the pool.  Although
CE for class A-M has improved since Fitch's last rating action, the
transaction has become more concentrated with 82 loans remaining
(38.9% of which are interest only loans), compared to 169 at
issuance.  The remaining pool faces significant refinance risk with
93.5% maturing or having an Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) in
2016 (ARD loans represent 10.3% of the pool).  Loan maturities are
concentrated in the third and fourth quarters of 2016 (91.7%).
Some loans might experience challenges securing refinance due to
performance issues or tenants lease rollovers, especially the loans
with a Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) falling below
1.25x.

Fitch modeled losses of 11.1% for the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 18.3%, including $364.7
million in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 22 loans
(28.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes eight specially
serviced assets (7.8%).

As of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance (including rakes) has been reduced by 65% to
$894.7 million from $2.56 billion at issuance.  Thirteen loans
(17.6%) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls totaling $5.5 million
are currently affecting class AJ.  Classes G through P have
outstanding cumulative interest shortfalls, but have been fully
written down.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is an interest-only (IO)
loan (4%) secured by a 296,308 square foot (sf) Class A office
building located in Bloomington, MN.  The loan was modified and
restructured into an A/B notes split effective November 2012.  The
property performance has improved since Fitch's last rating action.
The servicer-reported first quarter (1Q) 2016 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.99x, compared to 1.44x at year end (YE)
2015, 1.37x at YE 2014, and 0.78x at YE 2013.  However, the recent
DSCR reflects the A note balance only.  Fitch does not expect
recoveries on the B note and has modeled a loss on the A note.  Per
March 2016 rent roll, the property was 86.7% occupied, compared to
86.6% at last review.  The loan matures in October 2016.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is an IO loan
(4.5%) secured by a 336-unit multifamily property located in
Glendale, AZ.  As Arizona State University's (ASU) West Campus is
located within close proximity of the subject, a significant
portion of the residents at the property are students of ASU.  The
servicer reported 1Q 2016 DSCR was 1.2x, compared to 1.24x at YE
2015, 1.1x at YE 2014, and 1.03x at YE 2013.  As of March 31, 2016,
the property was 97.3% occupied.  The loan matures in October
2016.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses (1.7%) is a real
estate owned (REO) full-service hotel with 187 rooms.  The property
is located in Leominster, MA.  The hotel was converted to a Double
Tree effective September 2013.  As of trailing 12 month (TTM) March
2016, occupancy, ADR, and revenue per available room (RevPar) was
68%, $118.41, $80.53, respectively, compared to 61.2%, $113.07, and
$69.19 respectively, a year ago.  The property manager is
completing the property-improvement plan (PIP) to stabilize the
hotel under the new brand.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch conducted a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact on
the outstanding ratings in the event the pool becomes highly
concentrated with defaulted loans due to adverse selection as
performing loans pay off.  The Negative Outlooks on class A-M
indicate that the 'BB' rated class may be subject to future
downgrades should pool performance deteriorate and losses exceed
expectations.  The ratings of classes A-4 and A-1A remain stable as
increased loss expectations are unlikely to affect these classes.
Fitch will review this transaction again in six months to assess
the performance of the transaction after loan maturities.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $327.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $172.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $253.1 million class A-M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $141.5million class A-J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1, A-2, A-AB, A-3, AMP-E1 and AMP-E2 have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificates.


COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 14 classes in
COMM 2012-CCRE5 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE5 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on class PEZ was affirmed due to the credit performance
(or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the exchangeable
classes.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to $1.04 billion
from $1.13 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 52% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 9% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Five loans,
constituting 6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 92% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 94%, compared to 93%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.65X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 200
Varick Street Loan ($65.1 million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 12-story, 430,000 square foot office property located
in lower Manhattan. As of December 2015 the property was 100%
leased, unchanged from at securitization. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.62X,
respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Ritz-Carlton South Beach Loan ($32.5 million -- 3.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a beachfront land parcel in Miami Beach,
Florida. The land is subject to a long-term ground lease which is
set to expire in 2028. The improvements include a 375-room luxury
hotel. While Moody's DSCR figures reflect the cash flow from the
ground lease, Moody's considered the value of the ground and the
improvements when assessing the risk of the loan. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and
0.96X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Eastview Mall and Commons Loan ($90.0 million
-- 8.7% of the pool), which represents a participation interest in
a mortgage loan which is secured by a portion of super-regional
mall and adjacent retail power center in Victor, New York, a suburb
of Rochester. The mall is the dominant mall its trade area and
includes Macy's, Von Maur, JC Penney, Lord & Taylor and Sears as
anchor stores. The mall was 90% leased as of March 2015. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
86% and 1.04X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Harmon Corner Loan ($70.2 million --
6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a collateral portion of a
retail property located on the Strip in Las Vegas, Nevada. As of
March 2015 the property was 98% occupied compared to 81% in June
2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.07X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Metroplex Loan ($60.6 million -- 5.9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 405,000 SF office property in
the Mid-Wilshire office submarket of Los Angeles, California. As of
December 2015 the property was 88% leased, compared to 86% leased
at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and
0.87X, respectively, compared to 101% and 0.99X at the last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 15 classes in
COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

The rating on class PEZ was affirmed due to the credit performance
(or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3.5% to $1.44
billion from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 66% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 9% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Seven loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 49% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 89%, compared to 94% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.04X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.92X and 1.15X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Federal Center
Plaza Loan ($130.0 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured
by two adjacent office buildings totaling 725,000 square feet (SF)
in Washington, DC. The property was 100% leased as of March 2016,
same as at last review, with federal government agencies as the
largest tenants. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.51X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 23.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Moffett Towers Loan ($118.9 million -- 8.2%
of the pool), which is secured by three eight-story Class A office
buildings totaling 950,000 SF located in Sunnyvale, California.
Each building is LEED Gold certified and the properties have 2,881
parking spaces as well as shared amenities. The loan is pari passu
with two other loans that are securitized in two other CMBS deals.
All tenants at the property are on triple net leases. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to
105% and 0.95X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Rochester Hotel Portfolio ($105.6
million A note and $9.6 million B note -- the A note is 7.3% of the
pool), which is secured by one limited-service, one extended stay
and two full-service hotels located in Rochester, Minnesota. The
four Interstate Hotels & Resorts-managed hotels total 1,230 keys
and are each connected to the Mayo Clinic via climate controlled
pedestrian tunnels. Moody's A note LTV and stressed DSCR are 86%
and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.40X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is The Avenues Loan ($110.0 million -- 7.6%
of the pool), which is secured by a 599,000 SF retail component of
a 1.1M SF super-regional mall in Jacksonville, Florida. The
property was 95% leased as of December 2015 compared to 85% leased
as of last review. The sponsor is Simon Property Group. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.50X, respectively, compared to 71%
and 1.40X at the last review.


COMM 2016-GCT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to COMM
2016-GCT Mortgage Trust's $264.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2016-GCT.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $264.0 million loan, which is part of a
$319.0 million whole mortgage loan, secured by the fee interest in
a 50-story office and retail building, known as the Gas Company
Tower, and the associated 1,186-space World Trade Center parking
garage in Los Angeles.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 21,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 92.9%, based on S&P
Global Ratings' value.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2016-GCT Mortgage Trust

Class       Rating                    Amount ($)(i)
A          AAA (sf)                      90,971,000
X-A(i)     AA- (sf)                 125,318,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)                      34,347,000
C          A- (sf)                       25,760,000
D          BBB- (sf)                     31,598,000
E          BB- (sf)                      42,933,000
F          B- (sf)                       38,391,000

(i)There is also $55.0 million in companion loans, which will be
repaid pro rata and pari passu with the senior trust loan
($89.0 million of class A). S&P Global Ratings' LTV, market value
decline, and debt yield reflect the entire debt balance, including
the companion loans.  (ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of
the class X-A certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount
of principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
class A and B certificates.  LTV--Loan-to-value ratio, based on S&P
Global Ratings' values.


CPS AUTO 2016-C: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to CPS Auto Receivables
Trust 2016-C's $318.5 million asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 54.89%, 48.54%, 38.92%,
      29.31%, and 23.67% of credit support for the class A, B, C,
      D, and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of approximately 3.20x, 2.70x,
      2.10x, 1.60x, and 1.27x our 17.00% expected cumulative net
      loss range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- S&P's expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.60x its expected net loss level, the ratings on the class
      A and B notes will not decline by more than one rating
      category during the first year, and the ratings on the class

      C through E notes will not decline by more than two rating
      categories during the first year, all else being equal,
      which is consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The rated notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form
      of subordination, overcollateralization, a reserve account,
      and excess spread for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated

      notes under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios,
      which it believes are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-C

Class    Rating      Type          Interest         Amount
                                   rate           (mil. $)
A        AAA (sf)    Senior        Fixed            159.25
B        AA (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             38.18
C        A (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed             50.38
D        BBB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed             39.81
E        BB- (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed             30.88



DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C3: Fitch to Rate Cl. E Certs BB
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on DBJPM Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2016-C3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $33,545,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,084,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,000,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $250,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $279,987,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $700,467,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $74,851,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44,687,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,867,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44,687,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36,867,000ab class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,804,000ab class X-D ' BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,804,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,874,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

These classes are not expected to be rated:

   -- $8,938,000a class F.
   -- $10,054,000a class G.
   -- $29,047,404a class H.

  a)Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b)Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 18, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 32 loans secured by 54
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$893,738,404 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and German
American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.7% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
91.0% of the pool.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage Lower than Recent Deals: The transaction has lower
leverage than other recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's
weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is better than both the
YTD 2016 average of 1.16x and the 2015 average of 1.18x.  The
pool's WA Fitch LTV of 104.8% is better than both the YTD 2016
average of 107.5% and the 2015 average of 109.3%.  Excluding the
credit opinion loans (15% of the pool), the Fitch DSCR and LTV are
1.15x and 112.3%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two of the six largest loans
in the pool have investment-grade credit opinions.  Westfield San
Francisco Centre (9.4% of the pool) is the largest loan in the pool
and has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'Asf' on a
stand-alone basis.  The Shops at Crystals (5.6% of the pool), has
an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf' on a stand-alone
basis.  The implied credit enhancement levels for the conduit
portion of the transaction for 'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are 24.250% and
8.625%, respectively.

High Pool Concentration: The pool is more concentrated than other
recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.  The top 10 loans
comprise 64% of the pool, which is greater the YTD 2016 average of
54.8% and the 2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's loan concentration
index (LCI) of 518 is above the YTD 2016 average of 422 and the
2015 average of 367.  Additionally, the pool's sponsor
concentration index (SCI) of 831 is significantly higher than the
YTD 2016 average of 482 and the 2015 average of 410.  Two sponsors,
CIM Commercial Trust Corporation and Simon Property Group, each
represent more than 10% of the pool with 17.2% and 14.5%,
respectively.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11% below the
most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to DBJPM
2016-C3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities on page 12.



GS MORTGAGE 2010-C1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded one class of GS Mortgage Securities Trust,
2010-C1 as follows:

-- Class D to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes in the
transaction as listed below:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These rating actions reflect the strong performance of the
transaction, which has experienced collateral reduction of 21.7%
since issuance, with 19 of the original 23 loans remaining in the
pool as of the July 2016 remittance. Based on the servicer's
reported YE2015 figures, the transaction benefits from strong
overall credit metrics with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.10 times (x) and WA debt yield of 18.8%.
These metrics compare well with the issuance levels of 1.80x and
14.5%, respectively. The performance for the 12 largest
non-defeased loans has also been quite strong since issuance, with
a WA net cash flow (NCF) growth of 24.9% over the DBRS underwritten
(UW) figures at YE2015 and a WA DSCR of 2.05x, up from the 1.65x
DBRS UW NCF figure. Furthermore, the WA occupancy for the 12
largest non-defeased loans is strong at 97.7%. The transaction also
benefits from three defeased loans in the pool, representing 17.2%
of the overall balance, with all loans in the Top 15.

As of the July 2016 remittance report, there are no loans in
special servicing and two loans, representing 0.8% of the pool, on
the servicer's watchlist; however, these loans are being monitored
for not reporting YE2015 financials, not for cash flow declines.
Loans secured by retail and regional mall properties comprise
nearly 77.0% of the non-defeased loans in the pool. This
concentration risk is mitigated by the strong cash flow growth of
the loans since issuance. Additionally, a significant portion of
the retail properties in the pool are shadow-rated investment grade
by DBRS.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated 11 loans investment grade. These
shadow ratings were generally assigned based on the stability of
cash flows, the refinance DSCR and the exit debt yield. Additional
factors include the desirability of the location and the quality of
the property, tenancy and sponsor. Since issuance, two of those
loans, Prospectus ID #9, 180 N. LaSalle, and Prospectus ID #17,
Lake View Plaza, have paid out and left the pool at their
respective maturity dates.

The nine remaining shadow-rated loans, which represent
approximately 56.0% of the current pool balance, are Prospectus ID
#1, 660 Madison Avenue (14.2% of Pool), Prospectus ID #2,
Burnsville Center (11.8% of Pool), Prospectus ID #5, Cole Retail
Portfolio (10.2% of Pool), Prospectus ID #4, Valley View Mall (9.3%
of Pool), Prospectus ID #8, Parkway Place (6.0% of Pool),
Prospectus ID #11, Aardex Ground Lease (3.5% of Pool), Prospectus
ID #19, Winn Dixie – Hammond (0.4% of Pool), Prospectus ID #21,
Winn Dixie – Montgomery (0.4% of Pool) and Prospectus ID #22,
Winn Dixie – Opa Locka (0.4% of Pool). DBRS has today confirmed
that the performance of these loans remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics. The WA NCF growth over the
DBRS UW figures for these loans was 20.5% at YE2015.

The largest loan in the pool, Prospectus ID #1, 660 Madison Avenue
Retail (14.2% of Pool), is secured by a 264,498-square foot (sf)
anchored retail condominium unit in the Upper East Side of
Manhattan, located one block east of Central Park. The collateral
is 100.0% leased to Barneys Department Store (Barneys) through
January 2019. Although the lease ends approximately one year prior
to loan maturity, the tenant has four ten-year lease extension
options. According to the YE2015 OSAR, the DSCR was 2.04x, an
increase from the 1.65x DBRS UW figure, and the exit debt yield was
20.0%. At issuance, this loan was shadow-rated because of the
above-average property quality, the importance of the store to
Barneys, the short 25-year amortization schedule and the high exit
debt yield.

The second-largest non-defeased loan is Prospectus ID #2,
Burnsville Center (11.8% of Pool), which is secured by a 523,692 sf
portion of a 1.1 million sf mall in Burnsville, Minnesota. The
subject is the only Minneapolis area mall south of the Minnesota
River. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Sears, JCPenney, Gordmans
and Dick's Sporting Goods; however, only Gordmans and Dick's
Sporting Goods are a part of the collateral for the loan. As of the
March 2016 rent roll, the collateral portion of the mall is 91.0%
occupied, up from 88.0% at March 2015. According to the YE2015
OSAR, the DSCR is 1.95x, an increase from the 1.51x DBRS UW figure,
and 1.85x at YE2014. At issuance, this loan was shadow-rated
because of the loan's 25-year amortization schedule, the
experienced sponsor, its reputation as an established regional mall
and the loan's strong credit characteristics.

Although occupancy rates and cash flow growth since issuance are
healthy for the regional malls and anchored retail properties in
the portfolio, sales reporting obtained for this review was limited
to two properties, Prospectus ID #2, Burnsville Center, and
Prospectus ID #6, Mall at Johnson City, which showed generally
healthy figures. Burnsville Center's reporting anchor tenants,
Macy's and Gordmans, reported stable sales year over year (YOY) for
YE2015, with $131 sales psf and $137 sales psf, respectively.
Meanwhile, Mall at Johnson City as a whole experienced a slight
decrease in sales YOY, with $217 sales psf, down 3.4% from the
previous year as of the T-12 May 2016 sales report.


JMP CREDIT II: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A, E, and F notes from
JMP Credit Advisors CLO II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in April 2013.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 2016 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2016, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect a general improvement in the
portfolio's credit quality, as well as collateral seasoning since
S&P's effective date rating affirmations in August 2013.  Since
then, the reported weighted average life has decreased to 4.26
years from 5.69 years.  Because time horizon factors heavily into
default probability, a shorter weighted average life positively
affects the creditworthiness of the collateral pool.  In addition,
the number of issuers in the portfolio has increased during this
period, and this diversification has contributed to the improved
credit quality.  The collateral seasoning, combined with the
improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.

Although there has been a modest increase in both defaulted assets
and assets rated in the 'CCC' category, these factors are offset by
the decline in the weighted average life and positive credit
quality migration of the collateral portfolio, both of which have
lowered the credit risk profile.

According to the July 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have remained
relatively stable since our August 2013 rating affirmations.

   -- The class A/B O/C decreased to 131.11% from 131.23%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 122.81% from 122.92%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 114.82% from 114.92%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 107.80% from 107.90%.
   -- The class F O/C ratio decreased to 104.32% from 104.42%.

The current coverage test ratios are all passing and well above
their minimum threshold values.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class C, D, E, and F notes, its rating actions considered the
cushion at the higher ratings and additional sensitivity runs that
reflected the exposure to specific distressed industries and
allowed for volatility in the underlying portfolio because the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the class A, E, and F notes reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

JMP Credit Advisors CLO II Ltd.

                 Rating
Class       To          From
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

JMP Credit Advisors CLO II Ltd.
Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
E           BB (sf)
F           B (sf)



JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC13: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Ca(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating on two classes and
affirmed the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-CIBC13 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2015
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on Class B was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was downgraded because it
does not, nor will, receive any future interest payments except for
prepayment penalties.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.2% of the
current balance, compared to 28.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.5% of the
original pooled balance.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $140 million
from $2.72 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 58% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 22% of the pool, has defeased and
is secured by US government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Forty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $321 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%). Six loans, constituting 27% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Bayou Walk Village loan ($12 million -- 8.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 93,000 square foot (SF) retail shopping
center in Shreveport, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to
Special Servicing for Imminent Default due to structural issues at
the property in January 2014. The tenants at the property were
forced to vacate in March 2014 as the structural concerns were
deemed too dangerous for them to continue to operate.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $17.9 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (48% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 3.2% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 68%, compared to 83%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.72X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.29X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 1015 - 1055 North Main Street Loan ($11.5
million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 208,000 SF
suburban office building located in Santa Ana, California. The
property is 100% as of March 2016. The County of Orange leases 96%
of the space; the Orange County Department of Child Support
Services' Community Resource Center is based out of this location.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.89X, respectively,
compared to 66% and 1.55X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the State Farm Insurance Building Loan
($9.4 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a suburban
office property in Vallejo, California, 33 miles northeast of San
Francisco. The sole tenant is State Farm, which leases 78% of the
space. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.83X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.29X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the T-Mobile - Oakland Maine Loan ($8.7
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a suburban office
property in Oakland, Maine. The property is 100% occupied by
T-Mobile, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 64% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.53X at the
last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC16: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 3 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class,
affirmed the ratings on six classes, and downgraded the ratings on
one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-CIBC16 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2015
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class A-1A was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-J, B through E were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the P&I class A-M was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down by 63% since Moody's last review. In
addition, loans constituting 32% of the pool that have debt yields
exceeding 10% and are scheduled to mature within the next 14
months.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.3% of the
current balance, compared to 10.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 75% to $547 million
from $2.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 35 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 70% of
the pool.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 64% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $173 million (for an average loss
severity of 53%). Four loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the REPM Portfolio ($81.7 million -- 15.0% of the pool), which
is secured by the fee interest in a portfolio of ten industrial /
flex projects in eight states. The loan transferred to special
servicing in March 2015 for imminent default, subsequently
defaulting on monthly payments. The special servicer has engaged
legal counsel in all states and is commencing foreclosure actions.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $84.5 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (65% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 7% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $5.4 million (a 15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 42% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%, compared to 87% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 4.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 31% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Sequoia Plaza Loan ($92.7 million -- 17% of the
pool), which is secured by three 4-story office complex located in
Arlington, Virginia. The occupancy decreased from 90% as of
September 2014 to to 68% as of September 2015 due to tenants
vacated the space upon or prior to lease expiration. The largest
tenant, Arlington Department of Human Services, expanded its
occupancy in the property in late 2015, as part of its plan to
consolidate existing facilities around the county into its
headquarters at Sequoia Plaza, which increased the aggregate
occupancy to 84% as of March 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 131% and 0.82X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 875 East Wisconsin Avenue Loan
($41.5 million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by an
eight-story class-A office property located in the Downtown area of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The property was 100% leased to three major
tenants as of March 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and
1.34X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.32X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Capitol Commons Loan ($32.9 million
-- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by an office property
located in Lansing, Michigan, 0.6 miles southwest of Michigan State
Capitol. This loan transferred to special servicing in October 2013
for imminent default. It remains payment current and returned to
master servicing in February 2016 as a corrected mortgage. As the
property is fully leased to State of Michigan, Moody's accounted
for single-tenant risk through a lit/dark blended value approach.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.77X, respectively,
compared to 148% and 0.68X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-C22: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2014-C22 (JPMBB 2014-C22).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of JPMBB 2014-C22 are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral.  There has been no
material change to the transaction's performance since issuance. As
of the July 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 1.3% since issuance and remained
relatively flat at $1.1 billion.  The pool has experienced no
realized losses to date.  No loans have been in special servicing
since issuance, and none are defeased.

Fitch has designated three (3.4%) Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC),
primarily due to upcoming tenant rollover risk.  Each of the three
loans are on the master servicer's watchlist; an additional six
loans, 6.1 %, are also on the master servicer's watchlist for
damages noted in the most recent inspections or failure to meet a
performance threshold set by the servicer.  However, these loans
are performing in line with Fitch's expectations. 12.9% of the pool
is full-term interest-only, and 59% of the pool is partial term
interest-only.

The largest loan (8.1% of the pool) is secured by a two-building
office complex consisting of 1,032,402 square feet (sf) located in
Long Island City, NY.  As of year-end (YE) 2015 the properties were
100% occupied, primarily by various New York agencies (rated 'AA'
by Fitch).  There is minimal rollover over the next two years (less
than 0.5% total) and no rollover until 2019 when 11% of the NRA
expires.  The largest concentration of lease rollover is in 2020
with 32.4%.  The loan is interest-only until 2019 and matures in
July 2024.

The second largest loan (6.9%) is secured by a 421,719-sf, 15-story
office building located in East Rutherford, NJ.  Per the March 2016
rent roll, the property was 92.5% compared with 100% at issuance
and 95.4% at YE 2015.  The property is occupied by over 20 tenants
representing a variety of industries. 9.1% of net rentable area
(NRA) is scheduled to rollover in 2016.  The largest concentration
of lease rollover is in 2020 with approximately 30%. The loan is
full term interest-only and matures in July 2024.

The largest FLOC (1.8% of the pool) is secured by a portfolio of
three office buildings (110,104 sf) located in Needham and Newton,
MA.  Per the May 2016 rent roll, the portfolio was 98.5% occupied.
Largest tenants include Dialogic Corporation, Inflexxion, Inc. and
Caris Diagnostics, Inc.  Two tenants, Dialogic Corporation (25%
NRA), and Affiliated Physicians Group (7% NRA), representing a
total of 32% of NRA are not expected to renew their leases after
their 2016 expirations.  Fitch's analysis included stresses on the
existing net cash flow which assumed additional vacancy.  The loan
is interest-only until 2019 and matures in July 2024.

The two remaining FLOCs include a 29,715 sf mixed use property
located in San Francisco, CA (1.2%) and a 117 room extended stay
hotel located South Bend, IN (0.4%).  The larger of the two is on
the watchlist due to the loss of two tenants in early 2016 (42% of
NRA).  The other loan is on the watchlist due to declines in
performance.  As of YE 2015 and YTD March 2016, the
servicer-reported DSCR was 0.85x and 0.48x, respectively.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks remain Stable for all classes.  Rating Outlooks
on classes A-1 through E remain Stable due to the overall stable
performance of the pool.  Downgrades are possible with significant
performance decline.  Upgrades, while not likely in the near term,
are possible with increased credit enhancement and overall improved
pool performance.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $33 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $29.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $175 million class A-3A1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $75 million class A-3A2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $355.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $102.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $78.4 million class A-S* at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $58.8 million class B* at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $47.6 million class C* at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $184.9 million class EC* at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $848.5 million class X-A** at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $28 million class X-C** at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $61.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $28 million class E at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.

* The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

** Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $35 million class NR certificates, the
$12.6 million class F, the $14 million class G, the $15.1 million
UHP, the $26.6 million interest only classes X-D or the $35 million
interest only classes X-E certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew
its rating of the interest only class X-B.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2015-C30: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C30
issued by JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C30:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NR at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class EC certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction since issuance in July 2015. The collateral consists of
70 loans secured by 114 properties. As of the July 2016 remittance,
the pool has experienced minimal collateral reduction of 0.5% since
issuance as a result of loan amortization with all of the original
70 loans remaining in the pool. The pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.61
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.0% based on YE2015 financials.
At issuance, the pool reported a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.66x
and 8.8%, respectively.

As of the July 2016 remittance, there are no loans on the
servicer's watchlist or in special servicing.

The second-largest loan in the pool, Pearlridge Center (Prospectus
ID#2, 5.4% of the current pool) is secured by a 1.1 million square
foot (sf) mixed-use super regional shopping center, of which
903,692 sf serves as collateral for this loan. The subject is
located in Aiea, Hawaii. The loan represents the A-1 portion of a
pari passu loan, which had an original aggregate balance of $130.4
million. The whole loan balance of the loan is $225.0 million. The
collateral comprises two main sections: Uptown Pearlridge, which is
anchored by a Macy's, and Downtown Pearlridge, which is anchored by
Sears (on a ground lease) and Pearlridge Theaters. The two sections
are connected by a monorail. According to YE2015 financials, the
loan reported a DSCR of 2.91x, which represents an increase from
the DBRS underwritten (UW) DSCR of 2.32x. Based on the most recent
rent roll dated March 2016, the property was 94.7% occupied as the
collateral portion was 93.4% occupied, which is consistent with the
occupancy levels at issuance. The largest collateral tenant,
Macy's, representing 16.6% of the net rentable area (NRA), has a
lease expiration of February 2027, passed loan maturity. According
to the trailing 12-month May 2016 Tenant Sales Report, Macy's
reported sales of $279.00 per square foot (psf), which represents a
3.8% decline compared with the prior year. Similarly, the
Pearlridge Mall Theater and Sears reported a decline in sales of
3.6% and 8.4% over the same period to $354,374 per screen from
$374,775 per screen and to $218.00 psf from $238.00 psf,
respectively. Despite a drop in sales, the tenants are on long-term
leases and the remerchandising and renovation program for Downtown
Pearlridge is expected to improve the quality of the subject. This
loan is interest only (IO) for the entire term and reported a DBRS
Term Refinance (Refi) DSCR of 1.47x with an exit debt yield of
14.3% based on the A-note balance. At issuance, this loan was
shadow-rated investment-grade because of its strong credit
qualities. DBRS confirms with this review that the performance of
the loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

The Scottsdale Quarter loan (Prospectus ID#11, 3.2% of the current
pool) is secured by a 541,971 sf mixed-use lifestyle center located
in Scottsdale, Arizona. Approximately 62.5% of the subject is
retail space and the remaining portion is office space. The loan
represents the non-controlling portion of a pari passu loan, which
had an original aggregate balance of $42.0 million. The whole loan
balance of the loan is $165.0 million. Based on YE2015 reporting,
the DSCR for the loan was 2.90x compared with the DBRS UW DSCR of
2.13x. As of the March 2016 rent roll, the property was 94.5%
occupied, which is similar to the occupancy of 95.6% at issuance in
April 2015. The retail space is anchored by iPic Theaters,
representing 8.2% of the NRA, and is on a long-term lease expiring
in December 2025. According to the site inspection from June 2015,
the property was determined to be in above-average condition. There
is an adjacent development which is under construction and is
expected to be completed by fall 2016. The new property will not be
a part of collateral, but is expected to benefit the subject as it
will consist of 275 multifamily units, a 130-150 key hotel, about
96,500 sf of retail and 130,000 sf of office space. This loan is IO
for the entire term and reported a DBRS Term Refi DSCR of 1.35x
with an exit debt yield of 13.3% based on the A-note balance. At
issuance, this loan was shadow-rated investment-grade because of
its strong credit qualities. DBRS confirms with this review that
the performance of the loan remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Moody's Cuts Cl. K Debt Rating to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on nine
classes, affirmed the ratings on two classes and placed nine
classes under review for downgrade in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2004-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. X-ST, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes D, E, F, G, H, J, and K were
downgraded due to realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans that were higher than Moody's had
previously expected. The downgrades stem primarily from the
expected future performance of UBS Center -- Stamford loan, which
is collateralized by an office property located in Stamford, CT and
comprises 75% of the collateral pool.

The rating on the IO class XCL was downgraded due to a decline in
the credit performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class XST was downgraded to align the rating
with the expected credit performance of its referenced loan, the
UBS Center -- Stamford ($152M, 75% of the pool balance).

The ratings on the P&I classes L and M were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings of eight P&I classes were placed on review for possible
downgrade resulting from uncertainty regarding the resolution of
the UBS Center -- Stamford loan. The rating on one IO class, whose
reference classes include some of those aforementioned P&I classes,
was placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 6.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 15 July, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $203 million
from $1.42 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
75% of the pool.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $32 million (for an average loss
severity of 49.5%). Three loans, constituting 92% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the UBS Center -- Stamford ($152 million -- 75% of the pool),
which is secured by the leasehold interest in a Class A office
property located in Stamford, Connecticut. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer in January 2016 due to imminent
non-monetary default. The property is 100% leased to UBS AG,
Stamford Branch. The UBS lease is triple net and expires in
December 2017, however, UBS is not obligated to pay base rent
during the last 14 months of their lease. The loan has benefitted
from a 24 year amortization schedule and has amortized 34% since
securitization. Moody's value reflects the credit risk resulting
from the decision by UBS to vacate the space and not exercising
their option for any of the space that expires in December 2017.

As of the 15 July, 2016 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $7.1 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 62%
of the pool.

The largest performing loan is the Centre at River Oaks Loan ($9.6
million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored
retail property located in Houston, TX. The property, which was
previously anchored by a Borders, is 100% leased as of 31 December,
2015. The top tenants include TCH Pediatrics Associates, Inc.
(23.1% of NRA), Uita Salon, Cosmetics, & Fragrances (10.2% of NRA),
and Six Foot Studios, Ltd. (9.4% of NRA). Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 43.2% and 2.25X, respectively.

The second largest performing loan is the FedEx Freight
Distribution Center Loan ($5.8 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which
is secured by a warehouse facility located in Bessemer, Alabama,
approximately 10 miles west of Birmingham. The property is 100%
leased to FedEx Freight East, Inc. through October 2017. Moody's
accounted for single-tenant risk through a lit/dark blended value
approach. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69.7% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 63.5% and 1.53X at the last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on three other classes from the
same transaction.  At the same time, S&P placed its ratings on all
10 certificates on CreditWatch with negative implications.

"We downgraded our ratings on classes B through, and including, H
due to anticipated interest shortfalls from the specially serviced
UBS Center -- Stamford loan ($151.6 million, 74.7%).  The
underlying collateral is a 712,067-sq.-ft. office property in
Stamford, Conn., which is currently 100% leased to UBS.  The loan,
which is scheduled to mature in October 2016, was transferred to
the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital),
in January 2016 for imminent non-monetary default.  Based on S&P's
conversations with CWCapital, UBS is currently in the process of
vacating the property; however, they will continue to pay rent
under their lease until October 2016, at which time a free rent
period commences.  CWCapital stated that there has been
little-to-no interest in leasing the building to date.  Compounding
these issues are the property's location in the Stamford market,
which is currently experiencing high vacancies that are expected to
continue for the foreseeable future and the building's unique
structure, which contains a 103,000-sq.-ft. trading floor.  A May
2016 appraisal, as contained in the July 2016 transaction reports,
indicated an "as-is" property value of $44.4 million, which is
considerably lower than the loan's $151.6 million total exposure,
implying a significant loss upon the loan's eventual resolution,
the timing of which is uncertain.  Given the aforementioned, as
well as S&P's understanding from CWCapital that the borrower does
not intend to fund the ongoing debt service payments, there is a
high likelihood that this loan will generate significant recurring
interest shortfalls once UBS' free rent period begins.  The "as-is"
appraisal value implies that the additional interest shortfalls
from appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
associated with an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) on the loan
would result in classes B and below experiencing liquidity
interruptions.

The affirmed 'AAA (sf)' rating on class A-4 reflects anticipated
credit enhancement that we believe to be commensurate with the
certificates' outstanding rating and S&P's belief that, based on
currently available information at this time, this class would be
insulated from any increase in trust-level interest shortfalls
associated with the UBS Center -- Stamford loan.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the X-CL and X-ST
interest-only (IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating
IO securities.

S&P placed the ratings on all 10 certificates on CreditWatch with
negative implications to reflect the potential for these classes to
experience ongoing interest shortfalls beyond durations
commensurate with their current respective ratings, given the
uncertain resolution timing on the UBS Center -- Stamford loan.
The placement of the three 'AAA (sf)' ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications further reflects the possibility of a
deterioration in the underlying property value and/or a
nonrecoverability determination being made on the loan, which could
cause these certificates to experience interest shortfalls. Should
S&P come to expect any of the bonds to incur interest shortfalls
beyond the duration commensurate with their respective ratings, S&P
may take further negative rating action in line with its criteria,
"Structured Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology,"
published Dec. 15, 2015.

S&P will resolve its CreditWatch negative placements after further
discussions with the master and special servicers, and as more
information regarding the UBS Center -- Stamford loan becomes
available.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $203.0 million, which is 14.3% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes four loans (which treats
the Passaic Street Industrial Park A and B hope note as a single
loan, which is how they are referred to in this press release),
down from 103 loans at issuance.  Two of these loans ($187.5
million, 92.4%) are with the special servicer, CWCapital and no
loans were reported on the master servicer's watchlist or defeased.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 92.1% of the loans in the pool, of which 81.1% was
year-end 2014 data and 18.9% was partial-or year-end 2015 data.

Excluding the two specially serviced loans, S&P calculated a 1.53x
S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt service coverage (DSC)
and 46.9% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value ratio
using a 7.59% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization
rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $32.3 million in principal
losses, or 2.3% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 11.4% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on loss incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced loans.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 15, 2016, trustee remittance reports, two loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital. The larger of
the two, the UBS Center -- Stamford loan.

The remaining specially serviced loan is the Passaic Street
Industrial Park A and B hope notes loan ($35.9 million, 17.7%),
which is the second-largest loan in the pool.  The loan, which has
a reported $36.0 million in total exposure, is secured by a
2,110,719-sq.-ft. industrial warehouse property in Wood Ridge, N.J.
The loan was re-transferred to the special servicer in March 2016,
due to a capital event notice provided by the borrower.  The loan
was previously transferred to the special servicer in March 2010
due to monetary default, and was modified in February 2012, the
terms of which included: (i)the bifurcation of the single note into
a $21.7 million senior A note and a $16.1 million subordinate B
hope note; (ii)a reduction in the interest rate payable on the A
note and the full deferral of interest owed on the B note; and
(iii) the extension of the loan's maturity date to Dec. 11, 2018.
As of year-end 2015, the reported DSC and occupancy were 2.01x and
94.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the loan's
eventual resolution, which it considers to be a loss between 26%
and 59% of a loan's outstanding balance.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1
                              Rating
Class          Identifier     To                      From
A-4            52108HYK4      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)
B              52108HYL2      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     AA+ (sf)
C              52108HYM0      BBB (sf)/Watch Neg      AA (sf)
D              52108HYN8      BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      A+ (sf)
E              52108HYP3      BB (sf)/Watch Neg       A- (sf)
F              52108HYQ1      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg       BBB+ (sf)
G              52108HYR9      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)
H              52108HYT5      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC+ (sf)
X-CL           52108HZP2      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)
X-ST           52108HZT4      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)


LBUBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. X Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.8% of the
current balance, compared to 17.8% at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $634.1
million from $1.007 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 75% of
the pool. Four loans, constituting 3.6% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Eight loans, constituting 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $146.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 68%). Three cross-collateralized cross-defaulted loans,
constituting 2.9% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The three loans, West Point Shopping Center ($9.7 million -- 1.5%
of the pool), Foothills Shopping Center ($5.7 million -- 0.9% of
the pool) and Country Square Shopping Center ($3.1 million -- 0.5%
of the pool), are collectively referred to as the WFC Portfolio.
The WFC Portfolio originally transferred to the special servicer in
March 2011 due to imminent default after the Utah Department of
Transportation (Utah DOT) condemned a significant portion of the
West Point Shopping Center property for highway construction. The
condemnation resulted in the closing of two access points to the
property and subsequently, the two anchors vacated. West Point
Shopping Center is currently 6% leased and per the special
servicer, only has value in the land. The WFC Portfolio transferred
to the special servicer again in March 2016 for imminent default
and the servicer is evaluating the borrower's request for a
modification.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 4.5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $5.5 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 36% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 94%, unchanged
from Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.36X and 1.15X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 48% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Westfield Southlake Loan ($140 million -- 22%
of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.4
million square foot (SF) regional mall located in Merrillville,
Indiana. The mall is anchored by Sears (not part of the
collateral), J.C. Penney, Macy's (not part of the collateral) and
Carson (not part of the collateral). As of March 2016, the property
was 99% leased, compared to 100% at yearend 2015. The loan is
interest-only for its entire ten-year term maturing in January
2018, though there was a small condemnation in 2014 that resulted
in a principal payment. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.11X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Regions Harbert Plaza Loan ($83.9
million -- 13.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 614,000 SF,
32-story Class A office building with a small retail component
located in downtown Birmingham, Alabama. The property is considered
the premier commercial office building in Birmingham. The total
property was 94% leased as of March 2016, unchanged from the prior
two years and down from 98% in 2012 and 2013. The office component
was 95% leased as of May 2016, with three tenants occupying 37% NRA
with lease expirations through 2017, including the largest tenant,
Region's Bank (35% NRA). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and
1.11X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.23X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Chevy Chase Center Loan ($81.4
million -- 12.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 398,000 SF
mixed-use property in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The office component
is 224,000 SF and the retail space is 174,000 SF. The office
component is primarily located in an eight-story tower and is
leased by The Mills Limited Partnership (51% NRA) through April
2019. However, The Mills Limited Partnership's physical occupancy
is 7.8% of the NRA; 29.4% has subsequently been sublet to seven
different tenants and 13.7% of their leased space is dark. The
borrower estimates that only 65% of tenants will renew their leases
over the next two years. The total property was 92% leased as of
yearend 2015, compared to 93% at yearend 2014 and 95% at yearend
2013. The loan fully amortizes on a 240-month schedule and matures
in November 2026. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.34X,
respectively, compared to 73% and 1.26X at the last review.


LNR CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 12 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO V LTD. Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2007-1 ("LNR CDO V"):

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

LNR CDO V is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). As of the June 27, 2016 trustee report, the collateral
par amount is $19.6 million, representing a $741.7 million decrease
since securitization primarily due to realized losses to the
collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10000, same
as at last review. The current ratings on the Moody's-rated
collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's rated collateral
follow: Ca/C and 100.0%, same as at last review.


LNR CDO IV: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 14 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO IV Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2006-1 ("LNR CDO IV"):

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

LNR CDO IV is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). As of the June 28, 2016 trustee report, the collateral
par amount is $202.4 million, representing a $1.4 billion decrease
since securitization primarily due to realized losses to the
collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9045,
compared to 9062 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 3.1% compared to 0.1% at last
review; Baa1-Baa3 and 0.0% compared to 3.6%; Ba1-Ba3 and 1.8%
compared to 1.5% at last review; B1-B3 and 0.0% compared to 2.5% at
last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 95.1% compared to 92.3% at last
review.




LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C notes
and affirmed its ratings on the class A, D, and E notes from
Longfellow Place CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in 2013 and is managed by NewStar
Capital LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the July 5, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
January 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The upgrades primarily reflect credit quality improvement in the
underlying collateral since S&P's November 2013 effective date
rating affirmations.  Collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit
rating of 'BB-' or higher has increased significantly from the
April 2013 effective date report used for S&P's previous review.
The purchasing of this higher-rated collateral has caused the
portfolio's weighted average rating to rise to 'B+' from 'B'.

The transaction has also benefited from collateral seasoning, with
the reported weighted average life decreasing to 3.42 years as of
the July 2016 trustee report from 5.12 years as of the effective
date.  Because time horizon factors heavily into default
probability, a shorter weighted average life positively affects the
collateral pool's creditworthiness.  This seasoning, combined with
the improved credit quality, has decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which, in turn, provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the April 2013 effective date
report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets increased to
$9.82 million as of July 2016, from $4.97 million as of the April
2013 effective date report.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and
below increased to $24.89 million from $4.39 million over the same
period.  Overall, the increase in defaulted assets and assets rated
'CCC+' and below has been largely offset by the decline in the
weighted average life and positive portfolio credit migration of
the collateral portfolio.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
minimally affected the level of credit support available to all
tranches, as seen by the mild decline in the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio is 131.66%, down from 131.86%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio is 118.75%, down from 118.93%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio is 112.56%, down from 112.72%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio is 107.21%, down from 107.37%.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a higher rating on the class C, D, and E notes.  However,
because the transaction currently has some exposure to 'CCC' rated
and defaulted collateral obligations, and loans from companies in
the energy and commodities sectors (which have come under
significant pressure from falling oil and commodity prices in the
past year), S&P limited the upgrade in some cases to offset future
potential credit migration in the underlying collateral.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd.
                     Rating
Class            To         From
B                AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
C                A+ (sf)    A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd.
Class           Rating
A               AAA (sf)
D               BBB (sf)
E               BB (sf)



MARINER CLO 2016-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Mariner CLO
2016-3 Ltd./Mariner CLO 2016-3 LLC's $460.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 22,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

   -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of

      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Mariner CLO 2016-3 Ltd./Mariner CLO 2016-3 LLC Notes

Class                     Rating                   Amount
                                                (mil. $)(i)
A                         AAA (sf)                330.00
B                         AA (sf)                  55.00
C                         A (sf)                   30.00
D                         BBB (sf)                 25.00
E                         BB (sf)                  20.00
Subordinated notes        NR                       43.40

NR--Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-TOP17: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class, upgraded one class, and
affirmed 11 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TOP17.

                      KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class B reflects sufficient credit enhancement of
the class relative to expected losses and the class seniority.  In
addition, the Coventry Mall asset (formerly 70% of the pool) was
disposed in May 2016 for losses that were less than expected.  The
downgrade to class C reflects expected losses from the specially
serviced asset which are likely to impact the class.  The
affirmations of the remaining classes reflect realized losses
incurred.  The pool is concentrated with only 11 loans remaining,
of which nine (54.1%) are fully amortizing and mature in 2019
through 2024.  Fitch modeled losses of 13% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 1.5%, including
$11.4 million (1.2% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date.  Fitch has designated three loans (52.9%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced asset
(20.5%).

As of the June 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.6% to $23.6 million from
$980.8 million at issuance.  No loans are defeased.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced asset (20.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
145-key Hampton Inn located in Augusta, GA, roughly 140 miles east
of Atlanta.  The loan matured in December 2014, but an extension
was granted through March 2016.  The borrower was granted the
extension to convert the property into a Red Roof Inn after the
Hampton Inn franchise agreement expired in March 2016.  However,
the borrower failed to pay off the loan and a court appointed
receiver took control of the property in July 2016 in preparation
for foreclosure.  The receiver is overseeing the conversion of the
property to a Red Roof Inn.  A foreclosure sale date has not yet
been scheduled.

The largest loan in the pool (25.4%) is secured by a 230,600 square
foot (sf) warehouse/distribution center located in Weston, FL.  The
subject had been 100% occupied by Circuit City until the company
filed for bankruptcy in 2008.  A new lease was signed with a
logistics company to occupy 34% of the space in late 2014.  The
tenant has been gradually expanding in the space and will occupy
100% of the building starting September 2016.  As of March 2016,
the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and occupancy were reported
to be 1.70x and 72%, respectively.  The balloon loan matures in
November 2017.

The third largest loan in the pool (16.8%) is secured by a 54,220
sf anchored retail property located in Lawrenceville, GA,
approximately 27 miles northwest of Atlanta.  The subject is
anchored by LA Fitness (76% of net rentable area through October
2018) and is located directly south of Sugarloaf Mills, which is a
1.2 million sf enclosed mall anchored by Bass Pro Shops, Burlington
Coat Factory, Saks Off Fifth and AMC Theaters.  As of year-end
2015, the property was reported to be 91% occupied.  The DSCR for
the same period was reported to be 1.20x. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in December 2024.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class B has been revised to Stable from
Negative.  Although the credit enhancement will increase with
continued paydown, Fitch has concerns with adverse selection as
there are only 11 loans remaining.  Therefore, a rating cap of
'BBsf' is considered appropriate for this concentrated pool.  Fitch
does not foresee negative rating migration for class B unless there
is material economic change to the remaining loans. The distressed
class C, however, is subject to a further downgrade as losses are
realized.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades this class and revises the Recovery Estimates (RE)
as indicated:

   -- $7.4 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 70%.

Fitch upgrades this class and revises the Rating Outlook as
indicated:

   -- $14.6 million class B to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $1.6 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-AB, A-5 and A-J certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and
X-2 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C7: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has affirmed the ratings on 15 classes
in Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C7
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on twelve P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The transaction contains a group of exchangeable certificates.
Classes A-S, B and C may be exchanged for Class PST certificates
and Class PST may be exchanged for the Classes A-S, B and C. The
PST certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of interest
and principal distributable on the Classes A-S, B and C
certificates that are exchanged for such PST certificates. The
rating on the PST class was affirmed based on the weighted average
rating factor (or WARF) of its exchangeable classes.

The ratings on the IO classes, classes X-A and X-B were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.2% of the
current balance, compared to 2.4 % at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7.7% to $1.29
billion from $1.39 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 57% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 1.7% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Six loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, the Oakridge Office Park Loan ($15.7 million -- 1.2% of
the pool) is currently in special servicing. The loan is secured by
five office properties totaling approximately 315,500 square feet
(SF) in Orlando, Florida. The loan transferred to special servicing
in June 2014 after several major tenants departed and/or downsized
at their lease expirations. As of April 2016, the property was 48%
leased, the same as last review and compared to 87% at
securitization. The Special Servicer initially entered into a
forbearance agreement with the Borrower to reduce payments to
interest-only with an escalated maturity date of December 2014. The
Borrower was unable to cure the default, foreclosure was filed and
a receiver was appointed in February 2015. The special servicer
indicated that the receiver is currently preparing the property for
sale. Moody's estimates a moderate loss on this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $3.8 million (a 15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 48% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95%, compared to
99% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.73X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.69X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Sunvalley
Shopping Center Fee Loan ($22.4 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which
is secured by the leased fee interest associated with six parcels
of land totaling 68.4 acres located in Concord, California. The
parcels generate revenue through a ground lease to a 1.4 million
square foot regional mall which is operated by an affiliate of
Taubman Centers Inc. The mall anchors are Sears, JC Penney, and
Macy's. Moody's structured credit assessment is aaa (sca.pd), the
same as at Moody's last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Chrysler East Building Loan ($165 million --
12.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 32-story, 745,000 SF
multi-tenant office building within the Grand Central office market
of New York, New York. The loan sponsor is Tishman Speyer
Properties. Several leases expired in 2014 and 2015 including the
two largest tenants at securitization, Credit Agricole (19% of the
NRA) and Grant Thorton (8% of the NRA). Both tenants vacated the
property, however, Credit Aricole was already subleasing its space
and the majority of its original space has been re-leased. Property
performance has declined since securitization and the property was
83% leased as of March 2016 compared to 96% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.75X, respectively, the
same as at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Millennium Boston Retail Loan
($103.2 million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by nine
commercial condominium units contained within three buildings,
totaling 282,000 SF of mixed use space in the Midtown/Theater
District area of downtown Boston, Massachusetts. The properties are
100% leased to nine tenants, including Loews Theater, The Sports
Club/LA, and CVS. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.02X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Solomon Pond Mall Loan ($102.7
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 399,000 SF
component of a 885,000 SF regional mall located in Marlborough,
Massachusetts (approximately 27 miles west of Boston). The property
is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney, and Sears, none of which are part
of the loan collateral. The largest collateral tenants are Regal
Cinema (17% of the NRA) and Tilt Arcade (7% of the NRA). Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to
92% and 1.15X at the last review.


ONEMAIN FINC'L 2016-2: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2 (the Issuer):

-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class A (Class A Notes) confirmed at AA
    (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class B (Class B Notes) confirmed at A
    (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class C (Class C Notes) confirmed at BBB
    (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class D (Class D Notes; collectively with

    the Class A, B and C Notes, the Notes) confirmed at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS’s review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Revision of the coupon rates for the Class C and Class D
    Notes. The Class C Notes’ coupon rate was reduced to 5.67%
    from 7.20%. The Class D Notes’ coupon rate was reduced to
    6.43% from 8.69%. The reductions on the coupon rates are
    expected to result in greater excess spread for the
    transaction.

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

The transaction is a securitization of unsecured consumer loans
using a revolving period followed by sequential pay amortization.
In the cash flow modeling of the expected excess cash flows
available to the Issuer, various key factors affecting the
performance of the collateral for the senior Notes over the life of
the transaction are stressed to simulate a potential deterioration
in the collateral’s performance. Key inputs in the cash flow
modeling include charge-off rates and payment rates.

DBRS incorporated the projected excess cash flows generated in the
cash flow modeling scenario into the priority of payments for the
transaction. The cash flow modeling tested the ability of the Notes
to pay interest at their respective interest rates and principal
amounts in full by the final maturity date in accordance with the
terms of the transaction documents.

The transaction was recently issued, closing in March 2016. The
confirmation of the outstanding ratings reflects the current credit
enhancement levels for the outstanding Notes provided by
subordination, overcollateralization and the reserve account. As of
the June 2016 payment date, the three-month average annualized
charge-off rate was approximately 0.43%, which is within the
expectations of 10.22%. The weighted-average coupon of the
portfolio as of the same distribution date was 26.25%, which is in
compliance with the transaction’s threshold of 22.00%. The
weighted-average remaining term of the portfolio was 46 months,
which is in compliance with the transaction’s limit of 50 months.
Overcollateralization of $115,189,345 was above its required level
of $110,002,661. Trigger thresholds that would result in early
amortization are all currently in compliance.


PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL 2003-PWR1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 6 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Prudential Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2003-PWR1 (PCMT 2003-PWR1) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

                      KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the distressed ratings indicate the weak
performance of the remaining loan and already incurred losses.  One
loan remains in the pool, which is scheduled to mature in 2020.

As of the June 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97% to $29 million from $960
million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes G through P.  The trust has incurred 5.1% in realized
losses.

The remaining loan in the pool, Brandywine Office Building & Garage
loan (100% of the pool), is secured by a 405,844 square foot (sf)
office building with a 660 parking space garage located in
Wilmington, DE.  The loan recently underwent two modifications in
2016 and 2011, which included a $15.1 million write-off of
principal; an interest rate reduction with periodic rate increases
until December 2017; and interest-only payments until maturity May
2020.  The property's performance has continued to suffer due to
declining occupancy and deteriorating cash flows.  Occupancy is 37%
as of March 2016.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Ratings on class F and G are not likely to change unless
performance of the asset improves significantly or upon disposition
of the asset as losses are realized.

                    DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises REs as indicated:

   -- $8.8 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 25%;
   -- $12 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $8.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and X-2 certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.


SCHOONER TRUST 2006-5: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. K Certs to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two and
downgraded the rating on one class in Schooner Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-5 as:

  Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2015,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

  Cl. L, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2015,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)

  Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 23, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down 97% since Moody's last review and 98.2%
since securitization.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment.  However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance.  Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.  Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED
Moody's review used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.2% to $8.64
million from $487 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 2 mortgage loans which are 56% and 44% of the
pool.  These loans are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring
of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool.  The remaining two
loans are currently in special servicing for non-monetary default
as they are past maturity.

The largest specially serviced loan is the 3565 Jarry Street East
Loan ($4.86 million -- 56% of the pool), which is secured by a
centrally located, 6 story industrial loft style office property in
Montreal, Quebec.  The property was 91% leased as of June 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and 2.42X, respectively,
compared to 48% and 2.21X at the last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 207 Weston Loan
($3.79 million -- 44% of the pool), which is secured by a 694 unit
drive through self-storage and U-Haul rental facility located in
Toronto West, Ontario.  The property was 100% occupied as of July
2016.  The loan is recourse to the borrower.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.63X, respectively, compared to 173% and
0.56X at the last review.


TOWD POINT 2016-3: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3
(TPMT 2016-3) as:

   -- $656,051,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,489,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,691,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,892,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,741,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32,169,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,489,000 class A2A exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $58,489,000 class X1 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,489,000 class A2B exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $58,489,000 class X2 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,691,000 class M1A exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $50,691,000 class X3 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,691,000 class M1B exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $50,691,000 class X4 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,892,000 class M2A exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $42,892,000 class X5 notional exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,892,000 class M2B exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,892,000 class X6 notional exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
       Outlook Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $42,891,000 class B3 notes;
   -- $42,892,896 class B4 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consisted of
5,356 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $974.82 million (which includes $22.25
million, or 2.28%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the cut-off
date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1 notes reflects the 32.70%
subordination provided by the 6.00% class A2, 5.20% class M1, 4.40%
class M2, 5.00% class B1, 3.30% class B2, 4.40% class B3 and 4.40%
class B4 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicers, Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS),rated 'RPS1-' and JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (Chase), rated 'RPS2+', and the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings and the
sequential pay structure.

A customized version of the cash flow assumptions workbook was
created to account for the lack of servicer advancing.  The
delinquency timing scenarios are consistent with the pool's
stressed projected default scenarios.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch Ratings identifies as "clean current" (80%) and
loans that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings are identified as "dirty current" (20%).  All loans were
current as of the cutoff date; 81.1% of the loans have received
modifications.

Due Diligence Compliance Findings (Concern): The third-party review
(TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 11% 'C'
and 'D' graded loans.  For 59 loans, the due diligence results
showed issues regarding high cost testing -- the loans were either
missing the final HUD1 or used alternate documentation to test --
and therefore a slight upwards revision to the model output loss
severity (LS) was applied, as further described in the Third-Party
Due Diligence section beginning on page 6.  In addition, timelines
were extended on 38 loans which were missing final modification
documents.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest
(P&I), which reduces liquidity to the trust.  However, as P&I
advances made on behalf of loans that become delinquent and
eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust, the
loan-level loss severities (LS) are less for this transaction than
for those where the servicer is obligated to advance P&I.
Structural provisions and cash flow priorities, together with
increased subordination, provide for timely payments of interest to
the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Mixed): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full.  Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest.  While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high investment
grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience long
periods of interest deferral that will generally not be repaid
until such note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's "Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions," dated June 2016, the agency may
assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes that incur deferrals if such
deferrals are permitted under terms of the transaction documents,
provided such amounts are fully recovered well in advance of the
legal final maturity under the relevant rating stress.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey) as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in August 2017.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in August 2017.  If FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
does not fulfill its obligation to repurchase a mortgage loan due
to a breach, Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P. (the responsible party) will repurchase the loan.

Tier 2 Representation Framework (Concern): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism
construct for this transaction to be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings.  Thus, Fitch increased its
'AAAsf' loss expectations by roughly 218 bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses
in the reps.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): An
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the
relevant local jurisdiction, was also performed.  Per the
representations provided in the transaction documents all loans
have either all been recorded in the appropriate jurisdiction, are
in the process of being recorded, or will be sent for recordation
within 12 months of the closing date.
While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, Fitch believes that FirstKey's
oversight for completion of these activities serves as a strong
mitigant to potential delays.  In addition, the obligation of
FirstKey Mortgage, LLC or Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage
Opportunity Fund, L.P. to repurchase loans, for which assignments
are not recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment
date in August 2017, aligns the issuer's interests regarding
completing the recordation process with those of noteholders.

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Fitch's analysis of loans that have
had clean pay histories for 24 months or more found that, for these
loans, its loan loss model projected a probability of default (PD)
that was more punitive than that indicated by actual delinquency
roll rate projections.  To account for this difference, Fitch
reduced the pool's lifetime default expectations by approximately
11%.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $22.25 million (2.28% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 693 loans.  Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan.  The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals.  Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative
to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Third-Party Loan Sale Provisions (Neutral): The transaction permits
nonperforming loans and loans classified as real estate-owned (REO)
serviced by SPS to be sold to unaffiliated third parties to
maximize liquidation proceeds to the issuer.  FirstKey as asset
manager is responsible for arranging such sales.  To ensure that
loan sales do not result in losses to the trust that exceed Fitch's
expectations, the sale price is floored at a minimum value equal to
59.27% of the unpaid principal balance, which approximates Fitch's
'Bsf' LS expectation.  Loans serviced by Chase are not permitted to
be sold out of the trust.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): FK Investments WS, LLC (FK
Investments), a majority-owned affiliate of FirstKey Mortgage, LLC,
will acquire and retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of the
securities to be issued.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels.  The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 38.2% at 'AAA'.  The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

                     DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information, as well as the
final Form 15E, from WestCor Land Title Insurance Company
(WestCor), Clayton Holdings LLC, and American Mortgage Consultants
(AMC)/JCIII & Associates, Inc. (JCIII).  The due diligence focused
on regulatory compliance, pay history, servicing comments, the
presence of key documents in the loan file and data integrity.  In
addition, Westcor, AMC, and JCIII were retained to perform an
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgages were recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction and
the related assignment chains.

A regulatory compliance and data integrity review was competed on
100% of the pool.  A pay history review was conducted on 99% of the
pool, and a servicing comment review was completed on approximately
12% of the loans.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and based on the
findings, Fitch made minor adjustments to its analysis.

Fitch made an adjustment on 59 loans that were subject to federal,
state, and/or local predatory testing.  These loans contained
material violations including an inability to test for high cost
violations or confirm compliance, which could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability.  These loans were marked as
'indeterminate'.  Typically the HUD issues are related to missing
the Final HUD, illegible HUDs, incomplete HUDs due to missing
pages, or only having estimated HUDs.  The final HUD1 was not used
to test for High Cost loans.  To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed
a 100% loss severity for loans in the states that fall under
Freddie Mac's do not purchase list of 'high cost' or 'high risk'.
Six loans were impacted by this approach.

For the remaining 53 loans, where the properties are not located in
the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not purchase list, the
likelihood of all loans being high cost is lower.  However, Fitch
assumes the trust could potentially incur notable legal expenses.
Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by 5% for these
loans to account for the risk.

There were 38 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents.  For these loans, timelines were
extended by an additional three months, in addition to the
six-month timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-LC5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, classes X-A and X-B were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the July 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5.1% to $1.21
billion from $1.28 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 53% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 8.2% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Two loans,
constituting 0.7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Five loans, constituting 15.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated and there are no loans in special
servicing at this time.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 4.1% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $8.5 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 62% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 92.5%, compared
to 94.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.8% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.69X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Trump Tower
Commercial Condominium Loan ($100 million -- 8.2% of the pool),
which is secured by the commercial condominium component of the
Trump Tower located at 725 5th Avenue in New York City. The
collateral is a Class A multi-tenant office and retail building
containing approximately 244,500 square feet (SF) and consists of
the lower level, ground floor and floors 2 - 26. The retail
represents approximately 24% of the collateral and is located on
the Garden Level (Lower Level), and 2nd through 4th floors. The
office space comprises the remaining 76% of the collateral and is
located on the 5th and 14th through 26th floors. Due to the public
atrium there are no 6th through 13th floors within the building.
The largest tenant in the retail space is Gucci (20% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration February 2026) which operates
its American flagship store. The remaining floors 29-68 comprise
the residential component and are not contributed as loan
collateral. The loan is interest only for the full 10-year term. As
of March 2016 occupancy was 85%, compared to 94% at last review.
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa
(sca.pd) and 1.49X, respectively, compared to aaa (sca.pd) and
1.79X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Westside Pavilion Loan ($145.4 million -- 12%
of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in a
755,500 SF regional mall (collateral is 535,500 SF) located in Los
Angeles, California. The property is situated approximately 10
miles west of downtown Los Angeles. The property was constructed in
1985 and most recently renovated in 2007, the scope of which
included the addition of a 12-screen movie theater. The mall
anchors include Macy's (non-owned) Macy's Home and Nordstrom. The
collateral also includes an Urban Home, Westside Tavern restaurant,
and Landmark Theatres. As of March 2016, the property was
approximately 95% leased compared to 94% at Moody's last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively,
compared to 98% and 1.02X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Starwood Capital Hotel Portfolio
Loan ($105.0 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted portfolio of 16
limited-service hotels and four full service hotels totaling 1,735
keys. Eighteen properties are located in Texas with one property
each in Altus, Oklahoma and Texarkana, Arkansas. All of the hotels
currently operate under individual franchise agreements, with no
franchise agreements rolling during the loan term. Hotel flags
include Holiday Inn Express (6), Hampton Inn & Suites (4),
Courtyard Marriott (3), Comfort Inn & Suites (1), Holiday Inn (1),
Fairfield Inn and Suites by Marriott (1), Candlewood Suites (1) and
Country Inn & Suites (1). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and
1.48X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.46X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 100 Church Street Loan ($77.6 million
-- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 21-story, 1.1 million
SF Class B+ office building in the City Hall office submarket of
Lower Manhattan. The loan represents a 34.8% pari-passu piece in a
$223.2 million loan. The property was originally built in 1958 and
renovated in 2012. As of March 2016, the property was approximately
93% leased compared to 96% at Moody's last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 95% and
1.02X at the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C16: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-C16 certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool since issuance.  The modeled base case loss of
3.41% is consistent with Fitch's base case loss assessment at
issuance.  There are currently eight loans on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 14.1% of the pool.  The largest of these
loans is being flagged for deferred maintenance and is not
considered a Fitch Loan of Concern.  There are no delinquent or
specially serviced loans.  The pool exhibits strong credit metrics,
with a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.15x
and a weighted-average debt yield of 12.4%; however, there has been
limited amortization since issuance.  Loans representing 29% of the
pool are interest-only for the full term, including the three
largest loans.  Additionally, at issuance there were nine partial
interest-only loans, three of which (7.3% of the pool) are still in
their interest-only periods.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by 997,549 square feet (sf)
of space within the 1.6 million sf Westfield Mission Valley Mall in
San Diego, CA.  The subject is situated just north of San Diego
immediately off of Interstate 8.  A Macy's (non-collateral),
Target, Bed, Bath & Beyond and Nordstrom Rack act as anchor
tenants.  The trust loan is pari-passu with a $55 million note that
was securitized in the WFRBS 2013-C17 transaction.  This loan is
interest-only for the full term, and the interest-only DSCR for
YE2015 was 3.16x, up from 3.04x at YE2014.

The second largest loan is Brennan Industrial Portfolio and is
secured by a portfolio of 23 industrial and two office properties
located in 14 states across the country.  All of the properties
were 100% occupied as of March 2016, and no leases are scheduled to
expire until 2024; however, two tenants (2.8% of the portfolio NRA)
have termination options in 2017 and 2018.  This loan is
interest-only for the full term.  The interest-only DSCR was 2.76x
for YE2015, up from 2.69x at YE2014.  This loan is on the watchlist
because of deferred maintenance at one of the collateral properties
and is not considered a Fitch Loan of Concern.

The third largest loan in the pool is Augusta Mall.  The collateral
comprises 500,222 sf within the 1.1 million sf Augusta Mall located
in Augusta, GA.  The subject is anchored by Dillard's, Macy's, JC
Penney and Sears, none of which serve as collateral for the loan.
The trust loan is pari-passu with a $110 million note that was
securitized in WFRBS 2013-C15.  The interest-only loan reported a
YE2015 DSCR of 3.77x, up from 2.25x at YE2014.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Due to the
limited seasoning and lack of amortization, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative rating migration until a material economic or
asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $19.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $160.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $44 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $183 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $221.6 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $70.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $100.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $832.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $56.2 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.8 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class PEX at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $47.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $24.8 million class E at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.5 million class F at 'B-sf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G and X-B certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the class X-C certificate.  The
class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for the class PEX
certificates, and the class PEX certificates may be exchanged for
the class A-S, B and C certificates.



[*] Fitch Lowers 25 Distressed Classes in 9 U.S. CMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 25 already distressed classes in nine
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions. The
25 classes have been downgraded to 'D', as the bonds have incurred
a principal write-down. The bonds were all previously rated 'CC' or
'C', which indicates that losses were probable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs. Any
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review. In cases where the last rated tranches of a
transaction are in default and rated 'D', the defaulted ratings
will be automatically withdrawn within 11 months of the date of the
previous rating action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch would
further review the affected classes.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

           http://bit.ly/2aLYuwC


[*] Moody's Hikes $30MM of Second Lien RMBS
-------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 5 tranches
from four deals backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-HF1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust, Series 2003-E

Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2015 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFC

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFB

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are the result of an increase in
credit enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $567.3MM of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on July 22, 2016,  upgraded the ratings
of 25 tranches from 14 transactions and downgraded the rating of 1
tranche from 1 transaction, backed by Subprime RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-6

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2013,
   Downgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2013,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB5

  Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-3

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2010,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Finance America Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 19, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-OPT1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 27, 2011,
   Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH1

  Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 28, 2010,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 28, 2010,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE5

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 19, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC5

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 3, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 14, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-3
Trust

  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating of Class M-1 from Finance
America Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1 was downgraded to B1 from Ba1
due to interest shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped because
of a weak interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism.  The rating
actions are a result of the recent performance of the underlying
pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on these
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in June 2016 from 5.3% in June
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review of 47 Classes From 14 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 47 classes from 14 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2001 and 2010.  The review yielded various upgrades,
downgrades, affirmations, and withdrawals.  S&P removed one of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative
implications on April 29, 2016.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.  As discussed in S&P's criteria, "The Interaction Of Bond
Insurance And Credit Ratings," published Aug. 24, 2009, the rating
on a bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the rating on
the bond insurer and the rating of the underlying obligation,
without considering the potential credit enhancement from the bond
insurance.  Of the classes reviewed, class A3 ('AA (sf)') from
American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-4 is insured by Assured
Guaranty Municipal Corp. ('AA').  The reviewed transactions also
have four other classes that benefitted from a rated insurance
provider at the time of deal origination, but for which S&P Global
Ratings has subsequently withdrawn the rating on the insurance
provider.

                               ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 15 classes, including 12 ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover our projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more
of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

                           DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on three classes, all of which were lowered
by one notch.  Two of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining downgraded class
already had a speculative-grade rating.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that our projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover our projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends; and/or
   -- Observed interest shortfalls.

Interest Shortfalls

S&P previously placed the rating on class I-A3 from BCAP LLC
2010-RR2 Trust on CreditWatch negative on April 29, 2016 to reflect
reported interest shortfalls and inconsistency in the trustee
reporting during recent remittance periods.  S&P downgraded this
rating, and removed it from CreditWatch negative, based on these
interest shortfalls pursuant to S&P's interest shortfall criteria,
which designate a maximum potential rating (MPR) to this class.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 14 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of S&P's upgrade or affirmed its ratings
on those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote
ratings stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of
these characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced -- or a complete stop of --
unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover S&P's 'B' expected case projected losses for these
classes.  Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC',
'CCC-', and 'CC' Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)'
affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes are still
vulnerable to defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect
our view that these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on classes M-II-2 and M-II-3 from RAMP
Series 2002-RS1 Trust because the related pool has a small number
of loans remaining.  Once a pool has declined to a de minimis
amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of credit instability
that is incompatible with any rating level.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/1679444



[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 18 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2001
and 2006.  The review yielded 31 upgrades, four downgrades
(including one to 'D (sf)'), 43 affirmations, and 11 withdrawals.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate Alternative-A, negative amortization,
re-performing, and outside-the-guidelines mortgage loan collateral.


Subordination and/or bond insurance provide credit support for the
reviewed transactions.  With respect to insured obligations, where
S&P maintains a rating on the bond insurer that is lower than what
S&P would rate the class without bond insurance, or where the bond
insurer is not rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying
collateral's credit quality and the transaction structure to derive
the rating on the class.  As discussed in S&P's criteria, "The
Interaction Of Bond Insurance And Credit Ratings", published Aug.
24, 2009, the rating on a bond-insured obligation will be the
higher of the rating on the bond insurer and the rating of the
underlying obligation, without considering the potential credit
enhancement from the bond insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, these are insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2004-9XS class I-A5
      ('A (sf)') and class 1-A6 ('A+ (sf)'), insured by MBIA
      Insurance Corp. ('CCC'); and

   -- Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-
      AB4 class A-4A ('AA (sf)') and class A5 ('AA (sf)'), insured

      by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. ('AA').

Of the transactions reviewed, there were also four other classes
that were insured by a rated insurance provider when the deal was
originated, but S&P Global Ratings has subsequently withdrawn the
rating on the insurance provider of those classes.

                      ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The projected credit support for the affected classes is sufficient
to cover S&P's projected losses at these rating levels. The
upgrades reflect one or more of:

   -- Improvement of underlying collateral;
   -- An increase in credit support;
   -- Expected short duration;
   -- Decrease in delinquencies; and/or
   -- Rising conditional prepayment rates (CPRs).

                            DOWNGRADES

All of the classes S&P downgraded already had speculative-grade
ratings (of 'BB+' (sf) or lower).  The downgrades reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support for the affected classes
will be insufficient to cover S&P's remaining projected losses for
the related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades also
reflect one or more of:

   -- Deteriorated collateral performance;
   -- Decreased credit enhancement available to the classes;
      and/or
   -- Observed principal write-downs.

S&P lowered the rating on class M2 from Structured Asset Securities
Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-GEL4 to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' due
to principal write-downs incurred by the class.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on 10 classes from Structured Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-4 due to the small number of
loans remaining in the related pool.  Once a pool has declined to a
de minimis amount, S&P believes that tail risk cannot be addressed
because the high degree of credit instability is incompatible with
any rating level.

S&P withdrew its rating on class A-IO1 from Structured Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-5 due to the application of
S&P' interest-only (IO) criteria, which state that S&P will
maintain the rating on an IO class until the ratings on all of the
classes that the IO security references, in the determination of
its notional balance, are either lowered to below 'AA-' or have
been retired.  Reference classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 paid down in
full in May 2016.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority of principal payments;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;
   -- Low subordination; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

Of the 43 affirmed ratings, 15 are investment-grade
(rated 'BBB-' sf or higher), and 28 are speculative-grade.  The
affirmations of classes rated above 'CCC (sf)' reflect the classes'
relatively senior positions in payment priority and S&P's opinion
that its projected credit support is sufficient to cover our
projected losses at those rating levels.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://bit.ly/2a91GkN



[^] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 10 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 72 classes from 10 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2005.  The review yielded 12 upgrades, 15
downgrades, and 45 affirmations.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate alternative-A mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 12 classes, including two ratings that
were raised three or more notches.  S&P's projected credit support
for the affected classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect:

   -- Increased credit support relative to S&P's projected losses;

      Or

   -- Application of S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria.

                             DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include 10 ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on five classes to speculative
grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or higher),
four remained at an investment-grade level, and the remaining six
already had speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that our projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover S&P's projected losses for
the related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades
reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased credit enhancement available to the classes;
      and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

S&P lowered the rating on class B-1 from Alternative Loan Trust
2003-17T2 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because of principal
write-downs incurred by this class.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

S&P lowered its rating on class A-5 from Ameriquest Mortgage
Securities Inc. to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'.  This downgrade
reflects the application of S&P's imputed promises criteria, which
resulted in a maximum potential rating (MPR) lower than the
previous rating on the class.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities by applying its "Methodology For Incorporating Loan
Modifications And Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings,"
published April 17, 2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues
Based On Imputed Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014. Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 34 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations of reflect S&P's opinion
that its projected credit support on these classes remained
relatively consistent with S&P's prior projections and is
sufficient to cover our projected losses for those rating
scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop of--unscheduled
principal payments to their subordinate classes. However, these
transactions allow for unscheduled principal payments to resume to
the subordinate classes if the delinquency triggers begin passing
again.  This would result in eroding the credit support available
for the more senior classes.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings
on certain classes in these transactions even though they may have
passed at higher rating scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' reflect S&P's belief that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its 'B'
expected case projected losses for these classes.  Pursuant to
S&P's "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.0% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.8% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at https://is.gd/hxnyf8


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

                   *** End of Transmission ***