TCR_Public/160612.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 12, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 164

                            Headlines

ALM LTD XVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-3: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class G Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2006-G: Moody's Hikes Cl. 3-A-2 Debt Rating to Ba3
BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. G Debt
BBSG 2016-MRP: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating to Class E Certs

BEAR STEARNS 2004-9: Moody's Cuts Cl. II-3-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Puts Cl. G Debt Rating on Review
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CARNOW AUTO 2015-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Debt

CENT CLO 17: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CIFC FUNDING 2012-III: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. B-3L Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C1: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'
COMM 2005-C6: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Certificates to B-
COMM 2015-PC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt

COMM MORTGAGE 2006-C8: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. D Certs to Csf
CPS AUTO: Moody's Takes Actions on Auto Loans Issued 2012-2015
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C3: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to BB
CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-X Debt Rating to B2
DRYDEN XXV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

DRYDEN XXVI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
DSLA MORTGAGE 2004-AR1: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-1A Debt Rating to Ba2
EFS COGEN: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Proposed $1BB Loan
EVERGLADES RE 2014-1: S&P Raises Rating on Notes to B+(sf)
FLATIRON CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2016-DNA3: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. M-3B Debt
GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
GOLUB CAPITAL 10: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
GRAMERCY RE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ca

GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-RR2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
GREYWOLF CLO II: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Ratings on Cl. F Debt
HALCYON LOAN 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
JP MORGAN 2013-C13: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Certificates
JP MORGAN 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certificates 'BBsf'
KKR CLO 14: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Hikes Class K Debt Rating to B1

LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
MADISON PARK X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
MID-STATE CAPITAL 2006-1: Moody's Raises Cl. B Debt Rating to Caa3
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Debt

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-2: Moody's Rates Cl. B-5 Debt 'B3(sf)'
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-3: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
PETRA CRE CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Tranches
RAMP TRUST: Moody's Hikes $258MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Gives Prov. B1 Rating on B-4 Debt

STACR 2016-HQA2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class M-3AF Debt
STONE TOWER VI: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
TIAA CLO I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on 2 Note Classes
TRINITAS CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes

VERTICAL BRIDGE 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class F Debt 'BB-sf'
WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on E Debt
WESTWOOD CDO I: Moody's Cuts 2021 Class D Rating to 'B1(sf)'
[*] Fitch Takes Various Actions on 189 RMBS Deals From 112 Deals

[*] Moody's Puts on Review 8 Note Classes in 5 FFELP-Backed Loans
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $297MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $261.2MM of Subprime RMBS
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 41 Classes From 15 CDO Deals
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 10 Classes From 5 CMBS Transactions


                            *********

ALM LTD XVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to ALM XVIII
Ltd./ALM XVIII LLC's $413.5 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 3,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM XVIII Ltd./ALM XVIII LLC

Class                   Rating                  Amount
                                              (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)                275.00
A-2                     AA (sf)                  54.00
B                       A (sf)                   41.00
C                       BBB (sf)                 22.00
D                       BB- (sf)                 21.50
Preferred shares        NR                       36.55

NR--Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-3: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class F commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
rating on class G from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade on class F reflects S&P's expectation of the available
credit enhancement for the class, which S&P believes is greater
than its most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for
the rating level.  The upgrade also reflects S&P's views regarding
the collateral's current and future performance, available
liquidity support, and the reduction in the trust balance.

The affirmation on class G reflects S&P's views regarding the
collateral's current and future performance, the transaction's
structure, liquidity support available to the class, and historical
interest shortfalls.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class F and positive rating movement on class G,
S&P's analysis also considered the susceptibility of these classes
to reduced liquidity support from the sole specially serviced loan
($7.4 million, 28.8% of the collateral pool balance) as well the
classes' historical interest shortfalls.

                      TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $25.5 million, which is 2.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes three loans, down from 94
loans at issuance.  There is one loan with the special servicer,
and no loans are defeased or on the master servicer's watchlist.
The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported year-end
2015 financial information for 100% of the loans in the pool.

S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service
coverage and loan-to-value ratio of 1.15x and 73.4%, respectively,
using an S&P Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate of
7.12% for the two performing loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $48.8 million in principal
losses, or 4.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 4.5% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
specially serviced loan.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the Nextel
Office Building - Temple, TX loan was the only loan in the pool
with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services (Midland).  The
loan was transferred to special servicing on Jan. 15, 2016, due to
maturity default.  The loan matured on Jan. 1, 2016.  The loan has
a nonperforming matured balloon payment status and is secured by a
108,800-sq.-ft. built-to-suit call center in Temple, Texas.
According to Midland, although the property is 49.7% leased to
Nextel Communications Inc., a subsidiary of Sprint Corp.
('B/Stable'), until January 2021, the property is physically 100%
vacant.  An appraisal reduction amount of $1.9 million is in effect
against the loan.  Midland is currently exploring various
liquidation strategies.  S&P expects a moderate loss (between
26%-59%) upon its eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-3

                                   Rating        Rating
Class          Identifier          To            From
F              05947USK5           A- (sf)       B- (sf)
G              05947USL3           CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-G: Moody's Hikes Cl. 3-A-2 Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
from Banc of America Funding 2006-G Trust, backed by Alt-A RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-G Trust

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily the result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectation on these pools. The rating upgrades are primarily
due to the stronger collateral performance and the credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The rating actions also reflect corrections to the cash-flow model
used by Moody's in rating this transaction. In the prior model,
interest due to Group 3 senior bonds and principal due to Classes
2-A-1 and 2-A-4 were not correctly calculated, resulting in higher
interest and principal distributions distributed to these bonds
and, ultimately, lower excess cash flow available to all senior
bonds than called for in the transaction documents. These errors
have now been corrected, and the rating actions reflect these
changes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in April
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.


BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-UBS10 (the Certificates) issued by Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-UBS10. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-H at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G, X-H, D, E, F, G and H have been
privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G and X-H balances are
notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address
the likelihood of receiving interest based on the notional amount
outstanding. DBRS considers the IO certificate’s position within
the transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

The collateral consists of 52 fixed-rate loans secured by 84
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, five loans, representing 16.3% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 22
loans, representing 51.7% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x; however, the DBRS refinance (Refi) DSCRs for the loans are
based on a weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of
9.75%, which implies an inter¬est rate of 9.18%, amortizing on a
30-year schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.3% over
the WA contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The
loans’ probability of default (POD) is based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 28
equal-sized loans, though the top ten represent 51.5% of the pool.
Diversity is further enhanced by seven loans, representing 20.2% of
the pool, that are secured by multiple properties (39 in total).
Eight loans, representing 26.1% of the pool, are located in urban
markets, which benefit from consistent investor demand and
increased liquidity even in times of stress. Urban markets
represented in this deal include Los Angeles, New York, Dallas,
Boston, Chicago and Cincinnati. Although there are 15 loans,
totaling 17.7% of the transaction balance, located in
tertiary/rural markets, 41.4% of this concentration is attributed
to two retail properties anchored by national tenants that are both
dominant centers in their respective markets. Additionally, one of
these properties is operated by Simon Property Group, Inc. (Simon),
which DBRS considers to be a strong operator.

The transaction has a high concentration of loans suffering from
elevated refinance risk, as evidenced by the pool’s WA DBRS Refi
DSCR of 1.02x. Twenty-two loans, representing 51.7% of the pool,
have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 1.00x. Eleven of these loans,
comprising 25.9% of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x.
The DBRS Refi DSCRs for these loans are based on a WA stressed
refinance constant of 9.75%, which implies an inter¬est rate of
9.18%, amortizing on a 30-year schedule. This represents a
significant stress of 4.3% over the WA contractual interest rate of
the loans in the pool. DBRS models POD based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term DSCR and the DBRS Refi DSCR. Nine
loans, representing 16.4% of the pool, are secured by hotel
properties, including three of the top 15 loans. To further
mitigate the more volatile cash flow of hotels, the loans in the
pool secured by hotel properties have WA DBRS Going-In and Exit
Debt Yields of 10.8% and 12.6%, respectively, which compare quite
favorably with the WA DBRS Going-In and Exit Debt Yields of 8.5%
and 9.5%, respectively, for the non-hotel properties in the pool.
Additionally, 72.1% of the hotel concentration are located in urban
markets, and 30.4% of these hotels are considered to be of Above
Average property quality by DBRS. Eight loans, representing 16.6%
of the pool, including four of the top 15 loans, are structured
with IO payments for the full term. An additional 19 loans,
representing 49.7% of the pool, have partial IO periods remaining
ranging from 11 to 116 months.

The DBRS sample included 25 of the 52 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 34 of the 84 properties in the
portfolio (71.4% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS
conducted meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent
or a representative of the borrowing entity for 64.7% of the pool.
The DBRS sample had an average NCF variance of -11.3% and ranged
from -28.7% to -4.2%. Six loans, comprising 21.1% of the DBRS
sample (17.7% of the pool), were considered to be of Above Average
property quality based on physical attributes and/or a desirable
location within their respective markets. Five of these loans are
within the top 15 (Twenty Ninth Street Retail, Gateway Plaza,
Renaissance Cincinnati, Le Meridien Cambridge MIT and AvidXchange),
while the remaining loan, Newberry Street Portfolio, is the 16th
largest in the pool. Higher-quality properties are more likely to
retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance. Six loans,
representing 19.0% of the pool, have sponsorship with negative
credit history and/or loan collateral associated with a borrowing
structure that DBRS deemed to be weak. Such sponsors were
associated with a prior DPO, loan default, foreclosure, voluntary
bankruptcy filing, limited net worth and/or liquidity, a historical
negative credit event, a non-standard borrower structure and/or
inadequate commercial real estate experience. DBRS increased the
POD for the loans with identified sponsorship concerns.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the credit provided by the transaction structure and underlying
trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing surveillance,
which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS after the date
of issuance.


BBSG 2016-MRP: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating to Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BBSG
2016-MRP Mortgage Trust's $162.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2016-MRP.

The note issuance is a CMBS transaction backed by a $162.0 million
trust mortgage loan, which is part of a whole mortgage loan
totaling $262.0 million, secured by a first lien on the borrower's
leasehold interest and the fee interest owned by an affiliate of
the borrower in The Mall at Rockingham Park, a 1.03 million-sq.-ft.
super regional mall located in Salem, N.H. Of the total mall square
footage, 540,867 sq. ft. will serve as the loan's collateral.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 6,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BBSG 2016-MRP Mortgage Trust
Class   Rating(i)      Amount ($)
A       AAA (sf)       42,500,000
X       AA- (sf)   74,100,000(ii)
B       AA- (sf)       31,600,000
C       A- (sf)        23,800,000
D       BBB- (sf)      29,100,000
E       BB- (sf)       35,000,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the class A and B
certificates.



BEAR STEARNS 2004-9: Moody's Cuts Cl. II-3-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of twenty one
tranches and upgraded the ratings of four tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-9

Cl. II-3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2015
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-9

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
2012 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)*

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
Caa1, Outlook Negative on May 20, 2016)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A1

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2015
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2015
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2015
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2015
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2012
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-2

Cl. IV-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-4

Cl. 1A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2015
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

All but one of the actions are a result of the recent performance
of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The ratings downgraded are due to the
weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds. The ratings upgraded are a
result of the improving performance of the related pools and
sufficient support provided by super senior support tranches.

The rating action on First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2007-1 Interest-Only Class A-2 reflects the correction of an error.
Class A-2 is an interest-only (IO) bond linked to a single bond in
the same transaction, Class A-1; under Moody's methodology, this IO
bond should therefore carry the same rating as the referenced bond.
When the rating on Class A-1 was downgraded on August 25, 2015,
however, the rating on Class A-2 was not changed accordingly. This
has been corrected, and the rating action reflects this change.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMSI) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-TOP28.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 5.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 7%, including $55.9
million (3.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 44 loans (29.2%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes one specially serviced asset (0.3%).  There
is a large retail exposure within the transaction as 58% of the
pool is collateralized by retail properties, including nine of the
top 15 loans and the largest loan in the pool, representing 12.7%
of the collateral.  Additionally, with 87.4% of the pool maturing
in 2017, the transaction faces significant maturity risk.

As of the May 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 24.1% to $1.34 billion from
$1.76 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(7.4% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes G through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Pavilions At
Hartman Heritage loan (1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
220,000 square foot (sf) retail property and is located in
Independence, MO, within the Kansas City MSA.  As of year-end (YE)
2015, occupancy was reported to be 70% and the debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported to be 1.23x, slightly higher
than the 1.19x reported at YE 2013.  The interest only loan matures
in August 2017.  While the property saw an over 60% improvement in
property cash flow between YE 2012 and 2011, the property is still
performing significantly below expectations at issuance when
occupancy was 92% and the DSCR was 2.06x.  Occupancy, however, will
improve in 2016 with Party City renewing their lease and expanding
into a larger space at the property.

The specially serviced asset (0.31%) is a 60,266-sf suburban office
property located in Longmont, CO, which is approximately 10 miles
north of Boulder.  The loan transferred to the special servicer in
September 2015.  The property's single tenant, Crocs, Inc.,
provided the borrower with notice that it intends to exercise its
early termination option and vacate the property effective June 30,
2016.  According to the special servicer, the borrower has failed
to make a reserve deposit required by the loan documents and
foreclosure has been initiated.

The largest loan in the pool is the Easton Town Center loan
(12.7%), which is secured by 1,301,992-sf of retail/office space in
a 1,708,992-sf anchored retail lifestyle center located in
Columbus, OH.  The interest-only loan matures in August 2017 and is
pari-passu with a $110 million note in MSCI 2007-IQ16.  The loan
sponsors are Limited Brands, Inc., Steiner & Associates and The
Georgetown Company.  Included in the 1,301,992-sf of collateral is
an office component encompassing 223,506-sf.  The center is
anchored by Macy's and Nordstrom, neither of which are part of the
collateral.  Of the 240 tenants that are included in the
collateral, AMC Theaters is the largest.  Other tenants include HH
Gregg, Barnes & Noble, Louis Vuitton, Anthropologie, Burberry,
Apple, The Lego Store, Pottery Barn, Sephora, J. Crew, Banana
Republic and Talbots.  Total center sales (excluding reported
anchor and temporary tenants) for YE 2015 were $534.5 million ($539
per square foot (psf)) compared to $506.4 million ($522 psf) for YE
2014.  Performance at the property has been stable.  Occupancy for
YE 2015 was reported to be 98%, which has been the same for the
past three years.  The YE 2015 DSCR improved to 2.60x from 2.56x at
YE 2014 due to a net operating income (NOI) increase of 1.8%.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings on senior classes A-4 through A-J are expected to
remain stable as these classes will benefit from increased credit
enhancement as the pool continues to pay down.  The Rating Outlooks
on classes B and C remain Stable due to the continued stable
performance of the pool.  Upgrades to these classes, as well class
A-J, may be warranted with continued paydown as the majority of the
loans near their maturities in 2017.  The distressed classes are
subject to further downgrade as losses are realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $801.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $115.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $176.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $114.5 million class A-J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30.8 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.4 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28.6 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $22 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 65%;
   -- $17.6 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $14.6 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-AB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Puts Cl. G Debt Rating on Review
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited placed the following class of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-3 issued by Canadian
Commercial Mortgage Origination Trust 2015-3 Under Review with
Negative Implications:

-- Class G at B (sf)

DBRS has placed Class G Under Review with Negative Implications
because of concerns and uncertainties surrounding the Clearwater
Suites Hotel loan (Prospectus ID#7, 3.9% of the current pool
balance), with the collateral property’s decline in performance
in 2015 and in light of the recent wildfire activity in Fort
McMurray, Alberta, where the property is located. The subject loan
represents the $23.0 million A-2 controlling pari passu note of the
$33.0 million whole loan balance; the $10.0 million A-1
non-controlling note is secured in the CMLS 2014-1 transaction,
also rated by DBRS.

Clearwater Suites is a 150-unit, full-service hotel located in Fort
McMurray, Alberta, approximately 17 kilometres from the Fort
McMurray International Airport, within the city’s downtown core.
The area has recently sustained widespread damage as a result of a
wildfire that broke out in early May 2016. According to an update
provided in early May 2016, the servicer indicated that the hotel
had not been physically affected by the wildfire; however, the
property’s website confirms that the subject remains closed until
access to the area is provided by the regional authorities. Based
on the most recent maps detailing affected areas provided the
various news sources, it appears that the subject property falls
outside of those areas reported to have sustained significant
damage. All residents and workers have been evacuated from the
area, and the government is expected to allow re-entry beginning
June 1, 2016.

In addition to the issues caused by the wildfire, the property’s
performance has shown a steady decline in the last year. Revenues
have been adversely affected by the downturn in the oil industry,
upon which the area is heavily reliant for jobs and residents.

This transaction closed in September 2015, and at the time of
issuance, it was noted that the cash flows had declined compared
with the cash flows at the time of issuance of the CMLS 2014-1
transaction. As a result, the DBRS underwritten (UW) net cash flow
(NCF) was updated in conjunction with the analysis for this
transaction. The DBRS UW NCF for this loan was $3.0 million, which
is representative of a 1.15 times (x) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR). However, according to the year-end 2015 financials, cash
flows fell even further by the end of the year, and the loan
finished with a DSCR of 0.86x. As of December 2015, the property
had a year-to-date occupancy rate of 54.1%, an average daily rate
of $193.89 and a revenue per available room rate of $104.88,
respectively, compared with 70.1%, $212.17 and $148.67 as of
December 2014, respectively.

Compounding the increased risk with the performance decline is the
likelihood that any business interruption coverage (should it be
required in the event the property’s operations are affected by
the wildfire activity) would be limited to providing relief to the
most recent cash flows achieved over a specified period. However,
if the property’s operations are not affected by the fires, DBRS
believes there will be a short- to middle-term benefit to the
property, as displaced residents and workers in the area for
reconstruction will need temporary and transient housing.
Sustaining improved occupancy rates, however, would be dependent on
the ability of the oil industry to rebound. As the situation is
ongoing, the extent of the impact to the subject property is
unknown at this time. DBRS will continue to monitor as information
is received and the property’s operational status is confirmed.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C-1, and C-2
notes from Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-2 Ltd.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, D, E, F, and
P notes.  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-2 Ltd. is a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in March 2013 and is managed by Carlyle Investment Management LLC.


The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 22, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction remains in its reinvestment period until April 2017.

Since S&P's effective date rating affirmations, the $35 million
class A-2 notes were converted in full to class A-1 notes, and the
class X notes have paid down in full.  The transaction has also
experienced par gain of approximately $3.25 million, which has led
to overcollateralization (O/C) ratio improvements since the June
20, 2013, trustee report used in our last review.  The April 2016
trustee report indicated these O/C increases:

   -- Class A/B O/C ratio increased to 133.15% from 132.43%.
   -- Class C O/C ratio increased to 120.67% from 120.02%.
   -- Class D O/C ratio increased to 113.86% from 113.25%.
   -- Class E O/C ratio increased to 108.74% from 108.16%.

Distressed collateral has increased slightly as 'CCC' rated and
defaulted collateral are currently 2.90% and 0.77%, respectively,
of the aggregate principal balance, up from 1.07% and 0% at the
effective date.  However, this has been more than offset by an
overall improvement in credit quality, as the percentage of
collateral with an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'BB-' or
higher has increased to 34.1% from 21.0% in June 2013.  In
addition, the reported weighted average life has decreased to 4.62
years from 5.81 years.  The above decreased the overall credit risk
profile, which in turn provided more cushion to the tranche
ratings.

The cash flow analysis pointed to upgrades for several of the
tranches; however, S&P also considered a sensitivity run to allow
for volatility in the underlying portfolio given that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period.

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis point
to a lower rating for the class F notes.  However, given the
increase in O/C available to the notes, as well as the overall
credit quality improvement and decrease in weighted average life of
the collateral, we affirmed the 'B (sf)' rating.

The class P notes consist of approximately $1.24 million in
subordinated notes and zero-coupon U.S. Treasury securities due
February 2025 with a total face value of $5 million.  The
principal-only rating was affirmed in line with the 'AA+' long-term
rating of the U.S. government.

The other affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

                       CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
                          Cash flow
           Previous       implied       Cash flow    Final
Class      rating(i)      rating(ii)      cushion    rating
A-1        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)         15.48%    AAA (sf)
B          AA (sf)        AA+ (sf)         14.12%    AA+ (sf)
C-1        A (sf)         AA (sf)           0.17%    A+ (sf)
C-2        A (sf          AA (sf)           0.17%    A+ (sf)
D          BBB (sf)       A- (sf)           2.05%    BBB (sf)
E          BB (sf)        BB+ (sf)          5.43%    BB (sf)
F          B (sf)         CCC+ (sf)         1.14%    B (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario          Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case                  15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating          20.0                      7.5
Above base case                  25.0                     10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
        implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class   rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
C-1     AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
C-2     AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
D       A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)  BB (sf)
F       CCC+ (sf)  CC (sf)    CCC+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread         Recovery
         Cash flow   compression    compression
         implied     implied        implied        Final
Class    rating      rating         rating         rating
A-1      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
B        AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)       AA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
C-1      AA  (sf)    A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
C-2      AA  (sf)    A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
D        A-  (sf)    BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
E        BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)        B (sf)         BB (sf)
F        CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)      CC (sf)        B (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To          From
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C-1         A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C-2         A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-2 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)
F           B (sf)
P           AA+p (sf)

p--Principal only.


CARNOW AUTO 2015-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on outstanding classes from
CarNow Auto Receivables Trust 2014-1 and affirmed its ratings on
the five outstanding classes from CarNow Auto Receivables Trust
2015-1 following its review.

The rating actions reflect each series' collateral performance to
date, S&P's views regarding future collateral performance, each
series' structure, available credit enhancement, and S&P's analysis
of existing loss coverage levels.  In addition, S&P considered
secondary credit factors, such as credit stability, payment
priorities under certain scenarios, S&P's economic forecast, and
sector- and issuer-specific analysis.  Furthermore, S&P's review
includes cash flow analysis for series 2015-1.

Based on all of these factors, S&P considers the notes'
creditworthiness consistent with the raised and affirmed ratings.

S&P raised the ratings on series 2014-1's class B and C notes to,
and affirmed the rating on series 2015-1's class A notes at, 'AA
(sf)' to reflect certain limitations, which, when taken as a whole,
S&P believes weigh against a higher rating.

Since series 2014-1 closed, its credit support has increased as a
percent of the amortizing pool balance.  Subordination, as a
percent of the current pool balance, for the higher classes has
increased due to the sequential pay structure.  This is in addition
to a non-amortizing reserve account, along with a higher
overcollateralization (O/C) percentage.  Cumulative lifetime
losses, though, are also increasing and projecting higher.  In
S&P's opinion, the total credit support as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance, compared with S&P's revised expected
remaining losses, is adequate for the raised ratings, even with a
higher revised loss expectation.

While series 2015-1 is performing worse that series 2014-1 and
worse than originally expected, S&P believes the ratings are
currently adequately supported, assuming losses do not exceed 35%
of the initial collateral balance all else equal.  Given the short
amount of securitized performance for this transaction (eight
months) and high pool factor (approximately 70%), S&P is
maintaining its initial loss expectation pending further collateral
performance data.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
(As of the May 2015 distribution month)

                    Pool     60-plus days    Current
Series   Month    factor    delinquencies        CNL
2014-1      20     29.56             3.43      24.10
2015-1       8     70.38             5.29      12.46

CNL--Cumulative net loss expectations.

Table 2
CNL Expectations (%)

                  Initial          Revised
                 lifetime         lifetime
Series           CNL exp.         CNL exp.
2014-1        25.75-26.25      28.75-29.25
2015-1        26.75-27.25              N/A

CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.
N/A--Not applicable.

Both series have sequential principal payment structures, with
credit enhancements consisting of O/C, a reserve account,
subordination for the higher classes, and excess spread.  Both
transactions' reserve account amounts are at their target
non-amortizing amount levels.  The series 2014-1 O/C amount grew to
its target level in approximately three months and has remained at
or close to the target.  It is currently at approximately 99% of
its target and is close to amortizing to its floor level.  The
series 2015-1 O/C amount also grew to its target level in
approximately three months, but has since steadily declined and is
currently at approximately 82% of its target.

Table 3
Hard Credit Support (%)
(As of the May 2015 distribution month)

                                               Current
                        Total hard          total hard
                    credit support   credit support(i)
Series     Class    at issuance(i)      (% of current)
2014-1     B                 40.50               97.75
2014-1     C                 27.75               57.15
2014-1     D                 23.00               42.76
2014-1     E                 17.50               25.86
2015-1     A                 53.24               71.58
2015-1     B                 39.99               50.99
2015-1     C                 27.99               32.87
2015-1     D                 23.74               26.12
2015-1     E                 18.74               18.30

(i)Consists of overcollateralization, a reserve account, and
subordination for the higher tranches and excludes excess spread
that can also provide additional enhancement.

S&P incorporated a cash flow analysis into its surveillance review
of series 2015-1 to assess the loss coverage level, giving credit
to excess spread.  S&P's cash flow scenarios included
forward-looking stressed assumptions on recoveries, timing of
losses, and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that S&P believes
is appropriate given the series 2015-1's current performance and
current ratings.  Aside from our break-even cash flow analysis, S&P
also conducted analysis to determine the impact that a higher level
of loss approximating a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have
on S&P's ratings if losses were to begin trending higher than S&P's
initial base-case loss expectation.  S&P's results show that the
affirmed ratings on series 2015-1 are consistent with S&P's rating
stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
deterioration for any given security under specific, hypothetical
stress scenarios.  The results demonstrated that all of the classes
from series 2015-1 currently have adequate credit enhancement at
their respective affirmed rating levels.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the outstanding
transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement remains
sufficient, in S&P's view, to cover its cumulative net loss
expectations under its stress scenarios for each of the rated
classes.

RATINGS RAISED

CarNow Auto Receivables Trust 2014-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
B          AA (sf)     A (sf)
C          AA (sf)     BBB (sf)
D          A+ (sf)     BB (sf)
E          BBB- (sf)   B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CarNow Auto Receivables Trust 2015-1
Class      Rating
A          AA (sf)
B          A (sf)
C          BBB (sf)
D          BB (sf)
E          B (sf)


CENT CLO 17: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2A,
A-2B, B, C, and D notes from Cent CLO 17 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
February 2013 and is scheduled to reinvest until January 2017.  The
deal is managed by Columbia Management Investment Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated April 22,
2016.

The transaction has benefited from an increase in the level of
assets rated 'BB-' or higher and a decrease in assets rated 'CCC-'.
Additionally, there has been a reduction in the weighted average
life of the collateral portfolio, which, according to the trustee
reports, fell from 4.98 as of the March 2013 effective date to 4.37
as of April 2016.  Because time horizon factors heavily into
default probability, a shorter weighted average life positively
affects the creditworthiness of the collateral pool.

Despite the improvement in credit quality, the transaction has
experienced an increase in defaults since the March 2013 effective
date.  Specifically, according to the relevant trustee reports, the
amount of defaulted assets increased to $17.74 million (4.35% of
the aggregate principal balance) as of April 2016 from zero as of
the February 2013 effective date.  This has had a detrimental
impact on the level of credit support available to all tranches:

   -- The class A overcollateralization (O/C) decreased to 129.81%

      from 131.47%.
   -- The class B O/C decreased to 118.53% from 120.04%.
   -- The class C O/C decreased to 111.98% from 113.41%.
   -- The class D O/C decreased to 106.69% from 108.05%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and well above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life and improvement in
credit quality of the collateral portfolio.  As such, the affirmed
ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although cash flow ratings point to a higher rating for classes
A-2A, A-2B, B, and C, S&P's rating actions take into account the
fact that the transaction is still in the reinvestment phase, as
well as additional sensitivities that capture any potential changes
in the underlying portfolio that may occur before the notes begin
to amortize.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
pointed to a lower rating on the class D notes than the rating
action reflects.  However, S&P affirmed the rating after
considering the margin of failure, the reduced weighted average
life of the portfolio, and the improvement in the credit quality of
the portfolio--all of which could help the notes once the
transaction begins to pay down after the end of its reinvestment
period in January 2017.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and on recoveries upon default under various interest
rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 8, 2014, criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSROs for the purpose of
assessing the credit quality of assets that S&P don't rate.  The
criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of corporate
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation
outlines treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

                           Cash flow
         Previous          implied      Cash flow      Final
Class    rating            rating (i)   cushion (ii)   rating

A-1      AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)      10.19%         AAA (sf)
A-2A     AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)      11.45%         AA (sf)
A-2B     AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)      11.45%         AA (sf)
B        A (sf)            A+ (sf)       6.99%          A (sf)
C        BBB (sf)          BBB+ (sf)     5.03%          BBB (sf)
D        BB (sf)           BB- (sf)      1.26%          BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios
by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess
the current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation
assumptions, assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario           Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                   Recovery      Correlation   Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease      increase      decrease
        implied    implied       implied       implied   Final
Class   rating     rating        rating        rating    rating

A-1     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2A    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
A-2B    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
B       A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)       A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)   A (sf)
C       BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     A- (sf)    BBB (sf)
D       BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)       BB (sf)       BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

                      DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                        Spread         Recovery
            Cash flow   compression    compression
            implied     implied        implied           Final
Class       rating      rating         rating            rating
A-1         AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)
A-2A        AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)       AA (sf)           AA (sf)
A-2B        AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)       AA (sf)           AA (sf)
B           A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)         A (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)          BBB (sf)
D           BB- (sf)    BB- (sf)       CCC+ (sf)         BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cent CLO 17 Ltd.

Class     Rating

A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2A        AA (sf)
A-2B        AA (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
D           BB (sf)


CIFC FUNDING 2012-III: S&P Affirms B Rating on Cl. B-3L Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1L, A-2F,
A-2L, A-3F, A-3L, B-1L, B-2L, and B-3L notes from CIFC Funding
2012-III Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that
closed in January 2013 and is managed by CIFC Asset Management
LLC.

The deal is currently in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled
to end in January 2017.  S&P's affirmations on all of the classes
reflect the available credit support consistent with the current
rating levels.

Per the April 2016 trustee report, the weighted average life has
decreased to 4.22 years from 5.49 years as of the effective date in
April 2013.  During this period, the assets in the portfolio rated
'BB-' and above increased and, simultaneously, the assets rated in
the 'B' category decreased.  In addition, the number of unique
obligors referenced in the portfolio has increased to 313 from 198
and contributed to the portfolio's diversification.  These factors
improved the portfolio's credit risk profile.  

Though the defaulted asset balance increased to $3.27 million as of
the April 2016 trustee report (from zero in April 2013) and the
amount of 'CCC' rated assets increased to $24.58 million (4.9% of
the portfolio) from $1.47 million, they were offset by the
seasoning of the portfolio.

All coverage tests are passing with a good cushion and the
overcollateralization (O/C) levels have been relatively stable
since the effective date.  For instance, the class B-3L O/C ratio
is about 107.59% as of the April 2016 trustee report (versus
107.67% in April 2013), well-above the minimum requirement of
102.80%.

Though the cash flow results showed higher ratings for the class
A-2F, A-2L, A-3F, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes, S&P took into account
that the transaction is still in its reinvestment period, and
considered other sensitivity analysis to allow for volatility in
the underlying portfolio.  Although S&P's cash flow results
indicated a lower rating for the class B-3L notes, it affirmed its
rating at 'B (sf)' to account for credit seasoning of the
collateral and the relative stability of the O/C levels over time.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest, ultimate
principal, or both to each of the rated tranches.  The cash flow
analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions," S&P said.

S&P's review of the transaction also relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's
Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSROs for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.  The criteria provide specific guidance for the treatment
of corporate assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the
interpretation outlines the treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

            CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

CIFC Funding 2012-III Ltd.
                   Cash flow     Cash flow
        Previous   implied       cushion   Final
Class   rating     rating(i)     (ii)      rating
A-1L    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      8.41%     AAA (sf)
A-2F    AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      12.02%    AA (sf)
A-2L    AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      12.02%    AA (sf)
A-3F    A (sf)     AA- (sf)      0.23%     A (sf)
A-3L    A (sf)     AA- (sf)      0.23%     A (sf)
B-1L    BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     6.89%     BBB (sf)
B-2L    BB- (sf)   BB (sf)       1.23%     BB- (sf)
B-3L    B (sf)     B- (sf)       1.97%     B (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1L   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2F   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2L   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-3F   AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
A-3L   AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
B-1L   BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)      BBB (sf)
B-2L   BB (sf)    B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)
B-3L   B- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)     B (sf)      B (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1L   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2F   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
A-2L   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
A-3F   AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
A-3L   AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
B-1L   BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
B-2L   BB (sf)      B+ (sf)       B- (sf)       BB- (sf)
B-3L   B- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     CC (sf)       B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CIFC Funding 2012-III Ltd.
Class       Rating          
A-1L        AAA (sf)
A-2F        AA (sf)
A-2L        AA (sf)
A-3F        A (sf)
A-3L        A (sf)
B-1L        BBB (sf)
B-2L        BB- (sf)
B-3L        B (sf)


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-C1: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks for
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C1 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-through certificates:

   -- $36,205,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,052,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $185,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $237,485,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55,255,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $567,727,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,896,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38,730,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,896,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $109,577,000b class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,951,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47,232,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,561,000c class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,446,000c class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
    exchanged for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates

    may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C
    certificates.
(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $9,447,000 class G or the $26,450,044 class
H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 54 loans secured by 130
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $755.7 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty
Corp., Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P., Starwood
Mortgage Funding V, LLC, and FCRE REL, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.06x is
below both the year to date 2016 average of 1.17x and the 2015
average of 1.18x.  The pool's Fitch LTV of 114.4% is above both the
year to date 2016 average of 107.9% and the 2015 average of
109.3%.

High Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 55.1% of
the pool by balance.  This is higher than the year to date 2016
average of 54.8% and the 2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's average
concentration resulted in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 471,
which is greater than the year to date 2016 and the 2015 averages
of 415 and 367, respectively.

Diverse Property Types: The pool has a diverse mix of property
types, with retail as the largest at 36.9%, followed by hotel at
19.9%, office at 12.5%, and self-storage at 10.9%.  Overall, there
are 27 retail properties, including the largest loan (13.5% of the
pool), consisting of a mix of unanchored and anchored shopping
centers.  None of the properties were malls.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 29.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-C1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.  In a
more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB-sf' could result.


COMM 2005-C6: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Certificates to B-
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2005-C6, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  S&P
raised its rating on class E to 'A- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' and S&P's
rating on class F to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expectation of the available credit
enhancement for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than
its most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the
respective rating levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral, available liquidity support, and reduction in the
trust's balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes E and F, S&P's analysis also considered
the classes' susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
seven specially serviced assets ($22.3 million, 35.7%).

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $62.5 million, which is 2.8% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 12 loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 137 loans at issuance.  Seven
of these assets are with the special servicer, two ($2.9 million,
4.6%) are defeased, and one ($0.8 million, 1.3%) is on the master
servicers' combined watchlist.  The master servicers, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC and Midland Loan Services Inc., reported
financial information for 100.0% of the nondefeased loans in the
pool, of which 62.6% was year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was
year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.22x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) ratio and a 51.6% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.53% S&P Global
Ratings weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the seven specially
serviced assets and two defeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $103.7 million in
principal losses, or 4.6% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 4.9% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the seven specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, seven assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the largest specially serviced asset is:

The Saddlewood Center loan ($5.1 million, 8.1%) is the
second-largest nondefeased loan (representing uncrossed loans) in
the pool and has a total reported exposure of $5.5 million.  The
loan is secured by retail property totaling 40,478 sq. ft. in
Naperville, Ill.  The loan was transferred to C-III on March 16,
2015, because the borrower could not repay the loan at maturity in
June 2015.  C-III stated that it is evaluating its options,
including foreclosure proceedings.  The reported DSC as of year-end
2014 was 1.08x, and reported occupancy as of March 31, 2015, was
90.0%.  An appraisal reduction amount of $105,780 is in effect
against this loan.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon this loan's
eventual resolution.

The six remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that each represent less than 5.3% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the seven specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 36.3%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

COMM 2005-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C6
                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To                 From
E                 126171AQ0        A- (sf)            B- (sf)
F                 126171AR8        B- (sf)            CCC- (sf)


COMM 2015-PC1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-PC1 issued by COMM 2015-PC1 Mortgage
Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which has been stable from issuance. The collateral consists
of 80 loans secured by 147 commercial properties. As of the May
2016 remittance, the pool has experienced collateral reduction of
0.4% due to scheduled amortization, with all of the original 80
loans remaining in the pool. There are 55 loans, representing 68.7%
of the current pool balance, which are reporting YE2015 financials.
These loans report a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.19 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.4%. At
issuance, the pool reported a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.51x and
9.6%, respectively. DBRS believes reported cash flows are likely
artificially depressed for some of the loans showing YE2015
metrics, as first year reporting is often skewed as compared to
underwritten or historical figures, particularly when it comes to
expenses. As such, DBRS expects the WA DSCR for the pool will
improve with the 2016 reporting.

At the May 2016 remittance, there were two loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, Prospectus ID #37, The Hub Shopping Center
and Prospectus ID #72, Chapin Center, representing 1.0% and 0.33%
of the current pool balance, respectively. The Chapin Center loan
was flagged for upcoming tenant rollover and the Hub Shopping
Center loan was flagged for a decline in cash flow from the
Issuer’s underwritten figures. Both loans are reporting Q1 2016
figures and the servicer reports the cash flow decline for the
former loan is likely the result of annualized expenses.

The City Center at 735 Water Street loan (Prospectus ID#15, 1.8% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a 353,000 square foot (sf)
mixed-use, LEED-certified office and retail property in downtown
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, situated directly on the Milwaukee River.
According to the December 2015 rent roll, the property reported an
occupancy rate of 88.3%; however, the third-largest tenant,
Borgelt, Powell, Petersen & Frauen S.C. (Borgelt), appears to have
vacated at its lease expiration in March 2016, and as such,
occupancy may be as low as 80.0%. The second-largest tenant,
National Business Furniture, occupies 7.8% of the net rentable area
(NRA) with a lease expiring in April 2016 and one five-year renewal
option remaining. As of June 2016, the tenant is still located at
the subject property and DBRS has asked the servicer to verify the
tenant’s current status. According to CoStar, Class B office
properties larger than 100,000 sf within a 0.2-mile radius from the
subject reported an average vacancy rate and availability rate of
12.1% and 19.6%, respectively. With Borgelt’s departure, vacancy
at the subject property appears to be above the market vacancy, but
in line with the market availability rate. The 833 East Michigan
building, a 358,000 sf Class A office property recently completed
in March 2016 is a direct competitor to the subject. This property
is located less than a mile from the subject and offers similar
amenities. According to CoStar, 833 Michigan is 70.2% occupied with
asking rents ranging between $19.50 per square foot (psf) and
$23.50 psf. In comparison, the subject’s asking rents range
between $15.00 psf and $19.00 psf. Since the acquisition of the
property, the sponsor has invested $23.6 million of capital
improvements into the asset in order to maintain a competitive
presence in the market. The YE2015 financials reported a DSCR of
1.64x, which is well above the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.16x. At
issuance, DBRS underwrote an additional vacancy factor of 15.0% for
the month-to-month tenants in place at the property, contributing
to the variance from the Issuer’s net cash flow figure by -18.4%.


COMM MORTGAGE 2006-C8: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. D Certs to Csf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 16 classes of COMM
Mortgage Trust series 2006-C8 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  In addition, Fitch has revised the Rating Outlooks
on class A-M to Positive from Stable.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of the overall stable pool
performance since Fitch's last rating action.  Performing loans
representing 91.8% of the remaining pool are scheduled to mature
within the next seven months, including the 28 defeased loans
(33.4%).  Fitch expects the majority of these loans will pay off at
maturity.  However, some loans may have trouble refinancing and
could default.  Fitch has applied additional stresses in its base
case to factor in the refinancing risk.  Fitch modeled losses of
13.9% for the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 14.8%, including $265.5 million (7% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 17
loans (14.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes five
specially serviced assets (7%).

As of the May 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.9% to $2.12 billion from
$3.78 billion at issuance.  Among the 28 defeased loans, four
(21.3%) are among the top 15 loans.  Interest shortfalls totaling
$30.6 million are currently affecting classes C through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (3.6% of the
pool) secured by 405,000 square feet (sf) of a 689,601 sf regional
mall located in Clovis, CA.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicing in September 2013 due to payment default and has
been real estate owned (REO) since January 2015.  As of March 2016,
the property was 83% occupied, compared to 87.9% at issuance.  The
servicer is working to lease up the vacant space and address
near-term capital improvements.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (2.5%)
secured by a recreational vehicle resort community (a portfolio of
12 at issuance) located in Saltlick, PA.  The one remaining
property consists of 885 units.  The other 11 properties have
previously been released or liquidated as REO assets.  The property
became REO in December 2015.  Based on servicer provided asset
valuations, significant losses are expected upon liquidation of the
property.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Positive Outlook on class A-M indicates that an upgrade is
possible if the maturing loans pay off as expected and the
recoveries on the specially serviced assets are better than
anticipated.  In addition, the distressed classes (rated below 'B')
may be subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

   -- $37.8 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $830.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $420.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $377.6 million class A-M at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Positive from

      Stable;
   -- $302.1 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
   -- $28.3 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $42.5 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $23.6 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28.3 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $27.2 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1, A-2A, A-2B, A-3 and A-AB have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class P, Q and S certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and X-S
certificates.


CPS AUTO: Moody's Takes Actions on Auto Loans Issued 2012-2015
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on June 7, 2016, upgraded 23 and
affirmed 25 securities from CPS Auto Receivables Trusts issued
between 2012 and 2015.  The transactions are serviced by Consumer
Portfolio Services, Inc.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

  Class A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa1 (sf)
  Class C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)
  Class D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016, Affirmed

   B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

  Class A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Class C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa1 (sf)
  Class D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)
  Class E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016, Affirmed

   B1 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

  Class A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Class C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa1 (sf)
  Class D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

  Class A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Class C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Class D, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)
  Class E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016, Affirmed

   B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-B

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa1 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed A1 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa1 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed A2 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa1 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,

   Affirmed A2 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Ba3 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

  Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa2 (sf)
  Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Aa3 (sf)
  Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Class D Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)
  Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 8, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are based on the build-up of credit enhancement due to
non-declining reserve accounts.  Other credit enhancement for the
deals includes overcollateralization and the sequential pay
structure of transactions issued after 2013-B.  All CPS
transactions issued prior to the 2013-C have pro-rata structures,
in which bonds are due to receive target payments.  Weak deal
performance has been offset in part by the build-up of credit
enhancement.

The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectation was increased on
the 2012-B and 2012-C transactions from 17.00% to 19.00%, on the
2012-D, 2013-A, and 2013-B transactions from 17.00% to 18.00%, on
the 2013-C transaction from 17.50% to 19.00%.  The CNL expectations
were unchanged at 17.00% on the 2013-D and 2014-A transactions and
at 15.50% on the 2014-D and 2015-A transactions. The increased CNL
expectations were due to worse than expected collateral
performance.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the May 2016 distribution
date) and credit assumptions for each affected transaction.  Credit
assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime CNL expected loss,
which is expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance;
Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and Moody's Aaa (sf)
level, which are expressed as a percentage of the current pool
balance.  The Aaa level is the level of credit enhancement that
would be consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset
pool.  Performance metrics include the pool factor, which is the
ratio of the current collateral balance to the original collateral
balance at closing; total credit enhancement, which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve
fund; and per annum excess spread.

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-B

  Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 17.45%
  Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%
  Pool factor -- 14.97%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 32.68%, Class B. 23.25%,

   Class C 17.42%, Class D 14.38%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.6%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-C

  Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 19.64%
  Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%
  Pool factor -- 16.67%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 41.00%, Class B. 32.00%,

   Class C 22.00%, Class D 15.66%, Class E 13.75%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.9%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2012-D

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) - 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 19.24%
   Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%
  Pool factor -- 19.59%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 40.10%, Class B 31.10%,
   Class C 21.10%, Class D 15.71%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 15.2%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) - 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 17.74%
  Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%
  Pool factor -- 25.63%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 38.65%, Class B. 29.65%,

   Class C 19.65%, Class D 13.36%, Class E 12.80%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 15.3%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-B

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 18.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 17.65%
  Aaa (sf) level - 42.00%
  Pool factor -- 28.95%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 37.70%, Class B. 28.70%,

   Class C 18.70%, Class D 12.20%, Class E 11.42%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.8%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

  Lifetime CNL expectation -- 19.00%; original expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.50%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 19.05%
  Aaa (sf) level - 44.00%
  Pool factor -- 34.07%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 83.63%, Class B. 49.14%,

   Class C 31.52%, Class D 65.85%, Class E 8.77%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.2%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-D

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 17.00%; original expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 15.80%
  Aaa (sf) level - 44.00%
  Pool factor -- 38.12%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 76.04%, Class B. 45.22%,

   Class C 29.48%, Class D 16.37%, Class E 9.14%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.7%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 17.00%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 17.00%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 17.43%
  Aaa (sf) level - 44.00%
  Pool factor -- 43.84%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 73.00%, Class B. 46.76%,

   Class C 25.66%, Class D 14.26%, Class E 7.98%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.6%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-D

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 15.50%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 15.50%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 15.55%
  Aaa (sf) level - 46.00%
  Pool factor -- 64.03%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 57.49%, Class B. 34.06%,

   Class C 17.67%, Class D 10.64%, Class E 5.56%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 13.9%

Issuer - CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

  Lifetime CNL expectation - 15.50%; prior expectation (March
   2016) -- 15.50%
  Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -- 16.33%
   Aaa (sf) level - 46.00%
  Pool factor -- 72.42%
  Total Hard credit enhancement - Class A 51.30%, Class B. 30.59%,

   Class C 16.08%, Class D 9.87%, Class E 5.38%
  Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 14.1%

                       PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
December 2015. Please see the Ratings Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles.  Other
reasons for better-than-expected performance include changes to
servicing practices that enhance collections or refinancing
opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles.  Other
reasons for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C3: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its rating
on one class and affirmed its ratings on three other classes from
the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-4, A-1-A1, A-1-A2, and A-M to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also reflect S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral and
available liquidity support.  In addition, the upgrades reflect the
trust balance's significant reduction.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement on classes A-4, A-1-A1, A-1-A2, and A-M,
S&P's analysis also considered the certificates' susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support from the magnitude of loans on the master
servicers' combined watchlists (49 loans; $496.6 million, 33.4% of
the pool balance), most of which are scheduled to mature through
the first half of 2017.  S&P also considered the susceptibility of
these classes to shortfalls due to potential corrected mortgage
fees, which would be incurred upon the repayment of a number of
corrected loans.

The downgrade on class B reflects anticipated credit support
erosion and reduced liquidity support since S&P last reviewed this
transaction.  S&P also considered the Koger Center Office Park
subordinate B hope note ($40.0 million, 2.7%). Reported debt
service coverage (DSC) and occupancy as of year-end 2014 on the
A-note was 0.63x and 70.4%, respectively.  As a result, S&P
believes the subordinate B hope note is at an increased risk of
experiencing a significant loss upon resolution, which may further
erode credit support for class B.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction's
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X interest-only
(IO) certificate based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.49 billion, which is 55.4% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 156 loans and one real
estate-owned (REO) asset (reflecting crossed loans), down from 237
loans at issuance.  Two of these assets ($13.2 million, 0.9%) are
with the special servicer, 19 ($227.0 million, 15.3%) are defeased,
and 49 ($496.6 million, 33.4%) are on the master servicers'
combined watchlists.  The master servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
and KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported financial information for
92.4% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 85.6% was
partial-year or year-end 2015 data and 4.3% was year-end 2014
data.

S&P calculated a 1.16x S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and
101.3% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio using a 7.64% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the two specially serviced assets, 19 defeased
loans, and the subordinate B hope note ($40.0 million, 2.7%).  The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $539.7 million (36.3%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.01x and 111.8%, respectively, for the top 10
nondefeased loans (excluding the subordinate B hope note).

To date, the transaction has experienced $268.1 million in
principal losses, or 10.0% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 10.2% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III).  Details of the two specially serviced assets are:

The Pinecrest Shopping Center REO asset ($8.1 million, 0.5%) has a
total reported exposure of $9.2 million.  The asset is a
102,504-sq.-ft. anchored retail property in Burlington City, Wis.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on July 22, 2013,
due to imminent default.  The property became an REO asset on Nov.
19, 2015.  C-III stated that leasing activity in the market is
minimal, and the leasing agent is attempting to secure
month-to-month tenants on longer-term leases.  C-III has
recommended that this asset be marketed for sale in the second
quarter of 2016.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end
2014 were 0.58x and 88.5%, respectively.  An appraisal reduction
amount of $3.8 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P
expects a moderate loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The Benjamin Center VII and IX loan ($5.1 million, 0.3%) has a
total reported exposure of $5.3 million.  The loan is secured by a
69,369-sq.-ft. industrial property located in Tampa City, Fla.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 21, 2015, due
to imminent monetary default. C-III indicated that it has engaged
counsel, a foreclosure was filed on March 4, 2016, and third-party
reports have been received and are currently under review.  The
reported DSC and occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2015, were 0.84x and
55.4%, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this loan's
eventual resolution.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C3
                                        Rating
Class             Identifier            To             From
A-AB              22544QAD1             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-4               22544QAE9             AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-1-A1            22544QAF6             AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-1-A2            22544QBD0             AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-M               22544QAG4             BB (sf)        B- (sf)
A-J               22544QAH2             CCC+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
B                 22544QAJ8             CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)
A-X               22544QBC2             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)


CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-X Debt Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the rating on one class of CSFB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2006-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class A-X) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.1% of the
current balance, compared to 9.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $1.99 billion
from $3.43 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 217 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 33% of
the pool. Fifteen loans, constituting 14% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Fifty-six loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $276 million (for an
average loss severity of 56%). Twenty-seven loans, constituting 18%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the West Covina Portfolio ($75.6 million
-- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by two cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted loans. The West Covina Village Community
Shopping Center Loan is secured by a 229,000 square foot (SF)
anchored retail center and the Wells Fargo Bank Tower Loan is
secured by a 215,000 SF suburban office building, both located in
West Covina, California. The loans initially transferred to special
servicing in June 2009 due to delinquent payments and a
modification closed in May 2013. The loans were returned to the
master servicer in 2013 but were subsequently transferred back to
the special servicer in June 2014. The Wells Fargo Bank Tower has
since become REO and the West Covina Village Community Shopping
Center is still in the foreclosure process.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Tryp by Wyndham
Times Square Loan, formerly known as the Best Western President
Loan ($70.0 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
16-story full service hotel located on West 48th Street between 7th
Avenue and 8th Avenue in New York, New York. The loan was first
transferred to special servicing in March 2014. In 2014, the flag
was changed from a Best Western to a Tryp by Wyndham. The loan was
modified in October 2014 with a maturity extension, interest rate
change, conversion to interest-only payments and a principal
paydown and was returned to the master servicer in October 2015.
The loan transferred to special servicing again in December 2015
for imminent default. The loan has remained in special servicing as
the borrower is requesting another modification.

The remaining 24 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $169.2 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (51% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 22 poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $19.4 million (a 15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 96% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to 98%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.32X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15.8% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 720 Fifth Avenue Loan ($165.0 million --
8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 121,100 SF mixed-use
(retail and office) property located in the Fifth Avenue submarket
of Manhattan. The property was 95% leased as of December 2015, the
same as of December 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124%
and 0.74X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Waterfront Plaza Loan ($100.0
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 521,700 SF
office property located in Honolulu, Hawaii between the downtown
and Kaka'ako sections of Honolulu. The property was 89% leased as
of December 2015, compared to 91% leased as of December 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.89X, respectively, the
same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Space Park Loan ($50.0 million --
2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a purpose-built datacenter
and telecommunications facility located in Santa Clara, California.
The property was constructed in 2001 and is located a mile west of
the Mineta San Jose International Airport. The property was 89%
leased as of December 2015, compared to 100% leased as of December
2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.19X at the last review.



DRYDEN XXV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C, D, and E notes from Dryden XXV Senior Loan Fund.  Dryden XXV
Senior Loan Fund is a U.S. CLO transaction that closed in December
2012.

The deal is currently in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled
to end in January 2017. Since the transaction's effective date, the
weighted average life of the collateral portfolio has decreased to
4.57 years from 5.41 years.  Because time horizon factors heavily
into default probability, a shorter weighted average life
positively affects the creditworthiness of the collateral pool.  In
addition, the number of obligors in the portfolio has increased
during this period, which contributed to the portfolio's
diversification.

Though the amount of 'CCC' rated and defaulted assets have
increased to $29.8 million and $1.22 million, respectively, from
$4.0 million and none at the effective date, the negative effects
were offset mostly by the overall credit seasoning of the
portfolio.

The increase in defaults has led to a slight decline in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios over time.  The April 2016
trustee report indicated these O/C changes when compared to the
February 2013 report:

   -- The class A/B O/C decreased to 131.94% from 132.27%.
   -- The class C O/C decreased to 119.36% from 119.65%.
   -- The class D O/C decreased to 112.77% from 113.05%.
   -- The class E O/C decreased to 107.68% from 107.95%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and
well-above their triggers.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

The cash flow results showed higher ratings for the class B-1,
B-2, C, and D notes, but S&P took into account that the transaction
is still in its reinvestment period, which is scheduled to end in
January 2017, and considered other sensitivity runs to allow for
volatility in the underlying portfolio.  Although the cash flow
results indicate a lower rating for the class E notes, S&P views
the overall credit seasoning as an improvement to the transaction
and also considered the relatively stable O/C ratios that currently
have significant cushion over their minimum requirements.  However,
any increase in defaults and/or par losses could lead to potential
negative rating actions on the class E notes in the future.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

             CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Dryden XXV Senior Loan Fund

                             Cash flow
             Previous        implied     Cash flow      Final
Class        rating          rating(i)   cushion(ii)    rating
A            AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)    9.16%          AAA (sf)
B-1          AA (sf)         AA+ (sf)    8.85%          AA (sf)
B-2          AA (sf)         AA+ (sf)    8.85%          AA (sf)
C            A (sf)          A+ (sf)     3.43%          A (sf)
D            BBB (sf)        BBB+ (sf)   0.81%          BBB (sf)
E            BB (sf)         B+ (sf)     4.15%          BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario            Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                    10% Recovery  Correlation  Correlation
         Cash flow  decrease      increase     decrease
         implied    implied       implied      implied   Final    

Class    rating     rating        rating       rating    rating   

A        AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)

B-1      AA+ (sf)   AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)  

B-2      AA+ (sf)   AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)  

C        A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)      A (sf)       AA- (sf)   A (sf)   

D        BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)

E        B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)      B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)   BB (sf)  


                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                            Spread         Recovery
            Cash flow       compression    compression
            implied         implied        implied       Final
Class       rating          rating         rating        rating
A           AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1         AA+ (sf)        AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)        AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)         A (sf)         BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)      BB- (sf)      BBB (sf)
E           B+ (sf)         B (sf)         CCC (sf)      BB (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Dryden XXV Senior Loan Fund

                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                  From
A                 26250JAA8       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B-1               26250JAB6       AA (sf)             AA (sf)
B-2               26250JAF7       AA (sf)             AA (sf)
C                 26250JAC4       A (sf)              A (sf)
D                 26250JAD2       BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)
E                 26250JAE0       BB (sf)             BB (sf)


DRYDEN XXVI: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, E,
F, and P notes from Dryden XXVI Senior Loan Fund, a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that closed in March 2013
managed by Prudential Investment Management Inc.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 30, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction remains in its reinvestment period until April 2017,
and S&P anticipates that the collateral manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction's
documents.

According to the April 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have decreased
slightly since S&P's effective date rating affirmations in July
2013, due to a par loss of approximately $1.66 million.  The April
2016 trustee report indicates the following O/C ratios decreased
since the May 2013 effective date report used in S&P's previous
rating actions, though they remain well above their covenanted
triggers:

   -- The senior ratio is 133.20%, down from the 133.76%.
   -- The class C ratio is 119.29%, down from the 119.78%.
   -- The class D ratio is 112.57%, down from the 113.03%.
   -- The class E ratio is 107.42%, down from the 107.87%.
   -- The interest diversion ratio is 105.44%, but was not
      reported in the effective date report.

However, the transaction has benefited from the seasoning of
collateral, as the reported weighted average life has decreased to
4.61 years from 5.70 years in May 2013.  Credit quality has
remained relatively stable, and distressed assets comprise a very
small portion of the overall portfolio, with 'CCC' rated obligors
and defaulted positions totaling 0.66% and 0.25%, respectively, of
the aggregate principal balance.

The rating affirmations on the classes reflect adequate credit
support at their current rating levels.  Although the cash flow
results show higher ratings for the class B, C, D, and E notes, S&P
considered the fact that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period and has not yet paid down any principal to the
rated notes.  Future reinvestments could alter some of the
portfolio characteristics.

While the cash flow analysis indicates a downgrade for the class F
notes, S&P considered the overall stable performance of the
transaction in credit quality and overcollateralization in S&P's
decision to affirm the rating.  However, once the interest
diversion test on the class F notes expires after the end of the
reinvestment period in April 2017, the class F notes will no longer
be directly protected from losses by any outstanding coverage tests
and could be susceptible to a sudden credit downturn in the
corporate loan market.

The class P notes consist of a $1.28 million subordinate note
component and a zero coupon U.S. Treasury component representing
$5.00 million due in February 2025; S&P affirmed the 'AA+p (sf)'
rating on the notes in line with the long-term rating on the U.S.
government.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems appropriate.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Dryden XXVI Senior Loan Fund
                      Cash flow
        Previous      implied      Cash flow      Final
Class   rating        rating(i)    cushion(ii)    rating
A       AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     6.86%          AAA (sf)
B       AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)     10.53%         AA (sf)
C       A (sf)        A+ (sf)      4.85%          A (sf)
D       BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)    3.43%          BBB (sf)
E       BB (sf)       BB+ (sf)     0.87%          BB (sf)
F       B (sf)        CCC- (sf)    (2.08%)        B (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
        Implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class   rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A       AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
C       A+ (sf)    A (sf)     A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)    A (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)
F       CCC- (sf)  CCC- (sf)  CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)   B (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread        Recovery     
        Cash flow    compression   compression       
        implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class   rating       rating        rating        rating      
A       AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
C       A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)      BB (sf)       BBB (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)
F       CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)     B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Dryden XXVI Senior Loan Fund
Class        Rating
A            AAA (sf)
B            AA (sf)
C            A (sf)
D            BBB (sf)
E            BB (sf)
F            B (sf)
P            AA+p (sf)

p--Principal only.


DSLA MORTGAGE 2004-AR1: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-1A Debt Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of eleven
tranches from five transactions backed by Option ARM RMBS loans,
issued by Harborview and DSLA.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1

  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2011,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 10, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 10,
   2012 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. X-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012
   Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR3

  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 10, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR4

  Cl. 2-A2A Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 25, 2015, Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-15

  Cl. 2-A1A1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A1A2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-7

  Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 1, 2016,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are the result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the stable or stronger
performance of the underlying pools and the credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in May 2016 from 5.5% in May
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


EFS COGEN: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Proposed $1BB Loan
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'BB' rating to EFS
Cogen Holdings I LLC's proposed $1.0 billion term loan B due 2023
and $125 million revolving credit facility due 2021.  The outlook
is stable.  S&P assigned a preliminary '1' rating to this debt,
indicating expectations for very high (90%-100%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

The 'BB+' rating on the existing term loan B due 2020 is unchanged,
but S&P will withdraw it at the close of this transaction, which is
intended to repay that debt.  Also at close, S&P will review the
final documentation associated with the new debt to determine if
features of the transaction structure constrain the rating.

EFS Cogen Holdings I LLC is a special-purpose, bankruptcy-remote
entity that owns two gas-fired combined-cycle cogeneration
facilities at the site of the Phillips 66 Bayway Refinery in
Linden, N.J.  The assets are the 777 megawatt (MW) Linden 1-5
facility, completed in May 1992, and the 165 MW Linden 6 facility,
completed in January 2002.  Linden 1-5 sells power to Consolidated
Edison of New York and steam to Phillips 66 and Infineum, while
Linden 6 provides power for the Phillips 66 Bayway Refinery.  The
latter continues to provide less than 10% of the project's total
cash flow.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the Linden asset
management team will continue to successfully manage the project
with high availability.  The Consolidated Edison and Phillips 66
contracts provide considerable stability to the project's cash flow
and debt repayment projections during the next year, and S&P
expects capacity and energy markets in NYISO Zone J to remain
robust.  S&P anticipates a DSCR of about 2.0x during the next two
years, increasing somewhat in the latter part of the term loan B
period.

Downside ratings pressure could result from persistent operating
difficulties--such as low availability factors or heat rate
degradations--that lead to DSCRs under 1.75x and heightened
refinancing risk.

S&P does not consider an upgrade likely during the next few years
given the merchant exposure that the project has during the latter
half of the debt period.  However, if the NYISO Zone J capacity
market improved considerably, S&P could revisit this, especially if
it resulted in DSCRs that exceeded 3x persistently beyond the end
of the PPA.


EVERGLADES RE 2014-1: S&P Raises Rating on Notes to B+(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it raised its issue credit rating on
Everglades Re Ltd.'s Series 2014-1 notes to 'B+(sf)' from 'B(sf)'.

The rating action follows S&P's review of the reset report for the
upcoming final risk period that begins on June 1, 2016, the
probability of attachment for the upcoming risk period, and the
expiration of the variable reset feature.

The transaction includes a variable reset feature that permits the
probability of attachment to range between 2.74% and 3.04% (base
case analysis), and for upcoming risk period, it's 2.74%.  The
attachment probability, based on the warm sea surface temperature
analysis for the upcoming risk period, is 3.14%.  Because the
transaction is entering its final risk period, the variable reset
is no longer applicable and the rating will be based on the updated
modeled results.

Similar to the Everglades Re II series 2015-1 notes, the attachment
level has dropped significantly (see Everglades Re II Ltd. Series
2015-1 Rating 'BB(sf)' Ratings Affirmed As Notes Reset To A Higher
Attachment Probability, published May 12, 2016, on RatingsDirect).
The initial attachment and exhaustion levels were $5.202 billion
and $7.702 billion, and the updated levels are $2.779 billion and
$5.279 billion, respectively.  The interest spread for the upcoming
risk period will equal 7.110%.

RATINGS LIST

Upgraded                   To            From
Everglades Re Ltd.
$1.5 bil principal-at-risk variable rate notes
  Series 2014-1            B+(sf)        B(sf)


FLATIRON CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, and D notes from Flatiron CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by New
York Life Investment Management LLC.  The deal is currently in its
reinvestment phase, which is scheduled to end in October 2016.

Since S&P's effective date affirmations in July 2013, the number of
unique obligors referenced in the portfolio has increased to 216
from 136 names and contributed to the portfolio's diversification,
although the portfolio has a substantial concentration of assets in
the oil and gas and nonferrous metals/mining industries, according
to the April 2016 trustee report.  Additionally, the portfolio's
weighted average maturity has decreased to 4.32 years from 5.47
years over the same period. Because time horizon is a significant
factor in estimating default probability, a shorter weighted
average life reflects positively on the collateral pool's
creditworthiness, all else being equal.

However, since the transaction's effective date, the amount of
'CCC' rated assets has increased to $17.17 million from none, and
defaults in the portfolio have also increased to $4.81 million from
none.  The increase in defaults has led to a slight decline in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios over time.  The April 2016
trustee report indicated these O/C changes when compared to the
January 2013 report:

   -- Class A O/C decreased to 134.42% from 135.94%;
   -- Class B O/C decreased to 119.82% from 121.18%;
   -- Class C O/C decreased to 113.65% from 114.94%; and
   -- Class D O/C decreased to 107.06% from 108.27%.

However, the current coverage test ratios are all passing and
well-above their trigger values.  The aforementioned seasoning of
the collateral pool has helped to offset some of this credit
deterioration and par loss.

Although the cash flow results indicate a lower rating for the
class D notes, S&P affirmed its rating to account for the class'
relatively stable O/C level and collateral seasoning.  In addition,
the transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to end in
October 2016 and paydowns following that will benefit the tranches.
However, any increase in defaults and/or par losses could lead to
potential negative rating actions on the class D notes in the
future.

For the class A-2, B, and C notes, the cash flow results showed
higher ratings.  However S&P considered the above factors and the
increase in 'CCC' rated assets, as well as that the transaction is
still in its reinvestment period, and considered other sensitivity
runs to allow for volatility in the underlying portfolio.

The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deem necessary.

           CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Flatiron CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
                    Cash flow
       Previous     implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating       rating     cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AAA          AAA        7.39%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA           AA+        13.80%      AA (sf)
B      A            A+         5.61%       A (sf)
C      BBB          BBB+       4.32%       BBB (sf)
D      BB           B+         3.48%       BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A (sf)     A+ (sf)      AA- (sf)   A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)
D      B+ (sf)    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    B- (sf)       BB (sf)       BBB (sf)
D      B+ (sf)      CC (sf)       CC (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Flatiron CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A-1                     AAA (sf)
A-2                     AA (sf)
B                       A (sf)
C                       BBB (sf)
D                       BB (sf)


FOUR CORNERS II: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Four Corners CLO II, Ltd:

US$21,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$232,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $27,154,095), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on August 20, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$10,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 20, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on August 20, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

US$11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 20, 2014 Downgraded to B1
(sf)

Four Corners CLO II, Ltd. issued in July 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2012.


FREDDIE MAC 2016-DNA3: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Cl. M-3B Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign these ratings and Rating Outlooks
to Freddie Mac's risk-transfer transaction, Structured Agency
Credit Risk Debt Notes Series 2016-DNA3 (STACR 2016-DNA3):

   -- $190,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $180,500,000 class M-2 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $180,500,000 class M-2F exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

      Stable;
   -- $180,500,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes
      'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $389,500,000 class M-3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $190,000,000 class M-3A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $190,000,000 class M-3AF exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $190,000,000 class M-3AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';

      Outlook Stable;
   -- $199,500,000 class M-3B notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $25,144,514,075 class A-H reference tranche;
   -- $74,679,095 class M-1H reference tranche;
   -- $70,945,141 class M-2H reference tranche;
   -- $74,679,095 class M-3AH reference tranche;
   -- $78,413,050 class M-3BH reference tranche;
   -- $35,000,000 class B notes;
   -- $229,679,097 class B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBBsf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 4.00%
subordination provided by the 0.95% class M-2 notes, the 1.00%
class M-3A notes, the 1.05% class M-3B notes and the 1.00% class B
notes.  The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-2 notes reflects the 3.05%
subordination provided by the 1.00% class M-3A notes, the 1.05%
class M-3B notes and the 1.00% class B notes.  The notes are
general unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac (rated 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans held in various Freddie
Mac-guaranteed MBS.

STACR 2016-DNA3 represents Freddie Mac's tenth risk transfer
transaction applying actual loan loss severity issued as part of
the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan
for 2013-2017 for each of the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of
risk-transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $26.5 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Freddie Mac where principal repayment of the notes is
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding
principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual
loan's loss severity (LS) percentage related to those credit
events, which includes borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors.  Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1, M-2, M-2F, M-2I,
M-3, M-3A, M-3AF, M-3AI and M-3B notes will be based on the lower
of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement (CE) available through subordination; and Freddie Mac's
Issuer Default Rating.  The M-1, M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B notes will
be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will carry a
12.5-year legal final maturity.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of 114,903 high-quality mortgage loans totaling
$26.47 billion that were acquired by Freddie Mac between Oct. 1,
2015 and Dec. 31, 2015.  The pool consists of loans with original
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of over 60% and less than or equal to
80% with a weighted average (WA) original combined LTV of 76%.  The
WA debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 35% and credit score of 748
reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Freddie Mac's tenth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed LS schedule.  The notes in
this transaction will experience losses realized at the time of
liquidation or loan modification, which will include both lost
principal and delinquent interest.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The M-1, M-2, M-3A and M-3B
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity.  Thus, any
credit events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are
borne by Freddie Mac and do not affect the transaction.  In
addition, credit events that occur prior to maturity with losses
realized from liquidations or loan modifications that occur after
the final maturity date will not be passed through to noteholders.
This feature more closely aligns the risk of loss to that of the
10-year, fixed LS STACRs where losses were passed through when a
credit event occurred; that is, loans became 180 days delinquent
with no consideration for liquidation timelines.  The credit ranged
from 8% at the 'Asf' rating category to 14% at the 'Bsf' rating
category.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive.
Loan quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and
indicate a tight control environment that limits origination risk.
Fitch has determined Freddie Mac to be an above-average aggregator
for its 2013 and later product.  The lower risk was accounted for
by Fitch by applying a lower default estimate for the reference
pool.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
the M-1 class will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage.  Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 class can receive a full pro rata
share of unscheduled principal, as long as a minimum CE level is
maintained, the cumulative net loss is within a certain threshold
and the delinquency test is within a certain threshold.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2, M-3A, M-3B and B classes will not receive any
scheduled or unscheduled principal allocations until the M-1 class
is paid in full.  The B class will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-3B class is paid in
full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from a solid alignment of
interests.  Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 5% of loss
protection, as well as a minimum of 50% of the first-loss B
tranche, sized at 100 bps.  Initially, Freddie Mac will retain an
approximately 28% vertical slice/interest in the M-1, M-2, M-3A and
M-3B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the GSE's assets are less than its obligations for longer than
60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing.  As receiver,
FHFA could repudiate any contract entered into by Freddie Mac if it
is determined that such action would promote an orderly
administration of Freddie Mac's affairs.  Fitch believes that the
U.S. government will continue to support Freddie Mac, as reflected
in its current rating of the GSE.  However, if, at some point,
Fitch views the support as being reduced and receivership likely,
the rating of Freddie Mac could be downgraded and ratings on the
M-1, M-2, M-3A and M-3B notes, along with their corresponding MAC
notes, could be affected.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels.  The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 24.2% at the 'BBBsf' level, 22.6% at the 'BBB-sf'
level and 14.7% at the 'Bsf' level.  The analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 36% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed eight classes of
General Electric Capital Assurance Company (GFCM) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class C reflects the stable performance of the
remaining pool and continued expected paydown, with 85.1% of the
remaining pool fully amortizing.  Fitch modeled losses of 6.7% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 1.6%, including $2.9 million (0.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has applied additional
stresses in its base case to factor in the significant retail
concentration (41.3%), secondary market locations of the remaining
collateral, limited near-term maturities, dated financials
(year-end [YE] 2015 data was received for approximately 50% of
pool) and limited tranche thickness.  In addition, the risk for
interest shortfalls or the potential for interest shortfalls to
occur were considered in determining the rating actions.

Fitch has designated 16 loans (16.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern; 71
of the original 171 loans remain.  There are no loans in special
servicing and none are defeased.  The weighted average Fitch
Loan-to-Value for the remaining loans in the pool is low at 48.8%.

As of the May 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 81.8% to $149.9 million from
$822.6 million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through J.  Loan maturities are: 11.5% between
2017 and 2018, 5.3% in 2019, 1.8% in 2020, with the majority of the
loans maturing between 2021 and 2023.

The largest loan in the pool (9.8%) is Gateway Center I, which is
cross-collateralized with Gateway Center II, currently the seventh
largest loan in the pool.  Gateway Center I is secured by a 259,759
square foot (sf) anchored retail center in Patchogue, NY. Tenants
include Bob's Stores, Best Buy, Marshall's and Home Goods, all that
have tenant expirations prior to the loan's April 2023 maturity.
The servicer reported occupancy and debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) were 99.0% and 2.02x respectively, as of YE 2015.

Cortland Ridge Apartments (4.3%), the largest Fitch Loan of
Concern, is secured by a 144-unit multifamily property located in
Orem, UT.  DSCR has been trending downward over the past several
years at a reported 1.01x as of YE 2015 compared to 1.11x at YE
2014 and 1.46x at YE 2013 due to increased operating expenses.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Upgrades are possible on classes A-5 through F, particularly on
class E, should the loans within the top 15 renew their major
tenant leases that are scheduled to expire prior to maturity.
Subordinate classes could be downgraded if expected losses
increase.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded this class:

   -- $13.4 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $82.9 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.3 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.3 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.3 million class E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $12.3 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 75%.
   -- $1.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.


GOLUB CAPITAL 10: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-R, C-R, D-R,
E, and F notes from Golub Capital Partners CLO 10 Ltd.  These
ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on April 1, 2016.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-R notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the May 6, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $115.75 million in
collective paydowns to the class A-R notes since S&P's July 2014
rating actions.  These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the June 2014 trustee
report, which S&P used for its July 2014 rating actions:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 197.09% from 146.01%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 147.23% from 126.79%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 130.58% from 118.91%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio improved to 118.06% from 112.35%.
   -- The class F O/C ratio improved to 111.64% from 108.76%.

The credit quality of the collateral portfolio has slightly
deteriorated since S&P's last rating actions.  The transaction has
shown an increase in collateral obligations with ratings in the
'CCC' category, with $11.29 million reported as of the May 2016
trustee report, compared with $3.24 million reported as of the June
2014 trustee report.  Over the same period, the par amount of
defaulted collateral has increased to $1.83 million from zero.
However, despite the slightly larger concentrations in the 'CCC'
category and defaulted collateral, the transaction has benefited
from a drop in the weighted average life due to seasoning of the
underlying collateral, with 3.24 years reported as of the May 2016
trustee report, compared with 4.71 years reported at the time of
our 2014 rating actions.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

This transaction has exposure to loans from companies in the energy
and commodities sectors, which have come under significant pressure
from falling oil and commodity prices in the past year. As of May
2016, the trustee reports a combined 5.45% of the aggregate
principal balance in the oil and gas and nonferrous metals/minerals
sectors.  This exposure limited the upgrade on the class E notes.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, on a criteria
interpretation, which allows S&P to use a limited number of public
ratings from other nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations for the purposes of assessing the credit quality of
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria provide
specific guidance for treatment of corporate assets not rated by
S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines treatment of
securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the May 2016
trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY METRICS COMPARISON
Class                       June 2014         May 2016
Notional balance (mil. $)                             
A-R                         197.00            81.25
B-R                         12.50             12.50
C-R                         31.75             31.75
D-R                         16.00             16.00
E                           15.00             15.00
F                           9.00              9.00

Coverage tests and collateral quality tests (%)
                            June 2014         May 2016
Weighted average spread     4.95              4.47
Weighted average life       4.71              3.24
A/B O/C                     146.01            197.09
C O/C                       126.79            147.23
D O/C                       118.91            130.58
E O/C                       112.35            118.06
F O/C                       108.76            111.64

O/C--Overcollateralization test.

CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Golub Capital Partners CLO 10 Ltd.

                            Cash flow     Cash flow
       Previous             implied       cushion    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)     (%)(ii)    rating
A-R    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)      27.25      AAA (sf)
B-R    AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)      27.25      AAA (sf)
C-R    A (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)      4.20       AAA (sf)
D-R    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)      2.88       AA+ (sf)
E      BB (sf)/Watch Pos    A- (sf)       0.54       BBB+ (sf)
F      B (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)      8.56       BB+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario          Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case                  15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating          20.0                      7.5
Above base case                  25.0                     10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
        implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class   rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-R     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B-R     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
C-R     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
D-R     AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)   AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)
E       A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
F       BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread         Recovery
         Cash flow   compression    compression
         implied     implied        implied        Final
Class    rating      rating         rating         rating
A-R      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
B-R      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
C-R      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)       AAA (sf)
D-R      AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)        AA+ (sf)
E        A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
F        BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)       B+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Golub Capital Partners CLO 10 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B-R           AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C-R           AAA (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
D-R           AA+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BBB+ (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Pos
F             BB+ (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Golub Capital Partners CLO 10 Ltd.
                
Class         Rating
A-R           AAA (sf)


GRAMERCY RE 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1, Ltd.
("Gramercy RE CDO 2007-1"):

Cl. B-FL, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of two classes of notes due to
greater than expected losses on certain assets resulting in an
additional $116.6 million in implied losses since last review and
reducing the effective enhancement of the outstanding Moody's rated
mezzanine classes. The improvements in WARF and stable WARR of the
remaining collateral pool did not fully offset the effects of the
assets losses. Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of three
classes of notes because the key transaction metrics are
commensurate with the existing ratings. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan obligation
(CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Gramercy RE CDO 2007-1 is a cash transaction whose reinvestment
period ended in August 2012. The transaction is currently backed by
a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(85.8% of the pool balance); ii) whole loans and senior
participations (11.3%); and iii) mezzanine interest (2.9%). As of
the May 16, 2016 note valuation report, the aggregate note balance
of the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$909.9 million from $1.1 billion at issuance, with principal
pay-down directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes.
The pay-down was the result of a combination of regular
amortization, resolution and sales of defaulted collateral, and the
failing of certain par value tests.

The Class A-2 notes are fully supported by MBIA Insurance
Corporation, which provides a guarantee on the scheduled payment of
interest and principal. The latest action on MBIA Insurance
Corporation was taken on May 20, 2016. Please see www.moodys.com
for more information.

The pool contains eleven CMBS assets totaling $260.2 million (34.7%
of the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's May 10, 2016 report. While there
have been moderate realized losses on the underlying collateral to
date, Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
4021, compared to 4242 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligation follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.0%
compared to 1.8% at last review; A1-A3 and 0.7% compared to 0.0% at
last review; Baa1-Baa3 and 5.6% compared to 6.4% at last review;
Ba1-Ba3 and 5.2% compared to 1.1% at last review; B1-B3 and 35.5%
compared to 47.4% at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 51.0% compared
to 43.3% at last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-RR2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on these
certificates issued by Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-RR2:

  Cl. A-1FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed

   C (sf)
  Cl. A-1FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed

   C (sf)
  Cl. X*, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

* Interest only certificate

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on three classes of certificates
because the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing
ratings.  The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic) transactions.

GCCMT 2007-RR2 is a re-remic cash transaction wholly backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance).  As of the May 20, 2016 trustee report, the
aggregate balance of the transaction has decreased to $120.6
million from $528.7 million at issuance due to realized losses
applied to the certificates as a result of losses on the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate.  The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9434,
compared to 9668 at last review.  The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-Ca/C (100%, the same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review.  The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
loans within the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change.  The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions.  The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments.  However, in light of the
performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is
unlikely that the ratings announced today are sensitive to further
change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance.  Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GREYWOLF CLO II: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2 and B notes,
and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, C, D, and E notes, from
Greywolf CLO II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
managed by Greywolf Capital Management LP.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated April 21,
2016.

The upgrades primarily reflect the decline in the weighted average
maturity of the underlying portfolio, which decreased to 4.86 years
in April 2016 from 5.66 years as of the August 2013 effective date.
Because time horizon factors heavily into default probability, a
shorter weighted average life positively affects the
creditworthiness of the collateral pool.  In addition, the current
portfolio has a higher percentage of assets rated 'BB-' than the
effective date portfolio.  This improved the portfolio's credit
quality.

Although par losses have occurred as a result of defaults, the
transaction has managed to mitigate some of these losses through
the recent sale of assets at prices above the purchase prices.
Nonetheless, the trustee-reported overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios have declined since the August 2013 effective date.

   -- The class A O/C decreased to 135.23% from 137.18%.
   -- The class B O/C decreased to 121.03% from 122.78%.
   -- The class C O/C decreased to 114.18% from 115.83%.
   -- The class D O/C decreased to 108.87% from 110.44%.
   -- The class E O/C decreased to 105.94% from 107.47%.

Despite the decline in credit support, current levels are above the
triggers, and cash flow analysis shows strong results.

Although the cash flow results indicated higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, C, D, and E notes, S&P took into account that the
transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is scheduled
to end in April 2017.  Since future reinvestment activity could
change some of the portfolio characteristics, S&P's analysis
included extra sensitivity runs to capture these possibilities.  In
addition, S&P also considered the increase in both defaulted and
'CCC' assets, as well as the decline in the O/C ratios.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P Global Ratings will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and will take further rating
actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Greywolf CLO II Ltd.

                     Cash flow
       Previous      implied     Cash flow     Final
Class  rating        rating(i)   cushion(ii)   rating
A-1    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    15.01%        AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)       AAA (sf)    2.64%         AA+ (sf)
B      A (sf)        AA+ (sf)    0.83%         A+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)      A+ (sf)     1.55%         BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)   1.00%         BB (sf)
E      B (sf)        BB+ (sf)    1.58%         B (sf)  

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)   AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    B (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)      A (sf)        A+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A- (sf)       BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)       BB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B+ (sf)       B (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Greywolf CLO II Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To            From
A-2         AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
B           A+ (sf)       A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Greywolf CLO II Ltd.

Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
C         BBB (sf)
D         BB (sf)
E         B (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2013-GC13 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2013-GC13.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool since issuance.  As of the May 2016 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
2.5% to $1.3 billion from $1.334 billion at issuance.  There have
been no delinquent or specially serviced loans since issuance.

There are seven loans on the servicer watch list (5.5% of the
pool); the loans are on the watch list due to deferred maintenance
and declines in occupancy and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).

The largest watch list loan and Fitch Loan of Concern (1.6% of the
pool) is the Warehouse & Flex Portfolio loan; a portfolio of four
warehouse/flex buildings consisting of 216,415 sf located in Bucks
County, PA (suburban Philadelphia).  The sole tenant at one of the
properties, Asset Management Specialists (18.7% of NRA, 40,500 sf)
vacated upon lease expiration in September 2015.  Near-term
rollover was a consideration at issuance and at closing a $2.275
million reserve was funded to address potential rollover in 2015
for the lease expirations of L-3 Communications (33% of NRA, lease
extended to December 2020 from December 2015), Vestcom New Century
(19.3% of NRA, lease extended to March 2017 from March 2015), and
Asset Management Specialists.  With successful lease extensions for
L-3 Communications and Vestcom New Century, the leasing reserve is
available to cover shortfalls related to Asset Management
Specialists' former space.  Occupancy has declined to 71% as of 1Q
2016.  Net operating income (NOI) DSCR was 1.32x and 1.03x as of
year-end (YE) 2015 and 1Q 2016, respectively, as a result of the
decrease in occupancy.  Fitch will continue to monitor.

The largest loan in the pool (11.5% of the pool) is the 11 West
42nd Street loan, a 943,701 square foot (sf), 32-story office tower
located in midtown New York, NY.  The property was originally built
in 1927 and renovated in 1978.  As of the September 2015 rent roll,
major tenants included CIT Group, Inc. (16% net rentable area
[NRA], expires October 2021), NYU (11.9% NRA, expires September
2021), Estee Lauder Companies Inc. (11.9% NRA, expires March 2025)
and WellPoint Holding Corp (11.2%, expired December 2015).  While
the WellPoint lease renewal has not been confirmed, the office
submarket is strong, and subject occupancy was 100% with NOI DSCR
at 2.53x as of YE 2015.

The second largest loan in the pool (11.3% of the pool) is the Mall
St. Matthews loan, a 1,020,376 sf regional mall located in
Louisville, KY.  The mall is anchored by Dillard's (expires
December 2045) and Dillard's Men's & Home (expires December 2045),
which are not part of the collateral, while JC Penney (expires
August 2017) and Forever 21 (expires February 2026) are included in
the collateral.  Total collateral is 670,376 sf.  The property was
originally built in 1962 but most recently renovated in 2013.
Occupancy was 96% as of December 2015, which is in-line with
performance at issuance.  NOI DSCR was 1.97x as of YE 2015.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable, as overall pool
performance has been stable since issuance.  Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-level
metrics.  Upgrades may occur with stable to improved pool
performance and significant paydown or defeasance.

                          DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $33.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $72.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $149.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $135 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $420.3 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $89.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $98.4 million** class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $88.4 million** class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50 million** class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $236.8 million** class PEZ at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $76.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $30 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $13.3 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $998.6 million* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30 million* class X-B 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.
** Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for up to the full certificate principal amount of the
class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-C or class G
certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Ratings on Cl. F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks for GS Mortgage Securities Trust (GSMS) 2016-GS2
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-GS2.

-- $11,733,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $137,578,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187,977,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,162,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $570,488,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,224,000b class X-B AA-sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,038,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,224,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $122,918,000c class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,656,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,223,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,223,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,643,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,506,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,903,230a class G 'NR'.

a Privately placed and pursuant to rule 144A.
b Notional amount and interest only.
c The class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
May 9, 2016. Fitch does not rate the $31,903,230 class G. The
certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 37 loans secured by 115
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $750.6 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 83.4% of the properties by
balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of 93.8%
of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) on the trust-specific debt is 1.24x, higher than the 2015
and YTD 2016 averages of 1.18x and 1.17x, respectively, for the
other Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals. The Fitch stressed
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the trust-specific debt is 103.4%,
lower than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 109.3% and 107.9%,
respectively, for the other Fitch-rated deals.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
compose 62.7% of the pool by balance. Compared to other Fitch-rated
U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this transaction is
higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 average concentrations of 49.3%
and 54.8%, respectively. The pool's concentration results in a loan
concentration index (LCI) of 539, which is higher than the 2015
average of 367 and 2016 YTD average of 415.

Credit Opinion Loan: One loan in the pool received shadow ratings.
The Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 (9.99% of the pool) received an
investment-grade rating of 'AAAsf' on a fusion basis and a 'AAAsf'
rating on a stand-alone basis.

Interest-Only Loans: 17 loans that make up 62.5% of the pool are
full interest-only. This is higher than the average of 23.3% for
2015 and 30.8% for YTD 2016 of the other Fitch-rated U.S.
multiborrower deals. In addition, 14 loans which comprised 23.3% of
the pool are partial interest-only; this share is lower than the
average of 43.1% for 2015 and 41.1% for YTD 2016 of the other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals. Overall, the pool is
scheduled to pay down by 5.08%, compared with the averages of 11.7%
for 2015 and 9.9% YTD for 2016 for the other Fitch-rated U.S.
deals.

ADDITIONAL RATING DRIVERS

Sponsor Concentration: The top 10 sponsors comprise 75.7% of the
pool, including a single sponsor's 17.3% share. This results in a
sponsor concentration index (SCI) of 833, which is higher than the
2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 410 and 461, respectively, for other
Fitch-rated multiborrower deals.

Mortgage Coupons: The weighted average (WA) mortgage coupon for
this pool of loans is 4.55%, well below historical averages. Fitch
accounted for increased refinance risk in a higher interest rate
environment by analyzing sensitivity to increased interest rates in
conjunction with Fitch's stressed refinance rates, which were 9.07%
on a WA basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 6.4% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period). The
following rating sensitivities describe how the ratings would react
to further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF. The implied rating
sensitivities are only indicative of some of the potential outcomes
and do not consider other risk factors to which the transaction is
exposed. Stressing additional risk factors may result in different
outcomes. Furthermore, the implied ratings, after the further NCF
stresses are applied, are more akin to what the ratings would be at
deal issuance had those further stressed NCFs been in place at that
time.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to GSMS
2016-GS2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


HALCYON LOAN 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2A,
A-2B, B, C, and D notes from Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 5, 2016, trustee report.

The transaction remains in its reinvestment period until April
2017.  The portfolio has above-average exposure to
commodities-related issuers, some of which are on CreditWatch
negative or have a negative outlook, and some of which are
currently trading at distressed prices.  The balance of assets with
an S&P Global Ratings' credit rating of 'CCC+' and below has
increased to $25 million as of the April 2016 trustee report from
$18 million as of the May 2013 trustee report, while the balance of
defaulted assets has increased to $7.4 million from $1.9 million,
respectively.  As a result of the haircuts to the
overcollateralization (O/C) numerator, the class A O/C ratio has
declined to 130.27% from 131.19% during the same time period.  The
balance of assets rated 'BB-' and above increased.

The affirmed ratings reflect adequate credit support at the current
rating levels.  Although the cash flow results showed higher
ratings for the class A-2, B, C, and D notes, S&P affirmed its
ratings on all five classes of notes to maintain rating cushion as
the transaction continues to reinvest and due to the previously
stated credit factors.  The rating on the subordinate class D note
may be susceptible to negative rating actions if the portfolio's
credit quality continues to deteriorate.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 8, 2014, criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSRO's for purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets S&P do not rate.  The
criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of corporate
assets not rated by us, while the interpretation outlines treatment
of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
                   Cash flow
        Previous   implied     Cash flow    Final
Class   rating     rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    11.68%       AAA (sf)
A-2A    AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    11.69%       AA (sf)
A-2B    AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    11.69%       AA (sf)
B       A (sf)     AA- (sf)    1.93%        A (sf)
C       BBB (sf)   A- (sf)     1.19%        BBB (sf)
D       BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    4.76%        BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which S&P made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios
by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess
the current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation
assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery  Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease  increase    decrease
       implied    implied   implied     implied    Final
Class  rating     rating    rating      rating     rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)    AA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2A   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
A-2B   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
B      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)   A (sf)
C      A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                      Spread        Recovery
         Cash flow    compression   compression
         implied      implied       implied       Final
Class    rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2A     AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
A-2B     AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
B        AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
C        A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
D        BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B+ (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2013-1 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2A        AA (sf)
A-2B        AA (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
D           BB (sf)


JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on two classes in J.P. Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp. 2000-C10 as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class F was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in defeasance and credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 15% since Moody's last review
and defeasance now represents 14% of the pool.

The rating on the Class G was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the current
balance, unchanged from Moody's last review. Moody's does not
anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.4% of the original
pooled balance.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 16, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $10.6 million
from $738.5 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
8% to 38% of the pool. One loan, constituting 13.9% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $62.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full year 2015 operating results for 80% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 30%, compared to 40% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 4.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 3.54X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 70% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Pavillion East Loan ($4.1 million -- 38.3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 171,969 square foot (SF) anchored
retail center located in Richardson, Texas. Major tenants include
Richardson Bike Mart (20% of the NRA -- lease expiration December
31, 2017), Sprouts Grocers (17% of the NRA -- lease expiration
October 2016) and TJ Maxx (17% of the NRA -- lease expiration
October 2016). Spouts Grocers and TJ Maxx sublease their space from
Albertson's, a supermarket retailer, which vacated the property in
2006. As of March 2016 the property was 93% leased, compared to 95%
as of December 2014. Property performance has slipped in recent
years due to an increase in expenses. The loan has amortized over
63% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 28% and
3.93X, respectively, unchanged since the last review.

The second largest loan is the Pavillion West Loan ($1.7 million --
17% of the pool), which is secured by an 84,250 SF retail center
located in Dallas, Texas. The anchor tenant is 24 Hour Fitness (38%
of the NRA -- lease expiration September 2016). As of March 2016,
the property was 87% leased, compared to 88% in December 2014.
Property performance has slipped over the past two years as
expenses have outpaced revenue growth. The loan has amortized over
62% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 23% and
5.17X, respectively, compared to 24% and 4.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Eckerd -- Media Loan ($1.5 million --
14.3% of the pool), which is secured by a freestanding Rite-Aid
Drug store in Media Borough, Pennsylvania. The loan is subject to a
20-year lease with multiple five-year renewal options. The loan has
amortized over 62% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 42% and 2.60X, respectively, compared to 45% and 2.41X at
the last review.


JP MORGAN 2013-C13: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on one class of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C13, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised rating on class D reflects S&P's expectation of the
available credit enhancement for this class, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level, S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral, as well as
the reduced pool trust balance.

The affirmed ratings on classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, A-S, B,
C, E, and F reflect S&P's expectation that the available
enhancement levels for these classes will be within S&P's estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the respective
rating levels, as well as S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A interest-only (IO)
certificate based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the rating on the IO security would not be higher than the
lowest rated reference class.  The notional balance on class X-A
references classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, and A-S.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $924.6 million, which is 96.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 44 loans, down from 45
loans at issuance.  One loan ($3.9 million, 0.4%) is defeased.  No
loans are reported as specially serviced.  The master servicer,
Midland Loan Services, reported financial information for 100.0% of
the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 92.6% was partial-or
year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.77x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 79.8% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.63% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the one defeased loan
($3.9 million, 0.4%).  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $570.9 million (61.7%).
Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated an S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.76x and 79.3%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has not experienced any principal loss.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, none of the
loans in the pool are with the special servicer, KeyBank real
estate capital.

RATING RAISED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
               Rating
Class     To          From         
D         BBB (sf)   BBB- (sf)     

RATINGS AFFIRMED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)
A-3       AAA (sf)
A-4       AAA (sf)
A-SB      AAA (sf)
A-S       AAA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         A- (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         B+ (sf)
X-A       AAA (sf)


JP MORGAN 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certificates 'BBsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2016-1
(JPMMT 2016-1) as follows:

-- $350,762,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $350,762,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $263,072,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $263,072,000 class A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87,690,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $87,690,000 class A-8 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $70,229,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $70,229,000 class A-10 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,461,000 class A-11 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $17,461,000 class A-12 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,076,000 class A-13 exchangeable certificates 'AA+';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $35,076,000 class A-14 certificates 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $350,762,000 class A-X-3 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $263,072,000 class A-X-4 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $87,690,000 class A-X-5 notional exchangeable certificates
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,229,000 class A-X-6 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook

    Stable
-- $17,461,000 class A-X-7 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook

    Stable
-- $35,076,000 class A-X-8 notional certificates 'AA+sf; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $4,952,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,285,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,190,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,095,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following certificates:
-- $385,838,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates;
-- $385,838,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates;
-- $385,838,000 class A-X-1 notional certificates;
-- $385,838,000 class A-X-2 notional exchangeable certificates;
-- $3,301,428 class B-5 certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of high-quality 30-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans to
borrowers with strong credit profiles, low leverage and large
liquid reserves. The pool has a weighted average (WA) FICO score of
764 and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 73.3%.
The collateral attributes of the subject pool are largely
consistent with recent JPMMT transactions issued in 2015.

Geographically Diverse Pool (Positive): The pool's primary
concentration risk is in California, where approximately 30% of the
collateral is located. Approximately 42% of the pool is located in
the top five regions in the subject pool (Atlanta, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Seattle and New York). However, these concentrations
show significant improvement over many of the JPMMT deals rated by
Fitch in 2015, in which over 50% of the pool was concentrated in
California and over 80% in the top five regions. As a result, no
geographic concentration penalty was applied.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained. To mitigate tail risk, which arises as
the pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination
floor of 1.25% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates. Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that
might allow principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders
earlier than the five-year lockout schedule.

Leakage from Reviewer Expenses (Negative): The trust is obligated
to reimburse the breach reviewer, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC
(Pentalpha), each month for any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred if the company is requested to participate in any
arbitration, legal or regulatory actions, proceedings or hearings.
These expenses include Pentalpha's legal fees and other expenses
incurred outside its annual fee schedule and are not subject to a
cap or certificateholder approval.

Furthermore, certificateholders are obligated to pay Pentalpha a
termination fee of $140,000 to terminate the contract. While Fitch
accounted for the potential additional costs by upwardly adjusting
its loss estimation for the pool, Fitch views this construct as
adding potentially more ratings volatility than those that do not
have this type of provision.

Extraordinary Expense Adjustment (Negative): Extraordinary
expenses, which include loan file review costs, arbitration
expenses for enforcement of the reps and additional fees of
Pentalpha, will be taken out of available funds and not accounted
for in the contractual interest owed to the bondholders. This
construct can result in principal and interest shortfalls to the
bonds, starting from the bottom of the capital structure. To
account for the risk of these noncredit events reducing
subordination, Fitch adjusted its loss expectations upward by 40
basis points (bps) at the 'AAAsf' level.

Tier 3 Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch
said, “we believe the value of the rep and warranty framework is
diluted by the presence of qualifying and conditional language in
conjunction with sunset provisions, which reduces lender breach
liability. While we believe the high credit-quality pool and clean
diligence results mitigate these risks, we considered the weaker
framework in our analysis.”

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 5.8%. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in its
presale report released today 'J.P. Morgan Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-1', available at 'www.fitchratings.com' or by clicking on the
link.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information on 100% of the
loans in the collateral pool from AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Inglet
Blair LLC (Inglet Blair) and Opus Capital Markets Consultants
(Opus). Fitch received certifications indicating that the
loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with its
published standards for reviewing loans and in accordance with the
independence standards outlined in its criteria. While the
diligence results showed minimal findings, some exceptions were
noted. To account for these differences, Fitch adjusted the
original appraisal value for one loan (due to a property value
variance) to derive its loss expectations, which did not have a
material impact on the agency's initial projections. Fitch believes
the overall results of the review generally reflected strong
underwriting controls.



KKR CLO 14: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by KKR CLO 14 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $310,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,

   Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $56,300,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $30,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $28,400,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $22,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

KKR CLO 14 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

  Par amount: $500,200,000
  Diversity Score: 55
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

  Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2825 to 3249)
  Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A-1A Notes: 0
  Class A-1B Notes: 0
  Class A-2 Notes: -1
  Class B Notes: -2
  Class C Notes: -1
  Class D Notes: 0

  Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2825 to 3673)
  Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A-1A Notes: -1
  Class A-1B Notes: -1
  Class A-2 Notes: -3
  Class B Notes: -3
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1


LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Hikes Class K Debt Rating to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed the ratings of three classes in LB Commercial Trust
1998-C4 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I Class H was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges

The ratings on the P&I Classes J and K were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
amortization as well as an increase in defeasance. The deal has
paid down 11% since Moody's last review and defeasance has
increased to 21% of the pool from 16% at the last review.

The rating on the P&I Class L was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.0% of the
current balance, compared to 5.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 16, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $44.6 million
from $2.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 35 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 62% of
the pool. Eleven loans, constituting 21% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities. The pool contains a
Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component, representing 19% of the pool.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $42.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%). Three loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $0.5
million loss for the specially serviced loans (16% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2015 and full year 2014 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 55%, compared to 59% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
18% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 2.46X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 2.24X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Pinnacle Center Loan ($6.0 million -- 13.4% of
the pool), which is secured by a 230,000 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Thornton, Colorado. As of September 2015 the
property was 86% compared to 88% at the last review. The largest
tenant is Hobby Lobby occupying 21% of the net rentable area (NRA).
Performance has slightly improved since the last review due to
higher revenues. This loan has amortized 29% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.64X, respectively,
compared to 76% and 1.42X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center
Loan ($4.8 million -- 10.8% of the pool) which is secured by a
70,000 SF retail center located in Richmond, Virginia. As of March
2016 the center was 83% leased, essentially the same as the last
review. Performance has been stable. This loan has amortized 30%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and
1.63X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.53X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Cineplex Multiplex Loan ($3.3 million
-- 7.5% of the pool) which is secured by a 48,217 SF cinema located
in Huntington, New York. This fully amortizing loan has paid down
49% since securitization. Both the theater's lease expiration and
the loan maturity are in September 2023. To reflect the single
tenant risk, Moody's applied a lit-dark approach to this loan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and 2.71X, respectively,
compared to 48% and 2.49X at last review.

The CTL component consists of 11 loans, constituting 19% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to six tenants. The largest CTL
exposures are Sweetbay Supermarket ($2.9 million, 6.7% of the pool;
parent Delhaize America, LLC; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2;
stable outlook), CVS Health ($2.0 million, 4.4% of the pool;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1; stable outlook); and Sears
Holding Corp. $1.7 million, 3.8% of the pool; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa3; negative outlook). The bottom-dollar
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for the CTL component is
2,538 compared to 2,268 at last review. WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of the default probability.


LSTAR COMMERCIAL 2015-3: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-3 (the
Certificates) issued by LSTAR Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-3:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. Since issuance, the transaction has experienced
collateral reduction of 7.7% as a result of scheduled loan
amortization and unexpected loan prepayments as 16 of the original
62 loans have paid out of the trust ahead of their respective
maturity dates. Eleven loans, representing 87.1% of the current
pool balance, have YE2015 financials available, reporting a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.90 times (x) and 9.6%, respectively. The
transaction is concentrated as the largest 12 loans represent 91.2%
of the current pool balance.

The largest 12 loans in the pool were newly originated at issuance
while the remaining 34 loans are seasoned loans that were purchased
by the loan seller from Fannie Mae or were originally part of the
now retired LASL 2006-MF2 and LASL 2006-MF3 CMBS transactions. Of
the 16 loans that have prepaid to date, one loan was newly
originated at issuance and 15 loans were seasoned loans. The newly
originated loans are secured by hospitality, retail, office and
multifamily properties, while the seasoned loans are secured by
multifamily and manufactured housing community properties. The
seasoned loans are granular within the transaction as the largest
seasoned loan represents 0.6% of the current pool balance. All of
the remaining seasoned loans, representing 8.7% of the current pool
balance, are fully amortizing.

As of the May 2016 remittance, there are two loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, representing 0.6% of the current pool
balance, which were flagged for items of deferred maintenance or
the debt service payment was received late; however, there are no
delinquent loans in the transaction. A loan in the top 15 is
highlighted below.

The Hudson River Commons loan (Prospectus ID#10, 4.0% of the
current pool balance) is secured by a 129,000 square foot (sf)
anchored retail property in Troy, New York, approximately 8.8 miles
northeast of Albany. The property represents the dominate retail
centre in Troy, with anchor tenants including Big Lots, Peebles and
Save-A-Lot, all with leases scheduled to expire in 2020 or 2023.
The property remains at 100% occupancy as of the December 2015 rent
roll. According to the YE2015 financials, the DSCR was reported at
1.10x, which is a decrease from the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.40x with the
decline in net cash flow mainly driven by an increase in total
operating expenses. Repairs and maintenance increased by 58.0% over
the DBRS underwritten figure, which may have been attributed by
ongoing renovations at the property. DBRS was aware of these
capital expenditure projects at issuance, which included updates to
the property’s facade, parking lot, roof, pylon sign, drainage
systems and the outparcel lot. DBRS has sent a question to the
servicer for an explanation regarding the increase in expenses. The
borrower has invested $3.5 million into the renovation to date,
with an additional $1.0 million budgeted for the future. The
servicer was contacted for a status update regarding the
renovations and a response is currently outstanding as of the date
of this press release. DBRS expects the cash flow to stabilize once
all renovations are completed.


MADISON PARK X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and C
notes from Madison Park Funding X Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) that closed in December 2012 and is managed by
Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-1a, A-1b, A-2, D, and E notes.

The deal is currently in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled
to end in January 2017.  S&P anticipates that the manager will
continue to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the
transaction documents.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the April 7, 2016, trustee report. The
upgrades are due to the increased credit support available to the
class B-1, B-2, and C notes.  The affirmations reflect S&P's belief
that the available credit support is consistent with the current
rating levels.

Since the effective date analysis in July 2013, the transaction has
experienced par gain and benefited significantly from both
seasoning and improvement in the underlying collateral's credit
quality, both of which were the prime driving factors for the
rating actions.  

Per the April 2016 monthly trustee report, the portfolio's weighted
average life is 4.41 years, down from 5.29 years as of the April
2013 trustee report, which was used for S&P's effective date
analysis.  Since then, the percentage of 'BB-' and higher rated
assets has also increased.  These factors have decreased the credit
risk profile, which in turn provided more cushion to the ratings on
the tranches.

Additionally, since effective date the par gain has led to an
increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the April
2013 trustee report:

   -- Class A/B O/C increased to 137.16% from 135.33%.
   -- Class C O/C increased to 124.38% from 122.72%.
   -- Class D O/C increased to 117.11% from 115.54%.
   -- Class E O/C increased to 110.95% from 109.47%.

The amount of 'CCC' rated assets has increased to $28.12 million
(about 3.56% of the performing assets and principal cash) per the
April 2016 trustee report from $13.26 million at the effective
date.  In addition, the defaulted balance also increased to $9.77
million from zero.

Although these negative aspects were offset by the overall
seasoning and positive portfolio credit quality migration, any
significant deterioration in these metrics could negatively affect
the deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As a
result, although S&P's cash flow analysis pointed to higher ratings
for the class C, D, and E notes, it considered the above and also
other stress tests to allow for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.  

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Madison Park Funding X Ltd.

                    Cash flow
       Previous     implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating       rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A-1a   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    16.23%       AAA (sf)
A-1b   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    13.27%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    13.27%       AAA (sf)
B-1    AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)    13.56%       AA+ (sf)
B-2    AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)    13.56%       AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)       AA- (sf)    2.18%        A+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)     A- (sf)     0.51%        BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)    1.28%        BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1a   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1b   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1a   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1b   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       A- (sf)       A+ (sf)
D      A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B- (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Madison Park Funding X Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
B-1         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Madison Park Funding X Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1a        AAA (sf)
A-1b        AAA (sf)
A-2         AAA (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


MID-STATE CAPITAL 2006-1: Moody's Raises Cl. B Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five tranches
issued from two transactions.  The collateral backing these
transactions consists primarily of stick-built single family homes.
Unlike traditional manufactured housing collateral, Mid-State
pools are backed by land/home manufactured housing collateral.
These properties are typically 90% completed by Jim Walter Homes,
with the borrower having to contribute the remaining 10% to
complete the construction of the property.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Mid-State Capital Corporation 2006-1 Trust

  Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 30, 2009,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 1, 2011,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Mid-State Trust VI

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 14, 2012,
   Downgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 14, 2012,
   Downgraded to A2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on four other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades on classes E, F, and G reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the 17 assets ($222.0 million, 73.3%) with the
special servicer (discussed below), as well as a reduction in the
liquidity support available to these classes due to ongoing
interest shortfalls.  In addition, S&P lowered its ratings on
classes F and G to 'D (sf)' because it expects the accumulated
interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  Classes F and G have carried accumulated interest
shortfalls for the past nine and 11 consecutive months,
respectively.

According to the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $505,357, and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $399,376;

   -- Non-recoverable interest totaling $58,266; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $44,036.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class E.

The affirmations on classes A-J, B, C, and D reflect S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings.  The affirmations also reflect
S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction’s collateral, the transaction structure, and
liquidity support available to the classes.

While the available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes A-J through D, S&P's rating actions also
considered the bonds' susceptibility to potential future interest
shortfalls as the master servicer is currently advancing on 15 of
the 17 assets, subject to appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) for
each assets.  If the future performance of the transaction's
collateral (73.3% of which is specially serviced) differ markedly
from S&P's expectations, it may take further rating actions as
necessary.

                     TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $303.0 million, which is 11.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 17 loans and seven real
estate owned (REO) assets (reflecting crossed REO assets), down
from 268 loans at issuance.  Seventeen of these assets ($222.0
million, 73.3%) are with the special servicer; one ($4.3 million,
1.4%) is defeased; and four ($62.1 million, 20.5%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., reported financial information for 87.0% of the nondefeased
loans in the pool, of which 46.4% was year-end 2015 data, 18.8% was
year-end 2014 data, and 21.8% was partial year 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 0.89x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 75.5% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.98% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the 17 specially serviced
assets and the defeased loan.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $249.5 million (82.3%).
Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a S&P Global
Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 0.75x and 78.9%,
respectively, for three of the top 10 nondefeased loans.  The
remaining loans are specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $133.1 million in
principal losses, or 4.9% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 8.9% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
17 specially serviced assets.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance reports, 17 assets
($222.0 million, 73.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners LLC (LNR).  Details of the three largest specially
serviced assets, which are top 10 nondefeased loans, are:

   -- Market Place at Northglenn REO asset ($56.1 million, 18.5%),

      is the largest asset in the pool and has $61.5 million in
      total reported exposure.  The asset is a 439,273-sq.-ft.
      retail property in Northglenn, Colo.  The loan was
      transferred to the special servicer on Aug. 30, 2011, due to

      imminent default.  The property became REO on July 11, 2012.

      The special servicer indicated that it is negotiating lease
      rollovers and leasing up the vacant units at the property
      before listing the property for sale.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy as of Sept. 30, 2015, were 0.72x and 77.0%,
      respectively.  An ARA of $18.6 million is in effect against
      this loan, and S&P expects a moderate loss upon its eventual

      resolution.

   -- The Allstate Charlotte & Roanoke loan ($37.2 million,
      12.3%), is the second-largest loan in the transaction and
      has $40.8 million in total reported exposure; it is secured
      by two office buildings totaling 357,489-sq.-ft. located in
      Roanoke, Va. and Charlotte, N.C.  The loan was transferred
      to the special servicer on Dec. 8, 2014, due to imminent
      default.  An ARA of $16.8 million is in effect against this
      loan, and S&P expects a moderate loss upon its eventual
      resolution.

   -- The Roseville Portfolio – Roll-up REO asset ($35.8 million,

      11.8%), is the third-largest asset in the transaction and
      has $39.8 million in total reported exposure.  The loan was
      originally secured by three properties, of which the only
      collateral remaining is a 211,993-sq.-ft. retail property in

      Roseville, Calif.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on Dec. 29, 2008, due to imminent default and
      became REO on April 11, 2012.  The special servicer
      indicated that it is looking to lease and renew leases at
      the property before listing the property for sale.  The
      reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.09x
      and 57.0%, respectively.  A $33.1 million ARA is in effect
      against this loan, and S&P expects a significant loss upon
      its eventual resolution.

The remaining assets with the special servicer have each individual
balances that represent 6.0% or less of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 17 specially serviced
assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 49.8%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-HQ8

                                       Rating        Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A-J              617451FN4             BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
B                617451FP9             BB (sf)       BB (sf)
C                617451FQ7             B+ (sf)       B+ (sf)
D                617451FR5             B- (sf)       B- (sf)
E                617451FS3             CCC- (sf)     CCC (sf)
F                617451FT1             D (sf)        CCC- (sf)
G                617451FW4             D (sf)        CCC- (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 18 classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc 2007-HQ11 as:

  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-3-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-3-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-4-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. C, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 5, 2015,
   Affirmed Ca (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on June 5, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the nine investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the eight below-investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on class G was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO class X was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.6% of the
current balance, compared to 9.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 9.8% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 13, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $1.51 billion
from $2.42 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 123 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 48% of
the pool.  Twenty two loans, constituting 17% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Thirty loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $87.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 33%).  Nine loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Galleria at Pittsburgh Mills ($133.0 million -- 8.8% of
the pool), which is secured by an 887,000 square foot (SF) interest
in a 1.06 million SF regional mall located in Tarentum,
Pennsylvania.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2015, for the second time, due to the Sponsor's request
for another modification associated with the maturity date,
interest rate, and release of a parcel.  Sears, which represented
approximately 19% of the net rentable area (NRA), closed its store
and vacated in November 2015.  As of March 2016, the property was
60% leased.  Foreclosure has been initiated and a Receiver was
appointed in January 2016.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $155.6 million
loss for eight of the specially serviced loans (81% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $11.9 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2014 operating results for
98% of the pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results
for 86% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96%,
compared to 101% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 4% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.49X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One Seaport Plaza Loan ($225.0 million -- 14.9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1 million SF class A office
building located in the financial district of lower Manhattan.  The
loan is interest-only for the entire term and matures in January
2017.  There is also a $15 million B-note held outside the trust.
As of April 2016, the property was 99% leased, compared to 94% at
last review.  The loan sponsor is Jack Resnick & Sons, the
property's original developer and owner.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 88% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.08X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the 485 Lexington Avenue Loan ($135.0
million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 915,000 SF
class A office building located near Grand Central Station in
Manhattan.  The loan represents a pari-passu interest in a $450.0
million loan.  The loan is interest-only for the entire term and
matures in February 2017.  The property was essentially 100% leased
as of March 2015, which is the same as last review.  The largest
tenants include Citibank, N.A. (33% of the NRA; lease expiration
February 2017) and Travelers Indemnity Company (19% of the NRA;
lease expiration August 2021).  Nearly a third of Citibank's space
is subleased to Xerox Corp.  The loan sponsor is SL Green.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.74X, respectively, the same as
at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Southaven Towne Center Loan ($38.7
million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 271,830 SF
retail property located in Southaven, Mississippi.  Southaven, a
city in DeSoto County, Mississippi, United States, is a suburb of
Memphis, Tennessee.  Largest tenants include Gorman's, HH Gregg
Electronics and Bed Bath and Beyond.  Additional stores include
Dillard's (not part of the collateral), Claire's, Ashley Furniture,
American Eagle and Finish Line.  As of December 2015, the property
was 98% leased.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 0.98X at the last review.



NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-2: Moody's Rates Cl. B-5 Debt 'B3(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 11
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-2.  The NRMLT 2016-2 transaction is a securitization of $301.1
million of first lien, seasoned performing and re-performing
mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of approximately 154
months, weighted average updated LTV ratio of 56.9% and weighted
average updated FICO score of 699. Approximately 91.1% of the loans
have been either current or not more than 30 days delinquent in the
past 24 months.  Approximately 20.2% of the loans in the pool were
previously modified.  Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC and PNC Mortgage ,
will act as primary servicers and Nationstar Mortgage LLC will act
as master and successor servicer.

The complete rating action is:

  Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IO, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Our losses on the collateral pool average 2.45% in an expected
scenario and reach 14.45% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes.  Moody's based its expected losses
on the pool on our estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances.  The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and Moody's
assessment of the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework
for this transaction.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to our surveillance approach.  Under this approach, we
apply expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool.  Moody's assumptions on these variables
are based on the observed rate of delinquency on seasoned modified
and non-modified loans, and the collateral attributes of the pool
including the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past
24 months.  For this pool, Moody's used default burnout and
voluntary CPR assumptions similar to those detailed in our "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated before 2005.
Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to
losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and
loss severity assumptions.

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2016-2 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor V LLC, has previously purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts.  Of these collapsed
loans, approximately 67% based on balance were originated to Alt A
guidelines, 19% of the loans by balance were originated to subprime
guidelines and 14% based on balance were originated to prime
guidelines.  The transaction consists primarily of 30-year fixed
rate loans. 79.8% of the loans in this pool by balance have never
been modified and have been performing while approximately 20.2% of
the loans were previously modified but are now current and cash
flowing.  The weighted average seasoning on the collateral is
approximately 154 months.

Property values were updated using home data index (HDI) values or
broker price opinions (BPOs) which were both provided by Clear
Capital and eMortgage Logic.  HDIs were obtained for all but 20 of
the 2,449 properties and 2,421 properties were included in the
securitization pool.  In addition, updated BPOs were obtained from
a third party BPO provider for 658 properties.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties
("R&W")

A third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review on a sample of 875 loans proposed to be included in the
mortgage pool.  The regulatory compliance review consisted of a
review of compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in
Lending Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement
Protection Act/Regulation X (TILA), and federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations.  The TPR identified 457 loans with
compliance exceptions, the majority of which were due to missing
HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charges, missing
right to cancel disclosures, or missing FACTA disclosures. Although
the diligence provider's report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages.

The third party due diligence provider also conducted reviews of
data integrity, pay history, and title/lien on selected samples to
confirm that certain information in the mortgage loan files matched
the information supplied by the servicers.  Any issues identified
during the data integrity review were corrected on the data tape,
and the pay history analysis indicated there were no material pay
history issues on the data tape.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files.  To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer, depositor or
custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage
loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding
the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the
mortgage loan documents, and such missing document, defect or
breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization
against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or
similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title
claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such
actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the related seller, indenture
trustee, depositor, master servicer, related servicer and
custodian.  Upon notification of a missing or defective mortgage
loan file, the related seller will have 120 days from the date it
receives such notification to deliver the missing document or
otherwise cure the defect or breach.  If it is unable to do so, the
related seller will be obligated to replace or repurchase the
mortgage loan.

Despite this provision, we increased our loss severities to account
for loans with missing title policies (according to both the
title/lien review and a custodial file review), mortgage notes, or
mortgage/deed/security agreements.  This adjustment was based on
both the results of the TPR review and because the R&W provider is
an unrated entity and weak from a credit perspective. In our
analysis we assumed that 2.74% of the projected defaults will have
missing documents' breaches that will not be remedied and result in
higher than expected loss severities.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association.  The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.  The paying agent and cash management functions
will be performed by Citibank, N.A.  In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers.

Ocwen has experienced significant losses over the past two years
due to regulatory issues and limited opportunities in its core
market.  A further weakening of Ocwen's financial profile could
adversely impact its ability to service the loans serviced by it
adequately.  However, having Nationstar Mortgage LLC as a master
servicer mitigates this risk due to the performance oversight that
it will provide.  Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the named successor
servicer for the transaction and we assess Nationstar Mortgage
LLC's servicing quality assessment at SQ3+ as a master servicer of
residential mortgage loans.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met.  To pass the first test,
the delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50%
of the subordinate bonds outstanding.  To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool.  The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 3.0% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 16.0  These provisions
mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from our original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in March 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-3: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OneMain Financial
Issuance Trust 2016-3's $350.000 million asset-backed notes series
2016-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.0%, 48.5%, 41.4%, and
      34.50% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

      These credit support levels are sufficient to withstand
      stresses commensurate with the ratings on the notes based on

      S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of our 'A+ (sf)',
      'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of credit

      deterioration as equal to a two-category downgrade within
      the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely payment of periodic interest

      and principal by the legal final maturity date according to
      the transaction documents, based on stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, using assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- OneMain Financial Group LLC's (OneMain's) established
      management and its experience in origination and servicing
      consumer loan products.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s (Wells Fargo; the backup servicer)
      consumer loan servicing experience.

   -- The operational risks associated with OneMain's
      decentralized business model.

   -- The uncertainty concerning the integration of OneMain's
      operations with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s operations.  OneMain

      Holdings Inc. (formerly known as Springleaf Holdings Inc.)
      acquired OneMain from CitiFinancial Credit Co., a wholly
      owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., on Nov. 15, 2015.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-3

Class       Rating     Type          Interest           Amount
                                         Rate(%)      (mil. $)
A           A+ (sf)    Senior            3.83          248.700
B           BBB (sf)   Subordinate       5.61           38.710
C           BB (sf)    Subordinate       6.86           29.530
D           B+ (sf)    Subordinate       7.50           33.060


PETRA CRE CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on these notes
issued by Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on six classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a cash transaction whose reinvestment
period ended in June 2013.  The transaction is currently backed
solely by one defaulted mezzanine interest (100.0% of the current
pool balance).  As of the May 25, 2016 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $346.9 million from $1.0 billion at
issuance with the pay-down currently directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes.  The pay down is due to regular
amortization, recoveries on defaulted assets, interest proceeds
paid as principal as a result of failing certain par value
triggers.

On the April 25, 2016, payment date, an event of default occurred
on the transaction as a result of a default in the payment of
interest to the senior most outstanding class of notes.

Moody's does expect significant losses to occur on the defaulted
assets once realized and has accounted for this in its analysis.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate.  The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000,
the same as that at last review.  The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-C (100.0%, the same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.5 years, the same as that at last
review.  The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in July 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change.  The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions.  The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments.  However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced today are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance.  Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


RAMP TRUST: Moody's Hikes $258MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 11 tranches,
from 7 transactions issued by RFC backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RZ2 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS2 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS3 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS6 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of stable or improving performance of the
related pools and/or total credit enhancement available to the
bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in April
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.



SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Gives Prov. B1 Rating on B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 53
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2016-1.  The certificates are backed by one
pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans.  The assets of
the trust consist of 493 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans, substantially all of which have an original term to maturity
of 30 years.  The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2016-1
  Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO19, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-IO21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-IO22, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-IO23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO25, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is
0.35%. Aaa (sf) subordination for this transaction is 5.00%, which
is 0.75% higher than Moody's Aaa stress loss on the collateral of
4.25%.

The Aaa MILAN CE, inclusive of concentration adjustments, for this
pool is 4.25%.  Loan-level adjustments included: adjustments to
borrower probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, and at a pool level, for the default risk of HOA
properties in super lien states.  The MILAN model is based on
stressed trajectories of HPA, unemployment rates and interest
rates, at a monthly frequency over a ten year period.  The model
combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for a
portfolio as a whole.  Severity is also calculated on a loan-level
basis.  The pool loss level is then adjusted for borrower, zip
code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2016-1 transaction is a securitization
of 493 first lien residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate
unpaid principal balance of $344,889,837.  There are 109
originators in the transaction including Quicken Loans, Inc.
representing 16.4% of the outstanding principal balance of the
loans, First Republic Bank representing 6.4% of the outstanding
principal balance of the loans and PrimeLending, a PlainsCapital
Company representing 5.3% of the outstanding principal balance of
the mortgage loans.  The remaining originators each account for
less than 5.0% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool.
The loan-level review encompassed credit underwriting, property
value and regulatory compliance.  In addition, Redwood has agreed
to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of all
originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood), which Moody's has assessed as an Above
Average aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages. There have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that closed in
2010 and later, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Structural Considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent.  These loans on which principal
and interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance
Mortgage Loans ("SAML").  The balance of the SAML will be removed
from the principal and interest distribution amounts calculations.
Moody's views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the
integrity of senior and subordination relationships in the
structure.  Yet, in certain scenarios the SAML concept, as
implemented in this transaction, can lead to a reduction in
interest payment to certain tranches even when more subordinated
tranches are outstanding.  The senior/subordination relationship
between tranches is strengthened as the removal SAML in the
calculation of the senior percentage amount, directs more principal
to the senior bonds and less to the subordinate bonds. Further,
this feature limits the amount of servicer advances that could
increase the loss severity on the liquidated loans and preserves
the subordination amount for the most senior bonds.  On the other
hand, this feature can cause a reduction in the interest
distribution amount paid to the bonds; and if that were to happen
such a reduction in interest payment is unlikely to be recovered.
The final ratings on the bonds, which are expected loss ratings,
take into consideration our expected losses on the collateral and
the potential reduction in interest distributions to the bonds.
Furthermore, the likelihood that in particular the subordinate
tranches could potentially permanently lose some interest as a
result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios.  Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk.  The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.70% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Third party due diligence firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information the sponsor provided us.  One TPR firm
reviewed 100% of the mortgage loans for credit, property valuation,
compliance and data integrity.  Two other TPR firms reviewed a
sample of mortgage loans for property valuation and data integrity.
The custodian reviewed the mortgage files and did not find any
exceptions.

The due diligence review found that the majority of loans were
compliant with Redwood's underwriting guidelines and had no
valuation or regulatory defects.  Most of the loans that were not
compliant with Redwood's underwriting guidelines had strong
compensating factors.

Although the TPR report identified compliance-related exceptions
relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) rule, we
did not believe these to be material because either the sponsor or
originator corrected the errors or the errors are of a type that
would not likely lead to damages for the RMBS trust.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W.  There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee.  In addition,
CitiMortgage, Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers.  In addition, CitiMortgage, Inc., is committed
to act as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down
Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.

Up
Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


STACR 2016-HQA2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class M-3AF Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to nine
classes of notes on STACR 2016-HQA2, a securitization designed to
provide credit protection to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) against the performance of approximately
$18.5 billion reference pool of mortgages. All of the Notes in the
transaction are direct, unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac and as
such investors are exposed to the credit risk of Freddie Mac
(currently Aaa Stable).

The complete rating action is as follows:

$134.0 million of Class M-1 notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A3
(sf)

$201.0 million of Class M-2 notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

The Class M-2 noteholders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$201.0 million of Class M-2F exchangeable notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$201.0 million of Class M-2I exchangeable notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$134.0 million of Class M-3A notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
(sf)

The Class M-3A noteholders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$134.0 million of Class M-3AF exchangeable notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Ba2 (sf)

$134.0 million of Class M-3AI exchangeable notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Ba2 (sf)

$134.0 million of Class M-3B notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B3
(sf)

The Class M-3A and M-3B noteholders can exchange their notes for
the following notes:

$268.0 million of Class M-3 notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B1
(sf)

STACR 2016-HQA2 is the fourth transaction in the HQA series issued
by Freddie Mac. Similar to STACR 2016-HQA1, STACR 2016-HQA2's note
write-downs are determined by actual realized losses and
modification losses on the loans in the reference pool, and not
tied to a pre-set tiered severity schedule. In addition, the
interest amount paid to the notes can be reduced by the amount of
modification loss incurred on the mortgage loans. STACR 2016-HQA2
is also the ninth transaction in the STACR series (including
STACR-DNA) to have a legal final maturity of 12.5 years, as
compared to 10 years in STACR-DN and STACR-HQ securitizations.
Unlike typical RMBS transactions, STACR 2016-HQA2 noteholders are
not entitled to receive any cash from the mortgage loans in the
reference pool. Instead, the timing and amount of principal and
interest that Freddie Mac is obligated to pay on the notes are
linked to the performance of the mortgage loans in the reference
pool. Each of the mortgages in the reference pool had a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination that was greater than 80%
and equal to or less than 95%.

Moody's rating on the transaction is based on both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. This included a quantitative evaluation of
the credit quality of the reference pool and the impact of the
structural mechanisms on credit enhancement, as well as qualitative
assessments regarding the operational strength of Freddie Mac to
oversee its sellers and servicers.

Moody's base-case expected loss on for the reference pool is 1.15%
and is expected to reach 11.30% at a stress level consistent with a
Aaa rating.

The Notes

The M-1 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-2 notes can
exchange those notes for an M-2I exchangeable note and an M-2F
exchangeable note. The M-2I exchangeable notes are fixed rate
interest only notes that have a notional balance that equals the
M-2 note balance. The M-2F notes are adjustable rate P&I notes that
have a balance that equals the M-2 note balance and an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The M-3A notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-3A notes can
exchange those notes for an M-3AI exchangeable note and an M-3AF
exchangeable note. The M-3AI exchangeable notes are fixed rate
interest only notes that have a notional balance that equals the
M-3A note balance. The M-3AF notes are adjustable rate P&I notes
that have a balance that equals the M-3A note balance and an
interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The M-3B notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The M-3 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-3 notes can
exchange those notes for the M-3A and M-3B notes, and vice versa.
The M-3 exchangeable notes have a balance equal to the sum of the
M-3A and M-3B note balance, and a note rate based upon the exchange
portions of the related M-3A and M-3B notes, which is effectively
equal to the weighted average of M-3A and M-3B note rates.

Freddie Mac will only make principal payments on the notes based on
the scheduled and unscheduled principal payments that are actually
collected on the reference pool mortgages. Losses on the notes
occur as a result of credit events and modifications, and are
determined by actual realized and modification losses on loans in
the reference pool, and not tied to a pre-set loss severity
schedule. Freddie Mac is obligated to retire the notes in November
2028 if balances remain outstanding.

Credit events in STACR 2016-HQA2 occur when a short sale is
settled, when a seriously delinquent mortgage note is sold prior to
foreclosure, when the mortgaged property that secured the related
mortgage note is sold to a third party at a foreclosure sale, when
an REO disposition occurs, or when the related mortgage note is
charged-off. This differs from STACR-DN and STACR-HQ
securitizations, where credit events occur as early as when a
reference obligation is 180 or more days delinquent.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

As part of its analysis, Moody's considered historic Freddie Mac
performance and severity data, the eligibility criteria of loans in
the reference pool, and the high credit quality of the underlying
collateral. The reference pool consists of loans that Freddie Mac
acquired between July 1, 2015 and September 30, 2015, and have no
previous 30-day delinquencies since purchase. The loans in the
reference pool are to strong borrowers, as the weighted average
credit score of 749 indicates. The weighted average CLTV of 92% is
far higher than that of recent private label prime jumbo deals,
which typically have CLTVs in the high 60's range, but is similar
to the weighted average CLTV of other STACR-HQA and STACR-HQ
transactions. 99.9% of loans in the pool were covered by mortgage
insurance at origination with 74.4% covered by borrower provided
mortgage insurance (BPMI) and 25.5% covered by lender provided
mortgage insurance (LPMI). Freddie Mac will backstop the mortgage
insurance in this transaction.

Structural considerations

Moody's said, "we took structural features such as the principal
payment waterfall of the notes, a 12.5-year bullet maturity,
performance triggers, as well as the allocation of realized losses
and modification losses into consideration in our cash flow
analysis. The final structure for the transaction reflects
consistent credit enhancement levels available to the notes per the
offering circular.

"For modification losses, we have taken into consideration the
level of rate modifications based on the projected defaults, the
weighted average coupon of the reference pool (4.20%), and compared
that with the available credit enhancement on the notes, the coupon
and the accrued interest amount of the most junior bonds. Class B
and Class B-H reference tranches represent 1.00% of the pool. The
final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the amount of
interest available to absorb modification losses from the reference
pool."

The ratings are linked to Freddie Mac's rating. As an unsecured
general obligation of Freddie Mac, the rating on the notes will be
capped by the rating of Freddie Mac, which Moody's currently rates
Aaa (stable).

Collateral Analysis

The reference pool consists of 80,001 loans that meet specific
eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first lien, fixed
rate, fully amortizing loans with 30 year terms and original LTV
ratios that range between 80% and 95% on one to four unit
properties. The credit positive aspects of the pool include
borrower, loan and geographic diversification, and a high weighted
average FICO of 749. There are no interest-only (IO) loans in the
reference pool and all of the loans are underwritten to full
documentation standards.

Reps and Warranties

Moody's said, "Freddie Mac is not providing loan level reps and
warranties (RWs) for this transaction because the notes are a
direct obligation of Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac commands robust RWs
from its seller/servicers pertaining to all facets of the loan,
including but not limited to compliance with laws, compliance with
all underwriting guidelines, enforceability, good property
condition and appraisal procedures. To the extent that Freddie Mac
discovers a confirmed underwriting defect or a major servicing
defect, in the reference pool prior months' credit events will be
reversed. Our expected credit event rate takes into consideration
historic repurchase rates."


STONE TOWER VI: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Stone Tower CLO VI Ltd.:

US$37,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A1
(sf); previously on October 14, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$140,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
balance of $30,716,503), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October
14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$550,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
balance of $73,055,597), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October
14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$61,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on October 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$56,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on October 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$47,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 14, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

US$31,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Ba1
(sf); previously on October 14, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Stone Tower CLO VI Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2015. The Class
A-1 and A-2a notes have been paid down by approximately 47.5% or
$27.8 million and 62.4% or $121.3 million, respectively, since that
time. Based on the trustee's May 2016 report, the OC ratios for the
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported at
169.0%, 139.3%, 122.4% and 111.1%, respectively, versus October
2015 levels of 142.0%, 126.0%, 115.7% and 108.3%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since October 2015. Based on the trustee's May 2016 report, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2935 compared to
2492 on October 2015.


TELOS CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, E,
and F notes from Telos CLO 2013-3 Ltd., a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in February 2013 and
is managed by Telos Asset Management LLC.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.  The
rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's performance
using data from the April 4, 2016, trustee report.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in January 2017.  S&P anticipates that the manager
will continue to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the
transaction documents.

According to the April 4, 2016, trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios are well-above their minimum
requirements and they have increased marginally since the effective
date.  For instance, the class A/B ratio is 134.92%, up from
134.26% in the July 2013 trustee report, which S&P used for its
effective date analysis, and the class E ratio is 109.91%, up from
109.38%.

Although the cash flow results show higher ratings for all the
notes, S&P's final ratings reflect additional sensitivities to
capture any potential changes in the underlying portfolio until the
notes begin to amortize.  In addition, there has been a significant
increase in 'CCC' rated assets.  The amount of 'CCC' rated assets
has increased to $40.05 million, according to the April 4, 2016,
trustee report, from the $2.50 million reported in the July 2013
trustee report.  These factors are offset by the underlying
collateral pool's seasoning since S&P's effective date analysis.
The transaction also exhibits considerable exposure to the energy
sector, with over 8.56% of the collateral pool comprising assets
from the oil and gas and nonferrous metals/mining industries.  The
currently distressed nature of these industries could lead to
potential negative rating actions on the class F notes in the
future.  

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Telos CLO 2013-3 Ltd.

                    Cash flow
       Previous     implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating       rating     cushion(i)  rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   6.15%       AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)   9.21%       AA (sf)
C      A (sf)       A+ (sf)    6.65%       A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)  5.05%       BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)   2.79%       BB (sf)
F      B (sf)       B+ (sf)    1.27%       B (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios
by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess
the current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation
assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA (sf)    A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)    A- (sf)    BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)
F      B+ (sf)    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)    B (sf)

                  DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.
                                             
                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)       AA (sf)       AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    B- (sf)       BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     CC (sf)       B+ (sf)       BB (sf)
F      B+ (sf)      CC (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Telos CLO 2013-3 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A                       AAA (sf)
B                       AA (sf)
C                       A (sf)
D                       BBB (sf)
E                       BB (sf)
F                       B (sf)


TIAA CLO I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to TIAA CLO I
Ltd./TIAA CLO I LLC's $414.000 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 2,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

TIAA CLO I Ltd./TIAA CLO I LLC

Class                Rating                      Amount
                                               (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)                  292.500
B                     AA (sf)                    47.250
C (deferrable)        A (sf)                     31.500
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)                   22.500
E-1 (deferrable)      BB- (sf)                   10.000
E-2 (deferrable)      BB- (sf)                   10.250
Subordinated notes    NR                         41.545

NR--Not rated.


TRINITAS CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Trinitas CLO IV
Ltd./Trinitas CLO IV LLC's $370.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings are based on information as of June 2, 2016.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by S&P Global
      Ratings using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's and designated successor manager's
      experienced management teams.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.3439%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of a certain amount
      of excess interest proceeds available (before paying
      deferred interest on the class F notes, uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge
      termination payments, subordinated management fees, asset
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments)
      during the reinvestment period, at the collateral manager's
      option, as principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets or to pay principal on the notes according

      to the note payment sequence.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Trinitas CLO IV Ltd./Trinitas CLO IV LLC

                                      Amount
Class                Rating         (mil. $)
X                    AAA (sf)           2.00
A                    AAA (sf)         258.00
B                    AA (sf)           42.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)            28.00
D-1 (deferrable)     BBB (sf)          15.00
D-2 (deferrable)     BBB (sf)           5.00
E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)          20.00
Subordinated notes   NR                36.65

NR--Not rated.


VERTICAL BRIDGE 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class F Debt 'BB-sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for VB-S1 Issuer, LLC's
Secured Tower Revenue Notes Series 2016-1.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $240,000,000 series 2016-1 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,000,000 series 2016-1 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,000,000 series 2016-1 class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 17, 2016.

The transaction is an issuance of notes backed by mortgages
representing approximately 90.2% of the annualized run rate net
cash flow (ARRNCF) and guaranteed by the direct parent of the
borrower. This guarantee is secured by a pledge and
first-priority-perfected security interest in 100% of the equity
interest of the issuer (a direct subsidiary of which owns or leases
1,529 wireless communication sites). The notes will be issued
pursuant to an indenture dated as of the expected closing of the
series 2016-1 transaction.

The ratings reflect a structured finance analysis of the cash flows
from the ownership interest in cellular sites, not an assessment of
the corporate default risk of the ultimate parent, Vertical
Bridge.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Trust Leverage: Fitch Ratings' NCF on the pool is $36.5 million,
implying a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.23x. The debt multiple relative to Fitch's NCF is 8.8x, which
equates to a debt yield of 11.4%.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: There are 2,378 wireless tenant
leases. Telephony tenants represent approximately 85% of the
annualized run rate revenue (ARRR), and 47.4% of the ARRR is from
investment-grade tenants. The tenant leases have weighted average
annual escalators of approximately 3% and a weighted average final
remaining term (including renewals) of 25.1 years. The largest
tenant, AT&T (31.4% of ARRR) is rated investment grade by Fitch
(Long-Term Issuer-Default Rating of 'A-'/Stable Outlook).
No Term Securitization History: This is the first term
securitization completed by Vertical Bridge. VB's management team
consists of the former team that managed Global Tower Partners
(GTP) and from 2007 - 2013, GTP issued $2.0 billion of
securitization notes. Additionally, the 2016-1 notes are structured
with a more conservative cash trap trigger (1.60x) and
early-amortization DSCR trigger (1.40x) than comparable
transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch performed several stress scenarios in which Fitch's NCF was
stressed. Fitch determined that a 63% reduction in Fitch's NCF
would cause the notes to break even at 1.0x DSCR on an
interest-only basis.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for series 2016-1
class C, and an 8% decline in NCF would result in a one-category
downgrade, while a 17% decline would result in a downgrade to below
investment grade.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL2: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes,
downgraded the rating on one class, and affirmed the ratings on
four classes in Wamu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL2
as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I classes A-1A, B, C and D were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 27% since Moody's
last review.

The ratings on P&I classes E, F, G and H were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class X was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.2% of the
current balance, compared to 7.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.5% at the prior review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 27, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 77% to $197 million
from $842 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 215 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 21% of
the pool.

Sixty-seven loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $27.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$3.8 million loss for the specially serviced loans (99% expected
loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 31 poorly
performing loans, constituting 16% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $9.3 million (a 30% expected loss based on a
62% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 97% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 59% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 95%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 1.46X and 1.16X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Westlake
Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-2's $550 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 3,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 43.63%, 38.08%, 29.56%,
      22.87%, and 19.75% of credit support for the class A, B, C,
      D, and E notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These provide
      approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x,
      respectively, of S&P's 12.00%-12.50% expected cumulative net

      loss range.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      principal payments under stress cash flow modeling scenarios

      appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, S&P's ratings on the class A

      and B notes would not be lowered from the assigned
      preliminary ratings, S&P's ratings on the class C notes
      would remain within one rating category of the assigned
      preliminary ratings over one year, and S&P's ratings on the
      class D and E notes would remain within two rating
      categories of the assigned preliminary ratings, which is
      within the bounds of S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime automobile loans.

   -- The originator/servicer's long history in the
      subprime/specialty auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of approximately 10 years (2006-2016) of
      static pool data on the company's lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-2

Class   Prelim rtg  Type          Interest              Amount
                                  rate(i)             (mil. $)
A-1     A-1+ (sf)   Senior        Fixed                 149.00
A-2     AAA (sf)    Senior        Fixed/floating(ii)    219.00
B       AA (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed                  42.00
C       A (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed                  60.80
D       BBB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed                  50.66
E       BB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed                  28.54

(i) The interest rate for each class will be determined on the
pricing date.  
(ii) The class A-2 notes will be split into fixed-rate class A-2A
and floating-rate class A-2B.  The sizes of class A-2A and A-2B
will be determined at pricing, and class A2-B will be a max of 50%
of the overall class.  The class A-2B coupon will be expressed as a
spread tied to one-month LIBOR.


WESTWOOD CDO I: Moody's Cuts 2021 Class D Rating to 'B1(sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Westwood CDO I, Ltd.:

US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2015
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$13,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on December 10, 2015
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

In addition, Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following
notes:

US$342,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $189,814,354), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on December 10, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

US$16,600,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

US$4,400,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2021, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on December 10, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Westwood CDO I, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in March
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade on the Class B notes and rating affirmations on
the Class A-1, A-2, C-1 and C-2 notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's Class A, B and C over-collateralization (OC) ratios
since November 2015. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 14.1% or $31.2 million since then. Based on the
trustee's May 2016 report, the OC ratios for the Class A, B, and C
notes are reported at 136.8%, 119.8%, and 110.3%, respectively,
versus November 2015 levels of 133.1%, 118.5%, and 110.0%,
respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class D notes reflects a decrease in
the Class D OC ratio and deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying collateral portfolio. Based on the trustee's May 2016
report, the Class D OC ratio is at 104.9%, versus the November 2015
level of 105.2%. The erosion of the Class D OC ratio is a result of
new defaults since November 2015, as well as par losses from
selling assets below their par value. Additionally, the trustee's
reported weighted average rating factor for May 2016 is 2517
compared to 2342 in November 2015.


[*] Fitch Takes Various Actions on 189 RMBS Deals From 112 Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating action on 189 U.S. RMBS classes from
112 Alt-A and Subprime transactions:

-- 130 classes maintained on Rating Watch Negative;
-- 44 classes maintained on Rating Watch Positive;
-- 6 classes downgraded to 'Dsf';
-- 9 classes marked Paid-in-Full (PIF).


KEY RATING DRIVERS

All classes in this review exhibited either positive or negative
rating pressure during their last review in December 2015. At that
time, the classes were placed on Rating Watch while Fitch's U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model was undergoing its annual review. With the
model review recently completed, Fitch maintains Rating Watch on
the majority of classes and expects to resolve the ratings of the
affected classes in the coming months.

Six classes that were on Rating Watch Negative have incurred
principal writedowns since the last review and have been downgraded
to 'Dsf'. Additionally, nine classes have received full principal
with no losses and have been marked PIF.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


[*] Moody's Puts on Review 8 Note Classes in 5 FFELP-Backed Loans
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on six tranches
from four securitizations sponsored by Navient Solutions, Inc. and
on two tranches of in one securitization sponsored by Goal
Financial, LLC.  The transactions are backed by Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans that are guaranteed by the US
government for a minimum of 97% of defaulted principal and accrued
interest.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Goal Capital Funding Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-6, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
   previously on Feb. 10, 2015, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on May 31, 2006, Assigned A3 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-14

  Cl. B, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-7

  Cl. B, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2004-10

  Cl. A-8, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
   previously on May 5, 2014, Affirmed Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on May 5, 2014 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Issuer: SLM Student Loan Trust 2006-4

  Cl. A-6, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
   previously on Sept. 16, 2015, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Sept. 16, 2015, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The reviews result from the correction of an error in the priority
of payments of excess distribution amounts on the notes.  After the
pool balance declines to 10% or 5% of the initial pool balance,
depending on the transaction, the excess distribution amounts
should be distributed to the noteholders as additional principal
payments instead of to the residual holder.  Payments of the excess
distribution amounts should be made sequentially: first to the
Class A noteholders, until they are paid in full, then to the Class
B noteholders.  However, our model allocated such excess
distribution amounts to both Class A and Class B noteholders on a
pro rata basis (i.e., in proportion to the outstanding Class A and
Class B class balances).  The correction of this error could impact
the credit quality of some of the Class A notes positively, since
they will receive more cash from the excess distribution amounts,
and the credit quality of the Class B notes negatively, since they
will receive less cash from the excess distribution payments.

The error correction will likely not affect the ratings of classes
A-5A and A-5B in the SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-7 transaction,
which remain on review for downgrade.  Moody's placed these classes
on review for downgrade on June 22, 2015, as a result of the
increased risk that the tranches will not fully pay down by their
respective final maturity dates.  The potential upgrade pressure
due to the correction of the model error noted above may be offset
by the risk that these tranches will not fully pay down by final
maturity.

During the review period, Moody's will evaluate recent and expected
pool amortization trends, conduct detailed cash flow analyses and
examine structural features of the transactions to assess whether
the change in the excess distribution payment impacts the current
ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in April 2012.

These rating actions were based on Moody's existing Credit Rating
Methodology entitled "Moody's Approach to Rating Securities Backed
by FFELP Student Loans," dated April 02, 2012.  Please note that on
July 09, 2015, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which it
has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its Credit
Rating Methodology for FFELP Student Loans.  If the revised Credit
Rating Methodology is implemented as proposed, review status of
some of the tranches might change.  Please refer to Moody's Request
for Comment, titled "Proposed Changes to Moody's Approach to Rating
Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Credit Rating
Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions.  The decision to take
(or not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a
range of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are high levels
of voluntary prepayments, continued lower levels of deferment and
forbearance, and decrease use of Income Based Repayment or Extended
Repayment plans.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are continued
low levels of voluntary prepayments, high levels of deferment and
forbearance, and growing use of Income Based Repayment or Extended
Repayment plans.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $297MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 23 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of two tranches backed by Prime Jumbo
and Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2004-K Trust

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-2

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-1

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QR1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS14 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-S2 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2011 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA1 Trust

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-4 Trust

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating actions are mainly due to corrections to certain
data inputs to the cash-flow waterfalls used by Moody's to review
these transactions since their last rating actions. The inputs
relate to the allocation of principal between the senior and
subordinate bonds after a breach in performance triggers. The
cash-flow waterfalls did not capture the correct prepayment
percentages and were allocating an incorrect portion of principal
prepayments to subordinate bonds. The errors have now been
corrected, and the rating actions reflect the appropriate
allocation of principal prepayments. The actions also reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The downgrade actions on Classes II-A-1
and II-A2 from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-4 Trust
are due to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and
the erosion of enhancement available to the bonds. The ratings on
Classes A-3 and A-4 from RALI Series 2004-QR1 Trust have been
upgraded due to Moody's updated loss expectation and the upgrade on
the underlying bond. The resecuritization is backed by Class A-1
issued by RALI Series 2004-QS14 Trust.


[*] Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $261.2MM of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 31, 2016, upgraded the ratings of
15 tranches from six transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans,
and issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3

  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2012,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

  Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 10,
   2016, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   Caa1, Outlook changed to Negative on May 20, 2016)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF5

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 28, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT2

  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 13, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 23, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 23, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS2 Trust

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily the result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated
loss expectation on these pools.  The ratings upgraded are due to
the stable or improving performance of the underlying collateral
and the total credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The rating actions also reflect corrections to the cash-flow models
used by Moody's in rating the transactions RASC Series 2006-KS2,
First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF5, Option One Mortgage
Loan Trust 2003-3 and HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust
2006-OPT2.  The models for RASC Series 2006-KS2 and First Franklin
Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF5 were corrected to calculate the capped
coupon using scheduled interest instead of collected interest which
results in less excess funds paid out as principal.  The models for
Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3 and HSI Asset Securitization
Corporation Trust 2006-OPT2 were corrected to eliminate the double
payment of the Trustee and Servicing Fee which makes more interest
funds available to the transaction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 41 Classes From 15 CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 28 classes from nine
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions
and 13 classes from six CF collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- AIMCO CLO Series 2006-A (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      May 2016.  AMAC CDO Funding I (CDO OF CMBS): senior-most
      tranche paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Apidos Cinco CDO (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down,
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust (CDO OF CMBS): senior-
      most tranche paid down, other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Ares XII CLO Ltd (CF CLO): Optional redemption in May 2016.

   -- Capmark VII-CRE Ltd. (CDO OF CMBS): senior-most tranche paid

      down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Foothill CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): Optional redemption in May
      2016.  Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I Ltd. (CF CLO):
      Optional redemption in May 2016.

   -- Halcyon Loan Investors CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most
      tranche paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Highland Park CDO I Ltd. (CDO oF CMBS): senior most tranches

      paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- KKR Financial CLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Marathon Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd. (CDO OF CMBS): optional

      Redemption in May 2016.

   -- Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. (CDO oF CMBS): senior-most
      tranche paid down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Nantucket CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Venture V CDO Ltd (CF CLO): Optional redemption in May 2016.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

AIMCO CLO Series 2006-A
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

AMAC CDO Funding I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  BB+ (sf)

Apidos Cinco CDO
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a                NR                  AAA (sf)

ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  BBB- (sf)

Ares XII CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A- (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Capmark VII-CRE Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Foothill CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA- (sf)
E                   NR                  A- (sf)
Type I Q            NR                  AA+p (sf)

Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Halcyon Loan Investors CLO I Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  BB- (sf)

KKR Financial CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Marathon Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
B                   NR                  BB+ (sf)
C                   NR                  B (sf)
D                   NR                  B- (sf)
E                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)
F                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)
G                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)
H                   NR                  CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-J                 NR                  CCC- (sf)

Nantucket CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Venture V CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

NR -- Not rated.
p -- Principal only.


[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 10 Classes From 5 CMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on May 31, 2016, lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from five
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

Specifically, S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on nine classes
from five U.S. CMBS transactions due to accumulated interest
shortfalls that S&P expects to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  S&P also lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' the rating on
class C from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 due
to current interest shortfalls and its susceptibility to periodic
shortfalls.

The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates
are primarily due to one or more of these factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets;

   -- The lack of servicer advancing for loans/assets where the
      servicer has made nonrecoverable advance declarations;

   -- Interest rate modifications or deferrals, or both, related
      to corrected mortgage loans; or

   -- Special servicing fees.

S&P's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts based on
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using recent Member
of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P also considered
servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing
fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts according
to each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms
call for an ARA equal to 25% of the stated principal balance of a
loan to be implemented when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
time frame.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from the
affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  This is because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the MAI
appraisals.

Servicer-nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt-service advancing, the recovery of previously
made advances after an asset was deemed nonrecoverable, or the
failure to advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations
have been determined.  Trust expenses may include, but are not
limited to, property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
payments, and legal expenses.

Discussions of the individual transactions:

          BANC OF AMERICA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-4

S&P lowered its ratings on classes D and E to 'D (sf)' to reflect
its expectation that accumulated interest shortfalls will remain
outstanding for the near term.  Classes D and E have accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for two months and ten months,
respectively.  In addition, S&P lowered class C to 'CCC- (sf)' to
reflect current interest shortfalls and its susceptibility to
periodic shortfalls.  While class C may experience full repayment
of its outstanding interest shortfalls upon liquidation of certain
specially serviced assets, S&P believes this class is susceptible
to future shortfalls.  According to the May 10, 2016, trustee
remittance report, the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$1,209,482 and resulted primarily from:

   -- Other shortfalls totaling $438,094;
   -- Workout fees totaling $418,285;
   -- ASER amounts totaling $284,167;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $53,587; and
   -- Interest not advanced totaling $15,233.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class A-J.

   BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2006-PWR11

S&P lowered its rating on the class G commercial mortgage
pass-through certificate to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfall outstanding for 12 months.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term.  According to the May 11, 2016, trustee remittance report,
the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $102,631 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $53,166; and
   -- ASER amounts totaling $49,212.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class G.

    BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2006-PWR14

S&P lowered its ratings on the classes D and E commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for 10 months each.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term.  According to the May 11, 2016, trustee remittance report,
the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $183,298 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- Shortfalls due to interest rate modifications totaling
      $113,600;
   -- Current ASER totaling $46,340;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $13,703; and
   -- Workout fees totaling $8,701.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class D.

   BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUST 2007-TOP26

S&P lowered its rating on the class E commercial mortgage
pass-through certificate to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for nine months.  Based on S&P's
analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue in the near
term. According to the May 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $97,622 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Interest not advanced totaling $53,013;
   -- Repayment of prior shortfalls totaling $27,908;
   -- Workout fees totaling $6,952;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $4,540;
   -- ASER amounts totaling $4,377; and
   -- Reimbursement of advances paid to servicer totaling $1,202.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class E.

              LB-UBS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-C6

S&P lowered its ratings on the classes E, F, and G commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates to 'D (sf)' to reflect
accumulated interest shortfall outstanding for one to ten months.
Based on S&P's analysis, it expects interest shortfall to continue
in the near term.  According to the May 17, 2016, trustee
remittance report, the current monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$550,779 and resulted primarily from:

   -- Interest not advanced totaling $330,119;
   -- ASER amounts totaling $118,587;
   -- Special servicing fees totaling $101,242; and
   -- Workout fees totaling $1,002.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class E.

RATINGS LOWERED

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                  Reported
              Rating              Interest shortfalls
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
C         CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)     163,476    163,476
D         D (sf)      B- (sf)     114,636    227,365
E         D (sf)      CCC (sf)    82,432     612,544

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                  Reported
              Rating              Interest shortfalls
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
G         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)   36,884     484,889

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                  Reported
              Rating              Interest shortfalls
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
D         D (sf)      B- (sf)     39,934     307,180
E         D (sf)      CCC (sf)    98,280     982,798

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                  Reported
              Rating              Interest shortfalls
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
E         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)   43,058     210,543

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C6
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                  Reported
              Rating              Interest shortfalls
Class     To          From        Current    Accumulated
E         D (sf)      B (sf)      5,522      5,522
F         D (sf)      B- (sf)     176,769    589,845
G         D (sf)      B- (sf)     125,270    1,040,594


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

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