TCR_Public/160529.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 29, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 150

                            Headlines

A10 TERM ASSET 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class E Debt
AMERIQUEST SUBPRIME: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba3
AMMC CLO XI: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
AMMC CLO XII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes

AOZORA RE 2014-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Sr. Secured Notes
APIDOS CLO X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs
BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: DBRS Gives Prov B Rating to Cl. G Debt
BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch to Rate Class X-E Debt Rating 'BBsf'

BEAR STEARNS 2002-TOP6: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class J Debt
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class B Certs
BEAR STERNS 2001-TOP2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1

CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'B-'
CAPITALSOURCE TRUST 2006-A: Fitch Hikes Class C Debt Rating to Bsf
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2012-4: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CITIGROUP 2016-C1: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Hikes $841MM of Subprime RMBS

CMAC 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M Debt
COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'B-sf'
CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 9 Tranches
CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt

CSFB 1999-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. G Certs to 'BBsf'
CSMC TRUST 2014-TIKI: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
CWABS INC 2004-9: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. MF-1 Debt to B2
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CF2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. B-6 Certs
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. D Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
FANNIE MAE 2016-C03: Fitch Amends April 11 Ratings Release
FANNIE MAE: Fitch Corrects April 21 Ratings Release
FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Takes Actions After Review of 9 ABS Series
FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes

GCA2014 HOLDINGS: S&P Puts Cl. C Notes' BB Rating on Watch Neg.
GRAMERCY REAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to Ba1
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Debt

GS MORTGAGE 2014-NEW: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to BB+
GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch to Rate $31MM Class F Certs 'B-sf'
GSAA HOME 2005-5: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt to BB+
GSAMP TRUST 2003-SEA2: Moody's Cuts Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to B1(sf)
JAMESTOWN CLO I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes

JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B1(sf)
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC9: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 9 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2013-C13: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
JP MORGAN 2014-C21: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates

JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Puts 'BBsf' Rating to Cl. E Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C6: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to CCC-
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E2 Debt
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class E-2 Notes (P)Ba3

MASTR TRUST 2005-4: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-3 Debt Rating to Caa3(sf)
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-CAM1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. N Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. H Debt to BB+
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to Caa1
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. G Debt to BB

MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
MUIR WOODS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2003-1: S&P Hikes Cl. A-7 Debt Rating to B-

NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
NEWFLEET CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
NOMAD CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
OCP CLO 2016-11: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 27: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes

ONDECK ASSET 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class B Notes
PPM GRAYHAWK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB
PROTECTIVE LIFE 2007-PL: Fitch Hikes Class K Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on M Debt
RAIT 2015-FL4: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class X-1 Debt

RAMP TRUST 2003-RS10: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-II-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
REALT 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Ratings on Cl. F Debt
REALT 2016-1: Fitch Assigns B Rating on Class G Certificates
REGATTA VI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE 2016-I: S&P Rates Class 13 Notes BB-
RESOURCE CAPITAL 2014-CRE2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. C Debt
SCHOONER TRUST 2007-7: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. G Certs
SDART 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on $67.42MM Cl. E Notes
SOUND POINT II: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class B-2L Notes

TOWD POINT 2016-2 : DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class B1 Debt
VENTURE CLO XII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. K Debt
WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt

WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Finalizes BB Ratings on Cl. E Debt
WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt
WF-RBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating to Ba1
YORK CLO 3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to $20MM Class E Debt
[*] DBRS Confirms Ratings on 2 U.S. ABS Transactions

[*] DBRS Reviewed 472 Classes From 58 US RMBS Deals
[*] Fitch Lowers 16 Bonds in 8 Transactions to 'D'
[*] Moody's Hikes $122.2MM Securities Backed by Housing Collateral
[*] Moody's Hikes $855MM of Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC in 2005
[*] Moody's Hikes Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC in 2005

[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $719MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $88.4MM of Securities
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $235.5MM RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $37MM Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Loans
[*] Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $164MM of Subprime RMBS

[*] S&P Lowers 22 Ratings From 18 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 71 Classes From 15 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 6 RMBS Re-REMIC Transaction

                            *********

A10 TERM ASSET 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-1 (the Notes) to be issued by A10 Term Asset Financing 2016-1,
LLC. All trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Classes E and F are non-offered classes and are retained by the
Issuer.

The collateral consists of 27 loans, secured by 33 commercial
properties, all originated by A10 Capital, LLC (A10). A total of 11
underlying loans are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into
five separate portfolios or crossed groups. The DBRS analysis of
this transaction incorporates these crossed groups, resulting in a
modified loan count of 21, and loan references within this report
reflect this total. A10 specializes in mini-perm loans, which
typically have three- to five-year terms with extension options and
are used to finance properties until they are fully stabilized. The
borrowers are often new equity sponsors of fairly well-positioned
assets within their respective markets. A10’s initial advance is
the senior debt component typically for the purchase of a real
estate-owned acquisition or discounted payoff.

The pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity, based on the fully extended
loan term. Because of the floating-rate nature of almost half the
pool, the index (three-month LIBOR) was modeled at the lower of a
DBRS stressed rate that corresponded to the remaining fully
extended term of the loans and the strike price of the interest
rate cap, to the extent one is in-place, with the respective
contractual loan spread added to determine a stressed interest rate
over the loan term. For the hybrid loan, DBRS modeled the maximum
debt service expected throughout the life of the loan, which
occurred in the first 12 months of the loan’s switching to a
floating interest rate. When the cut-off whole-loan balances were
measured against the DBRS In-Place net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective in-place (fixed-rate loans) or stressed constants
(floating-rate loans), 16 loans, representing 70.7% of the total
loan commitments, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk, DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon amounts.
This resulted in 11 loans, representing 63.3% of the total
commitments, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x relative to the
DBRS Stabilized NCF. The properties are often transitioning, with
potential upside in the cash flow; however, DBRS does not give full
credit to the stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if other
loan structural features in place were insufficient to support such
treatment. Furthermore, even with structure provided, DBRS
generally does not assume the assets will stabilize above market
levels.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of the senior subordinate
notes other than the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes, ultimate recovery of
Deferred Collateralized Note Interest Amounts (inclusive of
interest payable thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent
permitted by law). Accordingly, DBRS will assign its Interest in
Arrears designation to any class of Offered Notes (other than the
Class A Notes) during any Interest Accrual Period when such class
accrues Deferred Collateralized Note Amounts.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the credit provided by the transaction structure and underlying
trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing surveillance,
which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS after the date
of issuance.


AMERIQUEST SUBPRIME: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
from three transactions backed by Subprime RMBS loans, and issued
by Ameriquest.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-11

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R1

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R5

  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to the the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds and the stable performance of the underlying
collateral.  The rating actions reflect the recent performance of
the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


AMMC CLO XI: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, E,
and F notes from AMMC CLO XI Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by American Money Management Corp.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 22, 2016, trustee report.

The affirmed ratings reflect adequate credit support at the current
rating levels.  Although the cash flow results showed higher
ratings for the class B, C, and D notes, S&P took into account that
the transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in October 2016, and that it has not yet paid down
any principal to the rated notes.  Future reinvestment activity
could change some of the portfolio characteristics.

In addition, there has been some deterioration in the portfolio's
credit quality that has been offset by overall credit seasoning.
The amount of assets rated 'CCC+' or below held in the portfolio
has increased to $18.46 million as of the April 2016 trustee report
from $3.99 million as of the March 2013 trustee report, which S&P
referenced in its effective date analysis.

Furthermore, according to the April 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have incrementally decreased for
each class since our June 2013 rating affirmations:

   -- Class A/B O/C decreased to 127.43% from 128.10%.
   -- Class C O/C decreased to 119.67% from 120.31%.
   -- Class D O/C decreased to 113.15% from 113.76%.
   -- Class E O/C decreased to 108.40% from 108.98%.
   -- Class F O/C decreased to 107.66% from 108.23%.

Although the cash flow results showed a lower rating for the class
F notes, S&P considered that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period, as noted above, as well as the stable
performance of the transaction.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

AMMC CLO XI Ltd.
                     Cash flow
       Previous      implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating        rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    9.56%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)    7.02%        AA (sf)
C      A (sf)        AA- (sf)    0.07%        A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)   3.84%        BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)       BB (sf)     0.73%        BB (sf)
F      BB- (sf)      B+ (sf)     3.71%        BB- (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C      A (sf)     A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+(sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)   BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)    B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)
F      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)

                      DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
C      A (sf)       A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)      B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)
F      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC (sf)      BB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

AMMC CLO XI Ltd.

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
B         AA (sf)
C         A (sf)
D         BBB (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         BB- (sf)


AMMC CLO XII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, D-1, and
D-2 notes from AMMC CLO XII Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) that closed in April 2013 and is managed by
American Money Management Corp.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A, E, and F notes.

The deal is currently in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled
to end in May 2017.  S&P anticipates that the manager will continue
to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from both the March 30, 2016, and April 28,
2016, trustee reports.  The upgrades are due to the increased
credit support at the previous rating levels.  The affirmations
reflect S&P's belief that the available credit support is
consistent with the current rating levels.  Since the May 2013
effective date, the transaction has benefited significantly from
both the seasoning and improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying collateral, which were the prime driving factors for the
rating actions.

Per the April 2016 monthly trustee report, the weighted average
life of the portfolio is 4.13 years, down from 5.46 years as of the
effective date.  Since then, the percentage of 'BB-' and higher
rated assets has increased to 29.50% from 20.55%.  

The above factors decreased the credit risk profile, which in turn,
provided more cushion to the tranches' ratings.

The amount of 'CCC' rated assets has increased to $15.43 million
(about 3.89% of the performing assets and principal cash) per the
April 2016 trustee report from $6.93 million at the effective date.
Overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have also marginally declined
(less than 3 basis points) since the effective date.  In addition,
the defaulted balance has increased slightly to
$1.14 million from $0.

Although these negative aspects were offset by the overall
seasoning and positive portfolio migration, any significant
deterioration in these three metrics could negatively affect the
deal in the future, especially the junior tranches.  As a result,
although S&P's cash flow analysis pointed to higher ratings for
most classes, it considered the above and also considered other
sensitivity runs to allow for volatility in the underlying
portfolio given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment
period.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The cash flow
analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

AMMC CLO XII Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)  cushion(ii)    rating
A      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        13.67%    AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)        11.42%    AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)               AA (sf)          1.28%    A+ (sf)
D-1    BBB (sf)             A- (sf)          1.60%    BBB+ (sf)
D-2    BBB (sf)             A- (sf)          1.60%    BBB+ (sf)
E      BB (sf)              BB+ (sf)         5.67%    BB (sf)
F      B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)          4.16%    B+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D-1    A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
D-2    A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BB (sf)
F      B+ (sf)    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)

                  DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      AA (sf)      AA- (sf)      A (sf)        A+ (sf)
D-1    A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D-2    A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       BB (sf)
F      B+ (sf)      B (sf)        CCC (sf)      B+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

AMMC CLO XII Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)      A (sf)
D-1         BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D-2         BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

AMMC CLO XII Ltd.
Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
E           BB (sf)
F           B+ (sf)


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, and D notes from Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
December 2012 and is managed by Anchorage Capital Group.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the April 4, 2016, monthly trustee
report.

Although there has been a slight decrease in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios and an increase in the amount of
'CCC' rated assets since S&P's June 2013 effective day
affirmations, the transaction has benefited from seasoning of the
underlying collateral.  Per the April 2016 monthly trustee report,
the weighted average life of the portfolio is 4.63 years, down from
5.64 years as of the effective date.  This decline contributed to
lower scenario default rates.  All coverage tests are passing and
well above the requirements.

The transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to end in
January 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction documents.
Although S&P's cash flow runs indicated a higher rating for some
tranches, its analysis and final ratings reflect additional
sensitivities to capture any potential changes in the underlying
portfolio until the notes begin to amortize.

The affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available to the rated notes is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                        Cash flow
       Previous         implied       Cash flow       Final
Class  rating           rating(i)   cushion(ii)       rating
A-1    AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)          3.01%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)          AA+ (sf)          4.16%       AA (sf)
B      A (sf)           A+ (sf)           2.49%       A (sf)
C      BBB (sf)         BBB+ (sf)         2.03%       BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)          BB (sf)           1.15%       BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A (sf)      A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)    B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)      A- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)       BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)      B+ (sf)       B- (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Anchorage Capital CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2         AA (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
D           BB (sf)


AOZORA RE 2014-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Sr. Secured Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB(sf)' rating on the
Series 2014-1 notes issued by Aozora Re Ltd.  The notes cover
losses from typhoons on a per-occurrence basis, are in their final
risk period.

This issue includes a variable reset feature that allows the
expected loss to range between 0.52% and 1.04% at each reset.  Per
S&P's criteria, it will look to the highest permitted reset when
determining the natural catastrophe (nat-cat) risk factor for an
issue.  The expected loss for the final risk period is 0.52%, and
the related attachment probability is 0.57%.  Once S&P applies the
stress to the attachment probability, the recommended nat-cat risk
factor would have been 'bb+'.

The model used for the reset was version 5.2 of the AIR Japan
Typhoon Model as implemented in CLASIC/2 version 15.0.5 and
CATRADER version 15.0.2., the model that was escrowed for the
duration of the issuance.  AIR Worldwide has updated its model for
this peril.  The updated model that was used for the Aozora Re
Series 2016-1 Class A notes was version 5.0.0 of the AIR Typhoon
Model for Japan as implemented in Touchstone 3.1.0 and CATRADER
version 17.1.0.  Per S&P's criteria, if there is an updated model
or view of the risk, S&P will consider this information when
determining the nat-cat risk factor.

The updated model includes storm surge, which was not specifically
included in the previous model version.  Because the covered
exposures between the two issues are the same, S&P looked at the
occurrence exceedance probability curve for the 2016-1 notes to
determine the attachment probability of the Series 2014-1 notes.
The attachment probability based on the updated model was 0.96% and
when stressed, the nat-cat risk factor for the final risk period is
'bb'.

On Feb. 24, 2016, JPMorgan Asset Management announced it would
liquidate the JPMorgan JPY Cash Liquidity Fund on March 11, 2016,
with proceeds disbursed to the fund investors on March 14.  The
funds in the issuer's collateral account at Citibank N.A. (London
Branch) will be held in cash.

The rating is based on the lowest of the implied nat-cat risk
factor ('bb'), the rating on Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance Co.
(SJNK), the ceding insurer; and the rating on the parent of
Citibank N.A. (London Branch).

RATINGS LIST

Rating Affirmed
Aozora Re Ltd.
  Series 2014-1 Senior Secured Notes              BB(sf)


APIDOS CLO X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C, D, and E notes from Apidos CLO X, a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.  The
rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the April 20, 2016, trustee report.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in October 2016.  S&P anticipates that the manager
will continue to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the
transaction documents.

According to the April 2016 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios are well above their minimum
requirement, though they have decreased marginally since the
effective date.  For instance, the class A/B ratio is 132.93%, down
from 133.66% in March 2013 (when the transaction became effective),
and the class E ratio is 107.81%, down from 108.40%.

In addition, there has been a slight increase in the amount of
defaulted assets and assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

However, these factors are offset by the seasoning of the
underlying collateral pool.  The weighted average life of the
portfolio per the April 2016 trustee report is 4.47 years, down
from 5.15 years in March 2013.  This decline contributed to lower
scenario default rates.

Although the cash flow results indicate higher rating for some
tranches, S&P's analysis and final ratings reflect additional
sensitivities to capture any potential changes in the underlying
portfolio until the notes begin to amortize.  On a standalone
basis, the results of the cash flow analysis point to a lower
rating on the class E notes because it failed by a small margin at
the current rating level.  S&P affirmed rather than lowered the
rating primarily because of the stable O/C level and overall
improvement in credit quality, which S&P believes results in a
tranche less exposed to the risk of default.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Apidos CLO X
                    Cash flow
        Previous    implied      Cash flow    Final
Class   rating      rating(i)  cushion(ii)    rating
A       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)        12.14%    AAA (sf)
B-1     AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)        12.68%    AA (sf)
B-2     AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)        12.68%    AA (sf)
C       A (sf)      A+ (sf)           7.2%    A (sf)
D       BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)        3.74%    BBB (sf)
E       BB (sf)     BB- (sf)         1.38%    BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA (sf)    A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)
E      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)     BB (sf)    BB (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Apidos CLO X

Class                   Rating
A                       AAA (sf)
B-1                     AA (sf)
B-2                     AA (sf)
C                       A (sf)
D                       BBB (sf)
E                       BB (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-5: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-5 as:

  Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Upgraded
   to A2 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Upgraded

   to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Upgraded
   to B1 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 23, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the two investment-grade P&I classes D and E were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.  The ratings on classes F, G, H and J
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class XC) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.6% of the
current balance, compared to 15.3% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                   DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further
adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 10, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $125.3
million from $1.96 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by seven mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 62% of the pool.  One loan, constituting 0.5% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by US government securities.
There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $70.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 19%).  Three loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced is
the Orchard Plaza Loan ($9.3 million -- 7.4% of the pool).  The
loan is secured by a 186,000 square foot (SF) retail property
located in Byron Center, Michigan.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in September 2015 due to maturity default.  The property
is anchored by Kmart (62% of the NRA; lease expiration October
2019) and was 72% leased as of March 2016.  The servicer is working
with the Borrower to potentially take this property REO.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the 220 West Garden
Street Loan (formerly the Sun Trust Tower Loan) ($7.1 million --
5.7% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 95,300 SF office
building located in downtown Pensacola, Florida. The loan
transferred to special servicing in July 2015 due to maturity
default.  The borrower is remitting all net cash flow. The largest
tenant, SunTrust (44% of net rentable area) vacated in March 2016
and the property is now 42% leased.  The servicer is still in
discussions regarding a potential maturity date extension and loan
modification with the Borrower, while dual tracking foreclosure.

The third largest loan in special servicing is the Clearview Plaza
Loan ($3.7 million -- 3.0% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
28,400 SF retail plaza in Snohomish, Washington.  The loan
transferred to Special Servicing in September 2015 due to maturity
default.  The borrower has agreed to a forbearance agreement as an
alternative to initiating foreclosure which will go through June
2016.  The property is 92% leased as of November 2015, compared to
88% in June 2015.  National tenants include O'Reilly Auto Parts,
Starbucks and Subway.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.1 million loss (43% loss on
average) for the two largest specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110%, compared
to 115% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 4% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 1.22X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 84% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 775, 777 and 779 San Marin Drive
Loan (formally known as the Fireman's Fund) ($77.1 million -- 61.5%
of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $147.0
million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a 710,000 SF
office complex located in Novato, which is north of San Francisco,
California.  The loan did not pay off at its anticipated repayment
date in October 2015 and it has a final maturity date in October
2018.  The property is currently fully-leased to Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co., which is now known as Allianz Global Corporate &
Specialty.  The tenant has announced its plans to vacate the
property, however, the current lease extends through November 2018.
Due to the single tenant nature Moody's incorporated a Lit/Dark
analysis.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 124% and 0.99X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the AmeriCredit Operations
Center Loan ($24.0 million -- 19.2% of the pool), which is secured
by 246,000 SF office building located in Arlington, Texas.  The
property is fully-leased to GM Financial through August 2017, one
month prior to the loan maturity date in September 2017.  Due to
the single tenant nature Moody's incorporated a Lit/Dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.28X, respectively,
compared to 96% and 1.26X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Washington Square West Loan
($3.4 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by 132 unit
multifamily property located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in the
Washington Square West neighborhood.  As of December 2015, the
property was 100% leased, the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 24% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to
29% and 3.50X at last review.


BANK OF AMERICA 2016-UBS10: DBRS Gives Prov B Rating to Cl. G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-UBS10 to
be issued by Bank of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2016-UBS10. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-H at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G, X-H, D, E, F, G and H will be privately
placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G and X-H balances are
notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address
the likelihood of receiving interest based on the notional amount
outstanding. DBRS considers the IO certificate’s position within
the transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

The collateral consists of 52 fixed-rate loans secured by 84
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, five loans, representing 16.3% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service covereage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 22
loans, representing 51.7% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x; however, the DBRS Refi DSCRs for the loans are based on a
weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of 9.75%, which
implies an inter¬est rate of 9.18%, amortizing on a 30-year
schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.3% over the WA
contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The loans’
probability of default (POD) is based on the more constraining of
the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 28
equal-sized loans, though the top ten represent 51.5% of the pool.
Diversity is further enhanced by seven loans, representing 20.2% of
the pool, that are secured by multiple properties (39 in total).
Eight loans, representing 26.1% of the pool, are located in urban
markets, which benefit from consistent investor demand and
increased liquidity even in times of stress. Urban markets
represented in this deal include Los Angeles, New York, Dallas,
Boston, Chicago and Cincinnati. Although there are 15 loans,
totaling 17.7% of the transaction balance, located in
tertiary/rural markets, 41.4% of this concentration is attributed
to two retail properties anchored by national tenants that are both
dominant centers in their respective markets. Additionally, one of
these properties is operated by Simon Property Group, Inc., which
DBRS considers to be a strong operator.

The transaction has a high concentration of loans suffering from
elevated refinance risk, as evidenced by the pool’s WA DBRS Refi
DSCR of 1.02x. Twenty-two loans, representing 51.7% of the pool,
have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 1.00x. Eleven of these loans,
comprising 25.9% of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x.
The DBRS Refi DSCRs for these loans are based on a WA stressed
refinance constant of 9.75%, which implies an inter¬est rate of
9.18%, amortizing on a 30-year schedule. This represents a
significant stress of 4.3% over the WA contractual interest rate of
the loans in the pool. DBRS models POD based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term DSCR and the DBRS Refi DSCR. Nine
loans, representing 16.4% of the pool, are secured by hotel
properties, including three of the top 15 loans. To further
mitigate the more volatile cash flow of hotels, the loans in the
pool secured by hotel properties have WA DBRS Going-In and Exit
Debt Yields of 10.8% and 12.6%, respectively, which compare quite
favorably with the WA DBRS Going-In and Exit Debt Yields of 8.5%
and 9.5%, respectively, for the non-hotel properties in the pool.
Additionally, 72.1% of the hotel concentration is located in urban
markets, and 30.4% of these hotels are considered to be of Above
Average property quality by DBRS. Eight loans, representing 16.6%
of the pool, including four of the top 15 loans, are structured
with IO payments for the full term. An additional 19 loans,
representing 49.7% of the pool, have partial IO periods remaining
ranging from 11 to 116 months.

The DBRS sample included 25 of the 52 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 34 of the 84 properties in the
portfolio (71.4% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS
conducted meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent
or a representative of the borrowing entity for 64.7% of the pool.
The DBRS sample had an average NCF variance of -11.3% and ranged
from -28.7% to -4.2%. Six loans, comprising 21.1% of the DBRS
sample (17.7% of the pool), were considered to be of Above Average
property quality based on physical attributes and/or a desirable
location within their respective markets. Five of these loans are
within the top 15 (Twenty Ninth Street Retail, Gateway Plaza,
Renaissance Cincinnati, Le Meridien Cambridge MIT and AvidXchange),
while the remaining loan, Newberry Street Portfolio, is the 16th
largest in the pool. Higher-quality properties are more likely to
retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance. Six loans,
representing 19.0% of the pool, have sponsorship with negative
credit history and/or loan collateral associated with a borrowing
structure that DBRS deemed to be weak. Such sponsors were
associated with a prior discounted payoff, loan default,
foreclosure, voluntary bankruptcy filing, limited net worth and/or
liquidity, a historical negative credit event, a non-standard
borrower structure and/or inadequate commercial real estate
experience. DBRS increased the POD for the loans with identified
sponsorship concerns.

The ratings assigned to the Notes by DBRS are based exclusively on
the credit provided by the transaction structure and underlying
trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing surveillance,
which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS after the date
of issuance.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch to Rate Class X-E Debt Rating 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-UBS10 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates. Fitch expects to rate the
transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as follows:

-- $31,300,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,900,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,500,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $221,682,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $613,382,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,816,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,813,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,003,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,909,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,480,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,906,000ab class X-E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,954,000ab class X-F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,480,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,906,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,954,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 16, 2016. Fitch does not expect to rate the
following classes:

--$18,620,000ab class X-G;
--$25,193,056ab class X-H;
--$18,620,000a class G;
--$25,193,056a class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 52 loans secured by 84
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $876.3 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by UBS Real Estate Securities Inc.,
Barclays Bank PLC, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings, LLC,
and Bank of America, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 79.6% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 84.8%, and asset summary reviews on
100.0% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage
statistics than other recent Fitch-rated transactions. The Fitch
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) are
1.14x and 108.2%, respectively. This is worse than for other
Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions; the year-to-date
(YTD) 2016 average Fitch DSCR is 1.17x and the YTD 2016 average
Fitch LTV is 107.9%.

High Concentration of Pari Passu Loans: Twelve loans representing
45.1% of the pool by balance are pari passu loans. Ten of the pari
passu loans (35.5% of the pool) have their controlling notes
securitized in other transactions. Two loans, In-Rel 8 (6.8% of the
pool) and Grove City Premium Outlets (2.7% of the pool) have their
controlling notes securitized in this transaction.

Less Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans make up 51.5% of the pool,
which is below the YTD 2016 average of 54.8% for other Fitch-rated
fixed-rate multiborrower transactions. The pool's Loan
Concentration Index (LCI) is 359 is below the YTD 2016 average of
415.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to BACM
2016-UBS10 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10-11.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP. The third-party due diligence information was provided on
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


BEAR STEARNS 2002-TOP6: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class J Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on two classes and downgrade the rating on one
class in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2002-TOP6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-TOP6 as follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class H was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review resulting from
amortization, and increase in defeasance. The pool has paid down by
38% since Moody's last review, and defeasance has increased to 36%
of the pool from 26% at last review. The class is fully covered by
defeasance.

The rating on the P&I Class J was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The class currently experiences interest shortfalls caused
by the servicer clawing back advances on a previously liquated
loan.

The rating on the P&I Class K, was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss and interest shortfalls.

The rating on the IO Class X-1 was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the prior review.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 16, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $20.6 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 31% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 64% of the pool. The pool contains one
loan, representing 31% of the pool, that has an investment grade
structured credit assessment. Six loans, representing 36% of the
pool have defeased and are secured by US Government securities.

Five loans, representing 43% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $19.9 million (38% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 97% of the
pool and full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 33% compared to 35% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.49X and 5.66X,
respectively, compared to 1.70X and 4.50X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is Regent
Court Loan ($6.5 million -- 31.4% of the pool), which is secured by
a 567,000 square foot (SF) Class A office building located in
Dearborn, Michigan. The property is 100% leased to the Ford Motor
Company through December 2016. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to decline in DSCR. The loan is fully amortizing on a
15-year term and has amortized 92% since securitization. Moody's
current structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa
(sca.pd) and 13.50X, respectively, compared to aa2 (sca.pd) and
5.78X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the McKee Commercial Center Loan ($2.1
million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 23,000 SF
retail center built in 2001 and located in San Jose, California.
The property is anchored by Walgreens. As of June 2015, the
property was 100% leased, the same as at last review. Performance
has been stable. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 54%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and
2.99X, respectively, compared to 43% and 2.53X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Sylvan Square Shopping Center Loan
($1.8 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 80,000 SF
shopping center located in Modesto, California, approximately 85
miles east of San Jose. As of October 2015, the property was 62%
leased, essentially the same at last review. Although, performance
has declined due to overall high vacancy, the loan is fully
amortizing and has benefited from 55% amortization since
securitization. The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to low
occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 40% and 2.70X,
respectively, compared to 44% and 2.44X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreen's Wichita Loan ($0.9 million
-- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,000 SF retail
property located in Sedgwick, KS, fully occupied by Walgreens with
the lease expiration in May 2021. Performance has been stable. The
loan is fully amortizing and has benefited from 55% amortization
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and
3.15X, respectively, compared to 38% and 2.83X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class B Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-M commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP28, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on class A-M to reflect its expectation of
the available credit enhancement for this class, which S&P believes
is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrade also
follows S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of
the transaction's collateral and reduction in trust balance.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings as well as S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-1 interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                          TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.34 billion, which is 75.9% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 150 loans (reflecting
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans), down from 193
loans at issuance.  One of these loans ($4.2 million, 0.3%) is with
the special servicer, nine ($98.7 million, 7.4%) are defeased, and
43 ($228.4 million, 17.1%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 99.9% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 86.0% was partial- or year-end 2015 data, and the remainder
was year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 1.44x S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 84.1% S&P Global Ratings' weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.62% S&P Global Ratings'
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
loan and the nine defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans
have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $552.1 million
(41.3%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.41x and 88.3%,
respectively, for the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $55.9 million in principal
losses, or 3.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to remain at approximately 3.2% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
specially serviced loan.

                         CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

According to the May 2016 trustee remittance report, the Boulder
Tech Center loan is the sole loan in the pool with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III), and has a total
reported exposure of $4.2 million.  The loan is secured by a
60,266-sq.-ft. office building in Boulder, Colo.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 22, 2015, because the
borrower failed to make the required lump sum
tenant-improvement/leasing reserve deposit of one year's debt
service.  C-III indicated that it intends to foreclose upon the
loan and that it will also review and evaluate any proposals
provided by the borrower.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of
year-end 2014 were 1.63x and 100.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a
minimal loss, which it defines as less than 25%, upon this loan's
eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP28
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-TOP28
                                   Rating
Class            Identifier        To                   From
A-4              073945AE7         AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-1A             073945AF4         AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-M              073945AG2         AA- (sf)             A- (sf)
A-J              073945AH0         BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
B                073945AJ6         BB (sf)              BB (sf)
C                073945AL1         BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)
D                073945AN7         B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
E                073945AQ0         B (sf)               B (sf)
F                073945AS6         B- (sf)              B- (sf)
X-1              073945BN6         AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)


BEAR STERNS 2001-TOP2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Bear Sterns Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., (BSCMS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2001-TOP2.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class E reflects the concentrated nature of the
pool and the thin subordinate class.  Potential losses from the
specially serviced asset could further reduce the subordinate class
F and negatively impact the credit enhancement of class E. The pool
is concentrated with only four loans remaining, all of which are
secured by retail properties.  Two of the loans (37.5%) are fully
amortizing and mature in January 2021.

As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.9% to $10.9 million from
$1.01 billion at issuance.  There has been $59.5 million (5.9% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated two loans (62.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes the one specially serviced asset (24.8%).  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes F through N.

The one specially serviced asset (14.1% of the pool) is secured by
a 20,773 square foot (sf) retail center located in Lewisville, TX.
A portion of the property is subject to condemnation from the Texas
Department of Transportation (TXDOT) as part of an expansion
project.  After enrollment in an early volunteer acquisition
program, the borrower agreed to an offer from TXDOT for the
property.  Prior to closing the TXDOT transaction, the borrower
filed suit challenging the trust's rights to the proceeds in
connection with the sale.  According to the special servicer, a
portion of the proceeds have been distributed to the trust, but the
remaining funds are being held in escrow until the conclusion of
the litigation.  Both the borrower and the trust have filed motions
for summary judgement and the parties are currently awaiting a
ruling from the court.  The February 2016 rent roll indicates the
property is 100% vacant.

The largest remaining loan and the other Fitch Loan of Concern
(47.7%) is secured by an 88,000-sf unanchored retail center located
in Houston, TX.  The property has suffered cash flow issues as a
result of occupancy declines.  For year-end (YE) 2014, the
occupancy and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) were reported to
be 76% and 0.63x, respectively.  Performance has improved with
occupancy at YE 2015 reported to be 82% and a DSCR of 0.76x.  Two
new leases were signed in 2015, which will improve occupancy and
the DSCR.  The loan has remained current and matures in August
2018.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

While a further upgrade to class E is possible, it is unlikely
given the pool concentration and thin subordinate class.  A
downgrade may be possible if losses to the specially serviced asset
are more than anticipated.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revises REs as indicated:

   -- $10 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
   -- $914,107 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D and X-2 certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1 certificates.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to BlueMountain CLO 2016-1
Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 LLC's $391.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable to the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by S&P Global
      Ratings using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
     corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.3439% to 12.5332%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment O/C test, a failure of which
      would lead to the reclassification of a certain amount of
      excess interest proceeds that are available (before paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      management fees, hedge payments, supplemental reserve
      account deposits, collateral manager incentive fees, and
      subordinated note payments) as principal proceeds during the

      reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 LLC

                                                Amount
Class                   Rating                (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)                263.50
B                       AA (sf)                  59.50
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                   29.75
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 18.70
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                 19.55
Subordinated notes      NR                       33.00

NR--Not rated.


BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Bridgeport CLO, Ltd.:

  $22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Upgraded to
   Aa1 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Upgraded to
   A3 (sf)

  $17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
   (current outstanding balance of $14,292,792.64), Upgraded to
   Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 5, 2015, Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $387,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes (current
   outstanding balance of $113,922,042.80), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on October 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $24,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on October 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Bridgeport CLO Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2013.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2015.  The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 33.3% or $56.9
million since that time.  Based on the Moody's calculation, the OC
ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B, Class C and Class D
notes are currently at 189.50%, 156.52%, 134.99%, 116.74% and
108.36%, respectively, versus September 2015 levels of 147.16%,
132.70%, 121.74%, 111.29% and 106.09%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period. Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

  7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a number of
     securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
     through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
     necessary information to update its credit estimates in a
     timely fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected
     by any default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in
     lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2091)
  Class A-1: 0
  Class A-2: 0
  Class B: 0
  Class C: +3
  Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3137)
  Class A-1: 0
  Class A-2: 0
  Class B: -1
  Class C: -2
  Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $217.3 million, defaulted par
of $1.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 12.88%
(implying a WARF of 2614), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.26%, a diversity score of 49 and a weighted average
spread of 3.14%(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction.  In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Cantor Commercial Real Estate CFCRE 2016-C4 Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2016-C4.

   -- $32,507,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,787,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,464,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $200,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $230,220,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54,000,000 class A-HR 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $596,975,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54,000,000b class X-HR 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,799,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,799,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $62,997,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,799,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,799,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,148,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,999,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,450,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,148,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,999,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,450,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the $37,798,889ab interest-only class X-G or
the $37,798,889a class G.  The classes above reflect the final
ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 154
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $839.9 million as of the cutoff date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending,
L.P., Societe Generale and Benefit Street Partners CRE Finance LLC.


Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 66.9% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 89%, and asset summary reviews on
89% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The pool has higher leverage statistics than
other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12x is
below the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average of 1.17x and full-year
2015 average of 1.18x.  The pool's Fitch loan to value (LTV) of
109.3% is above the YTD 2016 average of 107.9% and in line with the
full-year 2015 average of 109.3%.

Below-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by
11.6% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is
better than recent fixed-rate transactions and slightly worse than
the 2015 average of 11.7%.  Nine loans (30.2%) are full-term
interest-only, and 12 loans (28.7%) are partial interest-only.
Fitch-rated transactions YTD 2016 have an average full-term
interest-only percentage of 31.3% and a partial interest-only
percentage of 41%.

Less Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
compose 47.8% of the pool by balance.  Compared to other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this
transaction is lower than the YTD 2016 and full-year 2015 average
concentrations of 55.8% and 49.3%, respectively.  The pool's
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 348,
which is lower than the 2015 average of 367.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CFCRE
2016-C4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.  In a
more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB-sf' could result.



CAPITALSOURCE TRUST 2006-A: Fitch Hikes Class C Debt Rating to Bsf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four and affirmed seven classes of
CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A (CapitalSource 2006-A).
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate (CRE) market value and cash flow
declines.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect increased credit enhancement as a result of
asset repayments since the last rating action. Fitch's base case
loss expectation increased to 50.3% of the current collateral
balance, compared to 41.2% of the collateral balance at the last
rating action, as the pool is becoming more concentrated with 23
assets remaining.

Since the last rating action and as of the April 2016 trustee
report, principal paydowns to classes A-1A and A-1R were $86.1
million, primarily from six assets repaying in full. The asset
manager indicated one additional loan, Springhill Suites (1.9% of
pool), repaid in full in May 2016, which is not yet reflected in
the latest April trustee report. The percentage of defaulted loans
and Loans of Concern increased to 4.6% and 43.2%, respectively,
compared to 0% and 37.2% at the last rating action. As of the April
2016 trustee report, all overcollateralization and interest
coverage ratios were in compliance.

CapitalSource 2006-A is primarily collateralized by senior CRE debt
with 97.7% of the portfolio consisting of whole loans or A-notes as
of the April 2016 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations. The
remainder of the collateral pool consists of residential
mortgage-backed securities bonds (2.3%). The portfolio also holds a
high percentage of non-traditional property types, including loans
secured by healthcare (28.6%), hotels (25.4%), and undeveloped land
(24.3%).

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 79.6% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the
'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 10%, from, generally, third-quarter 2015 and year-end 2015 cash
flows. Modeled recoveries are 36.8%.

The three largest contributors to modeled losses have remained the
same since the last rating action.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a whole loan (18.9% of
pool) secured by a 331-key boutique hotel property without a gaming
component located in Atlantic City, NJ. Property cash flow remains
negative as performance continues to suffer from the challenged
Atlantic City market. The sponsor continues to pursue the passage
of a small-casino bill in order to develop a casino component at
the property. The loan has been modified to allow the deferral of
monthly debt service payments and furniture, fixture and equipment
payments through July 2016. This deferral period has been extended
multiple times since July 2013. Fitch modeled a term default with a
significant loss under its base case scenario.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is an A-note (10.1%)
secured by over 6,000 acres of land located in Edgewater and New
Smyrna Beach, FL. The borrower's initial business plan was to
develop single-family homes and commercial space; however, the plan
stalled during the market downturn in 2008. The land is heavily
forested and consists of wetlands; therefore, only a portion of the
land is developable. Debt service on this loan was previously
funded with revenue from timber operations at the property and
through timber reserves transferred as debt service reserves. These
reserves were depleted in 2012, and shortly afterward, the borrower
agreed to transfer the property to the lender in lieu of
foreclosure. A deed in lieu was completed in May 2013. The loan was
recently extended for an additional year to May 2017 in order to
continue obtaining permits and entitlements for development. Fitch
modeled a term default with a significant loss under its base case
scenario.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is an A-note (9 %)
secured by over 2,000 acres of land located in the Pocono Mountains
of Pennsylvania. The borrower's initial business plan included the
development of the site with retail and multifamily; however, the
plan stalled because of the economic downturn. The loan, which is
scheduled to mature in July 2016, has already been extended
multiple times to allow the borrower additional time to complete
the entitlement process and to allow the market to improve. The
asset manager continues to discuss workout strategy with the
borrower. Fitch modeled a significant loss under its base case
stress scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs', which applies stresses to property
cash flows and debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
The breakeven rates for classes A-1A, A-1R, A-2B, B and C are
generally consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The ratings for classes D through J are based upon a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and assets of
concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to each
class' credit enhancement.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
The Stable Outlook on classes A-1A, A-1R, A-2B, B and C reflects
increasing credit enhancement and expected continued paydowns.
Further upgrades may be possible with continued paydown and better
than expected recoveries on the remaining assets. The distressed
classes D through J may be subject to downgrade should loan
performance decline and/or further losses be realized.

CapitalSource 2006-A was initially issued as a $1.3 billion
revolving CRE CDO managed by CapitalSource Finance, LLC
(CapitalSource), a subsidiary of CapitalSource, Inc. In 2010, NS
Advisors II, LLC (NS Advisors II) became the delegated collateral
manager for the CDO under the delegation provisions of the
indenture. All collateral manager responsibilities and fees have
been delegated to NS Advisors II. In addition, an amendment to the
servicing agreement replaced the special servicer of the CDO with
NS Servicing, LLC (NS Servicing). NS Servicing assumed all rights,
interests, duties, and obligations as special servicer under the
servicing agreement previously held by CapitalSource.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded and revised or assigned Rating Outlooks on the
following classes as indicated:

-- $4 million class A-1A to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.2 million class A-1R to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $35.7 million class A-2B to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $62.4 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
    assigned.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes as
indicated:

-- $82.9 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30.2 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $30.2 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $26.7 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $33.2 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $31.2 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $47.5 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Class A-2A has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the preferred
shares.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2012-4: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and C
notes from Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-4 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that closed in December 2012
and is managed by Carlyle Investment Management LLC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A, D, and E notes from
the same transaction.

The deal is in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled to end in
January 2017.  Per the April 2016 trustee report, the weighted
average life has decreased to 4.51 years from 5.66 years as of the
effective date, which has led to lower scenario default rates and
an increase in the cash flow cushion for each class.  The
collateral principal amount has also increased since the effective
date, as the increases of the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
over time demonstrate.  The April 2016 trustee report indicated
these O/C changes when compared to the February 2013 report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio increased to 133.29% from 132.30%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 120.91% from 120.01%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 114.60% from 113.74%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio increased to 109.27% from 108.45%.

Although the cash flow results indicate higher ratings for the
class C, D, and E notes, when performing S&P's analysis it
considered the increase in 'CCC' rated and defaulted assets and
that the deal is still within the reinvestment period.  Since the
transaction's effective date, the defaulted asset balance has
increased to $1.72 million as of the April 2016 trustee report.
Over the same period, the amount of 'CCC' rated assets has
increased to $13.98 million from $2.69 million.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the available credit
support is consistent with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest,
ultimate principal, or both to each of the rated tranches.  In
S&P's view, the cash flow analysis demonstrated that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-4 Ltd.
                   Cash flow     Cash flow
        Previous   implied       cushion    Final
Class   rating     rating (i)    (%) (ii)   rating
A       AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      13.68      AAA (sf)
B-1     AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      12.10      AA+ (sf)
B-2     AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      12.10      AA+ (sf)
C       A (sf)     AA- (sf)      0.30       A+ (sf)
D       BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     5.85       BBB (sf)
E       BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)      1.58       BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the
intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the current
portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation assumptions
assuming the correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-4 Ltd.

                 Rating
Class       To          From
B-1         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A (sf

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2012-4 Ltd.

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


CITIGROUP 2016-C1: Fitch to Rate Class F Certificates 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C1 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $36,205,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,052,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $185,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $237,485,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55,255,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $567,727,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,896,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38,730,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,896,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $109,577,000b class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,951,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47,232,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,561,000c class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,446,000c class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Notional amount and interest-only.
  (b) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
      exchanged for class EC certificates, and class EC
      certificates may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and

      class C certificates.
  (c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 10, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$9,447,000 class G or the $26,450,044 class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 54 loans secured by 130
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $755.7 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty
Corp., Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending, L.P., Starwood
Mortgage Funding V LLC, and FCRE REL, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.06x is
below both the year to date 2016 average of 1.17x and the 2015
average of 1.18x.  The pool's Fitch LTV of 114.4% is above both the
year to date 2016 average of 107.9% and the 2015 average of
109.3%.

High Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 55.1% of
the pool by balance.  This is higher than the year to date 2016
average of 54.8% and the 2015 average of 49.3%.  The pool's average
concentration resulted in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 471,
which is greater than the year to date 2016 and the 2015 averages
of 415 and 367, respectively.

Diverse Property Types: The pool has a diverse mix of property
types, with retail as the largest at 35.2%, followed by hotel at
19.9%, office at 12.5%, and self-storage at 10.9%.  Overall, there
are 27 retail properties, including the largest loan (13.5% of the
pool), consisting of a mix of unanchored and anchored shopping
centers.  None of the properties were malls.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 29.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-C1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.  In a
more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB-sf' could result.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Hikes $841MM of Subprime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 23, 2016, upgraded the ratings of
23 tranches from 12 deals issued by various issuers, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2

  Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC4

  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE2

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE3

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WMC1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE1

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE4

  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.4% in April 2016 from 5.0% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


CMAC 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Commercial Mortgage
Acceptance Corp (CMAC) 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on P&I class L was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 16.5% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on P&I class M was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.


COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited has confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series COMM 2015-CCRE23 issued by COMM
2015-CCRE23 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class CM-B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Class CM-A is a non-pooled rake bond backed by the $33.5 million
Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio A-1 note and Classes CM-X-CP,
CM-X-EXT and CM-B are non-pooled rake bonds backed by the $355.0
million Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio B-note.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance. The collateral consists of 83
fixed-rate loans secured by 220 commercial properties. As of the
April 2016 remittance, the pool has experienced collateral
reduction of 0.5% due to scheduled loan amortization, with all of
the original 83 loans remaining in the pool. Approximately 34
loans, representing 57.2% of the current pool balance, are
reporting year-end or partial-year 2015 financials. These loans
report a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 2.21 times (x) and the WA debt yield of 10.7%. At issuance, the
pool reported a WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.92x and 9.5%,
respectively.

The Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#2, 7.3% of
the current pool) is secured by a portfolio of 65 Courtyard by
Marriott hotels, totaling 9,590 keys. The collateral included the
fee and leasehold interest in 49 hotels, the fee interest in nine
hotels and the leasehold interest in seven hotels. The subject loan
consists of the $33.5 million A-1 piece and $100.0 million A-2A
piece of the whole Senior A-note debt of $315.0 million, as well as
the controlling subordinate B-note debt of $355.0 million. This
loan benefits from granularity, as no single asset contributes more
than 4.7% of the DBRS underwritten (UW) net cash flow (NCF).
Additionally, the properties are spread across 29 states, with the
largest representation located in California (22.9% of the DBRS UW
NCF) and Illinois (8.9% of the DBRS UW NCF). The hotels operate
under a single management agreement that does not expire until
2025, past loan maturity in April 2020. According to the YE2015
financials, the loan reported a DSCR of 4.24x, representing an
increase from the DBRS UW DSCR of 3.15x. The consolidated YTD 2015
occupancy, average daily rate (ADR) and revenue per available room
(RevPAR) were 70.7%, $122.62 and $86.70, respectively. These
figures have all increased since issuance when compared with the
trailing 12-month February 2015 occupancy, ADR and RevPAR of 70.0%,
$116.31 and $81.42, respectively. At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated
this loan investment-grade. DBRS confirms with this review that the
performance of this loan remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics.

As of the April 2016 remittance, there are two loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, representing 3.9% of the current pool
balance, and there are no loans in special servicing. One loan on
the watchlist is highlighted below.

The Sherman Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#6, 3.6% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 267,648 square foot (sf) Class A office
complex located in the Van Nuys neighborhood of Los Angeles. The
complex consists of two four- and five-story office buildings which
were originally built in 1983 and 1988. This loan was added to the
watchlist as the largest tenant, North Los Angeles Regional Center
(NLARC), representing 26.3% of the net rentable area (NRA),
exercised its early termination option. The servicer has confirmed
that the tenant will be vacating in October 2016, prior to its
original lease expiration of April 2020. According to the asset
summary report, the tenant is required to pay a termination fee of
$790,000. According to the servicer, the borrower has identified a
possible replacement tenant that would occupy about half of the
NLARC’s space; however, a lease has yet to be executed and
potential terms are unknown at this time. According to the March
2016 rent roll, the property was 92.0% occupied with an average
annual rental rate of $27.73 per square foot (psf). The
second-largest tenant at the property, USA GSA (representing 9.8%
of the NRA) has a lease that expires in August 2016 and the
borrower is currently in talks with the tenant regarding the
upcoming lease expiry. As of April 2016, the loan has a current
reserve balance of approximately $1.9 million, not inclusive of the
NLARC termination fee. The YE2015 amortizing DSCR for the loan was
reported at 1.09x, which represents a decline from the DBRS UW DSCR
of 1.25x. The decline is attributable to an increase in operating
expenses with effective gross income in line with the DBRS UW
levels. According to Real Capital Analytics, within a five-mile
radius of the subject, 12 office properties have sold or refinanced
in the past year at an average price of $209 psf, compared with the
leverage of $182 psf for the loan. The borrower appears to be
committed to the property, as it contributed an additional $2.4
million in cash equity to refinance the loan at issuance, which
included funding an upfront TI/LC reserve of $1.3 million. Due to
the uncertainty surrounding upcoming lease expirations, DBRS
modeled the loan with an elevated probability of default.


CREDIT SUISSE 2016-C6: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust's CSAIL 2016-C6 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $17,021,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67,689,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $92,701,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $128,500,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $198,130,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $33,186,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $594,787,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,536,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,560,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $34,536,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $33,577,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,210,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,146,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,634,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,210,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,146,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,634,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Notional amount and interest-only.
  (b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 10, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$33,577,461 class X-NR or the $33,577,461 class NR.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 363
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $767.5 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Column Financial, Inc., Benefit
Street Partners CRE Finance LLC, The Bank of New York Mellon,
MC-Five Mile Commercial Mortgage Finance LLC and The Bancorp Bank.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 75% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 90.2%, and asset summary reviews on
100% of the pool.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, GLP Industrial Portfolio B (11.5%
of the pool by balance) and GLP Industrial Portfolio A (5.6% of the
pool), have investment-grade credit opinions of 'A+' and 'A',
respectively, on a stand-alone basis.  Excluding these loans,
Fitch's implied conduit subordination at the junior 'AAAsf' tranche
is approximately 27% and at 'BBB-sf', approximately 9.8%.

Above-Average Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 61.6%
of the pool, which is greater than the recent averages of 54.8% for
year-to-date (YTD) 2016 and 49.3% for 2015.  Additionally, the loan
concentration index (LCI) and sponsor concentration index (SCI) are
527 and 659, respectively, greater than the respective YTD 2016
averages of 415 and 461.

High Fitch Conduit Leverage: Although this transaction has a Fitch
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) of 1.19x
and 101.1%, respectively, excluding the credit-assessed GLP
Industrial Portfolio B (11.5% of the pool) and GLP Industrial
Portfolio Pool A (5.6% of the pool) loans, the Fitch DSCR and LTV
are 1.11x and 110%, respectively.  Both figures are worse than the
YTD 2016 averages for Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.17x and 107.9%,
respectively.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSAIL
2016-C6 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.  In a
more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB-sf' could result.  

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP.  The third-party due diligence information was provided
on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the 50 mortgage loans.  Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


CRYSTAL RIVER 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 9 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on nine classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

Crystal River 2006-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance) issued between 2005 and 2007. As of the April
22, 2016 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $388.4
million, from $390.3 million at issuance. The transaction is
currently under-collateralized by $330.3 million, with implied
losses through the senior-most outstanding class of notes.

The pool contains twelve assets totaling $46.3 million (79.8% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the April 22, 2016 trustee report. While there
have been realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.


CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C2 issued by CSAIL 2015-C2
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NR at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction since closing. At issuance, the collateral consisted of
118 fixed-rate loans secured by 160 commercial properties. As of
the April 2016 remittance, the pool experienced a collateral
reduction of 0.8% as a result of scheduled loan amortization. Loans
representing 47.2% of the pool are reporting YE2015 financials,
with loans representing 37.1% of the pool reporting partial year
financials for 2015. The seven loans in the Top 15 (representing
22.0% of the current pool balance) reporting YE2015 figures showed
a weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.67 times (x), a weighted-average decrease of -3.0% from
the respective DBRS underwritten figures. Eight loans in the Top 15
with 2015 partial year financials reported a WA DSCR of 2.17x with
WA net cash flow growth over the respective DBRS underwritten
figures of +25.8%.

As of the April 2016 remittance, there is one loan in special
servicing, representing 0.4% of the pool. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer because of delinquency. Eight loans,
representing 7.6% of the pool, are on the servicer’s watchlist.
The largest loan on the watchlist and the loan in special servicing
are discussed below.

The Depot (Prospectus ID#6, 2.4% of the current pool balance) is
secured by a 192-unit, 642-bed student housing property in Akron,
Ohio, located less than a quarter-mile from the University of Akron
and approximately half a mile south of the Akron, Ohio CBD. The
property was constructed in 2014 at a cost of $36 million by the
sponsor, The NRP Group. This loan was placed on the servicer's
watchlist because of the low DSCR of 0.61x at YE2015, with an
occupancy rate of 57.7%. These figures represent declines from the
DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.12x and in-place occupancy at issuance
of 94.2%. The decline in net cash flow was primarily driven by a
decrease in occupancy and reduced rental rates, which averaged $618
per bed as of the December 2015 rent roll, compared to an average
of $634 per bed at issuance. A competing property in the subject's
vicinity, 22 Exchange, secured in another CMBS transaction rated by
DBRS, reported a YE2015 occupancy rate of 94.0% and an average
rental rate of $652 per bed. 22 Exchange is also located within
walking distance of the campus; however, the property is older in
vintage and provides a less extensive amenity package compared to
the subject property. The 22 Exchange loan is being monitored for a
low DSCR due to rent concessions and increased operating expenses.
Enrollment at the University of Akron has been declining since
2011, with approximately 25,000 students enrolled for the Fall 2015
semester, a -2.7% decrease from Fall 2014. Although the enrollment
declines are likely contributors to the performance decline for the
subject property, given the competing property’s ability to
maintain occupancy well above that of the subject’s, DBRS
believes mismanagement of the property could also be a factor.
Given the sharp cash flow declines from issuance, this loan was
modeled with an increased probability of default and will be
closely monitored for developments.

The loan in special servicing, Elmhurst & Lake in the Hills
(Prospectus ID#68, 0.4% of the current pool balance), is secured by
two unanchored retail properties located in two Chicago suburbs,
Elmhurst and Lake in the Hills, Illinois. The properties
collectively consist of approximately 33,582 sf of space. According
to the January 2015 rent roll, the collateral was 81.4% occupied
with major tenants, including Xsport Fitness (28.3% of the
collateral NRA) at the Elmhurst location and Athletico (15.2% of
the collateral NRA) at the Lake in the Hills location, both with
leases scheduled to expire in 2018 and 2021, respectively. At
closing, approximately 18.6% of the combined NRA was vacant, shell
space, with a TI/LC reserve of $350,000 funded at closing for those
four spaces. The leasing reserve had a balance of approximately
$95,000 as of the May 2016 remittance, indicating some leasing
activity has occurred since issuance. The properties were
considered to be in good condition at the time of the engineer’s
respective inspections conducted at issuance. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in March 2016 due to payment
default, with monthly payments in various stages of delinquency
since July 2015 before transitioning over 60 days delinquent in
March 2016. The servicer advises that the borrower has not been
responsive to inquiries regarding the delinquency. The sponsors are
two individuals that acquired the properties in 2009 and 2010. The
trust loan refinanced existing debt on the property and returned
approximately $857,000 in cash equity to the sponsors, with $1.16
million in cash equity remaining. As the borrower has not been
responsive to the servicer's inquiries, the reason for the
delinquency is not apparent. DBRS has verified that all major
tenants in place at issuance remain open, indicating cash flows
have likely not declined significantly from issuance. Given the
unknown factor with this loan, DBRS has modeled the loan with an
increased probability of default and will closely monitor for
developments.


CSFB 1999-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. G Certs to 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed three classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. (CSFB)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade to class G reflects the possibility of losses from
the one specially serviced asset, which may be significant given
the low occupancy of the property and the special servicer's
value-add strategy.  Only two other loans remain, both of which are
defeased with maturity dates March 2019.  Although class G is fully
covered by the defeased collateral, Fitch remains concerned about
the ultimate recovery of the specially serviced asset given
significant expenses incurred and likely expenses required to
implement the value-add strategy.

As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.6% to $28.2 million from
$1.17 billion at issuance.  There has been $82.7 million (7.1% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through O.

The specially-serviced loan (24.7%) is secured by a 129,293 square
foot office building located in Parsippany, NJ.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in June 2013 due to imminent
default, primarily the result of vacancy issues.  The property's
largest tenant (52% of GLA) vacated in December 2013.  Foreclosure
has been completed and the property became real estate owned (REO)
in August 2015.  Current occupancy is approximately 16% as of April
2016.  The special servicer has no current disposition plans and is
implementing a value-add strategy.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class G has been revised to Negative from
Stable due to the prolonged value-add strategy and likely expenses
pertaining to the specially serviced asset.  A further downgrade
may be possible if the asset suffers a worse than anticipated
recovery.  A future upgrade will be unlikely given the risk of
losses and interest shortfalls with the current asset disposition
plan of the REO asset; should the asset be disposed prior to
incurring any shortfalls to class G the class would be upgraded.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded this class and revised the Rating Outlook as
indicated:

   -- $20.2 million class G to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook to
      Negative from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revises the RE as indicated:

   -- $8 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed classes:

   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and F certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class L, M and O certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class A-X and N
certificates.


CSMC TRUST 2014-TIKI: Moody's Affirms B3(sf) Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on six classes of
CSMC Trust 2014-TIKI, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-TIKI. Moody's rating action is as
follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 16, 2016 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance remains unchanged at $350 million. The
transaction is secured by a first lien mortgage loan on the Four
Seasons Resort Maui at Wailea, HI. The 380-room property was
developed in 1990, and is the only AAA 5 Diamond and Forbes 5-Star
luxury resort in Maui. The loan is interest only during the term
and its final maturity date including all extension options is in
September 2021. The sponsor of the loan is MSD Portfolio, LP. There
is $175 million of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.

The property's year-end 2015 net cash flow (NCF) was $47.3 million.
According to the servicer, the property is currently undergoing a
$40+ million guestroom renovation, and is approximately half way
through the process. Moody's stabilized Net Cash Flow is $32.0
million, and Moody's stabilized value is $320 million, the same as
securitization. Moody's trust LTV ratio is 109%, and Moody's
stressed DSCR for the trust is at 0.99X, the same as
securitization. The trust has not incurred any losses or interest
shortfalls as of the current Payment Date.


CWABS INC 2004-9: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. MF-1 Debt to B2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 19, 2016, upgraded the ratings of
7 tranches from 3 deals issued by various issuers, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

  Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 2,
   2014, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19,

   2016)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-9

  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 2, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC5

  Cl. B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432032

A list of updated estimated pool losses and recoveries is being
posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this review period
and may be found at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF345728



DLJ COMMERCIAL 1998-CF2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. B-6 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage
Corporation's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-CF2.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to the relatively stable performance of
the remaining pool and reflect the pool's high concentration (15
loans remaining).

As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99% to $11.4 million from
$1.11 billion at issuance.  Approximately 87.5% of the pool is
fully amortizing.  Two loans (21.9% of the pool) are defeased, and
no loans are in special servicing.  Fitch has designated four Fitch
Loans of Concern (46.1%).

The largest loan in the pool and largest Fitch Loan of Concern is
collateralized by a 224-unit multifamily property located in
Savannah, GA (27.2%).  As of year-end (YE) 2015, the property was
94.4% occupied, slightly down from 96.1% at YE 2014.  The
servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) decreased to
1.01x from 1.34x during the same period due to increased operating
expenses.  The largest driver, repairs and maintenance, increased
approximately 40%.  Per the master servicer, maintenance
requirements were greater than normal in efforts to improve the
property's aged condition and are expected to continue for several
years.

Two of the three remaining Fitch Loans of Concern are each secured
by a Super 8 hotel located in Albuquerque, NM (15.5%).  The
servicer-reported DSCR was well below 1.0x for each property as of
the trailing 12 month period ended Sept. 30, 2015.  The remaining
Fitch Loan of Concern is collateralized 102,067-sf retail property
located in El Paso, TX (3.4%).  The property was 97.2% occupied as
of YE 2015 with a servicer-reported DSCR of 1.23x.  K-Mart is
largest tenant occupying 85.4% of total space.  While the tenant's
lease expires in Nov. 2017, the servicer indicated K-Mart will be
vacating in July.  The loan is fully amortizing, with an expected
exposure of $1.33 per square foot at its October 2016 scheduled
maturity date.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook for class B-5 reflects the pool's
concentration which includes three economy hotels in Albuquerque,
NM (18%) with limited updated operating performance and six single
tenant properties (25.6%).  Class B-5 could be downgraded if
expected losses increase.  Upgrades are unlikely due to limited
credit enhancement.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $10 million class B-5 at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $1.4 million class B-6 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1A through B-4 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
class C.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on class S.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-2:

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transaction
    benefits from credit enhancement in the form of
    overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the
    reserve fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are
    sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected cumulative net
    loss assumptions under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- Exeter's capabilities with regards to originations,
    underwriting, servicing and ownership by the Blackstone Group,

    Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Vintage
    Fund.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter Finance
    Corp. (Exeter) and considers the entity to be an acceptable
    originator and servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts
    with an acceptable backup servicer.

-- Exeter senior management team has considerable experience and
    a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    Exeter's auto loan portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS methodology,
    "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Exeter Automobile
Receivables Trust 2016-2's $300.0 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 50.5%, 41.8%, 36.2%, and
      26.8% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 2.55x, 2.10x, 1.77x, and 1.30x our 18.75%-19.75%
      expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments that S&P believes

      will be made to the rated notes by the assumed legal final
      maturity dates under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios
      that we believe are appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes will remain within one rating category of S&P's
     'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, during the
      first year and that S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes

      will remain within two rating categories of S&P's
      'BBB+ (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings during the first year.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of
      credit deterioration as a one-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'AA' rated securities and a two-category
      downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
      securities under the moderate stress conditions.  The
      collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
      securitized in this transaction.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-2

Class       Rating      Type            Interest      Amount
                                        rate          (mil. $)
A           AA (sf)     Senior          Fixed         188.62
B           A (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed         46.34
C           BBB+ (sf)   Subordinate     Fixed         23.58
D           BB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed         41.46


FANNIE MAE 2016-C03: Fitch Amends April 11 Ratings Release
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrects a ratings release published on April 11,
2016.  It amends the criteria listed to add 'Global Rating Criteria
for Single- and Multi-Name Credit-Linked Notes' (March 2016).

The revised PR is as follows:

Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03:

-- $157,758,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $123,953,000 class 1M-2B exchangeable notes 'B+'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $180,295,000 class 1M-2 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $241,218,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $325,645,000 class 2M-2B exchangeable notes 'B'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $482,437,000 class 2M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';

    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $11,387,071,699 class 1A-H reference tranche;
-- $8,303,462 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
-- $2,965,665 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
-- $6,523,863 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 1B notes;
-- $73,615,331 class 1B-H reference tranche;
-- $24,375,769,743 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $12,696,268 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $8,252,274 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $17,139,262 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 2B notes;
-- $208,914,269 class 2B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 2.60%
subordination provided by the 1.60% class 1M-2 note and the 1.00%
1B note, and their corresponding reference tranches. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 2M-1 note reflects the 3.00% subordination provided
by the 2.00% class 2M-2 note and the 1.00% 2B note, and their
corresponding reference tranches. The notes are general senior
unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA', Outlook Stable)
subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of
certain residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie
Mae-guaranteed MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will be divided into two loan
groups. Group 1 will consist of mortgage loans with loan-to-values
(LTVs) greater than 60% and less than or equal to 80% while group 2
will consist of mortgage loans with LTVs greater than 80% and less
than or equal to 97%. While each loan group has its own issued
notes, each group's structure will be identical. There will be no
cross-collateralization.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03 (CAS 2016-C03) is
Fannie Mae's 12th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $37.25 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1 and
M-2 notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the
mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available
through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default Rating. The
notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will
carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

In February 2016, Fitch released an exposure draft criteria report,
which incorporates several proposed enhancements to its 'U.S. RMBS
Loan Loss Model Criteria,' dated August 2015. The changes are
detailed in the report titled 'Exposure Draft: U.S. RMBS Loan Loss
Model Criteria' available on Fitch's website at
www.fitchratings.com. Although the credit risk profile of this
reference pool is consistent with the previous transaction, the
exposure draft model estimated modestly lower expected losses as a
result of the model updates for group 1 and modestly higher
expected losses for Group 2. The bonds for this transaction were
analyzed with both criteria approaches, with a greater weight on
the exposure draft model results. The difference in ratings for
this transaction using the two separate models is less than one
rating notch.

There was one variation from criteria related to an
outside-the-model amortization credit that was applied. Fitch feels
the credit is more consistent with historical observations as well
as with Fitch's loss timing curve. The amortization credit is
consistent with Fitch's mid-loaded loss-timing curve with benchmark
prepayments. The difference in ratings for this transaction is less
than one rating notch. While this credit was applied outside of the
model for this transaction, Fitch expects to incorporate the
amortization credit in its 'US RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria' for
future transactions, subject to the review and approval by a
criteria review committee.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pools consist of high-quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from March through June 2015. The Group 1 reference pool
will consist of loans with LTVs greater than 60% and less than or
equal to 80%, and Group 2 will consist of loans with LTVs greater
than 80% and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference
pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent CAS
transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis
mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's fourth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in Group 2 are covered either by borrower
paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender paid MI (LPMI). Fannie Mae
will be guaranteeing the MI coverage amount, which will typically
be the MI coverage percentage multiplied by the sum of the unpaid
principal balance as of the date of the default, up to 36 months of
delinquent interest, taxes and maintenance expenses. While the
Fannie Mae guarantee allows for credit to be given to MI, Fitch
applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI available due to the
automatic termination provision as required by the Homeowners
Protection Act when the loan balance is first scheduled to reach
78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 1M-1, 1M-2, 1B, 2M-1, 2M-2
and 2B notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus,
any credit or modification events on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. In addition, credit or modification events that occur
prior to maturity with losses realized from liquidations or
modifications that occur after the final maturity date will not be
passed through to the noteholders. This feature more closely aligns
the risk of loss to that of the 10-year, fixed LS CAS deals where
losses were passed through at the time a credit event occurred -
i.e. loans became 180 days delinquent with no consideration for
liquidation timelines. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year hard
maturity in its default analysis and applied a reduction to its
lifetime default expectations.

Seller Insolvency Risk Addressed (Positive): An enhancement was
made with regards to insolvency risk. A loan will be removed from
the reference pool if a lender has declared bankruptcy or has been
put into receivership and, per the QC process, an eligibility
defect is identified that could otherwise have resulted in a
repurchase. In earlier CAS deals, if a lender declared bankruptcy
or was placed into receivership prior to a repurchase request made
by Fannie Mae for a breach of a rep and warranty, the loan would
not be removed from its related reference pool or treated as a
credit event reversal if it became 180 days past due. This
enhancement reduces the loss exposure arising from MI claim
rescissions due to underwriting breaches by insolvent sellers.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
first transaction in which Fitch received third party due diligence
on a loan production basis, as opposed to a transaction specific
review. Fitch believes that regular, periodic third-party reviews
(TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are sufficient for
validating Fannie Mae's quality control processes. The sample
selection was limited to a population of 6,333 loans that were
previously reviewed as part Fannie Mae's post-purchase quality
control (QC) review and met the reference pool's eligibility
criteria. 1,998 loans of those loans were selected for a full
review (credit, property valuation and compliance) by a third-party
due diligence provider. Of the 1,998 loans, 608 were part of this
transaction's reference pool (230 in Group 1 and 378 in Group 2).
Fitch views the results of the due diligence review as consistent
with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above average aggregator; as a
result no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss expectations based
on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
M-1 notes will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro-rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 notes can receive a full pro-rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately, as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained and the delinquency test is satisfied.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2 and B classes in each group will not receive any
scheduled or unscheduled allocations until their M-1 classes are
paid in full. The B classes will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-2 classes are paid in
full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00% in Group 1 and 4.00% in Group 2, as well
as the first loss B-H reference tranches, sized at 100 basis points
(bps) for each group. Fannie Mae is also retaining an approximately
5% vertical slice/interest in the M-1 and M-2 tranches for Group 1
and 2, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MDVs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 23% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 16.7% at the 'B+sf'
level for Group 1 and 22.1% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 14.2% at the
'Bsf' level for Group 2. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 32% would potentially reduce the
Group 1 'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively. And additional
MVDs of 11%, 11% and 33% would potentially reduce the Group 2
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance reviews,
desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Adfitech examined
selected loan files with respect to the presence or absence of
relevant documents. Fitch received certifications indicating that
the loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with
Fitch's published standards. The certifications also stated that
the company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

The offering documents for CAS 2016-C03 do not disclose any
representations, warranties, or enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that
are available to investors and which relate to the underlying asset
pools.


FANNIE MAE: Fitch Corrects April 21 Ratings Release
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrects a release published on April 21, 2016.  It
amends the listed criteria to add 'Global Rating Criteria for
Single- and Multi-Name Credit-Linked Notes' (March 2016).

The revised PR is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03:

-- $157,758,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $123,953,000 class 1M-2B exchangeable notes 'B+'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $180,295,000 class 1M-2 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $241,218,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $325,645,000 class 2M-2B exchangeable notes 'B'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $482,437,000 class 2M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $11,387,071,699 class 1A-H reference tranche;
-- $8,303,462 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
-- $2,965,665 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
-- $6,523,863 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 1B notes;
-- $73,615,331 class 1B-H reference tranche;
-- $24,375,769,743 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $12,696,268 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $8,252,274 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $17,139,262 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 2B notes;
-- $208,914,269 class 2B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 2.60%
subordination provided by the 1.60% class 1M-2 note and the 1.00%
1B note, and their corresponding reference tranches. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 2M-1 note reflects the 3.00% subordination provided
by the 2.00% class 2M-2 note and the 1.00% 2B note, and their
corresponding reference tranches. The notes are general senior
unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Stable Outlook)
subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of
certain residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie
Mae-guaranteed MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will be divided into two loan
groups. Group 1 will consist of mortgage loans with loan-to-values
(LTVs) greater than 60% and less than or equal to 80% while group 2
will consist of mortgage loans with LTVs greater than 80% and less
than or equal to 97%. While each loan group has its own issued
notes, each group's structure will be identical. There will be no
cross-collateralization.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03 (CAS 2016-C03) is
Fannie Mae's 12th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $37.25 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1 and
M-2 notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the
mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available
through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default Rating. The
notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will
carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

In February 2016, Fitch released an exposure draft criteria report,
which incorporates several proposed enhancements to its 'U.S. RMBS
Loan Loss Model Criteria,' dated August 2015. The changes are
detailed in the report titled 'Exposure Draft: U.S. RMBS Loan Loss
Model Criteria' available on Fitch's website at
www.fitchratings.com. Although the credit risk profile of this
reference pool is consistent with the previous transaction, the
exposure draft model estimated modestly lower expected losses as a
result of the model updates for group 1 and modestly higher
expected losses for Group 2. The bonds for this transaction were
analyzed with both criteria approaches, with a greater weight on
the exposure draft model results. The difference in ratings for
this transaction using the two separate models is less than one
rating notch.

There was one variation from criteria related to an
outside-the-model amortization credit that was applied. Fitch feels
the credit is more consistent with historical observations as well
as with Fitch's loss timing curve. The amortization credit is
consistent with Fitch's mid-loaded loss-timing curve with benchmark
prepayments. The difference in ratings for this transaction is less
than one rating notch. While this credit was applied outside of the
model for this transaction, Fitch expects to incorporate the
amortization credit in its 'US RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria' for
future transactions, subject to the review and approval by a
criteria review committee.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pools consist of high-quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from March through June 2015. The Group 1 reference pool
will consist of loans with LTVs greater than 60% and less than or
equal to 80%, and Group 2 will consist of loans with LTVs greater
than 80% and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference
pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent CAS
transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis
mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's fourth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in Group 2 are covered either by borrower
paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender paid MI (LPMI). Fannie Mae
will be guaranteeing the MI coverage amount, which will typically
be the MI coverage percentage multiplied by the sum of the unpaid
principal balance as of the date of the default, up to 36 months of
delinquent interest, taxes and maintenance expenses. While the
Fannie Mae guarantee allows for credit to be given to MI, Fitch
applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI available due to the
automatic termination provision as required by the Homeowners
Protection Act when the loan balance is first scheduled to reach
78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 1M-1, 1M-2, 1B, 2M-1, 2M-2
and 2B notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus,
any credit or modification events on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. In addition, credit or modification events that occur
prior to maturity with losses realized from liquidations or
modifications that occur after the final maturity date will not be
passed through to the noteholders. This feature more closely aligns
the risk of loss to that of the 10-year, fixed LS CAS deals where
losses were passed through at the time a credit event occurred -
i.e. loans became 180 days delinquent with no consideration for
liquidation timelines. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year hard
maturity in its default analysis and applied a reduction to its
lifetime default expectations.

Seller Insolvency Risk Addressed (Positive): An enhancement was
made with regards to insolvency risk. A loan will be removed from
the reference pool if a lender has declared bankruptcy or has been
put into receivership and, per the QC process, an eligibility
defect is identified that could otherwise have resulted in a
repurchase. In earlier CAS deals, if a lender declared bankruptcy
or was placed into receivership prior to a repurchase request made
by Fannie Mae for a breach of a rep and warranty, the loan would
not be removed from its related reference pool or treated as a
credit event reversal if it became 180 days past due. This
enhancement reduces the loss exposure arising from MI claim
rescissions due to underwriting breaches by insolvent sellers.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
first transaction in which Fitch received third party due diligence
on a loan production basis, as opposed to a transaction specific
review. Fitch believes that regular, periodic third-party reviews
(TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are sufficient for
validating Fannie Mae's quality control processes. The sample
selection was limited to a population of 6,333 loans that were
previously reviewed as part Fannie Mae's post-purchase quality
control (QC) review and met the reference pool's eligibility
criteria. 1,998 loans of those loans were selected for a full
review (credit, property valuation and compliance) by a third-party
due diligence provider. Of the 1,998 loans, 608 were part of this
transaction's reference pool (230 in Group 1 and 378 in Group 2).
Fitch views the results of the due diligence review as consistent
with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above average aggregator; as a
result no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss expectations based
on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
M-1 notes will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro-rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 notes can receive a full pro-rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately, as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained and the delinquency test is satisfied.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2 and B classes in each group will not receive any
scheduled or unscheduled allocations until their M-1 classes are
paid in full. The B classes will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-2 classes are paid in
full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00% in Group 1 and 4.00% in Group 2, as well
as the first loss B-H reference tranches, sized at 100 basis points
(bps) for each group. Fannie Mae is also retaining an approximately
5% vertical slice/interest in the M-1 and M-2 tranches for Group 1
and 2, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MDVs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 23% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 16.7% at the 'B+sf'
level for Group 1 and 22.1% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 14.2% at the
'Bsf' level for Group 2. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 32% would potentially reduce the
Group 1 'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively. And additional
MVDs of 11%, 11% and 33% would potentially reduce the Group 2
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance reviews,
desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Adfitech examined
selected loan files with respect to the presence or absence of
relevant documents. Fitch received certifications indicating that
the loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with
Fitch's published standards. The certifications also stated that
the company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

The offering documents for CAS 2016-C03 do not disclose any
representations, warranties, or enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that
are available to investors and which relate to the underlying asset
pools.


FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Takes Actions After Review of 9 ABS Series
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various rating actions following its review
of nine series of asset-backed securities (ABS) issued by First
Investors Auto Owner Trust (FIAOT) between 2012 and 2015.  S&P
raised its ratings on 16 classes from seven series and affirmed its
ratings on 23 classes from eight series.

The collateral pools for the FIAOT transactions consist of auto
loan receivables that were originated to mainly subprime
borrowers.

The rating actions reflect each transaction's collateral
performance to date, S&P's views regarding future collateral
performance, each transaction's structure and credit enhancement
level, and our analysis of existing loss coverage levels.  In
addition, S&P's analysis incorporates secondary credit factors,
such as credit stability, sector- and issuer-specific analysis, and
S&P's current economic forecast.  Furthermore, S&P's analysis
includes cash-flow and sensitivity analysis for select
transactions.

Based on all of these factors, S&P considers the creditworthiness
of the notes to be consistent with the raised and affirmed
ratings.

Most of First Investors' outstanding transactions have exhibited
consistent securitization performance; however, S&P has seen
increased net losses in outstanding transactions.  S&P projected
the lifetime losses on pools with at least 17 months of
performance--series 2012-2 to 2014-3--using a loss timing curve
derived from the paid-off transactions.  Projected losses appeared
to be trending higher than our initial CNLs of 7.50%-8.50%.  As a
result, in January 2016, S&P had increased its loss expectations on
six transactions (series 2012-2 to 2014-2).  At this time, S&P is
again increasing itsour loss expectations on series 2014-2 and are
revising upwards its initial loss expectation for series 2014-3.
Nonetheless, since each transaction closed, the credit support for
each class has increased as a percentage of the amortizing pool
balance and is, in our view, adequate to support the affirmed or
raised ratings.

S&P maintained its lifetime loss expectations for FIAOT's series
2015-1, 2015-2, and 2016-1 transactions.  Given the short amount of
securitized performance for these transactions (12 months or less)
and high pool factors (higher than 70%), S&P is maintaining its
initial loss expectation pending further collateral performance
data.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the April 2016 distribution date
                Pool     Current  60+ days
Series   Month  factor   CNL      delinquencies

2012-2   44     15.26    8.98     4.44
2013-1   39     18.72    8.29     2.63
2013-2   34     25.30    7.80     3.14
2013-3   29     31.44    7.75     3.16
2014-1   24     41.10    6.63     2.38
2014-2   20     51.02    5.88     2.23
2014-3   17     58.63    4.57     2.06
2015-1   12     71.43    2.35     1.61
2015-2    8     84.43    1.64     1.35
2016-1    2     96.71    0.02     0.28

CNL--Cumulative net loss.

Table 2
CNL Expectations (%)
As of the April 2016 distribution date
Series      Initial        Revised
            lifetime       lifetime
            CNL exp.       CNL exp.

2012-2     8.00-8.50       9.20-9.30
2013-1     8.00-8.50       8.90-9.10
2013-2     7.75-8.25       9.10-9.40
2013-3     7.50-8.00       9.75-10.25
2014-1     7.50-8.00       10.25-10.75
2014-2     7.50-8.00       10.25-10.75
2014-3     7.50-8.00       10.25-10.75
2015-1     8.25-8.50       N/A
2015-2     8.25-8.50       N/A
2016-1     9.25-9.75       N/A

CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations. N/A--Not applicable.

All of the series are structured as sequential principal payment
structures with credit enhancement consisting of
overcollateralization, a reserve account, subordination for the
higher classes, and excess spread.  The credit enhancement levels
have grown for all of the outstanding classes as a percentage of
their current collateral balances and are a major consideration
behind the upgrades and affirmations.

Table 3
Hard Credit Support (%)
As of the April 2016 distribution
                                     Current
                   Total hard        total hard
                   credit support    credit support (ii)
Series      Class  at issuance (i)   (% of current)

2012-2      B      15.51              98.37
2012-2      C       7.59              46.47
2012-2      D       2.50              13.11

2013-1      B      14.55              80.37
2013-1      C       6.53              37.53
2013-1      D       1.50              10.68

2013-2      A-2    19.50              79.58
2013-2      B      14.50              59.81
2013-2      C       7.00              30.17
2013-2      D       1.50               8.43

2013-3      A-3    19.20              63.86
2013-3      B      14.60              49.23
2013-3      C       6.30              22.84
2013-3      D       1.50               7.57

2014-1      A-3    19.98              51.86
2014-1      B      15.14              40.08
2014-1      C       7.41              21.28
2014-1      D       1.50               6.90

2014-2      A-2    19.80              42.31
2014-2      A-3    19.80              42.31
2014-2      B      15.15              33.20
2014-2      C       7.05              17.32
2014-2      D       1.50               6.44

2014-3      A-2    20.59              39.02
2014-3      A-3    20.59              39.02
2014-3      B      16.05              31.27
2014-3      C       8.32              18.09
2014-3      D       1.50               6.46

2015-1      A-2    22.51              36.25
2015-1      A-3    22.51              36.25
2015-1      B      17.51              29.25
2015-1      C       9.46              17.99
2015-1      D       2.11               7.70

2015-2      A-1    24.75              32.06
2015-2      A-2    24.75              32.06
2015-2      B      19.90              26.32
2015-2      C      12.30              17.31
2015-2      D       5.95               9.79
2015-2      E       1.50               4.53

2016-1      A-1    26.90              29.04
2016-1      A-2    26.90              20.04
2016-1      B      21.65              23.60
2016-1      C      13.80              15.48
2016-1      D       6.95               8.39
2016-1      E       2.10               3.37

(i) Consists of a reserve account and overcollateralization (as
well as subordination for the higher-rated tranches) and excludes
excess spread, which can also provide additional enhancement.
(ii) Calculated as a percent of the total gross receivable pool
balance.

S&P incorporated a cash flow analysis into its surveillance review
to assess the loss coverage level, giving credit to excess spread.
The various cash flow scenarios included forward-looking
assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses, and voluntary absolute
prepayment speeds that S&P believes is appropriate given the
transaction's current performance.  Aside from S&P's break-even
cash flow analysis, it also conducted a sensitivity analysis to
determine the impact that a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would
have on S&P's ratings if losses were to begin trending higher than
S&P's revised base-case loss expectation.  S&P's results show that
the raised and affirmed ratings are consistent with our rating
stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of credit
deterioration for any given security under specific, hypothetical
stress scenarios.  The results demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the classes have adequate credit enhancement at the raised
and affirmed rating levels.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of each transaction to
ensure that the credit enhancement remains sufficient, in S&P's
view, to cover its revised cumulative net loss expectations under
its stress scenarios for each of the rated classes.

RATINGS RAISED

First Investors Auto Owner Trust

Series    Class     To         From
2012-2    B         AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
2012-2    C         AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
2012-2    D         AA+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)

2013-1    B         AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
2013-1    C         AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
2013-1    D         AA (sf)    BBB (sf)

2013-2    B         AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
2013-2    C         AA (sf)    A (sf)
2013-2    D         A- (sf)    BBB (sf)

2013-3    B         AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
2013-3    C         AA (sf)    A (sf)

2014-1    B         AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
2014-1    C         AA- (sf)   A (sf)

2014-2    B         AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
2014-2    C         A+ (sf)    A (sf)

2014-3    B         AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

First Investors Auto Owner Trust

Series   Class      Rating

2013-2   A-2        AAA( sf)

2013-3   A-3        AAA (sf)
2013-3   D          BBB (sf)

2014-1   A-3        AAA (sf)
2014-1   D          BBB (sf)

2014-2   A-2        AAA (sf)
2014-2   A-3        AAA (sf)
2014-2   D          BBB (sf)

2014-3   A-2        AAA (sf)
2014-3   A-3        AAA (sf)
2014-3   C          A (sf)
2014-3   D          BBB (sf)

2015-1   A-2        AAA (sf)
2015-1   A-3        AAA (sf)
2015-1   B          AA (sf)
2015-1   C          A (sf)
2015-1   D          BBB (sf)

2015-2   A-1        AAA (sf)
2015-2   A-2        AAA (sf)
2015-2   B          AA (sf)
2015-2   C          A (sf)
2015-2   D          BBB (sf)
2015-2   E          BB (sf)


FORTRESS CREDIT: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D,
and E notes from Fortress Credit BSL Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in March 2013 and is
scheduled to reinvest until January 2017.  The deal is managed by
FC BSL CM LLC, an affiliate of Fortress Investment Group LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 6, 2016, trustee report.

The transaction has benefited from a decline in the weighted
average life of the collateral portfolio.  Because time horizon
factors heavily into default probability, a shorter weighted
average life positively affects the creditworthiness of the
collateral pool.  In S&P's analysis, this is reflected as a decline
in its scenario default rates (SDRs), which benefits the cash flow
cushions in S&P's quantitative analysis.  Additionally, there has
been an increase in the level of assets rated 'B+' or higher,
indicating that there has been some improvement in credit quality
outside of the increase in assets rated 'CCC+' or lower and
defaulted assets.

Despite the aforementioned increase in assets rated 'B+' or higher,
the transaction's balance of assets rated 'CCC' or lower and
defaults has increased since the April 2013 effective date.  As of
the April 2016 trustee report, assets in the portfolio rated 'CCC+'
or lower increased to $17.80 million from $0.70 million according
to the April 2013 report (4.44% and 0.17% of the aggregate
principal balance, respectively).  At the same time, the amount of
defaulted assets increased to $18.56 million (4.63% of the
aggregate principal) from zero during this period.  The transaction
also exhibits exposure to the energy sector with 9.03% of the
collateral pool consisting of assets from the oil and gas industry.


As a result of defaults in the portfolio, the transaction has
experienced a slight decline in credit support to all tranches
since the effective date.

   -- The class A/B overcollateralization (O/C) ratio decreased to

      133.56% from 135.74%.

   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 121.42% from 123.40%.

   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 114.04% from 115.90%.

   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 107.21% from 108.96%.

However, all the coverage test results are currently passing and
well above the minimum requirements.

The increased exposure to 'CCC' rated assets and defaults has been
largely offset by the drop in the weighted average life of the
collateral portfolio.  As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating levels.

Although cash flow ratings point to a higher rating for class B and
below, S&P's rating actions take into account the cushion at the
higher ratings and additional sensitivities to capture any
potential changes in the underlying portfolio until the notes begin
to amortize.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

                      Cash flow
       Previous       implied       Cash flow        Final
Class  rating         rating(i)   cushion(ii)        rating
A      AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)          5.99%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)        AA+ (sf)          4.93%        AA (sf)
C      A (sf)         A+ (sf)           3.13%        A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)         2.86%        BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)        BB+ (sf)          2.29%        BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the minimum spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the SDR at the assigned rating for a given class
of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario              Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case                      15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating              20.0                      7.5
Above base case                      25.0                     10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation   Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase      decrease
        implied    implied    implied       implied       Final
Class   rating     rating     rating        rating        rating
A       AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
C       A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A (sf)        AA- (sf)      A (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)      BB (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                        Spread         Recovery
            Cash flow   compression    compression
            implied     implied        implied           Final
Class       rating      rating         rating            rating
A           AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)
B           AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)        A- (sf)           A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)         BBB (sf)
E           BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)       BB- (sf)          BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Fortress Credit BSL Ltd.

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


GCA2014 HOLDINGS: S&P Puts Cl. C Notes' BB Rating on Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on the class C and D notes
from GCA2014 Holdings Ltd. on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

GCA2014 Holdings Ltd. is a securitization collateralized by all of
the issued and outstanding class A shares issued by Global
Container Assets 2014 Ltd. (AssetCo), which includes the rights to
receive cash flow from available payments at the bottom of the
payment waterfalls in AssetCo.  AssetCo. is a securitization
transaction backed by a portfolio of shipping containers and has
the right to net operating income from the portfolio and any net
residual cash flows from the sale of containers.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the drop in AssetCo.'s container
portfolio utilization rates to 87.90% from 94.00% at closing, the
14% decline in lease rates since closing, and the insufficient cash
flows to pay the scheduled principal on the class C and D notes and
the interest on the class D notes.

When the deal closed in December 2014, the deal was backed by a
$429.432 million (net book value) portfolio containing 192,856
containers.  According to the April 2016 servicer report for the
May 5, 2016, payment date, the transaction is currently backed by a
$360.351 million portfolio with 171,966 containers.

Per the same report, there were insufficient funds to pay the full
scheduled principal on the class C notes and no funds available to
pay the interest and scheduled principal on the class D notes on
the most recent payment date.  The class D notes have been
capitalizing interest since the March 7, 2016, payment date.

The class C and D notes are deferrable interest notes and nontimely
payment of interest does not trigger an event of default.

The class C notes' outstanding principal balance as of May 5, 2016,
is $44.954 million (approximately 81.7% of the original notional
amount), and that of the class D notes is 17.160 million
(approximately 85.8% of the original notional amount).

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS PLACED ON WATCH NEGATIVE

GCA2014 Holdings Ltd.
$163 million asset-backed notes series 2014-1  

                                    Rating
Class            To                               From
C                BB (sf)/Watch Neg                BB (sf)
D                B (sf)/Watch Neg                 B (sf)


GRAMERCY REAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes:

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of four classes of notes due to
greater than anticipated recoveries on high credit risk collateral
resulting in material amortization of approximately 28% of the
prior review outstanding balance of rated notes. Of the remaining
collateral pool, while there is an increase in credit risk, as
evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF), the
increase in the weighted average recovery rate (WARR) more than
offsets this. Additionally, the prior review senior classes of
notes have fully amortized resulting in the Class B notes being the
senior-most bonds. Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of five
classes of notes because key transaction metrics are commensurate
with the existing ratings. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan obligation
(CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd. is a cash transaction whose
reinvestment period ended in July 2011. The transaction is
currently backed by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (47.2% of the pool balance); ii) b-notes (38.0%);
iii) whole loans (9.5%); and iv) CRE CDO notes (5.3%). As of the
April 25, 2016 note valuation report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$267.2 million from $1.0 billion at issuance, with previous partial
junior notes cancellation to the class C, class D, class E, class
F, and class G notes and principal pay-down directed to the senior
most outstanding class of notes. The pay-down was the result of a
combination of regular amortization, resolution and sales of
defaulted collateral, and the failing of certain par value tests.
In general, holding all key parameters static, junior note
cancellations results in slightly higher expected losses and longer
weighted average lives on the senior notes, while producing
slightly lower expected losses on the mezzanine and junior notes.
However, this does not cause, in and of itself, a downgrade or
upgrade of any outstanding classes of notes.

The pool contains two CMBS assets totaling $23.0 million (13.8% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's March 31, 2016 report. While there
have been moderate realized losses on the underlying collateral to
date, Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the
defaulted securities.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2007-GG9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the ratings on six classes in Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-GG9 as:

  Cl. A-1-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-MFX, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on June 18, 2015, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 18, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 18, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2015, Downgraded

   to B2 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to a
significant increase in defeasance as well as Moody's expectation
of additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff
of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance.  Defeasance has increased to 30% of the pool from 1% at
last review.  In addition, loans constituting 58% of the pool have
either defeased or have debt yields exceeding 10.0% and are
scheduled to mature within the next twelve months.

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was affirmed due to stable
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.3% of the
current balance, compared to 7.8% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

               METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/ Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                      DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 26, compared to 19 at last review.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 41% to $3.9 billion
from $6.6 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 130 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 39% of
the pool.  One loan, constituting 4.5% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.  Twenty loans,
constituting 30% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $542 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%).  Nine loans, constituting 7.1% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the COPT Office Portfolio ($132.4 million -- 3.4% of the
pool), which was originally secured by 14 office properties located
in suburban Baltimore, Maryland and Colorado Springs, Colorado.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2013 and
became REO in December 2013.  Six buildings have been sold and the
eight remaining properties are located in Linthicum, Maryland.  A
March 2016 appraisal valued the remaining properties at $54.5
million.  Moody's anticipates a significant loss on this loan.

The other eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $124 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (45% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eleven poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $43 million (a 19% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2014 operating results for
95% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 108%,
compared to 112% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 0.96,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 0.92X, at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Merchandise
Mart Loan ($175 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $350 million senior mortgage loan.  The
asset is also encumbered by $300 million of mezzanine financing.
The loan is secured by a 3.4 million SF mixed-use property that
includes, office, design showroom, trade-show and retail space.
The property is located in the River North section of Chicago,
Illinois.  As of December 2015, the property was 99% leased,
compared to 95% in April 2015.  Notable recent lease signings
include Google, Inc's Motorola Mobility, for 608,000 SF. The
sponsor is Vornado Realty LP.  Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 1.83X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 17% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the 667 Madison Avenue Loan ($250 million -- 6.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 250,000 SF office property
located in the Plaza District in Manhattan.  As of March 2015, the
property was 87% leased compared to 100% in March 2014 due to a
large tenant vacating in 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
106% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to 107% and 0.86X.

The second largest loan is the TIAA RexCorp Long Island Portfolio
Loan ($235.9 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by five
suburban office properties located in Melville and Uniondale New
York.  As of December 2015, the portfolio was 95% leased, compared
to 91% leased in December 2014.  Approximately 18% of leases will
expire by the end of 2017.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130%
and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.69X, at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Stafford Place I loan
($176 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 12-story
Class A office building located in Arlington, Virginia
approximately 4 miles west of the Washington D.C. central business
district.  As of December 2015 the property was 100% leased
compared to 99% in December 2014, however the largest tenant, the
National Science Foundation, plans to vacate the property at the
end of its lease in December 2017.  The National Science Foundation
occupies 97% of net rentable area of the property. Moody's analysis
factored in the tenant concentration.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 145% and 0.63X, respectively, unchanged from last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-RR3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR3
("GSMS 2006-RR3"):

Cl. A1-P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. A1-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

GSMS 2006-RR3 is a static Re-Remic transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance), issued in 2005 and 2006. All of the CMBS
assets were securitized between 2004 and 2006. As of the April 20,
2016 trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance of the
transaction has decreased to $92.0 million compared to $727.8
million at issuance as a result of the sales and recoveries of
certain assets and realized losses to the remaining underlying CMBS
collateral pool.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on nine classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2013-NYC5, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-NYC5. Moody's
rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. XA-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. XA-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. XB-1, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges. The affirmation of three interest only
(IO) classes are due to consistent expected credit performance of
its referenced classes. The Certificates are collateralized by a
single fixed rate loan backed by a first lien commercial mortgage
on five full-service hotels located in Manhattan. Moody's does not
rate the most junior principal class, Class G and an IO class,
Class XB-2.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 12, 2016 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance remains unchanged at $410 million, the same as
securitization. There is additional debt of $50 million in the form
of subordinate unsecured partner loan that is not an obligation of
the borrowers, but of the joint venture entity that indirectly owns
the portfolio. The pool has not experienced any losses of or
interest shortfalls since securitization.

The interest-only, fixed-rate loan is secured by fee interests in
five full service hotels including Affinia Manhattan, Affinia
Shelburne, Affinia 50, The Benjamin, and Affinia Gardens. The
portfolio is located in Manhattan, and benefits from larger
guestroom size and rooms with kitchens in over half of the room
inventory.

All five properties are subject to separate management agreements
with DHG Management Company, LLC., an affiliate of one of the
sponsors, that run through 2031. The sponsors of the loan are
Denihan Hospitality Group (51%) and Pebblebrook Hotel Trust (49%),
a public REIT.

The portfolio's net cash flow (NCF) for 2015 was approximately
$36.2 million, similar to a level that was achieved during 2013
($37.4 million), after having recovered to $44.0 million in 2014.
According to STR, Inc., NYC MSA experienced Revenue per Available
Room (RevPAR) decline of 2.3% during the first four months of 2016
compared to the same period in 2015. This is in the heels of NYC
having experienced -1.7% RevPAR drop in 2015 over 2014. Moody's
expects the current challenging lodging market conditions in NYC to
continue in the near term. Moody's stabilized NCF has been adjusted
downward to approximately $40.0 million. Moody's Trust LTV Ratio is
104%, and Moody's Trust Stressed DSCR is 1.05X.



GS MORTGAGE 2014-NEW: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust 2014-NEW, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on three classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the borrowers'
fee interest in 25 independent-living facilities comprising 2,838
units across 17 U.S. states, which secures the outstanding
$295.3 million seven-year fixed rate amortizing mortgage loan that
backs this stand-alone transaction.  S&P also considered the deal
structure and liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades on the principal- and interest-paying bonds reflect
S&P's expectation of the credit enhancement available to the
classes, which S&P believes is greater than its estimates of credit
enhancement necessary at the most recent rating levels.  The
upgrades further reflect S&P's view of the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, and amortization of
the trust balance.

The affirmed ratings on the principal- and interest-paying
certificate classes reflect subordination and liquidity support
levels that are consistent with the outstanding ratings and S&P's
view of the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A interest-only (IO)
certificates and raised its rating on the class X-B IO
certificates, based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities
which state that the rating on the IO securities would not be
higher than the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance
on class X-A references the class A-1 and A-2 certificate balance,
and the notional balance on class X-B references the balance on the
class B, C, D, and E certificates.

When analyzing stand-alone (single borrower) transactions, S&P
predominantly uses a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  S&P's property-level analysis included reevaluating the
portfolio of 25 independent-living facilities that secures the
trust's mortgage loan and reviewing the servicer-reported net
operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the past four years.  S&P
then derived its sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF), which
S&P divided by a 8.40% weighted average capitalization rate to
determine its expected-case value.  This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio of 73.7% and debt service
coverage (DSC) of 1.79x (based on the stepped-up interest rate, as
discussed below) on the trust balance.

According to the May 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
fixed-rate mortgage loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$295.3 million, with a fixed interest rate of 3.80%, which steps up
to 4.55% on Jan. 6, 2019, and matures on Jan. 12, 2021.  The
mortgage loan amortizes on a 30-year schedule for the full
seven-year term of the loan.  According to the transaction
documents, the borrowers are required to pay the special servicing,
work-out, and liquidation fees, and costs and expenses incurred
from special servicer appraisals and inspections.  To date, the
trust has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the portfolio's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, 2013, and
2012, and on a review of the master lease to determine S&P's
opinion of a sustainable cash flow for this portfolio.  The
servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a DSC of 2.22x on the trust
balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015, with a portfolio
occupancy of 91.6%, and a DSC of 2.11x for the 12 months ended Dec.
31, 2014.   The properties within the portfolio are triple-net
leased by the 25 borrowers as landlord to NCT Master Tenant I LLC,
which, in turn, subleases the properties to 25 subtenants. Each
subtenant was organized for the purpose of subleasing the related
property and is obligated to pay rent to the master tenant per the
lease agreement.  The base rent started in January 2014 at $32.2
million and increases by 4.5% on the first of each January through
2017.  Starting on Jan. 1, 2018, the base rent will increase by at
least 3.5% and, if the consumer price index (CPI) exceeds 3.5%,
then the rent will increase by the CPI, subject to a cap of 3.75%.
S&P's analysis is primarily based on the Jan. 1, 2017 base rent of
$36.7 million.

RATINGS RAISED

                   Rating
Class      To               From
B          AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
C          AA- (sf)         A- (sf)
D          A- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
E          BB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)
X-B        BB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)
X-A       AAA (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS2: Fitch to Rate $31MM Class F Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the GS Mortgage
Securities Trust (GSMS) 2016-GS2 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates series 2016-GS2.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $11,733,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $137,578,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $165,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $187,977,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,162,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $570,488,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,224,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45,038,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,224,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $122,918,000c class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $35,656,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,223,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,223,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $20,643,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,506,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,903,230a class G 'NR'.

Privately placed and pursuant to rule 144A
Notional amount and interest only.

The class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for the class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 9, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$31,903,230 class G.  The certificates represent the beneficial
ownership interest in the trust, primary assets of which are 37
loans secured by 115 commercial properties having an aggregate
principal balance of approximately $750.6 million as of the cut-off
date.  The loans were contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Company.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 83.4% of the properties by
balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of 93.8%
of the pool.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) on the trust-specific debt is 1.24x, higher than the 2015
and YTD 2016 averages of 1.18x and 1.17x, respectively, for the
other Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals.  The Fitch stressed
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the trust-specific debt is 103.4%,
lower than the 2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 109.3% and 107.9%,
respectively, for the other Fitch-rated deals.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans in the transaction
compose 62.7% of the pool by balance.  Compared to other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals, the concentration in this
transaction is higher than the 2015 and YTD 2016 average
concentrations of 49.3% and 54.8%, respectively.  The pool's
concentration results in a loan concentration index (LCI) of 539,
which is higher than the 2015 average of 367 and 2016 YTD average
of 415.

Credit Opinion Loan: One loan in the pool received shadow ratings.
The Veritas Multifamily Pool 1 (9.99% of the pool) received an
investment-grade rating of 'AAAsf' on a fusion basis and a 'AAAsf'
rating on a stand-alone basis.

Interest-Only Loans: Seventeen loans that make up 62.5% of the pool
are full interest-only.  This is higher than the average of 23.3%
for 2015 and 30.8% for YTD 2016 of the other Fitch-rated U.S.
multiborrower deals.  In addition, 14 loans composing 23.3% of the
pool are partial interest-only; this share is lower than the
average of 43.1% for 2015 and 41.1% for YTD 2016 of the other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals.  Overall, the pool is
scheduled to pay down by 5.08%, compared with the averages of 11.7%
for 2015 and 9.9% YTD for 2016 for the other Fitch-rated U.S.
deals.

                     ADDITIONAL RATING DRIVERS

Sponsor Concentration: The top 10 sponsors compose 75.7% of the
pool, including a single sponsor's 17.3% share.  This results in a
sponsor concentration index (SCI) of 833, which is higher than the
2015 and YTD 2016 averages of 410 and 461, respectively, for other
Fitch-rated multiborrower deals.

Mortgage Coupons: The weighted average (WA) mortgage coupon for
this pool of loans is 4.55%, well below historical averages.  Fitch
accounted for increased refinance risk in a higher interest rate
environment by analyzing sensitivity to increased interest rates in
conjunction with Fitch's stressed refinance rates, which were 9.07%
on a WA basis.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 6.4% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period). The
following rating sensitivities describe how the ratings would react
to further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF.  The implied rating
sensitivities are only indicative of some of the potential outcomes
and do not consider other risk factors to which the transaction is
exposed.  Stressing additional risk factors may result in different
outcomes.  Furthermore, the implied ratings, after the further NCF
stresses are applied, are more akin to what the ratings would be at
deal issuance had those further stressed NCFs been in place at that
time.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to GSMS
2016-GS2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


GSAA HOME 2005-5: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes from two U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  Of the
six raised ratings, five are error corrections.  Specifically, S&P
corrected its ratings on classes M-2, M-3, M-4, and B-1 from GSAA
Home Equity Trust 2005-5 and our rating on class A1 from structured
Asset Securities Corp. series 1999-SP1.

These corrections are due to a change in the cash flow allocation
data provided to S&P by Intex Solutions Inc.  While the internal
model S&P uses in determining its ratings on U.S. RMBS transactions
typically applies S&P's criteria assumptions, Intex, in many cases,
provides the collateral composition and structural modeling used as
inputs in S&P's analysis.  Therefore, the resulting collateral
characteristics and structural mechanics that use S&P's input
assumptions depend on the modeling and data provided by Intex.

Classes M-2, M-3, M-4, and B-1 from GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-5
experienced interest shortfalls during the December 2015 remittance
period.  On April 11, 2016, S&P lowered its ratings on all four
classes.  S&P's downgrades reflected its expectation that, based on
Intex's cash flow allocation data, these interest shortfalls would
not be reimbursed.  S&P subsequently determined that Intex was not
applying the cash flow allocation set forth in the transaction
documents.  After S&P informed Intex of this error, Intex corrected
its cash flow allocation data to reflect the cash flow allocation
set forth in the transaction documents. Based on S&P's updated cash
flow results and its current view of these classes' credit risk,
S&P has raised its ratings on classes M-2, M-3, M-4, and B-1.

S&P previously lowered its rating on class A1 from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. series 1999-SP1 on May 9, 2014, and again on May
18, 2015, based on Intex's data regarding the allocation of
principal payments.  During this review, S&P observed that the cash
flow results for this class were inconsistent with this class'
available credit support and observed rate of paydown.  S&P then
determined that Intex was not applying the principal payment
allocation set forth in the transaction documents.  After S&P
informed Intex of this error, Intex corrected its cash flow data to
reflect the principal allocation set forth in the transaction
documents.  Based on S&P's updated cash flow results and its
current view of this class' credit risk, S&P has raised its rating
on this class.

In addition, S&P raised its rating on class A2 from Structured
Asset Securities Corp. series 1999-SP1 based on improved collateral
performance.  Class A2 was not affected by the corrections.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

  An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
  Real GDP growth of 2.3% for 2016;
  The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2016; and
  The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

  Total unemployment will tick up to 5.1% for 2016;
  Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
  Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able to
   purchase property; and
  While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
   2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices will

   largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these rates.

RATINGS RAISED

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 1999-SP1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         863572A94   A (sf)               BB+ (sf)
A2         863572B28   AA (sf)              BBB+ (sf)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-5
Series 2005-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        36242DR70   BB+ (sf)             CCC (sf)
M-3        36242DR88   BB (sf)              CCC (sf)
M-4        36242DR96   BB (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-1        36242DS20   BB- (sf)             CCC (sf)


GSAMP TRUST 2003-SEA2: Moody's Cuts Cl. M-1 Debt Rating to B1(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 13
tranches from six deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2015
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-SEA2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-SD2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-02

Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: SBMS VII 1997-HUD1

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-QHL1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades of Class
M-1 of GSAMP 2003-SEA2, Class M-3, Class M-4 and Class B of MASTR
2004-02 are a result of interest shortfalls which are unlikely to
be reimbursed. The rating downgrade of Class B-2 of SBMS VII
1997-HUD1 is due to significant depletion in credit enhancement.
The rating downgrade of Class IO of SBMS VII 1997-HUD1 is a result
of losses incurred on the linked tranches and the rating downgrade
of Class B-2.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. Please see
the Ratings Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in April
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


JAMESTOWN CLO I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B,
C, and D notes from Jamestown CLO I Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) managed by 3i Debt Management US LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 25, 2016, trustee report.

The transaction will remain in its reinvestment period until
November 2016.  The class A overcollateralization ratios have
declined to 132.08% as of April 2016 from 135.02% as of June 2013,
and the portfolio's credit quality has deteriorated slightly, as
the balance of assets with a 'CCC+' rating or below has increased
to $23 million from $4 million during the same period.  The
portfolio continues to be well-diversified with exposure to 224
unique obligors, while the weighted average life has declined to
4.51 years.  As of the April 2016 trustee report, the transaction
does not have above-average exposure to loans from issuers in
distressed sectors, and it does not have above-average exposure to
assets trading at distressed prices.

The affirmed ratings reflect adequate credit support at the current
rating levels.  Although the cash flow results showed higher
ratings for the class A-2, B, C, and D notes, S&P affirmed its
ratings on all five classes to maintain rating cushion as the
transaction continues to reinvest.

S&P Global Ratings will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Jamestown CLO I Ltd.

                     Cash flow
       Previous      implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating        rating(i)  cushion(ii) rating
A-1    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    7.33%        AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)    12.21%       AA (sf)
B      A (sf)        A+ (sf)     6.72%        A (sf)
C      BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)   8.04%        BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)       BB+ (sf)    1.05%        BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
B      A (sf)     A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA (sf)     A (sf)
C      BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)    B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                  DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA (sf)
B      A (sf)       A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
C      BBB (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)      BB- (sf)      CCC (sf)      BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Jamestown CLO I Ltd.

Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AA (sf)
B         A (sf)
C         BBB (sf)
D         BB (sf)


JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B1(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-C3 as follows. Moody's has also assigned
a rating to one previously withdrawn class:

Cl. F, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Reinstated to Ca (sf); previously on April 23, 2015
Withdrawn (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class F was upgraded due to overall improved pool
performance and an increase in credit support resulting from
principal recoveries of a previously liquidated loan. Class F is
fully covered by defeasance, however, the class has had previous
interest shortfalls for nearly four years and had a previous
principal loss that has since been recovered.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Class G was assigned a rating of Ca (sf) following the
reinstatement of principal to the class as reflected in the
trustee's report dated May 12, 2016. Class G previously had a zero
balance. Due to the zero balance, in a prior action on April 23,
2015, Moody's withdrew its rating for the Class. Prior to the
withdrawal, the Class had a rating of C (sf).

Moody’s says “Moody's rating action reflects a base expected
loss of 0% of the current balance, the same as at last review.
Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.1%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 10.1% at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $13 million
from $745 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 48% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 17% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $68 million (for an average loss
severity of 69%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 and full or partial year 2015
operating results for 100% of the pool.

Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 34%, compared to 39% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 3.37X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 2.76X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 44% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Conroe Shopping Center Loan ($2.4 million --
19% of the pool), which is secured by a 51,000 SF retail center
located in Conroe, Texas (approximately 41 miles north of downtown
Houston). The property was 100% leased as of September 2015 and has
been fully leased the past two years. The loan is fully amortizing,
has paid down 52% since securitization and matures in December
2022. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.04X,
respectively, compared to 38% and 2.67X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Shoal Creek Apartments, Phase II
Loan ($2.2 million -- 17% of the pool). The loan is secured by an
87-unit multifamily complex located in Athens, Georgia, near the
University of Georgia campus. The property was 100% leased as of
September 2015, the same as at last review and compared to 98% in
September 2014. The property is on the watchlist for low DSCR. The
loan is fully amortizing, has paid down 51% since securitization
and matures in November 2022. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 46% and 2.11X, respectively, compared to 50% and 1.95X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Golden State-Santa Clarita Loan ($1.1
million -- 9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 688 unit
self-storage facility in Santa Clarita, California. The property
was 96% leased as of December 2015, compared to 97% leased as of
March 2015 and 85% in December 2014. The loan is fully amortizing,
has paid down 51% since securitization and matures in September
2022. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 21% and 4.86X,
respectively, compared to 32% and 3.22X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC10: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on 12 classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-CIBC10 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2015 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class B was upgraded based primarily due to an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 11% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes A-J, C, D and E were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the remaining seven P&I classes were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 35.1% of the
current balance, compared to 34.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.


DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $263 million
from $1.96 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 33% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 79% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 1% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by US government securities.

Five loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $51.4 million (for an
average loss severity of 18%). Eight loans, constituting 54% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Continental Plaza Loan ($88.0 million -- 33.4%
of the pool), which is secured by three office buildings and a
single story retail center totaling 639,000 square feet (SF),
located in Hackensack, New Jersey. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2009 due to imminent default; was foreclosed
upon in August 2012 and the asset is now real estate owned (REO).
As of December 2015, the property was 70% leased. An August 2015
appraisal valued the property at $62.2 million.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $91.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (64% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 97% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 58%, compared to 59%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.86X,
respectively, compared to 1.62X and 1.81X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Greens at Hurricane Creek Apartments Loan
($19.8 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 576-unit
multifamily property located in Bryant, Arkansas. As of December
2015, the property was 97% occupied, unchanged from March 2014.
Performance has declined slightly due to an increase in operating
expenses. The loan benefits from amortization and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.38X, respectively, compared to 66% and
1.40X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 65-75 Lower Welden Street Loan
($16.5 million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 149,000
SF suburban office building located in St. Albans, Vermont
(approximately 18 miles from the Canadian border). As of December
2015, the property was 100% occupied by The Department of Homeland
Security, whose lease expires in January 2021. Due to the single
tenancy, Moody's analysis incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
74% and 1.25X at the last review.

The third largest loan is The Links at Oxford Apartments Loan
($15.7 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 492-unit
multifamily property located in Oxford, Mississippi. As of December
2015, the property was 100% occupied, unchanged from December 2013.
Performance has remained stable and the loan benefits from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.66X,
respectively, compared to 56% and 1.59X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC9: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 9 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 10 classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-CIBC9.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class D reflects the defeasance of the largest loan
in the pool since Fitch's last rating action.  The affirmations
reflect the pool concentration and the overall stable performance
of the remaining loans.  Currently, class D is 93% covered by
defeased collateral and will be fully covered in approximately
three months as the class continues to be paid down through
amortization.  There are only nine loans remaining, of which seven
(92.6%) mature in 2022 or later.  Two loans (32.3%) are defeased
and six (44.1%) are fully amortizing.  Based on the concentrated
nature of the pool, Fitch used a deterministic stress in its
analysis.

The pool has incurred $71.3 million (6.5% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated one loan
(18.3%) as a Fitch Loan of Concern. There are not any specially
serviced loans.  As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 97.3% to $30.1
million from $1.1 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes F through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Fitch Loan of
Concern (18.3% of the pool).  It is secured by a 81,903 square foot
(sf) retail center located in Littleton, CO, which is approximately
20 miles southwest of Denver.  The anchor space, which accounts for
51% of the net rentable area, is currently dark.  The space was
formerly occupied by Wild Oats, but the tenant continues to pay
full rent as it searches for a replacement tenant to sublease.  The
lease runs through January 2019.  Per the servicer, occupancy as of
February 2016 was 86%, but physically, the property is only 54%
occupied.  The year-end (YE) 2015 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was reported to be 0.94x.  The DSCR has been negatively
impacted by a decrease in occupancy and rental rates.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes D and E are Stable.  Class D will soon
be fully covered by defeased collateral and will continue to
benefit from paydown as the remaining loans amortize.  Fitch
analysis employed a deterministic scenario to reflect the pool's
exposure to single event risk associated with the Fitch Loan of
Concern as well as significant concentration with only nine loans
remaining.  An upgrade to class E is possible if additional loans
defease or pay off, but upgrades will be limited until then by pool
concentration, collateral quality and the potential for future
interest shortfalls.  No downgrades are expected unless there is a
significant deterioration in performance of any of the remaining
loans.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $10.5 million class D to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.


Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $11 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.6 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 95%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A1-A, B and C certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class NR certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


JP MORGAN 2013-C13: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2013-C13, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C13 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3.8% to $924.6
million from $961.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 44 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 62% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 12.9% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. One loan,
constituting 0.4% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

There are not any loans on the master servicer's watchlist nor are
there any in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 84% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95%, compared to
100% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.9% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.76X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.69X and 0.99X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Americold Cold Storage Portfolio Loan ($101.8 million -- 11% of the
pool), which is secured by 15 cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted temperature controlled warehouse facilities
containing a total capacity of 77.5 million cubic feet (3.6 million
square feet (SF)) located in nine states. This loan is a 50%
pari-passu component of a $203.6 million first mortgage loan; the
asset also has $102 million of mezzanine financing. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa1 (scap.pd)
and 1.68X, respectively.

The other loan with a structured credit assessment is the 501 Fifth
Avenue Loan ($17.5 million -- 1.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 159,000 SF, 23-story class B office building located in the
Grand Central submarket in New York City. As of January 2015, the
property was 91% leased, compared to 94% at yearend 2014. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and
1.48X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the IDS Center Loan ($90.9 million -- 9.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.4 million SF, 57-story class
A office tower; an 8-story annex building, Crystal Court, which is
an enclosed 2-story retail center and a subterranean parking
structure that has 655 spaces, located in downtown Minneapolis,
Minnesota. As of March 2016, the office component was 82% leased
and the retail component was 61% leased. The overall property was
80% leased as of March 2016. The loan is a pari-passu component of
a $179.4 million first mortgage loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 101% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.97X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the 589 Fifth Avenue Loan ($87.5 million
-- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 17-story, 169,000 SF
mixed-use office and retail building property, located in New York
City at the corner of 48th street and 5th avenue. The building has
approximately 57,000 SF of retail space, while the remainder is
used as office space. H&M leased 40% of the NRA (Net Rentable Area)
for their flagship store. As of December 2015, the property was
100% leased, compared to 94% at yearend 2014. The loan is a
pari-passu component of a $175 million first mortgage loan. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.88X, respectively, unchanged
from the prior review.

The third largest loan is the Atlantic Times Square Loan ($70.4
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 213,000 SF of
retail space and 100 multi-family units located in Monterey Park,
California. The largest retail tenants include a 14-screen AMC
theater and a 24 Hour Fitness. The multi-family units are a part of
a 210 condominium development. As of February 2016, the retail
component was 97% leased, compared to 91% at yearend 2014. The loan
also benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
93% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.90X at the last
review.


JP MORGAN 2014-C21: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A. Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2014-C21
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                      KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  The stable performance reflects no
material changes to pool metrics since issuance, therefore the
original rating analysis was considered in affirming the
transaction.
The pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.93% to
$1.25 billion from $1.26 billion at issuance.  Fitch has designated
three loans (1.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, two of which (1.1%)
are specially serviced.

The largest specially-serviced loan (0.5% of the pool) is secured
by an 81,000 SF office park consisting of 19 single-story
buildings, located in Lockport, New York.  The loan was in default
at securitization due to the failure to establish a lockbox as
required by the loan agreement.  The borrower refused to fund
monthly escrows designed to repay protective tax advances.  A
mortgage loan repurchase claim has been noticed to the loan
originator to repurchase the loan or substitute a qualified
replacement loan.  As of March 2016, the property was 85%
occupied.

The next specially-serviced loan (0.5% of the pool) is secured by a
96,200 SF office building located in Naperville, IL.  Occupancy
declined to 56% from 78% in 2014 after GM vacated in mid-2015.  The
loan transferred to special servicing after written notification
was received from the borrower stating that they cannot continue
debt service obligations.  The borrower has put forth a preliminary
discounted payoff (DPO) offer which is currently being evaluated.
The servicer is dual tracking both negotiations with the borrower
and potential foreclosure, depending on whether modification terms
can be agreed upon.

The largest loan in the pool (8.2% of the pool) is secured by Phase
I of Showcase Mall, a 182,037-sf retail and entertainment center
located on Las Vegas Boulevard in Las Vegas, NV.  The collateral
comprises two buildings: the main building, with frontage on Las
Vegas Boulevard, and a second building with no frontage that
includes a 1,418-space parking garage and an eight-screen United
Artist Theater (22.6% of collateral NRA).  Per the December 2015
rent roll, 43% of the net rentable area (NRA) rolls in 2017.  The
loan is structured with a $3.5 million reserve, $2.5 million of
which will be used for future retenanting costs.  As of December
2015, occupancy was 93%.Fitch will continue to monitor the rollover
over the next year.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

                      DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $24.1 million class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.5 million class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $59.4 million class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $325 million class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $357.2 million class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $82.5 million class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $949.9 million* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $90.1 million* class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69.5 million class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $90.1 million class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45.8 million class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $205.5 million class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.3 million* class X-C 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $74.3 million class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.3 million class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17.4 million class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged for a
related amount of class EC certificates, and class EC certificates
may be exchanged for class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

Class X-C, D, E and F are privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the $56.9 million NR class, or the $74.3
million interest-only class X-D.


JPMDB COMMERCIAL 2016-C2: Fitch Puts 'BBsf' Rating to Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks on JPMDB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-C2
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $23,342,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160,394,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $120,000,000 class A-3A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $222,981,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,243,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $700,848,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,639,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,888,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,639,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,828,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,000,000a class A-3B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,352,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,524,000a class D 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,856,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,276,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not rated:

-- $36,828,383 class NR.

(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
May 23, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 30 loans secured by 79
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$892,799,383 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and German
American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 86% of the properties by
balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of 92% of
the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Low Fitch Leverage: This transaction has lower leverage than other
Fitch-rated transactions. The Fitch debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the trust is 1.26x, while the year-to-date (YTD) 2016
and 2015 averages are 1.17x and 1.18x, respectively. The Fitch loan
to value (LTV) for the trust is 99.9%, which is lower than both the
YTD 2016 and 2015 averages of 107.9% and 109.3%, respectively.
Excluding the credit-opinion loans (10.1% of the pool), the Fitch
DSCR and LTV are 1.21x and 105.1%, respectively.

Concentrated Pool with Low Loan Count: The pool is more
concentrated than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The top 10 loans comprise 59.5% of the pool, which is
above recent averages of 55.8% for YTD 2016 and above the 2015
average of 49.3%. Additionally, the loan concentration index (LCI)
and sponsor concentration index (SCI) are 481 and 653,
respectively, above 2015 averages of 367 and 410.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: The transaction has two
credit opinion loans, totaling 10.1% of the pool. 787 Seventh Ave
(6.7% of the pool) is the third largest loan in the transaction and
has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf' on a stand-alone
basis. Palisades Center (3.4% of the pool) is the 14th largest loan
in the transaction and has an investment-grade credit opinion of
'AAsf' on a stand-alone basis. Excluding these loans, the conduit
has a Fitch stressed DSCR of 1.21x and 105.1%, respectively. The
implied credit enhancement levels for the conduit portion of the
transaction for 'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are 23.875% and 8.375%,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15% below the
most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMDB
2016-C2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young, LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.



LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C6: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed seven classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2004-C6 (LBUBS 2004-C6).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of class H is a result of higher certainty of losses
since Fitch's last rating action.  Although credit enhancement for
the non-distressed classes is high, affirmations are warranted
given the significant concentrations within the pool.  There are
six loans remaining, three of which (76.8%) are in special
servicing.  Given the concentrations, Fitch used additional
deterministic stress scenarios in its analysis.

Realized losses to date total $20.5 million.  Interest shortfalls
currently affect classes G through P. As of the April 2016
distribution date, the pool has paid down 94.3% since issuance.
There is one fully defeased loan (12.4%) in the pool, with an
outstanding principal balance of $9.5 million.  It is scheduled to
mature in July 2016.

The largest contributor to expected losses is Northridge Business
Park (43.5%), which is a seven-building office property totaling
471,034 square feet (sf) in Atlanta, GA.  The loan has been in
special servicing since 2009 following the borrower's request for a
loan modification.  In February 2011, the property's largest tenant
vacated the vast majority of its space, which represented 45% of
net rentable area (NRA), upon lease expiration.  Despite some
recent leasing activity, occupancy has remained low (43% as of
December 2015).  The property has been real estate owned (REO)
since February 2012 and the special servicer and is expected to be
sold at auction July 2016.

The second highest contributor to expected losses is the Stockdale
Tower (26.4%) loan.  The loan is secured by an approximately
176,000 square foot (sf), office property in Bakersfield, CA.
Chevron, the property's largest tenant which accounted for 33.5% of
NRA vacated.  This build-to-suit property also originally housed
Shell Oil but transferred to special in late 2009 upon its
departure.  Despite this, occupancy rose to 87% by 2011, driven by
new leases with several energy-related tenants.  Year-end 2015
occupancy was 52.8%; however, multiple new tenants have signed
leases at the property.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes F and G continue to be Stable.  The
ratings reflect the additional deterministic stresses which assumed
higher losses on the specially serviced loans.  No additional
rating changes are expected due to increasing credit enhancement.
Downgrades are possible with loan-level losses in excess of Fitch's
stressed expectations.  Conversely upgrades are possible with
significant reduction in expected losses or realized losses.
Distressed classes will be downgraded as losses are realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $11.8 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 70%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $14.3 million Class F at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.8 million Class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.4 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $16.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $1.7 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $6.7 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $5 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The certificates for classes A-1 through E have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XCL and
XCP certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to CCC-
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class NBT-3 and NBT-4
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction to 'CCC- (sf)'.  S&P
also affirmed its 'BBB- (sf)' rating on the class NBT-2 raked
certificates.  The ratings on all of the classes remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The ratings were originally placed on CreditWatch with negative
implications in March 2016 due to actual and expected interest
shortfalls.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the interest
shortfalls affecting the classes, as well as S&P's expectations
around the ultimate resolution of the Northborough Tower real
estate-owned (REO) asset.  The class NBT raked certificates derive
100% of their cash flows from a nonpooled portion ($7.8 million) of
this asset (aggregate balance of $15.7 million), which was
transferred to the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III), on Jan. 18, 2016, due to maturity default.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), stated that as a
result of the loan's default and per the transaction documentation,
proceeds received on the nonpooled portion of the loan are being
diverted to repay principal on the pooled portion ($7.9 million)
first, which will continue until the pooled portion is repaid in
full or the loan is liquidated or resolved.  As a result, the class
NBT certificates continue to short 100% of their accrued
certificate interest, which they have done for four consecutive
months as of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report.

Based on S&P's recent conversations with C-III, as well as reported
information, S&P understands that the asset became REO on May 9,
2016, with an anticipated resolution to occur no later than
September 2016.  In addition, a recent appraisal value was detailed
in the monthly reporting information.  Based on this, S&P believes
that the class NBT-3 and NBT-4 certificates are at an elevated risk
of experiencing principal losses upon this asset's ultimate
resolution; thus S&P lowered its ratings to 'CCC- (sf)'.

The recent valuation information further indicates that class
NBT-2 could see a full recovery of its principal balance upon asset
resolution, so S&P affirmed its 'BBB- (sf)' rating.

All of the ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative implications
given S&P's expectation that the certificates will continue to
experience interest shortfalls until the asset is resolved, as well
as the potential for the resolution timeframe to extend beyond that
anticipated, based on S&P's analysis.

Over the next few months, S&P will continue to engage in ongoing
discussion with the special servicer as part of S&P's efforts to
monitor the interest shortfalls and progress of the asset
resolution (including any updates to expected recoverable value
and/or resolution timeframe) and will resolve and/or take
additional rating actions as necessary.

As of the May 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the Northborough
Tower asset had a $15.7 million whole loan balance divided into a
$7.9 million senior pooled portion and a
$7.8 million subordinate nonpooled portion.  The property is a
207,908-sq.-ft. office building in Houston.  The property is
currently vacant; however, it is 100% leased to a single tenant
that is expected to continue to fulfill its lease obligations until
its April 2018 lease expiration.  The reported debt service
coverage was 2.53x as of year-end 2014 and 2.27x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2015.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3
Commercial mortgage pass through certificates series 2006-C3
                         Rating
Class       Identifier   To                    From
NBT-2       52108MGW7    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
NBT-3       52108MGX5    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
NBT-4       52108MGY3    CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Class E2 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 11, LLC - Equipment
Contract Backed Notes, Series 2016-1:

-- Series 2016-1, Class A1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class A2 rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class A3 rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class A4 rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class B rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class C rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class D rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class E1 rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class E2 rated BB (high) (sf)

The DBRS provisional ratings are based on DBRS’s review of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and the historical
    performance of the LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. portfolio.

-- The legal structure and legal opinions that address the true
    sale of the assets, the non-consolidation of the trust, and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
    for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.




LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class E-2 Notes (P)Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 11, LLC Series
2016-1 (LEAF 2016-1), sponsored by LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc.
(unrated). The transaction is a securitization of equipment loans
and leases, whose collateral is mainly represented by office and
other small-ticket equipment.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 11 LLC, Series 2016-1

$97,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$61,000,000 Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$36,008,000 Class A-4 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$13,904,000 Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$14,432,000 Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

$11,440,000 Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

$10,560,000 Class E-1 Notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$9,152,000 Class E-2 Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying equipment
contracts and their steady historical and expected performance, the
transaction's sequential structure, the experience and expertise of
LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. (unrated), as the servicer, and the
back-up servicing arrangement with U.S. Bank National Association
(Aa1/P-1; stable).

Moody's cumulative net loss expectation for the LEAF transaction is
3.50%, and the Aaa level is 23.0%. Moody's net loss expectation for
the LEAF 2016-1 transaction is based on the analysis of the credit
quality of the underlying collateral, comparable issuer historical
performance trends, the ability of LEAF Commercial Capital Inc. to
perform the servicing functions, and current expectations for
future economic conditions. There is initially 21.1% hard credit
enhancement behind the Class A notes consisting of
overcollateralization, a non-declining reserve account and
subordination.


MASTR TRUST 2005-4: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-3 Debt Rating to Caa3(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-4.

The resecuritization is backed by several residential
mortgage-backed securities, which in turn are backed by residential
mortgage loans.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of Class A-1 and Class A-2 are due to
increasing credit enhancement available to the tranches. The rating
upgrade of Class A-3 reflects Moody's increased recovery
expectations on the underlying RMBS bonds.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-CAM1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. N Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed one class of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 1999-CAM1 (MSC 1999-CAM1).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of class M is a result of declining loss expectations
given the increased credit enhancement, continued relatively stable
performance of the six remaining loans and continued expected
paydown.

As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool balance has been
reduced by 99.4% to $4.7 million from $806.5 million at issuance
with only six of the 152 original loans remaining.  There are no
defeased loans and three loans totaling 7.7% of the pool are fully
amortizing.  There are five loans (39%) which are single-tenant
retail properties.  Maturity dates are in 2016 (0.6%), 2017
(38.4%), and 2018 (61%).  Classes N through O have prior incurred
unpaid interest shortfalls.  There are no delinquent or specially
serviced loans.

The largest loan (61%) is secured by a 79,038 square foot (sf)
medical office property located in Fairfax, VA.  Reported occupancy
declined over the last few years.  As of year-end (YE) 2014,
occupancy was 78% - a slight improvement compared to 76% in 2013 -
but lower than 87% in 2012.  The property is occupied mostly by
doctors and medical-related tenants as it is located adjacent to
the Inova Fair Oaks Hospital.  Although occupancy has declined, the
loan's debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) remains high at 2.67x as
of YE 2014.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a lack of occupancy updates provided by the
borrower.  Leases with two of the larger tenants comprising
approximately 14% of net rentable area (NRA) were scheduled to
expire in 2015.  The balloon loan matures in August 2018.

The second largest loan (23.9%) is secured by an 11,200 sf
single-tenant retail building located in Tampa, FL.  The building
is fully leased by CVS through June 2017.  According to the master
servicer, CVS has subleased their entire space to Spanish grocer
National Supermarket through the end of their lease term, which is
just prior to the loan's August 2017 maturity.  The loan is on the
watchlist for both deferred maintenance issues and the upcoming
expiration of the sublease.  According to servicer commentary, the
borrower states that the deferred maintenance issues have been
corrected.  At lease expiration, the loan's balance will be
approximately $82 psf.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further upgrades were not considered due to the concentration of
single-tenant retail properties, several of which have tenants with
lease expirations prior to loan maturity.  While not expected,
downgrades to class M are possible if expected or realized losses
increase.  Class N will remain at 'Dsf', as losses have been
realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded this class and revised the Recovery Estimate
(RE) as indicated:

   -- $4.6 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed this class:

   -- $0.3 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1 through L have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class
O.  Fitch previously withdrew its rating on the interest-only class
X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. H Debt to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2003-TOP11, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

"We raised our ratings on classes C through H to reflect our
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which is greater than our most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The upgrades also
reflect our views regarding the current and future performance of
the transaction's collateral, available liquidity support, and the
reduced trust balance.  We upgraded class H to further reflect the
fact that the interest shortfalls that were previously affecting
the certificates have been resolved in full, and we do not believe,
at this time, that the class is susceptible to near-term interest
shortfalls.  Our rating actions also considered anticipated
improvement in credit enhancement in the near-term after the
defeased Center Tower loan ($48.6 million, 67.1%) pays off in June
2016," S&P said.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $72.4 million, which is 6.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 21 loans, down from 203
loans at issuance.  One of these loans ($2.2 million, 3.1%) is with
the special servicer, five ($52.3 million, 72.3%) are defeased, and
one ($0.66 million, 0.9%) is on the master servicer's watchlist.
The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 100% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which
20.9% was year-end 2014 data, 73.3% was year-end 2015 data, and the
remainder was partial-year 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.90x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 25.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.39% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the specially serviced
loan and the five defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans
have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $17.2 million
(23.8%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, we calculated an S&P
Global Ratings' weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.9x and 27.6%,
respectively, for nine of the top 10 nondefeased loans. The
remaining loan is specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $21.2 million in principal
losses, or 1.8% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 1.9% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution on the
specially serviced asset.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 13, 2016, trustee remittance report, one loan
($2.2 million, 3.1%) is with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC (C-III).  Details of the specially serviced loan
follow:

The 9200 Edmonton Road loan ($2.2 million, 3.1%) is the
third-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and has a total reported
exposure of $2.5 million.  The loan is secured by an office
property totaling 38,690 sq. ft. in Greenbelt, Md.  The loan was
transferred to C-III on April 20, 2015, because of imminent
monetary default on the balloon payment.  The loan was previously
with the special servicer and has been returned to the master
servicer after being modified on April 24, 2014.  Terms of the
modifications included extending the maturity date to May 1, 2015,
from May 1, 2013.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end
2015 were 1.93x and 100.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate
loss upon this loan's eventual resolution, which it considers to be
between 26% and 59% of the loan's current balance.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-TOP 11
                                        Rating
Class             Identifier            To          From
C                 61746WH45             AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)
D                 61746WH52             AAA (sf)    A- (sf)
E                 61746WH86             AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
F                 61746WH94             AA+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
G                 61746WJ27             AA (sf)     B+ (sf)
H                 61746WJ35             BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Hikes Cl. H Debt Rating to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on 5 classes,
affirmed the ratings on two classes, upgraded the rating on one
class in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP15 as:

  Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. H, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 36% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance, compared to 8.4% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.9% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14, the same as at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to
$35.2 million from $890 million at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1% to 9.6% of the pool.

Six loans, constituting 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%).  One loan, the Curlew Lakes loan ($3.0 million
8.5% of the pool), is currently in special servicing.  The loan is
secured by a retail center located twenty-five miles northwest of
Tampa, Florida.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2014 due to maturity default.  As of July 2015, the
property was 45% leased compared to 52% as of March 2013.  The
special servicer indicated the property is currently being marketed
for sale.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 39.9%, compared to
55.7% at the previous review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.6% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.60X and 3.69X,
respectively, compared to 1.51X and 2.81X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Elkhorn Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($3.4 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center located in Sacramento, California.  The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in June 2024.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 60% and 1.63X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.69X at the
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Braeswood Shopping Center
loan ($3.1 million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by an
outdoor retail property located in Houston, Texas.  The loan is
fully amortizing and matures in June 2024.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 25% and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 27%
and 3.87X at the last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Del Monte Plaza
($2.8 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by an outdoor
retail property located in Reno, Nevada.  The loan is also fully
amortizing and matures in March 2024.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 38% and 2.59X, respectively, compared to 38% and 2.55X at
the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLF: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. G Debt to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded five classes and affirmed five classes
of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust series 2007-XLF (MSCI 2007-XLF).


                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The transaction is extremely concentrated with only one loan
remaining, the specially serviced HRO Hotel Portfolio loan, which
is secured by five full service hotels (1,939 keys) located in
Stamford, CT; Sonoma, CA; Norfolk, VA; Atlanta, GA; and Southfield,
MI.  The loan matured in October 2015 without repayment; however,
the special servicer has indicated that the borrower is working
towards a full refinance in early 2016.

Since the last rating action, the former Le Meridien Resort loan
paid off in full ($10.8 million) while the HRO Hotel Portfolio loan
received approximately $9 million in unscheduled pre-payments.
Upgrades reflect the classes' increased credit enhancement as well
as the slightly improving performance of the underlying hotel
collateral.

The HRO Hotel Portfolio hotels currently operate under the
Marriott, Hilton, Sheraton, and Westin flags.  Per the TTM December
2015 STR reporting, the portfolio had a weighted average occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR of 71.4%, $129, and $93, respectively with the
average RevPAR increasing 4% over the prior year.  Average RevPAR
penetration for the portfolio was below 100%, as of TTM December
2015.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Due to the risk associated with a single borrower transaction
secured by five hotels, several of which are located in secondary
markets, and most of which are underperforming their competition,
senior ratings have been capped at 'Asf'; further upgrades are
unlikely.

Per the special servicer, the borrower is actively pursuing a
refinance of the loan that would result in a full payoff by early
2016.  Should the refinance fall through, and property performance
decline, downgrades would be possible to classes D through H and
M-HRO.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these ratings:

   -- $5.6 million class D to Asf' from BBBsf; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27.4 million class E to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $26.3 million class F to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $26.6 million class G to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf'; Assigned
      Stable Outlook;
   -- $13.5 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Assigned Stable

      Outlook;

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $10.4 million class J at 'Dsf' RE 100%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf' RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf' RE 0%;
   -- $5.1 million class M-HRO at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $7.8 million class N-HRO at 'Dsf'; RE 50%.

Classes A-1 through C, M-MPK, M-STR, N-MPK, and N-STR have paid in
full.  Class M-BRL is not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 16 classes in
Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C10 as:

  Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed
   A1 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes is consistent with Moody's expectations.

The rating on the exchangeable class (Class PST) was affirmed
because the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the exchangable classes is consistent with
Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance compared to 2.2% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 25, unchanged from at Moody's last review.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $1.42 billion
from $1.49 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 73 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to just under 10% of the pool.  Two loans, constituting 8% of
the pool, have investment-grade structured credit assessments.  The
pool contains no defeased loans.

One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.  There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 91% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 61% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 104%, compared
to 105% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 16.7% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.67X and 1.02X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is Milford
Plaza Fee Loan ($110 million -- 8% of the pool), which represents a
pari passu interest in a $275 million first mortgage.  The loan is
secured by the ground lease on the land beneath the Row NYC Hotel,
formerly the Milford Plaza Hotel -- a 28-story, 1,331 key
full-service hotel located in Midtown Manhattan.  The triple net
(NNN) ground lease commenced in 2013, expires in 2112 and includes
annual CPI rent increases.  The tenant has purchase options at the
end of years 10, 20 and 30.  Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd) and 0.64X, respectively.

The other loan with a structured credit assessment is the Hampshire
House Co-op Loan ($9 million -- less than 1% of the pool), which is
secured by a 196-unit residential cooperative building overlooking
the south end of Central Park in Manhattan. Building amenities
include a doorman, health club, spa, laundry, live-in super and a
parking garage.  Property occupancy was 95% as of September 2015.
The loan is interest-only during the entire term and the loan
exposure is $45,918 per unit.  Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) >4.00X, respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Westfield Citrus Park Loan ($140
million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.1 million SF regional mall located in northwest
Tampa, Florida.  The mall anchors are Dillard's, Macy's, Sears and
J.C. Penney.  The anchor space is not part of the loan collateral.
The mall was 97% leased as of year-end 2015 compared to 94% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
1.02X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.00X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the 500 North Capitol Loan ($105 million
-- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 233,000 SF, Class A
office building located in downtown Washington, DC.  As of year-end
2015, the property was 93% leased.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 120% and 0.89X, respectively, unchanged from the last review.

The third largest loan is the Southdale Center Loan
($98 million -- 7% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $152 million first mortgage.  The loan is secured by
a super-regional mall located in Edina, Minnesota.  The mall is
anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, Herberger's, Marshall's and a
movie theater.  Macy's and J.C. Penney are not a part of the
collateral.  The mall was 78% leased as of year-end 2014, compared
to 80% the prior year and 84% reported at securitization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
109% and 0.90X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fourteen
classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2013-C11 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the exchangeable class (PST) was affirmed due to the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.5% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review. The deal
has not experienced any realized losses and Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 4.3% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 15th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $832 million
from $856 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 66% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Two loans,
constituting 6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

One loan, constituting 0.4% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool, and the deal has not
experienced any realized losses. One loan, constituting 9.8% of the
pool, is currently in special servicing. The specially serviced
loan is the Matrix Corporate Center Loan ($81.4 million - 9.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a 1,046,701 square feet(SF) office
complex located just outside of Danbury, Connecticut, 33 miles
northeast of Stamford, Connecticut. The loan was transferred to
Special Servicing in February 2016. The property's second largest
tenant, which occupies approximately 19% of the net rentable
area(NRA) under a lease that will mature in December 2016, recently
notified the property's owner that it wouldn't be renewing its
lease. The property was 56% leased as of December 2015, compared to
58% as of December 2014, and 73% at securitization. Moody's
estimates a modest loss for the specially serviced loan.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 93% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to
99% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.62X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the University
Towers Cooperative Loan ($18 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by three 15-story coop apartment buildings located in
Brooklyn and constructed in 1957. Occupancy as of June 2015 was
96%, compared to 97% as of both December 2014 and December 2013.
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa
(sca.pd) and 5.48X, respectively, compared to aaa (sca.pd) and
5.31X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Westfield Countryside Loan ($100 million -- 12%
of the pool), which represents a 64.5% pari-passu interest in a
$155.0 million loan. The loan is secured by a 465,000 SF component
of an approximately 1.26 million SF super-regional mall located in
Clearwater, Florida, 20 miles west of the Tampa CBD. The mall is
anchored by Dillard's, Macy's, Sears, and JC Penney, all of which
are non-collateral. The collateral was 95% leased as of December
2015, compared to 92% leased as of December 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 100% and
0.97X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Mall at Tuttle Crossing Loan ($95
million -- 11% of the pool), which represents a 76% pari-passu
interest in a $125 million loan. The loan is secured by a 385,000
SF component of an approximately 1.13 million SF super-regional
mall located in Dublin, Ohio, 11 miles from the Columbus CBD. The
mall is currently anchored by JC Penney, Sears and two Macy's
stores that are all non-collateral. Collateral was 88% leased as of
December 2015, essentially the same as of December 14 and at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.34X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Southdale Center Loan ($54.0 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which represents a 35.5% pari-passu interest
in a $152 million loan. The loan is secured by a 634,880 SF
component of an approximately 1.23 million SF super-regional mall
located in Edina, Minnesota, approximately 7 miles southeast of the
Minneapolis CBD. The property is currently anchored by Macy's, J.C.
Penney, Herberger's, and Marshall's and includes a 16-screen
American MultiCinema movie theater. The Macy's and J.C. Penney
stores are owned by their respective tenants and are not part of
the collateral. As of December 2014, the property was 78% leased,
compared to 87% leased as of August 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 107% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 108% and 0.90X
at Moody's last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C16.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the April 2016 distribution
date, the pool has no delinquent or specially serviced loans. Since
issuance, the pool has experienced 1.2% collateral reduction.
There are currently five loans on the servicer watchlist (5% of the
pool), including one loan in the Top 15.

The watchlisted loan is Aspen Heights - Stillwater, which
represents 3% of the pool.  The loan is secured by a 231-unit,
792-bed student housing property located two miles from Oklahoma
State University.  Built in 2013, amenities at the property include
two fitness centers, a resort-style swimming pool, clubhouse,
volleyball court, tanning room and grilling areas.  At issuance,
the property was 99% occupied.  Occupancy dipped to 88% at year-end
(YE) 2014 before improving slightly to 90.7% as of October 2015.
The loan has been flagged because the fiscal first quarter (1Q)
2015 (ending October 2015) net cash flow (NCF) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported to be 1.03x, down from the 2015
fiscal year end (ending July 2015) NCF DSCR of 1.18x.  The most
recent decline in DSCR should have triggered a cash flow sweep,
although this has not yet been confirmed by the servicer. Fitch
continues make attempts to collect information on this and other
loans in the pool through the 17g-5 provider.  The most recent
round of questions was submitted on May 2, 2015, and at the time of
this release, no updates have been received.  This loan, which was
structured with a five-year interest-only period, will continue to
be monitored by Fitch.

The largest loan in the pool (11.6% of the pool) is secured by
Arundel Mills Mall, a 1.5 million square foot (sf) super-regional
mall, and Arundel Mills Marketplace, an adjacent anchored retail
center located in Hanover, Maryland within the Baltimore-Washington
Corridor.  As of December 2015, the property was fully occupied by
over 150 tenants, including Bass Pro Shops (7.7% of the net
rentable area [NRA]), Cinemark Theatres (6.5% of the NRA) and
Burlington Coat Factory (4.9% of the NRA).  Bass Pro Shops' lease
is scheduled to roll in October 2016, and there has been no update
from the servicer at this time regarding the tenant's renewal.
Several other tenants, including Burlington Coat Factory, TJ Maxx
and Dave and Buster's have renewed their leases in the last seven
months.  Bass Pro Shops reported $328 psf in sales for YE2015.

The second largest loan (8% of the pool) is secured by a portfolio
of 14 suburban office properties located in 11 cities across 11
states.  The properties are 100% leased to State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, and are used as regional operation
headquarters.  The majority of leases are scheduled to roll in
November 2028.  None of the individual leases contain termination
options, and all are structured with two five-year renewal options.


Green Hills Corporate Center is the third largest loan (5% of the
pool) and is secured by a five-building office complex located in
Reading, Pennsylvania.  The property is essentially fully occupied
by two tenants--Penske Truck Leasing (72.1% NRA through December
2020) and Worley Parsons (25.8% NRA through March 2022).  Penske is
rated 'BBB+' by Fitch (last affirmed October 2015) and operates its
headquarters from the property.  Worley Parsons has been a tenant
since the first phase of the property was developed in 1970.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's
portfolio-level metrics.  At this time, Fitch has not identified
any material changes in the pool's overall performance.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $37.6 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $132.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $250 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $335.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $941.5 million interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $91.8 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $91.8 million interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $47.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class PST at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28.5 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class F, G, H or the interest-only class
X-C certificates.  The class A-S, B, and C certificates may be
exchanged for class PST certificates and vice versa.


MUIR WOODS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C notes
from Muir Woods CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) that closed in August 2012 and is managed by Franklin
Advisors Inc.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A, D, E, and F notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 8, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades mainly reflect the stable performance and overall
credit seasoning of the underlying collateral pool.  According to
the April 2016 trustee report, the overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios are well above the required minimums, though they have
decreased marginally since the effective date.  For instance, the
class A/B ratio was 130.4% as per the April 2016 monthly report,
down from 132.6% in November 2012 (when transaction went
effective), and the class E ratio is 106.9%, down from 108.6%.

In addition, there has been a modest increase in both defaulted
assets and assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

However, these factors are offset by the seasoning of the
underlying collateral pool.  The weighted average life of the
portfolio as per the April 2016 trustee report was 3.84 years, down
from 5.55 years in November 2012.  There was also an increase in
assets rated 'BB-' or higher over this period.  Both the decline in
weighted average life and the increase in assets rated 'BB-' or
higher lowered the credit risk profile of the portfolio.

Although the cash flow results indicate a higher rating for some
tranches, S&P's analysis and final ratings reflect additional
sensitivities that capture any potential changes in the underlying
portfolio until the notes begin to amortize.  On a standalone
basis, the results of the cash flow analysis point to a lower
rating for the class F notes, failing by a small margin at the
current rating level.  S&P's decision to affirm the rating was
primarily based on the stable O/C level and overall improvement in
credit quality, which S&P believes results in less risk of default.
The affirmations of the other ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in September 2016.  S&P anticipates that the
manager will continue to reinvest principal proceeds in line with
the transaction documents.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Muir Woods CLO Ltd.
                        Cash flow
       Previous         implied    Cash flow    Final
Class  rating           rating     cushion (i)  rating
A      AAA              AAA        12.5%        AAA (sf)
B      AA               AAA        0.22%        AA+ (sf)
C      A                AA-        1.58%        A+ (sf)
D      BBB              A-         0.46%        BBB (sf)
E      BB               BB+        3.94%        BB (sf)
F      B                B-         0.38%        B (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the
intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the current
portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation assumptions
assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A      AAA        AAA        AAA          AAA        AAA (sf)
B      AAA        AA+        AA+          AAA        AA+ (sf)
C      AA-        A+         A+           AA+        A+ (sf)
D      A-         BBB+       BBB+         A+         BBB (sf)
E      BB+        BB-        BB+          BB+        BB (sf)
F      B-         CCC+       B-           B-         B (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CC (sf)       BB (sf)
F      B- (sf)      CC (sf)       CC (sf)       B (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Muir Woods CLO Ltd.
               Rating
Class     To          From
B         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C         A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Muir Woods CLO Ltd.

Class     Rating
A         AAA (sf)
D         BBB (sf)
E         BB (sf)
F         B (sf)


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2003-1: S&P Hikes Cl. A-7 Debt Rating to B-
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on nine classes of notes and
certificates, affirmed its ratings on 57 classes of notes and
certificates, and lowered its ratings on three classes of notes
issued by 20 National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (14 discrete
trusts, five grantor trusts, and one master trust) all
collateralized by private student loans issued between 2003 and
2007.  At the same time, S&P removed 18 ratings from CreditWatch
with positive implications.

The rating actions reflect S&P's updated views regarding collateral
performance.  Collateral performance since S&P's last full
surveillance review in 2013 has improved, as the pace of increase
in cumulative defaults has slowed.  Additionally, the percentage of
loans in repayment and that are current has increased to greater
than 90% of the pools' outstanding balances. As a result, credit
enhancement levels in some of the more seasoned trusts have begun
to stabilize.  The rating actions also considered the trust's
relevant structural features--in particular, each trust's cost of
funds, capital structure, payment waterfalls, subordinate interest
reprioritization features, and nonmonetary event of default (EOD)
provisions.

                         CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

In August 2015, S&P placed 24 class A notes from 13 trusts on
CreditWatch with positive implications because S&P believed that
the likelihood of a payment structure change after a nonmonetary
EOD was, at the time, sufficiently remote.  Six of the classes have
been paid in full since being placed on CreditWatch.

                       NONMONETARY EOD REVIEW

Based on S&P's "Criteria For Global Structured Finance Transactions
Subject To A Change In Payment Priorities Or Sale Of Collateral
Upon A Nonmonetary EOD," published March 2, 2015, S&P considers the
creditworthiness, operational capabilities, track records, and
incentives of the transaction parties that have an obligation to
minimize the likelihood of a nonmonetary EOD.  Based on S&P's
nonmonetary EOD criteria, it also considers structural features
that mitigate the risk of principal payment reprioritization after
a nonmonetary EOD, such as noteholder voting or bond insurer
consent.

Since the CreditWatch actions, S&P became aware that the indenture
trustee commenced litigation regarding certain trusts' appointment
of Odyssey Education Resources LLC as a servicer.  S&P also became
aware that 15 of the trusts called a servicer default on the
current servicer (Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency),
conducted a preliminary audit of the servicer, and commenced
litigation against the servicer.  At the time of this release, the
disputes between these transaction parties remain unresolved.

As a result of the unresolved disputes between these transaction
parties, S&P no longer views the likelihood of a nonmonetary EOD as
sufficiently remote for these trusts.  The discrete transactions
(series 2003-1 through 2007-4) do not have any structural features
that would mitigate a reprioritization of principal payments to pro
rata for the senior notes after a nonmonetary EOD (automatic
switch).  Accordingly, for these transactions S&P will continue to
treat the class A senior notes as a single class.

For the master trust, the reprioritization of principal payments to
pro rata for the senior notes requires acceleration, which further
requires consent of the bond insurer (Ambac Assurance Corp.).  As a
result of these structural features, S&P continues to view the
likelihood of a reprioritization of the principal payments for the
master trust as sufficiently remote and have differentiated the
ratings based on each class' available credit enhancement.

                         TRUST PERFORMANCE

Since S&P's 2013 full surveillance review, the pace of increase in
cumulative defaults for all of the trusts has slowed.  These trusts
have pool factors that range from 21% to 56% and now have greater
than 92% of their loans in repayment and current status.

The performance, in terms of the pace of defaults and the
percentage of loans in repayment, indicates that the trusts have
likely moved to their post-peak default periods and that their
default curves may be moving closer to a more stabilized pace. This
effect is more pronounced in the more seasoned trusts issued before
2006.

Table 1
Cumulative Default Rate(i)
                      
            Current   12 mos          Last review   12 mos
Series      Mar 2016  change(ii)      Aug 2013      change(ii)
NCMSLT I    27.2%     +0.7%           24.7%         +1.6%
2003-1      33.0%     +0.9%           30.0%         +2.1%
2004-1      31.6%     +0.8%           28.4%         +2.1%
2004-2      34.2%     +1.2%           30.0%         +2.9%
2005-1      30.1%     +1.1%           26.2%         +2.4%
2005-2      37.9%     +1.2%           32.9%         +3.5%
2005-3      34.2%     +1.4%           29.0%         +3.6%
2006-1      36.8%     +1.6%           31.0%         +3.9%
2006-2      46.7%     +2.1%           38.9%         +5.5%
2006-3      39.9%     +2.1%           32.2%         +5.5%
2006-4      47.5%     +2.3%           38.7%         +7.3%
2007-1      41.8%     +2.3%           33.4%         +6.4%
2007-2      46.0%     +2.8%           35.7%         +6.8%
2007-3      41.3%     +2.8%           30.1%         +6.8%
2007-4      41.4%     +2.9%           30.3%         +7.0%

(i)Reported cumulative defaults as a percentage of initial student
loans financed.  (ii)Calculated as the 12-month absolute change in
the cumulative default rate.

Table 2
            Pool     In repayment and current status(i)
            factor      Current       Last review
Series      Mar 2016    Mar 2016      Aug 2013
NCMSLT I    21.4%       95.7%         94.0%
2003-1      30.3%       95.8%         94.0%
2004-1      29.6%       95.7%         93.6%
2004-2      38.8%       95.9%         93.0%
2005-1      35.3%       95.9%         93.1%
2005-2      37.9%       95.4%         91.2%
2005-3      43.3%       95.3%         91.9%
2006-1      44.3%       95.1%         91.4%
2006-2      43.5%       94.2%         89.1%
2006-3      50.1%       93.9%         88.3%
2006-4      47.8%       93.6%         87.5%
2007-1      50.7%       92.5%         86.1%
2007-2      49.8%       92.5%         84.2%
2007-3      55.8%       92.9%         83.4%
2007-4      55.9%       92.7%         83.3%

(i)Reported percentage of the loan pool in repayment and less than
30 days delinquent as a percentage of total principal ending
balance (does not include accrued interest).

The historical impact of poor collateral performance, as measured
by high percentages of realized cumulative net losses, has led to
high levels of under-collateralization for all of the trusts.
However, collateral performance has improved since S&P's last
review, particularly for the more seasoned trusts, and combined
with senior bond principal amortization is stabilizing hard credit
enhancement to the senior classes for each trust.  Additionally,
interest reprioritization triggers that reprioritize subordinate
class interest payments below senior class principal payments have
also helped stabilize senior class hard enhancement for some of the
trusts.  This is reflected by the flat-to-increasing senior parity
levels for series 2003-1 through 2005-3 compared to declines for
the remaining series.

Table 3
               Total parity(i)
            Current      Change since
Series      Mar 2016     last review
NCMSLT I    64.5%        -14.3%
2003-1      76.8%        -5.5%
2004-1      70.8%        -7.2%
2004-2      85.3%        -1.3%
2005-1      80.6%        -3.5%
2005-2      73.7%        -5.3%
2005-3      79.2%        -4.0%
2006-1      75.5%        -5.2%
2006-2      67.4%        -8.0%
2006-3      72.7%        -6.0%
2006-4      67.7%        -7.4%
2007-1      70.3%        -6.5%
2007-2      67.3%        -8.9%
2007-3      59.3%        -13.3%
2007-4      59.3%        -13.2%
(i)Generally defined as total assets/total outstanding note
balance.

Table 4
               Senior parity(i)
            Current      Change since
Series      Mar 2016     last review
NCMSLT I    64.5%        -14.3%(ii)
2003-1      123.2%        8.4%
2004-1      100.5%        0.0%
2004-2      121.4%        10.8%
2005-1      114.5%        7.3%
2005-2      98.6%         0.8%
2005-3      103.8%        2.4%
2006-1      96.1%        -0.6%
2006-2      85.4%        -5.1%
2006-3      101.3%       -0.1%
2006-4      95.1%        -2.4%
2007-1      93.7%        -2.3%
2007-2      92.4%        -5.1%
2007-3      59.3%        -13.3%(ii)
2007-4      59.3%        -13.2%(ii)

(i)Generally defined as total assets/class A outstanding note
balance.  (ii)The master trust and the series 2007-3 and 2007-4
trusts each comprise one class of senior notes.

                        STRUCTURAL FEATURES

The master trust as well as series 2007-3 and 2007-4 were
originally structured with a bond insurance policy from Ambac
Assurance Corp (Ambac).  Because S&P do not rate Ambac, S&P gives
no value to the bond insurance policy it provides to the notes.

The reserve accounts for each of the trusts are currently at their
respective floors or are amortizing toward their floors.  The
reserve accounts are available to pay note interest (except for the
interest on subordinate classes that have been reprioritized) and
fees, as well as principal at final maturity.

In addition to subordination of the lower classes of notes in each
trust, all of the trusts except for series 2003-1, 2004-1, 2007-3,
2007-4 and the master trust are supported by interest
reprioritization triggers.  The triggers are generally based on a
cumulative default threshold and/or parity levels.  When a class's
interest reprioritization trigger is breached, the interest payment
to that class will become subordinate to principal payments of the
most senior classes until targeted parity levels are reached.

At issuance, each of the trusts were structured to provide excess
spread over the transaction's life as additional credit
enhancement.  Excess spread levels have been under pressure for
each trust, primarily because of under-collateralization.
Additionally, the master trust as well as series 2003-1, 2004-1,
2007-3, and 2007-4 contain higher-cost auction-rate notes.  The
coupons on the auction-rate notes have been based on the maximum
rate definitions in the indentures (generally LIBOR plus a rating
dependent margin) since the auction-rate market failed.

             EXPECTED DEFAULT AND NET LOSS PROJECTIONS

As discussed earlier, the trusts recent performance indicates that
they are likely past their peak default periods as evidenced by
slowing in their pace of defaults.  As a result, S&P now expects
lifetime cumulative gross defaults for more seasoned trusts to
range from 31%-41% (series 2003-1 through series 2005-1 and the
master trust), lifetime cumulative gross defaults for the
moderately seasoned trusts to range from 42%-45% (series 2005-2
through 2006-1), and lifetime cumulative gross defaults for the
least seasoned trusts to still potentially exceed 50% (series
2006-2 through 2007-4).  At the time of S&P's 2013 full
surveillance review, it expected lifetime cumulative gross defaults
for the more seasoned trusts to range from 35%-43%, for the
moderately seasoned trusts to be as high as 48%, and for the least
seasoned trusts to be as high as 50% or more.  S&P's revised
base-case recovery assumption of 10% for all of the trusts
considers cumulative recoveries for the trusts excluding previous
claims payments by the guarantor, which is no longer paying
claims.

              BREAK-EVEN CASH FLOW MODELING ASSUMPTIONS

S&P ran break-even cash flows that maximized cumulative net losses
under various interest rate scenarios and rating stress
assumptions.  These are some of the major assumptions S&P modeled:

   -- A five- to seven-year default curve;

   -- Recovery rates ranging from 0%-10%, taken evenly over eight
      years;

   -- Flat prepayments speeds of 3% constant prepayment rate (CPR,

      an annualized prepayment speed stated as a percentage of the

      current loan balance) for the deal's life, and ramped
      prepayment speeds starting at 3% CPR and increasing 1% per
      year to a maximum rate of 5%-8% depending on the rating
      scenario (constant for the remainder of the deal's life);

   -- Deferment as percentage of the loan pool of 3.25%-6.75% for
      48 months;

   -- Forbearance as percentage of the loan pool of 1.00%-2.50%
      for 12 months;

   -- Automated clearing house borrower benefit utilization as
      percentage of the loan pool of 20%-35%;

   -- Stressed interest rate vectors for the various indices; and

   -- Auctions that failed for each transaction's life, with
      auction-rate coupons based on maximum rate definitions in
      the indentures and the current ratings assigned to the
      notes.

                      RATING ACTION RATIONALE

In general, the discrete trusts impaired by substantial
under-collateralization levels and/or containing auction-rate
securities yielded the lowest break-evens due to the compression of
excess spread.  The resulting pressure on excess spread has caused
total parity to continue to decline, as principal collections were
used in some periods to cover interest expenses in S&P's stressed
cash flows.  The class A senior notes for trusts with subordinate
note interest triggers were generally able to absorb greater losses
than trusts without subordinate note triggers.  As discussed above,
when an interest trigger is breached, available funds in the
trust's payment waterfall are used to make principal payments to
the class A notes before paying interest to the subordinate notes.
S&P believes the principal distribution amount owed to class A
notes will continue to consume any remaining available funds,
resulting in interest shortfalls to the subordinate notes. As such,
the subordinate note interest triggers offer additional protection
to the class A notes.

S&P's rating actions were based on its review of the remaining
available credit enhancement, the expected trend in hard
enhancement based on recent performance, the benefit S&P believes
certain classes will receive due to the breach of interest
reprioritization triggers, and the results of S&P's break-even cash
flow analysis.  Additionally, the senior classes of notes from the
discrete trusts were affected by S&P's views on the likelihood of a
nonmonetary EOD discussed above, and treated as a single class in
assigning ratings.

Certain classes were affected by the application of S&P's criteria
for assigning 'CCC' and 'CC' ratings.  Each of these classes of
notes are now under-collateralized as a result of the collateral's
poor historical performance and/or have exposure to auction-rate
coupons with no protection from interest reprioritization in a
stressed scenario.  S&P's criteria state that it rates an issuer or
issue 'CC' when we expect default to be a virtual certainty,
regardless of the time to default.  Accordingly, the 'CC (sf)'
rated classes reflect that S&P believes they will default under the
optimistic collateral performance scenario over a longer period of
time based on their substantial under-collateralization and their
recent declining trend in hard enhancement (despite recent
improvements in collateral performance).  Classes rated 'CCC (sf)'
reflect that they are under-collateralized or have exposure to
auction-rate coupons without the benefit of subordinate note
interest reprioritization, but that in S&P's view are still
vulnerable to non-payment.

The grantor trusts are pass-through structures, and the ratings on
the certificates issued out of the related grantor trusts are
linked to the credit quality of the underlying notes backing the
certificates from the discrete trust.

S&P previously lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on 19 of the class
B, C, and D notes from 10 discrete trusts because the affected
classes have breached their subordinate interest triggers and are
not receiving interest payments.

S&P will continue to monitor the ongoing performance of these
trusts.  In particular, S&P will continue to review available
credit enhancement, which is primarily a function of the pace of
defaults, principal amortization, excess spread, and the ongoing
disputes between the transaction parties.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-7        B- (sf)     CCC (sf)
B-1        CC (sf)     CC (sf)
B-2        CC (sf)     CC (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-2        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
B-1        CC (sf)     CC (sf)
B-2        CC (sf)     CC (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-4        BB (sf)     BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
B          CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-4        B+ (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
B          CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)


National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-4        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3
               Rating
Class      To            From
A-4        B (sf)      B- (sf)/Watch Pos
B          CC (sf)     CC (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1
               Rating
Class      To            From
A-4        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-5        B- (sf)     B- (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-3        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-3        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos From
A-4        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-5        B- (sf)     B- (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)
D          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-2        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        B- (sf)     B- (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)
D          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-2        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        B- (sf)     B- (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)
D          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-2        CCC (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        CCC (sf)    B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        CCC (sf)    B- (sf)
B          D (sf)      D (sf)
C          D (sf)      D (sf)
D          D (sf)      D (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-3-AR-1   CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3-AR-1   CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-3-AR-1   CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3-AR-1   CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)

National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I (Series NCT-2003)
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-11       B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
A-12       CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)
A-13       CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)
A-14       CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)

National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I (Series NCT-2005AR)

               Rating
Class      To          From
A-15       CC (sf)     CC (sf)
A-16       CC (sf)     CC (sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2004-1 ( 2004-GT1)
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-1        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
A-2        CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2004-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-5-1      BB (sf)     BB- (sf)
A-5-2      BB (sf)     BB- (sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-1
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-5-1      B+ (sf)     B- (sf)
A-5-2      B+ (sf)     B- (sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-2
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-5-1      B- (sf)     B- (sf)
A-5-2      B- (sf)     B- (sf)

NCF Grantor Trust 2005-3
               Rating
Class      To          From
A-5-1      B (sf)      B- (sf)
A-5-2      B (sf)      B- (sf)


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-2: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 15
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-2 ("NRMLT 2016-2"). The NRMLT 2016-2 transaction is a
securitization of $301.1 million of first lien, seasoned performing
and re-performing mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of
approximately 154 months, weighted average updated LTV ratio of
56.9% and weighted average updated FICO score of 699. Approximately
91.1% of the loans have been either current or not more than 30
days delinquent in the past 24 months. Approximately 20.2% of the
loans in the pool were previously modified. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC and
PNC Mortgage , will act as primary servicers and Nationstar
Mortgage LLC will act as master and successor servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Class A-1 Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-IO Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Assigned Aaa(sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-4 Notes, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class A-5 Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-6 Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B-1 Notes, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class B1-IO Notes, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class B-2 Notes, Assigned A3 (sf)

Class B2-IO Notes, Assigned A3 (sf)

Class B-3 Notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class B-4 Notes, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Class B-5 Notes, Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's losses on the collateral pool average 2.45% in an expected
scenario and reach 14.45% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes. We based our expected losses on the
pool on our estimates of (1) the default rate on the remaining
balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate on the
defaulted balances. The final expected losses for the pool reflect
the third party review (TPR) findings and Moody's assessment of the
representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework for this
transaction.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to its surveillance approach. Under this approach, Moody's
applied expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool. Our assumptions on these variables are
based on the observed rate of delinquency on seasoned modified and
non-modified loans, and the collateral attributes of the pool
including the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past
24 months. Moody's said, "For this pool, we used default burnout
and voluntary CPR assumptions similar to those detailed in our "US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated before
2005. We then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to
losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and
loss severity assumptions."

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2016-2 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor V LLC, has previously purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts. Of these collapsed
loans, approximately 67% based on balance were originated to Alt A
guidelines, 19% of the loans by balance were originated to subprime
guidelines and 14% based on balance were originated to prime
guidelines. The transaction consists primarily of 30-year fixed
rate loans. 79.8% of the loans in this pool by balance have never
been modified and have been performing while approximately 20.2% of
the loans were previously modified but are now current and cash
flowing. The weighted average seasoning on the collateral is
approximately 154 months. Property values were updated using home
data index (HDI) values or broker price opinions (BPOs) which were
both provided by Clear Capital. HDIs were obtained for all but 20
of the 2,449 properties contained within the securitization. In
addition, updated BPOs were obtained from a third party BPO
provider for 658 properties.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties
("R&W")

A third party due diligence provider, AMC, conducted a compliance
review on a sample of 875 loans proposed to be included in the
mortgage pool. The regulatory compliance review consisted of a
review of compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in
Lending Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement
Protection Act/Regulation X (TILA), and federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations. The TPR identified 457 loans with
compliance exceptions, the majority of which were due to missing
HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charges, missing
right to cancel disclosures, or missing FACTA disclosures. Although
the diligence provider's report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages.

The third party due diligence provider also conducted reviews of
data integrity, pay history, and title/lien on selected samples to
confirm that certain information in the mortgage loan files matched
the information supplied by the servicers. Any issues identified
during the data integrity review were corrected on the data tape,
and the pay history analysis indicated there were no material pay
history issues on the data tape.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor V LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer, depositor or
custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage
loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding
the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the
mortgage loan documents, and such missing document, defect or
breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization
against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or
similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title
claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such
actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the related seller, indenture
trustee, depositor, master servicer, related servicer and
custodian. Upon notification of a missing or defective mortgage
loan file, the related seller will have 120 days from the date it
receives such notification to deliver the missing document or
otherwise cure the defect or breach. If it is unable to do so, the
related seller will be obligated to replace or repurchase the
mortgage loan.

Moody's said, "Despite this provision, we increased our loss
severities to account for loans with missing title policies
(according to both the title/lien review and a custodial file
review), mortgage notes, or mortgage/deed/security agreements. This
adjustment was based on both the results of the TPR review and
because the R&W provider is an unrated entity and weak from a
credit perspective. In our analysis we assumed that 2.74% of the
projected defaults will have missing documents' breaches that will
not be remedied and result in higher than expected loss
severities."

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash management functions
will be performed by Citibank, N.A. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers.

Moody's said, "Ocwen has experienced significant losses over the
past two years due to regulatory issues and limited opportunities
in its core market. A further weakening of Ocwen's financial
profile could adversely impact its ability to service the loans
serviced by it adequately. However, having Nationstar Mortgage LLC
as a master servicer mitigates this risk due to the performance
oversight that it will provide. Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the
named successor servicer for the transaction and we assess
Nationstar Mortgage LLC's servicing quality assessment at SQ3+ as a
master servicer of residential mortgage loans."

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met. To pass the first test, the
delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50% of
the subordinate bonds outstanding. To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 3.0% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 16.0%. These provisions
mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's said, "Levels of credit protection that are higher than
necessary to protect investors against current expectations of loss
could drive the ratings up. Losses could decline from our original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments."

Down

Moody's said, "Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings down. Losses could rise above our original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud."


NEWFLEET CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Newfleet CLO
2016-1 Ltd./Newfleet CLO 2016-1 LLC's $320.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization backed by a revolving
pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 16,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated otes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by S&P Global
      Ratings' CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by S&P using the
      assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's timely interest and ultimate principal
      payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned preliminary rating under various interest
      rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.3439% to
      12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- During the reinvestment period, the transaction will benefit

      from a interest diversion test, a failure of which would
      lead to the reclassification of up to 50.0% of the excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying
      subordinated management fees, uncapped administrative
      expenses, incentive management fees, and subordinate note
      payments, as principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral obligations.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Newfleet CLO 2016-1 Ltd./Newfleet CLO 2016-1 LLC

                 Preliminary       Preliminary
Class            rating        amount (Mil. $)
X                AAA (sf)                 0.50
A                AAA (sf)               227.50
B                AA (sf)                 38.50
C (deferrable)   A (sf)                  21.00
D (deferrable)   BBB (sf)                17.50
E (deferrable)   BB- (sf)                15.00
Subordinated
notes           NR                      35.515

NR--Not rated.


NOMAD CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2 and B notes
from Nomad CLO Ltd., U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that
closed in March 2013 and is managed by INVESCO Senior Secured
Management Inc.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, C, and D notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the April 2016 trustee report.

The upgrades mainly reflect the underlying collateral pool's stable
performance and overall credit seasoning.  According to the April
2016 trustee report, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios are
well-above their minimum requirement, though they have decreased
since the effective date.  In the April 2016 trustee report the
trustee reported these O/C ratios:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 136.34%, compared with 138.19% in
      the May 2013 report, which S&P used for its last review in
      July 2013;

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 121.68%, compared with 123.33% in
      May 2013;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 114.97%, compared with 116.53% in
      May 2013; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 107.63%, compared with 109.09% in
      May 2013.

In addition, there has been a modest increase in both defaulted
assets and assets rated in the 'CCC' category.  However, these
factors are offset by the underlying collateral pool's seasoning.
The portfolio's weighted average life per the April 2016 trustee
report is 4.76 years, down from 5.38 years in May 2013.  There was
also an increase in assets rated 'BB-' or higher over this period.
Both of these factors have lowered the portfolio's credit risk
profile.

Although the cash flow results indicated higher ratings for some
tranches, S&P's analysis and final ratings reflect additional
sensitivities to capture any potential changes in the underlying
portfolio until the notes begin to amortize.  The affirmations of
the class A-1, C, and D notes reflect S&P's belief that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in January 2017.  S&P anticipates that the manager
will continue to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the
transaction documents.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Nomad CLO Ltd.

                        Cash flow
       Previous         implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating           rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A-1    AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)    18.21%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)          AAA (sf)    5.48%        AA+ (sf)
B      A (sf)           AA+ (sf)    2.34%        A+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)         A+ (sf)     2.40%        BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)    6.25%        BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

               RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)   AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A (sf)      A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BB (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)       A (sf)        A+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A- (sf)       BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      B (sf)        BB (sf)
         

RATINGS RAISED

Nomad CLO Ltd.
               Rating
Class     To          From
A-2       AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B         A+ (sf)     A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Nomad CLO Ltd.

Class                   Rating
A-1                     AAA (sf)
C                       BBB (sf)
D                       BB (sf)


OCP CLO 2016-11: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OCP CLO 2016-11 Ltd./OCP
CLO 2016-11 Corp.'s $456.50 million fixed- and floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated securities.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by S&P Global
      Ratings using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis

      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under

      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.3439%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment interest diversion test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of available excess interest proceeds into principal
      proceeds, which are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees; subordinated hedge
      termination payments; collateral manager incentive fees; and

      subordinated securities payments to principal proceeds to
      purchase additional collateral obligations during the
      reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2016-11 Ltd./OCP CLO 2016-11 Corp.

Class                  Rating              Amount
                                         (mil. $)
A-1a                   AAA (sf)            103.00
A-1b                   AAA (sf)           0.00(i)
A-1L                   AAA (sf)         207.00(i)
A-2a                   AA (sf)              50.00
A-2b                   AA (sf)              18.00
B                      A (sf)               39.50
C                      BBB (sf)             22.00
D-1                    BB- (sf)             12.00
D-2                    BB- (sf)              5.00
Subordinated notes     NR                   45.10

(i)Includes $207 million aggregate outstanding amount of class A-1L
loans that may be converted into class A-1b notes if a conversion
option has been exercised.  
NR--Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 27: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Octagon Investment Partners 27,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $310,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $70,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,

   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $35,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Octagon 27 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 4.5 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

  Par amount: $500,000,000
  Diversity Score: 60
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2610
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.75%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2610 to 3002)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -1
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2610 to 3393)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -2
  Class C Notes: -4
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1


ONDECK ASSET 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to OnDeck Asset
Securitization Trust II LLC's $250 million fixed-rate asset-backed
notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by a revolving pool of term loans made to U.S. small
businesses to fund their working capital needs.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The available credit enhancement in the form of
      subordination (for the class A notes),
      overcollateralization, a funded reserve account, and excess
      spread;

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is intended to be
      bankruptcy remote;

   -- The credit quality of the initial and future collateral
      portfolio, which consists of a revolving pool of fixed-rate
      small business loans;

   -- The issuer's ability to make timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the notes;

   -- The servicing capability of the servicer, OnDeck Capital
      Inc.; and

   -- The servicing capability of Portfolio Financial Servicing
      Co. and its responsibility as a warm backup servicer on the
      closing date.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OnDeck Asset Securitization Trust II LLC (Series 2016-1)

Class       Rating          Amount
                          (mil. $)

A           BBB+ (sf)       211.54
B           BB- (sf)         38.46


PPM GRAYHAWK: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised and removed from CreditWatch its ratings
on the class A-3, B, C, and D notes from PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO).  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1, A-2a, and A-2b
notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow our review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 7, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect an aggregate paydown of $167.26 million to the
class A-1 and A-2a notes since S&P's October 2014 rating actions,
leaving them with approximately 28.33% and 10.41%, respectively, of
their original outstanding balances remaining. This has improved
the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.

The credit quality of the collateral portfolio has slightly
deteriorated since S&P's last rating actions.  The transaction has
shown a small increase in assets with ratings in the 'CCC'
category, with $5.73 million reported as of the April 2016 trustee
report compared with $1.03 million reported in the October 2014
trustee report, which S&P used for its last rating actions.  Over
the same period, the amount of defaulted collateral has increased
to $0.67 million from $0.03 million.  However, despite the slightly
larger concentrations in 'CCC' category and defaulted collateral,
the transaction has benefitted from a drop in the weighted average
life due to seasoning of the underlying collateral, with 2.96 years
reported as of the April 2016 trustee report compared with 3.77
years reported at the time of S&P's last rating actions.  

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.  

On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
pointed to a higher rating on the class D notes than the rating
action reflects.  However, because the transaction currently has
small exposure to 'CCC' rated collateral obligations, and a small
exposure to long-dated assets (i.e. assets that mature after the
stated maturity of the CLO), S&P limited the upgrade of the class
to 'BB (sf)' to offset future potential credit migration in the
underlying collateral.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the April
2016 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with
S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY METRICS COMPARISON

Class                       October 2014      April 2016
Notional Balance (mil. $)                             
A-1                         52.22              18.13 (i)
A-2a                        153.99             20.82 (i)
A-2b                        50.00              50.00
A-3                         16.00              16.00
B                           22.00              22.00
C                           14.00              14.00
D                           10.39              10.39

Coverage Tests, WAS (%)                   
Weighted average spread     2.95              2.92
A O/C                       120.97            143.86
B O/C                       111.92            122.50
C O/C                       106.84            111.92
D O/C                       103.35            105.19
A I/C                       615.3             397.3
B I/C                       556.7             338.6
C I/C                       503.3             296.0
D I/C                       431.3             247.7

O/C--Overcollateralization Test.
I/C--Interest Coverage Test.
(i) Balance adjusted to reflect payment on the April 2016 payment
date.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating (i)  cushion (ii) rating
A-1    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    34.53%       AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    34.53%       AAA (sf)
A-2b   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    34.53%       AAA (sf)
A-3    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    22.34%       AAA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    10.51%       AA+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  A+ (sf)     1.11%        A+ (sf)
D      B- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)    0.00%        BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2b   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                  DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2b   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.

                    Rating
Class        To              From        
A-3          AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA+ (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C            A+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BB (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2a        AAA (sf)
A-2b        AAA (sf)


PROTECTIVE LIFE 2007-PL: Fitch Hikes Class K Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed 16 classes of
Protective Finance Corporation REMIC 2007-PL commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are the result of increased credit enhancement as a
result of amortization and prepayments since Fitch's last rating
action. The affirmations are due to the transaction's overall
stable performance. The ratings reflect a stressed analysis, which
included increased cash flow haircuts, cap rates and default
probabilities.

There were variances from criteria related to classes D through G
where Fitch's surveillance criteria would indicate that upgrades
are possible. However, further upgrades were not warranted based on
the lack of updated financial information including occupancy
information, the small balance nature of the loans, smaller class
sizes, minimal upcoming maturities, high retail concentration with
single tenant exposure, and properties located in tertiary markets.


As of the April 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 70.3% to $301.6 million from
$1.02 billion at issuance. There are currently 101 loans remaining
of the original 199 with an average loan size of $2,985,833. No
loans are defeased. There are currently no loans in special
servicing. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class S.

Approximately 99% of the pool is fully amortizing. The transaction
has a high concentration of retail properties (71%), which include
single tenant exposure. Upcoming maturities are minimal through
2017 with the larger maturity concentrations in 2025 (12.1%), 2026
(14.7%), and 2027 (11%).

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a 429,935 square foot
(sf) retail power center located in Conway, AR. The largest tenants
include Kohl's, Belk, TJ Maxx. The most recent servicer reported
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 2.34x as of year-end (YE)
2014. The property is 100% occupied per the December 2015 rent
roll.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on classes A-1A through N remains Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown and
amortization. Further upgrades to classes D through K are possible
with stable performance and continued increased credit enhancement.
Upgrades to the junior classes are not likely due to the smaller
class sizes, single tenant exposure and properties located in
tertiary markets. Downgrades to junior classes are possible if
performance declines significantly.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following:

Protective Life 2007-PL

-- $8.9 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.4 million class D to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirmed the following ratings:

-- $2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $101.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.1 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class E at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.4 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class G at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class H at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.1 million class L at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.5 million class M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.5 million class N at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.5 million class O at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $3.8 million class P at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $2.5 million class Q at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO certificates.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on M Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and upgraded the ratings on one class in Prudential Securities
Secured Financing Corporation 1998-C1 as:

  Cl. L, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 3, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 3, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. A-EC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 3, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class L was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 35% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class M was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.  Class M has already experienced a 67%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class A-EC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.  

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further
adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 16, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.5% to $5.6
million from $1.15 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 47% of the pool.  One loan, constituting 25% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 67% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $23 million (for an average loss
severity of 41%).

Moody's received full or partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 50%,
compared to 54% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.26X and 2.76X,
respectively, compared to 1.29X and 2.99X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 74% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Best Buy Loan ($2.6 million -- 47% of the
pool), which is secured by a single tenant retail property located
in Crestwood, MO.  Best Buy occupies 100% of the NRA through
November 2017 and the loan matures in December 2017.  The loan has
amortized approximately 34% since securitization and Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.87X, respectively, compared to 59%
and 1.85X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Village Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($1.1 million -- 20% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery
anchored retail center located in Hazlehurst, GA.  As of June 2015
the property was 85% leased.  The loan has amortized approximately
52% since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 41%
and 2.51X, respectively, compared to 43% and 2.38X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Rite Aid Drug/Susquehanna Loan
($370,000 -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant
retail store located in Harrisburg, PA.  Rite Aid occupies 100% of
the NRA through May 2026.  The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 77% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 27% and 3.87X, respectively, compared to 27% and 3.83X at the
last review.


RAIT 2015-FL4: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class X-1 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the ratings on the following classes of notes
issued by RAIT 2015-FL4 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
  -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
  -- Class X-1 at BB (sf)
  -- Class X-2 at BB (sf)
  -- Class E at BB (sf)
  -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the pool
since issuance in May 2015. The transaction currently consists of
18 interest-only, floating-rate loans secured by 23 traditional
commercial real estate properties, including office, retail,
industrial and multifamily. According to the May 2016 remittance,
two loans have been repaid in full, resulting in collateral
reduction of 15.0% since issuance. Based on the most recent last
12-month financial reporting for the individual loans, the pool has
a weighted-average debt yield of 8.6%.

There are currently no loans on the servicer’s watchlist or any
delinquent or specially serviced loans. All the properties securing
the loans are cash flowing assets; however, most properties are in
a period of stabilization with viable plans to improve asset value.
Select loans were initially funded with reserves, which may have
included funds for capital improvements, tenant inducements,
leasing commissions and operating shortfalls. In both its initial
transaction analysis and in this review, DBRS took into account the
potential effects of the in-place reserves. DBRS has highlighted
one loan below.

The Summit Office Park loan (10.6% of the current pool balance) is
secured by a four-building Class B office property in Independence,
Ohio, built in stages from 1984 to 1989. In addition to the trust
loan of $20.0 million, there is also a $3.0 million mezzanine loan
to fund leasing costs for new and renewal leases across the
property. As of January 2016, property occupancy improved to 72.5%
when compared with the issuance occupancy rate of 68.1% as a result
of several small- and medium-sized tenants signing leases at the
property. Base rental rates for these tenants ranged from a low of
$12.91 psf to a high of $21.25 psf and leasing packages paid by the
borrower ranged from a low of $6.50 psf to high of $35.00 psf. The
largest tenants at the property include Nations Lending Corp. (8.3%
of the total net rentable area [NRA]), Reliability First (6.5% of
the NRA) and Cigna Healthcare (5.1%) of the NRA, which have lease
expirations in January 2017/June 2022, February 2027 and July 2018,
respectively. According to the Q1 2016 Reis report, office
properties in the Rockside Road Corridor submarket have an average
vacancy of 23.6% with average an asking rental rate of $16.86 psf.

According to the May 2016 loan level reserve report, the TI/LC
reserve has a current balance of $2.5 million, with additional
monthly contributions of $50,000. Based on the current vacancy
across the property, this computes to over $18.00 psf in available
dollars to lease the property to a stabilized occupancy rate, which
appears reasonable given the leasing packages given to tenants that
have signed leases within the past year. According to the T12
ending March 2016 financials, the net operating income was $2.1
million, indicative of a 10.8% debt yield on the trust loan and a
9.4% debt yield on the whole loan.


RAMP TRUST 2003-RS10: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-II-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches,
from 7 transactions issued by RFC backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS10 Trust
  Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2012,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-KR1 Trust
  Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-KR2 Trust
  Cl. M-I-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2015,
    Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS1 Trust
  M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 6, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RZ1 Trust
  A-II, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 16, 2015, Upgraded
   to A3 (sf)
  M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 16, 2015, Upgraded

   to Ba2 (sf)
  M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 4, 2012,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2001-KS2 Home Equity Mortgage Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-KS2
  Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2013,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2013,
   Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2013,
   Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS1 Trust
  Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 19, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec. 19, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of stable or improving performance of the
related pools and the total credit enhancement available to the
bonds.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-1 issued
by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust, Series 2015-1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class H.

The rating confirmations reflect that the performance of the
transaction has remained in line with DBRS expectations since
issuance in May 2015. The collateral consists of 46 fixed-rate
loans secured by 46 commercial and multifamily properties. As of
the May 2016 remittance, the pool has experienced a collateral
reduction of 2.5% since issuance as a result of loan amortization,
with all of the original 46 loans remaining in the pool. The
transaction benefits from 32 loans, representing 82.6% of the
current pool balance, having some degree of recourse to their
respective sponsors. Approximately nine loans, representing 35.3%
of the current pool balance, are reporting year-end 2015
financials. These loans reported a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.31 times (x) and a WA debt yield
of 10.3%. At issuance, the pool reported a WA DSCR and debt yield
of 1.50x and 9.3%, respectively. There are no loans on the
servicer’s watchlist or in special servicing.

The largest loan in the pool is the Alta Vista Manor loan
(Prospectus ID#1, 9.2% of the current pool). This loan is secured
by a five-storey, 174-unit luxury retirement home in Ottawa,
Ontario. According to the March 2016 rent roll, the property was
97.7% occupied, representing an increase from issuance of 93.1%.
The average rental rate was $4,056 per unit and is in line with the
issuance rate of $4,047 per unit. According to the Canada Mortgage
and Housing Corporation 2015 Senior Housing Report, the vacancy
rate in the Ottawa East submarket decreased to 8.0% in 2015
compared with 10.4% in 2014. Properties built after 2000 reported
an average rental rate of $4,078 per unit for the overall Ottawa
market. The YE2015 DSCR was 1.80x and represents an increase from
the DBRS underwritten (UW) DSCR of 1.56x.

The U-Haul SAC 3 Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#35-38, 41-46, 3.7%
of the current pool) is a portfolio of ten individual loans secured
by ten self-storage properties, totalling 4,985 storage units. The
subject $12.1 million loan represents the A2 pari passu note of the
$30.2 million whole loan. The A1 note is securitized in the IMSCI
2015-6 transaction, also rated by DBRS. The individual loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted by a blanket second
mortgage, and the loan is fully amortizing over a 20-year loan
term. The properties operate under the U-Haul brand name across ten
cities in Ontario with approximately half of the portfolio by loan
allocation located in the Greater Toronto Area. The largest
representation is located in Oakville (15.6%), Burlington (14.8%)
and Kitchener (14.4%). According to the December 2015 rent rolls,
the portfolio was 90.7% occupied, representing an increase in
occupancy, up from 88.4% in August 2014, with individual property
occupancies ranging from 81.0% to 95.5%. The largest loan by
allocated balance, U-Haul Oakville (containing 571 units), saw
occupancy increase to 90.2% from 87.2% over the same period.
According to YE2015 financials, the portfolio loan reported a DSCR
of 1.72x, representing an increase from the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.49x.
At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated this loan investment grade. DBRS has
today confirmed that the performance of the loan remains consistent
with investment-grade-loan characteristics.


REALT 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Ratings on Cl. F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-1 issued by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust (REALT), Series
2016-1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

Class X is notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO)
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers the IO
certificates’ position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral for the transaction consists of 53 fixed-rate loans
and two pari passu co-ownership interests in separate whole loans.
The mortgage loans are secured by 91 properties. One loan,
representing 5.40% of the pool balance, is shadow-rated investment
grade at BBB (low) by DBRS.

All 55 loans (including four pari passu co-ownership interests) in
the transaction amortize for the entire term, 53.9% of the pool by
loan balance amortizes on schedules that are 25 years or less
(47.4% have between 20 years and 25 years of remaining
amortization) and 46.1% of the pool by loan balance will amortize
on schedules that are longer than 25 years. Fifteen loans (30.5% of
the pool by loan balance) were modelled with Strong sponsor
strength and 27 loans (50.6% of the pool by loan balance) were
considered to have meaningful recourse to the respective sponsor;
all else being equal, recourse loans typically have lower
probability of default and were modelled as such.

The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow and their
respective actual constants, DBRS identified one loan, representing
7.50% of the pool, based on the trust A-note balances, as having a
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), indicating
a higher likelihood of mid-term default. In addition, 29.8% of the
loans in the pool by loan balance have DBRS Refinance DSCRs below
1.00x, based on the trust A-note balance. The DBRS weighted-average
(WA) Term DSCR and Going-In Debt Yield are 1.38x and 8.5%,
respectively, and the DBRS WA Refinance DSCR and Exit Debt Yield
are 1.15x and 11.3%, respectively, based on the trust A-note
balance.

DBRS sampled 36 loans, representing 82.9% of the pool by loan
balance, and site inspections were performed on 52 properties,
representing 74.0% of the pool by loan allocated balance. Of the
sampled loans, one loan, representing 5.8% of the pool balance, was
considered to be of Above Average property quality.

The ratings that DBRS assigned to the Certificates are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


REALT 2016-1: Fitch Assigns B Rating on Class G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust's (REAL-T) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2016-1:

   -- $196,710,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $150,114,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,022,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $12,028,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,026,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $5,513,000 class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4,511,000 class F 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4,010,000 class G 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

All currencies are in Canadian dollars (CAD).

Fitch does not rate the $400,953,248 (notional balance)
interest-only class X or the non-offered $8,019,248 class H
certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 55 loans secured by 91 commercial
properties located in Canada having an aggregate principal balance
of approximately $401 million as of the cutoff date.  The loans
were originated or acquired by Royal Bank of Canada.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.5% of the properties,
by balance, cash flow analysis on 100%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.12x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 110%, and
a Fitch debt yield of 8.43%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 4.29% to issuer cash flows.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated Canadian multiborrower deals.  The pool's Fitch
DSCR of 1.12x is below both the 2015 and 2014 averages of 1.18x and
1.13x, respectively.  The pool's Fitch LTV of 110% is above both
the 2015 average of 102.6% and the 2014 average of 104.8%.

Significant Amortization: The pool's weighted average remaining
amortization term is 27 years, which represents faster amortization
than U.S. conduit loans.  There are no partial or full
interest-only loans.  The pool's maturity balance represents a
paydown of 23.3% of the closing balance, which represents less
paydown than the 2015 Canadian average of 28.8% but significantly
more paydown than the 2015 U.S. multiborrower average of 11.7%.

Canadian Loan Attributes and Historical Performance: The ratings
reflect strong historical Canadian commercial real estate loan
performance, including a low delinquency rate and low historical
losses of less than 0.1%, as well as positive loan attributes, such
as short amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower and
additional guarantors.

Loans with Recourse: Of the pool, 82.3% of the loans feature full
or partial recourse to the borrowers and/or sponsors, which is
above the 63% from the recent IMSCI 2015-6 transaction and in line
with the 82.6% from the REAL-T 2015-1 transaction.  In Fitch's
analysis, the probability of default is reduced for loans with
recourse.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 17.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  The following rating
sensitivities describe how the ratings would react to further NCF
declines below Fitch's NCF.  The implied rating sensitivities are
only indicative of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors to which the transaction is exposed.
Stressing additional risk factors may result in different outcomes.
Furthermore, the implied ratings, after the further NCF stresses
are applied, are more akin to what the ratings would be at deal
issuance had those further stressed NCFs been in place at that
time.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to REAL-T
2016-1 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in which NCF
declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the senior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.  In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could
result.


REGATTA VI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Regatta VI Funding Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $252,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $48,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,

   Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $23,750,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Regatta VI is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments
representing principal proceeds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may
consist of first-lien last-out loans, second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of
the closing date.

Regatta Loan Management LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's four year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 65

  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2725
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2725 to 3134)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -1
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2725 to 3543)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class X Notes: 0
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B Notes: -3
  Class C Notes: -4
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1


RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE 2016-I: S&P Rates Class 13 Notes BB-
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'BB-(sf)' rating to
the Series 2016-I Class 13 notes issued by Residential Reinsurance
2016 Ltd. (Res Re 2016).  The notes cover losses in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia from tropical cyclones (including
flood coverage for renters' policies), earthquakes (including fire
following), severe thunderstorms, winter storms, wildfires,
volcanic eruption, meteorite impacts, and other perils on an annual
aggregate basis.

The rating is based on the lowest of the natural-catastrophe
(nat-cat) risk factor ('bb-'), the rating on the assets in the
Regulation 114 trust account ('AAAm'), and the rating on the ceding
insurer--various operating companies in the United Services
Automobile Assn. (USAA).

S&P derived the 'bb-' nat-cat risk factor from the most recently
commercially available AIR model covering each peril and region.
These models will be used for each reset.  AIR does not have models
to analyze the risks from wildfire (other than in California), nor
models for volcanic eruption, meteorite impact, and other perils.

This is the first transaction S&P has rated that included other
perils.  The other perils are defined as any naturally occurring
event that is identified as a catastrophe and assigned a
catastrophe code by Property Claims Services, other than a tropical
cyclone, earthquake, severe thunderstorm, winter storm, wildfire,
volcanic eruption, meteorite impact, or flood.  USAA will determine
whether any event is a naturally occurring event. Any event that
USAA identifies as being man-made or resulting from a man-made
occurrence, including (by way of example) terrorism or industrial
accident, will not be considered an "other peril."

Similar to other transactions that included meteorite impact and
volcanic eruption, S&P made a qualitative adjustment to account for
the unmodeled perils.  S&P considered the potential events that
could be covered as well as USAA's loss history.

This issuance has a variable reset.  Beginning with the initial
reset in June 2017, the attachment probability can be reset to
maximum of 1.23%.  This is the probability of attachment used to
determine the nat-cat risk factor for years two, three, and four.
Without taking into account the impact of the variable reset, the
nat-cat risk factor would have been within the 'bb' category.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Residential Reinsurance 2016 Ltd.
Senior secured class 13 notes               BB-(sf)


RESOURCE CAPITAL 2014-CRE2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. C Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the following
notes issued by Resource Capital Corp. 2014-CRE2, Ltd. ("Resource
2014-CRE2"):

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of three classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing
ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Resource 2014-CRE2 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of whole loans and pari-passu participations
collateralized by property types such as: i) multifamily (37.7% of
the collateral pool balance); ii) office (24.7%); iii) retail
(16.9%); iv) mixed-use (13.0%); and v) hospitality (7.8%). As of
the trustee's March 31, 2016 report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$298.8 million, from $353.9 million at issuance, as a result of
pay-downs from prepayments of the underlying collateral. The
transaction, while currently static, does provide for a pari-passu
acquisition of funded companion loan positions of existing assets
arising from future fundings. This companion note acquisition
period ends in July 2016.

No assets are listed as defaulted as of the trustee's March 31,
2016 report.


SCHOONER TRUST 2007-7: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in Schooner Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-7 as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Class C and D, were upgraded
primarily due to Moody's expectation of increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. Loans constituting 82% of the pool
that have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 12 months.

The ratings on P&I classes A-2, B and E through J were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on Classes K and L were
affirmed because the ratings are consistant with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class XC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.


SDART 2016-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on $67.42MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings and Outlooks to the Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-2 (SDART 2016-2) notes:

   -- $191,200,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
   -- $267,000,000 class A-2-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $83,000,000 class A-2-B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $161,920,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $163,150,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $175,290,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104,500,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67,420,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Credit Quality: 2016-2 is backed by collateral consistent
with the 2014-2016 pools, with a WA FICO score of 600 and an
internal WA loss forecast score (LFS) of 555.  The WA seasoning is
2.5 months, new vehicles total 34.4%, and the pool is
geographically diverse.

Increased Extended-Term Contracts: Despite the drop in 73-75 month
loans to 4.6%, 60+ month loans still account for 91.2% of the pool,
towards the higher end of the range historically for the platform.
Consistent with prior Fitch-rated transactions, an additional
stress was applied the loss proxy derivation for 73-75 month loans.
Although performance history is limited, loss severity observed
has been in excess of 61-72 loans thus far.

Weakening Performance: Although within range of the 2010-2012
performance, recent 2013-2015 portfolio and securitization losses
are tracking higher.  Loss frequency has been driven by weaker
collateral underwriting while loss severity has increased due to
the slightly weaker wholesale market and early stage defaults on
extended term collateral.  Fitch expects performance for the 2015
vintage to perform in line with 2013 and 2014, if not weaker.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: The cash flow distribution is a
sequential pay structure.  Initial hard credit enhancement (CE)
totals 49.85% for the class A notes consistent with 2016-1. Initial
WA excess spread is 10.45% per annum.

Stable Corporate Health: SC's recent financial results have been
weaker due to higher losses on the managed portfolio.  However, the
company has been profitable since 2007 and Fitch currently rates
Santander, SC's majority owner, 'A-/F2'/Outlook Stable.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SC demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer, as
evidenced by historical portfolio and securitization performance.
Fitch deems SC capable to service this series.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SC would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case.  This in turn could result in Fitch taking
negative rating actions on the notes.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-2 to increased credit
losses over the life of the transaction.  Fitch's analysis found
that the transaction displays some sensitivity to increased
defaults and credit losses.  This shows a potential downgrade of
one or two categories under Fitch's moderate (1.5x base case loss)
scenario, especially for the subordinate bonds.  The notes could
experience downgrades of three or more rating categories,
potentially leading to distressed ratings (below 'Bsf') or possibly
default, under Fitch's severe (2x base case loss) scenario.


SOUND POINT II: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class B-2L Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1F, A-1L,
A-2F, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, B-2L, and B-3L notes from Sound Point CLO
II Ltd., a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by Sound Point Capital Management LP.

The rating affirmations on the classes reflect adequate credit
support at their current rating levels.  Although the cash flow
results show higher ratings for the class A-2F, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L,
B-2L, and B-3L notes, S&P considered the fact that the transaction
is still in its reinvestment period, which is scheduled to end in
April 2017 and has not yet paid down any principal to the rated
notes.  Future reinvestments could change some of the portfolio
characteristics.

According to the April 2016 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
decreased slightly since our July 2013 rating affirmations:

   -- The class A-2L ratio was 136.59%, down from the 136.96%
      reported in June 2013, which S&P referenced for its July
      2013 rating actions.

   -- The class A-3L ratio was 122.69%, down from the 123.02%
      reported in June 2013.

   -- The class B-1L ratio was 115.42%, down from the 115.73%
      reported in June 2013.  The class B-2L ratio was 109.12%,
      down from the 109.41% reported in June 2013.

   -- The class B-3L ratio was 106.22%, down from the 106.50%
      reported in June 2013.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems appropriate.

             CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Sound Point CLO II Ltd.
                          Cash flow
        Previous          implied     Cash flow    Final
Class   rating            rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A-1L    AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)    11.18%       AAA (sf)
A-1F    AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)    11.18%       AAA (sf)
A-2L    AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)    11.92%       AA (sf)
A-2F    AA (sf)           AA+ (sf)    11.92%       AA (sf)
A-3L    A (sf)            AA- (sf)    2.01%        A (sf)
B-1L    BBB (sf)          A- (sf)     1.20%        BBB (sf)
B-2L    BB- (sf)          BB+ (sf)    4.40%        BB- (sf)
B-3L    B (sf)            B+ (sf)     0.76%        B (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
        Implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class   rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1L    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1F    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2L    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2F    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-3L    AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
B-1L    A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
B-2L    BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)
B-3L    B+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)  B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     B (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread        Recovery     
        Cash flow    compression   compression       
        implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class   rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1L    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1F    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2L    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-2F    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)
A-3L    AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
B-1L    A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
B-2L    BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B (sf)        BB- (sf)
B-3L    B+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     CC (sf)       B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Sound Point CLO II Ltd.
Class        Rating
A-1F         AAA (sf)
A-1L         AAA (sf)
A-2F         AA (sf)
A-2L         AA (sf)
A-3L         A (sf)
B-1L         BBB (sf)
B-2L         BB- (sf)
B-3L         B (sf)


TOWD POINT 2016-2 : DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class B1 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the Asset
Backed Securities, Series 2016-2 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2016-2:

-- $541.5 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.8 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $57.3 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $39.4 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $40.2 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $29.7 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class A1C at AAA (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class X1 at AAA (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class X2 at AAA (sf)
-- $541.5 million Class X3 at AAA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class A3A at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class A3B at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class A3C at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class X4 at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class X5 at AA (sf)
-- $595.3 million Class X6 at AA (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class A4A at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class A4B at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class A4C at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class X7 at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class X8 at A (sf)
-- $652.6 million Class X9 at A (sf)
-- $692.0 million Class A5 at BBB (sf)

Classes X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8 and X9 are interest-only
notes. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A1A, A1B, A1C, X1, X2, X3, A3, A3A, A3B, A3C, X4, X5, X6,
A4, A4A, A4B, A4C, X7, X8, X9 and A5 are exchangeable notes. These
classes can be exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as
specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 38.10% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 31.95%,
25.40%, 20.90%, 16.30% and 12.90% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by approximately 4,053 loans with a total
principal balance of $874,783,073 as of the Cut-Off Date (April 30,
2016).

The portfolio contains 79.6% modified loans. Within the pool, 892
mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates
to 4.9% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 89.7% of the
modified loans. The loans are approximately 109 months seasoned,
and all are current as of the Cut-Off Date, including 0.6%
bankruptcy-performing loans. Approximately 61.7% of the mortgage
loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least
the past 24 months under both the Office of Thrift Supervision and
Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency methods.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from 28
transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2016 and are beneficially owned by both the Responsible Party and
other funds managed by affiliates of Cerberus Capital Management,
L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the transferring trusts,
FirstKey, through a wholly owned subsidiary, Towd Point Asset
Funding, LLC (the Depositor), will contribute loans to the Trust.
As the Sponsor, FirstKey, through a majority-owned affiliate, will
acquire and retain a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of
securities to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market. As of
the Cut-Off Date, all the loans are serviced by Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer; however, the servicer is
obligated to make advances in respect of taxes and insurance,
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
non-performing loans or real estate owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. The asset
sale price has to equal a minimum reserve amount in order to
maximize liquidation proceeds of such loans or properties. The
minimum reserve amount equals the product of 65.02% and the
then-current principal amount of the mortgage loans or REO
properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis, a
strong servicer and Asset Manager oversight. Additionally, a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review was performed on the
portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history
and data capture, as well as title and tax review. Servicing
comments were reviewed for a sample of loans. Updated broker price
opinions or exterior appraisals were provided for 100% of the pool;
however, a reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider (FirstKey) with a backstop by an unrated
entity (Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund,
L.P.), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan
representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.
Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and
relative clean performance history in recent years, (2) a
comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong representations
and warranties enforcement mechanism, including delinquency review
trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors are detailed in the related report. Please see the attached
appendix for additional information regarding sensitivity of
assumptions used in the rating process.


VENTURE CLO XII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-X, B-1,
B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E notes from Venture XII CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that closed in January 2013
and is managed by MJX Asset Management LLC.

The deal is in its reinvestment phase, which is scheduled to end in
February 2017.  Since the transaction's effective date, the
defaulted asset balance has increased to $6.20 million as of the
April 2016 trustee report.  Over the same period, the amount of
'CCC' rated assets has increased to $30.97 million from
$5.49 million.  The total par has decreased, primarily as a result
of recent defaults.  This has led to the minor decrease in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.  Per the April 2016 trustee
report, the weighted average life has decreased to 4.38 years from
5.33 years as of the effective date, which has led to an improved
credit risk profile and an increase in the cash flow cushion for
each class.

Although the cash flow results show higher ratings for the class
B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E notes, when performing S&P's analysis
it considered the increase in 'CCC' rated and defaulted assets, the
decrease in O/C ratios, the recent decline in par, and that the
transaction is still in its reinvesting period.

The April 2016 trustee report indicated these O/C changes when
compared to the April 2013 report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio decreased to 131.00% from 131.90%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 121.42% from 122.25%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 114.41% from 115.20%.
    -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 107.20% from 107.93%.

S&P's affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1, A-X, B-1, B-2,
C-1, C-2, D, and E notes reflect that the available credit support
is consistent with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest,
ultimate principal, or both to each of the rated tranches.  The
cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Venture XII CLO Ltd.
                   Cash flow     Cash flow
        Previous   implied       cushion   Final
Class   rating     rating (i)    (%) (ii)  rating
A-1     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      9.09      AAA (sf)
A-X     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      31.43     AAA (sf)
B-1     AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      7.60      AA (sf)
B-2     AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)      7.60      AA (sf)
C-1     A (sf)     A+ (sf)       7.29      A (sf)
C-2     A (sf)     A+ (sf)       7.29      A (sf)
D       BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     3.29      BBB (sf)
E       BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)      2.97      BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.  S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the
intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the current
portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation assumptions
assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-X    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
C-1    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
C-2    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-X    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B-1    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
B-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
C-1    A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
C-2    A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B- (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Venture XII CLO Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-X         AAA (sf)
B-1         AA (sf)
B-2         AA (sf)
C-1         A (sf)
C-2         A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. K Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2005-C17, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C17 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the four P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 24.5% of the
current balance, compared to 17.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
pooled certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $47 million from
$2.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are collateralized
by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 23% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 9% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by US government securities.

Four mortgage loans, constituting 59% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $70 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). One loan, constituting 7% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Bellemont of Sun Valley Loan, formally the Clarion Inn of Sun
Valley, ($3.3 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
58-room limited-service hotel located in Ketchum, ID. The hotel
lost its Clarion franchise and is now operating independently. The
loan transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to
imminent default, and foreclosure was recently completed in March
2016.

In addition to the specially serviced loan, Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for two poorly performing loans,
constituting 29% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss
of $9.5 million (a 56% expected loss on average) from the specially
serviced and troubled loans.

As of the May 2016 remittance statement Classes J, K and L did not
receive any interest distributions and cumulative interest
shortfalls on the deal were $7.8 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced and modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 99% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 88% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100%, compared to 86%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.33X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 47% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Westland Mall A-Note Loan ($10.5 million --
23% of the pool), which is secured by a 338,000 SF regional mall
located in West Burlington, IA. JC Penney vacated its 92,000 SF
space in April 2015 but will continue to pay rent through its lease
expiration in March 2017. As of year-end 2015, the property was 58%
occupied. The original loan transferred to special servicing in
June 2013 and was modified in March of 2014. The modification terms
included a note split into a $10.5 million A-Note and a $6.4
million B-Note and extended the loan maturity to January 2018.
Moody's analysis factored in the declining occupancy and loss of an
anchor tenant. Moody's A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and
0.85X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's views the B-Note as a troubled loan and anticipates a
significant loss.

The second largest loan is the Shopko Plaza Loan ($7.5 million --
16% of the pool), which is secured by a 129,000 SF retail center
located in Peoria, IL. The center's major tenant, Shopko (112,260
SF, 87% of net rental area) has been dark since January 2007 but
continues to pay rent under a lease that expires in October 2020.
The loan is on the watchlist due to low physical occupancy and
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 126% and 0.86X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Firewheel Corners Shopping Center
Loan ($4.0 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 22,000
SF unanchored strip center located in Garland, TX, a suburb of
Dallas. The property was 91% occupied as of April 2016. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.97X, respectively.


WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC16, issued by
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-LC16   as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stability of the
transaction and specifically address an update to the Pacific
Design Center loan (Prospectus ID#4, 5.2% of the current pool),
which DBRS anticipates will have a net cash flow decline in the
near future.

The Pacific Design Center loan is secured by the fee interest in
two buildings (the Blue Building and the Green Building),
comprising approximately 1.0 million square feet (sf), that are
part of the larger Pacific Design Center located in West Hollywood,
California. The Blue Building was constructed in 1976 and consists
of 611,700 sf of showroom space while the Green Building was built
in 1988 and consists of 385,100 sf of design showroom and office
space. Also located on the property is the Red Building
(non-collateral), which is a 420,000 sf two-tower office building
completed in 2012 through 2013. The subject loan represents $50
million A-2 note non-controlling pari passu piece of the $145
million whole loan; the A-1 controlling note is secured in the COMM
2014-CCRE18 transaction, also rated by DBRS. The loan is sponsored
by Charles S. Cohen, the current owner, president and Chief
Executive Officer of Cohen Brothers Realty Corporation. At
issuance, there was $84.5 million of hard equity behind the $145
million whole loan.

According to the December 2015 rent roll, the property was
approximately 68.0% occupied with an average rental rate of $33.74
per square foot (psf) compared with the 72.7% occupancy rate with
an average rental rate of $30.90 psf at issuance. Within the next
12 months, 31 tenants, representing 25.2% of the net rentable area
(NRA) have lease expirations. The three largest tenants, the
Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. (5.1% of the NRA); Weber
Shandwick/Rogers Cowan (5.1% of the NRA); and BNC (3.9% of the
NRA), have all confirmed that they will not renew upon their
respective January 2016 lease expirations. According to several
news articles, the tenants have all signed leases at Century City
and will be relocating upon lease expiration. At issuance, these
tenants were in lease negotiations with the borrower to renew on
long-term contracts at higher rates; however, negotiations failed.
Factoring in the possible tenants with near-term rollover,
occupancy could potentially fall below 50.0%. As of YE2015, CoStar
reported that Class A office buildings greater than 100,000 sf
within the West Hollywood submarket were achieving rental rates of
$47.93 psf with an average vacancy rate and average availability
rate of 4.9% and 7.5%, respectively. CoStar also reported that flex
properties within the submarket reported rental rates of $34.71 psf
with an average vacancy rate and average availability rate of 4.9%
and 6.2%, respectively. The loan benefits from a tenant reserve
which, as of April 2016, remittance totaled $2.75 million with
$50,000 in monthly contributions in addition to a $500,000
replacement reserve. Furthermore, at issuance, the borrower entered
into a master lease with the Cohen Brother Realty Corporation of
California for 193,720 sf portion at the property, expiring in July
2026. The purpose of this master lease was to bring occupancy of
this space (193,720 sf) to 85.0% at a rental rate of $35.00 psf
with a total annual rent of $6.8 million in the event that tenants
vacated the property. Mr. Cohen personally guarantees the lease
payments under a springing guarantee that will take effect upon the
DSCR (excluding cash flow from the master lease) falling below 1.10
times (x). The amount guaranteed will be permanently released on a
proportionate basis upon new tenants taking occupancy and
commencing rent on leases with a minimum term of five years. Once
the space has been leased up with the leases meeting the applicable
terms and rates, the sponsor will be released from the master lease
obligations. DBRS gave no credit to the master lease at issuance.
DBRS has modeled this loan with an elevated probability of default
(POD), given the decline in occupancy and near-term tenant
rollover.

As of the April 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and ten loans, representing 7.3% of the pool, on the
servicer’s watchlist. Five of these loans, representing 2.5% of
the pool, were flagged because of items of deferred maintenance.
One loan, representing 0.5% of the pool, was flagged as a result of
upcoming rollover within the next six months; however, most tenants
have indicated that they will execute a lease renewal. The five
remaining loans on the watchlist, representing 4.7% of the pool,
were flagged for performance-related reasons. According to YE2015
financials, these five loans had a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.38x and 10.6%,
respectively, compared with the DBRS underwritten figures of 1.44x
and 11.3%, respectively.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C28 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the stable performance of the
transaction since closing. At issuance, the collateral consisted of
99 fixed-rate loans secured by 134 commercial properties. As of the
April 2016 remittance, the pool has experienced a collateral
reduction of 0.5% as a result of scheduled loan amortization. Loans
representing 62.8% of the pool are reporting YE2015 financials, and
loans representing 29.9% of the pool are reporting 2015
partial-year financials. Eleven loans in the Top 15 (representing
44.3% of the current pool balance) reporting YE2015 figures exhibit
a weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.67 times (x) with WA net cash flow growth over the
respective DBRS underwritten figures of 4.2%. As of the April 2016
remittance, four loans, representing 3.1% of the current pool
balance, are on the servicer’s watchlist. Two of the loans on the
watchlist were flagged for deferred maintenance issues or upcoming
tenant rollover; however, the loan flagged for tenant rollover has
leasing traction at the property as advised by the servicer. One
loan in the Top 15 and the largest loan on the watchlist are
discussed below.

The Eastgate One Phases I-VII & XII loan (Prospectus ID#3, 6.5% of
the current pool balance) is secured by the borrower’s fee
interests in an 860,000 sf office complex in San Diego, California.
The subject consists of 16 two-story Class B buildings and,
together with Prospectus ID#5 – Eastgate Two Phases VIII-X, forms
the 24-building, 1.4 million square feet (sf) Eastgate Campus. The
campus is located approximately 15 miles north of downtown San
Diego. As of the September 2015 rent roll, the property was 75.9%
occupied, which is a decrease from the issuance occupancy rate of
85.3%. In addition, the former second-largest tenant, Qualcomm Inc.
(Qualcomm), which occupied 8.8% of the net rentable area (NRA),
vacated the property at its lease expiration in March 2016.
Qualcomm’s departure from the subject was expected at lease
expiry following its announcement in October 2015 to terminate
approximately 1,300 workers as early as November 2015. Jones Lang
LaSalle predicts approximately 300,000 sf of office space leased to
Qualcomm located in the UTC/Eastgate (the subject’s submarket),
Sorrento Mesa and Del Mar Heights submarkets will not be renewed by
Qualcomm. It was known at issuance that Agena Bioscience Inc. (7.4%
of NRA) executed a lease commencing in January 2016, which was
reflected in the September 2015 rent roll. When considering
Qualcom’s departure and the entry of Agena Bioscience Inc.,
occupancy would be approximately 75.0%. As of September 2015, the
entire Eastgate Campus was 83.4% occupied. According to the
borrower’s website, approximately 292,000 sf of space (21.0% of
NRA of the Eastgate Campus) was listed as available, including
Qualcomm’s former space. In comparison to the UTC Class B office
submarket, as of May 2016, CoStar reported a vacancy rate of 12.0%
and an availability rate of 14.2%. The September 2015 OSAR reported
an annualized DSCR of 1.31x, which is in line with the DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.33x; however, it only reported the previous
three months’ financials. Given the recent decline in occupancy
from issuance levels, the YE2015 net cash flow figure may fall
below DBRS underwritten levels. As such, this loan was modeled with
a stressed cash flow.

The Flatiron Hotel loan (Prospectus ID#12, 1.9% of the current pool
balance) is secured by the borrower’s fee interest in a 64-key
full-service boutique hotel in New York. It was built in 1927 and
is considered a New York City landmark building located in the
Madison Square District. The loan was placed on the watchlist
because of the low DSCR of 0.23x at YE2015 with an occupancy rate
of 66.7%. These figures represent declines from the DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.28x and the T-12 March 2015 occupancy rate
of 87.4%. The decline in occupancy and performance was a direct
result from renovations and a flood that occurred at the property
in April 2015 from a burst pipe, as well as the repairs following
the damage. The borrower was renovating several floors at the
property, as well as the ground floor lobby and restaurant at
issuance, and has advised the servicer that physical renovations
were completed in October 2015. In terms of the water damage from
the burst pipe, the borrower received $1.1 million in insurance
proceeds and has advised that recovery of the subject is on track
and performance is expected to improve beginning in May 2016.
According to the T-12 November 2015 Smith Travel Research report,
the subject’s occupancy was 72.6% with an average daily rate
(ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) of $226 and $164,
respectively. These figures are below the competitive set occupancy
rate of 86.3% with ADR and RevPAR at $246 and $212, respectively.
At issuance, the subject reported an ADR of $244, which is above
the subject’s current ADR of $226. While it appears property
performance will improve in the near term, given the uncertainty
surrounding the loan’s current performance after the completion
of repairs and renovations, this loan was modeled with a stressed
cash flow.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Finalizes BB Ratings on Cl. E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-C34 (the Certificates) to be issued by Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust (WFCM) 2016-C34. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-FG at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-H at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-E, X-FG, X-H, A-3FL, A-3FX, D, E, F and G have been
privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-E, X-FG and X-H balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood
of receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.
DBRS considers the IO certificates’ position within the
transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
rating.

TRANSACTION DESCRIPTION

The collateral consists of 68 fixed-rate loans secured by 92
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, 11 loans, representing 14.3% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 36
loans, representing 65.1% of the pool, having Refinance (Refi)
DSCRs below 1.00x. The loans’ probability of default (POD) is
based on the more constraining of the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

Only six loans, representing 6.6% of the pool, are secured by
properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant. This is lower than some recent conduit transactions that
have shown single-tenant concentrations in excess of 15.0% of the
pool. Loans secured by properties occupied by single tenants have
been found to suffer from higher loss severities in the event of
default. As such, DBRS modeled single-tenant properties with a
higher POD and cash flow volatility compared with multi-tenant
properties. None of the loans in the pool are secured by student or
military housing properties, which often exhibit higher cash flow
volatility than traditional multifamily properties. While no loans
in the pool are secured by properties exhibiting Above Average or
Excellent quality, only two loans, representing 1.6% of the pool,
were deemed to be Below Average property quality. The remaining
loans were considered Average property quality.

The pool is relatively more concentrated than recent WFCM
transactions, with the top ten loans accounting for 50.2% of the
pool. The deal's concentration profile is equivalent to that of a
pool of 27 equal-sized loans, which is less than favorable. The
transaction has a high concentration of loans suffering from
elevated refinance risk. Thirty-six loans, accounting for 65.1% of
the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 1.00x. Nine of these
loans, representing 21.0% of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less
than 0.90x. Twenty-two loans, representing 20.2% of the pool, are
secured by properties located in tertiary or rural markets,
including two of the top ten loans. The deal appears concentrated
by property type, with 33 loans (nine of the top 15 loans),
representing 46.2% of the pool, secured by retail properties. None
of the retail properties are outlet or regional malls.

The DBRS sample included 35 loans of the 68 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 40 of the 92 properties in the
portfolio (66.1% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS
conducted meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent
or a representative of the borrowing entity for 52.6% of the pool.
The DBRS sample had an average NCF variance of -7.8%, ranging from
-2.6% to 1.7%. Ten loans, representing 30.4% of the pool, have
sponsorship and/or loan collateral associated with a voluntary
bankruptcy filing, a prior discounted payoff, loan default, limited
net worth and/or liquidity, a historical negative credit event
and/or inadequate commercial real estate experience. DBRS increased
the POD for the loans with identified sponsorship concerns.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C34
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.:

-- $33,179,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100,629,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115,000,000c class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,000,000ac class A-3FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0ac class A-3FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $172,158,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,985,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,139,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $527,090,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,018,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,018,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,896,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41,289,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,205,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,205,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,907,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c)The aggregate initial balance of class A-3, A-3FL and A-3FX
    certificates will be $140,000,000. Holders of the class A-3FL
    certificates may exchange all or a portion of their
    certificates for a like principal amount of class A-3FX
    certificates having the same pass-through rate as the class A-
    3FX regular interest.

Fitch does not rate the $20,205,000ab class X-FG certificates,
$12,298,000a class G certificates, the $21,084,500a class H or the
$21,084,500ab class X-H certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 68 loans secured by 92
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $702.8 million as of the cut-off date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Natixis Real
Estate Capital LLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC, Silverpeak Real
Estate Finance LLC, and Basis Real Estate Capital II, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 74.5% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 79.9%, and asset summary reviews on
100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The pool has higher leverage statistics than
other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.
The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.07x is
below both the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average of 1.17x and
full-year 2015 average of 1.18x. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value
(LTV) of 112.9% is above both the YTD 2016 average of 107.9% and
full-year 2015 average of 109.3%.

Additional Subordinate Financing: Three loans (20.4% of the pool)
have additional subordinate debt in place, including the two
largest loans, Regent Portfolio (9.96% of the pool) and
Congressional North Shopping Center & 121 Congressional Lane
(8.4%). The pool's Fitch total debt DSCR and LTV of 1.04x and
115.2%, respectively, are worse than the YTD 2016 averages of 1.11x
and 112%, respectively.

Retail Concentration: Thirty-one of the 68 loans in the transaction
are completely are partially secured by retail properties. Retail
properties represent 38.0% of the pool by balance, which is
significantly above the YTD 2016 and full-year 2015 averages of
24.8% and 26.7%, respectively. No other property type accounts for
more than 16.1% of the pool by balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.2% below
the most recent net operating income (NOI; for properties for which
a recent NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and could result in potential rating
actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-C34 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10-11.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence information
was provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a
comparison and re-computation of certain characteristics with
respect to each of the 68 mortgage loans. Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and the findings did not have an impact
on the analysis.


WF-RBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C2: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in WF-RBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2011-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes, Class B, C, D and E, were upgraded
based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from
loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 28% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on the remaining three P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the two IO classes, Class X-A and X-B, were affirmed
because the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes are consistent with
Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.2% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.1% at the last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to $834 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 61% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 18% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Seven loans,
constituting 11% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Three loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have liquidated from the pool and there are currently no
loans are in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 75%, compared to
76% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 1.35X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Borgata
Ground Leases Loan ($57 million -- 7% of the pool), which is
secured by five parcels of land underlying portions of the Borgata
Hotel Casino & Spa Complex in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The
property is leased pursuant to four separate ground leases, all of
which expire in December 2070. Moody's value was stressed due to
ongoing concerns about casino revenue in Atlantic City. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd)
and 1.19X, respectively.

The second loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Westfield Westland Mall Loan ($52 million -- 6% of the pool), which
is secured by 225,000 square feet (SF) of net rentable area (NRA)
contained within a 829,000 SF super regional mall located in
Hialeah, Florida. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Sears and JC
Penney, all of which are owned by the respective tenants and not
included in the collateral. As of year-end 2015, the total property
was 99% occupied, compared to 96% at last review. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and
1.78X, respectively.

The third loan with a structured credit assessment is the Port
Charlotte Town Center Loan ($37 million -- 4% of the pool), which
is secured by 490,000 SF of NRA contained within a 774,000 SF super
regional mall in Port Charlotte, Florida. The mall contains five
anchors and a movie theater. The property is located along Tamiami
Trail (US 141). As of year-end 2015, the property was 92% occupied,
compared to 88% at last review. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.59X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the the Arboretum Loan ($84 million -- 10% of the
pool), which is secured by a Wal-Mart anchored retail center
totaling 563,000 SF located in Charlotte, North Carolina. The
property consists of 12 single-story buildings, five pad sites, and
a 16-screen movie theater. As of November 2015, the property was
99% leased, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 90% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.05X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Rentar Plaza Loan ($77 million -- 9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1,567,000 SF mixed-use property
located in Middle Village, NY. Property uses include
warehouse/distribution (64% of NRA), retail (32%) and office (4%).
The property has been 100% leased since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 69%
and 1.45X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Bellevue Galleria Loan ($51 million
-- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 204,000 SF mixed-use
property located in Bellevue, Washington. Property uses include
retail (59%) and office (41%). As of year-end 2015, the property
was 92% occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 79% and 1.23X at the last review.


YORK CLO 3: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to $20MM Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes to be issued by York CLO-3 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"York CLO-3").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$1,500,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class X
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$268,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class
B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2025 (the "Class B-2
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$19,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$11,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$10,500,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class
D-2 Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

York CLO-3 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. We expect the portfolio to be approximately
75% ramped as of the closing date.

York CLO Managed Holdings, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's two year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. Some portion of the Class A Notes may be issued in the form
of a loan. The Class A Notes and the loan will be pari passu.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.


[*] DBRS Confirms Ratings on 2 U.S. ABS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. conducted a review of two publicly rated U.S. structured
finance asset-backed securities with five outstanding publicly
rated classes. All of the five publicly rated classes reviewed were
confirmed as credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS’s expected losses at their current respective rating
levels.

The following public transactions were reviewed:

-- Gold Key Resorts 2014-A, LLC
-- BXG Receivables Note Trust 2013-A

A copy of the complete list of ratings is available free at:

                    https://is.gd/nRXRJA


[*] DBRS Reviewed 472 Classes From 58 US RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on May 13, 2016, reviewed 472 classes from 58 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the
472 classes reviewed, 90 classes were upgraded, 311 classes were
confirmed and 71 classes were discontinued due to full principal
repayment to the bondholders.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating level. For
transactions where the rating has been confirmed, current asset
performance and credit support levels have been consistent with the
current rating.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS and re-securitization of real
estate mortgage investment conduit (ReREMIC) transactions. The
pools backing these transactions consist of Second Lien,
Option-ARM, Scratch and Dent, ReREMIC, Alt-A, Prime and Subprime
collateral.

A copy of the list of ratings is available free at:

                        https://is.gd/lTJ6MG


[*] Fitch Lowers 16 Bonds in 8 Transactions to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on May 18, 2016, took various rating actions on
already distressed U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) bonds.  Fitch downgraded 16 bonds in eight transactions to
'D', as the bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds
were all previously rated 'C', which indicates that losses were
inevitable.

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on five classes in one
transaction as a result of realized losses.  The trust balances
have been reduced to $0 or have experienced non-recoverable
realized losses and are no longer considered by Fitch to be
relevant to the agency's coverage.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  Any
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.  In cases where the last rated tranches of a
transaction are in default and rated 'D', the defaulted ratings
will be automatically withdrawn within 11 months of the date of the
previous rating action.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen.  In this unlikely scenario, Fitch
would further review the affected classes.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

A list of Affected Ratings is available at http://bit.ly/1WNxoJo


[*] Moody's Hikes $122.2MM Securities Backed by Housing Collateral
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 12, 2016, upgraded the ratings of
nine tranches in eight transactions issued from 1996 to 2006. The
collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
manufactured housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Associates Manufactured Housing 1996-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Associates Manufactured Housing 1997-2

Cl. M, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Issuer: BankAmerica MH Contract 1997-2

Cl. M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: BankAmerica MH Contract 1998-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-MH1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2014 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitization Corp. Series 2001-4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitization Corp. Series 2002-2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC, Series
1998-I

Cl. M, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement.


[*] Moody's Hikes $855MM of Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC in 2005
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 60 tranches,
from 16 transactions issued by RFC backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC2 Trust

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC4 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC6 Trust

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 6, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS2 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS4 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS6 Trust

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 20, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS8 Trust

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ2 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ4 Trust

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-AHL2 Trust

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX2 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX4 Trust

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS11 Trust

  Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS4 Trust

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS7 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS9 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is a result of stable or improving performance of the
related pools and/or total credit enhancement available to the
bonds.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Hikes Subprime RMBS Issued by RFC in 2005
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 58 tranches,
from 16 transactions issued by RFC backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC1 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC3 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-EFC5 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS5 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-RZ3 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-AHL1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-AHL3 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX3 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS10 Trust

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS12 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS5 Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS8 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is a result of improving levels of credit enhancement
available to the bonds, stable or improving performance of the
related pools, and/or total credit enhancement available to the
bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $719MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 20, 2016, upgraded the ratings of
38 tranches from 10 transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by
various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-2

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. I-M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 6, 2014,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-4

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-4A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. II-4A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-7

  Cl. I-1A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. I-1A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. I-2A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. I-2A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 30, 2008,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR2

  Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. IV-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates 2005-4

  Cl. I-A1C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

  Cl. A-I-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 18, 2011,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-3

  Cl. A-PT, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Confirmed at B1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $88.4MM of Securities
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches
issued by six transactions between 1999 and 2002.  The collateral
backing these transactions consists primarily of manufactured
housing units.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Greenpoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-5

  Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1999-A

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 7, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 7, 2014,
    Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 7, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 7, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2001-B

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 14, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 14, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-B

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 3, 2014,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 3, 2014,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Senior/Subordinate
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-A

  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 14, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug. 14, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Senior/Subordinate
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-A

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 24, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  Performance has remained
generally stable from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $235.5MM RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 27 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from ten transactions,
backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-5

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3

Cl. 2A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-6

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-4 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR3

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-7

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR13
Trust

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2012 Confirmed at
B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR10

Cl. A-1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-1-C, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are due
to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in April
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $37MM Scratch-and-Dent RMBS Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on May 18, 2016, took actions on the
ratings of seven tranches issued from six deals backed by "scratch
and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-3

Cl. M6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-BO1

Cl. M-8, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-RP1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE4

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2014
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE1

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of an increase in
credit enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgraded is
due to interest shortfalls that are unlikely to be reimbursed.


[*] Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $164MM of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 4
tranches from 3 deals issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2010
    Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE1

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-1

  Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the stable
performance of the related pools and total credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The downgrade action on New Century Home
Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-1 Class M-1 is primarily the result
of recent interest shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped
because of a weak interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in April 2016 from 5.4% in
April 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Lowers 22 Ratings From 18 U.S. RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on May 16, 2016, lowered 22 ratings (including
19 to 'D (sf)') and withdrew one rating from 18 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P also removed
one of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2001 and
2006 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate loans
secured primarily by one- to four-family residential properties.

A combination of subordination, overcollateralization (when
available), excess interest, and bond insurance (as applicable)
provide credit enhancement for all of the tranches in this review.
Where the bond insurer is no longer rated, S&P solely relied on the
underlying collateral's credit quality and the transaction
structure to derive the ratings.

             APPLICATION OF INTEREST SHORTFALL CRITERIA

In reviewing these ratings, S&P applied its interest shortfall
criteria as stated in "Structured Finance Temporary Interest
Shortfall Methodology," Dec. 15, 2015, which impose a maximum
rating threshold on classes that have incurred interest shortfalls
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.  In applying the
criteria, S&P looked to reimbursement provisions within each
payment waterfall for the applicable class to determine whether the
reimbursement must be made immediately.  In instances where
immediate reimbursement is required, S&P used the maximum length of
time until full interest is reimbursed as part of S&P's analysis to
assign the rating on the class.

In instances where reimbursement may be delayed by other factors
within the payment waterfall, S&P used its cash flow projections to
determine the likelihood that the shortfall would be reimbursed
under various scenarios.

DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered 22 ratings to reflect the application of its interest
shortfall criteria. Of the lowered ratings, one moved to
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  The remaining 21 lowered ratings were already
speculative-grade before the rating actions.

S&P lowered its rating on class M-1 from CWABS Inc. series 2004-BC1
to 'D (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg'.  S&P placed the rating on
this class on CreditWatch with negative implications on Dec. 14,
2015, to reflect possible interest shortfalls, as cited in the
trustee reports.  After S&P's discussions with the trustee and
servicer, S&P has determined that such interest shortfalls were
related to repayments from the trust for previous advances. As
such, S&P applied its interest shortfall criteria to lower its
rating on this class.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its rating on class A-NA from Chevy Chase Funding LLC
series 2005-C.  This class had previously received bond insurance
payments from an insurer that S&P no longer rates.  S&P withdrew
its rating on the class because it don't have sufficient
information to assess the insurers' creditworthiness.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.3% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.1% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                  http://bit.ly/1U9kDSS



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 71 Classes From 15 RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various actions on 71 classes from 15 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P
raised 13 ratings, lowered 16 ratings, affirmed 40 ratings,
withdrew one rating, and discontinued one rating.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 1999 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
subprime, prime jumbo, Alternative-A, and scratch and dent mortgage
loan collateral.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, and/or bond insurance as applicable provide credit
enhancement for the transactions in this review.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective
class without bond insurance, it relied solely on the underlying
collateral's credit quality and the transaction structure to derive
the rating.

                       ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 13 classes from seven transactions based
on one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support
   -- Payment allocation mechanics; and
   -- Lower observed loss severities.

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on 16 classes from four transactions.  The
downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit support
for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover S&P's
remaining projected losses for the related transactions at a higher
rating.  The downgrades also reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased credit support;
   -- Tail risk; and/or
   -- Application of our interest shortfall criteria.

                          AFFIRMATIONS

For ratings in 12 of the transactions in this review, S&P
considered specific performance characteristics that, in its view,
could add volatility to its loss assumptions and, in turn, to the
ratings suggested by S&P's cash flow projections.  Accordingly, S&P
affirmed, rather than raised, its ratings on those classes to
promote ratings stability.  In general, the bonds that were
affected experience one or more of:

   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities;
   -- A low priority of principal payments; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 22 ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' categories.  These
affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover its projected losses on these
classes.

S&P also affirmed 17 'CCC (sf)' ratings and one 'CC (sf)' rating
from eight transactions.  S&P believes that its projected credit
support will remain insufficient to cover its projected losses to
these classes.  As defined in "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+',
'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the
'CCC (sf)' affirmations indicate that S&P believes these classes
are still vulnerable to default, while S&P's 'CC (sf)' affirmation
indicates that it believes this class is virtually certain to
default.

                   WITHDRAWALS AND DISCONTINUANCES

S&P withdrew its rating on class IV-X from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-26 due to the
application of S&P's interest-only (IO) criteria, which state that
S&P will maintain the rating on an IO class until the ratings on
all of the classes that the IO security references, in the
determination of its notional balance, are either lowered below
'AA-' or have been retired.

S&P discontinued its rating on class I-A-3 from Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE1 because this class has been paid
in full.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.3% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.1% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 6 RMBS Re-REMIC Transaction
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on May 23, 2016, took various actions on 123
classes from six U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transactions. S&P raised 67 ratings, lowered five ratings, affirmed
30 ratings, and discontinued three ratings.  The remaining ratings
underwent various CreditWatch actions.

Following this review, 11 ratings are on CreditWatch negative
implications and seven ratings are on CreditWatch developing
implications.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2005 and
2010 and are supported by underlying classes backed by a mix of
various mortgage loan collateral types.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), and excess
interest, as applicable, provide credit support for the re-REMIC
transactions' underlying securities.  In addition, the re-REMICs'
capital structures contain subordination.

                      ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporate various considerations into its decisions
to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 67 classes because the projected credit
support for these classes is sufficient to cover S&P's projected
losses at these rating levels.  Among other factors, the upgrades
reflect improved collateral performance trends in the underlying
transactions, expected short duration, and/or increased credit
support to the class.

                           DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on five classes due to deteriorated
collateral performance within the underlying transactions, erosion
of credit support, and the application of S&P's interest shortfall
criteria, among other reasons.

Application Of Interest Shortfall Criteria

Of the downgrades, S&P lowered four classes on account of recent
interest shortfalls that they experienced.

                               AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed 23 ratings in the 'AAA' through 'BB' categories. These
affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover our projected losses in those rating
scenarios.

S&P also affirmed seven 'CCC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover S&P's
projected losses to these classes at even lower than base-case loss
levels.  As defined in "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC',
'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings" published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)'
affirmations indicate that S&P believes these classes are still
vulnerable to default.

                        CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

The ratings on seven of the classes in this review were placed on
CreditWatch with negative implications on Jan. 20, 2016, as S&P
further investigated the weighted average coupon deterioration in
the affected pools according to S&P's loan modification criteria to
determine what effect such deterioration may have on S&P's ratings
for these classes.  Of these seven ratings, two had their
CreditWatch implications changed to developing from negative, as it
is possible that completion of our loan modification analysis could
result in an upgrade, affirmation, or downgrade.  The other ratings
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications as S&P continues
to investigate the weighted average coupon deterioration.

The ratings on five of the classes in this review were placed on
CreditWatch with developing implications because S&P is still
investigating the application of our loan modification criteria.
While each of these five classes has experienced enough improved
collateral performance to merit a possible upgrade, it is possible
that the completion of our loan modification analysis could result
in an affirmation or downgrade.  Six ratings were placed on
CreditWatch with negative implications as S&P further investigate
the impact of loan modifications on the ratings.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued our 'D (sf)' ratings on MLMS 2005-ACR1 Ltd.'s
classes M-4, M-5, and M-6 because the transaction has been called.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
our view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.3% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.1% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                  http://bit.ly/1WolyW0


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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