TCR_Public/160417.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 17, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 108

                            Headlines

A10 TERM 2013-2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
ARES CLO XXV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ARES IIIR/IVR: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
ASPEN FUNDING I: Moody's Hikes Class A-2L Notes Rating From Ba1

BANC OF AMERICA 2006-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Certs to CCC-
BAYVIEW FINANCIAL 2004-SSR1: Moody's Ups Cl. M Debt Rating to B3
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
BOCA HOTEL 2013-BOCA: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Certificates
BUSINESS LOAN 2001-2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. M Notes

CAJUN GLOBAL 2011-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba2
CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
COMM MORTGAGE 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
CPS AUTO 2016-B: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 4 Certs.

CSAIL 2016-C5: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Hikes Cl. B Debt Rating to Ba1(sf)
DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt
FANNIE MAE: Fitch to Rate Class 1M-2A Exchangeable Notes 'BB+sf'
GE BUSINESS 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to 'CCCsf'

GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC22: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2.0: Fitch Rates Class C Notes BBsf
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 8-2016: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B1(sf)
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Hikes Cl. C Certs Rating to Ba1

JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
MADISON PARK XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
MASTR ASSET 2005-HE2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-3 Certs to B2
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: DBRS Hikes Class H Debt Rating to BB(sf)
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: DBRS Confirms BBhigh Rating on Cl. F Debt

MSAT LP 2005-RR4: DBRS Hikes Class L Debt Rating to BB(sf)
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on E Notes
RAMP TRUST: Moody's Hikes $248MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
UPLAND CLO: Moody's Gives Ratings to 8 Note Classes

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs From B-
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C23: Moody's Hikes Cl. F Debt Rating to Ba2
[*] Moody's Hikes $954MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Issuers
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $1.18BB Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Raises $584MM of Subprime RMBS Issued in 2005-2006

[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $1.2 Billion of CWABS Subprime RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $101MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $108.5MM of Scratch and Dent RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $146MM RMBS Issued 2006-2008
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $432.6 Million of Subprime RMBS

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $476.1MM RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $48.4MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 15 Classes From 6 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Actions on 195 Classes From 106 U.S. RMBS Deals

                            *********

A10 TERM 2013-2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the following Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-1 issued by A10 Term Asset Financing
2013-2, LLC. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

The rating confirmations reflect the continued performance of the
pool. The transaction consists of 16 loans secured by 19
traditional commercial real estate assets, including office,
multifamily, retail and industrial properties. According to the
March 2016 remittance, there has been collateral reduction of 11.3%
since issuance, as two loans have been repaid in full and eight
properties out of an original 11-property portfolio loan have been
re-leased, with proceeds paying down the portfolio loan. The
remaining loans benefit from low leverage on a per-unit basis, with
the weighted-average debt yield based on the most recently reported
net operating income and outstanding trust balance at 9.3%, which
is moderately stable, given the pool consists of stabilizing
assets.

All of the collateral loans were originated by A10 Capital, LLC
(A10). A10 specializes in mini-perm loans, which typically have
two- to five-year terms and are used to finance properties until
they are fully stabilized. The borrowers are typically new equity
sponsors of fairly well-positioned assets within their respective
markets. A10’s initial advance is the senior debt component
typically used for the purchase of a real estate-owned acquisition
or discounted payoff loans. Most loans are structured with
three-year terms and include built-in extensions and future funding
facilities meant to aid in property stabilization, both of which
are at the lender’s sole discretion. Two loans have experienced
partial principal repayment totaling approximately $1.9 million,
with proceeds being used to fund the reserve account, which may be
used to provide future funding to individual borrowers. The reserve
account has a current balance of $8.5 million against total
potential future funding obligations of $21.6 million. According to
the most recent reporting, a portion of the collateral assets in
the subject pool have reached stabilization; however, others
continue to perform below the respective stabilization plans.

The transaction is concentrated, as the largest loan in the
transaction represents 14.2% of the current pool balance based on
the fully funded loan amount. This loan, Oak Creek, which is
secured by an office building in Milpitas, California, was recently
upsized by an additional $4.4 million over its original fully
funded loan balance of $15.2 million to fund the Tenant
Improvement/Leasing Commission (TI/LC) package of the newest
tenant, Cordis Corporation (Cordis). Cordis, which is wholly owned
by Cardinal Health, signed a 128-month lease for 75.1% of the net
rentable area at $24 per square foot triple net with 3% annual
increases. The lease is guaranteed by Cardinal Health. Cordis will
receive eight months’ free rent and a TI/LC package totaling $8.5
million, which will be funded by a combination of fresh borrower
equity and the aforementioned loan upsize proceeds. The signing
will bring the occupancy rate to 100.0%.

The largest five and ten loans represent 55.2% and 83.5% of the
current pool balance based on their fully funded loan amounts,
respectively. None of the loans in the pool has an initial maturity
date prior to December 1, 2016, and one loan, representing 8.3% of
the current pool balance, has completely drawn down its future
funding facility. Two additional loans, representing 6.6% of the
current pool balance, did not receive future funding components
with their respective financings.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of the Offered Notes other
than the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes, ultimate recovery of Deferred
Collateralized Note Interest Amounts (inclusive of interest payable
thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent permitted by law).
The transaction is a standard sequential pay waterfall.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-2's $220.33
million asset-backed notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 7,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.7%, 47.1%, 39.2%, and
      35.1% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.15x, 1.75x, 1.40x, and 1.25x S&P's 25.50%-
      26.50% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that

      S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.  The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB')
      stress scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes
      would remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary

      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the class

      C and D notes would remain within two rating categories of
      S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA' rated securities and a two-
      rating category downgrade within the first year for 'A'-
      through 'BB'-rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,

      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-2

Class       Rating       Type            Interest           Amount
                                         rate             (mil. $)
A           AA (sf)      Senior          Fixed              128.85
B           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed               39.94
C           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed               34.79
D           BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed               16.75



ARES CLO XXV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Ares XXV CLO Ltd.'s class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes.  Ares XXV
CLO Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
that closed in January 2013 and is managed by Ares CLO Management
XXV LP.

The affirmations follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated March 10,
2016.

The credit quality of the underlying collateral has deteriorated
since the transaction's effective date (Feb. 1, 2013), reflected in
the increase of 'CCC+' rated or lower assets and defaulted assets.
As of the March 2016 trustee report, assets in the portfolio rated
'CCC+' or lower increased to $28.52 million from $9.42 million
according to the February 2013 report.  The amount of defaulted
assets increased to $2.42 million from zero over the same period.
The transaction also exhibits moderate exposure to the energy
sector, with just over 5% of the collateral pool comprising assets
from the oil and gas industry.

Despite the deterioration in credit quality, the transaction has
experienced only a slight drop in credit support to all tranches
since its effective date:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio decreased to 134.17% from 134.77%;
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 120.78% from 121.33%;
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 113.52% from 114.03%; and
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 107.99% from 108.47%.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating (i)  cushion (ii) rating
A      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    14.02%       AAA (sf)
B-1    AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)    12.85%       AA (sf)
B-2    AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)    12.85%       AA (sf)
C      A (sf)               A+ (sf)     6.49%        A (sf)
D      BBB (sf)             BBB+ (sf)   3.00%        BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)              BB (sf)     0.01%        BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario             Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case          15.0                 5.0
Base case equals rating  20.0                 7.5
Above base case          25.0                 10.0

                    Recovery   Correlation   Correlation
        Cash flow   decrease   increase      decrease
        implied     implied    implied       implied     Final
Class   rating      rating     rating        rating      rating
A       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B-1     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
C       A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)       AA (sf)     A (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
E       BB (sf)     B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                        Spread            Recovery
            Cash flow   compression       compression
            implied     implied           implied      Final
Class       rating      rating            rating       rating
A           AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B-1         AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)      AA (sf)
B-2         AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)      AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)    A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)          BB- (sf)     BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)     B+ (sf)           CCC- (sf)    BB (sf)

RATINGS LIST

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares XXV CLO Ltd.
US$567.5 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Class       Rating

A           AAA (sf)
B-1         AA (sf)
B-2         AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


ARES IIIR/IVR: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Feb. 9, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, and E notes and removed S&P's rating on the class E
notes from CreditWatch positive.  Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd. is a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that that closed
in May 2007 and is managed by Ares Management LLC.

The upgrades reflect $210.7 million in paydowns to the class A-1
and A-2 notes since S&P's September 2014 rating actions that have
reduced the class's outstanding balance to 51.4% of its original
balance.  The underlying portfolio's credit quality continues to be
stable; however, the proportion of 'CCC' rated assets increased to
$20.46 million as of the March 3, 2016, trustee report from $12.05
million as of the Aug. 4, 2014, report, which S&P used for its
September 2014 analysis. As of the March 2016 trustee report, the
transaction held $5.65 million defaulted assets, down from $5.93
million as of the August 2014 trustee report.

The trustee reported these increases in overcollateralization
(O/C):

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio is 143.82%, up from 126.53% in
      August 2014;
   -- The class C O/C ratio is 126.01%, up from 116.87%;
   -- The class D O/C ratio is 114.23%, up from 109.87%; and
   -- The class E O/C ratio is 105.36%, up from 104.26%.

S&P upgraded the class D notes to 'A (sf)' even though the cash
flow analysis and supplemental test pointed to 'A+ (sf)' given the
greater 'CCC' exposure and the par losses this deal experienced.

The class E notes pass at at a lower rating level based on S&P's
cash flow analysis; however, given the pace of paydowns and higher
O/C ratios, S&P affirmed the class E notes at 'BB (sf)'.  However,
S&P will continue to monitor the portfolio performance and may take
rating actions if S&P sees any deterioration in credit quality or
further par losses.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd.

                              Cash flow
         Previous             implied    Cash flow    Final
Class    rating               rating(i)  cushion(ii)  rating
A-1      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   27.94%       AAA (sf)
A-2      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   27.94%       AAA (sf)
B        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)   14.26%       AAA (sf)
C        AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)   9.91%        AA+ (sf)
D        BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  A+ (sf)    3.25%        A (sf)
E        BB (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)    4.18%        BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

               RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)    A (sf)
E      B+ (sf)    B (sf)     B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)    BB (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)      A (sf)
E      B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       CC (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE
Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd.  

Class          Rating
           To         From
B          AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C          AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
D          A (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE
Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd.  

Class          Rating
           To         From
E          BB (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Ares IIIR/IVR CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)


ASPEN FUNDING I: Moody's Hikes Class A-2L Notes Rating From Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Aspen Funding I, Ltd.:

  US$12,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Due 2037
  (current outstanding balance of $3,565,542), Upgraded to
  Baa3 (sf); previously on November 10, 2015 Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf)

Aspen Funding I, Ltd., issued in May 2002, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of ABS and RMBS
originated in 2002.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since November 2015. The Class A-2L
notes have paid down by approximately 28.4%, or $1.4 million, since
then. Based on Moody's calculation, the par coverage on the Class
A-2L notes is currently 232.7%, versus 216.2% in November 2015.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since November 2015. Based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 1678, compared to 2390 in November 2015.



BANC OF AMERICA 2006-2: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Certs to CCC-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2006-2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P lowered its rating on one class, affirmed its
ratings on two classes, and discontinued its ratings on two other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-M, A-J, B, and C to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral and available liquidity
support.  The upgrades also reflect the trust balance's significant
reduction.

The downgrade on class E reflects S&P's expectation that the class,
which has carried accumulated interest shortfalls for the past five
consecutive months, will continue to be at risk of experiencing
interest shortfalls in the near term.

According to the March 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current net interest shortfalls totaled $276,672 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $138,780;

   -- Non-recoverable interest totaling $113,267; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $29,261.

The current net interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to
and including class E.

The affirmation on the class D certificates reflects S&P's
expectation that the available credit enhancement will be within
S&P's estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating.  The affirmation also reflects S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity support
available to the classes.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on classes B and C, and positive rating movement on
class D, S&P's analysis also considered these certificates'
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the 11 specially
serviced assets ($145.2 million, 22.7%) and the magnitude of
nondefeased, performing loans (40 loans; $362.5 million, 56.7%)
maturing in the next three months.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XW interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

Finally, S&P discontinued its ratings on classes A-4 and A-1A
following their full repayment as noted on the March 10, 2016,
trustee remittance report.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $639.1 million, which is 23.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 51 loans and four real
estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 160 loans at issuance.  Eleven
of these assets ($145.2 million, 22.7%) are with the special
servicer, four ($20.3 million, 3.2%) are defeased, and 33 ($341.8
million, 53.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. The master
servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported financial
information for 87.9% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 25.5% was year-end 2014 data, and the remainder was
partial-or year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.43x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 76.5% Standard & Poor's weighted average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.96% Standard & Poor's weighted
average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the 11 specially serviced assets ($145.2
million, 22.7%), four defeased loans ($20.3 million, 3.2%), and two
loans ($76.9 million, 12.0%) that, according to the master
servicer, have been repaid in full after the release of the March
2016 remittance report.  As of the March 016 remittance report, the
top 10 nondefeased assets had an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $381.6 million (59.7%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.32x and 81.7%, respectively, for five of the top 10
nondefeased assetss.  Three of the remaining assets are specially
serviced and discussed below, and two other loans, which had been
on the master servicer's watchlist, have repaid since the March 10,
2016, trustee remittance.

To date, the transaction has experienced $127.3 million in
principal losses, or 4.7% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 6.5% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the 11 ($145.2 million, 22.7%) specially serviced assets.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, 11 assets
($145.2 million, 22.7%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Torchlight Loan Services, LLC (Torchlight).  Details of the three
largest specially serviced assets, each of which is a top 10
nondefeased asset, are:

   -- The Belk Headquarters loan ($34.6 million, 5.4%) is the
      fifth-largest nondefeased asset in the pool and the largest
      asset with the special servicer, with a reported exposure of

      $35.0 million.  The asset is an office property totaling
      293,059 sq. ft. located in Charlotte, N.C.  According to the

      special servicer, the loan has since been repaid in full,
      with minimal losses expected, due to fees associated with
      the loan's resolution.

   -- The Wichita Retail Portfolio loan ($24.1 million, 3.8%) is
      the seventh-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and has a
      total reported exposure of $27.9 million.  The loan is
      secured by three retail properties totaling 360,942 sq. ft.
      in Wichita, Kan.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on July 10, 2014, due to monetary default.
      Torchlight stated that it is pursuing foreclosure.  Recent
      financial performance information was not available for the
      asset.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $7.7 million
      is in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss

      upon this loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The Doubletree Hotel-Palm Beach Gardens loan ($21.5 million,

      3.4%) is the eighth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and

      has a total reported exposure of $29.7 million.  The loan is

      secured by a 279-unit lodging property in Palm Beach
      Gardens, Fla.  The loan was transferred to the special
      servicer on June 20, 2014, and become REO Oct. 8, 2015.
      Torchlight indicated that negotiations are underway for a
      potential sale.  Recent financial performance information
      was not available for the asset.  The asset has been deemed
      non-recoverable by the master servicer.  S&P expects a
      moderate loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

The eight remaining assets with the special servicer have
individual balances that each represents less than 2.1% of the
total pool trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the 11
specially serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss
severity of 32.5%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

                                  Rating             Rating
Class       Identifier            To                 From
A-4         05950EAE8             NR                 AAA (sf)
A-1A        05950EAF5             NR                 AAA (sf)
A-M         05950EAG3             AAA (sf)           AA- (sf)
A-J         05950EAH1             AA+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)
B           05950EAJ7             A+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
C           05950EAK4             BBB- (sf)          BB (sf)
D           05950EAM0             B+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
E           05950EAN8             CCC- (sf)          B (sf)
XW          05950EAL2             AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated


BAYVIEW FINANCIAL 2004-SSR1: Moody's Ups Cl. M Debt Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class M issued
by Bayview Financial Asset Trust 2004-SSR1.

The resecuritization is backed by several securities, which in turn
are backed by residential mortgage loans, small balance commercial,
multifamily and mixed use loans, and SBA Assistance loans.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Asset Trust 2004-SSR1

  Cl. M Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov. 13, 2009,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade is due to increasing expected recoveries on the
bond, due to the credit enhancement from the reserve fund,
overcollateralization, and excess spread.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014 and "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5% in March 2016 from 5.5% in March
2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers on the underlying transactions or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

                  http://is.gd/Qv8pXD


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 LLC's
$368.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 7,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable to the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's

      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.3439% to 12.5332%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment O/C test, a failure of which
      would lead to the reclassification of a certain amount of
      excess interest proceeds that are available (before paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      management fees, hedge payments, supplemental reserve
      account deposits, collateral manager incentive fees, and
      subordinated note payments) as principal proceeds during the

      reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 LLC

                        Prelim.         Prelim. amount
Class                   rating                (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)                248.00
B                       AA (sf)                  56.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                   28.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                 17.60
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                 18.40
Subordinated notes      NR                       30.95

NR--Not rated.



BOCA HOTEL 2013-BOCA: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Boca
Hotel Portfolio Trust 2013-BOCA, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on three other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificate classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the two
remaining full-service hotel properties totaling 1,431 rooms and
two marinas in southern Florida, which secure the $302.1 million,
interest-only (IO) floating-rate mortgage loan that back this
stand-alone transaction.  S&P also considered the deal structure
and liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings also reflect the reduced trust balance and S&P's
expectation of the credit enhancement available to the classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its estimates of credit
enhancement necessary at the most recent rating levels and our view
of the current and future performance of the remaining
transaction's collateral.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings and S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest rated reference
classes.  The notional balances on class X-EXT reference classes A,
B, C, D, and E.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging properties and marinas that
secure the mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the
steady servicer-reported net operating income (NOI), average daily
rate, occupancy, and revenue per available room (RevPAR) for each
property for the past six years.  S&P derived its overall
sustainable NCF, which we divided by an 8.84% weighted average
capitalization rate, to determine S&P's expected-case value.  This
yielded an overall Standard & Poor's loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 70.2% and 1.51x, respectively, on the
trust balance.

As of the March 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $302.1 million,
down from $425.0 million at issuance.  At issuance, the loan was
originally secured by four full-service lodging properties totaling
1,852 rooms and three marinas in southern Florida, of which two
hotels and one marina were subsequently released in 2013 or 2014.

The loan pays interest rate at LIBOR plus various spreads.  The
spread on $89.6 million of the trust principal balance is currently
2.4420% (will increase to 2.6920% after the second loan extension
term), and it is 4.1248% (will increase to 4.3748% after the second
loan extension term) on the remaining $212.5 million trust balance.
In addition, the equity interest in the borrower of the whole loan
secures $261.7 million in mezzanine debt, down from $370.0 million
at issuance.  The loan matures on Aug. 9, 2016, (initially matured
on Aug. 9, 2015,), and has two one-year extension options remaining
(final maturity is Aug. 9, 2018,). According to the transaction
documents, the borrowers will pay the special servicing, work-out,
and liquidation fees, as well as costs and expenses incurred from
appraisals and inspections conducted by the special servicer.  To
date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012,
2011, and 2010 and the most recent Smith Travel Research reports
provided by the master servicer to determine our opinion of a
sustainable cash flow for the collateral property.  The master
servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported an overall DSC of 1.49x
on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014. Midland
indicated that the borrower has listed both properties for sale.

RATINGS LIST

Boca Hotel Portfolio Trust 2013-BOCA
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-BOCA
                                   Rating
Class             Identifier       To                  From
A                 096821AA1        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
X-EXT             096821AE3        BB (sf)             BB (sf)
B                 096821AG8        AAA (sf)            AA- (sf)
C                 096821AJ2        AA (sf)             A (sf)
D                 096821AL7        BBB (sf)            BBB- (sf)
E                 096821AN3        BB (sf)             BB (sf)



BUSINESS LOAN 2001-2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. M Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these series of Business Loan Express
SBA Loan-Backed Adjustable-Rate Notes, series 2001-2 (2001-2) and
series 2002-1 (2002-1); with a Stable Outlook as shown:

Series 2001-2
   -- Class A at 'CCsf', RE 100%;
   -- Class M at 'Csf', RE 100%.

Series 2002-1
   -- Class A at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

BLX 2001-2's affirmation for class A and M reflects the recent
stable performance of the transaction as credit enhancement (CE)
has built for class A and M notes.  However, the transaction
remains under-collateralized and late-stage delinquencies remain
elevated.  For these reasons, default is considered a real
possibility.  Class A and M notes are expected to have a 100%
recovery of current note balance.

BLX 2002-1's affirmation for class A and M reflects the increased
CE available, as the reserve balance has increased since last
review.  Fitch maintains the Stable Outlook as the CE is expected
to provide sufficient protection from losses and future obligor
concentrations.

                            METHODOLOGY

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in our 'Global Structured Finance Rating
Criteria', issued July 2015, including asset quality, CE, financial
structure, legal structure, and originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis focused on concentration risks within the pool, by
evaluating the impact of the default of the largest performing
obligors.  The obligor concentration analysis is consistent with
Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating U.S. Equipment Lease and Loan ABS',
dated Dec 2015.  The analysis compares expected loss coverage
relative to the default of a certain number of the largest
obligors.  The required net obligor coverage varies by rating
category.  The required number of obligors covered ranges from 20
at 'AAA' to five at 'B'.  Fitch applied loss and recovery
expectations based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance to the largest performing obligors commensurate with
the individual rating category.  The expected loss assumption was
then compared to the modeled loss coverage available to the
outstanding notes given Fitch's expected losses on the currently
delinquent loans.  Fitch also applied the 'Criteria for Rating Caps
and Limitations in Global Structured Finance Transactions' dated
May 2014 in determining the ratings.

Additionally, Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, focusing on delinquent and defaulted loans within
the pool.  All loans over 60 days delinquent were deemed defaulted
loans.  The defaulted loans were applied loss and recovery
expectations based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance to establish an expected net loss assumption for the
transaction.  Fitch stressed the cash flow generated by the
underlying assets by applying its expected net loss assumption.
Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to evaluate break-even
cash flow runs to determine the level of expected cumulative losses
the structure can withstand at a given rating level.  The loss
multiplier scale used is consistent with that of other commercial
ABS transactions.

While the obligor concentration approach was the primary driver,
its results were compared to the stressed loss approach and
qualitative factors such as the results of these approaches
compared to prior reviews, recent performance, and available CE.
The rating actions taken were ultimately the result of a
combination of these factors.  Fitch will continue to closely
monitor these transactions and may take additional rating action in
the event of changes in performance and CE measures.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected losses and impact available loss coverage and obligor
coverage.  Lower loss coverage could impact ratings and Rating
Outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.
Should performance significantly deteriorate, the decline in loss
coverage could negatively impact current ratings.



CAJUN GLOBAL 2011-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two classes
of notes issued in the Cajun Global, LLC, whole-business
securitization.  The transaction is backed by most existing and
future revenue-generating assets of Church's Holdings Corporation.
Church's is the owner and operator of quick-service restaurants
under the brand names of Church's Chicken and Texas Chicken, which
operate in the U.S. and internationally.  Specific collateral
assets include intellectual property assets, franchise and
development agreements, profits from company-owned restaurants,
real estate assets and rental income.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Cajun Global LLC, Series 2011-1

  Cl. A-1 Senior Secured Revolving Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);
   previously on Jan. 14, 2016, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade

  Cl. A-2 Senior Secured Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously

   on Jan. 14, 2016, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Downgrade

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades were prompted by weaker than expected net cash flows
to the transaction.  Net cash flow deteriorated in 2015 owing to a
decline in profit margins for the transaction's company-owned
restaurants, as well as a decline in the number of restaurants that
resulted in a decline in royalties that the domestic franchises
generate.

Since Moody's last downgrade action on the transaction in September
2014, the number of restaurants in the transaction has decreased by
a total of 80 restaurants.  The number of domestic franchised
restaurants has fallen to 870 from 939, the number of contributed
company-owned restaurants has declined to 226 from 236, and the
number of international franchises has decreased by one to 493.
The drop in total number of domestic restaurants is the result of
the company and franchisees closing unprofitable locations.
Royalties from domestic franchised restaurants declined to $29.5mm
in 2015 from $31.4mm in 2014, in large part as a result of the
declining number of restaurants.  Domestic franchised restaurants
contributed around 47% of the transaction's revenue on average over
the past three years.  Although the number of international
restaurants has generally been growing, the slight net decline in
international restaurants was driven in part by the closing of all
locations in Russia.

Cajun's cash flows from contributed company-owned restaurants have
also worsened since September 2014, largely as a result of higher
costs for the company-owned restaurants, which has resulted in
these restaurants generating lower profits.  Although revenues from
contributed company-owned restaurants held steady at $203.5mm in
2015 versus $202.7mm in 2014, cash flow to the securitization from
the royalties and profits of company-owned restaurants decreased to
$11.0mm in 2015 from $15.7mm in 2014.  This decline was driven by a
compression in profit margins before royalty expenses, to 5.4% from
7.8%.  Cajun's costs rose in 2015 largely as a result of increases
in poultry prices.  Meanwhile, the company increased promotions as
it faced heavy discounting from other quick-service restaurants
such as KFC.  The company expects its poultry expenses to decline
going forward, which will alleviate some pressure on profit
margins.  Margin compression had an outsized effect on the
transaction, because although company-owned restaurants comprised
approximately 14% of the total restaurants in the transaction in
both 2014 and 2015, cash flows from contributed company-owned
restaurants comprised only 17% of retained collections in 2015,
down from 22% in 2014.  Another concern is that same-store sales
growth for company-owned restaurants was negative for the last
three quarters of 2015 after increasing during the second half of
2014 and the first quarter of 2015.

As a result of the above performance trends, trailing 52-week net
cash flow declined to $35.2mm (of which $0.8mm was an equity
contribution) for the quarter ended Dec. 27, 2015, from $40.5mm for
the quarter ended July 13, 2014.  As a result, the debt service
coverage ratio (the ratio of the last four quarters' net cash flow
to the required interest and principal payments for the last four
quarters) declined to 1.54x for the quarter ended
Dec. 28, 2015, down from 1.84x as of the last downgrade action.  A
$1mm increase from 2014 to 2015 in the annual scheduled principal
amortization for the Class A-2 notes also affected this trend.  The
current DSCR level is just above the trigger level for cash
trapping of 1.50x.  Additionally, the transaction's leverage ratio
(the ratio of total outstanding debt plus amounts available under
the Class A-1 notes to annualized net cash flow) has increased
significantly over the past year as a result of the decline in cash
flows.

                         RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Operating Company Securitizations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up
Improvements in collections and net cash flows, leading to
decreases in leverage and increases in the debt service coverage
ratio.

Down
Further reductions in collections and net cash flows, leading to
increases in leverage and declines in the debt service coverage
ratio.



CD 2006-CD2: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in CD 2006-CD2 Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 61% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 41.0% of the
current balance, compared to 16.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.3% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $306 million
from $3.06 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 21 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 82% of
the pool.

Two loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $357.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%). Fifteen loans, constituting 81% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Harrisburg Portfolio ($49.6 million -- 16.2% of the pool),
which is secured by 13 office buildings totaling 554,547 square
feet (SF) within three business parks in Harrisburg and
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2012 due to imminent default and became REO
in March 2014. The loan was originally secured by 16 properties,
however, three properties (totaling 117,212 SF) were sold and the
proceeds were applied to the loan balance as well as outstanding
fees and advances. The remaining portfolio was 58% leased as of
January 2016. The master servicer has recognized a $21.7 million
appraisal reduction on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Riverview Square
Loan ($40.4 million -- 13.2% of the pool), which is secured by two
suburban office buildings located in East Hartford, Connecticut.
The loan transferred to special servicing effective June 10, 2015.
Occupancy declined to 37% as of October 2015 and is expected to
decline to 35% at the end of July 2016 when another tenant
vacates.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Canyon Corporate
Plaza Loan ($28.2 million -- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by
two suburban office buildings located in Phoenix, Arizona. The loan
transferred to special servicing effective December 16, 2016 after
a maturity default. The property is 95% occupied per the special
servicer commentary as of March 2016.

The remaining 12 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $125.0 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 81% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 99%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 9808 and 9868 Scranton Road Loan, formerly
known as the Conexant Building Loan ($27.3 million -- 8.9% of the
pool), which is secured by two four-story buildings located about
15 miles north of San Diego. The property was originally fully
leased to Conexant Systems through 2017, but the tenant defaulted
on their lease and sub-leased to two tenants. In May 2015, a new
lease was executed with MCI, an affiliate of Verizon Wireless. The
property was 55% leased as of January 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.13X, respectively, the same as at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Shelton Pointe Loan ($12.6 million
-- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by an office property
located in Shelton, Connecticut, roughly 15 miles west of New
Haven, Connecticut. The property was 93% leased as of September
2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.43X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Eastgate Business Center Loan ($7.2
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by an industrial
property located approximately 10 miles north of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.08X at the last review.


COMM MORTGAGE 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in COMM Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE1 as:

  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015, Affirmed

   Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015, Affirmed
   A2 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 23 at Moody's last review.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to $850.2 million
from $933 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 50 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 53% of
the pool.  No loans have investment-grade structured credit
assessments.  Two loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool, and there are no loans
in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 96% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 82%, compared to
84% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.71X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared 1.70X and 1.29X at the last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool.  The largest
conduit loan is the Crossgates Mall Loan ($113.6 million -- 13.4%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $283.9
million loan.  The loan is secured by a two-story, 1.3 million
square foot (SF) super regional mall located in Albany, New York.
The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods,
Best Buy and Regal Crossgates.  The property was 90% leased as of
December 2015 compared to 91% leased as of June 2014.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 90%
and 1.00X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Creekside Plaza Loan ($55.0
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by 228,000 SF Class
A three-building office complex and an above-ground parking
structure located in San Leandro, California.  As of December 2015,
the property was 100% leased, the same as last review and
securitization.  Performance has improved since last review due to
revenue growth.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall Loan
($52.2 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $145.5 million loan.  The loan is secured by a
636,000 SF (1.3 million SF total) super regional mall located in
Grandville, Michigan.  The mall is anchored by Macy's, Younkers,
Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods and Celebration
Cinemas.  The property was 98% leased as of December 2015, compared
to 93% in December 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and
1.34X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.24X at last review.


CPS AUTO 2016-B: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-B's $332.69 million asset-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 7,
2015.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 55.3%, 46.8%, 35.9%,
      28.6%, and 24.4% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of approximately 3.20x, 2.55x,
      1.95x, 1.55x, and 1.27x our 17.00%-18.00% expected
      cumulative net loss (CNL) range for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively.

   -- S&P's expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.60x its expected net loss level, the preliminary ratings
      on the class A and B notes will not decline by more than one

      rating category during the first year, and the preliminary
      ratings on the class C through E notes will not decline by
      more than two rating categories during the first year, all
      else being equal, which is consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria.

   -- The preliminary rated notes' underlying credit enhancement
      in the form of subordination, overcollateralization (O/C), a

      reserve account, and excess spread for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes under S&P's stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, which S&P believes are appropriate for
      the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-B

Class    Rating       Type          Interest     Prelim amt
                                    rate           (mil. $)
A        AAA (sf)     Senior        Fixed            162.86
B        AA- (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             53.72
C        A- (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed             56.27
D        BBB- (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed             35.02
E        BB- (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             24.82


CREDIT SUISSE 2003-C5: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms six distressed classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2003-C5.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the distressed ratings are due to continued
concerns with potential losses, most of which are a result of
potential occupancy issues with the largest loan in the pool
(72.6%).  As the pool is concentrated with only six loans
remaining, Fitch used a deterministic stress scenario in its
analysis.

As of the March 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.6% (including 2.5% of
realized losses) to $17.4 million from $1.261 billion at issuance.
Cumulative interest shortfalls in the amount of $4.8 million are
currently affecting classes P through K.

Of the original 155 loans, six remain, one of which (7.8%) is in
special servicing.  The non-specially serviced loans have maturity
dates in 2017 (72.6%), 2018 (11.6%), 2021 (3.2%), and 2023 (4.9%).
Three loans (16.5%) are fully amortizing, and none of the remaining
loans are defeased.

The largest loan in the pool, Ravine Development (72.2%), is
collateralized by a 154,776 square foot (sf) suburban office
building, located in Hanover Township, a suburb 15 miles northwest
of Newark, NJ.  The subject is fully occupied by Metropolitan Life
Insurance with a scheduled lease expiration date in October 2016.
The loan matures in January 2017.  In January 2015, Metropolitan
Life Insurance announced that a new 250,000-sf campus would be
built in close proximity to this location and employees relocated
upon completion of construction.  The sponsor is currently
marketing the building to new prospective tenants and indicates
that space will be available in the third quarter of 2017.  Fitch
will continue to monitor the leasing progress, construction
timeline for the new building and Metropolitan Life's exit strategy
for the subject.  Fitch's deterministic stress assumed a valuation
based on a potentially vacant building and recent comparable sales
transactions in the market.

The specially serviced loan is Waynesburg Centre (6.7%), a
44,688-sf retail center located 11 miles southeast of Canton, Ohio.
The property currently lists five suites comprising of 77% of the
net rentable area (NRA) as vacant.  The special servicer determined
that title defect exists that prevents an orderly disposition of
the subject.  Legal counsel is engaged, and efforts are underway to
resolve the outstanding issue through a judicial ruling.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch analysis employed a deterministic scenario to reflect the
pool's exposure to single event risk associated with the largest
loan in the pool as well as significant concentration with only six
loans remaining.  Further upgrades are unlikely as the potential
for future performance volatility of the concentrated pool warrants
a cap on ratings of the remaining classes.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $6.9 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE100%;
   -- $6.3 million class K at 'CCsf'; RE80%;
   -- $4.2 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
   -- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
   -- $0 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and, H have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P.  Classes A-SP and
A-X are previously withdrawn.



CSAIL 2016-C5: Fitch Assigns B- Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
CSAIL 2016-C5 Commercial Mortgage Trust pass-through certificates:

   -- $28,557,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $121,570,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19,780,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $170,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $267,448,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48,139,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67,891,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $723,385,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $51,503,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $51,503,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,139,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,821,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46,821,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,410,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,410,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,365,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,365,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Feb. 8, 2016.  Fitch does not rate the $39,797,933 class NR and
class X-NR certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 59 loans secured by 241
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $936.4 million as of the cutoff date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Column Financial, Inc., Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC, The Bank of New York Mellon, Silverpeak Real Estate
Finance LLC, and Jeffries LoanCore LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 70.9% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 79.7%, and asset summary reviews on
79.7% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Additional Debt: There are five loans representing 21.8% of the
pool with subordinate debt.  This is higher than the 2014 average
of 10.4% and the 2015 average of 9.1% for similar Fitch-rated
fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The largest loan in the pool,
GLP Portfolio Pool A (9.3%), received a credit opinion of 'Asf' on
a stand-alone basis.  The loan is secured by 114 industrial
properties across nine states in 11 markets.  The sponsor is Global
Logistics Properties, Ltd, which is currently rated 'BBB+' by
Fitch.

Fitch Leverage: The pool has a Fitch DSCR of 1.19x, which is above
the 2015 average DSCR of 1.18x, and a Fitch LTV of 106.1%, which is
below the 2015 average LTV of 109.3%.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest concentration by
property type is multifamily at 25.8%, followed by industrial
properties at 21.5%.  Hotels make up 21.2% of the pool.  The
industrial concentration is above the 2015 average of 4.2%.
Additionally, the hotel concentration is above the 2015 average of
17% for other Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

Pool Concentration: The pool has a higher loan concentration index
compared to other recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions.  The top 10 loans represent 53.3% of the pool, which
is higher than the 2015 average top 10 concentration of 49.3%.  The
pool's loan concentration index (LCI) of 414 is higher than the
2015 average LCI of 367.

Low Mortgage Coupons: The pool's weighted average mortgage coupon
is 4.55%, well below historical averages, but higher than the 2015
average of 4.45%.  Fitch accounted for increased refinance risk in
a higher interest rate environment by analyzing sensitivity to
increased interest rates.

Amortization: Five loans representing 27.5% of the pool are
interest-only, which is higher than the 2015 average of 23.3% for
other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions.  There are 32 loans,
representing 49.6% of the pool, that are partial interest-only.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is expected to
pay down by 8.8%.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSAIL
2015-C5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10-11.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from KPMG LLP.
The due diligence focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the 59 mortgage
loans.  Fitch considered this information in its analysis and the
findings did not have an impact on our analysis.



CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C3: Moody's Hikes Cl. B Debt Rating to Ba1(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes,
upgraded the ratings on two classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes C, D, E and F were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-J and B were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 72% since Moody's
last review.

The rating on the IO Class A-X was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

The rating on the IO class A-Y was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced loans (residential cooperatives).

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 31.3% of the
current balance, compared to 10.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72.1% to $95 million
from $1.63 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 78% of
the pool. Eleven loans, constituting 35.6% of the pool, are secured
by residential co-ops located primarily New York City. These co-op
loans have structured credit assessments of aaa (sca.pd).

Four loans, constituting 15.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss to
the trust, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $99 million
(for an average loss severity of 41%). Ten loans, constituting 58%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Tri-Pointe Plaza loan ($13 million
-- 14.5% of the pool), which is secured by six office buildings
totaling 152,000 square feet (SF). The loan transferred to special
servicing in July 2012 and became real estate owned (REO) in July
2013. The property failed to sell at auction in May 2014 and is not
currently listed for sale.

The remaining nine specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $28.2 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (58% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 96% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 65% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90%, compared to 83%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.99X and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 9.6% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Foxcroft Mobile Home Community Loan ($4.8
million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a manufactured
housing community in Loch Sheldrake in the Sullivan Country
Catskills, NY. The loan is currently on the watchlist due to its
DSCR being below the 1.10x threshold. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 107.5% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 78.7% and 1.3X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Fishers Gateway Shops Loan ($3.2
million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by an unanchored
retail property in Fishers, IN, approximately 20 miles outside of
Indianapolis. The property is currently fully occupied, the same as
at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75.6% and
1.39X, respectively, compared to 78.6% and 1.33X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the 750 New York Avenue Loan ($ 735
thousand -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured by a single-tenant
Duane Reade pharmacy in the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn,
NY. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.44X, respectively,
compared to 64% and 1.64X at the last review.



DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings on two classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-LC2 issued by DBUBS
2011-LC2 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C to AA (low) (sf) from A (high) (sf)

In addition, the following ratings were confirmed:

-- Classes A-1, A-1FL, A-1C, A-2, A-3FL, A-3C, A-4, X-A and X-B
    at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Classes F and FX at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

These rating actions are a reflection of the continued healthy
performance of the transaction, as well as the paydown since
issuance and the defeasance of six loans, which represent 6.0% of
the transaction balance. As of the March 2016 remittance, there has
been collateral reduction of 16.3%, with nine loans fully repaid
and an additional nine loans, representing 15.6% of the pool,
scheduled to mature within the next six months. Those nine loans
are have a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.69 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 12.1%, indicating a
healthy refinance profile overall.

The pool has performed as expected since issuance, with a WA DSCR
of 1.60x and WA debt yield of 11.6% as compared with the issuance
figures of 1.60x and 10.6%, respectively. The largest 14
non-defeased loans in the pool represent 69.1% of the pool balance
and have shown WA net cash flow (NCF) growth over the DBRS
underwritten figures of +14.5%, with a WA DSCR of 1.53x. The
largest three loans in the pool represent 33.4% of the transaction
balance with a WA DSCR of 1.57x and a WA NCF growth of +18.9% over
the DBRS underwritten figures. As of the March 2016 remittance,
there are 11 loans on the servicer’s watchlist (14.9% of the pool
balance) and one loan, Prospectus ID #43, Montgomery Village (0.50%
of the pool balance), in special servicing. The bulk of the loans
on the watchlist are being monitored for upcoming maturity. The
specially serviced loan is detailed below.

The Montgomery Village loan is secured by a medical office complex
containing eight two-story buildings constructed between 1971 and
1980, located in Gaithersburg, Maryland, approximately 15 miles
northwest of Bethesda. The loan resulted in a relatively sizable
cash out to the borrower, who had owned the property since 1991, of
$2.8 million at closing. At issuance, the issuer noted 87.0% of the
leased net rentable area (NRA) had been the property for over ten
years, with an average lease term including renewals of 19.5 years
and only one new tenant at the property since 2003. Property cash
flows dropped sharply in 2013 following an occupancy decline to 48%
from 90% at issuance. As a result, the YE2013, YE2014 and Q2 2015
DSCR figures were 0.71x, 0.42x and 0.05x, respectively, with the
February 2016 rent roll showing a physical occupancy rate of 24.0%
(one dark tenant with 2.5% of the NRA on a lease through February
29, 2016). Near-term rollover is high, with nearly all remaining
tenants scheduled to roll within the next 18 months.

The loan transferred to the special servicer in May 2014 when the
borrower stopped making payments on the loan. Initial workout
options included the borrower’s request for a modification, but
those talks fell through and the property was foreclosed in March
2015 and became REO as of April 2015. The first appraisal ordered
by the special servicer was dated June 2014 and valued the property
at $7.0 million ($97 psf), and the most recent appraisal, dated
November 2015, valued the property at $7.5 million ($104 psf).
According to the February 2015 and November 2015 site inspection
reports, the property is in deteriorating condition, rated a
“4” on the MBA scale at both visits, with significant exterior
deferred maintenance noted. The biggest concern is the structural
deterioration in the elevated walkways, for which an engineer was
engaged to assess and determine necessary repairs. The November
visit found the affected areas appropriately sealed off, with
repairs underway and temporary walkways safely in place for use
during the repair project. The estimated cost for the work to
address all issues is north of $1.0 million. Given the
deteriorating physical condition and financial position of the
property over the past year, DBRS assumed a loss based on a
significant haircut to the most recent appraised value, resulting
in a modeled loss severity in excess of 65.0%.



FANNIE MAE: Fitch to Rate Class 1M-2A Exchangeable Notes 'BB+sf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03:

-- $157,758,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $123,953,000 class 1M-2B exchangeable notes 'B+'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $180,295,000 class 1M-2 notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $56,342,000 class 1M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $241,218,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2A exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $325,645,000 class 2M-2B exchangeable notes 'B'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $482,437,000 class 2M-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2F exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $156,792,000 class 2M-2I exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $11,387,071,699 class 1A-H reference tranche;
-- $8,303,462 class 1M-1H reference tranche;
-- $2,965,665 class 1M-AH reference tranche;
-- $6,523,863 class 1M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 1B notes;
-- $73,615,331 class 1B-H reference tranche;
-- $24,375,769,743 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $12,696,268 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $8,252,274 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $17,139,262 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $45,000,000 class 2B notes;
-- $208,914,269 class 2B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 2.60%
subordination provided by the 1.60% class 1M-2 note and the 1.00%
1B note, and their corresponding reference tranches. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 2M-1 note reflects the 3.00% subordination provided
by the 2.00% class 2M-2 note and the 1.00% 2B note, and their
corresponding reference tranches. The notes are general senior
unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA', Outlook Stable)
subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of
certain residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie
Mae-guaranteed MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will be divided into two loan
groups. Group 1 will consist of mortgage loans with loan-to-values
(LTVs) greater than 60% and less than or equal to 80% while group 2
will consist of mortgage loans with LTVs greater than 80% and less
than or equal to 97%. While each loan group has its own issued
notes, each group's structure will be identical. There will be no
cross-collateralization.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2016-C03 (CAS 2016-C03) is
Fannie Mae's 12th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 - 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk transfer
transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $37.25 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Because of the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1 and
M-2 notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the
mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available
through subordination; and Fannie Mae's Issuer Default Rating. The
notes will be issued as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will
carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

In February 2016, Fitch released an exposure draft criteria report,
which incorporates several proposed enhancements to its 'U.S. RMBS
Loan Loss Model Criteria,' dated August 2015. The changes are
detailed in the report titled 'Exposure Draft: U.S. RMBS Loan Loss
Model Criteria' available on Fitch's website at
www.fitchratings.com. Although the credit risk profile of this
reference pool is consistent with the previous transaction, the
exposure draft model estimated modestly lower expected losses as a
result of the model updates for group 1 and modestly higher
expected losses for Group 2. The bonds for this transaction were
analyzed with both criteria approaches, with a greater weight on
the exposure draft model results. The difference in ratings for
this transaction using the two separate models is less than one
rating notch.

There was one variation from criteria related to an
outside-the-model amortization credit that was applied. Fitch feels
the credit is more consistent with historical observations as well
as with Fitch's loss timing curve. The amortization credit is
consistent with Fitch's mid-loaded loss-timing curve with benchmark
prepayments. The difference in ratings for this transaction is less
than one rating notch. While this credit was applied outside of the
model for this transaction, Fitch expects to incorporate the
amortization credit in its 'US RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria' for
future transactions, subject to the review and approval by a
criteria review committee.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pools consist of high-quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from March through June 2015. The Group 1 reference pool
will consist of loans with LTVs greater than 60% and less than or
equal to 80%, and Group 2 will consist of loans with LTVs greater
than 80% and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference
pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent CAS
transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis
mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's fourth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in Group 2 are covered either by borrower
paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender paid MI (LPMI). Fannie Mae
will be guaranteeing the MI coverage amount, which will typically
be the MI coverage percentage multiplied by the sum of the unpaid
principal balance as of the date of the default, up to 36 months of
delinquent interest, taxes and maintenance expenses. While the
Fannie Mae guarantee allows for credit to be given to MI, Fitch
applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI available due to the
automatic termination provision as required by the Homeowners
Protection Act when the loan balance is first scheduled to reach
78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 1M-1, 1M-2, 1B, 2M-1, 2M-2
and 2B notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus,
any credit or modification events on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. In addition, credit or modification events that occur
prior to maturity with losses realized from liquidations or
modifications that occur after the final maturity date will not be
passed through to the noteholders. This feature more closely aligns
the risk of loss to that of the 10-year, fixed LS CAS deals where
losses were passed through at the time a credit event occurred -
i.e. loans became 180 days delinquent with no consideration for
liquidation timelines. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year hard
maturity in its default analysis and applied a reduction to its
lifetime default expectations.

Seller Insolvency Risk Addressed (Positive): An enhancement was
made with regards to insolvency risk. A loan will be removed from
the reference pool if a lender has declared bankruptcy or has been
put into receivership and, per the QC process, an eligibility
defect is identified that could otherwise have resulted in a
repurchase. In earlier CAS deals, if a lender declared bankruptcy
or was placed into receivership prior to a repurchase request made
by Fannie Mae for a breach of a rep and warranty, the loan would
not be removed from its related reference pool or treated as a
credit event reversal if it became 180 days past due. This
enhancement reduces the loss exposure arising from MI claim
rescissions due to underwriting breaches by insolvent sellers.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
first transaction in which Fitch received third party due diligence
on a loan production basis, as opposed to a transaction specific
review. Fitch believes that regular, periodic third-party reviews
(TPRs) conducted on a loan production basis are sufficient for
validating Fannie Mae's quality control processes. The sample
selection was limited to a population of 6,333 loans that were
previously reviewed as part Fannie Mae's post-purchase quality
control (QC) review and met the reference pool's eligibility
criteria. 1,998 loans of those loans were selected for a full
review (credit, property valuation and compliance) by a third-party
due diligence provider. Of the 1,998 loans, 608 were part of this
transaction's reference pool (230 in Group 1 and 378 in Group 2).
Fitch views the results of the due diligence review as consistent
with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above average aggregator; as a
result no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss expectations based
on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The payment priority of
M-1 notes will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro-rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 notes can receive a full pro-rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately, as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained and the delinquency test is satisfied.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2 and B classes in each group will not receive any
scheduled or unscheduled allocations until their M-1 classes are
paid in full. The B classes will not receive any scheduled or
unscheduled principal allocations until the M-2 classes are paid in
full.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the A-H senior reference tranches, which have an initial
loss protection of 4.00% in Group 1 and 4.00% in Group 2, as well
as the first loss B-H reference tranches, sized at 100 basis points
(bps) for each group. Fannie Mae is also retaining an approximately
5% vertical slice/interest in the M-1 and M-2 tranches for Group 1
and 2, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MDVs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 23% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 16.7% at the 'B+sf'
level for Group 1 and 22.1% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 14.2% at the
'Bsf' level for Group 2. The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 32% would potentially reduce the
Group 1 'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively. And additional
MVDs of 11%, 11% and 33% would potentially reduce the Group 2
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance reviews,
desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Adfitech examined
selected loan files with respect to the presence or absence of
relevant documents. Fitch received certifications indicating that
the loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with
Fitch's published standards. The certifications also stated that
the company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


GE BUSINESS 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. D Notes to 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these rating actions on GE Business Loan Trusts
as listed below:

Series 2004-2
   -- Class A affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- Class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
   -- Class D affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;

Series 2005-1
   -- Class A-3 downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'B+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- Class C downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- Class D downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%

Series 2005-2
   -- Class A affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- Class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative.
   -- Class D affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

Series 2006-1
   -- Class A downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class C downgraded to 'B+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class D downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

Series 2006-2
   -- Class A affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class B affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Class D affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the notes in 2004-2, 2005-2, and 2006-2 reflect
the stable performance across the transactions and improved Credit
Enhancement (CE) levels.  While obligor concentrations remain a
concern within these transactions, the concentrations haven't
shifted materially since last review and remain consistent with
those expected for their respective ratings.

The downgrades in 2005-1 reflect recent defaults which have
substantially reduced the spread account exposing the notes to the
current delinquencies.  The expected charge-off of two large loans
will have a material impact on CE levels.  After charge-off,
available CE will not be able to support the loss coverage and
obligor coverage levels.  While recoveries on these loans and
previously defaulted loans would provide some additional support,
the timing and size of these recoveries is uncertain.  Class D
recovery estimate is 100%.

The downgrades of 2006-1 reflect the growing obligor concentrations
of the classes.  The downgrades for 2006-1 reflect growing obligor
concentrations.  While the transaction performance has remained
stable, obligor concentrations has increased and have outpace CE
growth over the last year.

The Negative Outlooks, (excluding 2004-2) designation on the trusts
reflects Fitch's concern with growing obligor concentrations as the
transactions continue to amortize.  As the number of obligors
decline, the risk exposure increases for a single obligor default
within the pools further limiting the outstanding credit support's
ability to sustain the default of a large obligor.  Given current
amortization and current concentrations, Fitch believes the trusts
to have increasing risk exposure to additional obligor defaults.
As such, Fitch will continue to diligently monitor these
transactions and may take additional rating action.

                            METHODOLOGY

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria', issued July 2015, including asset quality, credit
enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and originator
and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis focused on concentration risks within the pool, by
evaluating the impact of the default of the largest performing
obligors.  The obligor concentration analysis is consistent with
Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating US Equipment Lease and Loan ABS',
dated Dec 2015.  The analysis compares expected loss coverage
relative to the default of a certain number of the largest
obligors.  The required net obligor coverage varies by rating
category.  The required number of obligors covered ranges from 20
at 'AAA' to five at 'B'.  Fitch applied loss and recovery
expectations based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance to the largest performing obligors commensurate with
the individual rating category.  The expected loss assumption was
then compared to the modeled loss coverage available to the
outstanding notes given Fitch's expected losses on the currently
delinquent loans.  Fitch also applied the 'Criteria for Rating Caps
and Limitations in Global Structured Finance Transactions' dated
May 2014 in determining the ratings.

Additionally, Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool.  All loans over 60 days delinquent
were deemed defaulted loans.  The defaulted loans were applied loss
and recovery expectations based on collateral type and historical
recovery performance to establish an expected net loss assumption
for the transaction.  Fitch stressed the cashflow generated by the
underlying assets by applying its expected net loss assumption.
Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to evaluate break-even
cash flow runs to determine the level of expected cumulative losses
the structure can withstand at a given rating level.  The loss
multiplier scale utilized is consistent with that of other
commercial ABS transactions.

While the obligor concentration approach was the primary driver,
its results were compared to the stresses loss approach and
qualitative factors such the results of these approaches compared
to prior reviews, recent performance, and available credit
enhancement.  The rating actions taken were ultimately the result
of a combination of these factors.  Fitch will continue to closely
monitor these transactions and may take additional rating action in
the event of changes in performance and credit enhancement
measures.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected losses and impact available loss coverage and obligor
coverage.  Lower loss coverage could impact ratings and rating
outlooks, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.
Should performance materially deteriorate, the decline in loss
coverage could negatively impact current ratings.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was received in connection to this
review.



GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC22: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC22 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-GC22 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class PEZ certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. At issuance, the transaction consisted of 59
fixed-rate loans secured by 113 commercial properties. All loans
remain in the pool, with a collateral reduction of 1.1% since
issuance as a result of scheduled loan amortization. As of the
March 2016 remittance, loans representing 39.5% of the pool
reported YE2015 financials while loans representing 56.3% of the
pool reported 2015 partial-year financials. Based on the most
recent financials available, the transaction reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.71
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.8% compared with the DBRS
underwritten WA DSCR and debt yield of 1.52x and 8.6%,
respectively. The top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.74x and a WA
debt yield of 9.4% compared with the issuance WA DSCR and debt
yield of 1.57x and 8.4%, respectively.

The College Towers loan (Prospectus ID#14, 1.7% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 289-unit student housing property located
in Kent, Ohio. There are a total of 513 beds; however, leases are
signed on a per-unit basis. The subject serves Kent State
University, which reported a 7.9% increase in enrollment for the
Fall 2015 semester when compared with the Fall 2011 semester,
representing an average annual growth rate of 1.9%. As of the
December 2015 rent roll, the subject was 98.3% occupied, an
increase since issuance at 96.9%. Average rental rates have also
increased to $771 per unit compared with $758 per unit at issuance.
Despite healthy occupancy and rental rates, the performance of the
property has been below DBRS underwritten (UW) levels for two
consecutive years. The YE2015 DSCR was 1.12x, remaining unchanged
from YE2014, compared with the DBRS UW DSCR of 1.25x. The net cash
flow (NCF) decline was attributable to an increase in operating
expenses while effective gross income has been in line with
expectations at issuance. DBRS modeled this loan in accordance with
actual reported figures to reflect the performance of the loan.

As of the March 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and two loans on the servicer’s watchlist. One of the
loans on the watchlist was flagged because of minor deferred
maintenance items and it is expected that the loan will be removed
from the watchlist as the issues are resolved. The largest loan on
the servicer's watchlist is discussed below.

The Westwood Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#22, 1.2% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 201,712 square foot Class B
grocery-anchored shopping center located in Johnstown,
Pennsylvania. At issuance, the subject was anchored by Good Cents
Grocery (Good Cents) and Conemaugh Memorial Medical Center
(Conemaugh). This loan was placed on the watchlist as Good Cents,
representing 22.8% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated the
property in March 2015 prior to its original lease expiration in
December 2016. According to the September 2015 rent roll, the
property was 90.1% occupied; however, without Good Cents, the
actual occupancy would drop to 67.3%. According to CoStar, the
property is 92.3% occupied with an asking rental rate of $10.00 per
square foot (psf). Good Cents space is listed as occupied; however,
no updates regarding the status of this space has been provided.
Retail properties in the Johnstown area had a vacancy rate of 4.4%
with average asking rental rates of $8.00 psf. At issuance, the
loan was structured with an upfront tenant improvement (TI)/leasing
commissions (LC) reserve of $750,000 as well as ongoing TI/LC
deposits of $0.75 psf annually to mitigate the risk of the anchor
tenants, which both had lease expiration dates in 2016. Conemaugh
occupies 29.8% of the NRA with a lease expiration in November 2016.
As of March 2016, the balance of the reserve was $1.1 million.
According to the most recent available reporting for the loan, the
Q3 2015 annualized DSCR was 1.32x, which is in line with the DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.30x. Because of the uncertainty regarding
the anchor space, DBRS modeled this loan with a haircut to the Q3
2015 annualized NCF to reflect the risk of a vacant anchor.



GUGGENHEIM PDFNI 2.0: Fitch Rates Class C Notes BBsf
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to Guggenheim Private
Debt Fund Note Issuer 2.0, LLC (Guggenheim PDFNI 2.0):

-- $149,000,000 class A notes series A-1 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,000,000 class B notes series B-1 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,000,000 class C notes series C-1 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,000,000 class D notes series D-1 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class sizes above are based on $500 million of issuance
proceeds expected to be raised at the first funding date. Fitch
does not rate the leverage tranche, class E notes and limited
liability company interests.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Guggenheim PDFNI 2.0 is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that will invest in a portfolio comprised of a
combination of broadly syndicated loans and middle market private
debt investments (PDIs). The manager, Guggenheim Partners
Investment Management, LLC (GPIM) is expecting to raise not more
than $2 billion of commitments from investors to fund the
transaction. Investors will earn class-specific commitment fees on
the undrawn portions of their commitments. The commitments are
expected to be drawn upon at seven separate funding dates during
the investment period. At each funding date, notes and the leverage
tranche will be issued in proportions that may decrease the level
of credit enhancement (CE) available for each class of rated notes.
Assuming the leverage tranche and each class of notes is drawn as
contemplated in the indenture at each funding date, credit
enhancement can decrease from funding date one to funding date
seven as follows:

-- Class A notes: 52.2% at funding date one; 42.5% at funding
    date seven;
-- Class B notes: 42.2% at funding date one; 32% at funding date
    seven;
-- Class C notes: 33.2% at funding date one; 24.9% at funding
    date seven;
-- Class D notes: 29% at funding date one; 21.2% at funding date
    seven.

Fitch expects to assess the creditworthiness of the notes at each
of the seven funding dates.

The manager may reinvest proceeds during the transaction's
four-year investment period. Fitch has conducted an operational
review on GPIM and views GPIM as an acceptable manager for the
transaction.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) for each
class of rated notes, in addition to excess spread, is sufficient
to protect against portfolio default and recovery rate projections
in each class's respective rating stress scenario. The degree of CE
available to each class of rated notes exceeds the average CE
levels typically seen on like-rated tranches of recent CLO
issuances backed by middle market loans.

'B-/CCC+' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the Fitch
stressed portfolio is 'B-/CCC+', which is below that of recent
CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly
speculative credit quality while issuers in the 'CCC' rating
category denote substantial credit risk. When analyzing the capital
structure for the first funding date, class A, B, C and D notes are
projected to be able to withstand default rates of up to 89.8%,
82.2%, 77.6% and 75.5%, respectively.

Strong Recovery Expectations: In determining the rating of the
notes, Fitch stressed the indicative portfolio by assuming a higher
portfolio concentration of assets with lower recovery prospects and
further reduced recovery assumptions for higher rating stress
assumptions. The Fitch stressed portfolio assumed 100% of the
assets were assigned a Fitch Recovery Rating of 'RR3', resulting in
a base case recovery assumption of 54.5% for the first funding
date. The analysis of the class A and B notes assumed recovery
rates of 33.8% in Fitch's 'A-sf' scenario and 41.4% in Fitch's
'BBB-sf' scenario, respectively. Class C and D notes assumed
recovery rates of 49.7% in Fitch's 'BBsf' scenario and 54.5% in
Fitch's 'Bsf' scenario, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the first funding date structure's sensitivity to
the potential variability of key model assumptions including
decreases in weighted average spread or recovery rates and
increases in default rates or correlation. Fitch also analyzed the
impact of a failure to fund commitments beyond the first funding
date, a reduced weighted average life (WAL), a reduction in
portfolio par amounts and whether a related decrease of aggregate
available excess spread over the lifetime of the transaction would
negatively impact the expected performance of the notes. Fitch
expects each class of notes to generally remain within one rating
category below their original ratings even under the most extreme
sensitivity scenarios. Results under these sensitivity scenarios
ranged between 'AAAsf' and 'BB+sf' for the class A notes, 'A+sf'
and 'BBsf' for the class B notes, 'BBB+sf' and 'B+sf' for the class
C notes and 'BBB+sf' and 'B-sf' for the class D notes. The results
of the sensitivity analysis also contributed to Fitch's assignment
of Stable Outlooks to each class of notes.

VARIATIONS FROM CRITERIA

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its CLO rating
criteria, as described in its November 2015 report, 'Global Rating
Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs'.

The Fitch stressed portfolio for this transaction was not created
using the indicative portfolio as a basis. Rather, it was created
to account for certain unique features of the transaction, such as
a relatively low obligor count. Instead of starting with the
initial indicative portfolio and making adjustments thereto, the
Fitch stressed portfolio for this transaction represents an
entirely hypothetical portfolio constructed by Fitch. Fitch created
a new portfolio based upon the concentration limitations and
collateral quality tests, with a particular focus on obligor
concentrations permissible under the indenture. Stressing all
obligors to their covenanted levels is a more conservative
assumption than stressing the five largest, as is customary with
Fitch's analysis of broadly syndicated CLOs in the U.S. This
application resulted in a moderate to significant impact on PCM
output, since stresses to obligor size typically have a moderate to
significant impact on PCM output under the standard application of
criteria.

In its cash flow analysis, Fitch applied a flat amortization
profile over five years (20 payment periods), evenly distributed
around the maximum permissible WAL. This is a more conservative
assumption than assuming bullet maturities and has a minor impact
versus the standard application of criteria.

Fitch accounted for the maximum allowable industry concentration in
the top six industries (as opposed to three, as highlighted in the
CLO criteria) in its construction of the Fitch stressed portfolio,
given the expectation of a concentrated portfolio of debt and
preferred equity from middle market entities. The industries
selected generally had the highest correlations in Fitch's PCM.
This is a more conservative assumption and has a minor impact
versus the standard application of criteria.

Fitch assumed 15% of the portfolio was able to defer interest
payments in its cash flow model analysis, in line with the
permissible exposure to deferrable items under the concentration
limitations. According to the indenture, if these items have been
deferring for over a year they will not be given par credit for
certain tests. Fitch assumed these assets deferred their interest
payments for one year to account for the period in which such asset
would be deferring yet still be given par credit. This is a more
conservative assumption and has a minor impact versus the standard
application of criteria, which does not indicate a specific stress
for deferrable assets.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 8-2016: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Highbridge Loan Management 8-2016 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management
8-2016 LLC's $369.00 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's

      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.3439%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which would lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which would lead to the reclassification of a certain amount

      of excess interest proceeds, that are available (before
      paying subordinated, deferred subordinated and incentive
      management fees, uncapped administrative expenses, and
      subordinated note payments) as principal proceeds to
      purchase additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

RATINGS LIST

Highbridge Loan Management 8-2016, Ltd
US$426.75 mil fixed and floating rate notes

Amount
Class                   Rating                 (mil, USD)
X                       AAA (sf)                3.00
A                       AAA (sf)                248.00
B                       AA (sf)                 56.00
C-1                     A (sf)                  18.00
C-2                     A (sf)                  6.00
D                       BBB- (sf)               20.00
E                       BB- (sf)                18.00
Sub Notes               NR                      37.75

NR--Not rated


JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt Rating to B1(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2002-C2 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2015 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, E and F, were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 6% since Moody's
last review.

The rating on the P&I class, G, was affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.6% of the
current balance, compared to 12.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $22.9 million
from $1.03 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 4 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
10% to 52.4% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 52.4% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated with a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $75.7 million (for an
average loss severity of 52%).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%, compared to
88% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.93X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 0.92X and 1.33X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Avon Commons Loan ($12 million -- 52.4% of
the pool), which is secured by a 173,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located 10 miles west of Indianapolis in Avon, IN. The
property is shadow anchored by Target and there are five outparcels
leased to Longhorn, IHOP, Red Lobster, Olive Garden and On The
Border. The loan has been on the watchlist since January 2011 due
to a decrease in rental income and lower occupancy. Excluding
Target, the property was 76% leased as of February 2015, unchanged
since the prior review. Marshalls recently extended its lease for
10 years. Three tenants have leases expiring in 2016, including two
outparcels. The loan has amortized over 31% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 116% and 0.93X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza on Legacy Loan ($8.7 million
-- 38.4% of the pool), which consists of two cross-collateralized,
cross-defaulted loans secured by two anchored retail properties
totaling 175,000 SF in Plano, TX. The properties are adjacent to
each other and share a common parking lot. Both properties were
100% leased as of December 2015, unchanged since the prior review.
The loans have amortized over 40% since securitization and mature
in July 2017. Approximately 29% of the net rentable area leases
expire by 2018, with 7% in 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
50% and 2.07X, respectively, compared to 57% and 1.81X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Seneca Lake Loan ($2.1 million --
9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a townhouse community
comprised of three buildings with 151 units 15 miles south of
Cleveland in Broadview Heights, OH. As of December 2015, the
property was 84% leased. Occupancy has fluctuate between 76% and
90% since 2010. This loan has amortized over 51% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.76X,
respectively, compared to 67% and 1.53X at the last review.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For further specification of Moody's key rating assumptions and
sensitivity analysis, see the sections Methodology Assumptions and
Sensitivity to Assumptions of the disclosure form.

The analysis includes an assessment of collateral characteristics
and performance to determine the expected collateral loss or a
range of expected collateral losses or cash flows to the rated
instruments. As a second step, Moody's estimates expected
collateral losses or cash flows using a quantitative tool that
takes into account credit enhancement, loss allocation and other
structural features, to derive the expected loss for each rated
instrument.



JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Hikes Cl. C Certs Rating to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Pass-Through Certificates, Ser. 2002-CIBC4 as:

  Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 30, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 16% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO class was affirmed because the credit of the
referenced classes is consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance compared to 7.8% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 12.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to a Herf of 6 at Moody's last
review.

Because of the low Herf, Moody's used the excel-based Large Loan
Model in formulating a rating recommendation.  The large loan model
derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV
ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.  Moody's
also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 14, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $24 million
from $799 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 27% of the pool.  The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments.  Four loans,
constituting 15% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Two loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $98 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%).  One loan, constituting 7% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Northstar Center Building Two Loan ($2 million -- 7% of
the pool), which is secured by an unanchored three-story retail
center in Edwards, Colorado.  The property includes an apartment
unit.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in 2012 for
maturity default and became REO in October 2013.  The property was
87% occupied as of September 2015, up from 75% in April 2014 and
61% in June 2013.  Moody's analysis incorporates a modest loss for
this loan.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 75% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 56%, compared to
59% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.4% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.08X and 2.41X,
respectively, compared to 1.10X and 2.15X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 56% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Plainfield Commons Loan ($6
million -- 27% of the pool), which is secured by a 174,000 square
foot anchored retail property in Plainfield, Indiana.  The property
was 99% leased as of year-end 2015.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 39% and 2.65X, respectively, compared to 42% and 2.45X at prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Arrowood Villas Loan ($4 million --
17% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 120-unit multifamily
property in Charlotte, North Carolina.  The loan is currently on
the watchlist for low debt service coverage.  The property was 96%
leased as of September 2015.  The servicer reports that property
rents are below market.  The loan metrics benefit from
amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.06X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 555 Post Street Loan ($3 million --
12% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a seven-story office
property in downtown San Francisco, California, two blocks west of
Union Square.  Full-year 2014 property financial performance
suffered after substantial lease rollover at the property, however
the property is once again 100% leased as of September 2015.  The
loan metrics benefit from amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 66% and, 1.59X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.42X at
the last review.



JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C20 issued by JPMCC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C20 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since closing. At issuance, the collateral
consisted of 37 loans secured by 54 commercial properties. The
transaction had a DBRS weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS WA debt yield of 1.47 times (x) and 8.4%,
respectively. As of the March 2016 remittance, loans representing
60.9% of the current pool balance are reporting YE2015 financials,
and loans representing 32.6% of the current pool balance are
reporting 2015 partial-year financials. The nine loans in the top
15 (representing 48.5% of the current pool balance) reporting
YE2015 figures showed a WA amortizing DSCR of 1.71x, with a WA net
cash flow growth over the respective DBRS underwritten figures of
9.1%. All loans remain in the pool, with a collateral reduction of
1.2% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan amortization.

As of the March 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and four loans are on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 4.2% of the current pool balance. All of the loans on
the servicer’s watchlist were flagged for performance-related
issues and DBRS modelled the loans with stressed cash flows to
reflect the increased risk associated with the declining
performance of the underlying collateral. One loan in the top 15
and one loan on the servicer’s watchlist are discussed below.

The 200 West Monroe loan (Prospectus ID#6, 2.8% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a Class B office building in downtown
Chicago. As of the December 2015 rent roll, the property was 78.0%
occupied and the largest tenant, Select Hotels Group, occupied the
eighth, ninth and 23rd floor of the property, representing 15.5% of
the net rentable area (NRA). The servicer advises that the tenant
recently consolidated space and extended its lease to December
2017, leaving the 23rd floor vacant at the end of March 2016. In
addition, Amli (5.4% of NRA) exercised its early termination option
and vacated the property in January 2016. With these developments,
DBRS believes the property’s physical occupancy rate could be as
low as 67.2%. Amli’s termination fee was estimated to be $1.1
million and according to the servicer, the fee was received and
deposited into a reserve. According to CoStar, Class B office
properties located within a 0.2-mile radius from the subject
reported an average vacancy rate and availability rate of 15.9% and
22.4%, respectively. In terms of the average rental rate, the
submarket reported $27 psf, which is above the subject’s average
rental rate of $17 psf. The second- and third-largest tenants,
Barcodes LLC (7.5% of NRA) and Destiny Health (7.4% of NRA) have
increased their footprint at the property since issuance with
leases expiring in 2017 and 2026, respectively. According to the
YE2015 financials, the loan had a DSCR of 1.00x, down from the
YE2014 DSCR of 1.09x and DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.18x. Given the
performance decline, DBRS modelled this loan with a stressed NCF
figure.

The Gate at Aberdeen Proving Ground loan (Prospectus ID#21, 1.7% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a 105,000 sf mixed-use
property located in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, built in
2010 and is LEED Gold certified. This loan was placed on the
watchlist because of a low DSCR, which was 1.08x at Q3 2015,
compared to the YE2014 DSCR of 1.84x and DBRS underwritten DSCR of
1.52x. The former largest tenant, D&S Consultants Inc. (40.0% of
NRA), was seven months behind in rent payments and was evicted in
October 2015. As of the December 2015 rent roll, the property was
59.1% occupied. The second-and third-largest tenants, Telford Group
(10.9% of NRA) and QED Systems LLC (8.6% of NRA), have leases
scheduled to expire in August and September 2016, respectively.
According to CoStar, flex industrial and office properties located
in the Abderdeen Proving Ground submarket reported an average
rental rate of $24 psf with an average vacancy and availability
rate of 19.9% and 28.7%, respectively. The average rental rate at
the subject property is below the submarket at $19 psf. This loan
was modelled with a stressed cash flow given the decrease in
occupancy and soft market conditions present.



MADISON PARK XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. has assigned definitive ratings to
the following classes of notes issued by Madison Park Funding XX,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$310,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2027
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$34,800,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2027
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due 2027
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$40,800,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,400,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$26,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

U.S.$20,000,000 Combination Securities (composed of components
representing U.S.$ 4,000,000 of Class B-1 Notes, U.S.$12,000,000 of
Class C Notes and U.S.$4,000,000 of subordinated notes
(collectively, the "Underlying Components")) due 2027 (the
"Combination Securities"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf) only
with respect to the ultimate payment of the Combination Securities
Rated Balance (as that term is defined in the transaction's
documents).

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the
Combination Securities are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Moody's rating of the Combination Securities addresses only the
ultimate receipt of the Combination Securities Rated Balance by the
holders of the Combination Securities. Moody's rating of the
Combination Securities does not address any other payments or
additional amounts that a holder of the Combination Securities may
receive pursuant to the underlying documents.

Madison Park XX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. Subject to the cov-lite matrix, at least
92.5% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, and up
to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans or senior
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of
the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.75 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2940

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years



MASTR ASSET 2005-HE2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-3 Certs to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by MASTR.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE2

  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 8,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM3

  Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 5,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. A-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 15,

   2011, Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds.  The actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ6: DBRS Hikes Class H Debt Rating to BB(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the rating on the following class of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HQ6 (the
Certificates) issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-HQ6:

-- Class H upgraded to BB (sf) from CCC (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the ratings on the following classes:

-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class J at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class J, which has a
rating that does not carry a trend.

The rating upgrade reflects the increased credit enhancement to the
bonds as a result of loan repayment and scheduled amortization.
Since issuance, the transaction has experienced collateral
reduction of 97.3%, with eight of the original 177 loans
outstanding as of the March 2016 remittance report. In the last 12
months, 36 loans have been fully repaid from the trust,
contributing approximately $251 million in principal repayment,
while seven loans liquidated from the trust with a combined
realized loss of $63,420 that was contained to Class K, rated D
(sf) by DBRS. To date, 37 loans have liquidated from the trust,
representing an aggregate realized loss to the trust of $134.4
million.

As of the March 2016 remittance, three loans (40.7% of the pool)
reported partial-year 2015 (generally Q3 2015) cash flows, while
five loans (59.3% of the pool) reported YE2015 cash flows. Based on
the 2015 cash flows (both annualized partial-year cash flows and
YE2015 cash flows), the pool had a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.92 times (x) and a WA debt yield
of 7.6%. Of the eight loans remaining in the pool, five loans are
currently in special servicing, representing 60.0% of the pool.
Three of these loans, Town Centre Office and Executive Suites
(Prospectus ID#89, 7.0% of the pool), Tinley Crossings Corporate
Center (Prospectus ID#92, 6.9% of the pool) and Shops at Lakeline
Village (Prospectus ID#112, 5.3% of the pool) are reportedly
scheduled for upcoming auctions that will occur within the next 30
days, according to the servicer. The two largest loans in special
servicing are discussed in detail below. The remaining three
performing loans in the trust have scheduled maturities in April
2018 (33.8% of the pool) and March 2020 (6.2% of the pool). These
three loans have a WA DSCR and exit debt yield of 1.43x and 10.2%,
respectively.

The County Line Commerce Center loan (Prospectus ID#23, 28.8% of
the pool) is secured by a multi-tenant office/industrial complex
located in Warminster, Pennsylvania, approximately 50 miles
northeast of Philadelphia. The property consists of two Class A
office buildings, two office/warehouse structures and one
industrial building totalling 426,384 square feet (sf). The
earliest structures date back to 1941, with major
renovations/expansions occurring in 1988 and 2003. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 because of imminent
default and has been real estate owned (REO) since September 2010.
The property has been under environmental monitoring by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) since the 1980s because of
past ground water contamination by a former industrial tenant.
Numerous groundwater tests have come back showing contamination
levels well below legal limits, yet the EPA continues monitoring
the subject because of a remaining plume of contaminated
groundwater, which reportedly migrated onto the site many years ago
from an unknown source. The EPA was asked to further investigate
the outstanding issues, but the agency has indicated that there are
not sufficient resources in place to undertake the operation in the
near term. As such, the site will continue to be a designated
hazard pending further investigation.

As of January 2016, the complex was 63.4% occupied with an average
rental rate of $10.85 per square foot (psf) compared with 58.5%
occupied with an average rental rate of $12.29 psf as of January
2015. The largest tenant, Asea Brown Boveri Inc. (27.1% of the net
rentable area (NRA)), recently expanded its space by 20,670 sf and
signed a ten-year triple net lease through March 2025 at a reduced
rate of $4.79 psf compared with its previous rate of $7.40 psf.
Other sizable tenants include Aon Service Corporation (22.0% of NRA
through October 2020), Infologix (9.4% of the NRA through February
2017) and Advanced Coating Processors, LLC (3.8% of the NRA through
February 2017). An August 2015 appraisal valued the property at
$9.6 million (275.0% loan-to-value (LTV)), an increase from $9.0
million (293.0% LTV) in September 2014 but a decrease of $27.9
million when compared with the issuance value of $37.5 million
(94.0% LTV). According to the appraisal report, the decrease in
value can be attributed to a lack of positive leasing activity over
the past four years, the odd configuration of the property, as well
as the amount of capital needed to upgrade and lease the
collateral. Furthermore, the property has been under environmental
monitoring by the EPA for several years, as mentioned above. The
servicer states that the loan is expected to be resolved or
disposed of as of June 2016; however, no offers have been received
to date through marketing efforts. Although the servicer contends
the testing will not affect the value of the property, DBRS
believes this issue may be contributing to the property’s
inability to attract buyers and expects the trust to experience a
significant loss with the resolution of this loan.

Park Techne Center (Prospectus ID#60, 12.0% of the current pool
balance) is secured by three mixed-use buildings located in
Milford, Ohio, approximately 17 miles northeast of Cincinnati. The
structures were constructed in three phases from 1985 through 1989
and consist of 237,961 sf comprising 30% office space and 70% flex
space. The loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2015,
as it became delinquent and has been REO since March 2016. As of
YE2015 financials, the loan had a DSCR of 0.67x, down from 0.76x at
YE2014 and 0.82x at YE2013. According to the February 2016 rent
roll, the property was 71.0% occupied with an average rental rate
of $7.80 psf compared with 71.0% with an average rental rate of
$8.85 psf as of December 2014. The largest tenants include
Stationary Works (12.6% of the NRA through August 2018), Option
Care Enterprise (7.6% of NRA through August 2017) and Interplex
Medical (5.3% of the NRA through August 2016). Six tenants (12.0%
of the NRA) have lease expirations within the next 12 months;
however, three of these tenants are currently in ongoing lease
negotiations. Additionally, Healthcare Ventures (4.0% of the NRA),
which is currently on a month-to-month contract, is negotiating a
ten-year lease. Furthermore, four new prospective tenants are
interested in occupying approximately 16,900 sf collectively. An
April 2015 appraisal valued the properties at $8.7 million (125.0%
LTV), a decline of $5.3 million compared with the issuance value of
$14.0 million (57.0% LTV).


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: DBRS Confirms BBhigh Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C9 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C9 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since closing. At issuance, the collateral
consisted of 60 fixed-rate loans secured by 77 commercial
properties. As of the March 2016 remittance, 58 loans remain in the
pool out of the original 60 loans with an aggregate outstanding
principal balance of $1,195.0 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 6.4% as a result of scheduled loan amortization. Loans
representing 47.6% of the current pool balance are reporting YE2015
financials, and loans representing 37.9% of the pool have 2015
partial year financials. The nine loans in the top 15 (representing
45.2% of the current pool balance) reporting YE2015 figures showed
a weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.99 times (x), with WA net cash flow growth over the
respective DBRS underwritten figures of 24.8%.

As of the March 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and six loans on the servicer’s watchlist, representing
8.2% of the current pool balance. However, the largest watchlisted
loan, representing 5.2% of the pool, is expected to be removed from
the watchlist with the next remittance as performance has improved.
One loan in the top 15 and a watchlisted loan are discussed below.

The Best Western Grant Park loan (Prospectus ID#12, 2.0% of the
current pool balance) is secured by a nine-storey, 172-room,
limited-service hotel in downtown Chicago and was constructed in
1960. According to the YE2015 Smith Travel Research report, the
subject property performed below the competitive set with an
occupancy of 62.0%, average daily rate (ADR) of $135 and revenue
per available room (RevPAR) of $84. In comparison, the competitive
set reported an occupancy rate of 75.4%, ADR of $148 and RevPAR of
$112. Per the YE2015 financials, the loan reported an amortizing
DSCR of 1.44x, which is a decrease from the YE2014 and DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.59x. Departmental revenue decreased by 10.6%
from YE2014 and 3.1% from the DBRS underwritten level and operating
expenses are up slightly as well. It was known at closing that all
guest rooms and common areas were expected to be renovated at an
estimated cost of $3.8 million. The September 2015 site inspection
noted $2.1 million of interior capital improvements that were
completed, with an additional $1.5 million planned for the
renovation of the outdoor pool, deck and exterior walls. DBRS
expects the performance decline is related to the ongoing
improvement projects and expects cash flows to return to
underwritten levels at completion.

The 750 Eight Avenue Retail Condominium loan (Prospectus ID#25,
1.3% of the pool) is secured by an 8,800 square foot retail
property in Manhattan, New York, built in 2008. This loan was
placed on the servicer’s watchlist because one tenant, Pasta Bar
(39.5% of NRA as per the September 2015 rent roll) was evicted from
the property in December 2015 ahead of its 2024 lease expiration.
With this eviction, 750 Gifts LLC (60.5% of the NRA), a souvenir
shop, is the sole tenant at the property. Due to the tenant vacancy
trigger, a soft lockbox was sprung and per the loan documents, all
funds are to be swept into a cash management account. According to
the servicer, a prospective tenant is interested in taking over
Pasta Bar’s space and a lease is in the process of being
approved; however, lease terms are not available at this time. The
YE2015 financials reported a DSCR of 1.19x, which is above the
YE2014 DSCR of 1.03x but below DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.45x.
Given the cash flow decline that will be realized in the near term
with the occupancy drop at the property, DBRS modelled the loan
with a stressed cash flow to reflect the increased risk.



MSAT LP 2005-RR4: DBRS Hikes Class L Debt Rating to BB(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings of the following six classes of
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-RR4, issued by Multi Security Asset Trust LP, Series
2005-RR4 (MSAT) as follows:

-- Class F to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class G to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class H to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class J to A (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class K to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class L to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction as follows:

-- Class D at AAA (sf)
-- Class E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class M at B (low) (sf)
-- Class N at CCC (sf)
-- Class O at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, except for Classes N and O, which do not
have trends assigned.

The rating upgrades are a result of positive credit migration on
the underlying U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
assets attributed to amortization, increased defeasance, loan
seasoning and increased credit enhancement as a result of
successful loan repayments at maturity and recoveries on liquidated
loans. This performance has resulted in significant collateral
reduction to the MSAT 2005-RR4 capital structure. Since issuance in
March 2005, the transaction has amortized by 80.3%. Of the 16
original underlying CMBS transactions that were contributing to the
MSAT 2005-RR4 transaction, the contributing classes in 12
transactions have paid off in full and three of the remaining four
underlying U.S. CMBS transactions are currently experiencing
principal repayment.

While potential losses associated with the underlying U.S. CMBS
specially serviced loans could reduce credit enhancement or affect
the lowest-rated classes, the performance of the overall MSAT
2005-RR4 transaction has been strong. As of the March 2016
remittance report, the transaction has experienced realized losses
of approximately $32.1 million; however, losses have been contained
to the unrated Class P-2. The MSAT 2005-RR4 capital structure
currently has $6.8 million of credit support below the lowest
DBRS-rated class. With this surveillance review, DBRS anticipates
losses associated with the underlying specially serviced loans to
be contained to Class O, which DBRS rates C (sf).


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1:

  $27,000,000 Class D Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
   previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $336,500,000 Class A-1 Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding
   balance of $17,021,077), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $100,000,000 Class A-2 Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding
   balance of $5,354,409), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
   Dec. 4, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $24,000,000 Class B Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $58,500,000 Class C Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $29,100,000 Class E Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf);
   previously on Dec. 4, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1, issued in June 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans issued by middle market obligors.  The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in June 2013.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2015.  The Class
A notes have been paid down by approximately 54.5% or $26.8 million
since that time.  Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for
the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D, and Class E notes are
currently 847.8%, 409.0%, 180.9%, 143.9%, and 117.8%, versus
December 2015 levels of 439.2%, 295.2%, 164.1%, 136.2%, and 115.1%,
respectively.  The transaction does not have OC tests.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since December 2015.  Based on the Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 4998 compared to 4266
on December 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Sensitivity to default timing scenarios: The junior and
     mezzanine notes in this CLO rely significantly on excess
     interest for additional credit enhancement.  However, the
     availability of such credit enhancement from excess interest
     is subject to uncertainty relating to the timing and the
     amount of defaults, and the transaction could be negatively
     affected if the timing of defaults differs from Moody's
     assumptions.  Moody's modeled additional scenarios using
     concentrated default timing profiles to assess the
     sensitivity of the notes' ratings to volatility in the amount

     of excess interest available after defaults.

  6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large
     number of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has
     assessed through credit estimates.  If Moody's does not
     receive the necessary information to update its credit
     estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction could be
     negatively affected by any default probability adjustments
     Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (3998)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: +1
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5998)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: -1
Class E: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $189.7 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 28.59% (implying a
WARF of 4998), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.86%, a diversity score of 26 and a weighted average spread of
4.64% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates.  Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 17.8% of the collateral pool.
Additionally, for each credit estimates whose related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
two-notch equivalent assumed downgrade, which totals approximately
26.8% of the pool.


RAMP TRUST: Moody's Hikes $248MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2006
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 12, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 20 tranches, from 7 transactions issued by RFC backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS4 Trust

  Cl. A-II-A Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   April 17, 2012, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. A-II-B Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   April 17, 2012, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS6 Trust

  Cl. A-II-A Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   April 17, 2012, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. A-II-B Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2011, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS11 Trust

  Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
   Sept. 3, 2013, Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11,

   2015, Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
   March 30, 2011, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS9 Trust

  Cl. M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
   July 21, 2014, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS2 Trust

  Cl. A-3A Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
   May 20, 2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3B Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   April 6, 2010, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS6 Trust

  Cl. A-I Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   May 11, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A-II Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   May 11, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 1,
   2009, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS8 Trust

  Cl. A-I-5 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
   May 11, 2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-I-6 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
   April 9, 2012, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-I-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   May 11, 2015, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-I-2 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   May 11, 2015, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-II-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   July 21, 2014, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.



SALOMON BROTHERS 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one
interest-only class in Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII,
Inc. 2000-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-C2 as:

  Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the interest-only class was affirmed based on the
credit performance of the referenced class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 53.1% of the
current balance, compared to 50.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

                   DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 1, compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $19.3 million
from $781.5 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 73%
of the pool.  Three loans, constituting 21% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $52.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%).  One loan, constituting 73% of the pool is
currently in special servicing.  The specially serviced loan is the
former Diamond Point Plaza Loan ($14.2 million -- 73.4% of the
pool).  The loan has been in special servicing since 2002.  The
master servicer declared this loan non-recoverable in July 2009.
The loan was secured by a 251,000 square foot (SF) retail center
located in suburban Baltimore, Maryland; however, the collateral
was sold for $5 million in December 2012.  Sale proceeds were used
to partially recover outstanding expenses.  Ongoing legal issues
remain regarding a judgement.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average large loan LTV is 25% compared
to 32% at Moody's last review.  Moody's large loan component
excludes loans with CTL loans, specially serviced and troubled
loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average
haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating income
(NOI).  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed large loan DSCRs are 1.67X and 7.04X,
respectively, compared 1.68X and 5.46X at the last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest non-defeased and non-specially serviced loan represents
4.8% of the pool balance.  The loan is the Eckerd's- Gloversville
Loan ($779,942 -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 10,910
SF retail property located in Gloversville, New York. The property
was originally leased to Eckerd's (now a Rite-Aid) in upstate New
York.  The property is located approximately 50 miles north west of
Albany.  The lease is co-terminus with maturity date. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 33% and 3.28X, respectively, compared to 44%
and 2.48X, at the last review.

The other loan in the pool is the Southcenter Strip Retail Center
Loan ($376,022 -- 1.9% of the pool).  The loan is secured by an
unanchored retail center located in Tukwila, Washington.  There are
six tenants occupying the property.  As of December 2015, the
property was 100% leased.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 8% and
14.82X, respectively, compared to 11% and 11.21X at the last
review.


UPLAND CLO: Moody's Gives Ratings to 8 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes to be issued by Upland CLO, Limited (the "Issuer"
or "Upland CLO").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$235,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-2A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-2B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$8,500,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$16,500,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2A Notes,
the Class A-2B Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

"Upland CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, and eligible investments, and up
to 5.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior
unsecured loans and first-lien last-out loans. We expect the
portfolio to be approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date."

Invesco Senior Secured Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2675

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.2 years



WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs From B-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
D commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C22, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'B- (sf)'.

S&P's upgrade follows its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  The raised
rating further reflects S&P's expectation of the available credit
enhancement for this class, which S&P believes is greater than its
most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the rating
level and S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and future
performance.

While the available credit enhancement level suggests further
positive rating movement on class D, S&P's analysis also considered
its susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the five
specially serviced loans ($31.4 million, 55.6%).

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $56.4 million which is 2.2% of the pool balance at
issuance.  The pool currently includes six loans, down from 149
loans at issuance.  Five of these loans are with the special
servicer, one ($25.0 million, 44.4%) is on the master servicer's
watchlist, and no loans are defeased.  The master servicer, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information for 94.9% of the
loans in the pool, of which 46.8% was year-end 2015 data, and 53.2%
was partial-year 2015 or year-end 2014 data.

For the sole remaining non-specially serviced loan, S&P calculated
a 1.33x Standard & Poor's debt service coverage (DSC) and 94.7%
Standard & Poor's loan-to-value ratio using a 7.00% Standard &
Poor's capitalization rate.  S&P discusses the specially serviced
loans below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $226.4 million in
principal losses, or 8.9% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.4% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
five specially serviced loans.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 17, 2016, trustee remittance report, five loans in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management
LLC (CWCapital).  All of these loans have a reported nonperforming
matured balloon payment status and no appraisal reduction amounts
are reported to be in effect against these loans.  Details of the
two largest specially serviced loans are:

   -- The One Riverfront Plaza loan ($16.3 million, 28.9%) is the
      second-largest loan in the trust and largest loan with the
      special servicer.  The loan has a total reported exposure of

      $16.7 million and is secured by a 130,726-sq.-ft. office
      property in Westbrook, Maine.  The loan was transferred to
      CWCapital on Dec. 18, 2015, due to maturity default.  The
      loan matured on Dec. 11, 2015.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy as of the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2015, were
      1.00x and 100%, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate loss
      upon the loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The Key Plaza loan ($6.0 million, 10.6%) is the third-
      largest loan in the trust and has a total reported exposure
      of $6.2 million.  The loan is secured by 81,918-sq.-ft.
      office property in Augusta, Maine.  The loan was transferred

      to CWCapital on Dec. 18, 2015, due to maturity default.  The

      loan matured on Dec. 11, 2015.  The reported DSC and
      occupancy as of nine months ended Sept. 30, 2015, were 1.68x

      and 100%, respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the

      loan's eventual resolution.

The three remaining loans with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 7.8% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the five specially
serviced loans, arriving at a weighted average loss severity of
35.7%.

With respect to the specially serviced loans noted above, a minimal
loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C22

                                     Rating        Rating
Class             Identifier         To            From
D                 92976BBU5          BBB- (sf)     B- (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C23: Moody's Hikes Cl. F Debt Rating to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on seven classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C23 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 79% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with expected recovery of principal and interest from
liquidated and troubled loans. The ratings on six P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on one IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 68.5% of the
current balance, compared to 12.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17th, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $314 million
from $4.23 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 76% of
the pool.

Five loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $119.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 57%). Sixteen loans, constituting 84% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the TownMall of Westminster Loan ($40.1 million -- 14.1% of the
pool), which is secured by a 444,100 SF enclosed regional mall in
Westminster, Maryland. The mall was built in 1987 and is anchored
by Belk, Dick's Sporting Goods, Sears and Boscov's (which is not
part of the collateral). The loan transferred to special servicing
in June 2015 due to imminent monetary default. As of September 2015
the total mall was 83% leased, however the inline space was only
56% leased. The master servicer has recognized a $20.1 million
appraisal reduction on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Marriott
Renaissance -- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Loan ($33.5 million --
11.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 349 room full-service
hotel located near the Philadelphia Airport. The loan transferred
to special servicing effective December 23, 2015 due to imminent
maturity default. The loan defaulted after failing to pay off by
the January 11, 2016 maturity.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 100 Motor Parkway
Loan ($29.0 million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is secured by an
office property located in Hauppauge, New York. The loan
transferred to special servicing effective December 21, 2015, and
failed to pay off at maturity on January 11, 2016. The property was
72% leased as of January 2016.

The remaining 12 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $165.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (76% expected loss on average).
Moody's has assumed additional loss of $29.0 million due to
under-collateralization from the difference between the pooled loan
balance and the pooled certificate balance.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 89% of the
pool and full year 2015 operating results for 89% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 82%, compared to 93% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 10% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Walgreens Pool 1 Loan ($12.0 million -- 4.2% of
the pool), which is secured by three cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by properties located in Michigan.
All three properties are 100% leased to Walgreens through 2020. Due
to the single tenant exposure, a lit/dark approach was taken.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 100% and 0.95X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens Pool 2 Loan ($8.4 million
-- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by two cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted loans secured by properties located in
Michigan. Both properties are 100% leased to Walgreens through
2020. Due to the single tenant exposure, a lit/dark approach was
taken. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 0.95X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Arbutus Business Center Loan ($6.8
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by an industrial
property located in Arbutus, Maryland, located approximately six
miles southwest of Baltimore. The property was 99% leased as of
December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.74X,
respectively, compared to 57% and 1.67X at the last review.



[*] Moody's Hikes $954MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Issuers
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 7, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 32 tranches from 13 deals issued by various issuers, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. M6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-AG1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-1B1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE2

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE7

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-RM1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-WF1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. M-9, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-HE1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (Insured
Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-OP1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-OP2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.



[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $1.18BB Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 46 tranches
from 19 transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1

  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM1

  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-4

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT1

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4

  Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-1

  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB1

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB2

  Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-1D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2006-BC1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC1

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-1

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-11

  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. A7, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF4

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. M7, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-AM1

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-WF1

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-10HE

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-4HE

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-1
Trust

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-2
Trust

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 25, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 3, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Raises $584MM of Subprime RMBS Issued in 2005-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 12, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 32 tranches, from 9 transactions issued by CountryWide, backed
by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-15

  Cl. 1-AF-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-AF-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-AF-5, currently rated A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 18,
   2013, Downgraded to A2 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed
   at A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014,)
  Cl. 1-AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-3

  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-8

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-BC5

  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 27,
   2013, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Insured Rating
   Withdrawn Nov 08, 2012)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-11

  Cl. 2-AV, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-4

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-1M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC1

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC2

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC3

  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $1.2 Billion of CWABS Subprime RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 8, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 41 tranches, from 8 transactions issued by CountryWide, backed
by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-1

  Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 10, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 10, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 10,

   2014, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 10, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-10
  Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-12
  Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19,

   2016)
  Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-14
  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19,

   2016)
  Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-17
  Cl. 2-AV, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 3-AV-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 3-AV-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 4-AV-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. MV-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-4
  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19,

   2016)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-6
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 11, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-7
  Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. AF-5W, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 11,
   2015, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to
   B3, Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19,

   2016)
  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to higher
prepayments/faster liquidations.  The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF429837

A list of updated estimated pool losses and recoveries is being
posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this review period
and may be found at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF345728



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $101MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 11, 2016, has taken action on
the ratings of 14 tranches from 7 deals issued by various issuers,
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W11

  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 8,
   2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 8,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 5,

   2013, Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W9

  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 14,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 14,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   March 18, 2011, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2004-HE11
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
   March 5, 2013, Affirmed Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-RES1
  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 22, 2014, Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 22, 2014, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 22,

   2014, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-6 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   March 7, 2011, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-A
  Cl. B-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4,
   2015, Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-6
  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 9,

   2012, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB1
  Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   March 17, 2011, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrades are due
to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $108.5MM of Scratch and Dent RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken actions on the ratings of 12
tranches from six deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series
2004-A
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 7, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP1
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 6, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP2
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 24, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-SD1
  Cl. A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 28, 2013,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: SACO I Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-1
  Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 3, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgraded is due
to the weaker performance of the related pools and/or a decrease in
credit enhancement available to the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $146MM RMBS Issued 2006-2008
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 7, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of six tranches and downgraded the ratings of three tranches backed
by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-1

Cl. A-PO2 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21,
2012 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IA-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19,
2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 21,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 19,
2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May
19, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2006-2

Cl. I-A1-5 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr
30, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 16,
2013 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-2 Trust

Cl. IV-A-1 Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May
19, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2008-AR1 Trust

Cl. A-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 10,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools. The ratings downgraded are due to
the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion
of enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in March
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $432.6 Million of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 12, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 22 tranches and downgraded the rating of one tranche issued from
12 transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Carrington Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC4

  Cl. M-1 Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   July 22, 2013, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 29,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FRE1

  Cl. A-6 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 20,

   2014, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC1

  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 29,
   2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2

  Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 29,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC2

  Cl. A-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 29,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2015, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1

  Cl. A-2B Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   April 6, 2010, Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Corp. Series 2003-1

  Cl. M1 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct. 10,
   2013, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

  Cl. M-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   July 28, 2014, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   July 28, 2014, Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
   July 28, 2014 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M-6 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   April 19, 2012, Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. M-7 Certificate, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
   April 19, 2012, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFH3

  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   Nov. 13, 2013, Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC6

  Cl. B-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2009, Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 22,

   2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE5

  Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 9,

   2013, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 22,
   2015, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

  Cl. AV-1A Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   March 18, 2011, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. AV-1B Certificate, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
   March 18, 2011, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. AV-2 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
   March 18, 2011, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
downgrade is a result of recent interest shortfalls incurred on the
bond, which are unlikely to be reimbursed.  The actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $476.1MM RMBS Issued 2004-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from one transaction and upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches from six transactions backed by Option ARM RMBS loans, and
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-16

Cl. A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 20,
2012 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 20,
2012 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9

Cl. 2-A Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 22,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-11

Cl. 2-A-1A Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4,
2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4

Cl. 2A-1 Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 5,
2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6

Cl. 2A-1A Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR13

Cl. 2A Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 30,
2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR17

Cl. 1A-1A Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 3,
2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools. The ratings upgraded are due to the stronger
performance of the underlying collateral and the credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The ratings downgraded are due to the
weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in March
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $48.4MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on April 11, 2016, downgraded the
ratings of eight tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued
by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-D

  Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-L Trust

  Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 4, 2014,

   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings downgraded are due to the weaker
performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in March 2016 from 5.5% in
March 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 15 Classes From 6 CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on April 8, 2016, discontinued
its ratings on 12 classes from four cash flow (CF) collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transactions, one class from one CF
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and two classes from
one CF CDO of CDOs transaction.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Anchorage Capital CLO 7 Ltd. (CF CLO): class X notes(i) paid

      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption
      in March 2016.

   -- Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO III Ltd. (CF CDO of

      CDOs): senior-most tranche paid down; other rated tranches
      still outstanding.

   -- MACH ONE 2005-CDN1, ULC (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most
      tranche paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- MC Funding Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in March 2016.

   -- OFSI Fund III Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in March
      2016.

(i) An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Anchorage Capital CLO 7 Ltd.
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
X                   NR            AAA (sf)

Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd.
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
C                   NR            AAA (sf)
D-1                 NR            A+ (sf)
D-2                 NR            A+ (sf)
E                   NR            BB+ (sf)

Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO III Ltd.
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
A-3A                NR            A+ (sf)
A-3B                NR            A+ (sf)

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
J                   NR            CCC+ (sf)

MC Funding Ltd.
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
C                   NR            AAA (sf)
D                   NR            AA+ (sf)
E                   NR            BB+ (sf)

OFSI Fund III Ltd.
                    Rating        Rating
Class               To            From
C                   NR            AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR            BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E-1                 NR            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E-2                 NR            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 195 Classes From 106 U.S. RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on April 11, 2016, took various
rating actions on 195 classes from 106 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P lowered 185
ratings, including 162 to 'D (sf)', and removed 10 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed six ratings and removed all of them from CreditWatch
negative.  S&P also withdrew four ratings and removed two of them
from CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P discontinued one of
the lowered ratings.

Three of the lowered ratings and all of the affirmed ratings were
placed on CreditWatch with negative implications on Feb. 24, 2016,
to reflect possible interest shortfalls on the affected classes
cited in the trustee reports, which could negatively affect S&P's
ratings on those classes.  After verifying these interest
shortfalls, S&P applied its interest shortfall criteria and removed
these ratings from CreditWatch negative following the respective
rating actions.

Seven of the lowered ratings were placed on CreditWatch negative on
Jan. 20, 2016, to reflect S&P's lack of information necessary to
apply its loan modification criteria after S&P made multiple
requests to the applicable trustees or servicers for such
information.  In addition, the trustee reports cited possible
interest shortfalls on these classes.  After verifying these
interest shortfalls, S&P lowered these ratings to 'D (sf)' and
removed them from CreditWatch negative based on S&P's interest
shortfall criteria.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2001 and
2007, and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
loans secured primarily by one- to four-family residential
properties.

Some combination of subordination, overcollateralization (when
available), excess interest, and bond insurance (as applicable)
provide credit enhancement for all of the transactions in this
review.  Where the bond insurer is no longer rated, S&P solely
relied on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the ratings.

             APPLICATION OF INTEREST SHORTFALL CRITERIA

In reviewing these ratings, S&P applied its interest shortfall
criteria as stated in "Structured Finance Temporary Interest
Shortfall Methodology," Dec. 15, 2015, which impose a maximum
rating threshold on classes that have incurred interest shortfalls
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.  In applying the
criteria, S&P looked to reimbursement provisions within each
payment waterfall for the applicable class to determine whether the
reimbursement must be made immediately.  In instances where
immediate reimbursement is required, S&P used the maximum length of
time until full interest repayment as part of S&P's analysis to
assign the rating on the class.

In instances where reimbursement may be delayed by other factors
within the payment waterfall, S&P used its cash flow projections in
determining the likelihood that the shortfall would be reimbursed.

                             DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered 185 ratings to reflect the application of its interest
shortfall criteria.  Of the lowered ratings in this review, 10
moved to speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade
('BBB-' or higher), and four remained at investment grade.  The
remaining 171 lowered ratings were already speculative grade before
today's rating actions.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on six classes after it received
information to successfully assess the impact of interest
shortfalls on these classes.  Based on S&P's assessment, the
interest shortfall rating caps for these securities were higher
than their current ratings.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on four classes from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. series 2002-6 due to the small number of loans
remaining in the related pool.  Once a pool has declined to a de
minimis amount, S&P believes that tail risk cannot be addressed
because the high degree of credit instability is incompatible with
any rating level.

                           DISCONTINUANCE

S&P discontinued its rating on one class because the class has been
paid in full.  Prior to the discontinuance, S&P lowered the rating
to reflect the application of S&P's interest shortfall criteria.

                          ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.3% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.1% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.7% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/23G0FKo



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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