TCR_Public/160327.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 27, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 87

                            Headlines

ABCLO 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
ACAS CLO IX: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes
ALLSLC IV: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches in $252.2MM Bonds to CCC+
ALLY AUTO 2016-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba Rating on Class D Debt
AMERICAN HOME 2005-SD1: Moody's Cuts Cl. I-A1 Debt Rating to Caa3

APOLLO AVIATION 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on C Notes
BAMLL 2013-WNRK: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Debt
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-ASHF: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. F Certs
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on G Notes to 'BB'
BANC OF AMERICA 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. XC Debt to Caa2

BBCMS TRUST 2015-SLP: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR12: Moody's Hikes Cl. B Debt Rating to B1(sf)
CAS 2016-C02: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating on Class 1M-2 Notes
CGGS COMMERCIAL 2016-RND: Fitch to Rate Class E-FX Debt 'BB-sf'
CIG AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Discontinues Provisional BBsf Rating

CITI HELD 2016-PM1: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class C Notes
CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Debt
CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Debt
COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Tranches
COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class J Certificates

COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa3
COMM 2007-FL14: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Certificates
COMM 2013-CCRE12: Fitch Puts BB Rating on Class E Certificates
COMM 2016-DC2: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Cl. F Certificate

CONN'S RECEIVABLES 2016-A: Fitch Assigns B Rating on Cl. C Notes
CSAIL 2016-C5: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
CSMC TRUST 2015-TOWN: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs.
FANNIE MAE: Moody's Lowers $13.2 Million of FHA/VA RMBS
FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Moody's Hikes Class M Debt Rating to Ca(sf)

FIRST UNION 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 2 Tranches
FREDDIE MAC STARC 2016-HQA1: Fitch Rates Cl. M-3 Debt 'B'
FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2 Debt
GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs. to B
GS MORTGAGE 2013-PEMB: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs.

GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: Moody’s Withdraws Rating on X-CP Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificate
GS MORTGAGE 2016-RENT: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2016-RENT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificate
HAMPTON ROADS 2007-A: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class III Debt

ICE 1: Moody's Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'B3(sf)'
INDYMAC HOME 2000-C: Moody's Hikes Cl. AV Debt Rating to B1
JP MORGAN 2004-S1: Moody’s Hikes Cl. 3-A-1 Debt Rating From Ba1
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Debt Rating to Caa3
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC17: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. A-M Debt

JP MORGAN 2015-COSMO: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
JP MORGAN 2016-C1: Fitch Assigns Final BB-sf Rating to Cl. E Debt
JP MORGAN 2016-FL8: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Cl. C Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
KEYCORP STUDENT 2000-B: Moody's Reviews B1 Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt

KMART FUNDING: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Debt
LB-UBS 2006-C6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Certs to Ba1
LCM XXI LP: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Class E Notes
MOTEL 6 TRUST: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
NAAC REPERFORMING 2004-R3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 4 Tranches to B1

NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class M2 Debt 'Ba3(sf)'
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2016-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Debt
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 26: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XI: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class D Notes

ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-2: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
PPT ABS 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Certs to B3
PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
PRETSL COMBINATION: Moody's Raises Rating on Series P Certs to B2

PRIMUS CLO II: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E Notes
RPLMT 2014-1: Fitch Affirms Ratings After Revised Distributions
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certificates
SLM PRIVATE 2003-B: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B Loan
SLM PRIVATE 2003-C: Fitch Corrects Aug. 15 Release

STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lowers $205.8 Million of FHA/VA RMBS
SYMPHONY CLO XVII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
TELOS CLO 2016-7: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
TOWD POINT 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt

VENTURE IX CDO: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
VENTURE VII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
VENTURE VIII: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
VENTURE XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 (sf) Rating on Class E Debt
WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C3: Fitch Withdraws Rating on 4 Classes

WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C27: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2014-C22: Fitch Puts B Rating on 2 Cl. of Certs.
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Debt
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch to Rate Class X-E Debt at 'BB-sf'

WESTCHESTER CLO: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class D Notes
[*] DBRS Confirms Ratings on 37 Tranches From 13 Securities Deals
[*] DBRS Takes Rating Actions on 265 Classes From 98 RMBS Deals
[*] Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 US RMBS Housing Deals
[*] Fitch Lowers 169 Distressed Bonds in 90 RMBS Deals to 'Dsf'

[*] Moody's Hikes $1.5-Bil. of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $199.5MM Scratch and Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $240MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2004
[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $464MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS
[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $861MM Subprime RMBS From 2005-2006

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $238.9MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $58MM Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $74MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2003
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $859.3MM of Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS
[*] Moody's Ups Rating on $134MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Discontinues 'D' Ratings on 39 Classes From 29 CMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 7 Classes From 6 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 Prime RMBS Transactions
[] Moody's Hikes $146 Million of RMBS Issued From 2005

                            *********

ABCLO 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class A-2 notes.  ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in May 2007 and is managed
by AllianceBernstein L.P.

The upgrades reflect $104.9 million in paydowns to the class A-1a,
A-1b, and A-2 notes since S&P's October 2014 rating actions, which
have reduced the class A-2 notes' outstanding balance to 17.0% of
the original balance.  The class A-1a and A-1b notes are paid down.
At the same time, the portfolio's credit quality has improved.  As
of the Feb. 5, 2016, trustee report, which S&P used for this
review, 'CCC' rated assets are down to $900,000 (1.82%) from $8.4
million (5.32%) as of the Sept. 5, 2014, trustee report, which S&P
used for its October 2014 review.  There are no defaulted assets
currently in the portfolio, down from $4.4 million (2.7%) as of
Sept. 5, 2014.

The paydowns improved all of the tranches' overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios as reflected in the February 2016 monthly trustee
report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 3,523.65%, up from 151.03% in
      September 2014.

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 273.03%, up from 128.92% in
      September 2014.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 167.31%, up from 117.17% in
      September 2014.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 122.67%, up from 107.93% in
      September 2014.

S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes are driven by its largest
obligor default test, a supplemental stress test that addresses the
potential concentration of exposure to obligors in the
transaction's portfolio by assessing the effect of several of the
largest obligors defaulting simultaneously.  Although S&P's cash
flow analysis indicated a higher rating, the class C and D notes
can only pass the largest obligor default test at the 'AA' and 'BB'
rating category, respectively, even after running the supplemental
tests by giving benefit to excess spread.

The affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd.

                              Cash flow
          Previous            implied      Cash flow      Final
Class     rating              rating (i)   cushion (ii)   rating
A2        AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)     10.55%         AAA (sf)
B         AA+(sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)     10.55%         AAA (sf)
C         BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos  AAA (sf)     10.55%         AA+ (sf)
D         B+(sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)     5.77%          BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario          Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                    10% recovery  Correlation  Correlation
        Cash flow   decrease      increase     decrease
        implied     implied       implied      implied    Final
Class   rating      rating        rating       rating     rating
A2      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
C       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
D       AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                     DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                            Spread         Recovery
            Cash flow       compression    compression
            implied         implied        implied     Final
Class       rating          rating         rating      rating
A2          AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B           AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C           AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D           AA+ (sf)        AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

                            RATINGS LIST

ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-2     000744AC6    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       000744AD4    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C       000744AE2    AA+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D       000743AA2    BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


ACAS CLO IX: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to
six classes of notes to be issued by ACAS CLO IX, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $268,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2025, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  $44,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2025, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  $17,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2025, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  $22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2025, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $9,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2025, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)
  $9,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2025, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, and the Class D-2 Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

ACAS IX is a static cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be 100% ramped
as of the closing date.

American Capital CLO Management, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four month ramp-up period.
Thereafter, the Manager may not reinvest and all principal proceeds
will be used to make payments on the notes in accordance with the
note payment sequence.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.  The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
  Diversity Score: 68
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2661
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.84%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.00%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.3 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2661 to 3060)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -1
Class D-1 Notes: 0
Class D-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2661 to 3459)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -2
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -1
Class D-1 Notes: -1
Class D-2 Notes: --1



ALLSLC IV: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches in $252.2MM Bonds to CCC+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
bonds from Access To Loans For Learning Student Loan Corp.'s
(ALLSLC) series IV master trust.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative
implications on Jan. 8, 2016.  The downgrades reflect S&P's
assessment that the trust's available hard credit enhancement is
not sufficient to absorb the impact of the transaction's high cost
of funds in our cash flow scenarios.  The trust is a student loan
asset-backed securities trust collateralized by a pool of
consolidation loans originated through the U.S. Department of
Education's (ED) Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP).

The rating actions reflect S&P's views regarding future collateral
performance and the current credit enhancement available to support
the bonds, including overcollateralization (parity), subordination
for the senior bonds, and the reserve accounts.  S&P also
considered secondary credit factors, such as credit stability and
sector- and issuer-specific analyses, as well as a peer analysis.

CURRENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE(i)

                     Current       Bond                Maturity
Series     Class     balance ($)  factor(%)  Coupon    date
IV-A-8     Senior    24,100,000    70.9      Tax AR    July 2037
IV-A-10    Senior    15,900,000    68.5      T/E AR    July 2037
IV-A-11    Senior    100,000       0.3       T/E AR    July 2037
IV-A-13    Senior    14,863,040    9.3    3mLIB+0.20%  April 2024
IV-A-14    Senior    9,650,000     12.1      Tax AR   October 2042
IV-A-15    Senior    4,825,000     6.0       Tax AR   October 2042
IV-A-16    Senior    17,850,000    22.3      Tax AR   October 2042
IV-A-17    Senior    25,430,000    31.8      Tax AR   October 2042
IV-A-18    Senior    17,000,000    21.3      Tax AR   October 2042
IV-C-1     Sub.      7,000,000     23.3      T/E AR   January 2033
IV-D-1(ii) Jr. sub.  3,000,000     11.8      5.875%   January 2018

(i)As of the December 2015 servicer report.
Tax--Taxable.
T/E--Tax-exempt.
AR--Auction-rate.
3mLIB—Three-month LIBOR.
Jr. Subordinate bond not rated.

                      KEY STRUCTURAL FEATURES

The bonds were issued per a master trust indenture dated May 1,
1998.  The trust was restructured in 2013. Collateral was
transferred to a new discrete trust in exchange for cash, which was
used to redeem bonds at discounts to the par face amount.  The
current trust includes a senior LIBOR indexed bond (approximately
11% of the bonds), senior taxable auction-rate bonds (approximately
71% of the bonds), senior and subordinate tax-exempt auction-rate
bonds (ARS) (approximately 16% of the liabilities), and a junior
subordinate fixed-rate bond (approximately 2% of the liabilities).
Since auctions began failing in 2008, the trust has paid interest
to the ARS based on the maximum rate.

The maximum rate for taxable ARS (the senior auction-rate notes) is
defined as the least of:

   -- LIBOR plus a rating-dependent margin ranging from 2.0% to
      3.0%;
   -- Maximum legal rate; and
   -- 17.0%.

The maximum rate for tax-exempt ARS (the subordinate notes) is
defined as the least of:

   -- The greater of the after-tax equivalent rate or the SIFMA
      Municipal Swap Index, multiplied by a rating-dependent
      multiplier ranging from 200% to 250%;
   -- Maximum legal rate; and
   -- 14.0%.

The majority of the capital structure is senior auction-rate notes,
currently receiving LIBOR plus 3%. The LIBOR-indexed bonds are
subject to principal reduction payments per the targeted
amortization schedules outlined in the transaction documents.  The
LIBOR-indexed bonds mature in April 2024, but the targeted
amortization schedule reflects payment in full in October 2016. The
auction-rate bonds mature at dates between July 2037 and October
2042.  All of the bonds are subject to optional redemption at par
plus accrued interest on any interest payment date; however, any
redemptions are subject to meeting asset percentage requirements
(generally defined as total assets divided by total liabilities).
For optional redemptions, the trust must have a senior asset
percentage of 110%, subordinate asset percentage of 106%, and a
total asset percentage of 102%.  Because the targeted asset
percentages have not been reached, no optional redemptions have
been made.

The bonds are also subject to purchases in lieu of redemptions at
the option of the issuer.  The transaction documents require that
the purchase price cannot exceed the par amount of any bonds
purchased.  There are no targeted asset percentage requirements for
purchases in lieu of redemptions; however, no subordinate or junior
subordinate bonds can be purchased until all of the senior bonds
are paid in full.  As a result, only senior class ARS have been
purchased.

Releases of excess funds to the issuer are permitted, subject to a
senior asset percentage of 110%, subordinate asset percentage of
106%, and a total asset percentage of 102%.

                        COLLATERAL SUMMARY

The collateral in this pool is 100% FFELP loans with approximately
95% FFELP consolidation loans, and the balance of the pool is
Stafford/PLUS loans.  Loans originated under the FFELP program are
at least 97% guaranteed by the ED.  Approximately 56% of the loans
were disbursed after April 2006.  The loans that originated after
April 2006 do not benefit from "floor" income. Nonfloor income
loans require the trust to rebate the positive difference between
the borrowers' interest payments and special allowance payments
back to the ED, which limits the trust's available excess spread.
Since S&P's last full surveillance review in 2013, the liquidity
available to the trust has improved slightly as more loans have
come into repayment.

LOAN STATUS(i)
                             2015       2014       2013
Current   (%)                72.1       68.5       66.4
30-plus-day delinquent (%)    8.7       11.6       10.9
Forbearance (%)              12.2       12.6       11.8
Deferment (%)                 7.0        7.4       10.9

(i)As of December 2015.

                        CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

All of the classes of bonds benefit from a reserve fund, which
shall not be less than the greater of 0.75% of the aggregate
principal amount of the bonds outstanding or $500,000.  The senior
bonds benefit from the subordination of the subordinate and junior
subordinate bonds.  The subordinate bonds benefit from the
subordination of the junior subordinate bond.

Available hard credit enhancement to support the senior bonds--as
measured by parity levels--has increased since our last full
surveillance review in 2012, which is primarily attributable to the
restructuring in 2013 and the use of available funds to redeem
senior bonds.  Subordinate parity and total parity also increased
at the time of the restructuring and have since increased
slightly.

REPORTED PARITY(i)
                             2015       2014       2013
Senior(%)                   108.3      107.8      106.6
Subordinate(ii)(%)          102.8      102.9      102.5
Total(%)                    100.6      100.9      100.8

(i)As of December 2015.  
(ii)Subordinate parity generally defined as total assets divided by
the sum of the senior bonds and the subordinate bonds.

                             RATIONALE

S&P ran midstream cash flows for this trust under various interest
rate scenarios and rating stress assumptions.  S&P ran break-even
defaults, and these cash flow runs provided the break-even
percentages that represent the maximum amount of remaining
cumulative net losses the trust can absorb (as a percent of the
pool balance as of the cash flow cutoff date) in each rating
scenario while meeting full and timely payment of interest and
ultimate principal on the bonds.  These are some of the major
assumptions S&P modeled:

   -- Six- and seven-year default curves;
   -- Servicer claims rejection rates of 1.00%-1.25%;
   -- A delay after a default of a U.S. ED claim reimbursement;
   -- A two-month delay on special allowance payments and an
      interest rate subsidy;
   -- A flat voluntary prepayment speed of 3% annually and ramped
      voluntary prepayment speeds (ramped voluntary prepayments
      speeds start at 3% and increase annually over three to four
      years to a maximum of 5% to 6%, after which the rate is held

      constant);
   -- Forbearance rates ranging from 11.0% to 21.0% for 36 months;
   -- Deferment rates ranging from 8% to 12.0% for 36 months;
   -- One-month LIBOR interest rate paths (high and low) based on
      those that S&P publishes, as well as flat interest rates
      consistent with recent actual levels;
   -- Other indices that are stressed using their relationship to
      one-month LIBOR as a benchmark;
   -- Failed auctions for each transactions' life with auction-
      rate coupons based on their maximum rate definitions;
   -- Pro rata redemption of auction-rate securities by class; and
   -- Permitted releases of excess revenues down to the minimum
      required enhancement levels.

Since S&P's last review in 2012, the trust's hard credit
enhancement has increased largely because of its 2013
restructuring.  Additionally, more of the trust's loans have come
into repayment, and hard credit enhancement has increased primarily
due to discounted repurchases of senior taxable auction-rate
securities.  Despite these improvements, the exposure to the
maximum auction-rate definitions limits the trust's ability to
build hard enhancement in the absence of discounted repurchases
relative to other similar trusts with lower cost liabilities.
Additionally, excess spread will be lower in a rising interest rate
environment, which S&P's rating stress scenarios contemplate,
because of the associated increase in the cost of debt.

The downgrades of the senior (class A) auction-rate bonds reflect
S&P's view that while the transaction currently has senior parity
of 108.3% and sufficient capacity to meet its current debt service
obligations, in the absence of improvement in trust performance,
the trust may not be able to repay the principal balance of the
senior auction-rate bonds in full at their legal final maturity
dates due to the impact of negative excess spread.  The trust has
more than half of its collateral as nonfloor income loans and does
not have a net loan rate concept in its maximum rate definitions
that S&P has seen in other similar auction-rate trusts to limit the
impact of negative excess spread if interest rates increase. As a
result, even in S&P's cash flow scenarios with lower interest
rates, the bonds are vulnerable to default at legal final maturity.
Additionally, the payment in full of the junior subordinate bonds
at their legal final maturity in January 2018 will further reduce
the hard enhancement supporting the senior and subordinate bonds.
Accordingly, S&P lowered its rating on the senior auction-rate
bonds to 'CCC+ (sf)' to reflect their relative strength compared to
the subordinate auction-rate bonds.

Similarly, the subordinate (class C) auction-rate bond is also
affected by negative excess spread.  The subordinate bond has a
nearer-term legal final maturity, which gives the transaction less
time to grow sufficient credit enhancement to absorb the negative
excess spread before final principal payment is due and is
structurally junior to the senior bonds (cannot be repurchased at
discounts until the class A bonds have been paid in full or
optionally redeemed unless hard enhancement targets are
maintained).  Accordingly, S&P lowered its rating on the
subordinate bond to 'CCC (sf)'.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the student loan
receivables backing these transactions relative to its ratings and
the available credit enhancement to the classes.

RATINGS LOWERED

Access To Loans For Learning Student Loan Corp.

$252.2 million student loan program revenue bonds
                            Rating
Series           To                     From
IV-A-8           CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-A-10          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

$351 million student loan program revenue bonds
                            Rating
Series           To                     From
IV-A-11          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-C-1           CCC (sf)               B- (sf)/Watch Neg

$400 million student loan program revenue bonds
                            Rating
Series           To                     From
IV-A-14          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-A-15          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-A-16          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-A-17          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
IV-A-18          CCC+ (sf)              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg


ALLY AUTO 2016-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba Rating on Class D Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of notes to be issued by Ally Auto Receivables Trust (AART)
2016-1. This is the first public prime transaction of the year for
Ally Bank (Ally).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class A-1 Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

Class A-2-A Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Asset Backed Notes-, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-4 Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Class C Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Class D Asset Backed Notes, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying auto loans
and their expected performance, the strength of the structure, the
availability of excess spread over the life of the transaction, and
the experience and expertise of Ally Financial as servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AART 2016-1
pool is 0.75% and the Aaa Level is 7.00%. Moody's net loss
expectation and Aaa Level for AART 2016-1 are derived from an
analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral,
historical performance trends, the ability of Ally Financial, Inc.
to perform the servicing functions, and current expectations for
future economic conditions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if levels of credit protection are
higher than necessary to protect investors against current
expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could decline from Moody's
original expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor
defaults or appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US job market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit protection
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud. Additionally, Moody's could downgrade the
Class A-1 short-term rating following a significant slowdown in
principal collections that could result from, among other things,
high delinquencies or a servicer disruption that impacts obligor's
payments.


AMERICAN HOME 2005-SD1: Moody's Cuts Cl. I-A1 Debt Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche,
and downgraded the rating of one tranche issued from American Home
Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-SD1 backed by first and second-lien
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-SD1

  Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 10, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.  Group I pool consists both adjustable-rate and
fixed-rate first liens mortgage loans, and Group II consists of
fixed-rate second lien mortgage loans.  The rating upgraded is
primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement since Group II
principal is paid to the most senior bond, Class II-A1, and the
subordinate bond is not receiving principal.  The rating downgraded
is due to the erosion of credit enhancement available to Class
I-A1.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


APOLLO AVIATION 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Apollo Aviation Securitization Equity Trust 2016-1's $510
million fixed-rate notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by the two AOE issuers' series A, B, and C notes, which are in turn
backed by aircraft in the portfolio, aircraft-related leases, and
shares or beneficial interests in entities that directly and
indirectly receive aircraft portfolio leases and residual cash
flows.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 22,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The likelihood of timely interest on the class A notes
      (excluding the step-up amount) on each payment date, the
      timely interest on the class B notes (excluding the step-up
      amount) when they are the senior-most notes outstanding on
      each payment date, and the ultimate interest and principal
      payment on the class A, B, and C notes on the legal final
      maturity at the respective rating stress.

   -- The 63.62% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (based on the lower of
      the mean and median of the half-life base values and the
      half-life current market values) on the class A notes; the
      76.50% LTV ratio on the class B notes;

   -- and the 82.14% LTV ratio on the class C notes.

   -- The initial asset portfolio comprises 27 narrow-body
      passenger planes (17 from the A320 family and 10 B737-800)
      and five wide-body passenger planes (one A330-200, three
      A330-300, and one B777-200ER). Only one of the 32 aircraft
      (B777-200ER; 7% of the portfolio value) is out of
       production.

   -- The aircraft in the portfolio are in mid-life with a
      weighted average age (by value) of 14.8 years.  Currently,
      all the 32 aircraft are on lease with weighted average
      remaining maturity of 3.5 years.

   -- Some of the lessees are in emerging markets where the
      commercial aviation market is growing.  The class A and B
      notes follow a 12.4-years-to-zero amortization profile
      (straight-line amortization on 120 months in the first two
      years and straight-line amortization on 156 months
      thereafter); and the class C notes follow a 6.3-years-to-
      zero amortization profile (straight-line amortization on 60
      months for the first two years and straight-line
      amortization on 84 months thereafter).  Similar to the
      majority of the recently rated aircraft securitization
      transactions, this transaction has an expected final payment

      date (seven years after closing) after which the class A and

      B notes' amortization will be full turbo.  The class A and B

      notes have a partial cash sweep of 25% from four to six
      years after closing and 50% from six to seven years after
      closing.  The class C notes have a partial cash sweep of 75%

      18 months after closing and have a full cash sweep after
      month 42.  If a rapid amortization event (the debt service
      coverage ratio or utilization triggers have been breached or

      seven years after the initial closing date) has occurred and

      is continuing, the class A notes' outstanding principal
      balance will be paid from all available monthly cash flow.  
      If no rapid amortization event has occurred and is
      continuing but a disposition deficit has occurred, the class

      A notes will receive a disposition deficit amount.  A
      similar arrangement applies to the class B notes after the
      class A notes.

   -- A portion of the end-of-lease payments will be paid to the
      class A, B, and C notes according to a percentage equaling
      the aggregate then-current LTV ratio.

   -- There is a revolving credit facility that equals nine months

      of interest on the class A and B notes.  There is a series C

      reserve account (initially funded with $0.853 million) to
      cover the series C notes' interest in the first three
      months.  The remaining amount at the end of month three will

      be transferred to the collection account.

   -- ICF International will provide a maintenance analysis at
      closing.  After closing, Apollo Aviation Management Ltd.
      (AAML) will perform the maintenance analysis, which will be
      confirmed for reasonableness and achievability in an opinion

      letter from ICF International.  The senior maintenance
      reserve account, the junior reserve account, and the engine
      reserve account in aggregate must keep a balance of the
      higher of the lower of $1 million and the rated notes'
      outstanding notional amount and the sum of forward-looking
      maintenance expenses and engine reserve account payments (up

      to 12 months; for more details see the Maintenance Cash Flow

      Assumptions section).  Any excess maintenance amounts over
      the required amount will be transferred to the collection
      account.

   -- The senior indemnification (capped at $10 million) is
      modeled to occur in the first 12 months.

   -- The junior indemnification (uncapped) is subordinated to the

      rated classes' principal payment.

   -- AAML, an affiliate of Apollo Aviation Group LLC (a multi-
      strategy alternative investment firm specializing in
      commercial aviation investing), is the servicer for this
      transaction.  AAML is experienced in managing mid-life and
      older aircraft assets.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Apollo Aviation Securitization Equity Trust 2016-1

Class       Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A           A (sf)                      395
B           BBB (sf)                     80
C           BB (sf)                      35


BAMLL 2013-WNRK: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by BAMLL Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust, Series 2013-WBRK as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since closing, which is in line with DBRS’s
expectations at issuance. The transaction closed in April 2013 and
consists of a $360 million loan secured by the fee and leasehold
interest in Willowbrook Mall, an enclosed, partial two-story
super-regional mall located in Wayne, New Jersey. The fee interest
consists of approximately 495,000 square feet (sf) of major tenant
and in-line space while the leasehold interest consists of
approximately 28,000 sf of in-line space subject to a long-term
ground lease with Lord & Taylor. The mall is anchored by
Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Lord & Taylor and Sears, which do not serve
as collateral for the loan. The property is well located with a
2015 population of 1.37 million within a ten-mile radius, coupled
with strong income demographics as median household income is
$69,839 within a ten-mile radius and $84,851 within a five-mile
radius of the property.

The mall was built in 1969 and was most recently renovated in 2004
by the previous owner before being purchased by the current
sponsor, General Growth Properties Inc. According to a June 2015
news article published by NorthJersey.com, the property is
undergoing a renovation project to revitalize the look of the mall,
which commenced in June 2015. Improvements will include a new mall
entrance, a re-designed food court layout, installation of new
lights and other upgrades to common-area amenities. The structure
of the mall will not change and no additional leasable square
footage will be added to the property. It was known at closing that
the borrower was contemplating this project, but plans were not
finalized at that time. According to a July 2015 news article
published by Chron.com, the estimated cost of the project is
expected to exceed $10 million with an anticipated completion date
in late fall of 2016, which surpassed the original renovation
timeline of two years. DBRS has asked the servicer to confirm this
information. Construction work is being performed over night and
was halted during the holiday shopping season to prevent further
disruption for shoppers.

The property continues to exhibit strong occupancy rates with
occupancy at or above 97.0% since issuance. According to the
September 2015 rent roll, mall occupancy was 99.0% with an in-line
occupancy of 96.4%. Major in-line tenants include Old Navy (5.0% of
the net rentable area (NRA); lease expires in August 2016), Gap/Gap
Kids (3.8% of the NRA; lease expires September 2024) and Forever
XXI (3.1% of the NRA; lease expires in January 2019). According to
the servicer, the borrower is currently in negotiations with Old
Navy to relocate the tenant into a brand new two-level space
commencing in 2016 with an expected lease term of ten years. DBRS
has requested the details of the new lease terms from the servicer
and is awaiting a response. Nineteen tenants, occupying 14.0% of
the NRA, have leases that have expired or will be expiring in 2016;
however, three tenants (1.5% of the NRA) have either renewed the
leases at the same or increased rental rates or the space was
leased out to a new tenant at a similar rental rate. Three other
tenants (2.1% of the NRA) had leases that expired in January 2016,
but are still at the property according to the mall directory.
Leasing activity has been strong at the property as eight tenants
(5.6% of the NRA) have renewed or signed a new lease in 2015.
Notable tenants include Microsoft which replaced Guess, Against All
Odds which replaced Lane Bryant and Kids Footlocker which replaced
P.S. From Aeropostale. According to the September 2015 rent roll,
the mall-wide average rental rate was $59.67 per square foot (psf)
with a vacancy rate of 1.0% including the anchor tenants, which is
above the Passaic Route 46/23 submarket of Northern New Jersey
triple net rent of $22.00 psf and vacancy rate of 4.4% for eight
comparable retail properties, as reported by CoStar in March 2016.


The tenant sales report for the trailing 12-month period ending
September 2015 (T-12) showed consistency in overall in-line sales
performance for the property compared with YE2014 figures, with
tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf reporting T-12 sales of
$764.00 psf, a 1.6% increase from $752.00 psf at YE2014, and
tenants occupying more than 10,000 sf reporting T-12 sales of
$503.00 psf, a 0.2% increase from $502.00 psf at YE2014. Apple
reported a T-12 sales figure of $5,953 psf, which is a 3.3%
increase from $5,762 psf at YE2014, while Old Navy reported a T-12
sales of $524.00 psf, a 0.6% decrease from $527.00 psf at YE2014.
The property continues to exhibit strong performance with a Q3 2015
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.88 times (x), a decrease
from YE2014 DSCR of 2.98x but an improvement from the YE2013 DSCR
of 2.78x and the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 2.40x. The slight
decline in Q3 2015 net cash flow from the YE2014 figure is a result
of a decrease in expense reimbursements, percentage rent and
parking income; however, DBRS expects these figures to improve by
YE2015 when the figures are fully reported.



BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-ASHF: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to BAMLL
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ASHF's $325.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-ASHF.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan with four one-year extension options totaling $325.0
million, secured by cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
mortgages on the borrowers' fee interests in 17 full-service,
limited-service, and extended-stay hotels.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ASHF

Class        Rating            Amount ($)
A            AAA (sf)         121,200,000
X            B+ (sf)       325,000,000(i)
B            AA- (sf)          42,800,000
C            A- (sf)           30,800,000
D            BBB- (sf)         43,100,000
E            BB- (sf)          66,300,000
F            B+ (sf)           20,800,000

(i) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the A-1 portion of
the class A certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on G Notes to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's upgrades follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  The upgrades
also reflect S&P's expectation of the available credit enhancement
for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective
rating levels, S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance, and the reduced trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes F and G, S&P's analysis also considered
the classes' interest shortfall history and their susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support from the specially serviced asset ($7.4
million, 17.6%).

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $42.2 million, which is 3% of the pool balance at
issuance.  The pool currently includes four loans and one real
estate owned (REO) asset, down from 113 loans at issuance. One
asset is currently reported with the special servicer ($7.4
million, 17.6%) and one loan is defeased ($654,306, 1.6%).  The
master servicer, Keycorp Real estate Capital Markets Inc., reported
full- or partial-year 2015 financial information for all of the
loans in the pool.

For the three performing non-defeased loans, S&P calculated a 1.68x
Standard & Poor's weighted average DSC and 47.6% Standard & Poor's
weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.57% Standard &
Poor's weighted average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $50.6 million in principal
losses, or 3.8% of the original pool trust balance.

The largest loan in the pool is The Mercantile East Shopping Center
($28.7 million, 68.1%).  The loan is secured by a 261,260 -sq.-ft.
retail property in Ladera Ranch, Calif.  The reported DSC and
occupancy as of year-end 2014 were 2.01x and 97.9%, respectively.
It is S&P's understanding that Kohl's, which leases 36% of the net
rentable area, is set to close their store at this location.
Kohl's lease is expected to expire in January 2024, and removing
their rent results in a forecast DSC of 1.75x.

                      CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 10, 2016, trustee remittance report, one asset in
the pool was with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC.  The
Federal Way Center Office Building REO asset ($7.4 million, 17.6%)
is the second-largest asset in the pool and has $10.6 million in
total exposure.  The asset is secured by a 74,031-sq.-ft. office
property in Federal Way, Wash.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Aug. 28, 2009, due to imminent monetary default
and the asset became REO on Nov. 8, 2013.  There is a reported
appraisal reduction amount of $3.1 million.  LNR Partners LLC
stated that they are currently working through numerous deferred
maintenance issues and leasing efforts.  The reported DSC as of
September 2015 was 0.32x.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution, which it considers to be between 26%
and 59% of the outstanding asset balance.

RATINGS LIST

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-1
                                   Rating
Class          Identifier          To                From
F              05947UQA9           AA- (sf)          B- (sf)
G              05947UQC5           BB (sf)           CCC (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. XC Debt to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed five classes and downgraded the ratings on one
class in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, B, C and D, were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 63% since Moody's
last review.

The rating on the P&I class, A-J, was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes, E, F, G and H, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.9% of the
current balance, compared to 5.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $182.8
million from $2.04 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 86% of
the pool.

Nine loans, constituting 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-four loans have liquidated with a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $117.5 million (for an
average loss severity of 39%). Six loans, constituting 45% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Medical Mutual Headquarters ($47.1 million --
25.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 381,000 square foot (SF)
office building located in the central business district of
Cleveland, Ohio. The property is 100% leased to Medical Mutual of
Ohio and has served as the company's headquarters since 1990. The
tenant's lease expires in September 2020 and it does not have any
termination options. The loan transferred to special servicing due
to maturity default after the borrower was unable to pay off the
loan at the January 2016 maturity date. Due to the single tenant
exposure, Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $22.1 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (27% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 5% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $1.2 million (a 14% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 92% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 61% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106%, compared to 95% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.10X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.24X and 1.16X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Plaza Antonio Loan ($36.4 million -- 19.9% of
the pool), which is secured by a 105,000 SF retail complex that
includes nine buildings situated along Highway 241 in Rancho Santa
Margarita, California. The loan transferred to the special servicer
in January 2011 because the borrower indicated they could not
support amortized debt service payments. The special servicer
returned the asset to the master servicer in February 2014 with no
modification. As of October 2015 the property was 100% leased,
compared to 95.5% in January 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 113% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.88X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Mitsuwa Marketplace Loan ($15.4
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery
anchored retail store in Torrance, California. The top tenant,
Mitsuwa (lease expiration: September 2017), sub-leases space out to
specialty retailers, creating a Japanese-like market place. As of
September 2015, the property was 100% lease to Mitsuwa but was 91%
occupied. The loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 82% and
1.22X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Bayboro Loan ($9.7 million -- 5.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a three-story class B office
building located in St. Petersburg, Florida. As of February 2016,
the property was 92% leased. The borrower is in the process of
refinancing the loan and a payoff quote has been requested. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to
116% and 0.86X at the last review.


BBCMS TRUST 2015-SLP: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of BBCMS Trust 2015-SLP
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2015-SLP
(BBCMS 2015-SLP).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool.  The servicer provided year to date (YTD) Sept. 2015
financials for the portfolio and trailing 12 months (TTM) STR
reports for 55% of the assets.  Average RevPAR penetration for
hotels reporting was over 100%.  Fitch expects to review the
transaction again when year-end 2015 financial statements become
available.

The collateral consists of a diverse and granular pool of 127
limited service, extended stay and select service hotels located in
21 states.  Hotel flags include Fairfield Inn, Fairfield Inn &
Suites, Residence Inn, Springhill Suites, Courtyard, Hampton Inn,
Staybridge Suites, Homewood Suites, Comfort Suites, and Townplace
Suites.  No single asset comprises more than 2.3% of the pool.  The
portfolio does include approximately 20% exposure to certain energy
industry dependent markets in Texas, Colorado, and Oklahoma.  Fitch
remains concerned about the impact that recent volatility in the
oil and gas industry may have on overall economic performance in
these markets.  Additionally, three properties (3%) are located in
Bismarck, ND, which while not within the troubled Bakken shale
region, could see some collateral impact from the declining energy
market.  Fitch's analysis applied additional credit loss to account
for the potential negative performance impact.

Since issuance, eight properties (3.2% of the pool) from the
original pool of 135 hotels have been released resulting in pay
down of $18.4 million to the senior class.  Releases have included
five properties in energy dependent markets.

The transaction is sponsored by an affiliate of Starwood Capital
Group (Starwood).  Starwood is a global private investment firm
with a core focus on real estate.  Starwood created Starwood Hotels
& Resorts Worldwide, Inc. in 1995 and has since continued to
acquire and operate hotels throughout the world.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Should
portfolio performance remain stable or improve and properties
continue to be released, classes C through E could be upgraded in
the future.  All classes could be subject to downgrade should
performance decline.  Fitch will continue to monitor the impact to
the portfolio on the declining energy sector.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $181.6 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $68 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.1 million class C at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $76.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate Class F and V.



BEAR STEARNS 2006-PWR12: Moody's Hikes Cl. B Debt Rating to B1(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on seven classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-PWR12 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I class A-J and B were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down by 54% since Moody's last review. In
addition, loans constituting 37% of the pool that have debt yields
exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature within the next 6 months.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-1A, A-4 and A-M were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes, classes C through F, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.5% of the
current balance, compared to 6.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 70% to $615 million
from $2.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 77 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 53% of
the pool.

Sixty-two loan, constituting 77% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $121 million (for an average loss
severity of 52%). Seven loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Stone Mountain Square ($27.7 million -- 4.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 336,000 square feet (SF) anchored power
center located in Stone Mountain, Georgia. The loan transferred to
special servicing in January 2013 and became real estate owned
(REO) in August 2013. The asset is being marketed for sale and is
currently under contract.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $42.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 91% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to
93% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.08X,
respectively, compared to 1.32X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Woodland Mall Loan ($140.5 million -- 22.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a portion of a 1.2 million SF
regional mall located in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The collateral
consists of 397,000 SF of in-line tenant space. Excluded from the
collateral are shadow anchors, including Sears, JC Penney, Macy's
and Kohl's. As of December 2015, the collateral was 100% leased.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.85X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.84X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Broken Sound Portfolio Loan ($47.0
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 370,000 SF
portfolio, consisting of two class-A suburban office buildings, one
industrial, one mixed-use office/warehouse and one
retail/industrial buildings. As of January 2016, the portfolio was
73% leased, compared to 97% leased as of January 2015. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 125% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to
115% and 0.89X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Ardmore West Shopping Center Loan
($19.7 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 62,876
SF retail property located in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. The property
occupancy was 72% as of December 2015, a decrease from 98% as of
December 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 1.04X at the last review.


CAS 2016-C02: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating on Class 1M-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes on CAS 2016-C02, a securitization designed to
provide credit protection to the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) against the performance of a reference
pool of mortgages totaling approximately $36 billion.  All of the
Notes in the transaction are direct, unsecured obligations of
Fannie Mae, and as such investors are exposed to the credit risk of
Fannie Mae (Aaa Stable).

The complete rating action is:

  $342.3 million of Class 1M-1 notes, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)
  $599.0 million of Class 1M-2 notes, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

The Class 1M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for these
notes:

  $222.5 million of Class 1M-2A exchangeable notes, Assigned
   (P)Ba1(sf)
  $376.5 million of Class 1M-2B exchangeable notes, Assigned
   (P)B2 (sf)

The Class 1M-2A note holders can exchange their notes for these
notes:

  $222.5 million of Class 1M-2F exchangeable notes, Assigned
   (P)Ba1 (sf)
  $222.5 million of Class 1M-2I exchangeable notes, Assigned
   (P)Ba1 (sf)

CAS 2016-C02 is the eleventh transaction in the Connecticut Avenue
Securities series issued by Fannie Mae.  Unlike a typical RMBS
transaction, noteholders are not entitled to receive any cash from
the mortgage loans in the reference pool.  Instead, the timing and
amount of principal and interest that Fannie Mae is obligated to
pay on the Notes is linked to the performance of the mortgage loans
in the reference pool.

CAS 2016-C02's note write-downs are determined by actual realized
losses and modification losses on the loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to pre-set tiered severity schedules.  In addition,
the interest amount paid to the notes can be reduced by the amount
of modification loss incurred on the mortgage loans.  CAS 2016-C02
is also the third transaction in the CAS series to have a legal
final maturity of 12.5 years, as compared to 10 years in previous
fixed severity CAS securitizations.

Moody's rating on the transaction is based on both quantitative and
qualitative analyses.  This included a quantitative evaluation of
the credit quality of the reference pool and the impact of the
structural mechanisms on credit enhancement.  In addition, Moody's
made qualitative assessments of counterparty performance.

Moody's base-case expected loss for the reference pool is 1.10% and
is expected to reach 9.00% at a stress level consistent with a
(P)Aaa (sf) rating.

Below is a summary description of the transaction and Moody's
rating rationale.

The Notes

The Class 1M-1 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The Class 1M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.  The holders of the Class 1M-2
notes can exchange those notes for an Class 1M-2A exchangeable note
and an Class 1M-2B exchangeable note.

Additionally, the holders of the Class 1M-2A notes can exchange
those notes for the Class 1M-2F note and the Class 1M-2I note
(together with the Class 1M-2 note referred as the "RCR Notes").
The Class 1M-2I exchangeable notes are fixed rate interest only
notes that have a notional balance that equals the Class 1M-2A note
balance.  The Class 1M-2F notes are adjustable rate P&I notes that
have a balance that equals the Class 1M-2A note balance and an
interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

Fannie Mae will only make principal payments on the notes based on
the scheduled and unscheduled principal payments that are actually
collected on the reference pool mortgages.  Losses on the notes
occur as a result of credit events, and are determined by actual
realized and modification losses on loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to a pre-set loss severity schedule.  Fannie Mae is
obligated to retire the Notes in September 2028 if balances remain
outstanding.

Credit events in CAS 2016-C02 occur when a short sale is settled,
when a seriously delinquent mortgage note is sold prior to
foreclosure, when the mortgaged property that secured the related
mortgage note is sold to a third party at a foreclosure sale, when
an REO disposition occurs, or when the related mortgage note is
charged-off.  This differs from previous CAS fixed severity
securitizations, where credit events occur as early as when a
reference obligation is 180 or more days delinquent.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

As part of its analysis, Moody's considered historic Fannie Mae
performance and severity data, the eligibility criteria of loans in
the reference pool, and the high credit quality of the underlying
collateral.  The reference pool consists of loans that Fannie Mae
acquired between March 1, 2015, and May 31, 2015, and have no
previous 30-day delinquencies.  The loans in the reference pool are
to strong borrowers, as the weighted average credit scores of 752
indicate.  The weighted average CLTV of 76.00% is higher than
recent private label prime jumbo deals, which typically have CLTVs
in the high 60's range, but is similar to the weighted average
CLTVs of other CAS transactions.

                     Structural Considerations

Moody's took structural features such as the principal payment
waterfall of the notes, a 12.5-year bullet maturity, performance
triggers, as well as the allocation of realized losses and
modification losses into consideration in our cash flow analysis.
The final structure for the transaction reflects consistent credit
enhancement levels available to the notes per the term sheet
provided for the provisional ratings.

For modification losses, Moody's has taken into consideration the
level of rate modifications based on the projected defaults, the
weighted average coupon of the reference pool (4.00%), and compared
that with the available credit enhancement on the notes, the coupon
and the accrued interest amount of the most junior bonds.  The
Class 1B and Class 1B-H reference tranches each represent 1.00% of
the pool.  The final coupons on the notes will have an impact on
the amount of interest available to absorb modification losses from
the reference pool.

The ratings are linked to Fannie Mae's rating.  As an unsecured
general obligation of Fannie Mae, the rating on the notes will be
capped by the rating of Fannie Mae, which Moody's currently rates
Aaa (stable).

Collateral Analysis

The reference pool consists of 146,193 loans that meet specific
eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first lien, fixed
rate, fully amortizing loans with an original term of 301-360
months and LTVs that range between 60% and 80% on one to four unit
properties.  Overall, the reference pool is of prime quality.  The
credit positive aspects of the pool include borrower, loan and
geographic diversification, and a high weighted average FICO of
752.  There are no interest-only (IO) loans in the reference pool
and all of the loans are underwritten to full documentation
standards.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS," published in February 2015.

While assessing the ratings on this transaction, Moody's did not
deviate from its published methodology.  The severities for this
transaction were estimated using the data on Fannie Mae's actual
loss severities.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of our website, www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck.

Reps and Warranties

Fannie Mae is not providing loan level reps and warranties (RWs)
for this transaction because the notes are a direct obligation of
Fannie Mae.  Fannie Mae commands robust RWs from its
seller/servicers pertaining to all facets of the loan, including
but not limited to compliance with laws, compliance with all
underwriting guidelines, enforceability, good property condition
and appraisal procedures.  To the extent that a lender repurchases
a loan or indemnifies Fannie Mae discovers as a result of an
confirmed underwriting eligibility defect in the reference pool,
prior months' credit events will be reversed.  Moody's expected
credit event rate takes into consideration historic repurchase
rates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

                                Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

                               Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.  As an unsecured general obligation of Fannie
Mae, the ratings on the notes depend on the rating of Fannie Mae,
which Moody's currently rates Aaa.


CGGS COMMERCIAL 2016-RND: Fitch to Rate Class E-FX Debt 'BB-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on CGGS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-RND Pass Through Certificates, Series
2016-RND.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

Pool A
-- $607,700,000a class A-FX notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $486,160,000ab class X-FX-CP notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $607,700,000ab class X-FX-NCP notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $134,300,000a class B-FX notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78,000,000a class C-FX notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $122,000,000a class D-FX notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $173,000,000a class E-FX notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Pool B
-- $417,500,000a class A-FL notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $334,000,000ab class X-FL-CP notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $417,500,000ab class X-FL-NCP notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93,500,000a class B-FL notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,000,000a class C-FL notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,000,000a class D-FL notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based upon information provided as of
March 8, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial interest in a trust that
holds two loans, each consisting of a separate collateral pool and
secured primarily by lab office properties. The two loans in the
trust consist of: one five-year, fixed-rate, interest-only $1.115
billion mortgage loan secured by the fee and leasehold interests in
30 lab office properties and one multifamily property with a total
of 4.6 million square feet (sf) (Pool A); and one two-year,
floating-rate, interest-only $658 million mortgage loan secured by
the fee and leasehold interests in 28 lab office properties with a
total of 4 million sf (Pool B).

Proceeds from the loans were used to facilitate Blackstone Real
Estate Partners VIII's acquisition of BioMed Realty Trust Inc.
(BioMed), a public REIT that owns, manages, and develops office and
laboratory space. On Jan. 27, 2016, Blackstone and certain of its
affiliates and subsidiaries completed the acquisition of BioMed for
total consideration of approximately $8.8 billion. The properties
securing the loans represent a substantial portion of BioMed's
stabilized lab office portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Assets: Both Pool A and Pool B are collateralized by
portfolios of high-quality lab office properties located in highly
desirable and in-fill life science submarkets. Pool A received a
weighted average (WA) Fitch property quality grade of 'A-/B+' and
over one-half (as a percentage of NOI) of the properties were built
since 2000. Pool B received a WA Fitch property quality grade of
'B+' and approximately 75% of properties were built since 2000.

Pool Diversity: Pool A is collateralized by the fee (28) and
leasehold (three) interests in 31 (4.6 million sf) properties
located across three states and four distinct markets. Pool B is
collateralized by the fee (25) and leasehold (three) interests in
28 (4 million sf) lab office buildings located across 10 states.
The largest tenant exposure for Pool A is 10.9% by total base rent
(Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), while Pool B is more concentrated
with its largest individual exposure at 36.9% (Regeneron
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.).

Trust Leverage: Pool A's Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV for the $1.115
billion mortgage loan are 1.04x and 86.4%, respectively. Pool B's
Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV for the $658 million trust mortgage
loan are 1.30x and 69.2%, respectively.

Institutional Sponsorship: The sponsor of the loans will be
Blackstone Real Estate Partners VIII, which is owned by affiliates
of the Blackstone Group, L.P. (Blackstone; rated 'A+/F1'). As of
Sept. 30, 2015, Blackstone had more than $330 billion in assets
under management.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch found that Pool A could withstand a 73.9% decline in value
and an approximate 53% decline in Fitch's implied net cash flow
prior to experiencing $1 of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class. Pool B
could withstand a 74.7% decline in value and an approximate 56.1%
decline in Fitch's implied net cash flow prior to experiencing $1
of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class. Fitch performed several stress
scenarios in which the Fitch net cash flow (NCF) was stressed.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A-FX and
found that a 10% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 36% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade. Fitch also evaluated the
sensitivity of the ratings for class A-FL and found that a 10%
decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a one-category
downgrade, while a 37% decline would result in a downgrade to below
investment grade.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on ABS Due Diligence Form-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to the
mortgage loan and related mortgaged properties in the data file.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis, and the findings
did not have an impact on its analysis.


CIG AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Discontinues Provisional BBsf Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. discontinued its provisional ratings on the CIG Auto
Receivables Trust 2016-1 (CIGAR 2016-1) securities. CIGAR 2016-1,
an auto loan securitization transaction, has been withdrawn from
the market.

-- Series 2016-1, Class A, previously rated A (sf), is now rated
    Disc. -- Withdrawn

-- Series 2016-1, Class B, previously rated BBB (sf), is now
    rated Disc. -- Withdrawn

-- Series 2016-1, Class C, previously rated BB (sf), is now rated

    Disc. -- Withdrawn


CITI HELD 2016-PM1: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assigns these ratings to Citi Held for
Asset Issuance 2016-PM1 (CHAI 2016-PM1), which consists of notes
backed by marketplace loans serviced by Prosper Funding, LLC
(Prosper):

   -- $212,325,000 class A notes at 'A-sf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24,850,000 class B notes at 'BBB-sf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41,210,000 class C notes at 'Bsf(EXP)'; Outlook Stable.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Collateral Quality: The 2016-PM1 trust pool consists of
100% unsecured, fixed-rate, fully amortizing, consumer loans that
have either 36- or 60-month original loan terms, as well as
originated and serviced on Prosper's marketplace online lending
platform.  The pool exhibits a weighted average FICO score of 704
and a weighted average borrower rate of 13.57%.

Sufficient CE and Liquidity Support: The initial hard credit
enhancement (CE) for class A, B and C is expected to be 33.00%,
25.10% and 12.00%, respectively.  Liquidity support is provided by
a nondeclining reserve account, which will be fully funded at
closing at 0.50% of the initial pool balance.  Transaction cash
flows were satisfactory under all stressed scenarios, commensurate
with the expected ratings.

Untested Performance through a Full Economic Cycle: Loans
originated and serviced via online platforms, such as Prosper's, do
not yet have a performance history through a recessionary
environment.  Furthermore, as the underlying consumer loans are
unsecured and primarily intended for debt consolidation, Fitch
expects borrowers to treat paying down these loans as a lower
priority relative to other borrowings, such as an auto loan or a
mortgage.  As such, the pool could experience especially elevated
default frequency in an economic downturn.  Fitch placed a rating
cap on this transaction of 'Asf'.

Satisfactory Servicing Capabilities: Prosper will service all the
loans in the 2016-PM1 trust, and Citibank, N.A. will act as the
backup servicer.  Fitch considers the servicing operations of
Prosper of consumer loans to be acceptable and Citibank, as a
backup servicer, to be effective.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or chargeoffs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the investments.  Decreased CE may
make certain ratings on the investments susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case charge-off assumption by 1.5x, 2.0x, and 2.5x and
examining the rating implications.  Under the 1.5x base case stress
scenario, class A and B notes would fall below investment grade.
Under the 2.0x base case stress scenario, class A and B notes would
be downgraded to 'B+sf' and 'Bsf', respectively.  Under the 2.5x
base case stress scenario, class A notes would be downgraded to
'Bsf', and class B notes would fall to distressed category ratings.
Under all three stressed scenarios, class C notes would fall to
'CCCsf'.

Additionally, loans originated and serviced via online platforms
such as Prosper's are still relatively new, and may be subject to
regulatory scrutiny over concerns such as the 'true lender' among
the parties and violations of state usury laws.  Fitch believes it
to be unlikely that this transaction will be materially affected by
such regulatory actions.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis by assuming 0% recoveries
on all chargeoffs.  In such a scenario, the class A and B notes
would likely suffer a one notch downgrade; the class C notes would
retain their 'Bsf' rating.



CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC19 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC19 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance, with cash flows remaining
generally in line with the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. The
collateral consists of 72 fixed-rate loans secured by 128
commercial properties. At issuance, the transaction had a DBRS
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS
WA debt yield of 1.43 times (x) and 8.9%, respectively. As of the
February 2016 remittance, 51 loans (75.5% of the pool) reported Q3
2015 cash flows, while 26 loans (22.8% of the pool) reported YE2015
cash flows. DBRS is still waiting on updated financials for the 335
West 16th Street loan (Prospectus ID#8, 2.8% of the pool). For the
14 loans reporting 2015 cash flows in the Top 15, the WA amortizing
DSCR was 1.67x, with a WA net cash flow (NCF) growth over the
respective DBRS UW figures of approximately 14.6%. All 78 loans
remain in the pool with an aggregate balance of $1.0 billion,
representing a collateral reduction of approximately 1.5% since
issuance as a result of scheduled loan amortization.

There is one loan in the Top 15, Mid-City Plaza (Prospectus ID#13,
1.8% of the pool), exhibiting a YE2015 NCF indicative of a 12.7%
cash flow decline when compared with the DBRS UW figure. The loan
is secured by a 218,144 square foot (sf) anchored retail center
located in North Tonawanda, New York, approximately ten miles north
of Buffalo and 11 miles southeast of Niagara Falls. The property
consists of seven one-story buildings with the improvements
originally constructed in 1958 and additional buildings completed
in 2004. As of Q3 2015, the loan had an annualized DSCR of 1.55x
compared with the DBRS UW figure of 1.61x; however, the partial
2015 figure did not include the full amount of rental
reimbursements, which, if included, would total an annualized NCF
of approximately $2.3 million. Factoring in these reimbursements,
the loan would reflect a DSCR of approximately 1.95x. It should be
noted that total operating expenses also exhibited a 20.1% decline
compared with the DBRS UW figures, primarily because of a decline
in real estate taxes (19.3%) and insurance (99.5%) expense, which
generally have minor variances year to year. As of YE2015, the loan
reported a DSCR that had further eroded to 1.41x. DBRS has
contacted the servicer regarding an updated breakdown of the
expenses reimbursements, as well as the operating expense line
items.

As of September 2015, the property was 93.3% occupied with an
average triple net (NNN) rental rate of $12.18 psf NNN compared
with 94.5% with an average rental rate of $12.10 psf NNN at
issuance. According to CoStar, as of YE2015, the North Retail
submarket of Buffalo reported a vacancy rate of 5.5% with an
average rental rate of $10.94 psf NNN. The three largest tenants
include Top Markets (26% of the net rentable area (NRA)),
Grossman’s Bargain Outlet (11.4% of the NRA) and Dollar Tree
(4.4% of the NRA), with lease expiration dates of July 2024, March
2019 and January 2021, respectively. Rollover in the next 24 months
is minimal, as only two tenants, representing 5.7% of the pool,
have lease expirations.

As of the February 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and seven loans, representing 6.1% of the pool, on the
servicer's watchlist. Four of these loans, representing 3.7% of the
pool, were flagged because of items of deferred maintenance, while
the remaining three loans, representing 2.4% of the pool, were
flagged for performance-related reasons. According to the 2015 cash
flows reported (both Q3 2015 and YE2015 figures), these loans had a
WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 0.90x and 6.3%, respectively, compared
with the DBRS UW figures of 0.90x and 8.2%, respectively. DBRS has
highlighted one of these loans in detail below.

The 334-336 West Street 46th Street loan (Prospectus ID#35, 0.9% of
the pool) is secured by an 11,600-sf mixed-used building,
originally constructed between 1900 and 1920, with renovations most
recently completed in 2005 and 2014. The subject is located in
Manhattan, New York, and comprises one ground floor retail unit
(34.5% of the NRA) leased to Kosher Restaurant, two two-bedroom
units (24.3% of the NRA) and eight one-bedroom units (41.2% of the
NRA). The borrower acquired the property in late 2013 for $11.25
million, investing approximately $3.5 million of cash equity.

The loan was placed on the servicer's watchlist in February 2014 as
a result of a low YE2014 DSCR of 0.70x compared with the DBRS UW
figure of 1.15x. At the time, the decline in performance was a
result of a rental abatement for the restaurant tenant. In January
2014, the Kosher Restaurant signed a 15-year lease with a fixed
3.0% annual rental rate increase and received an initial six-month
rental abatement period, which was used to build out the tenant's
space, as it was delivered as-is with no tenant improvement
allowance. According to CoStar, as of YE2015, the Midtown Retail
submarket reported a vacancy rate of 5.5% with an average rental
rate of $100.67 psf compared with the current tenant's rental rate
of $115.87 psf. As of YE2015, performance increased moderately with
a DSCR of 0.85x. This figure is representative of a 43.0% decline
in estimated gross income when compared with the DBRS UW figures,
as a result of increased vacancy and declining rental rates of the
ten apartment units throughout 2015. It appears that three of the
apartment units were vacant for at least six months of the year;
however, according to the December 2015 rent roll, all units are
currently occupied. As of December 2015, the one-bedroom units had
an average rental rate of $2,925 per unit compared with $3,400 at
issuance, while the two-bedroom units had an average rental rate of
$4,900 compared with $6,000 at issuance. According to REIS, as of
YE2015, the Midtown West submarket reported that one-bedroom units
had an average rental rate of $4,314, while two-bedroom units had
an average rental rate of $6,220, both well above the subject
property’s rates.

The sponsors of the loan are brothers Salim and Isaac Assa, who are
the key principals of Assa Properties, a full-service real estate
development, acquisition and management firm based in New York, New
York, with over 3.0 million sf of assets located throughout the
United States and Mexico. According to an article dated February
15, 2015, by "Crain's New York Business," the City of New York has
sued Mr. Assa for running an "illegal hotel operation” at the
subject property and two other residential buildings he owns in the
area. These operations have reportedly resulted in approximately
$100,000 in outstanding fines for 36 unpaid violations, 16 of which
were attributed to the subject property. At issuance for the COMM
2013-CCRE6 transaction, which also contains a loan cosponsored by
the Assa brothers (Prospectus ID #14, 70 West 45th Street), DBRS
noted previous legal issues for the sponsors that included a
voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the entity that previously
owned the property. For additional information on the CCRE6
property sponsored by the Assa brothers, please refer to the press
release for that transaction dated January 16, 2016. To capture the
additional risk associated with the sponsors' legal issues, DBRS
elevates the probability for default for both the subject loan and
the CCRE6 loan in the modeling for each respective transaction.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Series 2014-GC21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since closing in May 2014. At issuance, the
transaction consisted of 64 fixed-rate loans secured by 99
commercial properties. The pool had a DBRS underwritten
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS
WA debt yield of 1.39 times (x) and 8.5%, respectively. As of the
February 2016 remittance, loans representing 81.9% of the current
pool balance reported YE2014 financials and loans representing
10.5% of the pool reported YE2015 financials, while loans
representing 84.2% of the pool reported 2015 partial-year
financials. Based on the most recent financials available, the Top
15 loans reported a WA amortizing DSCR of 1.60x, with a WA net cash
flow growth over the respective DBRS underwritten figures of 16.0%.
All loans remain in the pool, with a collateral reduction of 1.4%
since issuance as a result of scheduled loan amortization.

As of the February 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and six loans are on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 8.2% of the current pool balance. The majority of the
watchlisted loans were flagged for non-performance issues relating
to deferred maintenance or near-term tenant rollover risk. The
loans flagged for upcoming tenant lease expirations have either
successfully extended their leases or are in negotiations with the
respective tenants, according to the servicer. The largest loan and
two watchlisted loans are discussed below.

The Maine Mall loan (Prospectus ID#1, 12.2% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 730,000 square feet (sf) portion of a 1.0
million sf super-regional mall in South Portland, Maine.
Non-collateral anchors at the property include Macy’s and Sears,
while collateralized anchor tenants include The Bon Ton, JC Penney,
Best Buy and Sports Authority. According to the September 2015 rent
roll, collateral occupancy was 97.5%, which is consistent with the
YE2014 occupancy of 98.2%. Six tenants, representing 5.6% of the
net rentable area (NRA), have leases that have expired or will be
expiring in 2016, including Gap (2.2% of NRA) and Lane Bryant (0.8%
of NRA), both of which vacated the property at their respective
January 2016 lease expirations. Eleven tenants, occupying 6.9% of
the NRA, have renewed or signed new leases in 2015. According to
the September 2015 rent roll, the average rental rate was $26 per
square foot (psf) with a vacancy rate of 2.5%, compared with the
Southwest Cumberland County submarket average triple net rent of
$14 psf with a vacancy rate of 14.2% for retail properties, as
reported by CoStar.

The tenant sales reporting for the trailing 12 months period ending
September 2015 (T-12) showed consistent in-line sales for the
property compared with YE2014 figures, with JC Penney and Sports
Authority reporting flat sales of $117 psf and $110 psf,
respectively. Apple reported a T-12 sales figure of $6,599 psf, a
3.3% increase from YE2014 sales of $6,388 psf. Forever 21 reported
a T-12 sales figure of $195 psf, a 2.5% decrease from the YE2014
sales of $200 psf, and Gap, which is no longer at the property,
reported a T-12 sales of $137 psf, a 12.7% decrease from YE2014
sales of $157 psf. Overall, tenants occupying less than 10,000 sf
reported T-12 sales of $564 psf, which is a 1.2% increase from
YE2014 sales of $558 psf, while tenants occupying more than 10,000
sf reported T-12 sales of $218 psf, which is a 1.4% decrease from
YE2014 sales of $221 psf. The property continues to exhibit strong
performance with a Q3 2015 amortizing DSCR of 1.98x, an increase
from YE2014 DSCR of 1.87x and the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.59x.
The loan also benefits from sponsorship from General Growth
Properties, Inc.

The Independence Realty Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#16, 1.5% of
the current pool balance) is secured by three industrial properties
in Tampa, Florida, consisting of 216,000 sf of space. This loan was
placed on the watchlist in March 2015 when the DSCR fell to 0.71x
as a result of increased operating expenses. According to the
YE2015 operating statement analysis report (OSAR), the DSCR was at
1.00x at 81.2% occupancy, which is a decline from the YE2014 DSCR
of 1.08x at 85.0% occupancy and the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.13x
with an in-place occupancy of 87.1% at closing. The decline in net
cash flow was attributed to decreases in base rental revenue and
expense reimbursements. The base rental revenue of approximately
$1.2 million at YE2015 decreased by 9.8% from the YE2014 figure and
11.4% from the DBRS underwritten level. Expense reimbursements of
approximately $565,000 decreased by 13.6% from the YE2014 figure
and 9.6% from the DBRS underwritten amount. According to the
September 2015 rent roll, fourteen tenants, representing 21.4% of
the NRA, have leases that have expired or will be expiring in 2016.
This includes the former second-largest tenant, Capital Collateral
Regional (6.2% of NRA), which vacated the property at the December
2015 lease expiration, as per the servicer’s commentary. CoStar
reported approximately 38,000 sf of space (17.4% of NRA) as
available at the property, with asking triple net rent ranging
between $6 to $8 psf, which included Capital Collateral
Regional’s former space. Properties in the East Tampa/St.
Petersburg submarket reported an average rental rate of $17 psf
with a vacancy rate of 14.6% and availability rate of 16.4%, which
is below the subject’s vacancy rate of 18.8% and availability
rate of 17.4%. Given the declining trend in occupancy, this loan
was modeled based off of the YE2015 net cash flow.

The Newcastle North loan (Prospectus ID#29, 1.0% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a 112,000 sf office and R&D building
located within the Imperial Center Business Park in Durham, North
Carolina. The property is unique as it features a combination of
office and high-quality laboratory space. The subject property
serves as the global headquarters and technology center for the
single tenant, Reichhold Inc., now named Reichhold Liquidation,
Inc. (Reichhold). This loan was placed on the watchlist in May 2015
because Reichhold filed for voluntary protection under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the restructuring of the
debts for the U.S. portion of the Reichhold global organization. In
January 2015, Reichhold successfully emerged from bankruptcy after
the purchase of Reichhold’s assets was completed. During that
time, a debt-to-equity exchange was completed with a group of
high-profile investors; as a result, Reichhold is now owned by
those investors.

At issuance, the borrower pledged $1.8 million in the form of a
letter of credit as additional security for the lease, but it
expired in July 2015; however, the borrower replaced the letter of
credit with a cash deposit, which has been placed in a reserve.
According to the December 2015 rent roll, the property was 100%
occupied by Reichhold at an average rental rate of $11 psf with
annual rent steps of 3.0% until the January 2025 lease expiration.
The tenant has one five-year extension option at free market rent.
As per the Q3 2015 financials, the DSCR was at 1.77x, which is an
increase from the YE2014 DSCR of 1.56x and the DBRS underwritten
DSCR of 1.35x.


COBALT CMBS 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on eight classes,
affirmed seven classes and confirmed one class of COBALT CMBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-MFX, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-JFL, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-JFX, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. E, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. F, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes A-3 and A-1A, were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on eight P&I classes, Classes A-M through E, were
upgraded primarily due to an increase in credit support resulting
from the $250 million paydown of the Peter Cooper Village and
Stuyvesant Town loan in this pool. This loan was the main
contributor to the overall pool paydown of 14% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on Class F was confirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss. The ratings on four P&I
classes, Classes G through K, were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its reference classes.

The rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 12 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.8% of the
current balance compared to 7.5% at last review. The deal has paid
down 14% since last review and 33% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 9.4% compared to 9.3% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $1.6 billion
from $2.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 113 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 42% of
the pool. Eight loans, constituting 8% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities. The Peter Cooper
Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan has paid off in full with no loss.
In addition to the principal proceeds, outstanding interest
shortfalls for this deal were paid down in full through Class J.

Twenty-one loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $83.2 million. Twelve loans,
constituting 10% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $63 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (38% expected loss on average). Moody's
has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly performing
loans, constituting 11% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate
loss of $39 million (a 21% expected loss on average) from these
troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 95% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106%, compared to 103% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 1.29X and 1.01X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 75 Broad Street Loan ($243.5 million -- 14.9%
of the pool), which is secured by a 648,000 square foot (SF) office
telecom building located in the Financial District of New York. The
property was 94% leased as of September 2015 compared to 95% leased
as of December 2014. The largest tenants include Internap (12% of
the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration December 2016) and
the Millennium High School (12% of the NRA; lease expiration
September 2018). The loan is interest only for its entire term.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.77X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is The Woodies Building Loan ($163
million -- 10.0% of the pool) which is secured by two buildings
totaling 484,200 SF with street level retail and office space
above. These properties are located in the East End sub-market of
Washington, D.C. The office component represents 73% of the NRA and
is predominantly leased to government agencies. The largest office
tenants are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (34% of the total
NRA; lease expiration July 2020), the National Endowment of
Democracy (13% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2021) and the
Border Patrol (10% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2016). The
largest retail tenants are Forever 21, H&M, Madame Tussauds and
Zara. As of February 2015 the property was 99% leased, the same as
at last review. The loan has amortized 5% since securitization and
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 102% and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest loan is 90 Merrick Avenue ($38.0 million -- 2.3%
of the pool), which is secured by a 242,659 SF, nine-story suburban
office building located in East Meadow, New York. Property
occupancy has been stable for the past three years and the
property's financial performance has increased in 2015. The loan is
interest only and matures February 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 101% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.92X
at last review.


COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class J Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in COMM 2003-LNB1 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as:

  Cl. H, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on class Class H was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 10% since Moody's last
review.  Additionally, defeasance represents 14% of the pool
balance.

The rating on Class J was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss plus cumulative realized losses.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is 4.7% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.  

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $12 million
from $846 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 10% to
64% of the pool.  One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Eleven loans have been liquidated with a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $39 million (for an
average loss severity of 56%).  There are currently no loans on the
watchlist or in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 and full year 2015 operating
results for 100% of the pool.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

The three non-defeased loans represent 86% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Shaw's Merrimack Loan ($8 million -- 64% of the
pool), which is secured by an approximately 65,000 square foot (SF)
retail property located in Merrimack, New Hampshire.  The property
is 100% leased to Shaw's Supermarket.  The lease is coterminous
with the loan maturity, and the loan is fully amortizing.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
91% and 1.19X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens Canton Mart Loan ($1.5
million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
15,000 SF single tenant retail property located in Jackson,
Mississippi.  The property is 100% leased to Walgreens.  The lease
is coterminous with the loan maturity, and the loan is fully
amortizing.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.64X,
respectively, compared to 44% and 2.34X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens Lake Harbour Loan ($1
million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
14,400 SF single tenant retail property located in Ridgeland,
Mississippi.  The property is 100% leased to Walgreens.  The lease
is coterminous with the loan maturity, and the loan is fully
amortizing.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and 2.32X,
respectively, compared to 51% and 2.02X at the last review.


COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed the ratings of eight classes of COMM 2007-FL14 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL14 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-3-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-5-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of P&I Classes J and K were upgraded due to a decrease
in Moody's expected loss. The ratings of P&I Classes Class G and H
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss. The ratings of P&I Classes D, E and F were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan to
value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) are within acceptable ranges. The affirmations of
interest-only (IO) Classes X-3SG and X-5SG were affirmed based on
the credit performance of their referenced loan, the New Jersey
Office Portfolio loan. The affirmation of IO Class X-2 is due to
the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its referenced
classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2016 Payment Date, the transaction's
certificate balance has declined by 98% to $55.1 million from $2.5
billion at securitization due to the payoff of 11 loans and the
partial pay down of the one remaining loan, the New Jersey Office
Portfolio loan. The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan was
transferred to special servicing in January 2011.

The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan is secured by four office
buildings and one industrial building leased as an exhibition
center totaling 945,310 square feet. Two additional office
buildings originally in the portfolio were sold and released from
the loan collateral. The properties are located in Franklin
Township, New Jersey. As of the December 2015 rent rolls the
portfolio was 51% leased compared to 48% at securitization. The
loan is REO via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure that closed in April
2012. The properties have been listed for sale and the marketing of
the properties is ongoing. The whole loan in the amount of $74.2
million includes subordinate mortgage debt held outside the trust
in the amount of $19.1 million. The properties are challenged by
high market vacancy.


COMM 2007-FL14: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class D
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM 2007-FL14,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five other classes from
the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction in
which S&P primarily used its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian
CMBS transactions; under these critera, S&P re-evaluated the
transaction collateral, and S&P reviewed the deal structure and
liquidity available to the trust.

The higher rating on class D further reflects the significantly
reduced pool trust balance, S&P's expectation of the credit
enhancement available to the class, which S&P believes is greater
than its estimates of credit enhancement necessary at the most
recent rating level, and S&P's view of the current and future
performance of the transaction’s collateral.

While the available credit enhancement level suggests further
positive rating movement on class D, S&P's analysis also considered
the class' susceptibility to reduced liquidity support because the
sole remaining asset in the pool, the New Jersey Office Portfolio
real estate owned (REO) asset, is currently with the special
servicer.

The affirmations on five other classes reflect S&P's expectation
that the available credit enhancement for these classes will be
within S&P's estimate of the credit enhancement required for the
current ratings.  The affirmations also reflect S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral, the transaction structure, and the liquidity support
available to the classes.

As of the March 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of the New Jersey Office Portfolio REO asset.  The asset
pays interest at one-month LIBOR (0.427%) plus 0.9132% with a $55.1
million pooled trust balance and an additional $19.1 million
subordinate balance held outside the trust.  The pooled trust has
incurred $211,857 of principal losses to date.

S&P's property-level analysis of the New Jersey Office Portfolio
REO asset included a revaluation of the two remaining office
properties totaling 945,864 sq. ft. in Franklin Township, N.J.,
that serve as collateral in the trust.  An office property,
totaling 207,812 sq. ft., was sold in 2014.  S&P based its
analysis, in part, on a review of the servicer-reported net
operating income (NOI) for the years ended Dec. 31, 2010, through
2014, and the trailing 12-months-ended June 30, 2015.  The overall
properties were 51.1% occupied according to the Oct. 6, 2015, rent
rolls.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a debt
service coverage of 4.49x for the 12-months-ended June 30, 2015.
S&P derived its sustainable net cash flow, which it divided by a
Standard & Poor's capitalization rate of 7.50% to determine our
expected case value.  This yielded a Standard & Poor’s
loan-to-value ratio of over 100% on the pool trust balance.

The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 9, 2011,
due to monetary default, and the property became REO on April 24,
2012.  The special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors Inc.,
stated that it continues to evaluate leasing and sale
opportunities.

RATINGS LIST

COMM 2007-FL14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-FL14

                                 Rating               Rating
Class            Identifier      To                   From
D                200476AM1       BBB (sf)             BB+ (sf)
E                200476AN9       BB (sf)              BB (sf)
F                200476AP4       B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
G                200476AQ2       B (sf)               B (sf)
H                200476AR0       CCC+ (sf)            CCC+ (sf)
J                200476AS8       CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)



COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class G Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of COMM 2012-CCRE1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  There have been no defaulted or
specially serviced loans since issuance.  Fitch modeled losses of
2.4% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 2.2%.  The pool has experienced no realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated two (2.0%) Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOC) due to upcoming tenant rollover risk.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 8.7% to $851.4 million from
$932.8 million at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(3.9% of the pool) are defeased.

The largest loan in the pool (13.4%) is secured by a portion of a
1.7 million square foot (sf) regional mall (1.3 million-sf of
collateral) located in Albany, NY.  The mall is anchored by Macy's
(non-collateral), J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods, and Best Buy.
The servicer-reported occupancy and debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 90.1% and 1.51x, respectively, as of year-end (YE) 2015
compared to 90.9% and 1.49x at YE 2014.  Trailing 12-month November
2015 comparable sales (excluding anchors and tenants with no
reported sales or open less than 12 months) were a reported $491
psf compared to $455 psf the prior year.

The second largest loan in the pool (6.5%) is secured by a
227,707-sf office property located in San Leandro, CA.  Per the
December 2015 rent roll, occupancy remained at 100%.  The third
largest tenant (21.3% of net rentable area [NRA]) has a lease that
expires in April 2017.  The tenant has two five-year extension
options, and must provide notice six months prior to the lease
expiration date.  The servicer-reported YE 2014 DSCR was 1.89x,
compared to 1.76x at issuance.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through G are Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement from continued paydown and the stable
performance of the collateral.  The collateral has a weighted
average Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 69.4%. Future
upgrades are possible should loans pay off at their scheduled
maturities; 2017 maturities represent 11.6% of the pool. Fitch does
not foresee negative ratings migration unless a material economic
and/or asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $90.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $409.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $667.2 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $95.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.6 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $2.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $14 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.2 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Interest Only

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the $184.2 million interest-only class X-B, or the $26.8 million
class H.


COMM 2013-CCRE12: Fitch Puts BB Rating on Class E Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed two classes of COMM 2013-CCRE12 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates on Rating Watch Negative.  Fitch
has also revised the Rating Outlook to Negative on two classes.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Rating Watch Negative (RWN) placement and Outlook revision are
due to the significant decline in performance and recent transfer
to special servicing of three loans totaling $23.7 million, or 2.0%
of the pool.  The three multifamily properties are located in the
Bakken shale region of North Dakota, a market that has been
severely affected by low oil prices.  Fitch analysts recently
visited the area to assess the market conditions and the demand for
housing.  Fitch visited these properties and confirmed the low
demand for housing in the area.

The largest specially serviced loan, Roosevelt East Apartments
(1.4% of the pool) is secured by a 131-unit garden style
multifamily complex in Williston, ND (Bakken Formation).  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in October 2015 for
imminent default, and subsequently defaulted on the November 2015
payment.  A recent draft appraisal indicates property value has
declined considerably from issuance.  Fitch assumed additional
stresses based on the local market conditions and declining
occupancy.  As of year-end 2015, occupancy declined to 63% from 96%
year-end 2014.  The loan is listed as in foreclosure.

The second specially serviced loan (0.4%) is Pheasant Ridge A,
collateralized by a 42 unit multifamily property located in Watford
City, ND.  The property's occupancy has declined to 30% per the
December 2015 rent roll compared with 95% at year-end 2014.  The
loan is listed as 30 days delinquent.

The third specially serviced loan (0.2%) is Dakota Apartments A,
collateralized by a 32 unit multifamily property located in
Stanley, ND.  The property's occupancy declined to 50% per the
December 2015 rent roll compared with 100% at year-end 2014.  The
loan is listed as 30 days delinquent.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Watch Negative placements are due to the uncertainty of
value as updated appraisals are pending.  In addition, the special
servicer's workout plan is unknown, although a sale of the property
in the near term is unlikely due to the depressed market
conditions.  Downgrades of one category or more are possible to
these classes should the updated information exceed conservative
estimates.  Rating actions are expected in three to six months. The
Rating Outlook revision indicates the potential for a negative
rating action in the next 1 - 2 years should overall pool
performance decline.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch places these ratings on Negative Watch:

   -- $23.9 million class E 'BBsf';
   -- $16.5 million class F 'Bsf'.

Fitch revises these Rating Outlooks:

   -- $64.3 million class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;
   -- $193 million* class X-B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.


COMM 2016-DC2: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Cl. F Certificate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2016-DC2 Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

   -- $35,639,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4,483,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,740,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60,282,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $200,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $248,192,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $614,723,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,387,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,310,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,325,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $82,635,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,326,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,178,000ab class X-D 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,326,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $13,100,000a class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,078,000a class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the $14,108,000ab interest-only class X-E,
$29,225,159ab interest-only class X-F, $14,108,000a class G or the
$29,225,159a class H.

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on Feb. 22, 2016, the
balance of the class A-4 has increased from $165,000,000 to
$200,000,000 and the balance of class A-5 has decreased from
$283,192,000 to $248,192,000.  The classes above reflect the final
ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 64 loans secured by 91
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$806,195,160 as of the cut-off date.  The loans were contributed to
the trust by German American Capital Corporation, KeyBank National
Association, and Jefferies LoanCore LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.6% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
81.5% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12x is lower
than the 2015 average of 1.18x and in line with the year-to-date
(YTD) 2016 average of 1.12x, while the pool's Fitch loan-to-value
(LTV) of 110.6% is higher than the 2015 average of 109.3% and in
line with YTD 2016 average of 110.7%.

Amortization: The pool has four loans (14.9%) with full-term
interest-only structures, which is below the YTD 2016 and 2015
averages of 33.4% and 23.3%, respectively.  Partial interest-only
loans represent 54.6% of the pool or 23 loans, while 37 loans
(30.5%) are amortizing balloon loans with terms of five to 10
years.  The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.8% of the initial
pool balance prior to maturity, more than the respective YTD 2016
and 2015 averages of 9.3% and 11.7%.

Property Type Concentration: Retail represents the largest property
type concentration (31.2%), which is higher than both the YTD 2016
and the 2015 averages of 23.7% and 26.7%, respectively. Loans
secured by hotel properties comprise 13.6% of the pool, below both
the YTD 2016 and the 2015 averages of 16.1% and 17%, respectively.
Loans secured by manufactured housing community properties comprise
10.1% of the pool and it is significantly above both the YTD 2016
and the 2015 averages of 1.9% and 2.3%.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM
2016-DC2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP.  The third-party due diligence information was provided
on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the 64 mortgage loans.  Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on our analysis.


CONN'S RECEIVABLES 2016-A: Fitch Assigns B Rating on Cl. C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings to Conn's Receivables Funding
2016-A, LLC (Conn's 2016-A), which consists of notes backed by
retail loans originated and serviced by Conn Appliances, Inc.:

   -- $423,030,000 class A notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70,510,000 class B notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70,510,000 class C notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class R notes at 'NRsf'.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Collateral Quality: The 2016-A trust pool consists of 100%
fixed-rate consumer loans originated and serviced by Conn
Appliances, Inc.  The pool exhibits a weighted average FICO score
of 611 and a weighted average borrower rate of 21.54%.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE): The initial hard CE for class
A, B and C is expected to be 41.50%, 31.50% and 21.50%,
respectively, including the reserve account.  Additionally, the
class A notes will benefit from subordination provided by the class
B and C notes, and the class B notes will benefit from
subordination provided by the class C notes.  Transaction cash
flows were satisfactory under all stressed scenarios, commensurate
with the ratings.

Rating Cap at 'BBBsf': Due to higher loan defaults in recent years,
management changes at Conn's, and the credit risk profile of
Conn's, Fitch placed a rating cap on this transaction at the
'BBBsf' category.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a
non-declining reserve account, which will be fully funded at
closing at 1.50% of the initial pool balance.

Acceptable Servicing Capabilities: Conn Appliances, Inc.
demonstrates adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and
servicer.  The credit risk profile of the entity is mitigated by
the backup servicing provided by Systems & Services Technologies,
Inc. (SST).

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of Conn's would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or chargeoffs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the investments.  Decreased CE may
make certain ratings on the investments susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

Fitch conducts sensitivity analysis by stressing a transaction's
initial base case chargeoff assumption by 1.5x, 2.0x and 2.5x, and
examining the rating implications.  The 1.5x, 2.0x and 2.5x
increase of the base case chargeoffs are intended to provide an
indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration of a transaction's performance.

During the sensitivity analysis, Fitch examines the magnitude of
the multiplier compression by projecting the expected cash flows
and loss coverage levels over the life of investments under higher
than the initial base case chargeoff assumptions.  Fitch models
cash flows with the revised chargeoff estimates while holding
constant all other modeling assumptions.

Under the 1.5x base case stress scenario, class A notes would
retain the current rating, while class B notes would experience a
one-notch downgrade.  Under the 2x base case stress scenario, class
A notes would be downgraded one notch, while class B notes would be
downgraded one category to Bsf.  Under the 2.5x base case stress
scenario, class A notes would be downgraded to 'B+sf', and class B
and C notes would fall to 'CCCsf'.


CSAIL 2016-C5: Fitch to Rate 2 Tranches 'B-sf'
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the CSAIL 2016-C5
Commercial Mortgage Trust pass-through certificates. Fitch expects
to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as follows:

-- $28,557,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $121,570,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,780,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $267,448,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,139,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67,891,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $723,385,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,503,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,503,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,139,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,821,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,821,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,410,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,410,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,365,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,365,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 18, 2016. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$39,797,933 class NR and class X-NR certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 59 loans secured by 241
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $936.4 million as of the cutoff date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Column Financial, Inc., Rialto Mortgage
Finance, LLC, The Bank of New York Mellon, Silverpeak Real Estate
Finance LLC, and Jeffries LoanCore LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 70.9% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 79.7%, and asset summary reviews on
79.7% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Additional Debt: There are five loans representing 21.8% of the
pool with subordinate debt. This is higher than the 2014 average of
10.4% and the 2015 average of 9.1%, respectively for similar
Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

Investment Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The largest loan in the pool,
GLP Portfolio Pool A (9.3%), received a credit opinion of 'Asf' on
a stand-alone basis. The loan is secured by 114 industrial
properties across nine states in 11 markets. The sponsor is Global
Logistics Properties, Ltd, which is currently rated 'BBB+' by
Fitch.

Fitch Leverage: The pool has a Fitch DSCR of 1.19x, which is above
the 2015 average DSCR of 1.18x, and a Fitch LTV of 106.1%, which is
below the 2015 average LTV of 109.3%.

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest concentration by
property type is multifamily at 25.8%, followed by industrial
properties at 21.5%. Hotels make up 21.2% of the pool. The
industrial concentration is above the 2015 average of 4.2%.
Additionally, the hotel concentration is above the 2015 average of
17% for other Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions.

Pool Concentration: The pool has a higher loan concentration index
compared to other recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions. The top 10 loans represent 53.3% of the pool, which
is higher than the 2015 average top 10 concentration of 49.3%. The
pool's LCI of 414 is higher than the 2015 average LCI of 367.

Low Mortgage Coupons: The pool's weighted average mortgage coupon
is 4.55%, well below historical averages, but higher than the 2015
average of 4.45%. Fitch accounted for increased refinance risk in a
higher interest rate environment by analyzing sensitivity to
increased interest rates.

Amortization: Five loans representing 27.5% of the pool are
interest only, which is higher than the 2015 average of 23.3% for
other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. There are 32 loans,
representing 49.6% of the pool, that are partial interest-only.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is expected to
pay down by 8.8%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSAIL
2015-C5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from KPMG LLP.
The due diligence focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the 59 mortgage
loans. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and the
findings did not have an impact on its analysis.


CSMC TRUST 2015-TOWN: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of the CSMC Trust 2015-TOWN
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2015-TOWN.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the portfolio
since issuance.  Fitch reviewed the trailing 12 month (TTM)
September 2015 financial performance of the collateral.  The
collateral, a portfolio of 85 economy extended-stay hotels, has
demonstrated an upward trend in occupancy and servicer-reported net
cash flow improved 4.3% since issuance.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance remained at $380 million, unchanged from
issuance.  The two-year, floating-rate, interest-only loan matures
in March 2017 and has three one-year extension options.  This
single borrower transaction is primarily secured by first priority,
cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized mortgage liens consisting
of a portfolio of 85 economy extended-stay hotels (10,764 keys)
branded as InTown Suites.  The mortgage loan is also secured by all
FF&E and personal property used in the operation of the properties.
No single asset accounted for more than 2% of cash flow at
issuance.  The portfolio is located in 18 U.S. states with
concentrations in Texas (32.8%), Florida (11.7%), Tennessee (9.5%)
and Virginia (5%).  The top three cities in Texas as a percentage
of the total pool balance are Houston (9.7%), San Antonio (6.2%)
and Arlington (4.1%).

The servicer-reported occupancy was 87.3% as of TTM September 2015
compared to 86.8% as of year-end 2014 at issuance.  The servicer
provided the Smith Travel Report as of September 2015 for each
property; the portfolio's TTM RevPAR increased an average 10.2%
over the prior year.  While Fitch will continue to monitor the
exposure to properties in oil dependent economies, as of the
September 2015 reporting, the TTM RevPAR for these properties
showed increases similar to the balance of the portfolio.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  No rating
actions are anticipated unless there are material changes in
property performance or cash flow.  The portfolio is performing as
expected at issuance.  Fitch will continue to monitor the subject
portfolio's performance to ensure that revenues and incomes
considered at the time of Fitch's initial ratings are sustainable
over the loan term.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $138.5 million class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $24 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $36.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $9 million TF class certificates.


FANNIE MAE: Moody's Lowers $13.2 Million of FHA/VA RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches issued from four transactions. The collateral backing
these deals consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate
mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) or
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W1

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W6

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W1

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2015 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W4

Cl. IM, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2015
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools and the structural nuances of the
transactions. The ratings downgraded are primarily due to the
erosion of credit enhancement supporting these bonds, due to the
amortization of the subordinate bonds and losses incurred by the
subordinate bonds.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA guarantee covers
only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of either the
sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid interest, and
foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount. HUD usually pays
claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers submit the claims, but
can impose significant penalties on servicers if it finds
irregularities in the claim process later during the servicer
audits. This can prompt servicers to push more expenses to the
trust that they deem reasonably incurred than submit them to HUD
and face significant penalty. The rating actions consider the
portion of a defaulted loan normally not covered by the FHA or VA
guarantee and other servicer expenses they deemed reasonably
incurred and passed on to the trust.


FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Moody's Hikes Class M Debt Rating to Ca(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in First Union National
Bank-Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as follows:

Cl. K, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class K was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the P&I Class L was upgraded based primarily on
increase in credit support resulting from loans' amortization as
well as Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit
support resulting from the payoff of the defeased loans approaching
maturity, representing 26% of the deal. The deal has paid down 13%
since the last review.

The rating on the P&I Class M was upgraded due to higher expected
recovery rate than previously anticipated.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.7% of the
current balance, compared to 8.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.16% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.23% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2016 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $26.6 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool. The Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component of
the pool includes 11 loans, representing 39% of the pool. Thirteen
loans, representing 52% of the pool, have defeased and are secured
by U.S. Government securities.

Two loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with losses,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $24 million (for an
average loss severity of 29%). Currently, there are no loans in
special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, excluding defeasance. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.

The only remaining conduit loan is the Whitehall Estates Loan ($2.4
million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 252-unit
multifamily property in Charlotte, North Carolina. The property was
97% leased as of September 2015 compared to 94% leased as of
February 2015. Performance has been stable. This loan is fully
amortizing and matures in August 2018. It has amortized 76% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 20.2% and 5.09X,
respectively, compared to 25% and 4.05X at last review.

The CTL component includes 11 loans secured by properties leased
under bondable leases. The largest CTL exposures include Rite Aid
Corporation (61% of the CTL component, Moody's senior unsecured
rating of B3/Caa1 -- under review for possible upgrade), Walgreen
Co. (23%; Moody's senior unsecured rating of Baa2 -- under review
for possible downgrade), and CVS Health (7%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa1 -- stable outlook). The bottom-dollar
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool is 3404,
compared to 3249 at the last review. WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of default probability.


FIRST UNION 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed two classes of First
Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust (FUNBC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the amount of defeased collateral, increasing
credit enhancement, continued paydown and better than expected
recoveries on a disposed loan.  There are eight loans remaining in
the pool, six of which are defeased (51.9% of the pool).  All of
the defeased loans mature in June 2016.  The two non-defeased loans
(48.1%) are current and fully amortizing.  Fitch has not designated
either of the two as a Fitch Loan of Concern.  As of the February
2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
been reduced by 98% to $15.3 million from $776.3 million at
issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes M
through N.

The largest loan in the pool (43.6%) is secured by a single-tenant
grocery store located in Fredericksburg, VA, which is roughly 50
miles south of Washington, D.C.  The property is 100% leased to
Giant Foods, Inc. through August 2029.  The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in March 2025.  The year-end 2014 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was reported to be 1.33x.

The other remaining non-defeased loan is secured by a 32-unit
multi-family property located 30 miles southeast of Charlotte in
Wingate, NC.  The property consists of 8 two-story residential
buildings and is considered a 'tax credit' property with income
limitations for residency and residents receiving government
subsidies paying 50%-60% of the market rent.  As of June 2015,
occupancy was reported to be 94% and the DSCR was 1.32x.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Outlooks for class H and J remain Stable and are fully covered by
defeased collateral.  Defeasance also covers 41% of class K.  After
the significant paydown expected in June 2016 from the defeased
collateral, class K will become the most senior class.  A further
upgrade to class K is not warranted at this time due to the pool
concentration as only two non-defeased loans remain.  It is
expected that class K will remain at its current rating for the
remaining life of the deal unless there is a significant
performance decline of one of the remaining assets.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades these classes and assigns or revises Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

   -- $854,747 class H to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $3.9 million class J to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7.8 million class K to 'BBsf' from 'B-sf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Negative.

Fitch affirms this class and revises the RE as indicated:

   -- $2.8 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 75%.

Fitch affirms this class as indicated:

   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificates.


FREDDIE MAC STARC 2016-HQA1: Fitch Rates Cl. M-3 Debt 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Freddie Mac's risk-transfer transaction, Structured
Agency Credit Risk Debt Notes Series 2016-HQA1 (STACR 2016-HQA1):

-- $110,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110,000,000 class M-1F exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $110,000,000 class M-1I notional exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $120,000,000 class M-2 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $120,000,000 class M-2F exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $120,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $220,000,000 class M-3 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220,000,000 class M-3F exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $220,000,000 class M-3I notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $230,000,000 class M-12 exchangeable notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $450,000,000 class MA exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $16,945,260,752 class A-H reference tranche;
-- $87,246,421 class M-1H reference tranche;
-- $95,177,914 class M-2H reference tranche;
-- $174,492,843 class M-3H reference tranche;
-- $25,000,000 class B notes;
-- $154,314,928 class B-H reference tranche.

The 'BBBsf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 4.40%
subordination provided by the 1.20% class M-2 notes, the 2.20%
class M-3 notes, and the 1.00% class B notes. The 'BBB-sf' rating
for the M-2 notes reflects the 3.20% subordination provided by the
2.20% class M-3 notes and the 1.00% class B notes. The notes are
general unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac (rated 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans held in various Freddie
Mac-guaranteed MBS.

STACR 2016-HQA1 represents Freddie Mac's third risk-transfer
transaction applying actual loan loss severity to a reference pool
of over 80% loan to value (LTV) loans issued as part of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for 2013 -
2017 for each of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to
demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk-transfer
transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $17.9 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Freddie Mac where principal repayment of the notes is
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding
principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual
loan's loss severity (LS) percentage related to those credit
events, which includes borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors. Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's rating on the M-1, M-1F, M-1I, M-2, M-2F,
M-2I, M-3, M-3F, M-3I, MA and M-12 notes will be based on the lower
of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit
enhancement (CE) available through subordination; and Freddie Mac's
issuer default rating. The M-1, M-2, M-3 and B notes will be issued
as uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and will carry a 12.5-year legal
final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Actual Loss Severities: This will be Freddie Mac's third actual
loss risk-transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed LS schedule on loans with
LTVs of over 80%. The notes in this transaction will experience
losses realized at the time of liquidation, which will include both
principal and delinquent interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac: The majority of the
loans are covered either by borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI)
or lender-paid MI (LPMI). Freddie Mac will be guaranteeing the MI
coverage amount, which will typically be the MI coverage percentage
multiplied by the sum of the unpaid principal balance as of the
date of the default, up to 36 months of delinquent interest, taxes
and maintenance expenses. While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows
for credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount
of BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision as
required by the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance is
first scheduled to reach 78%.

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The reference mortgage loan pool
consists of 76,568 high-quality mortgage loans totaling $17.9
billion that were acquired by Freddie Mac between April 1, 2015 and
June 30, 2015. The pool consists of loans with original LTVs of
over 80% and less than or equal to 95% with a weighted average (WA)
original combined LTV of 91.6%. The WA debt-to-income (DTI) of
34.6% and credit score of 750 reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity: M-1, M-2 M-3 and B notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit events in the
reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne by Freddie Mac
and do not affect the transaction. In addition, credit events that
occur prior to maturity with losses realized from liquidations that
occur after the final maturity date will not be passed through to
noteholders. This feature more closely aligns the risk of loss to
that of the 10-year, fixed LS STACRs where losses were passed
through when a credit event occurred - i.e. loans became 180 days
delinquent with no consideration for liquidation timelines. The
credit ranged from 8% at the 'Asf' rating category to 12% at the
'BBsf' rating category.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes: Fitch found that
Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined process in place
for the purchase of loans and views its lender approval and
oversight processes for minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring
sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control
(QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a tight control
environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has determined
Freddie Mac to be an above-average aggregator for its 2013 and
later product. The lower risk was accounted for by Fitch by
applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Advantageous Payment Priority: The payment priority of the M-1
class will result in a shorter life and more stable CE than
mezzanine classes in private-label (PL) RMBS, providing a relative
credit advantage. Unlike PL mezzanine RMBS, which often do not
receive a full pro rata share of the pool's unscheduled principal
payment until year 10, the M-1 class can receive a full pro rata
share of unscheduled principal immediately as long as a minimum CE
level is maintained, the cumulative net loss is within a certain
threshold and the delinquency test is within a certain threshold.
Additionally, unlike PL mezzanine classes, which lose subordination
over time due to scheduled principal payments to more junior
classes, the M-2, M-3 and B classes will not receive any scheduled
or unscheduled principal allocations until the M-1 class is paid in
full. The B class will not receive any scheduled or unscheduled
principal allocations until the M-3 class is paid in full.

Solid Alignment of Interests: While the transaction is designed to
transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from solid alignment of interests. Freddie Mac
will retain credit risk in the transaction by holding the senior
reference tranche A-H, which has 5.50% of loss protection, as well
as a minimum of 50% of the first-loss B tranche. Initially, Freddie
Mac will retain an approximately 44% vertical slice/interest in the
M-1, M-2 and M-3 tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered: Under the Federal Housing Finance
Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines that the
GSE's assets are less than its obligations for longer than 60 days
following the deadline of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could
repudiate any contract entered into by Freddie Mac if it is
determined that such action would promote an orderly administration
of Freddie Mac's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government
will continue to support Freddie Mac, as reflected in its current
rating of the GSE. However, if at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the rating of
Freddie Mac could be downgraded and ratings on M-1, M-2 and M-3
notes, along with their corresponding MAC notes, could be
affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In February 2016, Fitch released an exposure draft criteria report,
which incorporates several proposed enhancements to its "U.S. RMBS
Loan Loss Model Criteria," dated August 2015. The changes are
detailed in the report entitled "Exposure Draft: U.S. RMBS Loan
Loss Model Criteria" available on Fitch's website at
www.fitchratings.com. Although the credit risk profile of this
reference pool is consistent with the previous transaction, the
exposure draft model estimated modestly higher expected losses as a
result of the model updates. The bonds for this transaction were
analyzed with both criteria approaches, with a greater weight on
the exposure draft model results. The difference in ratings for
this transaction using the two separate models is less than one
rating notch.

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
exposure draft model-projected 23.4% at the 'BBBsf' level, 21.8% at
the 'BBB-sf' level and 13.8% at the 'Bsf' level. The analysis
indicates that there is some potential rating migration with higher
MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 36% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further detailed in
Fitch's accompanying presale report, available at
'www.fitchratings.com' or by clicking on the above link.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Digital
Risk. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance reviews,
desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Digital Risk examined
selected loan files with respect to the presence or absence of
relevant documents. Fitch received certifications indicating that
the loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with
Fitch's published standards. The certifications also stated that
the company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on its analysis.


FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed five classes of FREMF
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-K703
as:

  Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 21, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 21, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015, Upgraded to

   A2 (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 21, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three IG P&I classes, Classes A-1, A-2 and B, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two IO classes, Classes X-1 and X-2, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.5% of the
current balance compared to 1.7% at last review.  The deal has paid
down 1% since last review and 7% since securitization. Moody's base
plus realized loss totals 1.4% compared to 1.6% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/ Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Conduit Loan Herf of 32 compared to 39 at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 25, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $1.14 billion
from $1.23 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 69 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 36% of the pool.  The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments.  Sixteen loans,
constituting 18% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Three loans, constituting 1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 84% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 78% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%, compared to
90% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.0% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.52X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 16% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Pavilions Loan ($81 million -- 7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 932-unit multifamily property
located in Manchester, Connecticut, a suburb of Hartford. The
property was 90% leased as of September 2015 compared to 97% leased
as of March 2014.  While occupancy has declined, the property's
financial performance has improved since Moody's last review.  The
loan also benefits from amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 90% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 99% and 0.95X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Park at Arlington Ridge II Loan ($50
million -- 4% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 395-unit
multifamily property located in Arlington, Virginia, a suburb of
Washington, DC.  As of year-end 2014, property occupancy was 96%
compared to 97% in March 2013.  The loan benefits from
amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 88% and 1.02X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Casoleil Apartments Loan ($48 million
-- 4% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 346-unit multifamily
property in San Diego, California.  The property was 96% leased as
of December 2015 compared to 95% occupied as of year-end 2014.
While occupancy has held steady, the property's financial
performance has improved.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98%
and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 100% and 0.92X at last review.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C2: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. H Certs. to B
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded one, and affirmed three
classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation (GECMC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class H reflects the increase in credit enhancement
due to significant loan paydown since Fitch's last rating action.
The downgrade to class J reflects an increase in expected losses to
the specially serviced loans.  Fitch modeled losses of 54.3% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
4.2%, including $53.5 million (3.1% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.

As of the March 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98% to $33.6 million from
$1.7 billion at issuance.  The pool is highly concentrated with
only three of the original 142 loans remaining.  The top two loans
are currently in special servicing (88.3%), of which one is real
estate owned (REO) (66.8% of the pool) and the other is in process
of foreclosure (21.5%).  The non-specially serviced loan is fully
amortizing, and matures in May 2025.  Interest shortfalls are
affecting classes J through Q.

The largest loan in the pool is the specially-serviced Chatsworth
Business Park loan (66.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
231,770 square foot (sf) office property in Chatsworth, CA.  The
loan had transferred to special servicing in March 2010 for
imminent maturity default, followed shortly thereafter by the
maturity of the loan in April 2010.  The lender foreclosed on the
property and the asset has been REO since August 2012.  The asset
was offered for sale in an October 2013 auction, but did not sell.
The property further experienced cash flow issues in 2014 when the
second largest tenant, Sanyo North America Corp. (previously 29% of
the net rentable area [NRA]) vacated in 2014 prior to its February
2017 lease expiration.  The property is currently 71% leased by a
single tenant, County of LA, whose lease recently expired on March
15, 2016.  A replacement tenant has not yet been identified for the
vacant space, and the servicer is currently in negotiations to
extend the County of LA lease.

The second largest loan in the pool is a specially serviced 44,264
sf retail center located in Salisbury, MD (21.5%).  The property's
major tenant is Barnes & Noble (50% NRA) whose lease expires in
April 2018.  Occupancy declined to 77.6% as of January 2016, down
from 85% in December 2014 due to Sleepy's (previously 7.5% NRA)
vacating in February 2015.  According to the servicer the borrower
was unable to refinance the loan due to the occupancy decline, and
the loan transferred to special servicing in May 2015 for maturity
default.  A receiver is in place, and the servicer expects to
obtain title and complete the foreclosure by second quarter 2016.

The remaining loan in the pool is secured by 93,522 sf grocery
anchored retail property in Phoenix, AZ.  The original grocery
anchor had occupied approximately 66,000 sf (71% NRA) prior to its
parent company filing for bankruptcy in May 2013.  The lease was
subsequently acquired by a new grocer entity, which reduced the
footprint at the property to 47,585 sf (50%).

As a result, occupancy declined, reporting at 79% for June 2015 and
December 2014, compared to 99% in December 2013.  The net operating
income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 2.0x
for as of year-to-date June 2015, compared to 1.82x at year end
(YE) December 2014 and 2.24x at YE December 2013.  The fully
amortizing loan matures in May 2025, and has remained current since
issuance.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class H is considered Stable as credit
enhancement is high and downgrades are not expected.  Further
upgrades were not warranted, however, as the transaction is highly
concentrated with only three loans remaining, with the top two in
special servicing (88.3%).  Further downgrade to the distressed
classes J is possible should additional losses be realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class and assigns Rating Outlook as indicated:

   -- $3.3 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Stable Outlook.

Fitch downgrades this class as indicated:

   -- $21 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 60%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $9.3 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $36,082 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-J, B, C, D, E, F, and G
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class N,
O, P and Q certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on
the interest-only class X-C and X-P certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-PEMB: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-PEMB, a stand-alone U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.
S&P's analysis included a review of the fee interest in 748,818 sq.
ft. of an approximately 1.1 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Pembroke Pines, Fla., which secures the $260.0 million fixed-rate,
interest-only (IO) mortgage loan that serves as collateral for the
stand-alone transaction.  S&P also considered the deal structure
and liquidity available to the trust.  The affirmations reflect
subordination and liquidity that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the retail property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the stable
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
full years ending in 2013 and 2014 and the nine months ending
September 2015.  S&P then derived its sustainable in-place net cash
flow (NCF), which it divided by a 6.75% capitalization rate to
determine our expected-case value.  This yielded an overall
Standard & Poor's loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage
(DSC) of 76.9% and 2.44x, respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the March 7, 2016, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $260.0 million
and pays an annual fixed interest rate of 3.562%.  The mortgage
loan pays interest only through its March 1, 2025, maturity.
According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections the special
servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2014, 2013, 2012, and
on the Sept. 30, 2015, rent roll provided by the master servicer to
determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the retail
property.  The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital,
reported a DSC of 2.77x on the trust balance for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2015, and collateral occupancy was 93.4% according
to the Sept. 30, 2015, rent roll.  Based on the September 2015 rent
roll, the five largest collateral tenants make up 54.7% of the
collateral's total net rentable area (NRA).  In addition, 2.1% of
the NRA tenants have leases that expire in 2016, 26.4% have leases
that expire in 2017, and 5.9% have leases that expire in 2018.

RATINGS LIST

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-PEMB
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-PEMB

                                     Rating              Rating
Class           Identifier           To                  From
A               36197VAA6            AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B               36197VAC2            AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)
C               36197VAE8            A- (sf)             A- (sf)
D               36197VAG3            BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)
E               36197VAJ7            BB (sf)             BB (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: Moody’s Withdraws Rating on X-CP Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the (P)Ba3(sf) assigned on
March 07, 2016 with respect to the Interest-Only Class X-CP note,
which was expected to be issued by GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust 2016-ICE2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-ICE2:

Cl. X-CP*, Withdrawn (sf)

*Interest-Only Class

RATINGS RATIONALE

"We have been informed by the issuer, GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust 2016-ICE2, that the Class X-CP note will not be
issued; as a result, we are withdrawing the provisional rating."



GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2016-ICE2's $970.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a single two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $970.0 million, with three one-year
extension options, and secured by the fee interests in 43
temperature-controlled warehouses.

Since S&P assigned its preliminary ratings on March 7, 2016, the
interest-only class X-CP and class X-NCP certificates, both of
which referenced the class A through E certificates, were removed
from the transaction.  In addition, on March 10, 2016, the
borrowers made a voluntary principal prepayment in the amount of
$30 million on the underlying mortgage loan.  As a result, the
outstanding principal balance of the class E certificates was
reduced by $30 million to $135.2 million from $165.2 million. While
the prepayment of the loan improved the transaction's metrics, it
did not affect S&P's ratings.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsors' and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  

RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2016-ICE2

Class       Rating(i)             Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)             521,100,000
B           AA- (sf)             110,890,000
C           A- (sf)               95,340,000
D           BBB- (sf)            107,470,000
E           BB- (sf)             135,200,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-RENT: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2016-RENT
Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2016-RENT:

-- $100,000,000a class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100,000,000ab class X-A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,750,000ab class X-B notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,750,000a class B notes 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,000,000a class C notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,000,000a class D notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,000,000a class E notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,000,000a class F notes 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The ratings are based upon information provided as of
March. 18, 2016.

Since Fitch issued expected ratings on Feb. 26, 2016 the balance
and rating on the class X-B has changed from $82,750,000 to
$53,750,000. The rating on the class X-B has changed from an
expected rating of 'A-sf' to 'AA-sf'.

The GSMS 2016-RENT Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
represent the beneficial interest in a trust secured by a loan
collateralized by portfolio of multifamily properties located in
San Francisco, CA. The whole loan consists of: one five-year,
fixed-rate, interest-only $480 million mortgage loan secured by the
fee interests in 61 multifamily properties with a total of 1,726
rent controlled units. As of January 2016, the portfolio has a
current vacancy rate of approximately 5.4% including units down for
renovation.

The whole loan is part of a split loan structure with an aggregate
outstanding principal balance of $480,000,000. The note structure
consists of trust note A-1 ($100,000,000), non-trust note A-2
($65,125,000), non-trust note A-3 ($65,125,000) and trust note B
($249,750,000). Notes A-1, A-2 and A-3 are pari passu with each
other. Note A-1 and Note B are included in this trust. It is
expected that notes A-2 and A-3 will be contributed to future
securitization.

The sponsor is a joint venture between Veritas Investments, Inc.
and affiliates of The Baupost Group, LLC. Veritas is the operating
partner of the joint venture. Veritas Investments currently owns
over 4,000 units across 167 buildings making it the largest
institutional multifamily landlord in San Francisco. The properties
in the portfolio were acquired by Veritas in 2011. The Baupost
Group is a Boston-based value-oriented hedge fund founded in 1982
with over $28.0 billion under management.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Below Market Rents: All the units in the portfolio are subject to
rent-control restrictions. As a result of these restrictions,
approximately 89% of the units have current rents below market rent
levels. In the aggregate, in-place rents are approximately 27.9%
below market rents as determined by the appraisal. Realizing market
rents as determined by the appraisal would result in an increase in
potential rent of approximately $20.2 million.

Strong Multifamily Market: The properties are all located in the
tight San Francisco multifamily market. The 61 properties are
located in several central San Francisco neighborhoods: Nob Hill;
Mission; Pacific Heights; Downtown San Francisco; Russian Hill; and
the Marina District. Per Reis, Inc.'s 4Q15 report, the average
asking rent in the overall San Francisco market is $2,556 and the
average vacancy rate is 4.1%. Reis is forecasting annualized asking
rent growth of 4.7%.

High Fitch Trust Leverage: Fitch's stressed DSCR and loan-to-value
(LTV) for the trust component and the companion loans are 0.84x and
103.6% based on an 8.56% discount to current net cash flow and an
8.00% refinance constant and a 7.00% cap rate, respectively.

Collateral Quality: Fitch assigned the portfolio a property quality
grade of 'B+'. The units are being renovated as they become vacant.
Since acquiring the assets, the sponsor has spent $32.9 million in
capital improvements, including $22.7 million on unit conversions
and renovations and $10.2 million on base-building upgrades.

Additional Debt: The total debt includes mezzanine financing not
included in the trust totaling $196,500,000.

Geographic Concentration: The properties are all located in San
Francisco, CA, which has a high degree of seismic activity. The
seismic reports determined that none of the properties have a
scenario expected loss (SEL/PML) exceeding 20%, and the aggregate
portfolio SEL/PML is 15%. The properties do not have specific
seismic coverage.

Portfolio Performance: The portfolio has achieved cash flow growth
while taking units offline for renovation. Year-end 2014 net cash
flow increased 19% over 2013. The trailing 12 months (TTM) to
November net cash flow increased 9.75% from year-end 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch found that the property could withstand a 68.2% decline in
appraised portfolio value and an approximate 49.6% decline in
Fitch's implied net cash flow prior to experiencing $1 of loss to
the 'AAAsf' rated class. Fitch performed several stress scenarios
in which the Fitch net cash flow (NCF) was stressed. Fitch
determined that a 40.2% reduction in Fitch's implied NCF would
cause the notes to break even at a 1.0x debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR), based on the actual debt service.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 7% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 39% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-RENT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2016-RENT's $349.75 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-RENT.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $349.75 million commercial mortgage loan
secured by the leasehold interests in the 61 multifamily properties
(totaling 1,726 units) located in San Francisco.

S&P's preliminary rating for the class X-B certificates was 'A
(sf)', as the notional balance referenced the class B and C
certificates.  Since the assignment of our preliminary ratings, the
reference class for the X-B certificates has been changed to
reference only the class B certificates, which S&P rates 'AA-
(sf)'; therefore, S&P's rating on the class X-B certificates is now
'AA- (sf)'.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2016-RENT

Class      Rating(i)           Amount ($)

A          AAA (sf)           100,000,000
X-A        AAA (sf)       100,000,000(ii)
X-B        AA- (sf)        53,750,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)            53,750,000
C          A (sf)              29,000,000
D          BBB (sf)            42,000,000
E          BB- (sf)            65,000,000
F          B- (sf)             60,000,000

(i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.


HAMPTON ROADS 2007-A: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class III Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Hampton Roads PPV, LLC military housing taxable revenue bonds
(Hampton Roads Unaccompanied Housing Project), 2007 series A (the
bonds):

-- Approximately $210 million class I at 'A-';
-- Approximately $58 million class II at 'BB';
-- Approximately $9 million class III at 'B+'.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Positive from Negative.

SECURITY

The bonds are special limited obligations of the issuer and are
primarily secured by a first lien on all receipts from the
operation of the unaccompanied housing project known as Hampton
Roads, located at Norfolk Naval Complex. The absence of a
cash-funded debt service reserve fund limits protections afforded
bondholders.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

SUFFICIENT DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE: The affirmation of the ratings
reflects the 2015 debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) of 1.58x,
1.22x, and 1.17x, which are increased from the 2014 respective
DSCRs of 1.41x, 1.09x, and 1.05x.

INCREASED BAH: The revision to a Positive Outlook reflects the
strong Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) increases the project has
received in the last two years as well as the expected improvement
these increases should provide to revenues and net operating income
moving forward. BAH rates have increased 8.44% in 2016, which
should provide the project with higher revenues moving forward.
This increase follows an 8.91% increase in BAH received in 2015.

STRONG OCCUPANCY: The project maintained an average occupancy of
95% for 2015 and 96% for 2014. Additionally, the project currently
has a 97.5% occupancy level.

HIGH TURNOVER LEVELS: The project continues to experience high
turnover levels as a result of deployments, which puts negative
pressure on the project's operations.

ABSENCE OF CASH RESERVE: The absence of a cash-funded debt service
reserve fund detracts from bondholder security for all classes of
bonds; however, the Class III bonds are most vulnerable.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

BAH INCREASES: Future increases in BAH, combined with stable
operations, could put positive pressure on the ratings and may
result in an upgrade. Conversely, future decreases in BAH could put
negative pressure on the ratings.

DECREASED OCCUPANCY AND/OR INCREASED EXPENSES: Management's
inability to maintain high occupancy levels and control operating
expenses could put negative pressure on the ratings.

CREDIT PROFILE

BASE INFORMATION

Hampton Roads/Norfolk Naval Complex (HRNC), located in southeastern
Virginia about 90 miles from Richmond and 185 miles from
Washington, D.C., is the largest naval base in the world. It covers
approximately 4,631 acres. HRNC consists of a number of
installations primarily located in the Norfolk and Sewells Point
areas and extends to sites in Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Suffolk,
Chesapeake, Portsmouth, Hampton, and Newport News. HRNC is
surrounded by many navy installations such as Naval Weapons Station
Yorktown/Cheatham Annex, Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base,
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Naval Air Station Oceana/Dam Neck Annex,
and Naval Security Group Activity Northwest.

PROJECT INFORMATION

The housing project located on Norfolk Naval Complex base in
Virginia (known as Hampton Roads) provides apartment residences for
single (i.e. unaccompanied) U.S. Navy enlisted personnel. As part
of the original development plan, 1,190 new units were added and
722 existing residential units were renovated.

DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE LEVELS

The project finished 2015 with DSCRs of 1.58x, 1.22x, and 1.17x,
respectively. These DSCRs are an increase from 2014 DSCRs of 1.41x,
1.09x, and 1.05x, respectively, and primarily reflect the project's
increased BAH rates in recent years. The project is expected to
demonstrate higher coverage ratios in 2016 as BAH increases should
enhance project revenues and net operating income.

Fitch views unaccompanied military housing projects as having more
risk than military family housing projects given the varied profile
of the respective tenant bases. Unaccompanied housing projects tend
to be subject to higher levels of physical wear and higher annual
turnover which leads to higher operating expenses. Therefore, Fitch
expects that the DSCRs for an unaccompanied project will be higher
than those of military family housing transactions at the same
rating level.

PROJECT OCCUPANCY LEVELS

Despite two declines in occupancy from deployments in 2015, the
project experienced an average occupancy rate of 95%. The average
occupancy in 2014, which also experienced a decline in occupancy
due to a deployment, was 96%. Additionally, management reports that
the current occupancy level for the project is 97.5%. Fitch
believes that project management will continue to be challenged by
the potential for future deployments and the need to reoccupy
units.

BAH RATES

BAH rates increased 8.44% in 2016, which followed an 8.91% increase
in 2014. Despite previous volatility in BAH rates, the project has
demonstrated two consecutive years of strong BAH increases, which
is expected to improve project revenues and net operating income
moving forward. The revision to a Positive from Negative Outlook
primarily reflects the unexpectedly significant BAH increases the
project has received over the last two years. These increases
should provide the project with higher net operating income and
DSCRs moving forward. Therefore, future BAH increases, mixed with
stable operations, could put positive pressure on ratings which may
result in an upgrade.

BRAC RISK

The first Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
recommendations were made in 1988, and U.S. Navy facilities in and
around Hampton Roads were not included in any of the commission's
recommendations. However, since the second BRAC review in 1991 and
recommendations made in 1993, 1995, and 2005, the BRAC Commission
has proposed to relocate Navy activities, ships, personnel,
operations, and infrastructure to HRNC.

It is clear from a review of the Navy's recommendations to the BRAC
Commission and the BRAC Commission's recommendations to the
President since 1988 that the HRNC, including the Naval Shipyard,
Norfolk, Naval Station, Norfolk, Naval Air Station, Oceana, Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, and
the related operations and infrastructure in around them are vital
to the U.S. Navy. None of these key facilities have been
recommended for closure by the Navy. Consequently, Fitch expects
that HRNC will continue to serve the U.S. Navy and retain its
status as the largest naval complex in the world.

DEBT SERVICE RESERVES

The bond debt service reserve fund is satisfied with an AMBAC
surety bond sized at maximum annual debt service. Fitch does not
assign any value to the AMBAC surety bond and the ratings reflect
this. In addition, there is an excess collateral agreement in place
in the amount of $6.5 million which acts as a line of credit to the
project from Merrill Lynch (rated 'A/F1') with a wrap from AIG
(rated 'A-'). At this time, the surety bond provider has had its
creditworthiness downgraded and subsequently withdrawn completely
since the issuance of the bonds. As a result, Fitch no longer views
this as a credit strength.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Hampton Roads LLC is managed by American Campus Communities, Inc.
(ACC). ACC has traditionally managed student housing properties and
currently has 200 properties with approximately 130,000 student
housing beds under its management. The Hampton Roads property
financing is the first arrangement where ACC is acting as manager
for a military housing project.


ICE 1: Moody's Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'B3(sf)'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and placed under review
for possible downgrade the rating on the following notes issued by
ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd.:

US$40,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Junior Subordinate Secured Term
Notes Due August 15, 2022 (current outstanding balance of
$35,901,461), Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on November 12, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Moody's also placed under review for possible downgrade the rating
on the following notes:

US$38,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Secured Term Notes
Due August 15, 2022, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on November 12, 2015 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds, senior secured loans and non-senior secured loans,
with significant exposure to emerging market corporate and
sovereign issuers. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of a decrease in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October
2015. The OC ratios for the Class A, B, C and D notes are reported
at 178.4%, 139.8%, 120.4% and 97.5%, respectively, in February
2016, versus October 2015 levels of 192.3%, 150.7%, 129.8% and
106.9%, respectively. The February 2016 OC ratios do not reflect
the $35.9 million payment made to the Class A-2 notes on the recent
payment date. The Class D notes are currently breaching the 106.6%
Class D OC trigger, and Moody's expects the breach to continue in
the near term.

In addition, 47% of the performing assets in the portfolio have
ratings with a negative outlook or are on review for downgrade.
Some of these assets also have ratings of Caa1 or lower or are
domiciled in countries that rely heavily on oil and gas for debt
serving ability, on which we recently took negative rating actions
to reflect our assessment of the credit impact of the continued
sharp fall in oil prices. These countries include Russia,
Venezuela, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. Lastly, the portfolio has
material exposure to the oil and gas, banking and sovereign
sectors, either in countries with low foreign currency ceilings or
those on which we recently took negative rating actions."

The deal also has a large, out-of-the-money interest rate swap,
which will continue to reduce excess interest in the deal until it
matures in August 2017. The diversion of interest for this swap,
however, will decrease substantially over the next year, leaving
excess interest available to deleverage the Class D notes as long
as the Class D OC test continues to fail and the other OC tests
remain in compliance. Since October 2015, $0.2 million of interest
proceeds have reduced the outstanding balance of the Class D notes
by 0.6%.

The ratings on the Class C and D notes are on review for downgrade,
pending Moody's rating resolution on underlying assets with a
negative outlook or are on review for downgrade.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the bond and
loan markets and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could
have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have
a positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Country risk: The portfolio includes exposure to a large number
of countries with foreign currency ceilings below Aa3, including
significant exposure to Venezuela, Argentina, Russia, Croatia and
Ukraine. Country risk arises from (a) political, financial and
economic factors either inside or outside the country, and (b) the
transfer of and conversion into foreign currency. Countries in the
same region could also be highly correlated because of mutual
dependence on external capital flows, on commodity price, or on
political regimes that could have spillover effects into
neighboring countries.

6) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

7) The deal contains a large number of securities whose default
probabilities Moody's has assessed through credit estimates. If
Moody's does not receive the necessary information to update its
credit estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction could be
negatively affected by any default probability adjustments Moody's
assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

8) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates Caa1 or lower, especially if they jump to
default.

9) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
that is currently out of the money. If fixed-rate assets prepay or
default, the mismatch between the swap notional and the amount of
fixed assets would be more substantial. In such cases, payments to
hedge counterparties could consume a large portion or all of the
interest proceeds, leaving the transaction, even with respect to
the senior notes, with poor interest coverage. Payment timing
mismatches between assets and liabilities can lead to additional
concerns. If the deal does not receive sufficient principal
proceeds on the payment date to supplement the interest proceeds
shortfall, an interest payment default is much more likely to
occur. Similarly, using principal proceeds to pay interest could
lead to the risk of payment default on the principal of the notes.


INDYMAC HOME 2000-C: Moody's Hikes Cl. AV Debt Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 8 tranches,
from 4 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series SPMD 2000-C

  Cl. AV, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 14, 2013,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-WMC2

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-BC4

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 21, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 21, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-4

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


JP MORGAN 2004-S1: Moody’s Hikes Cl. 3-A-1 Debt Rating From Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches and upgraded the ratings of two tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S1

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-P, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-3

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving
performance of the related pool. The ratings downgraded are due to
the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion
of enhancement available to the bonds.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Debt Rating to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the rating on one class and downgraded the rating on one
class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LDP4 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2015
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on two P&I Classes, Class B and C were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 75% since Moody's
last review.

The rating on Class D was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.4% of the
current balance, compared to 7.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $103 million
from $2.68 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 27% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 94% of
the pool.

One loan, constituting 0.5% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $221 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%). Six loans, constituting 70% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the 23 Main Street loan ($28.4 million -- 27.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 350,000 square foot (SF) Class A office
complex located in Holmdel, New Jersey. The property was built in
1977 and is currently 100% occupied by Vonage as the corporate
headquarters. The loan was transferred to special servicing in July
2015 due to potential hardship associated with the tenant's lease
modification request. An extension of the full 350,000 SF lease has
been approved by the Special Servicer.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $22.0 million loss
for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 89% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 76%, compared to
79% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and non-performing specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to
the most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.66X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.39X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Silver Hills Apartments Loan ($9.9
million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 273-unit
multifamily property located eight miles northwest of the Orlando,
Florida central business district (CBD). The property was 98%
leased as of September 2015, compared to 96% as of December 2013
and 89% as of December 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76%
and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.17X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Owens Corning Loan ($8.6 million --
8.2% of the pool), which is secured by an industrial property
located in Chester, South Carolina. The property is fully leased to
one tenant with a lease expiration in July 2025. The fully
amortizing loan has amortized approximately 39% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 51% and 2.02X,
respectively, compared to 45% and 2.3X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Oaks at St. Johns Apartments Loan
($6.1 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 158-unit
multifamily property located in St. Augustine, Florida,
approximately 24 miles southeast of Jacksonville. As of December
2015, the occupancy was 95%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90%
and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.07X at the last
review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC17: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. A-M Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 18 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp (JPMCC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC17.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance of the
pool since Fitch's last rating action. Fitch modeled losses of 8.9%
of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 18.2%, including $313.7 million (12.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Fifteen specially serviced
loans have liquidated since the June 2015 review with losses
extending to class AJ; currently three specially serviced loans
(7.9% of the pool) remain. Fitch has designated 27 loans (26.6% of
the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the remaining
specially serviced assets.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 34.8% to $1.65 billion from
$2.54 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 10 loans
(9.3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses (6.7% of the pool) is a
1,001,493 square foot (sf; 479,954 sf of collateral) regional mall
located in Wilmington, NC and known as the Independence Mall. The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2014 due to
monetary default. The non-owned anchors include Sears, Belk, and
Dillard's. Since the last rating action the largest collateral
tenant, JC Penney (23.4% net rentable area [NRA]), has extended
their lease from the previous expiration in August 2016 to August
2021. The year-to-date (YTD) Sept. 30, 2015 debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) is 0.86x with occupancy at 93%. The overall mall was
94.5% occupied as of the November 2015 rent roll. Per the special
servicer, the property has experienced a decline in the quality of
tenants being attracted to the mall and the property has
experienced challenges securing new leases; an adjacent power
center has lured potential tenants from the mall. The special
servicer is discussing a loan modification with the borrower.

The next largest contributor to expected losses (8.4% of the pool)
is secured by two office properties totaling 623,482 sf located in
the Orlando, FL CBD. Largest tenants are CNL Financial Group (22%
NRA, expiration October 2021) and Red Lobster (15% NRA, expiration
December 2027). The Red Lobster lease commenced in January 2015 and
the space serves as their new restaurant-support center and
headquarters. The two properties are approximately 99% occupied as
of December 2015; however, per the December 2015 rent rolls,
rollover in 2016 is roughly 18%. The loan matures in November 2016.


RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-4, A-SB, and A-1A reflect current
performance and credit enhancement. CE on all classes has declined
since Fitch's last rating action due to liquidation of the Bank of
America Plaza loan, previously a specially serviced loan and
largest loan in the pool ($263 million loan balance), and losses
from other specially serviced loans. In addition, a high
concentration of Fitch Loans of Concern remains. Upgrades to
classes A-4, A-SB, and A-1A are not likely as the pool becomes more
concentrated, and interest shortfalls may be a concern if
additional loans transfer to special servicing. The Negative
Outlook on class A-M reflects expected losses and risk from the
remaining specially serviced loans and the Fitch Loans of Concern.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings as indicated:

-- $986.8 million class A-4 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.2 million class A-SB at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $217.2 million class A-1A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $253.7 million class A-M at 'Bsf''; Outlook Negative;
-- $193.7 million class A-J at 'Dsf'; RE 30%;
-- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-3 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2015-COSMO: DBRS Confirms BB(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015 COSMO issued by
JPMCC 2015-COSMO:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class B at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. Class X-CP has been discontinued and
therefore its rating has been removed.

The rating confirmations reflect the continued stable performance
of the transaction. This transaction closed in March 2015,
consisting of an $875.0 million loan secured by The Cosmopolitan
luxury hotel and casino located in Las Vegas, Nevada. There is also
a $295.0 million senior mezzanine loan and a $130.0 million junior
mezzanine loan outside of the trust. The property opened in
December 2010 and is one of the newest hotels on the Strip,
featuring 2,966 rooms; 25 restaurants, lounges and bars; over
200,000 square feet (sf) of convention and banquet facilities; a
110,000 sf casino; 53,000 sf of entertainment space; 60,000 sf of
retail space; a 50,000 sf spa and fitness facility; a 1,800-seat
theatre; and a five-level underground parking garage. The subject
is located in an irreplaceable location right in between the
Bellagio Hotel and Casino and ARIA Resort & Casino. In addition,
the loan benefits from its strong sponsor, Blackstone Real Estate
Partners VII, which is an affiliate of Blackstone Group L.P., the
largest hotel owner in the United States.

According to YE2015 financials, the occupancy, average daily rate
(ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 93.3%, $310.81
and $289.86, respectively. These metrics are in line with the
trailing 12 months (T-12) November 2014 figures, which reported
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR at 95.0%, $309.35 and $292.23,
respectively. The YE2015 figures are also in line with the DBRS
underwritten occupancy, ADR and RevPAR of 91.5%, $311.91 and
$285.00, respectively. According to Visitor Volume Las Vegas, the
total visitor volume in 2015 increased by 5.2% when compared with
the prior year. In addition, occupancy for hotels located along the
Strip was 90.2% for YE2015, increasing from the 2014 occupancy of
88.8%.

This loan is interest only for the entire term, which is initially
two years, with three one-year extension options available to the
borrower. According to YE2015 financials, the property is
performing well, as the effective gross income (EGI) increased by
31.0% when compared with DBRS underwritten figures as a result of
increases from both room and food & beverage revenues. At issuance,
the subject was deemed to be underperforming in terms of gaming
revenue representation when compared with the average for
properties on the Strip; however, this revenue source has improved.
According to the Nevada Gaming Control Board, hotels’ average
gaming revenue in 2014 was approximately 40.0% of total revenues;
however, the subject only reported a 22.2% of its total revenue
from gaming for the T-12 period ending January 2015. At YE2015, the
reported gaming revenue increased, representing 31.2% of total
revenues (before promotions). According to the YE2015 sales report,
the overall retail sales decreased by 11.9% when compared with
YE2014; however, retail revenue only represents 1.2% of total DBRS
underwritten revenues. According to the YE2015 OSAR, the property
reported a net cash flow of $193.6 million; however, it appears
certain operating expenses, including Repairs & Maintenance and
Advertising & Marketing, were not fully captured, potentially
inflating the reported figures. Regardless, property performance
remains stable as the DBRS underwritten DSCR for the loan was
2.11x.


JP MORGAN 2016-C1: Fitch Assigns Final BB-sf Rating to Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the JP Morgan Chase JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2016-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:

-- $29,181,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95,864,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,513,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $317,480,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,301,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $774,099,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,760,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,263,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,760,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,760,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,263,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,206,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,490,000ac class D-1 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,716,000ac class D-2 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,206,000ac class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,380,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,496,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) The class D-1 and class D-2 certificates may be exchanged for
class D certificates, and class D certificates may be exchanged for
the class D-1 and class D-2 certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $44,708,765 class NR certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 110
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.02 billion as of the cut-off date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Association, Barclays Bank PLC, Starwood Mortgage Funding II LLC,
and Redwood Commercial Mortgage Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 68.6% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 84.8%, and asset summary reviews on
84.8% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multi-borrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.14x is lower than both the 2015 average of
1.18x and the 2014 average of 1.19x, while the pool's Fitch LTV of
109.5% is in line with the 2015 average of 109.3% and higher than
the 2014 average of 106.2%.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans account for 58.9% of the
pool, which is well above the 2015 and 2014 averages of 49.3% and
50.5%, respectively. Additionally, the loan concentration index
(LCI) is 442, which is above the 2015 and 2014 averages of 367 and
387, respectively.

Property Concentration: The largest property type is office
(36.4%), followed by hotel (19.1%), and multifamily (14.7%). The
pool's office concentration is above the 2014 averages of 22.8% and
the year to date 2015 averages of 23.2%, respectively. The pool's
hotel concentration is higher than the 2014 concentration of 14.2%,
and the year to date 2015 average of 16.6%. Loans secured by hotels
have a higher probability of default in Fitch's multi-borrower CMBS
model.

Lower Percentage of Loans Below 1.0x Fitch DSCR: 19.0% of the pool
falls below a 1.0x Fitch DSCR. This is lower than recent
transactions and below the 2015 average of 23.3%. Additionally, the
top 10 loans have a WAVG stressed loss of 3.9%, well below the
average loss for the pool.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 6.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMBB
2016-C1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 12-13.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third party due diligence information from
Ernst and Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


JP MORGAN 2016-FL8: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating on Cl. C Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2016-FL8's $337.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-FL8.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by five floating-rate loans secured by the fee
interest in an office property called Riverfront Plaza, by the fee
and leasehold interest in the DoubleTree Suites Santa Monica, the
fee interest in five retail properties called the Devonshire Retail
Portfolio, the fee interest in five suburban office and
industrial-flex properties called the Normandy Portfolio, and the
fee interest in three suburban office and industrial-flex
properties called the Jacksonville Office Portfolio.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 23,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings assigned reflect S&P's view of the
collateral's historical and projected performance, the sponsors'
and managers' experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the
loans' terms, and the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-FL8

Class       Rating(i)             Amount ($)
A           BBB- (sf)            271,400,000
X           BBB- (sf)        271,400,000(ii)
B           BB- (sf)              54,200,000
C           B (sf)                11,400,000

(i)The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance.



JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C21, issued by JPMBB
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance, with cash flows remaining
generally in line with the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. The
collateral consists of 73 fixed-rate loans secured by 84 commercial
properties. At issuance, the transaction had a DBRS
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS
WA debt yield of 1.52 times (x) and 8.7%, respectively. As of
February 2016 remittance, 48 loans (73.3% of the pool) reported
partial-year 2015 cash flows (most being Q3 2015), while 17 loans
(15.4% of the pool) reported year-end 2015 cash flows. The
remainder of the loans that did not report 2015 cash flows did
report year-end 2014 figures. Based on the 2015 cash flows (both
annualized and year-end 2015 cash flows) for the Top 15 loans, the
WA amortizing DSCR was 1.65x, with WA net cash flow growth over the
respective DBRS UW figures of approximately 18.7%. All 73 loans
remain in the pool, with an aggregate balance of $1.25 billion,
representing collateral reduction of approximately 0.9% since
issuance as a result of scheduled loan amortization. The
transaction benefits from a high concentration of loans secured by
properties within urban and suburban markets, representing 26.9%
and 61.1% of the pool, respectively. The property type with the
largest concentration in the pool is office, with 27.6% of the pool
balance; followed by retail, with 21.7%; multifamily, with 17.8%
(3.1% of which are considered to be student-housing properties);
and hotels, with 14.1%.

As of the February 2016 remittance, there are two loans in special
servicing and four loans on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 1.1% and 2.9% of the pool, respectively. Three of the
loans (2.1% of the pool) currently on the watchlist were flagged
due to items of deferred maintenance. The fourth loan, Shelly Plaza
(Prospectus ID#34, 0.7% of the pool), was flagged due to an
affiliation with A&P, which declared Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in July
2015. According to the servicer, the tenant, Super Fresh Grocery
Store (69.0% of the net rentable area (NRA) with an October 2022
lease expiration) has no plans to vacate. According to 2015
reporting (both annualized and year-end 2015), these loans had a WA
DSCR of 2.01x compared to the DBRS UW figure of 1.82x, reflective
of an 8.3% WA NCF growth. DBRS has highlighted both
specially-serviced loans in detail below.

The Lockport Professional Park loan (Prospectus ID#46, 0.5% of the
pool) is secured by 19 single-story, multi-tenant, office and
professional buildings, composing 82,292 square feet (sf). The
property is located in Lockport, New York, approximately 29.0 miles
northeast of Buffalo, New York. The buildings were constructed in
stages between 1990 and 2000, and are primarily occupied by medical
office tenants, as the park is located approximately 2.0 miles
south of the Eastern Niagara Health System. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in May 2015 due to payment default
and remained delinquent through December 2015, at which point the
borrower brought the loan current. As of the February 2016
remittance, the borrower was due for the February 2016 debt service
payment, but is less than 30 days delinquent. The loan was in
default when securitized as the borrower refused to set up a
lockbox, which the origination documents required. To date, the
borrower refuses to pay the tax escrow shortfall, asking that it be
taken from the TI/LC reserve. A receiver has been appointed by the
court, but has not been successful in obtaining updated financials.
As of Q2 2015 (the most recent financials), the loan had a DSCR and
debt yield of 1.24x and 9.9%, respectively, compared with the DBRS
UW figures of 1.32x and 10.5%.

The property has historically exhibited strong occupancy; however,
it has experienced a decline over the past two years. The appraiser
notes that this has been a result of an overall weakened local
office market, which has contributed to a decreased demand for
office space, continuing to put pressure on rental rates and
absorption periods. According to the August 2015 rent roll, the
property was 85.0% occupied with an average rental rate of $13.35
per square foot (psf), compared with 90.5% occupied with an average
rental rate of $14.36 psf as of May 2014. As of YE2015, Costar
reported Class A office buildings in the Buffalo/Niagara Falls
market had an average rental rate of $15.47 psf and a vacancy 9.6%,
respectively, a slight improvement from YE2014, which exhibited an
average rental rate of $15.20 psf with a vacancy rate of 10.0%.
Year-to-date deliveries in the market as of YE2015 totaled 916,000
sf, with 760,000 of net absorption, indicating a negative
absorption. Although the market is not directly comparable with the
subject, as Lockport Professional Park is considered a unique asset
in the market given its campus-like setting, and the fact that the
subject is found outside of the market’s parameters, the
appraiser notes that the market is still perceived as competitive.
Utilizing a sales comparison approach based on the most recent sale
of five comparable office properties (ranging from June 2012 to
April 2014), the appraiser found the subject to have an as-is value
of $5.82 million ($71.42 psf) as of August 2015, indicative of a
LTV of 116.0%. This compares negatively with the $9.7 million at
issuance, indicative of a 71.1% LTV ($119.03 psf). According to the
servicer, the primary workout strategy is that the loan seller
repurchases the loan from the pool, as the lockbox was never
established at issuance and a mortgage loan purchase agreement was
signed at issuance. The secondary strategy is foreclosure, which
would occur by YE2016 if that strategy is ultimately pursued;
however, there is no projected timetable in which the property
would be foreclosed. DBRS has modeled this loan with an elevated
probability of default given the recent decline in performance, as
well as the sharp drop in value since issuance.

The Shuman Office Building loan (Prospectus ID#47, 0.5% of the
pool) is secured by a 107,893 sf Class A/B office building located
in Naperville, Illinois, approximately 30 miles west of Chicago.
The property was originally constructed in 1981 by the General
Motors Corporation (GM). During the 2009–2010 GM bankruptcy,
rather than cancelling its lease, GM restructured the lease by
downsizing its space and extending its term from November 2013
through June 2015. The loan was placed on the servicer’s
watchlist in May 2015 due to upcoming lease expirations, including
GM (21.4% of the net rentable area (NRA)), Kaleidoscope/R-Works
(4.1% of the NRA with a June 2015 lease expiration), the Martin
Group (2.6% of the NRA with a June 2015 lease expiration) and a
couple of other smaller tenants. The loan transferred to the
special servicer in December 2015 upon written notice that the
borrower could not continue to fund the operating expense
shortfalls, as occupancy saw a sharp decline. According to the
December 2015 rent roll, the property was 52.4% occupied with an
average rental rate of $18.05 psf, compared with 82.1% occupied
with an average rental rate of $17.33 psf at issuance. According to
CoStar, as of YE2015, Class B Office buildings, ranging between
50,000 sf to 150,000 sf within a one-mile radius had an average
rental rate of $17.73 psf, with a vacancy rate of 14.0% and
availability of 18.2%. Within the next five years, rental rate
figures are projected to decrease to $17.58 psf, vacancy to
increase to 19.2% and availability to increase to 22.8%.

To date, no appraisal has been required as the loan is only
currently two months delinquent; however, it is likely that an
appraisal will be conducted in the near future. As of February 2016
remittance, the loan has an outstanding balance of $6.7 million
($62 psf). A preliminary broker opinion of value (BOV) was received
in February 2016, which concluded an estimated value range of $6.2
million to $7.5 million, compared with the issuance value of $9.3
million (LTV of 72.5%). The three largest tenants are Our
Children’s Homestead (9.4% of the NRA with a May 2020 lease
expiration), SpectaGuard Acquisition (7.9% of the NRA with a
November 2021 lease expiration) and Gateway One Lendings (6.7% NRA
through with a May 2017 lease expiration). Three tenants,
representing 11.6% of the NRA, will roll during 2017; however,
there is no rollover in either 2016 or 2018. As of Q3 2015, the
loan had a DSCR and debt yield of 1.03x and 5.1%, compared with the
DBRS UW figures of 1.61x and 7.9%, respectively. DBRS has modeled
this loan with an elevated probability of default given the recent
decline in performance, as well as the potential drop in value
since issuance.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated both the Miami International Mall
(Prospectus ID#3, 4.8% of the pool) and 307 West 38th Street
(Prospectus ID#12, 2.8% of the current pool balance) loans
investment grade. DBRS confirms that the performance of both loans
remains consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.


KEYCORP STUDENT 2000-B: Moody's Reviews B1 Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
upgrade notes in KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 1999-B and KeyCorp
Student Loan Trust 2000-B.  The underlying collateral for these
transactions includes loans originated under the Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP), which are guaranteed by the U.S.
government for a minimum of 98% of defaulted principal and accrued
interest, and private student loans, which are not guaranteed.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 1999-B
Certificates, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Feb 24, 2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-B
Class A-2, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Feb 24, 2014 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions were prompted by the continued build-up in
overcollateralization as a result of both improved collateral
performance and use of all available excess spread to pay down the
interest and principal on the notes (the transactions are currently
in the full turbo mode).  The ratio of total assets to total
liabilities in KeyCorp's 1999-B transaction has increased to 129%
as of January 2016 from 120% as of January 2015.  The ratio of
total assets to total liabilities in the 2000-B transaction has
increased to 109% as of December 2015 from 105% as of December
2014.  Annualized defaults on the private student loan have been
stable around 2% for both transactions.

During the review period, Moody's will project lifetime defaults
and net losses on the collateral and assess whether the available
credit enhancement is sufficient to upgrade the current ratings of
the affected classes of notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans"
published in April 2012 and "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S.
Private Student Loan-Backed Securities" published in January 2010.


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions.  The decision to take
(or not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a
range of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

                                Up

Among the factors that could drive the rating up are lower net
losses on the underlying assets than Moody's expects and further
increase in overcollateralization.

                               Down

Among the factors that could drive the rating down are higher net
losses on the underlying assets than Moody's.


KMART FUNDING: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class G Debt
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of Kmart Funding
Corporation Secured Lease Bonds as follows:

Cl. G, Affirmed C; previously on March 26, 2015 Affirmed at C

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the Class G was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss. The Class G has experienced
an aggregate $12.3 million realized loss due to the liquidations of
properties originally occupied by Kmart.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a higher
dark loan to value. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

This credit tenant lease (CTL) transaction at origination consisted
of seven classes supported by twenty-four retail properties leased
to Kmart under fully bondable, triple net leases. In 2001, Kmart
filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Kmart subsequently rejected the leases
for seventeen properties secured in this transaction. Leases for
three of the properties were later assumed by other retailers and
fourteen properties were liquidated from the trust. Currently, the
remaining portfolio consists of six retail properties and four
properties which have substituted by defeasance. Since
securitization, five classes had paid off prior to 2000 and one
class was withdrawn due to maturity in 2010. Class G, the remaining
certificate, has an outstanding balance of $8.6 million. This class
experienced $12.3 million in realized losses (59% overall severity)
due to liquidations. The bond's payment is semi-annual and the
final principal distribution date is July 1, 2018.


LB-UBS 2006-C6: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Certs to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the ratings on five classes in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C6 as:

  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed

   Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)
  Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 7, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on five P&I classes were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.4% of the
current balance, compared to 7.3% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.4% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 25% to $2.28 billion
from $3.05 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 117 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 48% of
the pool.  One loan, constituting 0.4% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.  Seventeen loans,
constituting 28% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Thirty-seven loans, constituting 40% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $143.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%).  Five loans, constituting 6.0% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Chapel Hill Mall loan ($65.4 -- million 2.9% of the
pool), which is secured by a 666,203 square foot (SF) enclosed
regional mall in Akron, Ohio.  The property became REO in September
2014, after transferring to special servicing in November 2013.
The mall was 91% leased as of January 2016, compared to 97% at
yearend 2014.  The value of the property is declining significantly
due to steadily dwindling tenant sales and resulting store
closures.  Macy's announced they will be closing their store this
month and tenants totaling 23,862 SF have indicated they will
vacating at lease expiration.  Leasing and sales marketing
strategies are currently being reviewed at this time.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $102 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (74% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans, constituting 12% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $67.8 million (a 25% expected loss based on a
63% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 33% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 94%, compared to
95% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.5% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Naples Walk I,
II, & III Loan ($8.3 million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 126,000 square foot (SF) grocery-anchored retail center
located in Naples, Florida.  As of March 2015, the property was 87%
leased, unchanged from Moody's prior review.  The property is
anchored by a Publix Supermarket through 2019.  Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa2 (sca.pd) and 1.61X,
respectively, compared to baa3 (sca.pd) and 1.49X at the last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the 125 High Street Loan ($340 million -- 14.9% of
the pool), which is secured by a 1.5 million SF Class A office
building and parking garage located in downtown Boston,
Massachusetts.  The property was 86% leased as of September 2015,
compared to 83% at yearend 2014.  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
vacated the property in October 2015 however, two major leases that
cover a majority of the space have been signed.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 96% and
0.93X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Las Americas Loan ($173.9
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 561,000 SF
outlet mall located in San Ysidro, California, located twenty miles
south of San Diego.  The mall's major tenants include Nike Factory
Store, Old Navy and the Gap Outlet.  The property was 97% leased as
of September 2015, compared to 96% at yearend 2014.  The loan
sponsor is Simon Property Group.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
76% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.24X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Chesterfield Loan ($140 million --
6.1% of the pool), which is secured by 641,800 SF of retail space
at the Chesterfield Mall in Chesterfield, Missouri.  Dillards,
Macy's and Sears serves as non-collateral anchors. The property was
90% leased as of September 2015, compared to 95% at yearend 2014.
Since securitization, mall revenue has declined by 25% and there
are six competing properties in a 20 mile radius. Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 182% and 0.54X, respectively, compared to 124% and 0.79X at the
last review.


LCM XXI LP: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB- Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to LCM XXI L.P./LCM XXI LLC's $344.70 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 18,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's

      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.3439%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the preliminary rated notes outstanding.

   -- During the reinvestment period, the transaction will benefit

      from an interest reinvestment test, a failure of which will
      lead to the reclassification of up to 50% of the excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, incentive management fees,

      and L.P. certificate note payments as either, at the
      collateral manager's option, principal proceeds to purchase
      additional collateral obligations or proceeds to pay
      principal on the notes according to the note payment
      sequence.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

LCM XXI L.P./LCM XXI LLC

Class               Rating                 Amount (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)                        235.00
B-1                 AA (sf)                          34.80
B-2                 AA (sf)                          12.00
C (deferrable)      A (sf)                           28.00
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)                         18.90
E (deferrable)      BB- (sf)                         16.00
L.P. certificates   NR                               36.36

NR--Not rated.


MOTEL 6 TRUST: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 11 rated classes of the Motel 6
Trust 2015-MTL6 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations and Stable Outlooks reflect the
stable-to-improving performance of the portfolio since issuance.
The collateral has demonstrated an upward trend in cash flow since
the sponsor's acquisition in March 2012, which parallels the U.S.
lodging industry's performance over the same time period.  The
strong performance of the hotel sector is expected to continue into
2016 as new supply remains below the historical average and demand
nears record levels.

As of the March 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance was $1.79 billion compared with $1.8 billion at
issuance.  The mortgage loan is secured by a first priority,
mortgage loan consisting of a $90 million portion that enables the
sponsor to voluntary prepay through Dec. 2016 and a $1.71 billion,
five-year fixed interest-only component.  Additionally, the
portfolio was encumbered with an additional $200 million in
mezzanine financing.

This single borrower transaction was originally secured by 507
owned economy hotels with the majority under the Motel 6 brand.
During 2015, 12 properties were released and the principal balance
reduced by $6.9 million.  The current portfolio includes 496
properties across 47 states and one Canadian province.
Approximately 13% of the portfolio by property count (64), are
located in Texas (11.7% by allocated loan amount).

Since acquisition of the portfolio in 2012, the sponsors have
invested significant capital towards property renovations as part
of a portfolio rebranding strategy.  Renovations on 110 properties
were completed in 2015, upgrading 74% of the portfolio since
acquisition enabling the sponsor to start a national advertising
campaign to raise customer awareness of the upgraded room
amenities.  The $75 million up-front capital expenditure reserve
has been depleted.

As of the year to date (YTD) ended September 2015, occupancy
reported at 70.3%, average daily rate (ADR) at $54.16, and revenue
per available room (RevPAR) at $38.53.  This compares with the
year-end December 2014 at 67.2% occupancy, $50.22 ADR, and $33.76
RevPAR.  Servicer reported net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) improved to 3.78x for YTD September 2015,
compared to 3.41x at YE December 2014.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch used conservative cash flow assumptions on the portfolio to
ensure that revenues and incomes are sustainable over the long
term.  Fitch applied an additional credit loss to cash flows from
properties located in Texas due to the potential performance
volatility within this region.  The Rating Outlook for all classes
remains Stable as no rating changes are expected based on the
performance improvement and volatility of hotel performance over
the long term.

                      DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $83 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $60 million class A-2A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $436.8 million class A-2A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $83 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.710 billion class X-CP at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.710 billion class X-NCP at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $310.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $140.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $212 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $350 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $200 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


NAAC REPERFORMING 2004-R3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 4 Tranches to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches issued from two transactions. The collateral backing these
deals consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate mortgage
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an
agency of the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) or
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust 2004-R3

Cl. A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AF, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. AS, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. PT, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series
2004-R2

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on this pool and the structural nuances of the
transaction. The ratings downgraded are primarily due to the
erosion of credit enhancement supporting these bonds, due to the
amortization of the subordinate bonds and losses incurred by the
subordinate bonds.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA guarantee covers
only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of either the
sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid interest, and
foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount. HUD usually pays
claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers submit the claims, but
can impose significant penalties on servicers if it finds
irregularities in the claim process later during the servicer
audits. This can prompt servicers to push more expenses to the
trust that they deem reasonably incurred than submit them to HUD
and face significant penalty. The rating actions consider the
portion of a defaulted loan normally not covered by the FHA or VA
guarantee and other servicer expenses they deemed reasonably
incurred and passed on to the trust.


NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class M2 Debt 'Ba3(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to three
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1 (NHLT 2016-1). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 884 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 201 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC. The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1

Class A, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class M1, Assigned A3 (sf)

Class M2, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral in Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1 consists of
first-lien inactive HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) insurance secured by properties in the US along with REO
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. Nationstar
acquired the mortgage assets from Ginnie Mae sponsored HECM
mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations. All of the mortgage assets
are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment of principal up to
certain amounts. If a borrower or their estate fails to pay the
amount due upon maturity or otherwise defaults, sale of the
property is used to recover the amount owed.

There are 1,085 mortgage assets with a balance of approximately
$302,891,615. Loans are in either default, due and payable,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO. Of the mortgage assets in
default (10.1% of total pool), 8.5% are in default due to
non-occupancy, 88.3% are in default due taxes and insurance and
3.2% are in default for other reasons. 12.3% of the mortgage assets
are due and payable. 63.0% of the mortgage assets are in
foreclosure. Finally, 14.6% of the mortgage assets are REO and were
acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure on the
associated loan. The pool includes 884 loans with an aggregate
balance of approximately $258,699,537 and 201 REO properties with
an aggregate balance of approximately $44,192,078. If the value of
the related mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount,
some of these loans may be settled by the borrower or their
estate.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst
three classes of notes with overcollateralization. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their mandatory call dates. The subordinate notes will not receive
principal until the beginning of their target amortization periods
(in the absence of an acceleration event). The notes also benefit
from overcollateralization as credit enhancement and an interest
reserve account funded with cash received from the initial
purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in February 2018. For the Class
M1 notes, the mandatory call date is in August 2018. Finally, for
the Class M2 notes, the mandatory call date is in February 2019.
For each of the subordinate notes, there are six month target
amortization periods that conclude on the respective mandatory call
dates. The legal final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to come from the
liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance claims.
These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the event
that there are not adequate funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve fund may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortage in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults. Also, while Nationstar is required
to pay to the trust any debenture interest due, a replacement
servicer will only remit debenture interest actually received.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
data integrity, presence of FHA insurance coverage, accurate
recordation of appraisals, accurate recording of occupancy status,
borrower age documentation, identification of non-borrower spouses,
identification of excessive corporate advances, and identification
of tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price
opinions (BPOs) were ordered for 181 properties that had appraisals
that were over one year old.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable)
and thus relatively weak from a credit perspective. Given the
nascent nature of their securitization program, we have limited
insight as to their ability to serve in this capacity. This risk is
mitigated by the fact that Nationstar is the equity holder in the
transaction and there is therefore a significant alignment of
interests. Another factor mitigating this risk is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is qualified and is made only as to the
initial mortgage loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws.

Upon the identification of a breach in R&W, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. We believe the absence of an independent third party
reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2016-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2016-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 13
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2016-1.  The NRMLT 2016-1 transaction is a securitization of $261.2
million of first lien, seasoned mortgage loans with weighted
average seasoning of 150 months, weighted average updated LTV ratio
of 60.7% and weighted average updated FICO score of 697.
Approximately 25.8% of the loans were previously modified.  Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC, Nationstar Mortgage LLC and PNC Mortgage
(PNC), will act as primary servicers and Nationstar Mortgage LLC
will act as Master Servicer.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1

  Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-IO, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B1-IO, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  Cl. B2-IO, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's losses on the collateral pool are 2.65% in an expected
scenario and reach 15.25% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
(sf) ratings on the senior classes.  Moody's based its expected
loss on this pool on our estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances.  The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and our assessment of
the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework of this
transaction.

To estimate the losses on this pool, we used an approach similar to
our surveillance approach.  Under this approach, Moody's applies
expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment rates
(CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate future
losses on the pool.  Moody's assumptions on these variables are
based on the observed rate of delinquency on seasoned modified and
non-modified loans, and the collateral attributes of the pool
including the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past
24 months.  For this pool, Moody's used default burnout and
voluntary CPR assumptions similar to those detailed in our "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" for Alt-A loans originated before 2005.
Moody's then aggregated the delinquencies and converted them to
losses by applying pool-specific lifetime default frequency and
loss severity assumptions.

                      Collateral Description

NRMLT 2016-1 is a securitization of seasoned performing residential
mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ Sponsor VI LLC, has previously
purchased or will purchase on the closing date, in connection with
the termination of various securitization trusts. The transaction
consists primarily of 30-year fixed rate loans. 74.2% of the loans
in this pool by balance have never been modified and have been
performing while approximately 25.8% of the loans were previously
modified but are now current and cash flowing.  The weighted
average seasoning on the collateral is 150 months.

       Third-party Review and Representations & Warranties

A third party due diligence provider conducted a compliance review
on a sample of 769 loans proposed to be included in the mortgage
pool.  The regulatory compliance review consisted of a review of
compliance with Section 32/HOEPA, Federal Truth in Lending
Act/Regulation Z (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Protection
Act/Regulation X (TILA), and federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations.  Home data index (HDI) values were
obtained for 1,773 out of 1,789 properties in the securitization.
In addition, updated broker price opinions (BPOs) were obtained for
522 of the properties contained within the securitization from a
third party BPO provider.

The third party due diligence provider also conducted a review of
data integrity, pay history, and title/lien review on the selected
sample to confirm that certain information in the mortgage loan
files matched the data supplied by the servicers.  Any issues
identified during the data integrity review were corrected on the
data tape, and the pay history analysis indicated there were no
material pay history issues on the data tape.

The third party due diligence review identified 567 loans that had
compliance exceptions, the majority of which were due to missing
HUD and/or TIL documents, under disclosed finance charges, missing
right to cancel disclosures, or missing FACTA disclosures. Although
the diligence provider's report indicated that the statute of
limitations for borrowers to rescind their loans has already
passed, borrowers can still raise these legal claims in defense
against foreclosure as a set off or recoupment and win damages that
can reduce the amount of the foreclosure proceeds. Such damages
include up to $4,000 in statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees
and other actual damages.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor VI LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files.  To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer, depositor or
custodian has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage
loan document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding
the completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the
mortgage loan documents, and such missing document, defect or
breach is preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization
against the related mortgaged property through foreclosure or
similar loss mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title
claim under the related title insurance policy, the party with such
actual knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the seller, indenture trustee,
depositor, master servicer, related servicer and custodian.  Upon
notification of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the
seller will have 120 days from the date it receives such
notification to deliver the missing document or otherwise cure the
defect or breach.  If it is unable to do so, the seller will be
obligated to replace or repurchase the mortgage loan.

Despite this provision, Moody's increased its loss severities to
account for loans with missing title policies (according to both
the title/lien review and a custodial file review), mortgage notes,
or mortgage/deed/security agreements.  This adjustment was based on
both the results of the TPR review and because the R&W provider is
an unrated entity and weak from a credit perspective. In our
analysis we assumed that 1.4% of the projected defaults will have
missing documents' breaches that will not be remedied and result in
higher than expected loss severities.

                    Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust National
Association.  The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash management functions
will be performed by Citibank, N.A.  In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, termination of servicers, and the appointment of
successor servicers.

                      Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met.  To pass the first test,
the delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50%
of the subordinate bonds outstanding.  To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool.  The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 3.1% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-2
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 16.75%.  These
provisions mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

                               Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from our original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

                               Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing Loans" published in
July 2014, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
November 2013.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2016-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to six classes of notes
issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2016-1 LLC (the "Issuer"
or "NewStar 2016-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$176,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$36,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$23,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

NewStar 2016-1 is a managed cash flow SME CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by small and medium enterprise
loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured
loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10 % of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans. The portfolio is
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

NewStar Financial, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, no collateral purchases are allowed.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue membership
interests.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $350,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3400

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.85%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 26: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Octagon Investment Partners 26,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $310,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $50,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $15,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2027,
   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $35,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2027, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Octagon 26 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 85% ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 4.5 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -1
Class B-2 Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -2


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XI: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1A, A-1B, A-2, and B notes from Octagon Investment Partners XI
Ltd.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class C and
D notes from the same transaction.  S&P also removed all of the
ratings from CreditWatch with positive implications.  Octagon
Investment Partners XI Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in July 2007 and is
managed by Octagon Credit Investors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 18, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $170.06 million in
collective paydowns to the pro rata class A-1A and A-1B notes since
S&P's February 2015 rating actions.  This is significantly higher
than the $0.50 million that was scheduled to amortize during this
period, primarily due to a wave of loan prepayments in 2015.  These
paydowns resulted in improvements in each of the reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the December 2014 trustee
report, which S&P used for its February 2015 rating actions:

   -- The class A O/C ratio improved to 142.45% from 124.34%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio improved to 123.55% from 114.79%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 114.26% from 109.63%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 107.45% from 105.63%.

The transaction has experienced approximately $4.45 million (0.97%
of the previous aggregate principal balance) in par loss since
S&P's previous actions, but this impact has been more than offset
by the faster-than-expected paydowns to the senior notes.  As of
the February 2016 trustee report, there is only one defaulted
position with a par balance of $1.25 million, but collateral with
an Standard & Poor's rating of 'CCC+' or lower has increased to
3.27% from 0.75%.

The transaction can purchase up to 7.50% of Euro-denominated senior
secured loans; however, all collateral obligations are currently
USD denominated.

S&P's decision to raise the rating on the class B notes to
'AA (sf)' rather than the cash flow implied rating of 'AA+ (sf)'
was based on the thin cushion at the higher rating level, as well
as the increase in 'CCC' obligations and a small exposure to the
distressed energy sector (reported oil and gas exposure is
currently at 3.49%).

The affirmation of the class C notes rating reflects S&P's belief
that the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating level.  Although the cash flow implied rating of the class D
notes indicates a one-notch downgrade, S&P's decision to affirm the
current rating is based on the increased overcollateralization
available to the notes as well as the faster-than-projected
amortization of the senior notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

                 CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd.
                            Cash flow   Cash flow
       Previous             implied       cushion    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)      (%)(ii)   rating
A-1A   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        22.06    AAA (sf)
A-1B   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        22.06    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        10.05    AAA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)         0.50    AA (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB+ (sf)        5.91    BBB+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)          0.84    BB+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario         Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case            15.0              5.0
Base case equals rating    20.0              7.5
Above base case            25.0             10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
        implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class   rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1A    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1B    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)   AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
C       BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    A (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
D       BB (sf)    B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread         Recovery
         Cash flow   compression    compression
         implied     implied        implied        Final
Class    rating      rating         rating         rating
A-1A     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-1B     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-2      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)       AAA (sf)
B        AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)        A (sf)         AA (sf)
C        BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)      BB (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
D        BB (sf)     BB- (sf)       CCC- (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1A        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1B        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D           BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-2: S&P Assigns B+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OneMain
Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2's $890.000 million asset-backed
notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.8%, 48.3%, 40.3%, and
      34.5% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

      These credit support levels are sufficient to withstand
      stresses commensurate with the ratings on the notes based on

      S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of our 'A+ (sf)',
      'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of credit

      deterioration as equal to a two-category downgrade within
      the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely payment of periodic interest

      and principal by the legal final maturity date according to
      the transaction documents, based on stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, using assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- OneMain's established management and its experience in
      origination and servicing consumer loan products.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s (the backup servicer) consumer loan
      servicing experience.

   -- The operational risks associated with OneMain Financial
      Group LLC's (OneMain's) decentralized business model.

   -- The uncertainty concerning the integration of OneMain's
      operations with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s operations.  OneMain

      Holdings Inc. (formerly known as Springleaf Holdings Inc.)
      acquired OneMain from CitiFinancial Credit Co., a wholly
      owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., on Nov. 15, 2015.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2

Class       Rating     Type          Interest           Amount
                                     rate             (mil. $)
A           A+ (sf)    Senior        Fixed             625.000
B           BBB (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed             108.490
C           BB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed              82.510
D           B+ (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed              74.000



PPT ABS 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Certs to B3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
from one deal backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans, issued by
PPT ABS LLC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: PPT ABS LLC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1
  Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 18, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The action is a result of the recent performance of the underlying
pool and reflects Moody's updated higher loss expectation on the
pool.  The rating downgraded is due to the weaker performance of
the underlying collateral.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1:

-- Class A-1 Notes rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Class A-2 Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regards to
    originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    Prestige's auto loan portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Prestige,
    and that the trust has a valid first-priority security
    interest in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS
    methodology "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."


PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Prestige
Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1's $312.082 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 44.7%, 39.2%, 30.3%,
      24.8%, and 22.5% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes, respectively (based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios, including excess spread), which provides coverage

      of more than 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x S&P's
      12.25%-12.75% expected cumulative net loss range for the
      class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.  These credit
      support levels are commensurate with the assigned 'AAA
      (sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)'
      ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes
      would not decline by more than one rating category (all else

      being equal).  These potential rating movements are
      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
      outline the outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a
      one-category downgrade within the first year for 'AAA' and
      'AA' rated securities, and a two-category downgrade within
      the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments made
      under the stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are
      consistent with the assigned ratings.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime auto loans.

   -- Prestige Financial Services Inc.'s securitization
      performance history since 2001.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

                                Interest  Amount   Legal final
Class  Rating     Type          rate (%)  (Mil. $) maturity
A-1    A-1+ (sf)  Senior        0.85     38.500    April 17, 2017
A-2    AAA (sf)   Senior        1.78    123.000    Aug. 15, 2019
A-3    AAA (sf)   Senior        1.99     50.260    June 15, 2020
B      AA (sf)    Subordinate   2.98     25.489    Nov. 16, 2020
C      A (sf)     Subordinate   3.56     37.589    Nov. 15, 2021
D      BBB (sf)   Subordinate   5.15     25.489    Nov. 15, 2021
E      BB (sf)    Subordinate   7.69     11.764    March 15, 2023



PRETSL COMBINATION: Moody's Raises Rating on Series P Certs to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on these
combination certificates issued by PreTSL Combination
Certificates:

  $7,715,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XVIII-3 due
   Sept. 23, 2035, (current rated balance of $4,006,659.28 as
   calculated by Moody's), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 5, 2014, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

PreTSL Combination Certificates, Series P XVIII-3, a combination
security, was issued in July 2006 and comprises $3.5 million of
Class B notes and $4.215 million of subordinated income notes
issued by Preferred Term Securities XVIII, Ltd, a TruPS CDO (the
Underlying Deal).

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade is primarily a result of recent upgrades to the
ratings of the underlying securities backing the combination
certificates and a reduction in the rated balance of the
combination certificates.  The rating on the combination
certificates is based on the credit quality of the respective
underlying components and the legal structure of the transaction.
Moody's upgraded the rating on the Underlying Deal's Class B notes
component to Baa2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) on Feb. 25, 2016.

Since the last rating action the rated balance of the combination
certificates has been reduced by approximately 4% from interest and
principal distributions received by the Class B notes component of
the Underlying Deal.  The certificates will continue to receive
distributions from the Class B notes in the Underlying Deal.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance (after treating deferring securities as
performing if they meet certain criteria) of $373.9 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $110.3 million, a weighted average
default probability of 9.74% (implying a WARF of 885), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 9.7%.  In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US
     banking sector.  Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the
     US insurance sector.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the Underlying Deal that is better than
     Moody's current expectations could have a positive impact on
     the transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the Underlying Deal's
     performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in the Underlying
     Deal is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
     proceeds and excess interest proceeds will continue and at
     what pace.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     notes' ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest
     payment priority.

  4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number

     of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS

     in the Underlying Deal.  The timing and amount of deferral
     cures could have significant positive impact on the
     transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the ratings
     on the notes.

  5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The Underlying Deal
     contains a large number of securities whose default
     probability Moody's assesses through credit scores derived
     using RiskCalc or credit estimates.  Because these are not
     public ratings, they are subject to additional uncertainties.

  6) The rating on the combination certificates will be sensitive
     to any change in the rating of the underlying Class B note in

     Preferred Term Securities XVIII, Ltd.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge™ cash
flow model.

The portfolio backing the Underlying Deal of the certificate
contains mainly of TruPS issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community banks and insurance companies that Moody's does not rate
publicly.  To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an econometric model
developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's
evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the
pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data.  For insurance TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment
of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis of the
underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 608)
Series P XVIII-3: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1470)
Series P XVIII-3: -2


PRIMUS CLO II: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, and C notes from Primus CLO II Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where they were placed on
Dec. 18, 2015.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
D and E notes.  Primus CLO II Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in July 2007 and is
managed by Primus Asset Management Inc.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 16, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $111.1 million in paydowns to the class A
notes since S&P's February 2015 rating actions, which have reduced
the class's outstanding balance to 46.4% of its original balance.
The transaction exited its reinvestment period in July 2014.

The trustee reported these overcollateralization (O/C) ratio
increases in the February 2016 monthly report, compared with the
January 2015 report:

   -- Class B's O/C test increased to 143.22% in February 2016
      from 123.44% in January 2015;
   -- Class C's O/C test increased to 118.20% from 111.11%;
   -- Class D's O/C test increased to 111.70% from 107.54%; and
   -- Class E's O/C test increased to 103.73% from 102.91%.

The rated notes also benefited from the portfolio's seasoning, with
the trustee reporting a weighted average life of 3.33 years. The
portfolio seasoning has helped reduce the simulated default
percentage, and thus improved its credit risk profile since S&P's
January 2015 rating actions.  S&P also considered the transaction's
exposure (4.0%) to energy- and commodity-related sectors, which are
currently facing unfavorable market conditions.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P's review of the transaction also relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's
Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSROs for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by Standard &
Poor's.  The criteria provide specific guidance for the treatment
of corporate assets not rated by Standard & Poor's, and the
interpretation outlines the treatment of securitized assets.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Primus CLO II Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    14.54%       AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    9.23%        AAA (sf)
C      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA- (sf)    0.94%        AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)   3.67%        BBB+ (sf)
E      B+ (sf)              BB- (sf)    0.59%        B+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario            Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                      7.5
Above base case             25.0                     10.0

                  10% recovery Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease     increase    decrease
       implied    implied      implied     implied   Final
Class  rating     rating       rating      rating    rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)  AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)  B+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CC (sf)       B+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Primus CLO II Ltd.

                Rating
Class       To          From
A           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C           AA- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Primus CLO II Ltd.

Class       Rating
D           BBB+ (sf)
E           B+ (sf)


RPLMT 2014-1: Fitch Affirms Ratings After Revised Distributions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, in late February 2016, affirmed the ratings on all
classes within RPLMT 2014-1, a U.S. RMBS transaction backed by a
pool of seasoned re-performing mortgage loans. In the February
remittance, principal was re-allocated among classes to correct for
errors in prior distributions. A further correction is expected
over the next one or more distributions, as there was not enough
principal distribution cash available to make the full adjustment
in the February 2016 remittance. The February 2016 redistribution
of principal did not affect the ratings of any classes, nor are
subsequent redistributions expected to have an impact.

Fitch affirms the following:

-- Class A-1 at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1A at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1B at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1F at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1H at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1 at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1A at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1C at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1D at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1G at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1H at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1I at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1J at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1K at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1L at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1M at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1N at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-1O at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2A at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2C at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2E at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2I at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2J at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2K at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2L at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2M at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B-2N at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect a stable to improving relationship of
credit enhancement (CE) to expected loss since the latest ratings
were assigned in April 2015. The CE of the A-1, B-1 and B-2 classes
has increased between roughly 5% - 6% over that period, while the
percentage of the pool that is serious (60+ days) delinquent has
increased roughly 2%.

The rating analysis took into account recent developments
concerning the transaction's operations. Between December 2014 and
November 2015, scheduled principal collections were incorrectly
distributed to bond holders as unscheduled principal, instead of
being properly identified as scheduled and unscheduled principal
and distributed accordingly. Per the transaction waterfall, senior
classes are to receive 100% of unscheduled principal for the first
five years of the transaction, and scheduled principal is to be
distributed pro rata among all classes. Since all principal
collections were being treated as unscheduled, the senior classes
received a larger share of the scheduled principal collected, while
the subordinate classes received little to no principal. The
transaction's securities administrator is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
the credit risk manager is The Palisades Group, LLC, and the
servicer is Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC.

Starting in December 2015, scheduled and unscheduled principal
collections began being distributed accurately, and subordinate
classes began receiving their pro rata share of scheduled
principal. In the February 2016 distribution, principal
distributions were allocated disproportionately to more accurately
reflect the actual mix of scheduled and unscheduled principal since
transaction closing. There was not enough principal cash
collections in February to fully adjust the principal balances, and
the remaining adjustments are expected to be made in one or more
subsequent distributions. No adjustments were made to prior
interest distributions.

The principal allocation issue and resolution did not result in
material changes to the credit profile of the rated bonds. The
re-allocation of principal in the February 2016 distribution
resulted in month-over-month changes in CE of the A-1, B-1 and B-2
classes of -52bps, -9bps and +27bps, respectively. The updated CE
is sufficient to support the current ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in early March 2016, affirmed the
ratings on seven classes in Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2001-MM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-MM as follows:

Cl. E-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. E-8, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. F-4, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. F-8, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. G-8, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $26 million
from $674 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

One loan, constituting 81% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 82%, compared to 63% at
Moody's last review. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.80X and 1.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.11X and 2.14X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

This transaction has several unique features in terms of
certificate structure, loan grouping, payment priority and loss
allocation. The interest-only class (Class X) is the only remaining
senior certificate in the trust. Additionally, there are six
remaining junior certificates that are divided into two series
corresponding to specific loan groups. At securitization, the
aggregate principal balance of each loan group was divided into a
senior portion and a junior portion and the senior portion of each
series supported the pooled classes. As of the February 2016
remittance date, the certificate principal balance of the related
senior portions have been reduced to zero and principal payments
are now applied to the junior certificates on a senior/sequential
basis within each respective loan group. Based on the payment
priority and the certificate structure of this transaction, it is
possible that a junior certificate holder may receive principal
payments before the principal balance of a higher-rated certificate
from a different loan group is reduced to zero. At securitization
there were eight loan groups, however, six groups, corresponding to
Classes E-1, F-1, G-1; E-2, F-2, G-2; E-3, F-3, G-3; E-5, F-5, G-5;
E-6, F-6, G-6; and E-7, F-7 and G-7, have been repaid in full.

Loan Group 4 originally consisted of four loans but due to pay offs
only one loan remains as the collateral for classes E-4, F-4 and
G-4. The remaining loan in Loan Group 4 is the Peace Corps Building
Loan ($4.9 million -- 19.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
159,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Washington,
D.C. The property was 100% leased as of February 2015, the same as
at last review. The GSA leases over 90% of the NRA through May 2018
which is six months prior to the loan maturity date of November
2018. The loan is fully amortizing and Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 21% and 5.05X, respectively, compared to 28% and 3.85X at
last review. Moody's affirmed the ratings of classes E-4, F-4 and
G-4 due to overall stable loan performance.

Loan Group 8 originally held four loans but due to pay offs only
one loan remains as the collateral for classes E-8, F-8 and G-8.
The remaining loan in Loan Group 8 is the Stamford Square Loan
($21.1 million -- 81.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 296,000
SF Class A office building located in Stamford, Connecticut. The
property was 71% leased as of December 2014 compared to 31% in
February 2014. The largest tenant (General Electric -- 57% NRA)
vacated at its lease expiration in June 2012. This loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSCR. The sponsor
completed an approximately $12 million renovation in 2011 to the
lobby and common areas. The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule
and matures in June 2020. The loan has amortized 39% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.18X,
respectively. Moody's affirmed the ratings of classes E-8, F-8 and
G-8 due to overall stable loan performance.


SLM PRIVATE 2003-B: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class B Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all ratings of the outstanding student loan
notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B (SLM
2003-B). The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$394 million of private student loans originated by Navient Corp.
under the Signature Education Loan Program, LAWLOANS program,
MBALoans program, and MEDLOANS program. The projected remaining
defaults are expected to range between 10%-12%. A recovery rate of
20% was applied which was determined to be appropriate based on
data provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by excess spread and the
senior notes benefits from subordination provided by the junior
notes. As of the June 16, 2015 distribution, the senior parity,
subordinate parity and total parity ratios are 118.58%, 111.54% and
96.02% respectively, comparable to levels observed last year.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account sized at approximately $3.12 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B:

-- Class A-2 at 'A-sf';
-- Class A-3 at 'A-sf';
-- Class A-4 at 'A-sf';
-- Class B at 'BBsf';
-- Class C at 'CCCsf', RE 15%.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.


SLM PRIVATE 2003-C: Fitch Corrects Aug. 15 Release
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on March 18, 2016, issued a correction to a press
release on SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-C, originally
published on Aug. 15, 2015. In accordance with Fitch's policies,
the committee followed an external appeal and the rating outcome
differed from that of the original rating committee. This
information was not disclosed in previous press release.

The correcting ratings release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings affirms all ratings of the outstanding student loan
notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-C (SLM
2003-C). The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$412 million of private student loans originated by Navient Corp.
under the Signature Education Loan Program, LAWLOANS program,
MBALoans program, and MEDLOANS program. The projected remaining
defaults are expected to range between 11%-13%. A recovery rate of
20% was applied which was determined to be appropriate based on
data provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by excess spread and the
senior notes benefits from subordination provided by the junior
notes. As of the June 16, 2015 distribution, the senior parity,
subordinate parity and total parity ratios are 118.54%, 110.68% and
95.38%, respectively, comparable to levels observed last year.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account sized at approximately $3.12 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms and maintains Outlook Negative on the following:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-C:

-- Class A-2 at 'A-sf';
-- Class A-3 at 'A-sf';
-- Class A-4 at 'A-sf';
-- Class A-5 at 'A-sf';
-- Class B at 'BBsf';
-- Class C at 'CCCsf', RE 10%.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Lowers $205.8 Million of FHA/VA RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in early March 2016, downgraded the
ratings of twelve tranches issued from five transactions. The
collateral backing these deals consists of first-lien fixed and
adjustable rate mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban
Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
(VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp (SASCO) 2006-RF1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-RF2

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. AIO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2007-RF1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-RF2

Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2009 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-RF7

Cl. A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on this pool and the structural nuances of the
transaction. The ratings downgraded are primarily due to the
erosion of credit enhancement supporting these bonds, due to the
amortization of the subordinate bonds and losses incurred by the
subordinate bonds.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA guarantee covers
only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of either the
sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid interest, and
foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount. HUD usually pays
claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers submit the claims, but
can impose significant penalties on servicers if it finds
irregularities in the claim process later during the servicer
audits. This can prompt servicers to push more expenses to the
trust that they deem reasonably incurred than submit them to HUD
and face significant penalty. The rating actions consider the
portion of a defaulted loan normally not covered by the FHA or VA
guarantee and other servicer expenses they deemed reasonably
incurred and passed on to the trust.


SYMPHONY CLO XVII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to nine classes of
notes issued by Symphony CLO XVII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $280,750,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)
  $40,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned

   Aaa (sf)
  $50,750,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028,
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  $32,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Assigned A2 (sf)
  $31,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  $25,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due

   2028, Assigned Ba3 (sf)
  $50,000,000 Class 1 Combination Notes (composed of components
   representing U.S.$36,250,000 of Class B Notes, U.S.$3,750,000
   of Class C Notes and U.S.$10,000,000 of subordinated notes due
   2028, Assigned Aa3 (sf)
  $20,000,000 Class 2 Combination Notes (composed of components
   representing U.S.$2,000,000 of Class B Notes, U.S.$12,250,000
   of Class C Notes and U.S.$5,750,000 of subordinated notes due
   2028, Assigned A3 (sf)
  $20,000,000 Class 3 Combination Notes (composed of components
   representing U.S.$16,000,000 of Class C Notes and;
  $4,000,000 of subordinated notes due 2028, Assigned A2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the
Combination Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Moody's ratings of the Combination Notes address only the ultimate
receipt of the Rated Balance (as that term is defined in the
transaction's documents) by the holders of the Combination Notes.
Moody's ratings of the Combination Notes do not address any other
payments or additional amounts that holders of the Combination
Notes may receive pursuant to the underlying documents.

Symphony CLO XVII, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
first-lien senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second-lien loans and unsecured loans.  As of the closing date, the
manager has not acquired any assets but expects to acquire
approximately 40% of the target par amount within the two week
period after the closing date.

Symphony Asset Management LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1,
Section 3.4 and Appendix 14 of the "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology
published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 50
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2865
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

The rating on the Combination Notes, which combine cash flows from
the Underlying Components, is subject to a higher degree of
volatility than those of the other Rated Notes, primarily due to
the uncertainty of cash flows from the subordinated note component.
Moody's applies haircuts to the cash flows from the subordinated
note component based on the target rating of the Combination Notes.
Actual distributions from the subordinated note component that
differ significantly from Moody's assumptions can lead to a faster
(or slower) speed of reduction in the Combination Notes' Rated
Balance, thereby resulting in better (or worse) ratings performance
than previously expected.  In addition, one or more of the
Underlying Components may be repaid earlier due to a refinancing of
the Issuer, potentially resulting in the subordinated notes being a
larger percentage of the Combination Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2865 to 3295)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1
Class 1 Combination Notes: -1
Class 2 Combination Notes: -1
Class 3 Combination Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2865 to 3725)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1
Class 1 Combination Notes: -2
Class 2 Combination Notes: -2
Class 3 Combination Notes: -3



TELOS CLO 2016-7: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Telos CLO 2016-7 Ltd./Telos CLO 2016-7 LLC's $225.00 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a static pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated
senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 17,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's

      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
      primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.3439%-12.0193%.  The transaction's
      overcollateralization and interest coverage tests, a failure

      of which will lead to the diversion of interest and
      principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the rated notes
      outstanding.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Telos CLO 2016-7 Ltd./Telos CLO 2016-7 LLC

Class                  Rating            Amount (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                   156.50
B                      AA (sf)                     37.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                      14.50
D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)                   12.00
E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                     5.00
Subordinated notes     NR                          27.37


TOWD POINT 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-1
(TPMT 2016-1) as:

   -- $523,151,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $51,387,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $37,092,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $32,069,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $29,364,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $20,864,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class A1A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class A1B exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class A1C exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class X1 notional exchangeable notes 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class X2 notional exchangeable notes 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $523,151,000 class X3 notional exchangeable notes 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class A3A exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class A3B exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class A3C exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class X4 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class X5 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $574,538,000 class X6 notional exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class A4A exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class A4B exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class A4C exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class X7 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class X8 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $611,630,000 class X9 notional exchangeable notes 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $643,699,000 class A5 exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

These classes will not be rated by Fitch:

   -- $39,410,000 class B3 notes;
   -- $39,413,325 class B4 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consisted of
2,868 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $772.75 million (which includes $7.95
million, or 1.03 %, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the cut-off
date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on class A1 notes reflects the 32.30%
subordination provided by the 6.65% class A2, 4.80% class M1, 4.15%
class M2, 3.80% class B1, 2.70% class B2, 5.10% class B3 and 5.10%
class B4 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicers, Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (rated 'RPS1-') and the representation
(rep) and warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings and
the sequential pay structure.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as 'clean current' (82.6%) and loans
that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings are identified as 'dirty current' (17.4%).  All loans
were current as of the cutoff date. 62.1% of the loans have
received modifications.

'D' Grades for Compliance (Concern): The third-party review (TPR)
firm's due diligence review resulted in 76 loans graded 'D', the
majority of which had late fee charges that violated state
regulation or had HUD1 Settlement Statement (HUD1) exceptions.  For
30 loans (1.05%), the due diligence results showed issues regarding
high cost testing with the loans either missing the final HUD1 or
having used alternate documentation to test. Therefore a slight
upwards revision to the model output loss severity (LS) was
applied, as further described in the Third-Party Due Diligence
section beginning on page 7.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Positive): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest
(P&I).  As P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become
delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to
the trust, the loan-level loss severities (LS) are less for this
transaction than for those where the servicers are obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Mixed): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full.  Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Neutral): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest.  While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high investment grade
rated bonds the lower rated bonds may experience long periods of
interest deferral that will generally not be repaid until such note
becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions,' published in May 2014, the agency
may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes that incur deferrals if
such deferrals are permitted under terms of the transaction
documents, provided such amounts are fully recovered with interest
accrued thereon prior to legal final maturity under the relevant
rating stress.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC as
rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to
breaches prior to the payment date in April 2017.  Thereafter, a
reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due to noteholders
for loans identified as having rep breaches.  Amounts on deposit in
the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of subordination,
will be available to cover additional defaults and losses resulting
from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring after April 2017.  If
FirstKey Mortgage, LLC does not fulfill its obligation to
repurchase a mortgage loan due to a breach, Cerberus Global
Residential Mortgage Opportunity Fund, L.P. (the responsible party)
will step in to repurchase the loan.

Tier 2 Representation Framework (Neutral): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to be consistent with what it views as a Tier
2 framework due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers and the
exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of third-party due
diligence findings.  Thus, Fitch increased its 'AAAsf' loss
expectations by roughly 200 bps to account for a potential increase
in defaults and losses arising from weaknesses in the reps.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): An
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgage and subsequent assignments were recorded in the
relevant local jurisdiction, was also performed.  Per the
representations provided in the transaction, all loans have either
been recorded in the appropriate jurisdiction, are in the process
of being recorded, or will be sent for recordation with 12 months
of the closing date.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, Fitch believes that FirstKey's
oversight for completion of these activities serves as a strong
mitigant to potential delays.  In addition, the obligation of
FirstKey Mortgage, LLC or Cerberus Global Residential Mortgage
Opportunity Fund, L.P. to repurchase loans, for which assignments
are not recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment
date in April 2017, aligns the issuer's interests regarding
completing the recordation process with those of noteholders.

PD Adjustment for Clean Current Loans (Positive): Fitch's analysis
of the performance of clean current loans found that, for these
loans, its loan loss model projected probability of default (PD)
that was more punitive than that indicated by Fitch's delinquency
roll rate projections.  To account for this difference, Fitch
reduced the lifetime default expectations by approximately 18% for
the loans that have a clean payment history for at least the past
24 months.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $7.95 million (1.03% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 363 loans.  Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan.  The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals.  Fitch believes borrower default
behaviour for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs as
exit strategies (i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative
to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Third-Party Loan Sale Provisions (Neutral): The transaction permits
nonperforming loans and loans classified as real estate-owned (REO)
to be sold to unaffiliated third parties to maximize liquidation
proceeds to the issuer.  FirstKey as asset manager is charged with
responsibility for arranging such sales.  To ensure that loan sales
do not result in losses to the trust that exceed Fitch's
expectations, the sale price is floored at a minimum value equal to
63.42% of the unpaid principal balance, which approximates Fitch's
'Bsf' LS expectations.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): FirstKey Mortgage, LLC in
its capacity as the Sponsor for the securitization will acquire and
retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of the securities to be
issued.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels.  The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 5%.  The analysis indicates there is some potential
rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model
projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information, as well as the
final Form 15E, from WestCor, Clayton, American Mortgage
Consultants (AMC)/JCIII & Associates (JCIII).  The due diligence
focused on regulatory compliance, pay history, servicing comments,
the presence of key documents in the loan file and data integrity.
In addition, Westcor, AMC, and JCIII were retained to perform an
updated title and tax search, as well as a review to confirm that
the mortgages were recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction and
the related assignment chains.

A regulatory compliance and data integrity review was competed on
100% of the pool.  A pay history review was conducted on 98% of the
pool, and a servicing comment review was completed on approximately
31% of the loans.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and based on the
findings, Fitch made minor adjustments to its analysis.

Two loans had their loss severity adjusted by 5%, since the statute
of limitations (SOL) had not expired based on the reports provided
by the TPR firms.

248 loans experienced a 1X30 delinquency in the last 12 months and
a servicing comment review was either not performed or performed
prior to October 2015; a 100% PD was assumed.

42 loans were found to have an exception due to missing
modification documents or a missing signature on modification
documents.  For these loans, timelines were extended by an
additional three months in addition to the six-month timeline
extension applied to the entire pool.

Two of the loans that were graded 'D' and eligible for federal,
state, and/or local predatory testing could expose the trust to
potential assignee liability as they contained material violations
including an inability to test for high cost violations or confirm
compliance.  These loans are marked as 'indeterminate' and are
located in states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not purchase
list of 'high cost' or 'high risk'.  For these two loans Fitch
assumed a 100% loss severity.

The likelihood of all loans being high cost is lower for the
remaining 28 loans graded 'D' and eligible for federal, state,
and/or local predatory testing where a final HUD1 was not used for
testing and the properties are not located in the states that fall
under Freddie Mac's do not purchase list.  However, Fitch assumes
the trust could potentially incur notable legal expenses and
increased its loss severity expectations by 5% for these loans to
account for the risk.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and upgraded the ratings on three classes in UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2012-C1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to a
significant increase in defeasance which increased to 26% of the
current pool balance from 0.3% at the last review, as well as an
increase in overall pool performance.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to $1.22 billion
from $1.33 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 43% of
the pool. Seven loans, constituting 26% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Twelve loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

The pool has not experienced any realized losses to date. One loan,
the Southport and Sheffield loan (for $6.1 million -- 0.5% of the
pool), is currently in special servicing. The loan is secured by
two mixed use, retail/office buildings totaling 29,894 SF and
located in the Lakeview neighborhood of Chicago, Illoinis. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in December 2015 due to
ongoing litigation involving the borrower. The loan remains current
on its debt service payments.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 1.8% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4.0 million (14% expected loss on average)
from the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 86% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 92%, compared to 94%
at last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.42X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.42 and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Dream Hotel Downtown Net Lease Loan ($120
million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
fee simple interest in a parcel of land located at 17th Street and
9th Avenue in Chelsea, Manhattan. The borrower leased its interest
in the collateral to Northquay Properties, LLC (Hotel Tenant) and
Northglen Properties LLC (Banquet/Conference Space Tenant) under
two separate Net Leases. The Net Leases are structured with step
ups in lease payments. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and
0.64X, respectively, consistent with the last three reviews.

The second largest loan is the Poughkeepsie Galleria Loan ($82
million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 691,000 square
foot (SF) portion of the 1.2 million SF regional mall located in
Poughkeepsie, New York (approximately 70 miles north of New York
City). Mall anchors include JCPenney, Regal Cinemas, and Dick's
Sporting Goods as part of the collateral. Anchors not part of the
collateral include Macy's, Best Buy, Target and Sears. As of
December 2015 the property was 95% leased. The $82 million loan
represents a pari passu portion of a total $148 million first
mortgage loan. The collateral is also encumbered by $21 million of
mezzanine debt. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.05X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Hartfield 21 Loan ($73 million --
6.0% of the pool), which is secured by the leasehold interest in a
class-A mixed use multi-family/office/retail development located in
center city Hartford, Connecticut. As of September 2015, the
property had a combined occupancy of 86%. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 96% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to 101% and 0.95X at
the last review.


VENTURE IX CDO: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, and C notes from Venture IX CDO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation transaction managed by MJX Asset Management LLC,
and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes from the same
transaction and removed them from CreditWatch positive.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A notes and a
subsequent increase in the credit support available to support the
notes since S&P's January 2015 rating actions.  The affirmations
reflect the available credit support consistent with the current
rating levels.

This analysis was based on the January 2016 monthly trustee report,
but S&P has also considered any trades executed by the manager
since then.

The transaction has paid down the class A notes by $158.72 million
since S&P's January 2015 review.  The paydowns reduced the note
balance to 57.10% of the original balance and improved the credit
support to the tranches as reflected in the higher the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.

The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the January 2016 monthly
report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 133.36%, up from 122.38% in the
      November 2014 report, which S&P used for its January 2015
      actions;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 121.07%, up from 115.27% in
      November 2014; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 114.33%, up from 111.13% in
      November 2014.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and on recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.


S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Venture IX CDO Ltd.

                           Cash flow
       Previous            implied     Cash flow    Final    
Class  rating              rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AAA (sf)    14.84%       AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AAA (sf)    0.67%        AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)    1.88%        AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)   6.08%        BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)    6.31%        BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

               RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     BBB (sf)      A- (sf)       AA- (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     CCC (sf)      B+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Venture IX CDO Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To          From
A             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


VENTURE VII: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1B, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Venture VII CDO Ltd. and removed
them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-1A, A-1AR, and E notes and removed the
rating on the class E notes from CreditWatch positive.  Venture VII
CDO Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
that closed in December 2006 and is managed by MJX Asset Management
LLC.

The transaction has an APEX revolver feature that was used to cover
principal losses during the reinvestment period, which ended in
January 2014.

The upgrades reflect the combined $66.3 million in pay downs to the
class A-1A, A-1AR, and A-2 notes since our October 2014 rating
actions.  The transaction has a pro rata sequential structure so
that even though the class A-1 and A-2 notes are pari passu, the
class A-1A and A-1AR notes receive paydowns before the class A-1B
notes and hence can be paid in full before the class A-1B and A-2
notes.

As of the Jan. 29, 2016, trustee report, the transaction holds
$22.8 million in defaulted assets and $35.9 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, which are both up from the Aug. 29, 2014, trustee report
that S&P used for its October 2014 rating actions.  At that time,
the transaction held $15.2 million in defaulted assets and $27.5
million in 'CCC' rated assets.  These credit quality deteriorations
were offset by collateral seasoning and note paydowns, which have
substantially improved the portfolio's credit risk profile and
overcollateralization ratios, respectively.  As part of S&P's
analysis, it also considered trades by the manager executed since
the Jan. 29, 2016, trustee report.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

            CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Venture VII CDO Ltd.

                             Cash flow
        Previous             implied     Cash flow       Final
Class   rating               rating(i)   cushion (%)(ii) rating
A-1A    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    15.16           AAA (sf)
A-1AR   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    15.16           AAA (sf)
A-1B    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    1.83            AAA (sf)
A-2     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    1.83            AAA (sf)
B       AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    7.34            AA+ (sf)
C       A (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)     5.43            A+ (sf)
D       BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   3.09            BBB+ (sf)
E       BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)    0.47            BB (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario          Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                  10% recovery  Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease      increase     decrease
       implied    implied       implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating        rating       rating     rating
A-1A   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1AR  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)       A+ (sf)      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)       BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow   compression   compression
        implied     implied       implied      Final
Class   rating      rating        rating       rating
A-1A    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-1AR   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-1B    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)
C       A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)    BB (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Venture VII CDO Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1A    92328WAA9    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1AR   92328WAC5    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1B    92328WAL5    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2     92328WAM3    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B       92328WAE1    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C       92328WAG6    A+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D       92328WAJ0    BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E       92328UAA3    BB (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Pos



VENTURE VIII: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1B, A-2B, A-3, and C notes from Venture VIII CDO Ltd. and removed
them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-1A, A-2A, B, D, and E notes and removed the
class B, D, and E notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.  Venture VIII CDO Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in June 2007 and is
managed by MJX Asset Management LLC.

The upgrades reflect the combined $223 million in paydowns to the
class A-1A, A-2A, and A-3 notes since our January 2015 rating
actions.  The transaction has a pro rata sequential structure; even
though the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes are pari passu, the class
A-1A and A-2A notes receive paydowns before the class A-1B and A-2B
notes and therefore can be paid in full before the class A-1B,
A-2B, and A-3 notes.

As of the Feb. 9, 2016, trustee report, the transaction holds $29.9
million in defaulted assets and $43.6 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, which are both up from $19.6 million and $30.9 million,
respectively, as of the Dec. 10, 2014, trustee report that S&P used
in its January 2015 rating actions.  These credit quality
deteriorations were offset by collateral seasoning and note
paydowns, which have improved the portfolio's credit risk profile
and the class A/B, C, and D overcollateralization ratios.  The
credit quality deterioration had a larger impact on the subordinate
class E notes, which is reflected in the slight decrease in the
class E overcollateralization ratio since S&P's January 2015 rating
actions.  As part of S&P's analysis, it also considered trades by
the manager executed since the Feb. 9, 2016, trustee report.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

            CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Venture VIII CDO Ltd

                             Cash flow
        Previous             implied    Cash flow        Final
Class   rating               rating(i)  cushion (%)(ii)  rating
A-1A    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   13.76            AAA (sf)
A-1B    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   7.23             AAA (sf)
A-2A    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   21.50            AAA (sf)
A-2B    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   7.23             AAA (sf)
A-3     AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   7.23             AAA (sf)
B       AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)   10.16            AA+ (sf)
C       A(sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)    4.25             A+ (sf)
D       BBB-(sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)  1.47             BBB- (sf)
E       BB+(sf)/Watch Pos    BB (sf)    1.34             BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
(BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario           Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                   10% Recovery  Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow   decrease      increase     decrease
       implied     implied       implied      implied    Final
Class  rating      rating        rating       rating     rating
A-1A   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2A   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2B   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)     A (sf)        A+ (sf)      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)
E      BB (sf)     B+ (sf)       BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow    compression   compression
        implied      implied       implied      Final
Class   rating       rating        rating       rating
A-1A    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-1B    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2A    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2B    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-3     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C       A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D       BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)      BB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
E       BB (sf)      BB- (sf)      B- (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Venture VIII CDO Ltd.

                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1A    92327JAA9    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1B    92327JAS0    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2A    92327JAC5    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2B    92327JAE1    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3     92327JAU5    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B       92327JAG6    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C       92327JAJ0    A+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D       92327JAL5    BBB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E       92327JAN1    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


VENTURE XXII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 (sf) Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., in late January 2016, assigned
ratings to eleven classes of notes issued by Venture XXII CLO,
Limited (the "Issuer" or "Venture XXII").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$222,000,000 Class A-1L Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class A-1L Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class A-1F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-1F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,292,105 Class B-1L Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class B-1L Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$23,157,895 Class B-1F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028
(the "Class B-1F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$10,550,000 Class C-1L Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-1L Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class C-1F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class C-1F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

US$8,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2028 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1L Notes, the Class A-1F Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B-1L Notes, the Class B-1F Notes, the Class C-1L Notes,
the Class C-1F Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes, the
Class E Notes, and the Class F Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Venture XXII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 95% ramped as of the closing
date.

MJX Venture Management LLC, a recently formed affiliate of MJX
Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest up to 75% of unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets,
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2725

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.00%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2725 to 3134)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1L Notes: 0

Class A-1F Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1L Notes: -1

Class B-1F Notes: -1

Class C-1L Notes: -2

Class C-1F Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -2

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2725 to 3543)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1L Notes: 0

Class A-1F Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1L Notes: -3

Class B-1F Notes: -3

Class C-1L Notes: -3

Class C-1F Notes: -3

Class D-1 Notes: -3

Class D-2 Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -4



WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C3: Fitch Withdraws Rating on 4 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the ratings on four distressed classes
of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2003-C3 (WACM
2003-C3).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating withdrawals are a result of the termination of the trust
fund in connection with the purchase by the master servicer, Wells
Fargo, of all the mortgage loans and each real estate owned (REO)
property remaining in the transaction.  As of the January 2016
servicer data, three of the four remaining loans (94.4% of the
pool) were fully defeased.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The transaction has been liquidated at the February 2016 payment
date pursuant to the termination by the trust.  All classes have
either been paid in full, partially repaid with a realized loss, or
fully written down due to realized losses.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has withdrawn these ratings:

   -- Class L at 'Dsf';
   -- Class M at 'Dsf';
   -- Class N at 'Dsf';
   -- Class O at 'Dsf'.

The class A-1, A-2, IO-II, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, and K classes
have paid in full.  The rating on class IO-I was previously
withdrawn.  Fitch does not rate class P.



WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C27: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes and downgraded the rating of one class in Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificate, Series 2006-C27 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes, classes A-1A through A-J were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on eight P&I classes, classes B through J were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, class X-C, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.4% of the
current balance, compared to 11.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $1.66 billion
from $3.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 35% of the pool. Thirteen loans, constituting 20% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities. There are no loans with an investment-grade structured
credit assessment.

Nineteen loans, constituting 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $126 million (for an average loss
severity of 27%). Twenty-two loans, constituting 24% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Glendale Center (for $125 million -- 7.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a fourteen story, 382,800 square foot (SF)
office building located in Glendale, California. The property
includes a one story retail building and a six level parking
structure. The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2011 due to imminent default as a result of cash flow issues and
has been REO since August 2012.

The remaining 21 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $169.8 million loss
for the specially serviced loans. Moody's has assumed a high
default probability for two poorly performing loans, constituting
4.0% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss of $11.6
million (a 17% expected loss based on average) from these troubled
loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 99% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 76% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to 96%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15.0% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 12.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 500-512 Seventh Avenue Loan ($107.2 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which represents a 50% pari-passu interest in
a first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a leasehold interest
in three office buildings totaling 1.2 million SF. The buildings
are located in the Garment District of Midtown Manhattan, New York.
As per the January 2016 rent roll the properties were 72% leased,
compared to 90% leased as of November 2014. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.0X, respectively, compared to 83% and
1.18X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Yuma Palms Regional Center Loan
($62.5 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 400,141
SF anchored retail center located in Yuma, Arizona. The mortgaged
property is part of the 1.05 million SF Yuma Palms open air
regional shopping center. As per the December 2015 rent roll the
property was 96% leased. The loan is interest only for the full
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 0.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the AIM Investments Corporate Campus Loan
($43.7 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
A suburban office buildings totaling 263,770 SF and located in
Denver, Colorado. The property was built in 2001 and is currently
100% leased to Invesco Holding with a lease expiration in October
2016. The loan is on the watchlist for the pending lease expiration
date. The December 2014 rent roll indicates 144,263 SF (54.7% of
GLA) has been leased to MDC Holdings for a 10 year term that
commences in November 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103%
and 1.00X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.21X at the last
review.


WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, A-3, B, and C notes from Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd., and
removed them from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and D notes
from the same transaction.  Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd. is a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
August 2007 and is managed by Grandview Capital Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Feb. 4, 2016.

The upgrades reflect a $79.30 million paydown to the class A-1
notes since S&P's July 2014 rating actions.  The affirmed ratings
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

Primarily due to the paydowns, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have improved since the July
2014 trustee report that was the basis of S&P's July 2014 rating
actions.  The February 2016 trustee report indicated these O/C
increases:

   -- Class A increased to 165.74% from 128.31%.
   -- Class B increased to 133.76% from 117.48%.
   -- Class C increased to 119.78% from 111.53%.
   -- Class D increased to 109.34% from 106.60%.

Since S&P's last rating actions on this transaction, there has been
deterioration in the underlying portfolio's credit quality. As of
the February 2016 trustee report, the transaction held $24.48
million in assets rated 'CCC+' or below, up from $7.55 million as
of the July 2014 trustee report, which was used as the basis for
S&P's last rating actions.  S&P's rating actions reflect the
application of market value haircuts on the long-dated assets held
in this transaction, per "Methodology And Assumptions For Market
Value Securities," published Sept. 17, 2013.  Although the class C
and D notes pass S&P's cash flow stresses at higher rating levels,
it did not raise the ratings to the higher levels to maintain
rating cushion due to the classes' exposure to 'CCC' rated assets
and assets with a negative rating outlook.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                               Cash flow  Cash flow
        Previous               implied      cushion   Final
Class   rating                 rating(i)    (%)(ii)   rating
A-1     AAA (sf)               AAA (sf)       25.95   AAA (sf)
A-2     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)       22.41   AAA (sf)
A-3     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)       12.71   AAA (sf)
B       A- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)        3.88   AA (sf)
C       BBB- (sf)/ Watch Pos   A- (sf)         1.55   BBB (sf)
D       BB (sf)                BB+ (sf)        6.42   BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario            Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                  15.0        5.0
Base case equals rating          20.0        7.5
Above base case                  25.0        10.0

                 Recovery    Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow decrease    increase     decrease
       implied   implied     implied      implied      Final
Class  rating    rating      rating       rating       rating
A-1    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)  AA (sf)     AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
C      A- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)    BB (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow   compression   compression
        implied     implied       implied       Final
Class   rating      rating        rating        rating
A-1     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA (sf)
C       A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)     BBB (sf)
D       BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      B (sf)        BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class      To           From
A-2        AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B          AA (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C          BBB (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
Class      Rating
A-1        AAA (sf)
D          BB (sf)


WELLS FARGO 2014-C22: Fitch Puts B Rating on 2 Cl. of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed four classes on Rating Watch Negative and
revised the Rating Outlook to Negative on one class of Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.'s WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2014-C22
commercial mortgage trust pass-through certificates.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Rating Watch Negative placement and Outlook revision are due to
the significant decline in performance and recent transfer to
special servicing of the eleventh-largest loan in the pool ($27.1
million, 1.8% of the pool).  The multifamily property is located in
the Bakken shale region of North Dakota, a market that has been
severely affected by low oil prices.  Fitch analysts recently
visited the area to assess the market conditions and demand for
housing.  Fitch visited the property and confirmed the low demand
for housing in the area.

The specially-serviced States Addition Apartments loan is secured
by a portfolio of three apartment complexes containing 235 units
located in Dickinson, ND (Bakken Formation).  The loan transferred
to special servicing in February 2016 for payment default; the
property has suffered occupancy declines of 50% as well as reduced
rents.  The local economy and property are highly dependent on the
area's oil industry, and the downturn in the petroleum sector and
subsequent cutbacks in the local oil drilling-related industries
has had a negative impact on the ND and Dickinson economies.  The
property's occupancy and debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of
December 2015 declined to 53% from 94% and 0.60x from 1.35x.  A
recent valuation was unavailable but has been ordered by the
special servicer.  The loan is categorized as 60-days delinquent.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Watch Negative placements are due to the uncertainty of
value, as updated appraisals are pending.  In addition, the special
servicer's workout plan is unknown although a sale of the property
in the near term is unlikely due to the depressed market
conditions.  Downgrades of one category or more are possible to
these classes should the updated information exceed conservative
estimates.  Rating actions are expected in three to six months. The
Rating Outlook revision indicates the potential for a negative
rating action in the next 1-2 years should overall pool performance
decline.

                         DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action

Fitch placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

   -- Interest-only X-C at 'BBsf';
   -- Interest-only X-D at 'Bsf';
   -- $31.6 million class E at 'BBsf;
   -- $14.9 million class F at 'Bsf'.

Fitch revised the Rating Outlook to this class as indicated:

   -- $111.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from

      Stable.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C33 to
be issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C33. The
trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G, D, E, F and G will be privately placed.


The Class X-A, Class X-B, Class X-D, Class X-E, Class X-F and Class
X-G balances are notional. DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO)
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers the IO
certificates' position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of 79 fixed-rate loans secured by 104
commercial and multifamily properties, comprising a total
transaction balance of $712,219,087. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The trust asset contributed
from one loan, representing 5.7% of the pool, is shadow-rated AA
(low) by DBRS. Proceeds for the shadow-rated loan are floored at
its rating within the pool. When 5.7% of the pool has no proceeds
assigned below the rated floor, the resulting pool subordination is
diluted or reduced below that rated floor. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the loan term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, six loans, representing 12.2% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 25
loans, representing 44.0% of the pool, having refinance (Refi)
DSCRs below 1.00x; however, the DBRS Refi DSCRs for these loans are
based on a weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of
9.83%, which implies an inter¬est rate of 9.28%, amortizing on a
30-year schedule. This represents a significant stress of 5.023%
over the WA contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The
loans' probability of default (POD) is based on the more
constraining of the DBRS Term or DBRS Refi DSCR.

Overall, the pool exhibits a relatively strong DBRS WA Term DSCR of
1.65x based on the whole loan balances, which indicates moderate
term default risk. Fourteen loans, representing 5.5% of the pool,
are secured by cooperative properties and are very low leverage,
with minimal term and refinance default risk. The pool is
relatively diverse based on loan size, with a concentration profile
equivalent to that of a pool of 32 equal-sized loans, though the
top ten represent 45.5% of the pool. Diversity is further enhanced
by eight loans, representing 17.4% of the pool, that are secured by
multiple properties (33 in total). Increased pool diversity
insulates the higher-rated classes from event risk. The
third-largest loan, 225 Liberty Street (5.7% of the pool), has
credit characteristics consistent with a AA (low) shadow rating.

Eight loans, representing 12.2% of the pool, are secured by
properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant, including the largest loan, Sanofi Office Complex (9.1% of
the pool). DBRS also treated the fourth-largest loan, Business &
Research Center at Garden City, as single-tenant given the
significant concentration of the largest tenant at the property.
Loans secured by properties occupied by single tenants have been
found to suffer from higher loss severities in the event of
default. Thirteen loans, representing 27.9% of the pool, including
four of the top 15 loans, are structured with IO payments for the
full term. An additional 24 loans, representing 31.8% of the pool,
have partial IO periods remaining ranging from one month to 59
months, including six of the top 15 loans. The transaction’s
scheduled amortization by maturity is 11.4%, excluding the Sanofi
Office Complex amortization recognized post ARD which would result
in 17.7% total amortization. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by
using the amortizing debt service obligation and the DBRS Refi DSCR
is calculated considering the balloon balance and lack of
amortization when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines POD
based on the lower of DBRS Term or DBRS Refi DSCR, so loans that
lack amortization will be treated more punitively. Twenty-seven
loans, representing 31.0% of the pool, are secured by
non-traditional property types, including three loans in the top
ten.

The DBRS sample included 28 of the 79 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 41 of the 104 properties in the pool
(64.6% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS conducted
meetings with the on-site property manager, leasing agent or a
representative of the borrowing entity for 45.2% of the pool. The
DBRS average sample NCF adjustment for the pool was -8.1% and
ranged from -21.2% to +8.8%. DBRS identified 15 loans, representing
29.5% of the pool, with unfavorable sponsor strength, including
seven of the top 15 loans. DBRS increased the POD for the loans
with identified sponsorship concerns.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: Fitch to Rate Class X-E Debt at 'BB-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $30,449,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,502,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $191,116,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,486,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,416,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $551,969,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,332,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,282,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,050,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,611,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,915,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,122,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,611,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16,915,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,122,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 10, 2016. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$30,270,087ab class X-G certificates and the $30,270,087a class G
certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 79 loans secured by 104
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $712.2 million as of the cut-off date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,
Ladder Capital Finance LLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC, C-III
Commercial Mortgage LLC, Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC and
National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 68.1% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 78.9%, and asset summary reviews on
78.9% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage in Line with Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch DSCR
and LTV are 1.48x and 101.1%, respectively. However, excluding
co-op and credit opinion collateral, the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV
are 1.15x and 108.5%, respectively. This is in line with other
recent Fitch-rated transactions. The 2015 and YTD 2016 average
Fitch LTVs were 109.3% and 108.3%, respectively. The 2015 and YTD
2016 average Fitch DSCRs were 1.18x and 1.15x, respectively.

Co-Op Collateral: The pool contains 14 loans (5.5% of the pool)
secured by multifamily co-ops, 12 of which are within the New York
City metro area with one each in Washington DC and Atlanta, GA. The
weighted average Fitch DSCR and LTV of the co-op collateral in this
transaction as rentals are 6.74x and 26.1%, respectively

Property Type Concentration: The pool's largest concentration by
property type is office (32.4%), which is greater than the 2015
average of 23.5%. The pool also has an above average concentration
of self-storage properties which comprise 14% of the pool, higher
than the 2015 average of 4%. Loans secured by hotel properties
comprise only 13% of the pool, which is below the 2015 average of
17%. Office properties have an average likelihood of default in
Fitch's multiborrower model, self-storage properties have a below
average likelihood of default, while hotels properties demonstrate
more volatility and have higher default probabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 17.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2016-C33 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10-11

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence information
was provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a
comparison and re-computation of certain characteristics with
respect to each of the 79 mortgage loans. Fitch considered this
information in its analysis and the findings did not have an impact
on the analysis.


WESTCHESTER CLO: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B and D notes from Westchester CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Highland Capital Management
L.P.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class A-1-A, A-1-B, B,
and D notes from the same transaction.  At the same time, S&P
removed its ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where it had placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 20, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $190.9 million in paydowns to the class A-1-A
notes since S&P's October 2014 rating actions, which have reduced
the class' outstanding balance to 46.8% of its original balance.
The transaction exited its reinvestment period in August 2014.  In
addition, the transaction has benefited from the underlying
portfolio's improved credit quality.  As of the Jan. 20, 2016,
trustee report, the transaction held $28.23 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, down from $34.59 million as of the August 2014 trustee
report, which S&P used in its October 2014 analysis.  In addition,
the transaction held $67.78 million in 'CCC' rated assets, down
from $85.39 million as of August 2014.  S&P also considered the
transaction's sizeable exposure (7.4%) to energy- and
commodity-related sectors, which are currently facing unfavorable
market conditions.

The affirmations on Westchester CLO Ltd.'s class A-1-A, A-1-B, B,
and D notes reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available
is commensurate with their current rating levels.

There is a feature in the principal waterfall that allows principal
proceeds to pay down deferred interest on the class E notes.  The
waterfall also has a turbo feature that redirects residual interest
and principal to pay down the class E notes if the class E coverage
tests are not satisfied.  Principal cash may only be used to pay
down the class E notes if the payment doesn't cause any other
coverage test above it to fail.  According to the January 2016
trustee report, the class E overcollateralization ratio was
102.96%, above the 102.30% threshold.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, S&P will take rating actions as it deem
necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Westchester CLO Ltd.
                             Cash flow   Cash flow
       Previous              implied       cushion       Final
Class  rating                rating(i)     (%)(ii)       rating
A-1-A  AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)        34.29       AAA (sf)
A-1-B  AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)        13.86       AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)        13.27       AA+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AA- (sf)         1.42       A+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)         3.04       BB+ (sf)
E      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)        0.83       B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
scenario         Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case           15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating   20.0                      7.5
Above base case           25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1-A  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1-B  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)  BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)    B+ (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1-A  AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1-B  AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       CC (sf)       BB+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)      CC (sf)       B+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Westchester CLO Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
C           A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E           B+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Westchester CLO Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
B           AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D           BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Westchester CLO Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1-A       AAA (sf)
A-1-B       AAA (sf)


[*] DBRS Confirms Ratings on 37 Tranches From 13 Securities Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has conducted a review of 13 publicly rated U.S.
structured finance asset-backed securities transactions that are
currently outstanding. Of the 46 securities reviewed, DBRS, on
March 11, 2016, confirmed 37, upgraded seven and discontinued two
due to repayment in full.

For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s
expected losses at their current respective rating levels. For the
upgraded securities, performance trends are such that credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses
at their new respective rating levels.

The following public transactions were reviewed:

-- Axis Equipment Finance Receivables II, LLC
-- Axis Equipment Finance Receivables III LLC
-- CNH Wholesale Master Note Trust Series 2013-2
-- Driver Australia One Trust
-- Driver Australia Two Trust
-- Navitas Equipment Receivables LLC 2015-1 LLC
-- New Hampshire Health and Education Facilities Authority
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-1
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-2
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-1
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-2
-- SNACC Auto Receivables Trust 2014-1
-- PCARS, LLC

A full text copy of the ratings are available free at:

                 http://is.gd/pqc9ln


[*] DBRS Takes Rating Actions on 265 Classes From 98 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 265 classes from 98 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 265 classes
reviewed, all of the ratings were confirmed on March 18, 2016.

For transactions where the rating has been confirmed, current asset
performance and credit support levels have been consistent with the
current rating or linked to the rating of corporate entities
providing credit support to the tranche or transaction.

The transactions are U.S. Net Interest Margin (NIM) transactions.
The pools backing these transactions consist of subprime and
second-lien residential loans.

A full text copy of the company's ratings is available free at:

                   http://is.gd/zv8jMZ



[*] Fitch Affirms Ratings on 3 US RMBS Housing Deals
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on seven classes from three
Associates Manufactured Housing (MH) transactions issued between
1996 - 1997.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect credit enhancement provided by the
transaction structure and a limited guarantee provided by Citigroup
Inc. Fitch's Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) for Citigroup is
'A'/Stable Outlook. Several of the classes affirmed at 'Asf' have
not received principal distributions and are reporting principal
writedowns. For these classes, the guarantor is making interest
distributions based on the class' original principal balance, and
Fitch expects full principal reimbursement of the writedown amounts
to be paid by the guarantor when the classes are due to receive
principal per the transactions' sequential waterfall.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to the rating action.


[*] Fitch Lowers 169 Distressed Bonds in 90 RMBS Deals to 'Dsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on March 18, 2016, downgraded 169 distressed bonds
in 90 U.S. RMBS transactions to 'Dsf'. The downgrades indicate that
the bonds have incurred a principal write-down. Of the bonds
downgraded to 'Dsf', 161 classes were previously rated 'Csf', and
eight classes were rated 'CCsf'. All ratings below 'CCCsf' indicate
a default is likely.

As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates (REs) of the
defaulted bonds were not revised. In addition, the review focused
only on the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other
bonds in the affected transactions.

Of the 169 classes affected by these downgrades, 111 are Prime, 30
are Alt-A, and 19 are Subprime. The remaining transaction types are
various other sectors. Approximately 69% of the bonds have an RE of
50%-100%, which indicates that the bonds will recover 50%-100% of
the current outstanding balance, while 12% have an RE of 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

All of the affected classes had incurred a principal write-down and
are expected to endure additional losses in the future.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility that this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch
would further review the affected class.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 169 Distressed Bonds to 'Dsf' in 90 U.S. RMBS
Transactions'. These actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch
analysts. The spreadsheet provides the contact information for the
performance analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of REs to the
transactions. The Recovery Estimate scale is based upon the
expected relative recovery characteristics of an obligation. For
structured finance, REs are designed to estimate recoveries on a
forward-looking basis.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


[*] Moody's Hikes $1.5-Bil. of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in mid-February 2016, upgraded the
ratings of 44 tranches from 17 transactions backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE7

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 16, 2014
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL1

Cl. I-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-C

Cl. 1-AV-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2013
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2013
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-B

Cl. 1-AV-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.


[*] Moody's Hikes $199.5MM Scratch and Dent RMBS Issued 2003-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
from seven deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP2 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-RP1 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-RP2 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: RFSC Series 2003-RP2 Trust

M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012 Confirmed at B3
(sf)

Issuer: RFSC Series 2004-RP1 Trust

M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 4, 2009 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Hikes $240MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
from eight transactions, backed by Subprime loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2003-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-FM2

2004FM2-M1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-OP1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-10

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R10

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Affirmed at A3, Outlook
Negative on July 2, 2014)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2003-HE4

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Series 2002-HE1

Cl. B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $464MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 21 tranches
from five transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-OA3
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-8
  Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 1,
   2015, Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)
  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 1,
   2015, Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)
  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 1,
   2015, Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-9
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2014,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-19XS
  Cl. A3A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A3B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A3C, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A6A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. A6B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A6C, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 4, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-23XS
  Cl. 1-A3A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct. 3, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A3B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A3C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A3D, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2013,
   Affirmed Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2013,
   Affirmed Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the stronger
collateral performance and the credit enhancement available to the
bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $861MM Subprime RMBS From 2005-2006
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 22, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 26 tranches from 12 transactions, backed by Subprime loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-WMC3
  Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE4
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
    Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE5
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 21, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 21, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 21, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2006-A
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 15, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 15, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, INABS
2006-C
  Cl. 1A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-WMC3
  Cl. A-1SS, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE3
  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010,
   Downgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-1
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-2
  Cl. A3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-3
  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. A5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $238.9MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 15 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from seven
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Alternative Loan Trust 2004-J9

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 18, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 22, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB8

  Cl. 8-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 9-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-13CB

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 25, 2012,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 28, 2011,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. PO, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 28, 2011,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-10

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12,
   2013, Confirmed at B2 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
   (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-7 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-7

  Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 8, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2003-3

  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB9

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.  The rating downgrades are due
to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and the
erosion of enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $58MM Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 15, 2016, upgraded the rating
of eleven tranches and downgraded the rating of one tranche from
five transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-30CB

  Cl. 1-A-15, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 25, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Loan
Trust, Series 2004-3

  Cl. I-A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 3,
   2011, Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
   Account - Unrated)
  Cl. II-AR-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 28,
   2015, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-MR-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 29, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-MR-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,

   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. II-MR-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-4

  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec, 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. 3-M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 3-M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 3-B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 30, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-6 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-6

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 19, 2013,
   Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-1

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 11, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the stronger
collateral performance and the credit enhancement available to the
bonds.  The rating downgrade is due to the erosion of credit
enhancement available to the bond.

The rating action on Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-4 also reflects a
correction to the cash-flow model used by Moody's in rating this
transaction.  In the prior model, excess cash flow was not
correctly calculated, resulting in lower payments to the Group 3
senior and subordinate bonds than called for in the transaction
documents.  This error has now been corrected, and today's rating
action reflects this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $74MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2003
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in February 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 15 tranches and downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches, from 11
transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2002-AR1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2001-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2002-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2002-HE16

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF1

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF4

Cl. I-A2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS2 Trust

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-BC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The downgrades are
the result of continued poor collateral perfromance.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $859.3MM of Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 21, 2016, downgraded the
ratings of 20 tranches from two transactions and upgraded the
ratings of 10 tranches from four transactions backed by Alt-A and
Option ARM RMBS loans, and issued by multiple issuers.
Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR5

  Cl. I-A-1A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 7, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 31, 2013,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Grantor Trust I-A-1B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   Dec. 7, 2010, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Underlying I-A-1B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 7,
   2010, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-3

  Cl. 1-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-6A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-76

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-S1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-7

  Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. AP, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 22, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 22, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-WF1

  Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The ratings upgraded are due to the stronger
performance of the underlying collateral and the credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The ratings downgraded are due to the
depletion of credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Ups Rating on $134MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 21, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 14 tranches from five transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option
ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-1

  Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-4

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC3

  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4

  Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-19XS

  Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 30, 2013,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 30, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues 'D' Ratings on 39 Classes From 29 CMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on March 21, 2016, discontinued
its 'D (sf)' ratings on 39 classes from 29 U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

S&P discontinued these ratings according to Standard & Poor's
surveillance and withdrawal policy.  S&P had previously lowered the
ratings to 'D (sf)' on these classes because of principal losses
and/or accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P believed would
remain outstanding for an extended period of time.  S&P views a
subsequent upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely
under the relevant criteria for the classes within this review.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

             http://is.gd/rTQW7b


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 7 Classes From 6 CDO Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on March 17, 2016, discontinued
its ratings on three classes from three cash flow (CF)
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), two classes from one
CF CDO transaction backed by mezzanine structured finance (SF)
securities, one class from one CF CDO transaction backed by project
finance securities, and one class guaranteed by the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), in its capacity as a U.S. government
agency.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- CT CDO III Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-most tranche paid
      down, other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- EIG Global Project Fund III Ltd. (CF CDO of project
      finance): senior-most tranche paid down, other rated
      tranches still outstanding.

   -- Legg Mason Real Estate CDO I Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): last
      rated tranche paid down.

   -- Multi Security Asset Trust L.P. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-
      most tranche paid down, other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2010-R1 (guaranteed by NCUA):
      senior-most tranche paid down, last rated tranche still
      outstanding.

Arroyo CDO I Ltd.'s (CF mezzanine SF CDO) ratings were discontinued
following the unwinding of the deal by the sole noteholder in
February.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Arroyo CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C-1                 NR                  CCC- (sf)
C-2                 NR                  CCC- (sf)

CT CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   NR                  B (sf)

EIG Global Project Fund III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Legg Mason Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
G                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Multi Security Asset Trust L.P.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

NCUA Guaranteed Notes Trust 2010-R1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
II-A                NR                  AA+ (sf)


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 Prime RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
209 classes from 18 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions issued between 2002 and 2005.  The review
yielded one upgrade, 74 downgrades (including one to 'D (sf)'), and
134 affirmations.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate prime jumbo mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

Subordination, and/or bond insurance provide credit support for the
reviewed transactions.  Where the bond insurer is rated lower than
what S&P would rate the respective class without bond insurance, or
it is not rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's
credit quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating.
As discussed in S&P's criteria, "The Interaction Of Bond Insurance
And Credit Ratings," published Aug. 24, 2009, the rating on a
bond-insured obligation will be the higher of the rating on the
bond insurer and the rating of the underlying obligation without
considering the potential credit enhancement from the bond
insurance.

The four classes listed below are insured as:

   -- Banc of America Mortgage 2003-6 Trust's class 1-A-1 ('B
      (sf)'), insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('B'),

   -- Prime Mortgage Trust 2003-2's class I-A-6 ('BB+ (sf)'),
      insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('B'),

   -- RFMSI Series 2003-S20 Trust's class I-A-5 ('AA (sf)'),
      insured by Assured Guaranty ('AA'), and

   -- RFMSI Series 2004-S2 Trust's class A-6 ('AA (sf)'), insured
      by Assured Guaranty ('AA').

                    ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Application Of U.S. RMBS Pre-2009 Criteria When Loan-Level Data Is
Not Available

When performing S&P's credit analysis to determine the foreclosure
frequency for all pools within this review, S&P segmented the
collateral into current loans (including reperforming) and
delinquent loans.  S&P further segmented the "current" bucket based
on payment pattern.

Where loan-level data was available, S&P derived the foreclosure
frequency as described in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash
Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," published March 2, 2016
(pre-2009 surveillance criteria).  When loan-level data was not
available, to derive the current bucket's foreclosure frequency, we
made certain assumptions regarding the percentage of current loans
that are reperforming, the percentage of current loans that have
impaired credit history, and the adjusted loan-to-value ratio of
perfect payers.

S&P used pool-level data to derive the foreclosure frequency for
delinquent loans because S&P uses cohort-specific roll rate
assumptions as set forth in its pre-2009 RMBS surveillance
criteria.

In this review, S&P did not have loan-level data available for
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-20.

                              UPGRADES

S&P raised its rating on class A from Sequoia Mortgage Trust 11
based on improved collateral performance and increased credit
support.  The upgrade reflects S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support for the class will be sufficient to cover the
projected losses at the higher rating level.

DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on 74 classes from 15 transactions,
including nine ratings that were lowered four or more notches.  Of
the 74 downgrades, S&P lowered its ratings on 11 classes to
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  Another 31 lowered ratings stayed at an investment-grade
level, and the remaining 32 downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover our remaining projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades also
reflect one or more of:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Substantial changes in pool-level constant prepayment rates;
   -- Payment allocation mechanics;
   -- Observed principal write-downs; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

S&P lowered the rating on class B-4 from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through
Trust 2003-J9 to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' due to principal
write-downs incurred by the class.

Tail Risk

Some of the transactions in this review are backed by a small
remaining pool of mortgage loans.  S&P believes that pools with
fewer than 100 loans could have an increased risk of credit
instability because a liquidation and subsequent loss on one or a
small number of remaining loans at the tail end of a transaction's
life may have a disproportionate impact on the remaining credit
support.

S&P addressed this tail risk on the small pools in this review by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this additional
risk, as set forth in S&P's pre-2009 RMBS surveillance criteria.
Tail risk present in the associated small loan pool backing RFMSI
Series 2003-S20 Trust was the primary driver for the downgrades of
classes II-A-1 and II-A-P from this transaction.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and in turn to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash flow
projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather than
raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings stability.
In general, the bonds that were affected reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority of principal payments;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;
   -- Low subordination; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

Of the 134 affirmed ratings, 51 are investment-grade and 83 are
speculative-grade.  The affirmations of classes rated above
'CCC (sf)' reflect the classes' relatively senior positions in
payment priority and S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover its projected losses at those rating
levels.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

             http://is.gd/1ffyUu



[] Moody's Hikes $146 Million of RMBS Issued From 2005
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in early March 2016, upgraded the
ratings of 17 tranches from three transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Lehman and SASCO.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-4

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-2XS

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-A5A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-9XS

Cl. 1-A3A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-A3B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3C, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the recent performance of
the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
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Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

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Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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