TCR_Public/160320.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 20, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 80

                            Headlines

BAKER STREET II: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody’s Affirms C Ratings on 4 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP20: Fitch Raises Cl. E Certs Rating to B
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on A-J Debt
CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'Dsf'

CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on D Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-2 Debt
CBA COMMERCIAL 2006-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X-1 Debt
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Fitch Cuts Cl. G Certs Rating to CCC
CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Cl. M-4 Certificates 'BBsf'

CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-4 Debt
COMM MORTGAGE 2005-FL10: Fitch Lowers Cl. J Certs Rating to C
CREDIT SUISSE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. I Certs
CREDIT SUISSE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. I Certificate
GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class J Debt

GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. E Certificates
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certificates
GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Certs

JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. L Certs to B2
JP MORGAN 2004-C3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 7 Tranches
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP11: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
JPMORGAN CHASE 2002-C2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. F Cert. to B-
KINGSLAND III: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2

KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to Caa1
LBUBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X Debt
LIMEROCK CLO I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Fitch Raises Cl. B Certs Rating to 'BB'
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. B Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 11 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. H Certs
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class E Notes
ONEMAIN FIN'L 2016-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Cl. D Debt
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ Rating on D Notes

PHOENIX CLO III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
RAAC TRUST 2005-RP1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-4 Debt to B2
RFC CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt

UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certificate
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Fitch Raises Class D Certs Rating to 'CCC'
WAMU COMMERCIAL 2006-SL1: Fitch Raises Class C Certs Rating to 'B'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C19: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X-B Debt
[*] Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 216 U.S. RMBS Classes

[*] Moody's Hikes $1.1BB Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $630MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2006-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $704MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $11.8MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2003
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $64MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $168.5MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $466.3MM of Subprime RMBS
[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 54 Classes From 37 RMBS Deals to 'D'

                            *********

BAKER STREET II: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from Baker Street CLO II Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Seix
Investment Advisors LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch
positive, where they were placed on Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same
time S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-2
notes.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A-1 and A-2
notes, pro rata, and a subsequent increase in the credit support
available to support all of the notes since our August 2014 rating
actions.  Since that time, the transaction has paid down both of
the class A notes by approximately $100.75 million, leaving each of
the notes at approximately 39.94% of their original balances.

In addition, the upgrades also reflect an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes.  The
trustee reported these O/C ratios in the February 2016 monthly
report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 142.82%, compared with 123.95%
      in the July 2014 report (which S&P used for its August 2014
      actions);

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 124.19%, compared with 114.82% in
      July 2014;

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.02%, compared with 108.75% in
      July 2014; and

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 106.17%, compared with 104.78% in
      July 2014.

The affirmations on classes A-1 and A-2 reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our corporate CDO criteria, which
allows us to use a limited number of public ratings from other
NRSROs for the purposes of assessing the credit quality of assets
not rated by Standard & Poor's.  The criteria provide specific
guidance for treatment of corporate assets not rated by Standard &
Poor's, while the interpretation outlines treatment of securitized
assets.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Baker Street CLO II Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)   cushion(ii)  rating
A-1    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    22.65%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    22.65%       AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    22.65%       AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    4.44%        AAA (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)    2.42%        A+ (sf)
E      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)   2.68%        BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
D      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
D      AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)    BBB (sf)      B- (sf)       BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Baker Street CLO II Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To          From
B             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Baker Street CLO II Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)



BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Moody’s Affirms C Ratings on 4 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  has upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded the rating of one class, and affirmed eight classes in
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-PWR7 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 21, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2015
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class B was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 14% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on Classes C and D were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 37% of the
current balance compared to 28% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $108 million
from $1.12 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 46% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Three loans,
constituting 3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Two loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $30 million (for an average loss
severity of 32%). Three loans, constituting 80% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
and largest loan in the pool is the Shops at Boca Park Loan ($49
million -- 46% of the pool), which is secured by a 277,000 square
foot lifestyle center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Tenants include
Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI), Total Wine & More, and the
Cheesecake Factory. The loan transferred to special servicing on
December 18, 2015 for imminent maturity default. The loan had a
previous stint in special servicing several years ago, and exited
special servicing in 2013 after receiving a rate reduction
modification as well as a loan extension and assumption by a new
borrower. The collateral was 93% occupied as of October 2015. The
servicer indicated that they are evaluating a loan modification
request.

The second largest loan in special servicing and second-largest
loan in the pool is the Quintard Mall Loan ($30 million -- 27% of
the pool), which is secured by a 375,000 square foot collateral
portion of a regional mall in Oxford, Alabama. Anchors include
Sears, Dillard's and JC Penney. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2013, and became REO in October 2014. The mall has
struggled financially for many years and faces competition from a
lifestyle center which opened in 2011, approximately four miles
east of the subject property. Total occupancy for the mall,
including non-collateral space, was 81% as of October 2015, down
from 85% in March 2015. The mall faces continued leasing headwinds,
with significant inline lease rollover in the next two years. The
servicer has engaged The Woodmont Company to manage and lease the
property. JC Penney recently exercised a 5-year lease renewal
option through August 2019. Sears and Dillard's are not part of the
loan collateral.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail
property in Las Vegas, Nevada. Moody's estimates an aggregate $40
million loss for the specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results and full or
partial year 2015 operating results for 100% of the performing
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to 86%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.94X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.08X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 16% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 33 Route 304 Loan ($8 million --
7% of the pool), which is secured by a 120,000 square foot retail
property in Nanuet, New York, approximately 30 miles northwest of
New York City. Tenants include Ashley Furniture, Planet Fitness,
and Verizon. The property occupancy was 68% as of September 2015,
compared to 84% at year-end 2014 and 68% reported at year-end 2012.
The loan is on the watchlist for low occupancy and DSCR. The loan
benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99%
and 1.04X, essentially unchanged since the last review.

The second largest loan is the Best Buy Plaza Loan ($6 million --
6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 109,000 square foot
retail center in Melbourne, Florida. Tenants include Best Buy, Ross
Dress for Less, and Petsmart. The loan benefits from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and, 1.38X, respectively,
compared to 80% and 1.22X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Sam Moon Center II Loan ($3 million
-- 3% of the pool). The loan is secured by a retail center in
Dallas, Texas. The property was 94% leased as of September 2015.
The loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 45%
and, 2.29X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.53X at the last
review.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP20: Fitch Raises Cl. E Certs Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four classes and affirmed 11 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-Top20.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the increase in credit enhancement due to
significant loan paydown since Fitch's last rating action.  Fitch
modeled losses of 17% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 3.8%, including $54.1 million (2.6% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated six loans (26%) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC), which
includes five specially serviced assets (15%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.8% to $147.5 million from
$2.1 billion at issuance.  The pool is highly concentrated with
only 16 of the original 223 loans remaining in the transaction, and
the largest loan representing 55.2% of the pool.  Per the servicer
reporting, there is one defeased loan (2.9%).  Interest shortfalls
are affecting classes H through Q.  The remaining non-specially
serviced loans mature in September 2016 (one loan; 11.7%),
September 2017 (one loan; 55.2%), plus five loans maturing in 2020
(5%) and four loans in 2025 (13.5%).

The largest loan in the pool is the Lakeforest Mall - A Note (55.2%
of the pool), secured by 402,625 square feet (sf) of inline space
in a 1.1 million sf regional mall in Gaithersburg, MD.
Non-collateral anchors include Sears, Macy's, JC Penney, and Lord &
Taylor.  In-line tenant sales reported at $292 per square foot
(psf) for 2014; tenant sales for 2015 were not provided.  The
September 2015 rent roll reported occupancy at 85%, a slight
decline from 93% reported in December 2014.  The September 2015
year to date (YTD) net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) reported at 1.63x, compared to 1.88x at year-end (YE)
2014.

The loan had previously transferred to special servicing in July
2010 for maturity default.  The maturity date has since been
extended twice to July 2011, and again to September 2017.  In
August 2012, the loan was modified into an A Note and B Note, and
the property was sold to a new sponsor while in special servicing.
The purchaser assumed the A Note and the B Note was written off for
a full loss.  The A Note, currently $81.4 million, has remained
current under the modified terms.

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by a 86,618 sf
suburban office property in Seattle, WA (11.7%).  The property
recently incurred a major vacancy when the former largest tenant
(92% of the net rentable area) vacated at the end of the lease term
in October 2015.  Prior to the tenant vacancy, the property was
100% occupied and NOI DSCR reported at 2.21x as of June 2015. Fitch
has identified the loan as a FLOC due to the occupancy concerns
coupled with the upcoming loan maturity in September 2016.  The
loan has been amortizing since issuance, and remains current as of
the February 2016 payment date.  

The largest loan in special servicing is secured by a 71,757 sf
retail center located in Meza, AZ (6.3%).  The property has
experienced cash flow issues since 2012 from tenant vacancy, with
occupancy declining to 72% as of May 2015 from 83% at YE 2012.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in May 2015 due to imminent
default.  The loan matured in September 2015, and the borrower has
been unable to secure financing.  A receiver was appointed in
January 2016, and foreclosure is anticipated in second quarter of
2016.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes B through F are considered Stable
due to sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown.
Although credit enhancement on these classes is high, Fitch remains
concerned with the increasing concentrations, as well as some
performance issues experienced by the two largest loans. Distressed
classes (those rated below 'B') may be subject to further
downgrades as additional losses are realized.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these classes:

   -- $12.4 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $20.7 million class C to 'AAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.5 million class D to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28.5 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $18.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $23.3 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 40%.
   -- $10.7 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class LF at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 A-AB, A-4A, A-4B, and A-J certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on A-J Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-TOP24 as:

  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 19, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2015,
   Affirmed A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on March 19, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 19, 2015, Affirmed
    C (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 19, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes A-4 and A-M, were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.  The ratings on three P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.5% of the
current balance, compared to 6.9% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.7% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to a Herf of 18 at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 41% to $912 million
from $1.53 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 48% of
the pool.  Three loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments.  One of them,
representing 1% of the pool, is secured by a residential co-op
located in New York, New York and has a structured credit
assessment of aaa (sca.pd).  The structured credit assesment on one
loan, representing 1% of the pool, was removed due to potential
refinance risks given lease rollover concerns and reduced occupancy
since last review.  Nine loans, constituting 10% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Thirty-nine loans, constituting 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $117.7 million.  Two
loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Marketplace
Center Loan ($11.8 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured
by an anchored retail center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2011 and became REO in
April 2012.

The other specially serviced loan is secured by an office property
located in Atlanta, Georgia.  Moody's has also assumed a high
default probability for 10 poorly performing loans, constituting 7%
of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss of $20 million (a
25% expected loss on average) from the specially serviced and
troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 98% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 89% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, compared to
102% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.36X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The first loan with a structured credit assessment is the Lee
Harrison Center Loan ($15.0 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 110,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in
Arlington, Virginia.  The center was 100% leased as of December
2015, the same as at last review.  The property is anchored by the
grocer Harris Teeter, which leases 34% of the net rentable area
(NRA) through February 2022. Moody's structured credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are a1 (sca.pd) and 2.05X, respectively.

The second loan with a structured credit assessment is the 461
Fifth Avenue Loan ($15.0 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a fee position in a parcel of land located in the Grand
Central submarket of Manhattan.  The parcel is improved with a
204,000 square foot office building.  Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.51X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the US Bancorp Tower Loan ($186.6 million -- 20.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1 million square foot office
building located in Portland, Oregon.  The property was 96% leased
as of December 2015 compared to 88% at the last review.  The loan
is interest only through the entire term and matures in August
2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.82X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Dulles Executive Plaza Loan ($68.8
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 380,000 SF
office building located in Herndon, Virginia.  The property was
100% leased as of September 2015 compared to 83% leased as of
September 2014.  The largest tenant is Lockheed Martin Corporation
whose leases for 50% and 33% of the NRA expire in 2021 and 2018,
respectively.  Lockheed Martin Corporation has previously reduced
its space at this property.  The loan is interest only throughout
its entire term and matures in September 2016.  Due to Lockheed
Martin Corporation's occupancy of 83% of the NRA, a Lit / Dark
analysis was used to determine Moody's value.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.80X, respectively, the same as at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Potomac Place Shopping Center Loan
($44.0 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by an 80,000
SF retail center located in Potomac, Maryland.  The property was
97% leased as of September 2015, the same as at the last review.
The property is anchored by Safeway (25% of the NRA; lease
expiration September 2027) and Rite Aid (15% of the NRA; lease
expiration September 2022).  The loan is interest only throughout
its entire term and matures in October 2016.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.09X, respectively, compared to 88% and
1.07X at the last review.



CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades one class and affirms six classes of
Capital Trust RE CDO 2005-1.  Fitch also withdraws the rating on
class B due to lack of relevancy.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Capital Trust 2005-1 is highly concentrated with assets from only
three obligors remaining in the portfolio.  The CDO is
significantly under collateralized.  Further, 100% of the portfolio
is considered either defaulted or Fitch assets of concern.  Since
Fitch's last rating action, the capital structure has paid down by
$33.3 million with no additional realized losses. As of the
February 2016 trustee report, the CDO was 58% invested in two
B-notes, one of which is defaulted (16.1%) and expected to have a
full loss, and 42% in three non-senior CRE CDOs from the same
obligor, CT CDO IV Ltd 2006-1 (all rated 'Csf').  Total recoveries
are expected to be low due to the subordinate and/or distressed
nature of the remaining collateral.

On March 20, 2012, the Trustee declared an event of default (EOD)
due to non-payment of full and timely accrued interest to the class
B notes.  The class B notes are a non-deferrable class and, while
now paid in full, are affirmed at 'Dsf' due to the earlier default
in the timely payment of its accrued interest.  Class C, which is
now the senior most class and thus non-deferrable, is downgraded to
'Dsf' due to the missed timely payment of the full accrued
interest.  On March 3, 2016, the Trustee declared an EOD with
respect to class C, as interest proceeds received were insufficient
to pay the full timely interest to the class. Interest proceeds
were received from only one CDO asset, a B-note (41.9%) secured by
a full service hotel located in Long Beach, CA.

As of the time of this rating action, the noteholders have not
given direction to accelerate the notes or liquidate the portfolio.


The 'Csf' ratings for classes D through H reflect the classes'
negative credit enhancement, and expectation of eventual default.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs', which applies stresses to property
cash flows and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project
future default levels for the underlying collateral in the
portfolio.

Capital Trust 2005-1 is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO managed
by CT Investment Management Co., LLC (CTIMCO).

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Classes D through H are subject to further downgrade to 'Dsf'
should the classes default at legal maturity or earlier.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded these ratings:

   -- $18.9 million class C to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 35%.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $0 class B at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
   -- $14.4 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $15.2 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $6.8 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $6.8 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $10.1 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Class A is paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class J and X-J
certificates or the preferred shares.



CARLYLE GLOBAL 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2016-1 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market Strategies CLO 2016-1 LLC's $368.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 10,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which

      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's

      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's the timely interest and ultimate principal

      payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned preliminary ratings under various interest

      rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.6206%-
      12.5332%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment interest diversion test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of available excess interest proceeds as principal
      proceeds, which will be available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, collateral manager
      incentive fees, and subordinate note payments to principal
      proceeds to purchase additional collateral obligations
      during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2016-1 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market
Strategies CLO 2016-1 LLC

Class                Rating                Amount
                                         (mil. $)
A-1                  AAA (sf)              246.40
A-2                  AA (sf)                56.80
B (deferrable)       A (sf)                 28.80
C (deferrable        BBB- (sf)              17.60
D (deferrable)       BB- (sf)               18.40
Subordinated notes   NR                     33.55

NR--Not rated.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. X-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-1 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A and M-1 were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO, Class X-2, was affirmed based on the credit
performance of its referenced classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS transaction.
Small balance transactions, which represent less than 1% of the
Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally experienced
higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit and fusion
transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.1% of the
current balance, compared to 12.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 25, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $28.9 million
from $214.9 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 104 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 29% of
the pool.

One-hundred and twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the
pool, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $28.2 million (for
an average loss severity of 68%). Four loans, constituting 2.3% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $432,250 loss for the specially
serviced loans (65% expected loss on average). Moody's has assumed
a high default probability for 60 poorly performing loans,
constituting 63% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate loss
of $4.4 million (a 24% expected loss based on a 60% probability
default) from these troubled loans.


CBA COMMERCIAL 2006-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class X-1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-2 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2015 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, Class A, was affirmed because the
rating is consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 29.2% of the
current balance, compared to 26.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 28.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 29.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 25, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 76% to $31.4 million
from $130 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 42% of
the pool.

Six loans, constituting 8.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $28.5 million. Thirty-three loans,
constituting 35% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $7.6 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (70% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $0.9 million (a 35% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2011-C1: Fitch Cuts Cl. G Certs Rating to CCC
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three subordinate classes and affirmed
seven classes of CFCRE Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect the continued decline in performance of the
largest loan in the pool, the specially serviced Hudson Valley
Mall, since Fitch's last rating action.  The mall, which represents
16.5% of the pool balance, has a Macy's anchor store expected to
close in April 2016.  There are three non-specially serviced loans
designated as Fitch Loans of Concern (13.9% of the pool), including
one delinquent loan (1.8%).  One loan is defeased (2.6%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 52.6% to $300.5 million from
$634.5 million at issuance.  The pool is becoming concentrated,
with the top 10 loans representing 67.5% of the pool balance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class NR.

The largest loan is the specially serviced Hudson Valley Mall loan.
The loan is secured by a 765,465 square foot (sf) regional mall,
of which 639,465 sf is collateral, located in Kingston, NY,
approximately 50 miles south of Albany, NY.  The property, which
was built in 1981, is currently anchored by Sears (15% net rentable
area [NRA], expires 2019), Regal Cinemas (6% NRA, expires 2017) and
Target (ground lease, expires 2026).  Anchor tenant Macy's, on a
lease to January 2017, is scheduled to close in April 2016.  JC
Penney, which represented 9% of the NRA, closed in April 2015 in
advance of their October 2017 lease maturity.  Other large tenants
include Dick's Sporting Goods and Best Buy.  Additional tenants are
operating under modified or month-to-month leases, or have kick-out
clauses.  Tenants such as Buffalo Wild Wings, Express, Children's
Place, Zales and Hollister have closed since issuance.  Occupancy
was 93% as of September 2015; however, this included the anchor
spaces that will be dark through lease expiration.  Estimated
physical occupancy including the anchor spaces would fall below
70%.  Significant losses were modeled based on Fitch's valuation,
which takes into consideration the vacant anchor tenants and the
expectation that occupancy may continue to decline.

The second largest loan is the Santa Fe Retail Portfolio (8.1%),
which is secured by a 189,504-sf, mixed-use portfolio of seven
properties located in Santa Fe, NM.  The portfolio consists of art
galleries, high-end retail, restaurants and office space.  The
occupancy has been stable since issuance, with reported
second-quarter 2015 occupancy of 95%.  The sponsor has an ownership
interest in several tenants.

The third-largest loan in the pool is Westport Village Retail (6.7%
of the pool), secured by a 172,574-sf retail center located in
Louisville, KY.  The center was completely redeveloped in 2008.
This Fitch Loan of Concern is scheduled to mature in April 2016.
Occupancy has declined to approximately 75%, as the largest tenant
left at year-end (YE) 2014.  The sponsor is InvenTrust, the former
Inland American Real Estate Trust, Inc., which assumed the loan
from the developer.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook remains on the three downgraded classes, since
there is potential for further downgrades as Fitch receives updated
information on the workout or disposition of the Hudson Valley Mall
loan.  Given the increasing concentrations in the pool and the size
of the loan, further declines in value will likely result in
additional downgrades.  The Outlook on class C is revised to Stable
as an upgrade is unlikely, since the pool is increasingly
concentrated and credit enhancement is expected to be eroded with
the disposition of the Hudson Valley Mall.  Fitch will continue to
monitor the performance of the remaining loans and take rating
action as warranted.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded these three classes:

   -- $27 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $7.9 million class F to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Negative;
   -- $7.9 million class G to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $2.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $153.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $16.7 million class B at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook to Stable from
      Positive;
   -- $14.3 million class D at 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class NR or
interest-only class X-B certificates.


CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-1: Fitch to Rate Cl. M-4 Certificates 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1 (CMT
2016-1) as follows:

-- $1,656,006,000 class A certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,462,000 class M-1 certificates 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,544,000 class M-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,010,000 class M-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,477,000 class M-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the $38,688,000 class B certificates.

This is the first RMBS transaction that Fitch is aware in which the
issuer intends to comply with the conditions set forth in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) Securitization Safe Harbor
Rule, (the Rule) in order to benefit from the safe harbor. The FDIC
confirms legal isolation of the securitized assets from the seller
in the case of its insolvency if the issuer complies with the
conditions in the Rule.

The certificates are supported by 6,111 very high quality prime
jumbo and agency conforming loans with a total balance of
approximately $1.887 billion as of the cutoff date. Credit
enhancement for the 'AAAsf' certificates of 12.25% reflects Fitch's
loss expectations of 8.25% plus structural features such as the
full pro rata pay structure, the lack of principal and interest
advances, and the servicing incentive fees paid from available
funds. Fitch believes that many of the Safe Harbor Rule
requirements align the interests of the sponsor and originator with
those of the certificateholders and are credit positive for the
transaction as outlined below.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above-Average Originator: Based on its review of JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (Chase) origination platform for agency and non-agency
loans, Fitch believes that the bank has strong processes and
procedures in place and views its ability to originate agency and
non-agency loans as above average. Fitch reduced its probability of
default by 77 basis points (bps) at the 'AAAsf' stress scenario to
account for the strong operational quality of the loans.

High-Quality Fixed-Rate Mortgages: The transaction includes a mix
of conforming (75%) and non-conforming collateral (25%) made to
prime quality borrowers. All of the loans were originated either by
Chase or by one of its correspondents in accordance with its
relevant guidelines. The collateral consists of up to 30-year
fixed-rate mortgage loans and is seasoned roughly 14 months.

Strong Due Diligence Results: Loan level due diligence was
performed on 100% of the non-conforming loans and a statistical
sample for the agency loans. The diligence sample size and scope
for the agency loans are consistent with those of other
risk-sharing transactions referencing Chase mortgage collateral and
rated by Fitch. All but 17 loans received an initial 'A' or 'B'
grade, indicating strong underwriting practices and sound quality
control procedures.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The 12.25% initial credit enhancement
for the 'AAAsf' certificates is materially higher than Fitch's
'AAAsf' mortgage pool loss expectation of 8.25%, reflecting
structural features such as the lack of delinquent principal and
interest advances, a pro rata principal distribution and the
servicing incentive fees and other expenses paid from available
funds.

No Servicer P&I Advances: While the Rule allows for servicing
advancing up to a maximum of 90 days, this transaction is not
incorporating any advancing of delinquent principal and interest
(P&I). As P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become
delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to
the trust, the loan-level loss severities (LS) are less for this
transaction than for those where the servicers are obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes.

Pro Rata Structure: Unlike prime jumbo securitizations issued post
crisis, this transaction will incorporate a pro rata principal
distribution among all classes starting at the first payment date.
This allows for a larger amount of principal distributed to the
subordinate bonds and a faster depletion of credit enhancement than
a standard shifting interest structure. However, the transaction
incorporates various performance triggers that can lock the
subordinate bonds out of principal, and a subordination floor of 55
bps prevents distributions to the subordinate bonds to protect
against adverse selection risk as the collateral pool pays down.
The initial credit enhancement reflects the probability of
subordinate balance paydowns over time.

Strong Alignment of Interests: Because the Rule requires the
sponsor, Chase, to retain an economic interest of at least 5% of
the credit risk of the securitized assets, Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from a strong alignment of interest in the
credit risk of the underlying collateral. The sponsor intends to
retain a 5% vertical interest in each class of certificates (other
than the class A-R certificates).

Loan Compliance Representation and Warranty: The Rule requires that
the loan documents for an RMBS transaction contain an additional
representation regarding loan underwriting compliance with
supervisory guidance governing the underwriting of residential
mortgages, including the Interagency Guidance on Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products, Oct. 5, 2006, and the Interagency Statement on
Subprime Mortgage Lending, July 10, 2007, and such other or
additional guidance applicable at the time of loan origination,
which, in Fitch's view, provides additional assurances about the
sound quality of the underlying pool.

Rep and Warranty Qualifiers: While the Rule for RMBS requires that
5% of the cash proceeds due to the sponsor be held in a reserve
fund for 12 months for loan repurchases due to breaches of reps and
warranties, which further aligns the interests of the seller with
those of the certificateholders, many of the reps contain
qualifying or conditional language that could result in fewer loan
repurchases. For this reason, Fitch increased the probability of
default for the 'AAAsf' class by 67 bps.

Servicing Framework to Benefit All Classes: The Rule requires that
RMBS loan servicing be conducted in accordance with best practices
for asset management; loss mitigation to commence when a loan
becomes 90 days delinquent; and that incentive fees be paid for
loan restructuring or other loss mitigation activities that
maximize the net present value of the loans. This requirement,
which also mandates that records be kept for subsequent review by
the trustee or an investor representative, is intended to protect
all classes from potentially detrimental activities that benefit
one class of investors at the expense of another. Servicing
incentive fees are paid from available funds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction. Two
sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 5.5%. The analysis indicates that there is some potential
rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model
projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example, additional MVD
of 6%, 31% and 52% could potentially lower the 'AAAsf' rated class
one rating category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from AMC
Diligence, LLC (AMC) on 100% of the non-agency loans and a
statistical sample of the conforming balance loans in the
collateral pool, which amounted to 15%. Fitch received
certifications indicating that the loan-level due diligence was
conducted in accordance with its published standards for reviewing
loans and in accordance with the independence standards outlined in
its criteria. The diligence results showed minimal findings with
some nonmaterial exceptions or waivers. All such findings were
sufficiently mitigated with compensating factors. Fitch believes
the overall results of the review generally reflected strong
underwriting controls.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its RMBS rating
criteria, as described in its January 2016 report, 'U.S. RMBS
Master Rating Criteria.' This incorporates a review of the
originators' lending platforms, as well as an assessment of the
transaction's R&Ws provided by the originators and arranger, which
were found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

An exception was made to Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Cash Flow Analysis
Criteria' with respect to the delinquency rate vectors used to
analyze structures with limited or no servicer advancing mechanism.
The delinquency rate vectors used are still derived from Fitch's
front-loaded, mid-loaded and back-loaded CDR curves; however,
rather than use an 18-month liquidation timeline, the assumed
liquidation timelines will be based on each rating category's
projected timelines. In addition, a recovery rate based on the
adjusted probability of default and cure rate adjustment (CRA), as
described in Fitch's 'Exposure Draft: U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria,' was incorporated.

The structure of the transaction does not apply interest on
deferred interest amounts, which is inconsistent with Fitch's
'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global Structured
Finance Transactions' for high investment-grade ratings. Given that
Fitch rates to the terms of a transaction and the deferred amount
can be factored into the investor's economic investment decision
prior to investing, Fitch did not deem this exception as material.

In accordance with its 'U.S. RMBS Master Rating Criteria', Fitch
looks for a true sale opinion for RMBS. This transaction is
structured in accordance with the FDIC's Safe Harbor Rule so no
true sale opinion is necessary. Fitch received an opinion
addressing the treatment of the assets in connection with this
transaction with respect to the FDIC Securitization Safe Harbor
Rule.



CHASE MORTGAGE 2016-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating on Cl. M-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1 (Chase 2016-1).  The ratings range from
(P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba3 (sf).

Chase 2016-1 is potentially the first residential mortgage-backed
security (RMBS) transaction issued under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) securitization safe harbor rule that
went into effect Sept. 30, 2010.  Unlike other RMBS transactions
that structure the transfer of mortgage loans to the trust as legal
"true sales" to achieve de-linkage from the effects of a sponsor
insolvency, this transaction has been structured under the
securitization safe harbor rule to mitigate the risk of the FDIC's
exercise of its repudiation power in the unlikely event that the
FDIC becomes the receiver or conservator of JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (JPMCB or Chase) (LT/ST: Aa2/P-1).  JPMCB will retain 5% of
each class of Certificates to comply with FDIC safe harbor
provisions, effectively providing some risk retention and aligning
its incentive with investors in the transaction.

The transaction incorporates several features unique to post-crisis
RMBS that are credit positive for the bondholders in the
transaction, senior bonds in particular.  It incorporates several
features that result in new protections for senior bonds and better
alignment with senior investors' interest.  Specifically: 1) A
pro-rata payment structure with multiple and more stringent
performance triggers than other post-crisis transactions; these
triggers redirect to the more senior notes cash that would
otherwise go to the junior notes in the event of performance
deterioration, 2) Lack of principal and interest (P&I) servicer
advancing that will boost ultimate liquidation recoveries on
delinquent loans available for senior bondholders.  The lack of P&I
advancing will also reduce the unpredictability of cash flows
driven by servicer stop-advance policies or practices and 3)
Immediate recognition of modification losses that allocates more
cash to senior bonds because written-down junior bonds accrue less
interest.

Separately, the transaction protects against disruption of cash
flow to the bonds and resulting interest shortfalls due to the lack
of P&I advancing by providing for interest payments (including
interest shortfalls if any) and principal payments to be paid from
aggregate available funds.  Moreover, Chase is obligated to make
protective advances in respect of certain taxes, insurance premiums
and the cost of the preservation, restoration and protection of the
mortgaged properties and any enforcement or judicial proceedings,
including foreclosures.

The certificates are backed by one pool of 6,111 (74% Conforming
and 26% Non-Conforming) prime quality, fixed rate, fully amortizing
first-lien residential mortgage loans, originated by Chase, who
will also serve as the servicer for the transaction. U.S. Bank
Trust National Association will serve as the trustee.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1
  Class A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Class M-1, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  Class M-2, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)
  Class M-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  Class M-4, Assigned (P)Ba3(sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale
Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the collateral pool is
0.55% in a base scenario and reaches 5.70% at a stress level
consistent with the Aaa ratings on the senior certificate.

We calculated losses on the pool using Moody's US MILAN model.
Loan-level adjustments to the model-implied losses included
adjustments to borrower probability of default for higher and lower
borrower Debt-To-Income Ratios (DTIs), borrowers with multiple
mortgaged properties, self-employed borrowers, and at a pool level,
for the default risk of HOA properties in super lien states.
Moody's final loss estimates also incorporate adjustments related
to originator assessment (we assess Chase as a strong originator of
prime jumbo residential mortgage loans) and the third-party review
(TPR) findings.  For the conforming loans, Moody's modeled its
severity estimate using conforming loan-specific severity data
published by Freddie Mac.

Given the unique pro-rata pay structure, servicing fee structure
and the lack of P&I advancing in the transaction, we modeled the
cash flows under a range of loss timing, servicing fee and
stop-advance assumptions to evaluate the impact on the bonds and
the resulting ratings under the different scenarios.  Moody's final
ratings on the bonds incorporate the results under the different
scenarios.

                  Key Collateral Characteristics

Chase 2016-1 is a securitization of a pool of 6,111 fixed-rate
prime conforming and non-conforming fully-amortizing loans with a
total balance of $1,887,187,001 and a remaining term to maturity of
343 months, with a weighted average (WA) seasoning of 14 months.
The borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and
sizeable equity in their properties.  The WA original FICO score is
768 and the WA combined original loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is
79.6%.  Although the majority of the loans were originated through
a correspondent lender (65.7%), this is offset by the stronger
property types (56.5% single-family), occupancy (99.4%
owner-occupied) and purpose (67.3% purchase) of the loans.
Moreover, the pool is geographically diverse with 25.4% of the
loans originated in California, 9.6% in New York and 8.9% in Texas.
The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
comparable to that of recent GSE credit risk transfer and prime
jumbo deals that Moody's has rated.

All of the mortgage loans in the pool were originated and serviced
by Chase.  Chase is a strong originator based on our Originator
Assessment for prime jumbo loans.  Reflecting our assessment of
Chase's prime jumbo underwriting, we marginally reduced our stress
loss expectations for the non-conforming part of the pool.

Based on our servicer assessment, Chase also has an above-average
servicing ability as a primary servicer of prime residential
mortgage loans.

        Third-party Review and Representations & Warranties

AMC Diligence, LLC, an independent third-party diligence provider,
conducted 100% review on the 758 non-conforming loans and randomly
selected 829 loans from the 5,353 conforming loans.  All loans were
reviewed for credit, compliance, appraisal and data integrity.
None of the non-conforming loans reviewed had any significant
defects, 11 of the 829 conforming loans received final Moody's
credit grades of Cs or Ds and were removed from the pool. Also, one
loan from the conforming sample with a high appraisal variance was
removed from the pool.  Any data discrepancies observed were
repaired and updated on the loan tape.  Moody's increased its Aaa
loss expectations marginally to reflect the findings of conforming
loans' credit quality from the sample review to the broader pool
that did not benefit from the due diligence review.

All of the loans were originated prior to March 2015, thus no loans
were subject to the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures (TRID) rules,
which became effective 3 October 2015.  Moreover, all 758
non-conforming loans adhere to the Ability-To-Repay (ATR)/Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rule, and because the conforming loans were
underwritten to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines, they meet QM
standards.

Chase, as the mortgage loan seller, has provided clear
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W.  There is a provision for binding arbitration in the
event of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning
R&W breaches.  The breach review is objective, thorough,
transparent, consistent and independent, and will be conducted by
Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC who is an independent third-party with
expertise in forensic loan reviews.  The securities administrator
will establish and maintain a repurchase reserve fund which will be
held for 12 months and will be initially equal at least 5% ($8.9MM)
of the cash proceeds from the securitization.  Given the
originator's business practices and the sunset period for the
reserve fund we don't expect this fund to be utilized materially
but it does provide additional support to the R&W framework.

                       Servicing Arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate.  Moody's assess Chase at SQ2, indicating an above
average servicing ability as a primary servicer of prime
residential mortgage loans.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure.  The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial base fee of $19 per loan monthly for
all performing loans and increases if the loans default with
monetary incentive fee for non-performing loans.  By establishing a
base servicing fee for performing loans that increases with the
delinquency of loans, the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary
incentives to the servicer with the costs of the servicer.  The
fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and adequate for this
transaction.  It also better aligns the servicer's costs with the
deal's performance and structure.  Class B (NR) is first in line to
absorb any increase in servicing costs above the base servicing
costs.

The institutional and reputational strength of the servicer,
alignment of costs with the monetary compensation for more
difficult tasks, incentive alignment due to risk retention and
requirements under FDIC safe harbor collectively mitigate the moral
hazard that the servicing arrangement will unduly influence the
servicers' behavior.  By contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a
servicer can take actions, such as modifications and prolonged work
outs, which increase the value of its mortgage servicing rights.

                      The Transaction Structure

The transaction follows a simple pro-rata payment structure amongst
the certificates with reverse sequential loss allocation and strong
performance tests.  High initial subordination relative to standard
shifting interest (SI) structures and the presence of strong
performance tests make the pro-rata transaction structure neutral
to SI structures.  Moreover, the transaction allows for all funds
collected (defined as the available distribution amount), including
interest and principal payments, liquidation proceeds, subsequent
recoveries, insurance proceeds and repurchase amounts, to be used
to make interest payments and then principal payments to the senior
bonds and subordinate bonds on a pro-rata basis.  However, any
trust expenses (subject to an annual expense cap of $500K) and
other expenses are deducted from available distribution.  This will
reduce the funds available to pay the certificates.

By itself, the pro-rata structure is weaker than SI structures
since unlike SI structures that feature a blanket lock-out period
during which senior bonds amortize faster, the pro-rata structure
allows for depletion of subordination at the outset resulting in
exposure to the senior bonds to credit deterioration.  However,
this transaction effectively mitigates against this risk through
the multiple and stringent performance tests that divert payments
to the bonds with higher payment priorities in the waterfall upon
performance deterioration.  Also, it is potentially the first prime
transaction in the US which recognizes and incorporates in certain
performance tests the future losses that may result from loans that
are already seriously delinquent.

                         Performance Tests

  The transaction will allocate 100% of prepayments to senior
   tranche if the current senior percentage exceeds the senior
   percentage as of the closing date minus 25% of the non-
   performing loan balance, defined as the percentage of loans
   that are more than 90 days delinquent, in foreclosure, subject
   to bankruptcy, or are real-estate owned (REO).  Although not
   strong as the lock-out feature in SI deals, this test is a
   strong mitigant to the pro-rata structure since it allows for
   faster amortization of the senior bonds (and hence percentage
   increase in credit enhancement) in the event of collateral
   under-performance.

  The transaction provides for Class B lock-out amount of
   $10,400,000, which mitigates tail risk by protecting both the
   senior and subordinate bonds from eroding credit enhancement
   over time.

  Additionally, all principal collected will be used to pay down
   the senior certificates if the aggregate class principal amount

   of the subordinate certificates is less than or equal to 0.55%
   of the cut-off date balance, or the aggregate class principle
   balance of the Class M-4 and the Class B certificates is zero,
   or the six months average 60 days or more (including
   foreclosure, bankruptcy and REO) delinquent loans and all
   modified loans within 12 months prior to distribution date
   equals or exceeds 25% of current aggregate balance of
   subordinate certificates, or cumulative realized loss amount
   exceeds 10% of original subordinate balance.  The delinquency
   and cumulative loss tests here are stronger than in standard SI

   deals which set these triggers typically at 50% of
   subordination balance and up to 40% of original subordination
   amount.

  For each class of subordinate certificates (other than the
   subordinate certificate then outstanding with the highest
   payment priority), if the sum of the subordinate class
   percentage for such class and that of the classes below is less

   than the sum of the original credit support of that class and
   25% of the non-performing loan percentage, then the subordinate

   principal distribution will be zero.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

                               Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.  Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.

                                 Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment.  Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

                            Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS," published in February 2015.


COMM MORTGAGE 2005-FL10: Fitch Lowers Cl. J Certs Rating to C
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed three classes of COMM
Mortgage Trust 2005-FL10.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

As of the February 2016 remittance, the pool has paid down by 98%
since issuance, with only one asset remaining.

The downgrade of the distressed rating is due to the continued
deterioration of the one remaining asset in the pool, the Berkshire
Mall.  The ratings reflect exceptionally high credit risk
associated with the asset.  The mall comprises 589,146 square feet
(sf) of a 715,146 sf regional mall located in Lanesboro, MA, about
40 miles east of Albany, NY.  The collateral consists of 192,793 sf
of in-line space and 396,353 sf of anchor/major tenant space.  The
non-collateral anchor space (Target) totals approximately 126,000
sf.

Recently, anchor tenants Macy's and Best Buy announced that they
will be closing their stores.  The mall continues to face
significant challenges related to trade area fundamentals, tenant
retention and capital expenditure needs which will ultimately
affect investor interest and the long-term viability of the asset.
The immediate trade area for the subject property is considered
rural and tertiary in nature and is confronting declining
population trends with incomes below state and national levels.
Although, the theater tenant executed a long-term renewal, the
vacancy of the anchors contributes to the declining trajectory of
the mall and low likelihood of recoverability on the asset.

The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2014 due to
the imminent expiration of the forbearance agreement.  A
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure was executed in June of 2014 and the
asset remains real estate owned.  The mall is being managed and
leased by CBL & Associates Properties, which specializes in new
development and repositioning of distressed properties.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the remaining distressed classes (those rated below
'Bsf') are subject to further downgrade as losses are realized.
Fitch anticipates significant losses based on current valuations of
the asset and uncertainty related to the stabilization of the
asset.  Upgrades are considered unlikely due to the distressed
nature of the collateral.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded this class as indicated:

   -- $6.4 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $19.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $6.5 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $4.3 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The following classes, originally rated by Fitch, have paid in
full: A-1, A-J1, A-J2, X-1, MOAX-1, MOAX-2, MOAX-3, B, C, D, E, F,
MOA-1, MOA-2, N-PC, O-PC, P-PC, Q-PC, N-DEL and O-DEL.

Fitch does not rate the class A-J3, G, H and MOA-3 certificates.

In addition, Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only classes X-2-DB, X-2-NOM, X-2-SG, X-3-DB, X-3-NOM and
X-3-SG.


CREDIT SUISSE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. I Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. (CSFB) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 1998-C2.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations to classes F and G reflect the high credit
enhancement (CE) as a result of continued paydown, including
defeasance sufficient to pay down both classes.  CE has improved
since Fitch's last rating action due to $27 million in principal
paydown, including $15 million from scheduled amortization payments
and $12 million received from the disposition of specially serviced
assets.  Class I was affirmed at 'Dsf' due to losses already
incurred.

Fitch modeled losses of 7.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 3.4%, including $56.4 million
(2.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated eight loans (23.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced asset (17.4%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95% to $104.4 million from
$1.92 billion at issuance.  There are 48 of the original 227 loans
remaining in the transaction.  Per the servicer reporting, 19 loans
(63.8% of the pool) are fully defeased.  Of the non-defeased loans
27 are fully amortizing (6.1%), all of which are secured by credit
tenant leases. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes
H through J.

The specially serviced loan, which is the largest loan in the pool
(17.4%), was originally secured by three properties (two retail and
one industrial) located in Irving and North Richland, TX. After
initially transferring to special servicing in December 2009, the
loan was modified with a reduced interest rate and its maturity
extended twice to April 2013 and finally May 2014.  The borrower
was unable to repay the loan at the extended maturity date and the
asset became real estate owned (REO) in July 2014. The industrial
property and one of the retail properties were sold in an April
2015 auction.  The remaining asset is a 242,000 square foot retail
property located in Irving, TX anchored by Best Buy (18% of the net
rentable area [NRA]) and Ross Dress for Less (12.4%).  The property
is not listed for sale, and the servicer is currently focused on
renewing existing leases at the property.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks of the investment-grade classes remain Stable
with future affirmations expected, as both classes are fully
covered by defeasance.  The rating for class I will remain at 'Dsf'
due to incurred losses.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $36 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.3 million class I at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A1, A2, B, C, D and E certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class H or J certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class AX
certificates.



CREDIT SUISSE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. I Certificate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. (CSFB) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 1998-C2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations to classes F and G reflect the high credit
enhancement (CE) as a result of continued paydown, including
defeasance sufficient to pay down both classes.  CE has improved
since Fitch's last rating action due to $27 million in principal
paydown, including $15 million from scheduled amortization payments
and $12 million received from the disposition of specially serviced
assets.  Class I was affirmed at 'Dsf' due to losses already
incurred.

Fitch modeled losses of 7.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 3.4%, including $56.4 million
(2.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated eight loans (23.2%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced asset (17.4%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95% to $104.4 million from
$1.92 billion at issuance.  There are 48 of the original 227 loans
remaining in the transaction.  Per the servicer reporting, 19 loans
(63.8% of the pool) are fully defeased.  Of the non-defeased loans
27 are fully amortizing (6.1%), all of which are secured by credit
tenant leases.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes
H through J.

The specially serviced loan, which is the largest loan in the pool
(17.4%), was originally secured by three properties (two retail and
one industrial) located in Irving and North Richland, TX. After
initially transferring to special servicing in December 2009, the
loan was modified with a reduced interest rate and its maturity
extended twice to April 2013 and finally May 2014.  The borrower
was unable to repay the loan at the extended maturity date and the
asset became real estate owned (REO) in July 2014. The industrial
property and one of the retail properties were sold in an April
2015 auction.  The remaining asset is a 242,000 square foot retail
property located in Irving, TX anchored by Best Buy (18% of the net
rentable area [NRA]) and Ross Dress for Less (12.4%).  The property
is not listed for sale, and the servicer is currently focused on
renewing existing leases at the property.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks of the investment-grade classes remain Stable
with future affirmations expected, as both classes are fully
covered by defeasance.  The rating for class I will remain at 'Dsf'
due to incurred losses.

                          DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $36 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.3 million class I at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A1, A2, B, C, D and E certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class H or J certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class AX
certificates.


GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class J Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  has affirmed the ratings of seven
classes in GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation 2003-C1 as follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Downgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Downgraded to B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance of its referenced classes

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 50% of the
current balance compared to 52% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 10, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $45 million
from $1.19 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to
75% of the pool.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $22 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%). All four remaining loans in the pool are in
special servicing. The largest loan is the 801 Market Street Loan
($34 million -- 75% of the pool), which is secured by a Class B
office condominium located in Center City Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The collateral consists of the top seven floors of a
13-story commercial property which formerly served as the flagship
for the now-defunct department store retailer Strawbridge &
Clothier. The loan transferred to special servicing in February
2013 due to maturity default. The property became REO in September
2014. The former largest tenant, which occupied 45% of the
property's net rentable area, vacated the property in November
2015, leaving the property approximately 30% occupied.

The remaining three loans are secured by a mix of property types.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $23 million loss for the four total
remaining loans in the pool (50% expected loss on average).


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes,
upgraded the ratings on one class and downgraded the ratings on six
classes in Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2004-GG1 as:

  Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Affirmed

   A1 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Affirmed
   Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Downgraded
   to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. H, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)
  Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)
  Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2015, Affirmed
    C (sf)
  Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2015 Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes F and G were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.  The ratings on classes N and O were affirmed as they are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the P&I class E was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 3% since Moody's last review
and 94% since securitization.

The ratings on five P&I classes were downgraded due higher
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class XC) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46.7% of the
current balance, compared to 46.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.4% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.  Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

               METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's used the excel-based Large Loan Model in formulating this
rating recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further
adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $167 million
from $2.6 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 8 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 49% of the pool.  One loan, constituting 0.5% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 49% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $38 million (for an average loss
severity of 22%).  Three loans, constituting 37% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Severance Town Center loan ($38.3 million -- 23% of the
pool), which is secured by a 644,500 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.  Economic occupancy
was 82% while physical occupancy is approximately 61% due to the
largest tenant (Walmart) having vacated their space but continuing
to pay rent through their January 2019 lease expiration.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2014 due to imminent
default.  The loan has passed its original maturity date in April
2014 and the special servicer indicated they are proceeding with
foreclosure.

The other two special serviced loans are secured by retail and
office properties.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $47 million loss
for the three specially serviced loans (77% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for the Aegon Center
B-Note ($21.1 million -- 13% of the pool) and has estimated a
significant loss from this loan.

Moody's received full or partial year 2014 operating results for
93% of the pool and partial year 2015 operating results for 57% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 117%, compared
to 116% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average positive haircut of 2.7% to the
most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.04X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 2.03X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Aegon Center A-Note Loan ($82 million --
49% of the pool), which is secured by a 759,650 SF 34-story Class A
office located in Louisville, Kentucky.  As of January 2016, the
property was 71% leased.  The loan had been in special servicing
for imminent monetary default due to Aegon's lease expiring in
December 2012.  The loan was modified in August 2013 and returned
to the master servicer on Nov. 7, 2013.  The loan was modified with
an A/B note split, resulting in an $82 million A-Note and a $21.1
million B-Note and a maturity date extension.  The loan maturity
was also extended to April 2019 from April 2014.  The interest rate
on the $82 million A-Note was reduced to 4.0% from 6.415% for three
years and interest on the $21.1 million B-Note accrues at 6.415%.
This modification has caused significant interest shortfalls.
Although the loan remains current, Moody's is concerned about the
property's below market occupancy level. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR on the A note are 120% and 0.88X, respectively, the
same as at last review.  As previously mentioned, Moody's
identified the B-Note as a troubled loan.

The remaining two performing loans each comprise less than 1% of
the pool.  They each have a Moody's current LTV below 20% and
stressed DSCR >4.00X.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C and D commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-GG6, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P discontinued the ratings on classes A-J and B, and affirmed the
outstanding rating on class E from the same transaction.

The rating actions on classes C, D, and E follow S&P's analysis of
the transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions.  This included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of
the trust’s collateral, the transaction's structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.  The upgrades on classes C and D
also reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be above S&P's estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings and
the reduced trust balance.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes C and D, as well as positive rating
movement on class E, S&P's analysis also considered the bonds'
susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the seven
specially serviced assets ($57.1 million, 37.2%) should the master
servicer increase appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction or
deem the certain assets nonrecoverable.  S&P also considered the
near-term maturity of the remaining performing loans in the pool
($96.4 million, 62.8%).

Lastly, S&P discontinued its ratings on classes A-J and B following
their full repayment, as detailed in the Feb. 12, 2016, trustee
remittance report.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 12, 2016 trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $153.5 million, constituting 3.9% of the pool
balance at issuance.  The pool currently includes eight loans
(counting the Tribune Tower A-note and B-note as one loan) and
three real estate owned (REO) assets, down from 178 loans at
issuance.  Seven of these assets are with the special servicer,
four loans ($92.7 million, 60.4%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, and no loan in the transaction is defeased.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information for
78.1% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 57.9% was
partial-year 2015 data and the rest year-end 2014 data.

S&P calculated a 0.94x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 130.8% Standard & Poor's weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, using a 7.50% Standard & Poor's
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the seven specially
serviced assets, the San Benito Plaza loan ($3.8 million, 2.5%),
which was transferred to special servicing subsequent to the
February 2016 trustee remittance report, and the Tribune Tower B
note ($3.7 million, 2.4%).

To date, the transaction has experienced $292.8 million in
principal losses, or 7.5% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 8.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the assets currently with the special servicer and the Tribune
Tower B note.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Feb. 12, 2016 trustee remittance report, seven assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, Torchlight Loan Services
LLC.  In addition, the master servicer communicated to S&P that the
San Benito Plaza loan was transferred to the special servicer at
the borrower's request because of its inability to refinance the
loan at maturity in February 2016.  Details of the three largest
specially serviced assets are:

   -- The Coral Springs Financial Plaza REO asset ($16.1 million,
      10.5%) is the largest asset with the special servicer and
      the third-largest asset remaining in the pool, with $18.2
      million in total reported exposure.  The asset is a 123,461-
      sq.-ft. office property in Coral Springs, Fla.  The loan was

      transferred to special servicing on June 10, 2009, and the
      property became REO on Jan. 17, 2013.  The asset has been
      deemed nonrecoverable by the master servicer.  The property
      is currently approximately 37.0% occupied.  According to
      Torchlight, the asset is being marketed for sale.  S&P
      expects significant losses upon the eventual resolution of
      the asset.

   -- The Bridgewater Hills Corporate Center loan ($13.8 million,
      9.0%) is the second-largest asset with the special servicer
      and fourth-largest asset remaining in the pool, with $15.7
      million in total reported exposure.  The loan is secured by
      a 115,558-sq.-ft. office property in Bridgewater, N.J.  The
      loan was transferred to the special servicer in November
      2014 for imminent default.  The property was previously 100%

      occupied by Valeant Pharmaceuticals under a lease that
      expired in October 2014, but has since vacated upon lease
      expiration.  Approximately 50,000 sq. ft. of the space is
      leased to a tenant.  However, it is expected to vacate the
      property by its lease expiration in June 2017.  The special
      servicer stated that it is dual tracking foreclosure with
      workout negotiations.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA)
      of $6.9 million is in effect against the loan.  S&P expects
      moderate losses upon the eventual resolution of the loan.

   -- The Sudley Tower REO asset ($9.5 million, 6.2%) is the
      third-largest asset with the special servicer and the fifth-
      largest asset remaining in the pool, with $11.4 million in
      total reported exposure.  The asset is a 90,650-sq.-ft.
      office property in Manassas, Va.  The loan was transferred
      to special servicing on Jan. 22, 2014, and the property
      became REO on June 2, 2014.  The property is currently
      approximately 57.0% occupied.  The special servicer stated
      that it plans to lease up the property prior to marketing
      the asset for sale.  An ARA of $4.2 million is in effect
      against the asset.  S&P expects moderate losses upon the
      eventual resolution of the asset.

The remaining specially serviced assets make up less than 6.3% of
the assets with the special servicer.  S&P estimated losses for the
eight specially serviced assets, as well as the Tribune Tower B
note, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 48.2%.

(A minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.)

RATINGS LIST

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-GG6
Commercial mortgage pass through certificates, series 2006-GG6
                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                  From
A-J               36228CXA6       NR                  BB- (sf)
B                 36228CXB4       NR                  B+ (sf)
C                 36228CXC2       A+ (sf)             B+ (sf)
D                 36228CXD0       B+ (sf)             B (sf)
E                 36228CXE8       CCC (sf)            CCC (sf)

NR--Not rated.


GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ7: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 13 classes in
GS Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-GCJ7 as:

  Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed

   Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on 11 P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at last review.  The deal has
paid down 1% since last review and 5% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 2.5% of the original pooled balance
compared to 2.7% at last review.  Moody's provides a current list
of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/ Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Conduit Loan Herf of 29 compared to 31 at last review.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $1.54 billion
from $1.62 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 80 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 45% of
the pool.  Ten loans, constituting 8.5% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Ten loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loan is the Independence Place
Loan (for $24 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a
264-unit multifamily property located near Fort Stewart in
Hinesville, Georgia.  As of January 2016 the property was 77%
leased compared to 71% at last review.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in October 2014, and the property became Real
Estate Owned (REO) in March 2015.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 89% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86% compared to 89% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.25X,
respectively compared to 1.54X and 1.22X at Moody's last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the 1155 F Street Loan ($125.7 million -- 8% of the
pool), which is secured by a class A trophy office and retail
building located in Washington, DC.  This property is also
encumbered by $19.9 million of mezzanine debt.  As of December
2015, the office and retail space had occupancy of 98% and 100%,
respectively.  The property is anchored by three law firms that
make up 59% of the net rentable area (NRA).  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.22X, respectively compared to 101% and
1.25X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Columbia Business Center Loan ($91.2
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by the fee and
leasehold interests in an industrial park consisting of 26
buildings located along the Columbia River in Vancouver,
Washington.  Approximately 9% of the NRA is allocated to office use
with the remainder used for warehouse and manufacturing purposes.
The property was 98% leased as of September 2015 versus 99% leased
as of November 2014 and 95% as of December 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.30X, respectively, compared to 100% and
1.26X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Bellis Fair Mall Loan ($88 million
  -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 538,226 SF component of
a 776,136 SF single-story, enclosed regional mall located in
Bellingham, Washington.  The property is approximately 90 miles
north of Seattle and 20 miles south of the international border
with Canada.  This mall is anchored by Macy's Target, Kohl's and
J.C. Penney, with only Macy's being part of the collateral.  The
property is the dominant mall within its trade area and the only
enclosed regional mall within the Bellingham and NW Washington
markets.  The closest regional mall competition is 28 miles south
of the subject.  The property was 98% leased as of December 2015
compared to 99% leased in December 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 71% and 1.41X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.34X at
the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-NYC5, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the five lodging properties totaling
1,532 rooms in New York City that secure the $410.0 million,
five-year interest-only (IO) fixed-rate mortgage loan, which serves
as collateral for this stand-alone transaction.  S&P also
considered the deal structure and liquidity available to the trust.
The affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XA-1, XA-2, XB-1, and XB-2 IO
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than the
lowest-rated reference classes.  The notional balances on classes
XA-1 and XA-2 reference class A, while classes XB-1 and XB-2
reference classes B, C, and D.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the lodging portfolio that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI), average daily rate
(ADR), occupancy, and revenue per available room (RevPAR) for each
of the five lodging properties for the past six years.  Although
S&P noted that the overall NOI has declined in 2015 compared to
2014, our analysis also considered the properties' location and
historical performance.  If the performance continues to lag S&P's
expectations, it may revise its assumptions underlying its
sustainable net cash flow (NCF) and value.  S&P derived its overall
sustainable NCF, which S&P divided by an 8.66% weighted average
capitalization rate, to determine S&P's expected-case value.  This
yielded an overall Standard & Poor's loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 87.2% and 2.67x, respectively, on the
trust balance.

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the IO mortgage
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $410.0 million, pays an
annual fixed interest rate of 3.673%, and matures on Jan. 5, 2018.
In addition, there is an unsecured partner loan totaling $50.0
million payable if and when cash flow is available between
partners.  According to the transaction documents, the borrowers
will pay the special servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation
fees, and costs and expenses incurred from appraisals and
inspections conducted by the special servicer.  To date, the trust
has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the properties'
historical NOIs for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, 2013,
2012, 2011, and 2010 and the most recent Smith Travel Research
reports provided by the master servicer to determine S&P's opinion
of a sustainable cash flow for the lodging portfolio.  The master
servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported an overall DSC and
occupancy of 2.52x and 89.6%, respectively, on the trust balance
for the 12 months ended June 30, 2015.

RATINGS LIST

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-NYC5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-NYC5
                                     Rating
Class           Identifier           To                  From
A               36197RAA5            AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
XA-1            36197RAC1            AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
XA-2            36197RAE7            AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
XB-1            36197RAG2            BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)
XB-2            36197RAJ6            BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)
B               36197RAL1            AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)
C               36197RAN7            A- (sf)             A- (sf)
D               36197RAQ0            BBB (sf)            BBB (sf)
E               36197RAS6            BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)
F               36197RAU1            BB (sf)             BB (sf)
G               36197RAW7            BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)


GS MORTGAGE 2016-ICE2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2016-ICE2's $1.0 billion
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a single two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $1.0 billion, with three one-year extension
options, and secured by the fee interests in 43
temperature-controlled warehouses.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 7,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2016-ICE2

Class       Rating(i)             Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)             521,100,000
X-CP        BB- (sf)         900,000,000(ii)
X-NCP       BB- (sf)         900,000,000(ii)
B           AA- (sf)             110,890,000
C           A- (sf)               95,340,000
D           BBB- (sf)            107,470,000
E           BB- (sf)             165,200,000

  (i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amounts of the class X-CP and
X-NCP certificates will initially be equal to the aggregate of the
initial principal balance of the A-2 portion of the class A
certificates ($421,100,000) and the certificate balances of the
class B, C, D, and E certificates.


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC5: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. L Certs to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded the ratings on three classes and affirmed the
ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-CIBC5 as:

  Cl. H, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)
  Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. L, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)
  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 1, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 15% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.  The rating
on Class M was affirmed because the rating is consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of three, compared to a Herf of four at Moody's
last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $40.2 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 30% of the pool.  Three loans, constituting 39% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2015 operating results for 90% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 56%, compared to 64% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.01X and 2.08X,
respectively, compared to 1.02X and 1.83X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 53% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Southern Wine & Spirits Building Loan ($11.9
million -- 29.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000 square
foot (SF) warehouse and office building in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The
property is 100% leased to Southern Wine and Spirits, one of the
largest distributors of wine, spirits and non-alcoholic beverages
in the US, through December 2021 under a triple net lease.  The
loan has amortized 48% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.20X, respectively, compared to 50% and
2.00X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Harwood Hills Village Shopping
Center Loan ($6.3 million -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 118,000 SF grocery-anchored retail center located in Bedford,
Texas.  The largest tenant is Minyard's Sun Fresh Grocery, which
leases 44% of the net rentable area (NRA) through August 2017.  As
of September 2015, the property was 93% leased compared to 92% at
last review.  The loan has amortized 40% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.15X, respectively,
compared to 103% and 1.00X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Village Shopping Center Loan ($3.2
million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000 SF
grocery-anchored center in Duncanville, Texas.  The largest tenant
is Tom Thumbs Grocery, which leases 55% of the NRA through January
2017.  As of September 2015, the property was 90% leased, the same
as at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and
1.90X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.61X at the last review.



JP MORGAN 2004-C3: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 7 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. (JPMCC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2004-C3.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of the remaining distressed classes are based on
the continued risks given the high concentration of specially
serviced loans and overall concentration with only seven
non-specially serviced loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 38.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.5%, including $65.1
million (4.3% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated two loans (50.5%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which are currently specially serviced.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.8% to $49.3 million from
$1.52 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(8.6% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes J through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Cambridge Court Phase I & II loan (36.8% of the
pool), which is the largest loan in the transaction.  The loan is
secured by a 277,517 square foot (sf) medical office property
consisting of two buildings, located in Auburn Hills, MI.  The loan
transferred to specially servicing in August 2014 due to monetary
default.  The largest tenants include Plante & Moran LLP (20%),
expiry Oct. 31, 2020; Ascension Health (9%), expiry March 31, 2016;
McLaren Health Care Corporation (4%), expiry June 30, 2022;
Strategic Manufacturing (5%), expiry Dec. 31, 2016; and RICOH (3%),
expiry Jan. 31, 2017.  The special servicer is currently working on
a 30,290 sf lease renewal/expansion with Ascension Health, and a
5,145 sf lease prospect.  The buildings, combined are 60% leased as
of January 2016.  The special servicer is working to improve
occupancy before marketing it for sale.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced South Hadley Shopping Center loan (13.7%), which
is the third largest loan in the transaction.  The loan secured by
a 91,648 sf retail property located in South Hadley, MA.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in November 2014 for imminent
maturity default.  At issuance, the largest tenants were Big Y
Foods (66%), lease exp Nov. 31, 2015; and Rocky's Hardware (10%),
exp March 10, 2018.  Big Y Foods (66%) vacated in August 2013 and
continued paying rent until their lease expired on Nov. 30, 2015.
Per the special servicer, the asset will be included in the March
2016 auction without a listing price.  They have ordered an updated
appraisal but it has not yet been received.  The property is 26%
occupied as of January 2016 with average rent $12.89 sf.

The second largest loan in the transaction is the T-Mobile - Lenexa
KS loan (17.6%), which is secured by a 77,484 sf single-tenant
retail property located in Lenexa, KS.  The property is 100%
occupied by Voicestream PCS II whose lease expires October 31, 2019
before the loans anticipated repayment date (ARD) of
Dec. 1, 2019.  The final maturity date is in December 2034.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Although the credit enhancement to class G has improved, future
upgrades are not expected due to the high concentration of
specially serviced loans (over 50% of the pool), increased deal
concentration, and adverse selection.  Additionally, there is
limited scheduled principal paydown which may result in the
remaining classes being outstanding for some time.  Losses remain
possible.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Recovery Estimates for these
ratings:

   -- $18.3 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $15.2 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 80%.
   -- $15.8 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-J, B, C, D, E and F
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP11: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-J Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-LDP11 as:

  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 11, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 11, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I classes A-3, A-SB, A-4, A-1A and A-M were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I classes A-J, B and C were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
uncertainty of future interest payments based on the fact that all
of its references classes have an interest rate equal to the
weighted average coupon of the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.4% of the
current balance, compared to 11.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 16.9% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/ Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 35, compared to 38 at Moody's last review.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 17, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 44% to $3.01 billion
from $5.41 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 177 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 39% of the pool.  The pool contains no loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Fourteen loans,
representing 11% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Fifty-one loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $561 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%).  Three loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the GSA Portfolio -- A Note Loan ($230 million -- 7.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of nine
cross-collateralized properties located in five states (Colorado,
New York, West Virginia, Kansas and Pennsylvania).  The loan has
transferred in and out of special servicing since 2012.  The loan
most recently transferred back to the Special Servicer in January
2016 due to leasing concerns.  The portfolio was 97% leased as of
November 2015, however, there is considerable lease rollover risk
associated with US Government leases representing approximately 94%
of the portfolio's net rentable area (NRA).  Several of the tenants
have termination rights and a large share of the government leases
are scheduled to expire in 2016.  The loan's maturity date was
extended to May 2017 as part of a loan modification which closed in
the first quarter of 2014.  The modification split the principal
balance into an A Note and a $34 million B Note.  There is also
mezzanine debt associated with the property.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Healthnet
Headquarters Loan ($69.6 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 327,300 square foot (SF) office property located in
Shelton, Connecticut.  The property was fully leased to a single
tenant through April 2017, however, that tenant has vacated.  The
space is currently partially occupied by a subtenant, following the
departure of the primary lessee.  Rents from the subtenant are
insufficient to cover debt service, and the borrower is seeking a
loan modification which would allow it to enter a long-term lease
agreement with the subtenant at market rents.

The remaining loan in special servicing is secured by a hotel
property located in York, Pennsylvania.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $138.8 million loss (41% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 30 poorly
performing loans, constituting 21% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $187.6 million (a 29% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 83% of the
pool and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 82% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 112%, compared to
116% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.3% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.31X and 0.90X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 17% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Maple Drive Portfolio ($220.0 million --
7.3% of the pool).  The loan is secured by three office properties
in Beverly Hills, California.  The properties were 97% leased as of
September 2015, unchanged from Moody's prior review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 134% and 0.71X, respectively, compared to
135% and 0.70X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Save Mart Portfolio ($167.9 million
-- 5.6% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a portfolio of 31
single tenant grocery stores with a total of 1,611,853 SF, spread
across several locations in Northern California.  As of September
2015, the portfolio was 100% leased.  The loan is currently on the
watchlist due to low DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105%
and 0.93X, respectively, compared to 107% and 0.91X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Americold Portfolio ($115.3 million
  -- 3.8% of the pool).  The loan is secured by seven freezer
warehouses/distribution centers located throughout the country
consisting of 1,373,997 rentable SF.  The properties are located in
Indiana, Washington, Oregon, Iowa, Arizona and Georgia.  The loan
is currently on the watchlist due to low DSCR.  The loan sponsor,
AmeriCold Realty Trust, LP, continues to fund all shortfalls and is
committed to turning around the performance of the underlying
properties.  Due to the low DSCR, Moody's considered this a
troubled loan.



JPMORGAN CHASE 2002-C2: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. F Cert. to B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P's upgrades follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  The upgrades
also reflect S&P's expectation of the available credit enhancement
for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective
rating levels, S&P's views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance, and the reduced trust balance.

Class F was previously lowered to 'D (sf)' due to accumulated
interest shortfalls that S&P expected to remain outstanding for a
prolonged period of time.  S&P raised its rating on this class to
'B- (sf)' because the interest shortfalls have been repaid in full,
and S&P do not believe, at this time, a further default is
virtually certain.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes E and F, S&P's analysis also considered
the classes' interest shortfall history and the susceptibility to
reduced liquidity support from the loan on the master servicer's
watchlist, the Avon Commons loan ($12.1 million, 52.4%), which had
a reported low debt service coverage (DSC) of 0.83xas of Dec. 31,
2014.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $23.1 million, which is 2.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes four loans, down from 108
loans at issuance.  No loans are reported with the special servicer
or defeased, and only the Avon Commons loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
reported financial information for all of the loans in the pool, of
which 90.7% was year-end 2014 data and the remainder was
partial-year 2015 data.

For the remaining loans, S&P calculated a 0.94x Standard & Poor's
weighted average DSC and 60.8% Standard & Poor's weighted average
loan-to-value ratio using a 7.03% Standard & Poor's weighted
average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $75.8 million in principal
losses, or 7.3% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2
                                  Rating
Class             Identifier      To                 From
E                 46625MPR4       AA (sf)            BBB- (sf)
F                 46625MPU7       B- (sf)            D (sf)



KINGSLAND III: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Kingsland III, Ltd.:

  $11,550,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2021, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 12,

   2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  $11,800,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes

   due 2021, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 12, 2015,

   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  $5,450,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2021, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

  $2,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
   2021, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $240,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2021 (current outstanding balance of $77,826,762, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on June 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $75,575,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $12,750,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $29,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on June 12, 2015,

   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Kingsland III, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2013.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades on the Class C and D Notes are a result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio.  The credit
quality of the portfolio has deteriorated since June 2015.  Based
on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2671 compared to 2552 on June 2015.  This is primarily a
result of the transaction's large exposure to energy and
commodity-linked collateral assets whose ratings were recently
downgraded, are currently on review for downgrade or have negative
credit outlooks.  Furthermore, 5.4% of the portfolio consists of
securities from obligors with either Moody's weakest Speculative
Grade Liquidity (SGL) Rating of SGL-4 or a derived Ca rating.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moody's observes that the
transaction has benefited from deleveraging of the senior notes and
an increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
since June 2015.  The Class A-1 Notes have deleveraged by 37.7%, or
$47 million since that time.  Based on the trustee's February 2016
report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
notes are reported at 153.1%, 131.0%, 117.7%, and 114.0%,
respectively, compared to May 2015 levels of 141.7%, 125.3%,
114.8%, and 111.8%, respectively.

These rating actions also reflect a correction to Moody's modeling
of securities that mature after the notes ("long-dated" assets). In
prior rating actions, this deal was modeled with the wrong maturity
date, which meant that the long-dated assets were not taken into
account and their liquidation values were over-stated. This error
has now been corrected, and today's rating actions reflect this
change.  Based on the trustee's February 2016 report, long-dated
assets make up approximately 6.6% of the portfolio. These
investments could expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher
     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.

  7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

  8) Exposure to assets with weak liquidity: The presence of
     assets with Moody's weakest SGL rating of SGL-4, exposes the
     notes to additional risks if these assets default.  The
     historical default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-
     4 ratings than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the
     deal's high exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute
     around 4.34% of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2122)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3: 0
Class B: +1
Class C-1: +3
Class C-2: +2
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3184)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3: 0
Class B: -2
Class C-1: -1
Class C-2: -2
Class D-1: 0
Class D-2: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in December 2015.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $254 million, defaulted par
of $8.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 14.4%
(implying a WARF of 2653), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.36%, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted average
spread of 3.07% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Kingsland IV, Ltd:

  $14,900,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   April 16, 2021, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 6,
   2015, Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $308,100,000 Class A-l Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   April 16, 2021, (current outstanding balance of
   $149,650,746.60), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6,
   2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $60,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
   Notes due April 16, 2021, (current outstanding balance of
   $29,143,280.75), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,

   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $22,900,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   April 16, 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due April 16, 2021, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 6, 2015, Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due April 16, 2021, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on
   Aug. 6, 2015, Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Kingsland IV, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
April 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on the Class E Notes is a result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio.  The credit
quality of the portfolio has deteriorated since August 2015.  Based
on Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 2735 compared to 2566 in August 2015.  This is primarily
a result of the transaction's large exposure to energy and
commodity-linked collateral assets whose ratings were recently
downgraded, are currently on review for downgrade or have negative
credit outlooks.  Furthermore, 4.4% of the portfolio consists of
securities from obligors with either Moody's weakest Speculative
Grade Liquidity (SGL) Rating of SGL-4 or a derived Ca rating.

In addition, the portfolio includes a number of investments in
securities that mature after the notes do.  Based on the trustee's
February 2016 report, securities that mature after the notes do
have increased to 14.3% of the portfolio from 10.1% in August 2015.
These investments could expose the notes to market risk in the
event of liquidation when the notes mature.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moody's observes that the
transaction has benefited from deleveraging of the senior notes and
an increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
since August 2015.  The Class A Notes have deleveraged by 17.4%, or
$37.8 million since that time.  Based on the trustee's February
2016 report, the OC ratios for the Class B, Class C, Class D, and
Class E notes are reported at 140.5%, 125.0%, 115.8%, and 109.1%,
respectively, compared to August 2015 levels of 134.4%, 121.7%,
114.0%, and 108.3%, respectively.

              Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and collateral sales by
     the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Realization
     of higher than assumed recoveries would positively impact the

     CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.  The deal's increased exposure owing to

     amendments to loan agreements extending maturities continues.

     In light of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets,

     which increases its sensitivity to the liquidation
     assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios
     using a range of liquidation value assumptions.  However,
     actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market
     prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the
     deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2188)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +3
Class D: +2
Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3283)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $276.9 million, defaulted par
of $10.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.95%
(implying a WARF of 2735), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.90%, a diversity score of 44 and a weighted average
spread of 3.05% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.


LBUBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 15 classes in
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class (Class X) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.7% of the
current balance, compared to 14.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2015 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $1.72 billion
from $2.98 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 139 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 61% of
the pool. Six loans, constituting 5.6% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Twenty-five loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $159 million (for an
average loss severity of 50%). Forty-nine loans, constituting 22%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
exposure in special servicing is the PECO Portfolio ($311 million
-- 18% of the pool), which consists of 39 cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans. The loans are secured by 39 retail
properties totaling 4.3 million square feet (SF) and located across
13 states. The average property size is 109,000 SF with no
individual asset representing more than 6% of the total SF or 7% of
the total portfolio balance. Major tenants include Tops, Bi-Lo,
Food Lion, Publix, Staples and Dollar Tree. The loans transferred
to special servicing in August 2012 due to imminent default. All 39
PECO loans have become became real-estate owned (REO) with three
properties having already been sold.

The remaining ten specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $162 million loss
for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eighteen poorly
performing loans, constituting 18% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $66 million (a 22% expected loss based on a
51% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 99%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 105%, compared to 109% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 0.89X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Potomac Mills Loan ($246 million -- 14% of the
pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $410 million
first mortgage loan. The other portion is held in WBCMT 2007-C33.
The loan is secured by a 1.5 million SF super regional mall located
in Woodbridge, Virginia. Anchor tenants include Costco and JC
Penney. The property has strong sponsorship from the Simon Property
Group. The property was 98% leased as of December 2014. The loan is
interest only for the full term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
102% and 0.90X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the McCandless Towers Loan ($112 million
-- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by two 11 story Class A
office towers totaling 418,000 SF in Santa Clara, CA. The property
was 93% leased as of December 2015, compared to 92% leased as of
December 2014 and 67% leased as of December 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 128%
and 0.76X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Greensboro Park Loan ($107 million --
6% of the pool), which is secured by two Class B office properties
totaling 485,000 SF, located in McLean, Virginia in the Tyson's
Corner submarket. The loan last transferred to Special Servicing in
February 2015 for imminent default. The loan subsequently
transferred back to the Master Servicer in August 2015 following a
modification to the loan maturity date. Collectively, the
properties were 75% occupied as of September 2015. Major tenants
include BB&T Bank and Elbit Systems of America. Due to the low
occupancy, Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.


LIMEROCK CLO I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Limerock CLO I:

  $22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2023,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Upgraded to
   Aa1 (sf)

  $19,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
   Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  $14,000,000 Class J Blended Securities (current outstanding
   balance of $10,740,039.29), Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
   Oct. 1, 2015, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $80,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023(current
   outstanding balance of $27,321,567.06), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
   outstanding balance of $20,491,175.29), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  U.S. $207,000,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Notes Due 2023
   (current outstanding balance of $55,549,505.28), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $23,000,000 Class A-3b Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $29,000,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Limerock CLO I, issued in April 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans,
with material exposure to CLO tranches.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in April 2014.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since October 2015.  The Class A-1,
Class A-2 and Class A-3a notes have been paid down collectively by
approximately 42.3%, or $75.9 million since that time.
Additionally, the rated balance of the Class J Blended Securities
have reduced by 1.2%, or $0.1 million since that time.  Based on
the trustee's February 2016 report, the over-collateralization (OC)
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are
reported at 156.00%, 136.65%, 123.42% and 112.01%, respectively,
versus October 2015 levels of 138.39%, 126.37%, 117.55% and
109.51%, respectively.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the portfolio since October 2015.  Based
on trustee's February 2016 report, the weighted average rating
factor is reported at 2248 compared to 2319 in October 2015.
               Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Exposure to structured finance assets: The deal has a
     significant investment in securities from CLO issuers.  The
     performance and characteristic of these investments can be
     notably different from corporate debt, and may introduce
     additional risk.  Currently, 12.7% of the deal's portfolio is

     composed of CLO notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1949)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3a: 0
Class A-3b: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +3
Class D: +3
Class J Blended: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2923)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class A-3a: 0
Class A-3b: 0
Class A-4: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class J Blended: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $242.2 million, defaulted par
of $0.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 14.92%
(implying a WARF of 2436), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.28%, a diversity score of 42 and a weighted average
spread of 3.25%(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Fitch Raises Cl. B Certs Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 12 classes of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust (MLMT) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-CIP1.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of class B reflects increased credit enhancement (CE)
due to loan payoffs, continued amortization, and the overall stable
performance of non-specially serviced loans.  Further upgrades were
limited, however, as six (68% of the current balance) out of the
eleven remaining loans in the pool are with the special servicer.

Fitch modeled losses of 57.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 9.7%, including $134.9
million (6.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.5% to $112.3 million from
$2.06 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes D through Q.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a real estate owned
(REO) portfolio (39%) of four hotels previously flagged as
Residence Inns.  The portfolio is located in TX, FL, and NY.  The
loan transferred to the special servicer in March 2014 due to
imminent default as Marriott management agreements were set to
expire.  The lender and the borrower agreed to a consensual
foreclosure.  Per servicer reporting, one hotel asset located in
Fishkill, NY was disposed of for $4.35 million in November 2015. It
is anticipated that the assets located in Tyler and Fort Worth, TX
will be part of an upcoming auction to occur in the first half of
2016.  Property management is working to stabilize the fourth hotel
located in Orlando, FL after completing a renovation in 2015.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is a REO asset, a
137 room hotel (12%) located in Yardley, PA.  The loan originally
transferred in February 2013 due to monetary default.  The asset
has been REO since April 2015.  The reported net operating income
(NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 0.93x as of year-end
(YE) 2014.  According to the special servicer, the property is in
good condition, but rooms are in need of updates.  The timing for
the disposal of this asset is unknown at this time.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (5%) secured by a 44,082 sf office center located in
Las Vegas, NV.  The loan transferred to the special servicer due to
maturity default in July 2015.  Per servicer reporting, occupancy
was just 10% as of November 2015.  The servicer has filed for
foreclosure.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on classes B and C remains Stable as credit
enhancement is high and downgrades are not expected.  Further
upgrades were not warranted, however, as the transaction is highly
concentrated and includes a large percentage of specially serviced
loans (68%).  Downgrades to the distressed classes D and E are
possible should additional losses be realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class as indicated:

   -- $45.5 million class B to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $18 million class C at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $38.6 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 35%.
   -- $25.7 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $11.6 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3A, A-3B, A-SB, A-4, AM and AJ certificates
have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XC
and XP certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. B Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HQ8 as:

  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Upgraded
   to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)
  Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 20, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes A-J and B, were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 42.4% of the
current balance, compared to 16.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/ Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 71% of the pool is in
special servicing.  In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs.  Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior classes.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 11, compared to 32 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $322 million
from $2.73 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 78% of
the pool.  Two loans, constituting 4.2% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Four loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

The trust has realized an aggregate loss of $131 million, for an
average loan loss severity of 59%.  Twenty loans, constituting 71%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Marketplace at Northglenn Loan
($56.4 million -- 17.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 439,000
square foot (SF) retail power center in Northglenn, a suburb of
Denver, Colorado.  Top tenants include Ulta, Petsmart, Bed Bath &
Beyond, Marshalls, Sports Authority and Ross Dress for Less.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in August 2011 for imminent
default after several national tenants relocated to competing
properties thereby triggering co-tenancy clauses and lower rents.
Foreclosure occurred in March 2012 and the asset became real estate
owned (REO) effective July 2012.  As of September 2015, the
property was 77% leased compared to 84% at year end 2014.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has also assumed a high default
probability for one poorly performing loan, constituting 5% of the
pool.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $134 million loss for the
specially serviced and troubled loans (54% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 92% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 104%, compared
to 92% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 23% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Inland BISYS Fund Loan ($25 million -- 7.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 240,000 SF office property
built in 1995 and located in Columbus, Ohio.  The property was 95%
leased as of September 2015, the same as Moody's prior review.  The
loan had an anticipated repayment date in 2012, with a final
maturity in June 2035.  To account for the single tenant exposure,
Moody's incorporated a "lit/ dark" analysis. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 104% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 99% and
1.07X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Centre Properties Portfolio Loan
($18.2 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by five
retail properties located in Indianapolis and Fishers, Indiana.
Major tenants at the properties include Hobby Lobby, Pep Boys,
Party City and Panera Bread.  The portfolio was a combined 71%
leased as of September 2015, compared to 72% at year end 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.80X, respectively,
compared to 120% and 0.83X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Bel Air Town Center Loan ($16.1
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 90,000 SF
unanchored retail neighborhood center in Bel Air, Maryland.  As of
the September 2015, the property was 79% leased to over 20 tenants.
Top tenants at the property include Chili's Restaurant, FedEx
Office, Taco Bell and T-Mobile.  The loan is being monitored for
low occupancy and increased expenses.  Moody's has identified this
as a troubled loan.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 11 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 13 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSCI) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ13

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class A-3 reflects improving credit enhancement due
to higher than expected recoveries on disposed assets and
delevering of the transaction (class A-2 repaid in full and class
A-1A and class A-3 have been reduced by 8.4% and 9.5%,
respectively, since the last rating action).

Fitch modeled losses of 5.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 18.9%, including $167.4 million
(16.1% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated five loans (6.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced asset (3.2%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 46.9% to $551.7 million from
$1.04 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, five loans
(12.2% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes A-J through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan secured by a 176,240 sf office property located in Milford, CT
(3.2% of the pool).  The loan transferred to the special servicer
in July 2014 due to imminent default.  The servicer-reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was well below 1.0x and occupancy was
23% as of year-to-date (YTD) Sept. 30 2015. Legal proceedings are
ongoing, and Fitch will continue to monitor the loan's resolution
process.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
58,039 sf office building located in Ft. Lauderdale, FL (1.6% of
the pool).  Occupancy significantly declined following the
downsizing of the sole tenant in 2014.  The Art Institute of Ft.
Lauderdale leased 100% of the space until 2014, and now represents
31.1% of total space.  Per the February 2016 rent roll, the
property was 41.8% leased including one new lease (7% of net
rentable area [NRA]) scheduled to commence March 1, 2016 and
another (3.6%) in May 2016.  The servicer-reported DSCR was 0.58x
as of YTD Sept. 30, 2015 compared to 1.16x as of year-end (YE)
2014.  The servicer indicated the remaining vacant suites continue
to be marketed on a monthly basis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The upgrade to class A-3 reflects the de-levering of the
transaction as loans paid off resulting in higher than expected
recoveries and the class' senior position in the capital stack.
While interest shortfalls were experienced from March through
August 2013, Fitch does not anticipate future interest shortfalls
to the class.  Fitch applied additional stresses to maturing loans
when considering the upgrade to account for refinance risk. Further
upgrades were limited due to the pool's maturity concentration
through 2017 (96.3%).  The Stable Rating Outlook on classes A-1A
and A-3 reflect the increasing credit enhancement and expected
continued pay down to the classes.

The distressed class A-M is subject to further downgrade should
more loans transfer to special servicing and/or additional losses
are realized.  The class could be upgraded should recoveries on the
loans be better than anticipated.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class:

   -- $302.8 million class A-3 to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $104.4 million class A-1A at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $103.9 million class A-M at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;
   -- $40.5 million class A-J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the class M, N, O and P certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Cl. H Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust (MSCI) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2011-C2.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Affirmations are due to the relatively stable performance of the
pool.  Despite recent paydown, upgrades were not warranted as the
pool is becoming adversely selected.  The pool has a high
concentration of loans secured by retail properties (45% of the
current balance), and properties located in Texas (36.5%) along
with three large loans of concern detailed below.

Fitch modeled losses of 3.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 3%.  The pool has experienced no
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated four loans (15.1%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
loan (4.3%).  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class J.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 10.5% to $1.09 billion from
$1.21 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(1% of the pool) are defeased.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern is the Three Riverway Office loan
(4.6%), secured by 398,413 square foot (sf) office building located
in Houston, TX.  Per servicer reporting, the net operating income
(NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) decreased to 1.67x as of
year-end (YE) 2014 from 1.75x as of YE 2013.  The property has
substantial lease turnover coming in the next two years as 28% of
net rentable area (NRA) rolls in the coming year, followed by
another 25% the next.  Another concern is the property's high
percentage of energy and commodity related tenants (34% of NRA)
given the sectors' recent weakness.  As of December 2015, the
property was 90% occupied.  Fitch will continue to monitor the loan
for leasing updates and further deterioration in performance.

The next largest loan of concern is the Towne West Square Mall loan
(4.4%), secured by a 945,000 sf (448,760 sf of collateral) regional
mall located in Wichita, KS.  The subject mall was anchored by
Dillard's, JCPenney, Sears, and Dick's Sporting Goods, with only
Sears included in the collateral for this loan.  Per servicer
reporting, collateral occupancy dropped to 53% as of the December
2015 rent roll from 78% as of YE 2014 after Sears vacated their
space at the end of their lease in April 2015.  As of December
2014, the NOI DSCR was 1.58x and 1.32x as of September 2015.

The third largest loan of concern is the specially serviced
Georgetown Center loan (4.3%) secured by two office buildings
located in Washington, D.C., and totalling 284,979 sf.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in January 2016 due to imminent
maturity default.  As of September 2015, occupancy at the property
was 93%.  Fannie Mae (31% of portfolio NRA) and Georgetown
University (32%) are the major tenants at the two buildings.
Fannie Mae has made it public that they intend to consolidate their
various locations throughout the Washington, DC metropolitan area
into one location within DC's Central Business District (CBD).  The
special servicer is in the process of finalizing a modification
that would extend the original maturity date of April 2016.  Once
the modification has received approval, it is anticipated that this
loan will transfer back to the master servicer.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A2 through H remain Stable as credit
enhancement is high and downgrades are not expected. Upgrades are
possible with stable pool performance, increased credit
enhancement, and/or resolution of the specially serviced loan.
Downgrades are possible if the Loans of Concern experience a
further deterioration in performance and losses begin to be
realized.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $303.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $89 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $439.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $831.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.1 million class C to 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31.9 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.2 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $12.1 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.2 million class H at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class J and X-B certificates.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes.  S&P
also removed its ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.  Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd. is a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Carlyle
Investment Management LLC.

The upgrades reflect a $136.82 million paydown to the class A notes
since S&P's May 2014 rating actions.  These paydowns have left the
class A notes at 15.64% of their original balance.  The affirmed
ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

As a result of the note paydowns, the transaction's credit support
has improved via higher overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since
the April 2014 trustee report, which S&P used in its May 2014
actions.  In the February 2016, trustee report, which S&P used for
this review, the trustee reported these O/C ratios:

   -- The senior class O/C ratio was 166.44%, up from 121.36% in
      April 2014;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 132.84%, up from 112.83% in April
      2014;

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 113.71%, up from 106.59% in April
      2014; and

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 103.66%, up from 102.77% in April
      2014.

In S&P's analysis, it considered that Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
has a relatively large bucket of long-dated assets, or underlying
securities that mature after the transaction's stated maturity.
Based on the February 2016 trustee report, the long-dated assets
constituted 11.57% of the underlying portfolio.  S&P's analysis
factored in the potential market value or settlement-related risk
arising from the remaining securities' potential liquidation on the
transaction's legal final maturity date.

The ratings on the class C, D, and E notes are constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's criteria for corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligations.  The obligor concentration of the
portfolio has increased since S&P's prior rating actions as the
number of unique obligors represented has decreased to 51 from
124.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)  cushion(ii)    rating
A      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        25.38%    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)        25.38%    AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    AAA (sf)         2.21%    AA+ (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg  A+ (sf)          0.16%    BBB+ (sf)
E      B- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)         2.56%    B- (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario              Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                      15.0                     5.0
Base case equals rating              20.0                     7.5
Above base case                      25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)      A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)     BB (sf)     B- (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)      A (sf)        BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
            Rating
Class       To          From
B           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D           BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
            Rating
Class       To          From
E           B- (sf)     B- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)



ONEMAIN FIN'L 2016-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Cl. D Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2 (OneMain):

-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class A rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class B rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class C rated BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-2 Notes, Class D rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
    address the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and
    principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- OneMain's capabilities with regards to originations,
    underwriting and servicing.

-- Acquisition of OneMain by Springleaf Holdings, Inc.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    OneMain's consumer loan portfolio. DBRS has used a hybrid
    approach in analyzing the OneMain portfolio that incorporates
    elements of static pool analysis employed for assets such as
    consumer loans, and revolving asset analysis employed for such

    assets as credit card master trusts.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions, which
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with OneMain and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and is consistent with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
    U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2's $395.560 million
asset-backed notes series 2016-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 10,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.1%, 47.9%, 40.1%, and
      34.2% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

      These credit support levels are sufficient to withstand
      stresses commensurate with the preliminary ratings on the
      notes based on S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of S&P's preliminary
      'A+ (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of

      credit deterioration as equal to a two-category downgrade
      within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities
      under moderate stress conditions.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely payment of periodic interest

      and principal by the legal final maturity date according to
      the transaction documents, based on stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, using assumptions commensurate with the
      assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- OneMain's established management and its experience in
      origination and servicing consumer loan products.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s (the backup servicer) consumer loan
      servicing experience.

   -- The operational risks associated with OneMain Financial
      Group LLC's (OneMain's) decentralized business model.

   -- The uncertainty concerning the integration of OneMain's
      operations with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s operations.  OneMain

      Holdings Inc. (formerly known as Springleaf Holdings Inc.)
      acquired OneMain from CitiFinancial Credit Co., a wholly
      owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., on Nov. 15, 2015.  The
      transaction's payment and legal structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2

Class       Rating     Type          Interest           Amount
                                     rate          (mil. $)(i)
A           A+ (sf)    Senior        Fixed             277.780
B           BBB (sf)   Subordinate   Fixed              48.220
C           BB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed              36.670
D           B+ (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed              32.890

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


PHOENIX CLO III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from Phoenix CLO III Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Voya Alternative
Asset Management LLC.  S&P also removed these ratings from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
A-1 and A-2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 4, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $217.99 million of paydowns to the class A-1
notes since S&P's May 2014 rating actions.  Since exiting its
reinvestment period in July 2013, the class A-1 notes have been
paid down to only 4.52% of their original outstanding balance.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit support available
is commensurate with the current rating level.

Because of the principal paydowns, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have improved significantly
since our last rating actions, which referenced the April 2014
trustee report.

   -- The class A/B O/C increased 58.40% to 180.90% from 122.50%,
   -- The class C O/C increased 27.60% to 141.10% from 113.50%,
   -- The class D O/C increased 13.90% to 120.20% from 107.30%,
      and
   -- The class E O/C increased 5.75% to 109.14% from 103.39%.

The credit quality of the collateral portfolio has improved with
the trustee reporting a decrease in defaulted assets to $8.13
million from $10.29 million as of the April 2014 trustee report.
Over the same period, the amount of 'CCC' assets in the portfolio
has decreased to $7.52 million from $11.85 million.  This
transaction also has low exposure to the distressed oil and gas and
nonferrous metals and mining sectors with a reported decrease of
assets from these sectors to only 1.72% of the portfolio from 4.02%
at the time of S&P's last rating actions.  Furthermore, the amount
of assets maturing after the transaction's stated maturity has also
decreased slightly to $7.55 million from $6.87 million as of the
April 2014 report.

The application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's criteria for corporate cash flow
CDOs, constrains the ratings on the class D and E notes. The
obligor concentration risk of the portfolio has increased since
S&P's last rating actions as the number of unique obligors
represented has decreased to 86 from 186 and the top five obligors
represent 19.24% of the portfolio.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults and recoveries upon default under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

            CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Phoenix CLO III Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating(i)  cushion(ii)    rating
A-1    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        26.22%    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        26.22%    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        26.22%    AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)         8.06%    AAA (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)          0.58%    A+ (sf)
E      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)        2.01%    BB+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
D      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
D      AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
E      A+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)     CCC (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Phoenix CLO III Ltd.
                   Rating
Class        To              From        
B            AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C            AAA (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D            A+ (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E            BB+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Phoenix CLO III Ltd.
Class     Rating
A-1       AAA (sf)
A-2       AAA (sf)



PRESTIGE AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1's $312.082 million
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 11,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 44.3%, 38.7%, 29.8%,
      24.2%, and 22.0% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes, respectively (based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios, including excess spread), which provides coverage

      of more than 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x S&P's
      12.25%-12.75% expected cumulative net loss range for the
      class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.  These credit
      support levels are commensurate with the assigned
      preliminary 'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and

      'BB (sf)' ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, its preliminary ratings on the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes would not decline by more than one rating
      category (all else being equal).  These potential rating
      movements are consistent with S&P's credit stability
      criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities, and a two-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'A' through
      'BB' rated securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments made
      under the stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are
      consistent with the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime auto loans.

   -- Prestige Financial Services Inc.'s securitization
      performance history since 2001.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class    Rating        Type          Interest       Amount
                                     rate         (mil. $)
A-1      A-1+ (sf)     Senior        Fixed          38.500
A-2      AAA (sf)      Senior        Fixed         123.000
A-3      AAA (sf)      Senior        Fixed          50.260
B        AA (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed          25.489
C        A (sf)        Subordinate   Fixed          37.589
D        BBB (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed          25.489
E        BB (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed          11.764



RAAC TRUST 2005-RP1: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-4 Debt to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken actions on the ratings of 8
tranches from three deals backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP1 Trust

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP1 Trust

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2014
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP4 Trust

  Cl. A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
   to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


RFC CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by RFC CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2R, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of twelve classes because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

RFC CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a currently static cash transaction, the
reinvestment period ended in April 2012, backed by a portfolio of:
i) b-note debt (59.6% of collateral pool balance); ii) commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (34.8%); and iii) asset backed
securities (ABS) ), primarily in the form related to the lumber
industry (5.6%). As of the January 29, 2016 monthly trustee report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including income
notes and deferred interest, has decreased to $505.0 million from
$1 billion at issuance, with the pay-down directed to the senior
most classes of notes, as a result of the combination of principal
repayment of collateral, resolution and sales of defaulted
collateral and credit risk collateral, and the failing of certain
par value tests. Currently, the transaction has realized
under-collateralization of $408.0 million (40.8% of original
aggregate note balance, compared to 40.0% at last review) primarily
due to realized losses on the collateral. The increase of the
under-collateralization implies losses of approximately 26% to
Class A2 and Class A2-R pro-rata. Classes A-1 and A-1R have fully
amortized.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fifteen
classes in UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C6 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.0% at Moody's last review. The deal
has not experienced any realized losses and Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 1.6% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2.6% to $1.26
billion from $1.30 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 60% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 10% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. One loan,
constituting 0.1% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Five loans, constituting 2.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool, and the deal has not
experienced any realized losses. No loans are currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 47% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 92%, compared to 96% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.7% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.87X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.84X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 575 Broadway
Loan ($125.9 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
six-story mixed-use building in Manhattan. The property is
encumbered by a ground lease that is scheduled in expire in June
2060. As of January 2016, the property was 100% leased, compared to
92% as of January 2015, and 94% leased as of September 2013.
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa3
(sca.pd) and 1.42X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Gateway Center Loan ($160 million -- 12.7% of
the pool), which is secured by three cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans on a 350,000 square foot (SF) component of a
640,000 SF anchored retail center in Brooklyn, New York. As of
September 2015, the property was 100% leased. The property was
constructed in 2002 by The Related Companies and is three
contiguous parcels that operate as one property. Non-collateral
anchors include Target and Home Depot. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 110% and 0.78X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Broward Mall Loan ($95 million --
7.5% of the pool), which is secured by 325,700 SF of net rentable
area (NRA) contained within a one million SF super-regional mall in
Plantation, Florida. The mall's non-collateral anchors include
Sears, Macy's, JC Penney, and Dillard's. The property was 96%
leased as of September 2015, compared to 88% leased as of September
2014. The full-term interest-only loan matures in March 2023.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.17X, respectively.

The third largest loan is The Shoppes at River Crossing Loan ($77.4
million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 525,000 SF
component of a 730,000 SF lifestyle center located in Macon,
Georgia. The property was 96% leased as of September 2015, compared
to 94% leased as of September 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 108% and 0.98X, respectively, the same as at last review.



UBS-BB 2013-C5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Certificate
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fourteen
classes in UBS-BB 2013-C5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-C5 as:

  Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015, Affirmed

   Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015, Affirmed
   A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)
  Cl. EC, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015, Affirmed

   A1 (sf)
  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X-B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on March 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the exchangable class, Class EC, was affirmed based
on the WARF of its exchangable classes.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current balance, compared to 2.5% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $1.439 billion
from $1.485 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 81 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 59% of
the pool.  Two loans, representing 1% of the pool have defeased and
are secured by US Government securities.

Ten loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool.  Two loans,
constituting less than 1% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing and Moody's identified two troubled loans representing
another 1% of the pool.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.8
million loss for the specially serviced and troubled loans (29%
expected loss on average).

The largest specially serviced loan is the Candlewood Suites
Decatur Loan ($4.8 million -- 0.3% of the pool), which is secured
by an 82 room Candlewood Suites franchise property located in
Decatur, TX approximately 60 miles northwest of Dallas.  Between
December 2014 and December 2015, occupancy dropped from 60% to 42%
and RevPar decreased from $54 to $32.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in July 2015 due to imminent default and a
receiver was put in place in November 2015.

The second specially serviced loan is the 7090 Industrial Portfolio
Loan ($3.9 million -- 0.3% of the pool), which is secured three
single story, multi-tenant industrial warehouse buildings
containing a total of 273,007 square feet located in Florence, KY
and Northwood, OH.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2015 due to imminent default.  The special servicer is
working with the borrower to correct any issues with the loan and
return to the master servicer.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 65% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to
95% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.06X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.93X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 37.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Santa Anita Mall Loan ($215 million --
14.9% of the pool), which is secured by 956,343 square feet (SF) of
net rentable area contained within a 1,472,167 SF super-regional
mall located in Arcadia, California.  The mall is located
approximately 19 miles northeast of Los Angeles, California.  The
property was built in 1974, and most recently renovated in 2009.
The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Macy's, and Nordstrom, which
are not part of the collateral.  The mall also contains a
borrower-owned 16-screen AMC theater, which serves as a significant
draw. As of September 2015, the property was 91% leased compared to
97% at securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and
1.13X, respectively, the same as last review.

The second largest loan is the Valencia Town Center Loan ($195
million -- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by 657,837 SF of
net rentable area contained within a 1,106,145 SF super-regional
mall located in Valencia, CA.  The property is located
approximately 34 miles northwest of Los Angeles, California.  The
property was built in 1992, expanded in 1998, and recently
renovated and further expanded in 2010 to include an outdoor
component.  The mall is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney, and Sears.
All anchor units are owned by their respective tenants and are not
included as collateral for the loan.  In addition, the property
contains a 12-screen Edwards Theaters.  As of September 2015, the
property was 94% leased compared to 93% at last reivew.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.09X, respectively, the same as
last review.

The third largest loan is the Starwood Office Portfolio Loan
($129.7 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by six office
buildings that total 1,287,408 SF and are located across four
states.  The properties are occupied by 26 tenants, eight of which
are assigned investment grade ratings and represent approximately
88% of the net rentable area.  As of September 2014, the portfolio
was 97% leased, compared to 99% at prior review.  The Lash Group,
currently leasing 92% of the net rentable area in 2000 Park Lane,
is planning to vacate at the end of their lease in April 2016.
Moody's analysis incorporated stressed cashflows to account for the
current tenant paying higher than market rents.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.98X, respectively, the same as last
review.



WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Fitch Raises Class D Certs Rating to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 11 classes of Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, 2005-C22 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade is the result of increasing credit enhancement from
continued paydown and further certainty regarding losses on the
specially serviced loans.  Since the last rating action, 122 loans
paid in full including six specially serviced loans with better
than expected recoveries.  There are seven loans remaining, of
which six (65%) are in Special Servicing and one (35%) is on the
Servicer's Watch List.

Expected losses on the original pool balance total 9.7%, including
$228 million (9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses
to date.  As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 97.2% to $70
million from $2.53 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes E through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is One Riverfront Plaza
(23%), an office building totaling 130,726 sf, located in
Westbrook, ME.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
December due to a maturity default.  The borrower has been unable
to refinance due to the single tenant vacating in January.  The
borrower is currently negotiating with a new tenant to occupy the
entire building.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is Palmer Town
Center (36%), a 153,400 sf retail property (anchored by Home Depot)
located in Easton, PA.  The collateral excludes the Home Depot
97,895 sf space.  The loan reached its anticipated repayment date
(ARD) in October 2015.  Per the Master Servicer, they are waiting
on a response regarding the borrower's payoff intent.  The loan's
final maturity date is in 2020.  The loan's annualized September
2015 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.48x and occupancy was
90% as of January 2016.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Class E will remain at 'Csf' due to expected losses.  Once losses
are incurred the class will be downgraded to 'D.' Classes F through
P have realized losses and will remain at 'D'.  Class D is likely
to remain at 'CCCsf' as further upgrades are limited by the
concentrated nature of the pool and adverse selection.
Additionally, the majority of the remaining paydown relies on
dispositions of specially serviced loans.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class and revised REs as indicated:

   -- $22.4 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf', RE 100%.

Fitch affirms these classes and revised REs as indicated:

   -- $47.5 million class E at 'Csf', RE 65%;
   -- $647 thousand class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-PB, A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-J, B and C
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class IO certificates.



WAMU COMMERCIAL 2006-SL1: Fitch Raises Class C Certs Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed 10 classes of WaMu
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1, small balance
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades follow the continued deleveraging of the pool, as 26
loans have repaid from the trust since the last rating action.
These payoffs have contributed $37.5 million in unscheduled
principal to the paydown of the class A-1A certificate.  Given the
increased credit enhancement and better than expected recoveries on
specially serviced loans, Fitch has upgraded the class C and D
certificates to reflect Fitch's current loss expectations.

Fitch modeled losses of 8.2% of the remaining pool, compared to
11.8% at the last rating action.  Driving the reduction in
estimated losses is the liquidation of what were previously the two
largest loans in special servicing.  Both loans had been major
contributors to Fitch's projected loss at the last review and
liquidated from the trust with higher than expected recoveries.
Current expected losses on the original pool balance total 7.3%,
including $24.6 million (4.8% of the original balance) in realized
losses to date.  There is one specially serviced asset remaining,
down from seven at the last rating action.

The pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 69.7%
since issuance.  No loans are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes E through N.

The pool comprises 174 small balance loans secured by commercial
properties.  Given this composition, the pool is considered diverse
in terms of loan count and size, with only 32.6% of the pool
balance represented in the largest 15 loans.  The pool is, however
concentrated in terms of geography and property type with 69.7% of
the pool represented by multifamily assets and 56.2% of the pool
located in California.

Twenty-eight loans (25.3% of the pool) are scheduled to mature in
2016, after which there are no scheduled maturities for at least
ten years.  The majority of the outstanding loans are scheduled to
come due in 2036 (73.7% of the pool), though not all of these loans
are fully amortizing.  Fitch expects the bulk of collateral
reduction in the next several years will be a result of prepayments
as the scheduled principal collected monthly is minimal.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-1A, B and C are Stable.  While
amortization has increased the credit support to these bonds,
future scheduled paydown beyond 2016 will be limited and many of
the pooled loans do not remit regular financial reports.  Upgrades
to these classes may be possible if financial updates are provided
and indicate improved collateral performance or if loans continue
to prepay and tighten the pool's maturity profile.  Downgrades to
the distressed classes are possible as losses are realized or if
additional defaults occur.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these classes:

   -- $14.7 million class C to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
      assigned;
   -- $10.2 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%;

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $106.6 million class A-1A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.2 million class B at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 50%;
   -- $3.8 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $2.2 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A certificate has been paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class N certificate.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificate.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C19: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on X-B Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-C19 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. PEX, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the exchangeable PEX class was affirmed based the
weighted average rating factor of its exchangable classes.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% of the
current balance, compared to 4.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.08 billion
from $1.10 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 99 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 38.9%
of the pool. Eight loans, constituting 3.2% of the pool, are New
York City multifamily cooperative loans which have received
investment-grade quality treatment.

Seven loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have not been any loans that have liquidated from the pool
nor are there any loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full year 2015 operating results for 13% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 107%, unchanged since
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1 %.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.03X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Renaissance Chicago Downtown Loan ($90 million
-- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 27-story, 553-room
hotel in Chicago's Loop. Amenities include a conference center,
fitness center, and indoor swimming pool. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 116% and 1.05X, respectively, unchanged since the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Lifetime Fitness Portfolio Loan
($75.2 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five fitness centers located in Arizona, Virginia,
Illinois, and Texas. All five properties are leased, triple-net, to
Lifetime Fitness, Inc. the third largest operator of fitness
centers in the United States. The loan benefits from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.31X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 1.27X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Nordic Cold Storage Portfolio Loan
($53.9 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of eight cross-collateralized, cross-defaulted cold
storage warehouse and distribution facilities located in Alabama,
Georgia, North Carolina, and Mississippi. The properties are
occupied under a triple-net master lease with a November 2033
expiration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.97X,
respectively, unchanged from the last review.


[*] Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 216 U.S. RMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings maintains 13 classes from 6 GSE credit-risk transfer
(CRT) transactions issued between 2014 and 2015 on Rating Watch
Positive. Fitch has also maintained 203 classes from 95 prime jumbo
RMBS transactions issued before 2009 on Rating Watch Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The prime jumbo classes initially were placed on Rating Watch
Negative in September 2015, pending the annual review of Fitch's
U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model, while the GSE CRT classes were placed on
Rating Watch Positive in October 2015. The U.S. RMBS Loan Loss
Model recently completed an exposure draft period, and is expected
to be finalized in the coming weeks. Classes on rating watch will
be analysed with the updated model for potential rating and
recovery estimate implications.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

A list of the ratings is available at http://is.gd/HnX7hT



[*] Moody's Hikes $1.1BB Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 26 tranches
from 11 deals issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE10

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE1

Cl. II-3A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CW2

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH3,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ3

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-1

Cl. M4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.



[*] Moody's Hikes $630MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2006-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 7 tranches,
from 5 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2

Cl. A2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF9

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT5

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-W1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-EQ1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.



[*] Moody's Hikes $704MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's upgrades $704 Million of Subprime RMBS issued from 2005 to
2007

Moody's Investors Service, on March 10, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of sixteen tranches backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by
miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
AEG 2006-HE1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-8

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement available to the
bonds.The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on $11.8MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2003
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
from two transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC4

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 16, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 16, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ca (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 16, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-4

  Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 18, 2013,
   Downgraded to A1 (sf)
  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 3,
   2012, Downgraded to A1 (sf)
  Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed
   at A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)
  Cl. AV-1B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2012,
   Downgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 15, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $64MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 11, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 14 tranches from 10 transactions, backed by Subprime loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2011,
   Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC1

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 13, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE2

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE3

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 21, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Confirmed at Ca (sf)
  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-D

  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-B

  Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 7, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 6, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-C

  Cl. BV-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 9, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Series
2002-HE4

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 24, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2002-4

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2014,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $168.5MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 8, 2016, downgraded the ratings
of 10 tranches from two transactions and upgraded the ratings of 16
tranches from six transactions backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, and
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-11

  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 7, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-2

  Cl. CB-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2004-1 Trust

  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 13, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP3

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 31, 2014,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM1

  Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. IIIA-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWMBS, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-6CB

  Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 28, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-5 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-5

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at B1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at B2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2005-QA1 Trust

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug. 16, 2013,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The ratings upgraded are due to the stronger
performance of the underlying collateral, the credit enhancement
available to the bonds, and realignment.  The ratings downgraded
are due to the weaker performance of the underlying collateral and
the depletion of credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
January 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $466.3MM of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eighteen
tranches backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-4

  Cl. M3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Basic Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2007-1

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)
  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2013,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec. 28, 2010,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ4

   Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)
  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 6, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2006-RS5 Trust

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 9, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-CTX1

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 17, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 17, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in February 2016 from 5.5% in
February 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Lowers Ratings on 54 Classes From 37 RMBS Deals to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on March 14, 2016, lowered its
ratings on 54 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 37
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2001 and 2010 to 'D (sf)', and removed one of them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also placed two
additional ratings from one transaction on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the principal
write-downs' impact on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  All of the classes whose ratings were lowered
to 'D (sf)' were rated either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' before the
rating actions, except for four classes that were rated 'BBB (sf)'
or
'B (sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating on class I-B-1 from BellaVista Mortgage
Trust 2004-1 and removed it from from CreditWatch negative.  This
class was placed on CreditWatch on Jan. 20, 2016, because S&P
lacked the information necessary to apply its loan modification
criteria.

As a result of the write-down on class B2 from Structured Asset
Securities Corp.'s series 2002-6, whose rating was lowered to 'D
(sf)' from 'B (sf)', S&P placed its ratings on classes B1 and AP
from this transaction on CreditWatch negative while S&P determines
whether the recent performance of the loans backing this
transaction has affected the ratings on these classes.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' on classes
X-A7, X-A8, and X-A11 from BCAP LLC 2010-RR1 Trust, a resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.
These classes experienced write-downs during the November 2015
distribution period, the same period in which the Group X
certificates from this transaction were collapsed.  S&P
subsequently withdrew its ratings on these classes to reflect their
zero principal balance.

The 54 defaulted classes consist of:

   -- 15 from prime jumbo transactions (27.78%);
   -- 13 from Alternative-A transactions (24.07%);
   -- Eight from subprime transactions (14.81);
   -- Eight from negative amortization transactions;
   -- Seven from re-REMIC transactions;
   -- Two from scratch and dent transactions; and
   -- One from a Federal Housing Administration/Veterans
      Administration transaction.

All of the transactions in this review receive credit enhancement
from a combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable).

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and S&P will further adjust its
ratings as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

A list of the affected ratings is available at:

              http://is.gd/K9Tf1h



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
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                   *** End of Transmission ***