TCR_Public/160228.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 28, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 59

                            Headlines

AIR CANADA 2015-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Debt
AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class D Notes
ATHERTON BAPTIST: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2010A Bonds to 'BB-'
BABSON CLO 2016-I: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
BAMLL COMMERCIAL: S&P Rates $19.4-Mil. Class F Certs 'B-sf'

BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Fitch Corrects Feb. 18 Ratings Release
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CITIGROUP 2016-GC36: Fitch Amends Feb. 17 Ratings Release
COBALT CMBS 2007-C3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to Dsf

COMM MORTGAGE 2016-DC2: Fitch Rates Class X-D Debt 'BB-sf'
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2016-C01: Moody’s Rates Class 1M-2 Debt 'Ba3'
FIRST INVESTORS 2016-1: S&P Rates $9.7MM Class E Notes 'BB'
FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. M Certs
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D Notes

FNT MORTGAGE 2001-4: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Tranches to BB+
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2000-C3: Fitch Raises Rating on Class J Notes to B
GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba1
GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC28: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Debt

GSAA HOME 2005-10: Moody's Cuts Class M-2 Debt Rating to B1(sf)
HIGHLAND PARK I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
JP MORGAN 2002-C1: Moody's Hikes Class H Debt Rating to 'B1(sf)'
JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC19: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Caa1
JP MORGAN 2016-ATRM: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Debt

JP MORGAN 2016-ATRM: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Certificates
KODIAK CDO I: Moody's Hilkes Class A-1 Debt Rating to Ba1(sf)
LATITUDE CLO II: S&P Hikes Rating on Class D Debt to B-
LEGACY BENEFITS 2004-1: Moody's Cuts Class B Debt Rating to Ba2
LENDMARK FUNDING 2016-A: Fitch to Class C Debt 'Bsf(exp)'

MADISON PARK VI: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Debt
MADISON PARK XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Ca
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-LC1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Lowers Cl. D Debt Rating to 'Csf'
MORGAN STANLEY 1998-HF2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 2 Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ5: Fitch Hikes Class F Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Ratings on 18 Classes Still on Watch Pos

NATIONS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba2'
NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. M2 Certs
NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: Moody’s Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: S&P Assigns BB Prelim Rating on "N" Notes
NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Moody's Hikes Cl. I-MM Debt Rating From 'Ba2'

PEOPLE'S CHOICE 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. M2 Debt Rating to Ba2
PREFERRED TERM XXV: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B-1 Notes to Ba2
PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody’s Affirms Ba2 on Cl. K Debt
PUTNAM CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
SALOMON BROTHERS 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. L Certs

SASCO 2005-AR1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M2 Debt to Caa3
SILVER SPRING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
SILVERMORE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. C Notes to Ba1
TABERNA PREFERRED V: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B3
TABERNA PREFERRED VI: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-1A Debt Rating to B2

UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: S&P Affirms B- Ratings on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2005-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba1
WIRELESS CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Class 2013-1B Debt Rating
[*] Moody's Cuts Ratings on $127.8MM FHA/VA RMBS Issued 1999-2005

[*] Moody's Hikes $356.7MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Raises $328.5MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] Moody's Raises $468MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $496.6MM Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $72.8MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued 2002-2003

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $77MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 14 Classes From 8 CDO Deals
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 58 Classes from 36 U.S. RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 U.S. RMBS Re-REMIC
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 U.S. Subprime RMBS

[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 U.S. RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 7 US RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 8 U.S. RMBS Transactions

                            *********

AIR CANADA 2015-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for the Air Canada 2015-1
and 2013-1 series of enhanced equipment trust certificates as
follows:

-- 2015-1 class A certificates due 2027 at 'A';
-- 2015-1 class B certificates due 2023 at 'BBB-';
-- 2015-1 class C certificates due 2020 at 'BB'.

-- 2013-1 class A certificates due 2025 at 'A';
-- 2013-1 class B certificates due 2021 at 'BBB-';
-- 2013-1 class C certificates due 2018 at 'BB'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Senior tranche ratings are primarily driven by a top-down analysis
which evaluates the level of overcollateralization maintained in
these transactions through a series of stress tests. Both the Air
Canada 2013-1 and 2015-1 class A certificates remain sufficiently
overcollateralized to pass Fitch's 'A' level stress tests when
incorporating the latest available aircraft appraisal data. This
suggests that senior tranche debt holders would be expected to
achieve full principal recovery prior to the expiration of the
transaction's liquidity facility even in a harsh downturn scenario.


Loan to value ratios in the 2013-1 transaction, which is secured by
five 777-300ERs, have weakened marginally over the past year due to
heavier than expected value depreciation of that aircraft. 777
values are experiencing some softness for various reasons including
the introduction of Airbus' A350 family, the pending introduction
of the 777x (scheduled for the 2020 timeframe), and in anticipation
of a number of 777-300ERs scheduled to come off of their initial
leases over the next several years. Despite recent valuation
softness, the transaction remains heavily overcollateralized,
producing a maximum stressed LTV of 81.6% in Fitch's 'A' level
stress test.

There have been no material changes to asset values or
loan-to-value ratios for the 2015-1 transaction since it was
launched less than one year ago. The transaction is backed by one
787-8 and 8 787-9s, which continue to be highly sought after
aircraft. Fitch's 'A' level stress scenario produces a maximum LTV
of 82.4% through the life of the transaction.

Subordinated tranche ratings are notched up from the underlying
airline rating based on three primary factors: 1) the likelihood
that the collateral would be affirmed in a potential bankruptcy
(0-3 notches), 2) the presence of a liquidity facility (1 notch)
and 3) recovery prospects. Fitch continues to view both of these
transactions as having a high likelihood of affirmation (+3
notches) given the importance of the 777-300ER and the 787 family
to Air Canada's fleet renewal efforts and international expansion
strategy. Air Canada's IDR remains 'B+/Rating Outlook Stable'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for both
transactions include:

-- Asset values in-line with those provided by Fitch's
    independent aircraft appraiser;
-- Asset value depreciation for collateral aircraft at roughly
    5%/year;
-- Asset value stresses in line with those detailed in Fitch's
    EETC criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A tranche ratings are primarily driven by the value of the
underlying collateral. The ratings for the 2013-1 class A
certificates could be considered for a negative action if market
values for the 777-300ER were to experience an unexpected and
severe decline. Similarly, the 2015-1 class A certificates could be
considered for a negative action if 787 values were to experience
an unexpected and severe decline. A positive rating action is not
expected at this time.

The B and C tranche ratings are linked to the underlying airline
Issuer Default Rating (IDR). Therefore if Air Canada's IDR were to
be downgraded, the B and C tranches would likely be downgraded in
tandem. However, if Fitch were to upgrade the IDR to 'BB-', the
subordinated tranches may not be upgraded as the agency's EETC
criteria provides for some ratings compression when airline IDRs
are in the 'BB' category.


AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.:

  $25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due Dec. 20, 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
   May 4, 2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $20,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due Dec. 20, 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   May 4, 2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $320,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   Dec. 20, 2020, (current outstanding balance of $83,028,497),
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $24,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   Dec 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $19,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   Dec. 20, 2020, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2015,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since May 2015.  The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 43% or $62 million since
then.  Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for the Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D notes are at 163.09%, 132.38%, 114.86%
and 102.18%, respectively, versus May 2015 levels of 138.76%,
120.95%, 109.56% and 100.66%, respectively.  Moody's notes that
based on the trustee report in January 2016, the transaction failed
to satisfy the Class D OC test requirement which is set at 101.9%,
due in part to a $2.2 million OC ratio numerator "haircut"
calculated in carrying holdings of certain low-rated collateral
exceeding 7.5% of the collateral portfolio par at their market
values.  On the payment date in January 2016, about $1.2 million of
excess interest proceeds was diverted to pay down Class A-1 notes
due to this Class D OC test failure.

Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the portfolio has
deteriorated since the May 2015.  Based on Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2678 compared to 2494
in May 2015.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with weak liquidity:
     The presence of assets with the worst Moody's speculative
     grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to
     additional risks if these assets default.  The historical
     default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-4 ratings
     than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the deal's
     material exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute
     around $6.7 million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2142)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 2
Class D: 2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3214)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $175.7 million, defaulted par
of $3.0 million, a weighted average default probability of 13.70%
(implying a WARF of 2678), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.75%, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted average
spread of 3.13% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


ATHERTON BAPTIST: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2010A Bonds to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+' approximately $29
million of series 2010A bonds issued by the city of Alhambra, CA on
behalf of Atherton Baptist Homes (Atherton).

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

SECURITY
The bonds are secured by gross revenue pledge, mortgage, and debt
service reserve fund.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PROGRESS BEING MADE: The rating upgrade to 'BB-' from 'B+' reflects
Atherton's solid fiscal 2015 performance and progress since
material organizational changes were made throughout 2014 to
address Atherton's historically weak governance and management
practices. These changes included a new CEO, a new Chairman of the
board, and restated bylaws to broaden the breadth and diversity of
board members. In addition, there is new oversight with a combined
sales and marketing director effective November 2015, who is
implementing a targeted marketing approach.

FISCAL 2015 PERFORMANCE LED BY IMPROVED OCCUPANCY: Atherton
exceeded its fiscal 2015 budget and is currently compliant with all
bond covenants. The improved performance was driven by increased
occupancy in its Classic independent living units (ILU), which had
a budgeted occupancy of 83.5% for fiscal 2015 and actual average
occupancy was 84.4%. Atherton has shown incremental progress
quarter over quarter from a low of 77.6% in the first quarter of
2014. Atherton's performance suffered after the slow fill of its 50
ILU expansion (Courtyard) that opened in June 2011. These units
reached 90% occupancy by third quarter 2013 and have since
maintained high occupancy (97% for fiscal 2015). The slow fill
diverted attention from sales and marketing of the older part of
the campus (Classic units - 170 ILUs) and with increased capital
investment in these units and focused sales and marketing, the
occupancy in the Classic ILUs is 89.4% as February 2016.

DEPENDENCE ON ENTRANCE FEES: Although profitability has improved
with a positive net operating margin in fiscal 2015, there is a
high dependence on entrance fees for debt service coverage, which
is atypical for a Type C community. Debt service coverage by
revenue only is only 0.3x in fiscal 2015 compared to the Type C
median ratio of 1.4x. However, including entrance fees, debt
service coverage is a solid at 2x.

LIGHT LIQUIDITY: Liquidity is light but in line with below
investment grade credits with 199 days cash on hand (DCOH) and
34.1% cash to debt at Dec. 31, 2015. Atherton has historically
missed its 180 DCOH covenant, but was met as of the Dec. 31, 2015
test date. Atherton's unrestricted cash and investments have been
volatile since initial entrance fee receipts (used to pay down
temporary debt from series 2010B) were part of unrestricted cash
and investments. Atherton paid off the series 2010B bonds in full
in 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

MAINTAINING IMRPOVEMENT: Atherton's fiscal 2016 budget and
five-year projections indicate continued steady improvement in ILU
occupancy and financial performance, which Fitch believes is
achievable and would result in further upward rating movement.
However, there are longer-term capital plans (after 2020), which
Fitch will assess as details and plans are available.

CREDIT PROFILE
Atherton Baptist Homes is a Type C continuing care retirement
community (CCRC) located in Alhambra, CA with 170 Classic ILUs, 50
Courtyard ILUs, 38 assisted living units (ALU), and 99 skilled
nursing facility (SNF) beds. Total revenue in fiscal 2015 (Dec. 31
year end; unaudited) was $18.6 million.

Organizational Changes
A management consultant report was issued in March 2014 due to the
violation of the occupancy requirement in the bond documents and
the cumulative cash used for operations financial covenant (this
covenant no longer tested as of fiscal 2015). There were several
recommendations for improvements in the areas of governance and
management practices as well as in marketing and sales strategies.
These changes were made throughout 2014 and have had a positive
impact on fiscal 2015 performance and sustaining the continued
improvement and progress will be key to reaching financial
stability.

Management has implemented tools to track various measures
including unit vacancies, time to move in, ongoing renovations,
weekly sales report, and daily SNF payor mix. The management
consultant is still engaged at Atherton although bond covenant
compliance is being met and the consultant provides ongoing
feedback to the board and management.

Improved Occupancy and Capital Spending
The Courtyard project was part of Atherton's campus improvement
plan. The project added 50 ILUs to the existing campus at a total
cost of $33.4 million and the Courtyard opened on time and within
budget in June 2011. Atherton issued $29.3 million fixed rate
series 2010A bonds and $14.64 million of series 2010B bonds to fund
the project. The Courtyard fill up was much slower than anticipated
but is now at 95% as of February 2016. The projections include the
Courtyard units maintaining 96% occupancy.

There has been significant progress in the occupancy of its Classic
units (170 units), which has been driven by much needed capital
investment to improve the marketability as well as focused sales
and marketing efforts. Atherton's capital budget includes updating
each unit upon turnover and also addressing deferred maintenance
needs. The organization is preparing a 30 year master facility
plan, which could include several large projects (after 2020), and
Fitch will assess the impact on the rating when details are
available.

Classic ILU occupancy has improved quarter over quarter from a low
of 77.6% in the first quarter of 2014 to 89.4% in the fourth
quarter 2015 and was 89.4% as of February 2016. Marketing
initiatives have been refined to a targeted approach versus broad
based, which will better utilize the marketing budget. Current
priorities are to update its website and have a better digital
marketing presence. The fiscal 2016 budget assumes 87.1% occupancy
in the Classic ILUs, and projections include steady improvement to
92.4% in 2020.

Positive Net Operating Margin
Although Fitch views Atherton's positive net operating margin in
fiscal 2015 favorably, there has been a structural imbalance of
cash operating expenses in excess of cash operating revenue due to
its history of poor management practices and weak board oversight,
which will likely take years to address. Operating ratio in 2015
was 109% down from 122% the prior year, however, the five year
projections still show an operating ratio over 100%. One of the
areas that was causing a significant issue was uncontrolled workers
compensation costs, which has been addressed and is now being
managed with seven open claims from a high of 26 in 2010.

Atherton's fiscal 2015 budget had a bottom line loss of $2.7
million and actual performance was negative $1.9 million. The
fiscal 2016 budget has a bottom line loss of $1.452 million.

Dependent on Entrance Fees
Atherton's poor profitability necessitates the dependence on net
entrance fees for debt service coverage. Net entrance fees in 2015
were $4.3 million compared to $3.3 million in 2014, $2.2 million in
2013, and $1.2 million in 2012. Atherton restructured its pricing
for the Courtyard units in 2016 and the predominant contract type
for the Courtyard is 90% refundable while the Classic units are
predominantly nonrefundable. The projections include net entrance
fees of $3.4 million in 2016, $3.6 million in 2017, $3.5 million in
2018, $3.7 million in 2019 and $3.7 million in 2020.

Debt service coverage was solid at 2x in 2015 compared to 1.3x in
2014 and 1.4x in 2013. With the projected net entrance fees, debt
service coverage is expected to be 1.9x in 2016, 1.9x in 2017, 2x
in 2018, 2.2x in 2019 and 2.3x in 2020 compared to the BBB category
median of 2x.

Building Liquidity
At Dec. 31, 2015, Atherton had $9.8 million of unrestricted cash
and investments which equated to 199 DCOH, a 3.8x cushion ratio and
34.1% cash to debt compared to Fitch's 'BBB' category medians of
400, 7.3x and 60%. With the projected improvement in occupancy and
cash flow with moderate capital spending ($1.4 million a year),
liquidity is projected to slowly build over the next five years
with 310 DCOH and 63.6% cash to debt in 2020. Atherton's investment
portfolio is fairly aggressive for its rating level with 57% of its
investments exposed to equities, which has been reduced but still
remains high.

Atherton maintains a defined benefit pension plan that is currently
underfunded, but the pension plan is not subject to ERISA
requirements. It is unlikely that pension contributions will be
made over the near term as there are other demands on liquidity
such as meeting its liquidity covenant and future capital needs.

Debt Profile
Total debt outstanding is approximately $29 million and is 100%
fixed rate. MADS is $2.56 million and accounted for 13.6% of total
revenue in 2015 compared to Fitch's 'BBB' category median of 12.4%.


Atherton is tested on the following bond covenants: 1.2x MADS
coverage tested quarterly on a rolling 12 month basis, 180 DCOH
tested every June 30 and Dec. 31, and maintaining 46 occupied
Courtyard ILUs (92%) and 140 Classic ILUs (82.4%) every quarter.
The liquidity covenant does not trigger an event of default as long
as there is a consultant call in. The only covenant that would
trigger an event of default is having less than 1x MADS coverage
for two consecutive years (based on audited fiscal year). As of
Dec. 31, 2015, Atherton is in compliance with all bond covenants.


BABSON CLO 2016-I: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of notes issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2016-I.

Moody's rating action is:

  $2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Term Notes due 2027,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Term Notes due 2027,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $32,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Term Notes due 2027,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $15,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Term Fixed Rate Notes due
   2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $26,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due
   2027, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $19,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes
   due 2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $5,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Term Fixed
   Rate Notes due 2027, Definitive Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Junior Term Notes due
   2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class
D-2 Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Babson 2016-I is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans.  At least 96% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as of
the closing date.

Babson Capital Management LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 55

  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.75%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -1
Class B-2 Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D-1 Notes: -1
Class D-2 Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class X Notes: 0
Class A Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D-1 Notes: -2
Class D-2 Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


BAMLL COMMERCIAL: S&P Rates $19.4-Mil. Class F Certs 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to BAMLL
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1's $166.0 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-SS1.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $166.0 million, 10-year fixed-rate,
interest-only mortgage loan secured by a first-priority mortgage on
the borrowers' fee-simple and leasehold interests in One Channel
Center (a 501,650 sq. ft. office building) and the adjacent Channel
Center Garage (a free-standing 965-stall parking garage), both
located in Boston. The One Channel Center collateral includes the
borrowers' leasehold and leased fee interests in both the
improvements and underlying land.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure. S&P determined that the loan has a beginning and ending
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 95.3% based on Standard & Poor's value
and the $166.0 million mortgage loan balance.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1

Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)        78,300,000
B           AA- (sf)        17,400,000
C           A- (sf)         13,100,000
D           BBB- (sf)       16,000,000
E           BB- (sf)        21,800,000
F           B- (sf)          19,400,000
X-A         AAA (sf)         78,300,000 (i)
X-B         A- (sf)          30,500,000 (i)

(i) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-A
     certificates will be equal to the principal amount of the
     class A certificates. The notional amount of the class X-B
     certificates will be equal to the principal amount of
     the class B and C certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Fitch Corrects Feb. 18 Ratings Release
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction of a release published on Feb.
18, 2016.  It corrects the rating of Class J provided in the
ratings list in the original release.

The corrected release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has upgraded five, downgraded one, and affirmed five
classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
(BSCMSI) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2004-PWR4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades to class E through class J are the result of increased
credit enhancement (CE) due to loan maturities and continued
amortization since the prior review as well as the defeasance of
the largest loan in the pool (75% of the current balance). The
affirmations for classes D, K and L are based on the stable
performance of non-specially serviced loans and sufficient CE. The
downgrade to the already distressed class M is the result of
modeled losses being realized and the resulting erosion of credit
enhancement.

Fitch modeled losses of 8.1% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 1.9%, including $13.4 million
(1.4% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated four loans (24.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes two specially serviced assets (11.2%). Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes N and Q.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.2% to $65.2 million from
$954.9 million at issuance.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a real estate owned
(REO) office complex (8.8%), containing three industrial flex
buildings totalling 117,798 square feet (sf). The complex, located
in Buffalo Grove, IL, transferred to the special servicer in May
2014 due to imminent default relating to its June 2014 maturity
date. The property has been REO since August 2015. Per the
servicer, only one of the three buildings is occupied. Siemens
(rated 'A'/Stable Outlook as of Jan. 19, 2016), the sole tenant,
recently agreed to renew their lease at the property till October
2021. The servicer plans to include the complex in an upcoming
auction.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced loan (2.4%) secured by an 18,064 sf unanchored retail
strip center located in Honolulu, HI. The loan transferred to the
special servicer in March 2014 due to imminent default relating to
its April 2014 maturity date. According to the servicer, the
borrower was unable to renegotiate the ground lease in place, which
resets at a much higher rate in August of this year. Occupancy
dropped to 82% as of year-end (YE) 2015 from 100% as of YE 2013.
The servicer has initiated the foreclosure process.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (7.7%) is secured by a 27,876 sf
single-tenant retail property located in Hastings-on-Hudson, NY.
The property was 100% occupied by The Food Emporium, which is fully
owned by The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P). A&P filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2015. Several media outlets have
confirmed that the store has closed down causing the store to "go
dark"; however, the loan remains current. The servicer reported net
operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) increased
to 1.69x as of YE 2014 from 1.56x as of YE 2013. The Food Emporium
lease extends to February 2024, five years after the loan's
maturity in June 2019. Fitch will continue to monitor performance
and leasing activity at the property.  

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes D through J remain Stable as credit
enhancement is high and downgrades are not expected. Additional
upgrades were not considered due to the pool concentration, high
percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the two
specially serviced loans, and the long dated maturities of the
remaining non-specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the
distressed classes K through M are possible should additional
losses be realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $9.5 million class E to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.5 million class F to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.4 million class G to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.7 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3.6 million class J to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $9.3 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.8 million class K at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $4.8 million class L at 'CCsf'; RE 85%.
-- $2.2 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch downgrades the following class as indicated:

-- $2.4 million class M to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B and C certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
BlueMountain Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes from the same
transaction.

Since S&P's effective date rating affirmations, the transaction has
consistently performed, and its weighted average recovery rates
have increased.  The deal is still in its reinvestment period until
July 2016, at which time S&P would expect the transaction to begin
amortizing.

The upgrades reflect the overall credit seasoning in the underlying
asset pool, as well as the increased credit support evidenced in
the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.

The O/C ratios have increased for each class from those in the
August 2012 trustee report, which S&P used in its effective date
affirmations.  In the January 2016 trustee report, which S&P used
for this review, the trustee reported these O/C ratios:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 136.46% compared with 135.83% in

      August 2012;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 122.17% compared with 121.61% in
      August 2012;

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 115.44% compared with 114.90% in
      August 2012; and

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 109.99% compared with 109.49% in
      August 2012.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes to reflect the
available credit support consistent with the current rating levels.


Although the class B, D, and E notes' cash flow results point to
higher rating levels, S&P took into account the transaction's
exposure to the energy and commodities sectors.  As of the January
2016 trustee report, the oil and gas sector made up 1.07% of the
portfolio, and nonferrous metals/minerals made up 1.89%.  In
addition, 'CCC' rated assets make up 4.19% of the underlying
portfolio.

S&P's transaction review included a cash flow analysis, based on
the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the aforementioned
trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with today's rating actions.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

            CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
                        Cash flow
       Previous         implied      Cash flow    Final
Class  rating           rating(i)  cushion(ii)    rating
A      AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)        16.30%    AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)          AAA (sf)         1.70%    AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)           AA- (sf)         1.98%    A+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)         BBB+ (sf)        8.04%    BBB+ (sf)
E      BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)         1.36%    BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
     coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned
     rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
     spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       A- (sf)       A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       B- (sf)       BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
                   Rating
Class       To              From
B           AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)
C           A+ (sf)         A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)       BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
BlueMountain CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
E           BB (sf)


CALLIDUS DEBT: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1D, A-1T, A-2, B, and C notes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO
Fund VI Ltd. and removed the ratings on the class A-1D, A-1T, and
A-2 ratings from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class D notes.  Callidus
Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in September 2007 and is
managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 13, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $96.92 million in paydowns to the class A-1
notes since S&P's January 2015 rating actions, which have reduced
the class's outstanding balance to 63.26% of its original balance.
The transaction exited its reinvestment period in October 2014.  In
addition, the transaction has benefited from the underlying
portfolio's improved credit quality.  As of the Jan. 13, 2016,
trustee report, the transaction held no defaulted assets and
$3.86 million 'CCC' rated assets.

As a result of the senior note paydowns, the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios increased significantly.  The trustee reported these
O/C ratios in the January 2016 monthly report compared to the
December 2014 trustee report, which S&P used for its January 2015
rating actions:

   -- The class A O/C ratio increased to 128.8% from 122.1% in
      December 2014;

   -- The class B O/C ratio increased to 120.0% from 115.7% in
      December 2014;

   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 111.1% from 108.9% in
      December 2014; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 106.2% from 105.0% in
      December 2014.

The affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

"Our transaction review included a cash flow analysis, based on the
portfolio and transaction as reflected in the aforementioned
trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with our
criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal
to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash flow
analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action," S&P said.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 2014 criteria "CDOs: Mapping
A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's
Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited number of
public ratings from other NRSRO's for purposes of assessing the
credit quality of assets not rated by Standard & Poor's.  The
criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of corporate
assets not rated by Standard &Poor's, while the interpretation
outlines treatment of securitized assets.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

               CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd.
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating     cushion(i)  rating
A-1D   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)   5.17%       AAA (sf)
A-1T   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)   5.17%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)   9.68%       AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)              AA (sf)    0.08%       AA (sf)
C      BBB (sf)             BBB+       2.88%       BBB+ (sf)
D      BB (sf)              BB-        0.77%       BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario          Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case            15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating    20.0                      7.5
Above base case            25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1D   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1T   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
B      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)
D      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)     BB (sf)    BB (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                  Spread         Recovery
       Cash flow  compression    compression
       implied    implied        implied      Final
Class  rating     rating         rating       rating     
A-1D   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-1T   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B      AA (sf)    AA- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)        CC (sf)      BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1D        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1T        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA (sf)     A+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd.
Class       Rating
D           BB (sf)


CITIGROUP 2016-GC36: Fitch Amends Feb. 17 Ratings Release
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings released an amended version of the press release it
originally published on Feb. 17, 2016, which omitted rating actions
for class X-B.

The amended version is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) 2016-GC36
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $42,973,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,079,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,518,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $225,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $415,175,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,409,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $861,171,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,017,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,136,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $182,060,000c class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,907,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,021,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,021,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,898,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,560,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
exchanged for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may
be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $15,894,000 class G or the $43,347,829
class H certificates. Fitch has withdrawn its rating for the
$75,136,000 interest-only class X-B as the certificates are no
longer being offered and will not be issued by the issuing entity.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 58 loans secured by 104
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.16 billion as of the cut-off date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company,
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Cantor Commercial Real
Estate Lending, L.P., and Starwood Mortgage Funding I LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.4%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans comprise 59.4% of the
pool, which is above the 2015 and 2014 averages of 49.3% and 50.5%,
respectively. Additionally, the LCI is 489, which is well above the
2015 and 2014 averages of 367 and 387, respectively.

Higher Leverage than Other Recent Deals: The pool demonstrates
leverage statistics that are worse than most recent Fitch-rated
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.08x is below both the 2015
average of 1.18x and the 2014 average of 1.19x. The pool's Fitch
LTV of 113.5% is above both the 2015 average of 109.3% and the 2014
average of 106.2%.

Above Average Collateral Quality: As a percentage of
Fitch-inspected properties, 46.6% of the pool received a property
quality grade of 'B+' or higher. Three loans (18.6% of the
inspected properties) received property quality grades of 'A-' or
higher. Eleven inspected properties (6.7%) received a property
quality grade of 'B-' or below.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down just 10.3%, which is less than the 2015 and
2014 averages of 11.7% and 12.05, respectively. Eight loans,
representing 29.5% of the pool, are full-term interest only, and 33
loans representing 42.3% of the pool are partial interest only. The
remainder of the pool consists of 17 balloon loans representing
28.2% of the pool, with loan terms of five to 10 years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 3.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which such information was provided). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-GC36 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the 58 mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


COBALT CMBS 2007-C3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to Dsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class, downgraded one class, and
affirmed 15 classes of Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust's
(COBALT) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2007-C3.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class A-M reflects the increase in credit
enhancement from continued pay down, coupled with increased
defeasance since Fitch's last review.  The downgrade to class G
reflects incurred losses on the subordinate tranche.  Fitch modeled
losses of 14.1% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 15.0%, including $106.4 million (5.3%
of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 30 loans (43.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes four specially serviced assets (4.7%).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 30.8% to $1.4 billion from
$2.02 billion at issuance.  Eight loans (18.1%) are fully defeased,
including the $145 million Charles River Plaza North loan (10.4% of
the pool).  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H
through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Irvine EOP San
Diego Portfolio loan (9.8% of the pool), the second largest loan in
the pool.  The interest only (IO) loan is collateralized by seven
properties consisting of six class A and B office buildings and one
single-tenant restaurant all located in San Diego, CA.  The
aggregate square footage for the portfolio is 380,954 square feet
(sf).  Per the January 2016 rent rolls the portfolio is 90%
occupied, an improvement from June 2010, which reported at 69%.
Three of the properties are 100% leased; the restaurant (2.3%) is
currently vacant.

Despite occupancy improvements, property performance remains below
underwritten levels with the net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) reporting at 0.90x for three month
year to date (YTD) September 2015, 0.81x for year-end (YE) June
2014, and 0.59x for YE 2013.  Leases for approximately 30% of the
collateral's net rentable area (NRA) are scheduled to expire by
year end 2016, with an additional 21% of the NRA to expire by
December 2017.  The loan remains current and is with the master
servicer.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Arbors at
Broadlands loan (3.6%), the fifth largest loan in the pool.  The IO
loan is secured by a 240-unit multifamily property located in
Ashburn, VA (approximately eight miles north-west of the Dulles
Airport).  The property has never met its underwritten rent
projections and performance has remained low since securitization.
The September 2015 rent roll reported occupancy at 96%, compared to
75% at issuance.

Despite high occupancy NOI DSCR remains low, at 0.99x and 1.0x for
YTD September 2015 and YE December 2014, respectively.  Per Reis'
fourth-quarter 2015 report, overall vacancy was at 4.2% for the
Suburban VA, Loundon County Submarket, with asking rents of $1,655
per month, compared to average in-place rents of $1,699 per month
at the subject property.  The loan has remained current since
issuance and is with the master servicer.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Sheraton
Suites - Alexandria, VA loan (3.9%), the fourth largest loan in the
pool.  The loan is secured by a 247-key full-service hotel located
in the Old Town section of Alexandria, VA, just outside of
Washington, D.C..  Performance has shown gradual signs of
improvement since 2013, after exhibiting declining occupancy and
room revenue's since 2011.  The trailing twelve month (TTM) ended
December 2015 reported occupancy of 77.3%, ADR of $149.31, and
RevPAR of $115.48, compared with 73.6%, $144.73, and $106.45,
respectively, at YE December 2014.  Per the December 2015 Smith
Travel Research Report (STR), the property is outperforming in
occupancy and underperforming for ADR RevPAR the competitive set
which reports TTM occupancy at 75.1%, ADR at $166.21, and RevPAR at
$124.74.  The loan, which has been amortizing since July 2012,
reported an NOI DSCR of 1.13x for YE 2015 and 1.0x for YE 2014. The
loan remains current and is with the master servicer.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook on classes A-4, A-1A, and A-M are expected to remain
Stable as the classes benefit from increasing credit enhancement
and continued delevering of the transaction through amortization
and repayment of maturing loans.  Fitch had applied additional
stresses to maturing loans when considering the upgrade to account
for refinance risk.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded these classes as indicated:

   -- $201.7 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

   -- $12.1 million class G to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $662.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $234.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $153.8 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 70%;
   -- $40.3 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $20.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $25.2 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $20.2 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $25.2 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- Class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-PB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO certificates.


COMM MORTGAGE 2016-DC2: Fitch Rates Class X-D Debt 'BB-sf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM Mortgage Trust 2016-DC2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $35,639,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,483,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,740,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,282,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $283,192,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $614,723,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,387,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,310,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,325,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82,635,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,326,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,178,000ab class X-D 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,108,000ab class X-E 'NR';
-- $29,225,159ab class X-F 'NR';
-- $42,326,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,100,000a class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,078,000a class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,108,000a class G 'NR';
-- $29,225,159a class H 'NR'.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Feb. 17, 2016. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$14,108,000ab interest-only class X-E, $29,225,159ab interest-only
class X-F, $14,108,000a class G or the $29,225,159a class H.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 64 loans secured by 91
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$806,195,160 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by German American Capital Corporation, KeyBank National
Association, and Jefferies LoanCore LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.6% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
81.5% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12x is lower
than the 2015 average of 1.18x and in line with the year-to-date
(YTD) 2016 average of 1.12x, while the pool's Fitch loan-to-value
(LTV) of 110.6% is higher than the 2015 average of 109.3% and in
line with YTD 2016 average of 110.7%.

Amortization: The pool has four loans (14.9%) with full-term
interest-only structures, which is below the YTD 2016 and 2015
averages of 33.4% and 23.3%, respectively. Partial interest-only
loans represent 54.6% of the pool or 23 loans, while 37 loans
(30.5%) are amortizing balloon loans with terms of five to 10
years. The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.8% of the initial
pool balance prior to maturity, more than the respective YTD 2016
and 2015 averages of 9.3% and 11.7%.

Property Type Concentration: Retail represents the largest property
type concentration (31.2%), which is higher than both the YTD 2016
and the 2015 averages of 23.7% and 26.7%, respectively. Loans
secured by hotel properties comprise 13.6% of the pool, below both
the YTD 2016 and the 2015 averages of 16.1% and 17.0%,
respectively. Loans secured by manufactured housing community
properties comprise 10.1% of the pool and it is significantly above
both the YTD 2016 and the 2015 averages of 1.9% and 2.3%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.3% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM
2016-DC2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG LLP. The third-party due diligence information was provided on
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the 64 mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on its analysis.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2016-C01: Moody’s Rates Class 1M-2 Debt 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to twelve
classes of notes on Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2016-C01,
a securitization designed to provide credit protection to the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) against the
performance of two reference pools of mortgages totaling
approximately $945 million. All of the Notes in the transaction are
direct, unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae, and as such investors
are exposed to the credit risk of Fannie Mae (Aaa Stable).

The complete rating action is as follows:

$207.6 million of Class 1M-1 notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$333.9 million of Class 1M-2 notes, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class 1M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$135.4 million of Class 1M-2A exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$198.5 million of Class 1M-2B exchangeable notes, Assigned B2
(sf)

The Class 1M-2A note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$135.4 million of Class 1M-2F exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$135.4 million of Class 1M-2I exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$113.2 million of Class 2M-1 notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$195.4 million of Class 2M-2 notes, Assigned B1 (sf)

The Class 2M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$56.6 million of Class 2M-2A exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$138.9 million of Class 2M-2B exchangeable notes, Assigned B2
(sf)

The Class 2M-2A note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$56.6 million of Class 2M-2F exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$56.6 million of Class 2M-2I exchangeable notes, Assigned Ba1
(sf)

CAS 2016-C01 is the tenth transaction in the Connecticut Avenue
Securities series issued by Fannie Mae. Unlike a typical RMBS
transaction, noteholders are not entitled to receive any cash from
the mortgage loans in the reference pool. Instead, the timing and
amount of principal and interest that Fannie Mae is obligated to
pay on the Notes is linked to the performance of the mortgage loans
in the reference pool.

CAS 2016-C01's note write-downs are determined by actual realized
losses and modification losses on the loans in the Group 1 and
Group 2 reference pools, and not tied to pre-set tiered severity
schedules. In addition, the interest amount paid to the notes can
be reduced by the amount of modification loss incurred on the
mortgage loans. CAS 2016-C01 is also the second transaction in the
CAS series to have a legal final maturity of 12.5 years, as
compared to 10 years in previous fixed severity CAS
securitizations.

Moody's rating on the transaction is based on both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. This included a quantitative evaluation of
the credit quality of the reference pool and the impact of the
structural mechanisms on credit enhancement. In addition, Moody's
made qualitative assessments of counterparty performance.

Moody's base-case expected loss for the Group 1 reference pool is
1.05% and is expected to reach 8.85% at a stress level consistent
with a Aaa rating. For the Group 2 reference pool, Moody's
base-case expected loss is 1.15% and is expected to reach 11.10% at
a stress level consistent with a Aaa rating.

The Notes

The 1M-1 and 2M-1 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an
interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The 1M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the 1M-2 notes can
exchange those notes for an 1M-2A exchangeable note and an 1M-2B
exchangeable note (together referred as the "Group 1 Exchangeable
Notes").

Additionally, the holders of the 1M-2A notes can exchange those
notes for the 1M-2F note and the 1M-2I note (together with the 1M-2
note referred as the "Group 1 RCR Notes"). The 1M-2I exchangeable
notes are fixed rate interest only notes that have a notional
balance that equals the 1M-2A note balance. The 1M-2F notes are
adjustable rate P&I notes that have a balance that equals the 1M-2A
note balance and an interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The 2M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the 2M-2 notes can
exchange those notes for the 2M-2A exchangeable note and the 2M-2B
exchangeable note (together referred as the "Group 2 Exchangeable
Notes").

Similarly, the holders of the 2M-2A notes can exchange those notes
for the 2M-2F note and the 2M-2I note (together with the 2M-2 note
referred as the "Group 2 RCR Notes"). The 2M-2I exchangeable notes
are fixed rate interest only notes that have a notional balance
that equals the 2M-2A note balance. The 2M-2F notes are adjustable
rate P&I notes that have a balance that equals the 2M-2A note
balance and an interest rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

Fannie Mae will only make principal payments on the notes based on
the scheduled and unscheduled principal payments that are actually
collected on the reference pool mortgages. Losses on the notes
occur as a result of credit events, and are determined by actual
realized and modification losses on loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to a pre-set loss severity schedule. Fannie Mae is
obligated to retire the Notes in August 2028 if balances remain
outstanding.

Credit events in CAS 2016-C01 occur when a short sale is settled,
when a seriously delinquent mortgage note is sold prior to
foreclosure, when the mortgaged property that secured the related
mortgage note is sold to a third party at a foreclosure sale, when
an REO disposition occurs, or when the related mortgage note is
charged-off. This differs from previous CAS fixed severity
securitizations, where credit events occur as early as when a
reference obligation is 180 or more days delinquent.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

As part of its analysis, Moody's considered historic Fannie Mae
performance and severity data, the eligibility criteria of loans in
the reference pool, and the high credit quality of the underlying
collateral. The reference pool consists of loans that Fannie Mae
acquired between January 1, 2015 and February 28, 2015, and have no
previous 30-day delinquencies. The loans in the reference pool are
to strong borrowers, as the weighted average credit scores of 749
(Group 1) and 744 (Group 2) indicate. The weighted average CLTV of
76.23% (Group 1) and 91.67% (Group 2) is higher than recent private
label prime jumbo deals, which typically have CLTVs in the high
60's range, but is similar to the weighted average CLTVs of other
CAS transactions.

Structural Considerations

Moody's took structural features such as the principal payment
waterfall of the notes, a 12.5-year bullet maturity, performance
triggers, as well as the allocation of realized losses and
modification losses into consideration in its cash flow analysis.
The final structure for the transaction reflects consistent credit
enhancement levels available to the notes per the term sheet
provided for the provisional ratings.

For modification losses, Moody's has taken into consideration the
level of rate modifications based on the projected defaults, the
weighted average coupons of the Group 1 (4.18%) and Group 2 (4.25%)
reference pools, and compared that with the available credit
enhancement on the notes, the coupon and the accrued interest
amount of the most junior bonds. The Class B and Class B-H
reference tranches for Group 1 and Group 2 each represent 1.00% of
the pool. The final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the
amount of interest available to absorb modification losses from the
reference pool.

The ratings are linked to Fannie Mae's rating. As an unsecured
general obligation of Fannie Mae, the rating on the notes will be
capped by the rating of Fannie Mae, which Moody's currently rates
Aaa (stable).

Collateral Analysis

The Group 1 reference pool consists of 80,606 loans that meet
specific eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first lien,
fixed rate, fully amortizing loans with an original term of 301-360
months and LTVs that range between 60% and 80% on one to four unit
properties. Overall, the reference pool is of prime quality. The
credit positive aspects of the pool include borrower, loan and
geographic diversification, and a high weighted average FICO of
749. There are no interest-only (IO) loans in the reference pool
and all of the loans are underwritten to full documentation
standards.

The Group 2 reference pool consists of 47,896 loans that meet
specific eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first lien,
fixed rate, fully amortizing loans with an original term of 301-360
months and LTVs that range between 80% and 97% on one to four unit
properties. Overall, the reference pool is of prime quality. The
credit positive aspects of the pool include borrower, loan and
geographic diversification, and a high weighted average FICO of
744. There are no interest-only (IO) loans in the reference pool
and all of the loans are underwritten to full documentation
standards.

While assessing the ratings on this transaction, Moody's did not
deviate from its published methodology. The severities for this
transaction were estimated using the data on Fannie Mae's actual
loss severities.

Reps and Warranties

Fannie Mae is not providing loan level reps and warranties (RWs)
for this transaction because the notes are a direct obligation of
Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae commands robust RWs from its
seller/servicers pertaining to all facets of the loan, including
but not limited to compliance with laws, compliance with all
underwriting guidelines, enforceability, good property condition
and appraisal procedures. To the extent that a lender repurchases a
loan or indemnifies Fannie Mae discovers as a result of an
confirmed underwriting eligibility defect in the reference pool,
prior months' credit events will be reversed. Moody's expected
credit event rate takes into consideration historic repurchase
rates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud. As an unsecured general obligation of Fannie Mae, the
ratings on the notes depend on the rating of Fannie Mae, which
Moody's currently rates Aaa.


FIRST INVESTORS 2016-1: S&P Rates $9.7MM Class E Notes 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to First
Investors Auto Owner Trust 2016-1's $198.80 million asset-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

--  The availability of approximately 35.6%, 31.0%, 24.6%,
     18.9%, and 15.4% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
     and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
     scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support
     levels provide approximately 3.65x, 3.15x, 2.45x, 1.85x, and
     1.50x coverage of S&P's 9.25%-9.75% expected cumulative net
     loss range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
     respectively.

  -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
     stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate
     for the ratings.

  -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
     scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would not
     drop by more than one rating category, and the ratings on
     the class C, D, and E notes would not drop by more than two
     rating categories within the first year. These potential
     rating movements are consistent with S&P's rating stability
     criteria.

  -- The collateral characteristics of the pool being securitized
     with direct loans accounting for approximately 26% of the
     initial cut-off pool. These loans historically have lower
     losses than the indirect-originated loans. Prefunding will
     also be used in this transaction in the amount of $30.0
     million, approximately 15% of the pool. The subsequent
     receivables, which amount to approximately 20%-30% of the
     2015 company's quarterly origination volume, are expected to
     be transferred into the trust within three months from the
     closing date.

First Investors Financial Services Inc.'s 26-year history of
originating and underwriting auto loans, 15-year history of
self-servicing auto loans, and 12 years as a third-party servicer,
as well as its track record of securitizing auto loans since 2000.

First Investors' 13 years of origination static pool data,
segmented by direct and indirect loans.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s experience as the committed back-up
servicer.

The transaction's sequential payment structure, which builds credit
enhancement based on a percentage of receivables as the pool
amortizes.

RATINGS LIST

First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2016-1
US$198.8 mil asset backed notes series 2016-1

Class      Rating                  Amount
                                   (mil. $)
-----      ------                 --------    
  A-1        AAA (sf)                114.0
  A-2        AAA (sf)                 35.2
  B          AA (sf)                  10.5
  C          A (sf)                   15.7
  D          BBB (sf)                 13.7
  E          BB (sf)                   9.7


FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. M Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of First Union National
Bank-Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust (FUNC)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the high percentage of defeased
collateral, low leverage of the remaining non-defeased loans and
the high percentage of fully amortizing loans (68%).  There are 25
loans remaining in the pool, 13 of which are defeased (52.2% of the
pool).  Fitch has designated one loan (5.5%) as a Fitch Loan of
Concern, which is secured by a dark Rite Aid in Claremont, NH. Rite
Aid vacated in 2008 and moved to a new location.  The loan,
however, has remained current.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.8% to $26.6 million from
$1.18 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes M through N.

The largest non-defeased loan in the pool (8.9%) is backed by a
250-unit multifamily development located in Charlotte, NC.  As of
September 2015, the property was 97% occupied and the debt service
coverage ratio was reported to be 1.41x.

Of the remaining 12 non-defeased loans, 11 are single-tenant
properties representing 38.9% of the pool, including five loans
with exposure to Rite Aid/Eckerd (23.9%; rated 'B', Rating Watch
Positive by Fitch), four with Walgreens (9.2%; not rated by Fitch),
one with CVS (2.8%), and one IHOP (3%).

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on the class K notes reflects Fitch's Outlook on
the rating of the U.S. government as the class is fully covered by
defeased collateral.  Upgrades to class L are limited due to the
concentration of loans in secondary and tertiary markets and the
reliance on collateral backed by single-tenant retail properties.
An upgrade to class L is possible if additional loans defease.
Alternatively, a downgrade is possible if performance of the
remaining collateral declines significantly.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $6 million class K at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.8 million class L at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.7 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 90%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificates.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Flagship
Credit Auto Trust 2016-1's $446.56 million auto receivables-backed
notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an ABS transaction backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 38.78%, 29.51%, 21.92%,
      and 18.15% credit support (including excess spread) for the
      class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively, based on stressed
      cash flow scenarios.  These credit support levels provide
      coverage of approximately 3.10x, 2.40x, 1.75x, and 1.40x
      S&P's 11.75%-12.25% expected cumulative net loss range for
      the class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate
      to the assigned ratings.

   -- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, S&P's ratings on the class A

      and B notes would remain within one rating category of its
      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings during the first year and
      S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes would remain within

      two rating categories of our 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB- (sf)'
      ratings, respectively, during the first year.  This is
      within the one-category rating tolerance for S&P's 'AA'- and

      two-category rating tolerance for its 'A'-, 'BBB'-, and
      'BB'-rated securities, as outlined in S&P's credit stability

      criteria.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The characteristics of the collateral pool being
      securitized.  The pool includes receivables originated on
      both the Flagship Credit Acceptance LLC (64%) and CarFinance

      Capital LLC (36%) platforms.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2016-1

Class   Rating      Type              Interest        Amount
                                      Rate          (mil. $)
A       AA (sf)     Senior            Fixed           327.17
B       A (sf)      Subordinate       Fixed            50.05
C       BBB (sf)    Subordinate       Fixed            45.46
D       BB- (sf)    Subordinate       Fixed            23.88



FNT MORTGAGE 2001-4: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Tranches to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected by raising its ratings
on five classes from two U.S. RMBS prime jumbo transactions issued
in 2001. In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on one class from one
of these transactions.

S&P said, "In early 2013, we identified an error in the application
of our tail risk criteria set forth in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance
Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," Feb. 18,
2015, and corrected 59 ratings (see "S&P Corrects 55 Ratings, Takes
35 Other Rating Actions On 14 U.S. RMBS Prime Jumbo Transactions
Issued In 1997-2008," April 3, 2013, and "Four Ratings Raised From
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust Series 2000-TBC3," Dec. 23, 2013).
We recently identified five additional ratings affected by this
error -- three on
FNT Mortgage Certificates 2001-4 and two on Sequoia Mortgage Trust
5."

FNT Mortgage Certificates 2001-4 and Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5 are
each backed by a small remaining pool of prime jumbo mortgage
loans. S&P believes pools with less than 100 loans remaining create
an increased risk of credit instability, because a liquidation and
subsequent loss on one loan, or a small number of loans, at the
tail end of a transaction's life may have a disproportionate impact
on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit enhancement. S&P refers
to this as tail risk.

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes in this review by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, as set
forth in its tail risk criteria. The rating actions reflect the
correct application of its tail risk criteria.

The rating on class B-2 from Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5 was not
affected by the error. Therefore, at this time, S&P is
simultaneously affirming its rating on this class at 'CC (sf)' due
to continuing insufficient credit support compared with its
projected losses.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
our view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions. Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are as follows:

An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable. "Although we view overall housing
fundamentals positively, we believe RMBS fundamentals still hinge
on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of modified loans,
the propensity of servicers to advance on delinquent loans, and
liquidation timelines," said S&P.

S&P said, "Under our baseline economic assumptions, we expect RMBS
collateral quality to improve. However, if the U.S. economy were to
become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside forecast,
we believe that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken."

S&P's downside scenario reflects the following key assumptions:

Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able to
   purchase property; and
While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in 2016,
  limited access to credit and pressure on home prices will
  largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these rates.

RATINGS RAISED

FNT Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series FNT 2001-4
Series 2001-4
                                  Rating
Class      CUSIP          To                   From
IV-A-1     22540WED8      BB+ (sf)             B+ (sf)
IV-A-3     22540WFT2      BB+ (sf)             B+ (sf)
V-A-1      22540WEF3      BB+ (sf)             B+ (sf)

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5
Series 5
                                  Rating
Class      CUSIP          To                   From
A          81743WAA9      A+ (sf)              B+ (sf)
B-1        81743WAC5      B (sf)               B- (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5
Series 5
Class      CUSIP          Rating
B-2        81743WAD3      CC (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2000-C3: Fitch Raises Rating on Class J Notes to B
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed five classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2000-C3.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class J reflects the imminent payoff of the only
loan remaining in the pool.  The loan is secured by a portfolio of
four grocery-anchored retail properties in Georgia and South
Carolina totaling 167,177 square feet.  Three of the properties are
anchored by Bi-Lo and the other is a dark Piggly Wiggly store. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in November 2014 due to
imminent default ahead of the loan's March 2016 maturity. According
to the special servicer, the four collateral properties are under
contract to sell as part of a larger portfolio of properties owned
by the loan sponsor.  It is expected that the sale proceeds will
pay off the loan in full before the maturity date. As of year-end
2014, the debt service coverage ratio was reported to be 1.10x and
economic occupancy was 97%.

The affirmation of classes K through O reflects incurred losses.
The pool has experienced $45.3 million (3.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  As of the February2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 98.9% to $14.5 million from $1.32 billion at issuance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting the class K through P
notes.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A further upgrade to class J is limited by the concentrated nature
of the pool.  No further rating changes are anticipated for the
remaining life of the deal.  A downgrade to class J could occur if
the remaining loan does not pay off as expected and experiences a
significant performance decline.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades this class and assigns the Rating Outlook as
indicated:

   -- $10.9 million class J notes to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
      Stable assigned.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $3.6 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 100%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, S-MAC-1, S-MAC-2, S-MAC-3
and S-MAC-4 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class P and S-AM certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Gramercy Real Estate CDO
2007-1 Ltd./LLC.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations at distressed levels reflect the high probability
of default of the classes.  Since the last rating action, the class
A-1 notes have received approximately $48.2 million in pay down
from asset sales, principal amortization, and interest diversion
due to the failure of the coverage tests.  Over the same period,
the CDO realized losses of approximately $91 million, including, as
expected, the full write down of a $39.9 million junior mezzanine
interest in Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village.  

The CDO is approximately $150 million under collateralized.  As of
the February 2016 trustee report, the CDO was comprised of 13.9%
commercial real estate loans and 86.1% rated securities.  The rated
securities have a weighted average Fitch derived rating of 'CCC+'.

The CDO continues to fail its overcollateralization tests,
resulting in the capitalization of interest for classes C through
J.  The transaction entered into an Event of Default (EOD) on March
12, 2012 due to the class A/B Par Value Ratio falling below 89%; to
date, the majority controlling class has waived the EOD until Jan.
27, 2017.  The majority of the controlling class, however, has
reserved the right to revoke or extend the waiver at any time.

In recent payment periods, interest proceeds have been insufficient
to pay both swap counterparty obligations and timely interest due
on the senior classes (A-1 through B).  As a result, a significant
portion of the interest due on these obligations has been paid
using principal proceeds.  Fitch is concerned about the asset
manager's ability to continue to manage the CDO such that principal
and interest proceeds are available to make timely interest
payments to these classes given the diminished amount of funds
available and significant swap payments, which are senior to these
classes within the waterfall.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 71.6% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the
'B' stress.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be 35.5%
reflecting low recovery expectations upon default of the CMBS
tranches and non-senior real estate loans.  This results in a
Fitch's base case loss of 46.2%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss is the expected
losses on the CMBS bond collateral.  The second largest contributor
to loss is related to a mezzanine loan (2.9% of the pool) backed by
a 1.2 million-sf office tower located in the garment district of
Midtown Manhattan.  As of the September 2015 rent roll, the
property was 85% leased.  However, the loan is over-leveraged, and
Fitch modeled a significant loss on this interest.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs', which applies stresses to property
cash flows and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) tests to project
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries for
the CRE loan portion of the collateral are based on stressed cash
flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The non-CRE loan
portion of the collateral was analyzed in the Portfolio Credit
Model according to the 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured
Finance CDOs'.  The transaction was not cash flow modeled given the
limited available interest received from the assets relative to the
interest rate swap payments due; unpredictable timing and
availability of principal proceeds; and distressed nature of the
ratings.

All ratings are based on a deterministic analysis that considers
Fitch's base case loss expectation for the pool and the current
percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring
in anticipated recoveries relative to each class' credit
enhancement as well as consideration for the likelihood of the CDO
to continue its ability to make timely payments on the senior
classes.  Ultimate recoveries to the senior class, however, should
be significant.

Gramercy 2007-1 is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation CREL CDO managed by CWCapital Investments LLC.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Classes A-1 through B are subject to further downgrade should
available interest and principal proceeds not be sufficient to meet
timely interest payment obligations.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $499.9 million class A-1 notes at 'CCsf/RE 65%';
   -- $121 million class A-2 notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $116.6 million class A-3 notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $29.5 million class B-FL notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $20 million class B-FX notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $22.6 million class C-FL notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $5.2 million class C-FX notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $5 million class D notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $5.8 million class E notes at 'Csf/RE 0%;
   -- $11.5 million class F notes at 'Csf/RE 0%';
   -- $3.7 million class G-FL notes at 'Csf/RE 0%';
   -- $3 million class G-FX notes at 'Csf/RE 0%';
   -- $2.6 million class H-FL notes at 'Csf/RE 0%';
   -- $7.8 million class H-FX notes at 'Csf/RE 0%';
   -- $20.9 million class J notes at 'Csf/RE 0%'.

Fitch does not rate classes K and preferred shares.


GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from two RMBS transactions backed by second lien and HELOC mortgage
loans.

Complete rating action is:

Issuer: Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HE4

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2005-11

  Cl. I-A-1b, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,

   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. I-G, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. I-M-1a, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 14, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up in credit
enhancement on the bonds and stable performance of the underlying
collateral.  The rating actions reflect recent performance of the
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.  Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions.


GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC28: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-GC28 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2015-GC28 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which remains in line with DBRS expectations. At
issuance, the collateral consisted of 74 fixed-rate loans secured
by 112 commercial properties. The transaction had a DBRS
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS
WA debt yield of 1.68 times (x) and 8.9%, respectively. As of the
February 2016 remittance, loans representing 89.4% of the current
pool balance are reporting 2015 partial-year financials (most loans
reporting a Q3 2015 figure). Based on the 2015 cash flows, the top
15 loans reported a WA amortizing DSCR of 2.20x, with a WA net cash
flow growth over the respective DBRS underwritten figures of 12.1%.
All loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate balance of $908.1
million, representing a collateral reduction of 0.6% since issuance
as a result of scheduled loan amortization.

As of the February 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and three loans are on the servicer’s watchlist,
representing 3.2% of the current pool balance. One loan in the top
15 and the largest watchlisted loan are detailed below.

The 411 Seventh Avenue loan (Prospectus ID#8, 2.4% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a 301,771 square foot (sf) Class B
office property in the Pittsburgh central business district (CBD).
The property was built in 1915 and renovated in 1993, and is
commonly known as the Chamber of Commerce building. According to
the September 2015 rent roll, the property was 77.2% occupied,
which is a decrease from the in-place occupancy of 83.3% at
issuance. The largest two tenants, Duquesne Lights and Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, occupy 40.3% of the net rentable area (NRA) and
15.0% of the NRA, respectively. Both tenants have leases scheduled
to expire beyond loan maturity in 2029/2030 and are
investment-grade tenants. The former third-largest tenant, Gateway
Health Plan, previously occupied 6.4% of the NRA and vacated the
property at its December 2015 lease expiration. Consequently,
occupancy appears to have further declined to 70.8%. In order to
improve occupancy, the borrower has changed companies for its
leasing services from Jones Lang LaSalle to Colliers and Colliers
has been actively marketing the property since December 2015. Three
prospective tenants have shown interest in the property; however,
no letters of intent or new leases have been executed to date.
According to CoStar, properties larger than 200,000 sf in the
Pittsburgh CBD submarket reported an average rental rate of $20.91
per square foot (psf), an average vacancy rate of 9.7% and an
average availability rate of 14.0%. The subject property is
underperforming in comparison with an average rental rate of $18.77
psf and vacancy rate of 29.2%; however, the average rental rate is
slightly above the issuance rental rate of $18.66 psf.

This loan was structured with an upfront tenant
improvements/leasing commission rollover reserve of $500,000 at
issuance with monthly deposits equivalent to $136,000 per year.
This amount translates to approximately $7.27 psf when considering
all vacant units, which may not be enough to successfully attract
enough new tenants to bring the occupancy rate to the submarket
average. At Q3 2015, the DSCR was 1.54x, an increase from the DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.48x; however, DBRS expects the net cash flow
to decline slightly given that occupancy is below the market and
underwritten levels.

The Schuyler Commons loan (Prospectus ID#15, 1.6% of the current
pool balance) is secured by a 144-unit multifamily apartment
complex located in Utica, New York. The property is a Class A,
age-restricted senior housing community that was constructed in
2008. This loan was placed on the watchlist because the Q2 2015
DSCR declined to 1.00x when occupancy was at 89.6%, a decrease from
the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.10x and the in-place occupancy of
93.1% at issuance. According to the September 2015 rent roll,
occupancy has further declined to 86.8%, with an average rental
rate of $1,450 per unit, which is slightly above the issuance
average rental rate of $1,444 per unit. Despite the decline in
occupancy, the Q3 2015 DSCR has improved to 1.09x. The slight
difference between the Q3 2015 net cash flow and DBRS underwritten
net cash flow is mainly driven by a 2.1% decrease in effective
gross income and a 6.0% increase in operating expenses,
specifically the general and administrative expense.


GSAA HOME 2005-10: Moody's Cuts Class M-2 Debt Rating to B1(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 21 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche, from 10 transactions
issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-10

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-AHL

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-I1

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
Series INABS 2006-D

Cl. 2A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-4

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2006-BNC1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The ratings
downgrade is the result of structural features resulting in higher
expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.


HIGHLAND PARK I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CC
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
A-1 notes from Highland Park CDO I Ltd., a U.S. commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.  At
the same time, S&P also lowered the rating on the class B notes and
affirmed the rating on the class A-2 notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using the data from the December 2015 trustee report.

The rating on class A-1 was raised due to its improved credit
support and the expectation of continuing paydowns.  Since S&P's
February 2013 rating actions, the transaction has paid down the
class A-1 notes by $224.37 million.  Following the Nov. 25, 2015,
payment date, the class A-1 note balance declined to 11.44% (from
79.64% in February 2013).  S&P expects the paydowns to continue
since the deal is failing its class A/B overcollateralization (O/C)
test.  Based on December 2015 monthly trustee report, the class A/B
OC ratio is at 76.40% (versus the required 121.4%), down from
82.40% in December 2012.  From this, S&P can calculate that the
class A-1 and A-2 O/C ratios are 317.87% and 106.24%, respectively.
The comparative numbers based on the December 2012 monthly trustee
report are 119.82% and 93.16%, respectively.

Though the paydowns improved the credit support to the senior
notes, the decline in the class A/B O/C ratio indicates a par
erosion for the class B notes.  The class B notes are still current
in their interest, but their low O/C was the primary reason for the
downgrade and reflects S&P's view that the class is unlikely to be
repaid in full.

The affirmation of the class A-2 rating reflects S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATING RAISED

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To          From
A-1                BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)

RATING LOWERED

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                       Rating
Class              To          From
B                  CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Highland Park CDO I Ltd.

Class              Rating
A-2                CCC- (sf)


JP MORGAN 2002-C1: Moody's Hikes Class H Debt Rating to 'B1(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-C1 as follows:

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Class G and H, were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 39% since Moody's
last review.

The rating on one P&I class, Class J, was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance, compared to 33.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $30.9 million
from $816.6 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 51% of the pool. Seven loans, constituting 21.9% of the pool,
have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $36.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). The Park Villa Apartments Loan, constituting 8.3%
of the pool, is the only loan in special servicing. The loan is
secured by a 92-unit multifamily property located six miles from
downtown Atlanta, Georgia. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in December 2011 for imminent default and became real
estate owned ("REO") in June 2013.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 80% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 88%, compared to 84% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.00X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.02X and 1.42X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 69% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Hamilton Mill Business Center Loan ($15.9
million -- 51.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 550,000 square
foot (SF) industrial property located in Buford, Georgia. The
property serves as a single tenant distribution center for Office
Depot with a lease expiration in April 2020. The property was sold
in July 2014 to Gramercy Property Trust for over $26 million and
the loan was assumed. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's
stressed the value of the property utilizing a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.18X, respectively,
compared to 90% and 1.17X at the last review.

The second largest loan is The Container Store Loan ($4.6 million
-- 14.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 24,000 SF retail
property located in White Plains, New York. The Container Store
occupies the entire property and its lease expires in January 2021.
The tenant recently extended their lease five years. Performance
has remained stable and the loan benefits from amortization. Due to
the single tenant exposure, Moody's stressed the value of the
property utilizing a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 91% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.23X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the FM 1960 Plaza Loan ($764,700 -- 2.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 41,000 SF retail center located
in Houston's Far North submarket. Property performance dropped in
2014 due to a decline in revenue. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
73% and 1.59X, respectively, compared to 69% and 1.70X at the last
review.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC19: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Caa1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed six and downgraded three classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC19 as
follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015
Affirmed B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four investment grade P&I classes, Classes A-4,
A-SB, A-1A and A-M, were affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) & the transaction's key
metrics are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two below investment grade P&I classes, Classes C
and D, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's base expected loss.

The ratings on two below investment grade P&I classes, Classes A-J
and B, were downgraded due to higher anticipated and realized
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded based on a
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from the principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.6% of the
current balance compared to 7.7% at last review. The deal has paid
down 4% since last review and 28% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 14.9% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 14.6% at last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.


JP MORGAN 2016-ATRM: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Cl. E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns ratings and Rating Outlooks to J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ATRM commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2016-ATRM as follows:

-- $191,600,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67,400,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98,000,000 class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,700,000 class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Jan. 19, 2016, the
issuer removed the $347,000,000 class X-CP and the $347,000,000
class X-NCP. As such, Fitch withdrew its expected ratings of
'BBB-sf' for each class. Fitch does not rate the $58,300,000 class
G.

The certificates represent the beneficial interest in a trust that
holds a five-year, fixed rate, interest-only $585 million mortgage
loan secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 30 hotel
properties with a total of 7,236 rooms located in 16 states. The
sponsor of the loan is Atrium Holding Company. The loan was
originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (rated
'A+'/'F1'/Stable Outlook).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Diverse Portfolio: The portfolio exhibits geographic diversity,
with 30 properties located across 16 states; no state represents
more than 15.2% of portfolio cash flow. The top 10 properties
account for approximately 54% of the portfolio cash flow and 39% of
the total keys.

Asset Quality and Age: The 30 properties comprising the portfolio
have an average age of 23.5 years (built from 1979-2000) which is
considered an older vintage. The portfolio's assets are well
maintained, with $258.9 million ($35,785 per key) of capital
improvements spent from 2005 through November 2015. In addition,
$125.2 million ($17,300 per key) in capital improvements are
budgeted through 2020.

High Trust Leverage: Fitch's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for the trust component of
the debt are 1.04x and 103%, respectively.

National Franchise Flags: Twenty nine of the 30 hotels are
franchised with Hilton, Marriott, Intercontinental Hotel Group
(IHG), Carlson Rezidor, and Starwood and benefit from their
respective loyalty point and reservations systems. The Embassy
Suites by Hilton represents the largest brand, with 34.5% of the
portfolio's total keys and 47.1% of the portfolio's trailing 12
months (TTM) November 2015 net cash flow (NCF). The remaining
brands include Marriott, Renaissance, Holiday Inn, Hilton,
Sheraton, Homewood Suites, Hampton Inn & Suites, Crowne Plaza,
Radisson and one independently operated hotel.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch found that the 'AAAsf' class could withstand an approximate
72.5% decrease to the most recent actual NCF prior to experiencing
$1 of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class. Fitch performed several
stress scenarios in which the Fitch NCF was stressed. Fitch
determined that a 68% reduction in Fitch's implied NCF would cause
the notes to break even at a 1.0x DSCR, based on the actual debt
service.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 15% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 45% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.


JP MORGAN 2016-ATRM: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ATRM's
$585.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2016-ATRM.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one five-year, fixed-rate commercial mortgage
loan totaling $585.0 million, secured by cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted mortgages and deeds of trust on the borrowers' fee
and leasehold interests in 30 full-service, limited-service, and
extended-stay hotels and by a first-lien mortgage encumbering all
of the operating lessees' rights in the properties.

"Since we assigned our preliminary ratings on Jan. 19, 2016, the
master servicer for the transaction was changed to KeyBank N.A.,
and the interest-only classes X-CP and X-NCP were eliminated from
the transaction.  Also, the transaction's class F and G
certificates have been designated as control-eligible certificates
with certain control rights.  In addition, the interest rate on the
underlying loan increased by 0.50% to 4.87% from 4.37%, resulting
in a decrease in the Standard & Poor's debt service coverage ratio
to 2.26x from 2.52x, based on Standard & Poor's net cash flow and
the loan's fixed interest rate.  The final offering circular also
provides additional information with respect to a previously
outstanding mezzanine financing, noting that affiliates of the
prior borrower purchased the mezzanine loan, which was originated
in 2008 and had an outstanding balance of $239.0 million at the
time of purchase, for $151.8 million, a 36.5% discount," S&P said.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a beginning and ending
loan-to-value ratio of 94.6%, based on Standard & Poor's value.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ATRM

Class     Rating(i)         Amount ($)
A         AAA (sf)         191,600,000
B         AA- (sf)          67,400,000
C         A (sf)            35,000,000
D         BBB- (sf)         53,000,000
E         BB (sf)           98,000,000
F         B+ (sf)           81,700,000
G         B- (sf)           58,300,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the
     Securities Act of 1933.


KODIAK CDO I: Moody's Hilkes Class A-1 Debt Rating to Ba1(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.:

US$338,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of $89,669,253.45), Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf); previously on January 29, 2014 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

US$103,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of $105,074,977.56, including
cumulative defaulted interest balance of $1,574,977.5), Upgraded to
B3 (sf); previously on January 29, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Kodiak CDO I, Ltd., issued on September 19, 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS), with small
exposure to corporate bonds and CMBS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2015.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 21.7% or $26.3
million since February 2015, using principal proceeds from the
redemptions/prepayments of the underlying assets and the diversion
of excess interest proceeds. In 2014, the transaction declared an
event of default (EoD) due to a missed interest payment with
respect to the class B notes, and a majority of the controlling
class directed the trustee to declare the Class A-1 notes
immediately due and payable. As a result of the acceleration of the
notes, all proceeds are currently used to pay interest, then
principal on the Class A-1 notes. The Class A-1 notes' par coverage
has thus improved to 384.1% from 308.3% since February 2015, by
Moody's calculations. The Class A-2 notes' par coverage has also
improved to 178.3% from 166.4% over the same period, although the
notes continue to default on its interest because of the
acceleration of the Class A-1 notes.

In addition, $239 million in notional of pay-fixed,
receive-floating interest rate swaps will mature by in August 2016,
which will free up more excess interest to pay down the Class A-1
notes. On the last payment date in February 2016, the deal paid
$2.6 million of interest proceeds to the swap counterparty. As a
result of the note acceleration, the Class A-1 notes will continue
to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the use of
proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The actions also reflect the consideration that an EoD is
continuing for the transaction, and that as a remedy to the EoD, 66
2/3% of each class, voting separately, can direct the trustee to
proceed with the sale and liquidation of the collateral. In such a
case, the severity of losses will depend on the timing and choice
of remedy. Although Moody's believes the likelihood of liquidation
is remote, the upgrade magnitude on the notes were tempered by
concerns about potential losses arising from liquidation as well as
the deal's high exposure to assets with low credit quality.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance (after treating deferring securities as performing if they
meet certain criteria) of $344.4 million, defaulted/deferring par
of $36.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 55.72%
(implying a WARF of 4718), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10.5%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


LATITUDE CLO II: S&P Hikes Rating on Class D Debt to B-
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Latitude CLO II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, and removed them from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.

The transaction continues to amortize, with two classes of notes
paid in full since S&P's May 2014 rating actions. The class B notes
are currently receiving paydowns, and their outstanding balance is
now at 94.74% of their original balance. The transaction has paid
down a total of $88.11 million since May 2014.

The lower balances helped increase the credit support to all
tranches, resulting in upgrades. The increase in the credit support
is reflected in the higher overcollateralization (O/C) ratios. The
January 2016 trustee report indicated the following O/C increases
from the April 2014 trustee report, which S&P used for its previous
rating actions:

The class B O/C ratio increased to 215.99% from 126.46%.
The class C O/C ratio increased to 142.10% from 113.21%.
The class D O/C ratio increased to 115.50% from 105.75%.

Though the credit support increased, the portfolio currently has
nearly 46% of the performing collateral maturing after the
transaction's maturity in December 2018. S&P's analysis considered
the potential market value and/or settlement-related risk resulting
from the remaining securities' potential liquidation on the
transaction's legal final maturity date.

The ratings on the class C and D notes were affected by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria. S&P's rating on the class D notes reflects the
class' strong cash flow results, the portfolio's lower weighted
average life, and the application of "Criteria For Assigning
'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012.

S&P said, "We will continue to review whether, in our view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and we will take rating
actions as we deem necessary."

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Latitude CLO II Ltd.
                              Cash flow   Cash flow
        Previous              implied       cushion   Final
Class   rating                rating(i)     (%)(ii)   rating
B       A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)        20.50   AAA (sf)
C       BB (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)        15.29   BBB+ (sf)
D       CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)        2.69   B- (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
      coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-
      even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
      assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the
      actual spread, coupon, and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                    Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow    decrease   increase    decrease
       implied      implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating       rating     rating      rating      rating
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   B- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)     CCC (sf)      B- (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM WATCH POSITIVE

Latitude CLO II Ltd.

          Rating        Rating
Class     To            From
B         AAA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         BBB+ (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Pos
D         B- (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos


LEGACY BENEFITS 2004-1: Moody's Cuts Class B Debt Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible downgrade the Class A
Notes and has downgraded and placed on review for possible
downgrade Class B Notes issued by Legacy Benefits Life Insurance
Settlements 2004-1 LLC. The underlying collateral consists of a
pool of universal life insurance policies and annuity contracts
purchased on the lives of the insured individuals. Amounts received
under the fixed payment annuity contracts are designated to cover
the future premium payments on the corresponding insurance policy,
as well as fees, interest and principal on the notes.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Legacy Benefits Life Insurance Settlement 2004-1 LLC

  Cl. A, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
  previously on Jan 15, 2014 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review
  for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jan 15, 2014
  Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are prompted by the risk of potential insurance
policy lapses and also subordination in the case of the Class B
Notes. Policy lapses occur when the account value for a policy
depletes completely, and there are no funds remaining to apply to
the cost of insurance. The annuities may not be able to keep up
with the rise in the cost of insurance of the corresponding
insurance policies, thus depleting the account values. In addition,
there is risk of policy lapses as the insured individuals age and
approach their policies' corresponding maturity dates, if any.
Moody's anticipates that some policies might be at risk of lapsing
assuming a continued rising cost of insurance and the potential for
continued decreased mortality.

During the review period, Moody's will refine its analysis of
potential policy lapses, and will evaluate the potential impact to
credit enhancement for the Class A and Class B Notes that would
result from such lapses.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

  Change in mortality or lapse risk.


LENDMARK FUNDING 2016-A: Fitch to Class C Debt 'Bsf(exp)'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Lendmark Funding Trust 2016-A (LFT
2016-A) as follows:

-- $133,468,000 class A notes 'BBB+sf(exp)'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,780,000 class B notes 'BBsf(exp)'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,432,000 class C notes 'Bsf(exp)'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Collateral Quality: The LFT 2016-A collateral pool
comprises secured and unsecured fixed rate personal loans and sales
finance contracts originated by the company based on its
underwriting guidelines. The portfolio will also include renewed
loans that will replace or refinance the existing loan. Additional
eligible loans will be added to the portfolio during the Revolving
period ending Jan. 31, 2018.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided
by overcollateralization (OC) and excess spread. The initial OC of
approximately $20.65 million will be maintained for the life of the
transaction. Additionally, the class A notes will benefit from
subordination provided by the class B and C notes, and the class B
notes will benefit from subordination provided by the class C
notes. In addition, trust performance and other triggers based on
credit and servicing risks are used to provide additional
protection for investors should loan performance or certain
counterparties' financial conditions deteriorate (each an early
amortization event). When an early amortization event occurs, the
Revolving period will end and note amortization will begin.

Adequate Liquidity Support: A reserve account sized at $2 million,
which equals 1% of the initial pool balance with a floor at 1% of
the initial pool balance, will be funded at closing.

Acceptable Servicing Capabilities: Lendmark Financial Services LLC.
will service 100% of the portfolio. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo) is the back-up servicer and image file custodian. Fitch
considers all parties acceptable servicers. Wells Fargo in its
capacity of image file custodian will retain electronic copies of
all imaged files of each loan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in available CE, and
the remaining loss coverage levels available to the notes and may
make certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating
actions, depending on the extent of the decline in the coverage.
Rating sensitivity results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, given that the transaction is exposed to
multiple dynamic risk factors. Rating sensitivity should not be
used as an indicator of future rating performance.

Holding all other inputs constant, a 15% increase in base case
defaults resulted in a downgrade of at least three rating
categories for the notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from KPMG LLP.
The third-party due diligence focused on comparing the sample
characteristics provided in the data file of 47,103 consumer loans
to the corresponding information in the loan agreements.


MADISON PARK VI: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the Class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from Madison Park Funding VI Ltd. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and E notes.

Madison Park Funding VI Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in September 2007 and is
managed by Credit Suisse Alternative Capital LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $22.8 million in paydowns to the class A-1
notes since S&P's February 2013 rating actions, which have reduced
the class's outstanding balance to 91.2% of its original balance.
The transaction exited its reinvestment period in January 2015. In
addition, the transaction has benefited from the underlying
portfolio's improved credit quality. As of the Jan. 15, 2016,
trustee report, the transaction held $6.96 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, down from $21.41 million as of the Jan. 17, 2013, trustee
report, which S&P used its February 2013 analysis. These
improvements are also evident in the higher overcollateralization
ratios for the class A/B, C, D, and E notes.  

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

On the Jan. 26, 2016 payment date, the manager retained $7.17
million in principal proceeds, which may be used to purchase
additional collateral in accordance with its post-reinvestment
investment criteria.

As of the January 2016 trustee report, the balance of collateral
with a maturity date after the transaction's stated maturity
represented 12.33% of the portfolio. A CLO concentrated in
long-dated assets like this could be exposed to market value risk
at maturity because the collateral manager may have to sell these
assets for less than par to repay the CLO's subordinate rated notes
when they mature. S&P's analysis accounted for the potential market
value and/or settlement-related risk arising from the potential
liquidation of the remaining securities on the transaction's legal
final maturity date.

S&P's transaction review included a cash flow analysis, based on
the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the aforementioned
trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, S&P's analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal
to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash flow
analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating     cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AAA                  AAA        28.22%      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+                  AAA        8.77%       AAA (sf)
B      AA                   AA+        13.39%      AA+ (sf)
C      A                    AA         2.07%       AA- (sf)
D      BBB+                 A+         4.31%       A- (sf)
E      BB+                  BBB+       3.27%       BB+ (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
      coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-
      even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
      assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the
      actual spread, coupon, and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to its base-case analysis, S&P generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
scenario            Within industry (%) Between industries (%)
-----------         ------------------- ----------------------
Below base case             15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                      7.5
Above base case             25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1    AAA        AAA        AAA          AAA        AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA        AA+        AA+          AAA        AAA (sf)
B      AA+        AA         AA+          AAA        AA+ (sf)
C      AA         A-         A+           AA-        AA- (sf)
D      A+         BB+        BBB+         BBB+       A- (sf)
E      BBB+       B+         BB           BB+        BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied      Final
Class  rating       rating        rating       rating
A-1    AAA          AAA           AAA          AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA          AA+           AA+          AAA (sf)
B      AA+          AA            AA           AA+ (sf)
C      AA           A             A            AA- (sf)
D      A+           BBB+          BBB+         A- (sf)
E      BBB+         BB+           BB+          BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.

                Rating
Class       To          From
A-2         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           AA- (sf)    A (sf)
D           A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Madison Park Funding VI Ltd.

                Rating
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)    
E           BB+ (sf)


MADISON PARK XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to
the classes of notes to be issued by Madison Park Funding XX, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $310,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $57,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,

   Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $40,800,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $25,400,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2027, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $26,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
   2027, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders.  The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Madison Park Funding XX, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO.  The
issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
first lien senior secured corporate loans.  Subject to the cov-lite
matrix, at least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of senior
secured loans, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans or senior unsecured loans.  Moody's expects the
portfolio to be approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.75 year
reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 65
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2960
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2960 to 3404)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2960 to 3848)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1


MARATHON CLO IV: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B-1, and B-2 notes from Marathon CLO IV Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Marathon Asset
Management L.P. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, C, and D notes from the same transaction.

Since S&P's effective date rating affirmations, the transaction's
reinvestment period ended and it entered its amortization phase.
The upgrades reflect the increased credit support available to the
rated notes due to the $28.6 million paydown to the class A-1 notes
since the end of the reinvestment period in May 2015.

Due to these paydowns, the transaction's credit support has
improved via a higher overcollateralization (O/C) ratio for class
A; however, the other O/C ratios have declined since the August
2012 trustee report, which S&P used in its used effective date
affirmations, in part due to an increase in the 'CCC' bucket. In
the January 2016 trustee report, which S&P used for this review,
the trustee reported the following O/C ratios:

  The class A O/C ratio was 138.224%, compared with 136.808% in
  August 2012;

  The class B O/C ratio was 123.311%, compared with 123.524% in
  August 2012;

  The class C O/C ratio was 115.092%, compared with 116.065% in
  August 2012; and

  The class D O/C ratio was 108.638%, compared with 110.137% in
  August 2012.

S&P said, "We affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, C, and D notes
to reflect the available credit support consistent with the current
rating levels.

"Although the class B-1, B-2, C, and D notes' cash flow results
point to higher rating levels, we took into account the
transaction's significant exposure to the energy and commodities
sectors. As of the January 2016 trustee report the oil and gas
sector made up 6.65% of the portfolio and nonferrous metals/
minerals made up 4.69%. In addition, 'CCC' rated assets make up
10.3% of the underlying portfolio.  

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with this
rating action."

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Marathon CLO IV Ltd.
                        Cash flow
       Previous         implied     Cash flow    Final            

Class rating           rating (i)  cushion (ii) rating
----- --------         ---------   ------------ ------
A-1    AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)    11.90%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)          AA+ (sf)    13.93%       AA+ (sf)
B-1    A (sf)           AA- (sf)    1.12%        A+ (sf)
B-2    A (sf)           AA- (sf)    1.12%        A+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)         BBB+ (sf)   5.60%        BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)    0.17%        BB (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
      coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-
      even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
      assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the
      actual spread, coupon, and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to its base-case analysis, S&P generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B-1    AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
B-2    AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class rating       rating        rating        rating      
----- ---------    -----------   -----------   ------
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B-1    AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
B-2    AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Marathon CLO IV Ltd.

            Rating          Rating
Class       To              From        
A-2         AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)
B-1         A+ (sf)         A (sf)
B-2         A+ (sf)         A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Marathon CLO IV Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
D           BB (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of five classes
and downgraded one class in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1
as follows.

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Reinstated to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes, Class C and D, were were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on three P&I classes, Class E, F and G, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
uncertainty of future interest payments based on the fact that all
of its referenced classes have an interest rate equal to the
weighted average coupon of the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 34% of the
current balance compared to 13% at Moody's last review. The deal
has paid down 56% from the the last review and Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 51% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior classes and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $153.3
million from $3.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
2% to 27% of the pool. One loan, constituting 16% of the pool, has
an investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Two loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $161 million (for an average loss
severity of 35%). Six loans, constituting 51% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the EDS Portfolio Loan ($42
million -- 27% of the pool), which is secured by three office
properties totaling 388,000 square feet. The properties are located
in East Pennsboro, Pennsylvania; Auburn Hills, Michigan; and Rancho
Cordova, California. The loan transferred to special servicing in
June 2015 for imminent maturity default due to upcoming lease
expiration dates. The properties were occupied by a single tenant,
Electronic Data Systems Corp., until the tenant vacated at the
lease expiration in September 2015. The three properties are now
fully vacant. The servicer is in discussions with the borrower
regarding consensual title conveyance including foreclosure.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by retail
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $50 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (64% expected loss on average). Moody's
has assumed a high default probability for one poorly performing
loan, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated an aggregate
loss of $2 million (a 15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from the troubled loan.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Blue Cross
Building 31 Loan ($24 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured
by two adjacent office properties totaling 517,000 square feet,
located in Richardson, Texas. The builidngs are 100% leased to Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Texas through December 31, 2020. Moody's
used a lit/dark approach to account for the single-tenant exposure
when assessing the loan's credit quality. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.58X. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

There are three additional performing loans in the pool. The
largest performing loan is the Fresh Direct Warehouse Loan ($36
million -- 23% of the pool), which is secured by a 283,000 square
foot warehouse property in Long Island City, New York. The property
is just under 100% leased to an entity controlled by Fresh Direct,
the online grocer. The property serves as a headquarters and
distribution facility for the company. The loan matured in December
2015 and as of the latest remittance statement the loan was being
held with the master servicer per the forbearance agreement.
Moody's does not expect a loss on this loan.

The second largest performing loan is the Green Valley Technical
Plaza 33 Loan ($13.2 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 108,300 SF suburban office building in Fairfield, California.
The loan passed its anticipated repayment date (ARD) in October
2015 and is currently on the watchlist for low occupancy and DSCR.
The property was only 49% leased as of September 2015. Moody's has
recognized this as a troubled loan.

The third largest performing loan is the Deer Park Loan ($2.5
million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by an 84 unit senior
housing multifamily property in Novato, California approximately 30
miles north of San Francisco. The property offers studio, one and
two bedroom apartments in a variety of floor plans while operating
on month-to-month leases. The loan is fully amortizing and matures
in September 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 16% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 17% and >4.00X at prior
review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-LC1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed five classes and downgraded
one class in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LC1 as:

  Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Downgraded

   to C (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sept. 25, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 51.9% of the
current balance, compared to 6.3% at Moody's last review.  The deal
has paid down 92% since the prior review and Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 4.8% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 5.9% at the last review.  

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 85.5% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified one troubled loan
representing 14% of the pool.  In this approach, Moody's determines
a probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior classes.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Feb. 12, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $58 million
from $1.55 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of approximately $44 million (for an
average loss severity of 33%).  Eight loans, constituting 85.5% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Stirling Town Center
($11.4 million -- 19.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 55,000
square foot (SF) Walgreens shadow anchored retail property located
in Cooper City, FL, approximately 15 miles west of Fort Lauderdale.
The property comprises four buildings with 30 tenant bays ranging
in size from 780 SF to 7,900 SF of the gross leasable area (GLA).
The loan transferred to special servicing in 2011 for delinquent
payments and became REO in 2014.  As of Sept. 2015, the property
was 92% leased.

The remaining seven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail and office property types and Moody's has identified one
troubled loan.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $30.1 million loss
for the specially serviced and troubled loans (52% expected loss on
average).

The two performing loans represent approximately 14% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the DRS Tactical Systems Office
Building Loan ($8.3 million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured
by a 105,000 SF, single tenant, office property in Melbourne,
Florida.  DRS Tactical Systems did not renewed their lease at
expiration on Jan. 31, 2016, and the property is currently vacant.
The loan has passed its anticipated repayment date in January 2016
and is currently on the master servicer's watchlist.  Due to the
vacancy, Moody's has identified this loan as a troubled loan.

The other performing loan is the Kenmore Storefront Building Loan
($110,772 -- less than 0.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
retail property located in Kenmore, Washington, 20 miles northeast
of Seattle.  The property was 100% occupied as of September 2015
and has amortized 89% since securitization.  Performance remains
stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 5% and >4.00X,
respectively, compared to 7% and >4.00X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-1: Fitch Lowers Cl. D Debt Rating to 'Csf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 11 classes of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-1.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are primarily due to the poor quality of the
remaining collateral as a result of adverse selection of the pool.
The transaction has experienced significant paydown since August
2015 as performing loans paid off at maturity.  As such, the
transaction has become highly concentrated with only 29 loans
remaining, 21 of which (84.9% of the remaining pool) have been
identified as Fitch loans of concern either due to performance
issues or maturity default risks.  Fitch has modeled total losses
of 9.5% on the original pool balance, including realized losses of
$96.7 million (4.5% of the original pool balance).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 90.4% to $204.8 million from
$2.14 billion at issuance and 82.1% from $1.14 billion at last
review.  Fifteen loans (65.3%) are currently in special servicing,
including 10 (56.9%) of the top 15 loans.  Interest shortfalls
totaling $10.9 million are currently affecting class B and below.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the largest loan in
the pool (18.1%) which is secured by a 394,578 square foot (sf)
office property located in Hyattsville, MD.  The property is 99%
occupied by U.S. Department of Treasury (GSA) with lease expiring
in April 2016.  The other tenant (1%) is a cafeteria whose lease
terms are reliant on the GSA lease.  The loan was most recently
transferred to special servicing in November 2015 due to imminent
maturity default.  The loan matured in December 2015 and was not
paid off.  The borrower has had difficulty obtaining refinance as
the GSA tenant intends to vacate by May 2017 and relocate to a
nearby property.  The Borrower and the GSA tenant are currently in
negotiations for a one year lease extension.  The special servicer
is pursuing foreclosure.  The as-is value of the property based on
full vacancy indicates significant losses on the loan.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the second
largest loan in the pool (10.9%) which is secured by a 170,796 sf,
Class-B, retail center located in Reno, NV.  The property became a
real estate owned asset (REO) in June 2015 due to foreclosure.  The
property is shadow-anchored by Costco Wholesale (not part of the
collateral).  Currently the property is only 55% occupied, compared
to 95.5% at issuance.  The servicer is working to stabilize the
property through leasing up activities.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the fourth
largest loan in the pool (5.8%) which is secured by a 130,000 sf
retail center located in Norcross, GA.  The property became a REO
asset in May 2014 due to foreclosure.  The property's anchor is
grocer, Kroger (48% of the property with lease expiring in 2022).
The property occupancy rate has improved significantly since
becoming REO.  The property is currently 94% occupied compared to
78% at June 2014.  The special servicer is looking to renew
additional leases and will subsequently determine the timing of a
disposition.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks indicate that future downgrades are possible
should more loans transfer to special servicing, and/or losses on
the specially serviced assets exceed expectations.  In addition,
the distressed classes (rated below 'B') may be subject to further
rating actions as losses are realized.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades these classes as indicated:

   -- $24.9 million class AJ to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $30.3 million class AN-FL to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- $21.4 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE0%;
   -- $29.5 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE0%;

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $50.9 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE50%;
   -- $16.1 million class E at 'Csf', RE0%.
   -- $24.1 million class F at 'Csf', RE0%;
   -- $7.7 million class G at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3FL, A-3B, A-SB, A-4, A-1A, and AM
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-HF2: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on 2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-HF2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect stable performance since the last rating
action with 41.9% of the pool (six loans) defeased according to
servicer reporting.  The pool has experienced $28.3 million (2.7%
of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.3% to $28.2 million from
$1.06 billion at issuance.  The second largest loan (13.3% of pool)
is defeased and matures in June 2016, 2% matures in 2017, and 60.4%
matures in 2018.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes L through N.

The largest loan in the pool is a retail center in Pleasant Hill,
CA.  The property has been 100% occupied for the last several years
and is anchored by Staples (29.1% net rentable area [NRA],
expiration Oct. 2016), Rite Aid (23.5% NRA, expiration Nov. 2016),
and Smart & Final (17.5% NRA, expiration Nov. 2016).  Per the
borrower, both Staples and Smart & Final plan on staying at the
property.  Currently, Rite Aid has not provided notice of renewal
but has until May to confirm.  The debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was stable at 1.76x as of YE 2015.  The loan is scheduled to
mature in 2018.

Eight of the remaining nine non-defeased loans (53.4% of the pool)
are represented by retail properties.  A portion of the retail
exposure consists of five single-tenant drug store assets (7.0% of
the pool) including one Walgreens and four CVS stores, all located
in secondary or tertiary markets.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Classes J and K are expected to remain stable due to high credit
enhancement and continued expected paydown.  Downgrades are not
expected on classes J and K, as the performance of the remaining
pool has been stable with no loans in special servicing.  Upgrades
are not expected to class K as the pool has become concentrated. In
addition, class L, which has previously taken losses, should be
sufficient to absorb potential losses.

                        DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $8.9 million class J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.6 million class K at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $8.7 million class L at 'Dsf', RE 90%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G and H certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-RM1 as follows:

N, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2015 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ5: Fitch Hikes Class F Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one, downgraded two, and affirmed seven
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2005-HQ5 (MSCI 2005-HQ5).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects increased credit enhancement as a result of
better recoveries than previously modeled from the liquidation of
the remaining specially serviced assets in the pool since Fitch's
last rating action. The downgrades reflect realized losses to those
classes, which were reflected in the January remittance.

Since Fitch's last rating action, six specially serviced assets,
which included a modified A/B note, were resolved and liquidated
resulting in total losses of $26 million. Since issuance, realized
losses for the transaction were $83.7 million (5.5% of the original
pool balance).

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99% to $17.2 million from
$1.52 billion at issuance. Of the original 89 loans, the pool is
concentrated with only three loans remaining, all of which are
sponsored by Government Properties Trust (GPT). Cumulative interest
shortfalls totaling $2.7 million are currently impacting classes J
and K and classes N through Q.

The remaining GPT loans in the pool are secured by three office
properties totaling 100,300 square feet located in Baton Rouge, LA,
Charleston, SC, and Bakersfield, CA. The properties are each fully
occupied by the General Services Administration (GSA). The loans
mature in March 2020.

The Baton Rouge property is occupied by the Federal Court House on
a lease until July 2019. The Charleston property is occupied by the
Department of Veteran Affairs - VA Clinic on a lease until June
2019. The Bakersfield property is occupied by The Drug Enforcement
Agency on a lease until March 2021; however, the tenant has the
option to terminate its lease beginning April 2016 by providing at
least a 90-day notice.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch revised the Rating Outlook on class F to Stable from Negative
due to the senior payment priority in the capital structure, the
stable performance of the remaining loans, and expected continued
paydown. A further upgrade was not warranted due to the binary risk
associated with the GSA single-tenancy at each of the remaining
properties, as well as the single tenant at each of the properties
either having a lease expiring prior to loan maturity or having the
option to terminate its lease prior to loan maturity. A downgrade
is unlikely unless occupancy or cash flow deteriorates
significantly.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded and revised Rating Outlook to the following
class:

-- $5.7 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $11.5 million class G to 'Dsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
-- $0 class H to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the class the following classes and revised
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-J, B, C, D, and E
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class Q
certificates. Fitch has previously withdrawn the ratings on the
interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Ratings on 18 Classes Still on Watch Pos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services stated that its ratings on 18
classes from 13 National Collegiate Student Loan Trust transactions
issued between 2004 and 2007 remain on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

On Aug. 28, 2015, S&P placed these ratings on CreditWatch with
positive implications following the publication of our criteria for
analyzing transactions subject to payment priority changes upon a
nonmonetary event of default (EOD; see "Methodology: Criteria For
Global Structured Finance Transactions Subject To A Change In
Payment Priorities Or Sale Of Collateral Upon A Nonmonetary EOD,"
published March 2, 2015). Six of the classes that were previously
placed on CreditWatch have been paid in full, so S&P already
discontinued those ratings before the current CreditWatch
extension. In order to resolve the CreditWatch placements, S&P is
reviewing additional information
from key transaction parties to supplement its operational risk
assessment and to enhance its view on the likelihood of a payment
priority change upon a non-monetary event of default.

Standard & Poor's will continue to evaluate the potential impact of
the available credit enhancement in these transactions relative to
S&P's ratings and the additional information received. S&P will
take ratings actions once it has completed its review.

RATINGS UNCHANGED

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        63543PAM8   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        63543PAN6   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        63543PAX4   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        63543PBG0   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        63543PBT2   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        63543TAD0   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        63543PCC8   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        63543MAC7   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        63543VAC7   B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4        63543VAD5   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        63543WAB7   B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        63543WAC5   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        63543XAB5   B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        63543XAC3   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-2        63543LAB1   B- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3        63543LAC9   B- (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3-AR-1   63544DAE2   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3-AR-1   63544EAE0   CCC (sf)/Watch Pos


NATIONS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has assigned definitive ratings to the Equipment Contract
Backed Notes, Series 2016-1 issued by Nations Equipment Finance
Funding III, LLC.  The transaction is a securitization of equipment
loans and leases sponsored by Nations Equipment Finance, LLC (NR,
NEF), which will also act as the servicer.  The issuer, Nations
Equipment Finance Funding III, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
NEF Holdings, LLC. an affiliate of the servicer.  The equipment
loans and leases were originated by Nations Fund I, LLC (the
originator), a subsidiary of the transferor, and are backed by
collateral including trailers, trucks and various types of
construction and manufacturing equipment.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Nations Equipment Finance Funding III, LLC, Series 2016-1

  $131,046,000, Fixed-rate Class A Notes, Definitive Rating
   Assigned A3 (sf)

  $11,063,000, Fixed-rate Class B Notes, Definitive Rating
   Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $9,360,000, Fixed-rate Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned

   Ba2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Series 2016-1 is the third securitization sponsored by NEF, which
was founded and is led by a team of former GE Capital executives.

The definitive ratings that we assigned to the notes are primarily
based on:

  (1) Limited historical performance of Nations' portfolio, with
      relatively low incidence of default and low net loss rate
      since 2010;

  (2) weak credit quality and small number of obligors backing the

      loans in the pool;

  (3) assessed value of the collateral backing the loans in the
      pool;

  (4) credit enhancement including overcollateralization, excess
      spread, and a non-declining reserve account;

  (5) the sequential pay structure;

  (6) the experience and expertise of NEF as the servicer; and

  (7) US Bank National Association (rated long-term deposits Aa1/
      long-term CR assessment Aa2 (cr), short-term deposit P-1,
      BCA aa3) as backup servicer for contracts.

Credit enhancement to the notes includes (i) initial
overcollateralization of 11.0%, which is expected to grow with time
as the notes pay down, (ii) annual excess spread of approximately
3.0%, (iii) a non-declining reserve account funded at 1.5% of the
initial collateral balance, and (iv) subordination in the case of
the Class A and Class B notes (12.0% and 5.5%, respectively).

The definitive rating for the Class B notes, Baa3 (sf), is one
notch lower than its provisional rating, (p) Baa2 (sf).  This
difference is a result of the transaction closing with a materially
higher weighted average cost of funds (WAC) than Moody's modeled
when the provisional ratings were assigned.  The WAC assumptions,
as well as other structural features, were provided by the issuer.

The equipment loans and leases backing the notes transaction were
extended primarily to middle market obligors and are secured by
various types of equipment including tractors (18.7%), construction
equipment (14.0%), cranes (8.1%), machining centers (6.8%), and
aircraft (6.5%).

The pool consists of 128 contracts with 62 unique obligors and an
initial balance of $170,190,781.  The average contract balance is
$1,329,615.  The weighted average original and remaining terms to
maturity are 58 and 47 months, respectively.  The largest obligor
is 6.7% of the initial pool balance and the top five obligors
comprise 24.4% of the initial pool balance.  Nearly all of the
contracts in this deal are fixed interest rate and monthly pay.

                     PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

                               Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss.  Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of
payment.  As the primary drivers of performance, positive changes
in the US macro economy and the performance of various sectors
where the lessees operate could also affect the ratings.

                               Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss.  Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the contracts or
a greater than expected deterioration in the value of the equipment
that secure the obligor's promise of payment.  As the primary
drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro economy
could also affect Moody's ratings.  Other reasons for worse
performance than Moody's expectations could include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


NATIONSTAR HECM 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. M2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to three
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1 (NHLT 2016-1).  The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by one pool of inactive HECM reverse
first-lien mortgage loans.  The collateral pool is comprised of
1,085 mortgage loans.  The servicer for the deal is Nationstar
Mortgage LLC.  The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1

  Class A Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  Class M1 Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  Class M2 Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral in Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1 consists of
first-lien inactive home equity conversion reverse mortgage loans
(HECMs) covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with real estate owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance.  Nationstar
acquired the mortgage assets from Ginnie Mae sponsored HECM
mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations.  All of the mortgage assets
are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment of principal up to
certain amounts.  If a borrower or their estate fails to pay the
amount due upon maturity or otherwise defaults, sale of the
property is used to recover the amount owed.

There are 1,085 mortgage assets with a balance of approximately
$302,891,615.  Loans are in either default, due and payable,
foreclosure or REO status.  Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO.  Of the mortgage assets in
default (10.1% of total pool), 8.5% are in default due to
non-occupancy, 88.3% are in default due taxes and insurance and
3.2% are in default for other reasons. 12.3% of the mortgage assets
are due and payable. 63.0% of the mortgage assets are in
foreclosure. Finally, 14.6% of the mortgage assets are REO and were
acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure on the
associated loan.  The pool includes 884 loans with an aggregate
balance of approximately $258,699,537 and 201 REO properties with
an aggregate balance of approximately $44,192,078.  If the value of
the related mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount,
some of these loans may be settled by the borrower or their
estate.

                       Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst
three classes of notes with overcollateralization.  All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their mandatory call dates.  The subordinate notes will not receive
principal until the beginning of their target amortization periods
(in the absence of an acceleration event).  The notes also benefit
from overcollateralization as credit enhancement and an interest
reserve account funded with cash received from the initial
purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium.  The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in February 2018.  For the Class
M1 notes, the mandatory call date is in August 2018. Finally, for
the Class M2 notes, the mandatory call date is in February 2019.
For each of the subordinate notes, there are six month target
amortization periods that conclude on the respective mandatory call
dates.  The legal final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to come from the
liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance claims.
These funds will be received with irregular timing.  In the event
that there are not adequate funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve fund may be utilized.  Additionally,
any shortage in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall.  These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer.  Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer.  However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults.  Also, while Nationstar is required
to pay to the trust any debenture interest due, a replacement
servicer will only remit debenture interest actually received.

                        Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar.  The review focused on
data integrity, presence of FHA insurance coverage, accurate
recordation of appraisals, accurate recording of occupancy status,
borrower age documentation, identification of non-borrower spouses,
identification of excessive corporate advances, and identification
of tax liens with first priority in Texas.  Also, broker price
opinions (BPOs) were ordered for 176 properties for appraisals that
were over one year old.
Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable)
and thus relatively weak from a credit perspective.  Given the
nascent nature of their securitization program, Moody's has limited
insight as to their ability to serve in this capacity. This risk is
mitigated by the fact that Nationstar is the equity holder in the
transaction and there is therefore a significant alignment of
interests.  Another factor mitigating this risk is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect.  Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is qualified and is made only as to the
initial mortgage loans.  Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws.

Upon the identification of a breach in R&W, Nationstar has to cure
the breach.  If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification.  Moody's believes the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

                     Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2016-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB.  The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

                              Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up.  Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market.  Property markets could
improve from our original expectations resulting in appreciation in
the value of the mortgaged property and faster property sales.

                               Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down.  Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market.  Property markets could
deteriorate from our original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.

                           Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitizations Backed by Non-performing Loans," published
in July 2014 and "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Reverse
Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Moody's quantitative asset analysis was based on a loan-by-loan
modeling of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA
insurance and with various stresses applied to model parameters
depending on the target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: Funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO property and through FHA
insurance claim receipts.  There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance.  Specifically, the amount of
insurance proceeds received depends on whether a sales based claim
(SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is filed.

If the property is sold within six months of the receipt of
marketable title, the claim is for the unpaid principal balance
(UPB) minus net sales proceeds.  This is a SBC.  If the REO
property has not been sold by the end of six months after receipt
of marketable title, the servicer must file an ABC for the UPB
minus the most recent appraisal.  An additional claim will be filed
with the FHA for allowable foreclosure costs, debenture interest,
mortgage insurance premiums, and escrow advances.

ABCs are expected to have higher levels of losses than SBCs.  The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO.  Additionally, ABCs do not
cover the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover
these costs.  For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6%
ordinarily.  Moody's base case expectation of 13.5% losses on ABCs
is based on the historical experience of Nationstar.  Moody's
stressed these losses at higher credit rating levels.

In our asset analysis, we also assumed there would be some losses
for SBCs, albeit at lower levels.  With an SBC, FHA insurance will
only protect against losses to the extent that the REO property is
sold at 95% of the latest appraised value or greater (and claim
amounts are lower than the MCA).  Sales at prices below this level
will suffer losses.  Based on historical performance, Moody's
assumed that SBCs would suffer 1% losses in the base case scenario.
Moody's stressed these losses at higher rating levels.

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total).  All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure.  Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario we assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs.  Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels.

Liquidation process: Each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. The
loans are assumed to move through each of these stages until being
sold out of REO.  Depending on the reason for default, a loan may
be in default status for one to six months.  Due and payable status
is expected to last six to twelve months. Foreclosure status is
based on the state in which that the related property is located
and is further stressed at higher rating levels.  The base case
foreclosure timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance.  REO
disposition is assumed to take place in six months with respect to
sales based claims and twelve months with respect to appraisal
based claims.

Debenture interest: The receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer.  If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment.
Moody's base case assumption is that all debenture interest will be
received.  This is also based on the historical experience of
Nationstar.  Moody's stressed the amount of debenture interest that
will be received at higher rating levels.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into our analysis, including the following:
In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in our analysis.  However, for seasoned appraisals
we applied a 15% haircut to account for potential home price
depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the cut-off
date.

Mortgage loans with significant positive equity are likely to be
bought out of the trust or otherwise cured and therefore will not
transition to REO status.  Moody's estimated which loans would be
bought out of the trust by comparing each loans' appraisal value
(post haircut) to its UPB.

Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA.

Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar was no longer the
servicer.  Moody's assumes these in the situation where Nationstar
is no longer the servicer:

  a. Foreclosure Costs and servicing fees: Nationstar subordinates

     their collection of FCL cost collections (from insurance
     claim) and servicing fees and advances (effectively also from

     insurance claim).  A replacement servicer will not
     subordinate these.

  b. Nationstar also indemnifies the trust for lost debenture
     interest.  A replacement servicer may not do this.

  c. A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus

     Moody's assumes a 25bps strip will take effect if the
     servicer changes.

  d. One third of foreclosure costs may be removed from sales
     proceeds to reimburse replacement servicer.  This is
     typically in the order of $1,500.


NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: Moody’s Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Cl. E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by Neuberger Berman CLO XXI, Ltd.
(the "Issuer" or "Neuberger Berman CLO XXI").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$223,200,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$23,400,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$19,800,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$16,200,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2027 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes, are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Neuberger Berman CLO XXI, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The
issued notes and loans will be collateralized primarily by broadly
syndicated first-lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 96%
of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The underlying portfolio is
expected to be approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

Neuberger Berman Investment Advisers LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may purchase
additional collateral using principal proceeds from prepayments and
sales of credit risk obligations, subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
fee notes and subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates
interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert
interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of
seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $360,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2760

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.8%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.85%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years


NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: S&P Assigns BB Prelim Rating on "N" Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Neuberger Berman CLO XXI Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XXI LLC's
$242.40 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 18,
2016. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

  -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
     notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
     payable to the subordinated notes.

  -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
     withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
     (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
     can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
     Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
     using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
     collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria. The
     transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
     bankruptcy remote.

  -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
     primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
     secured term loans.

  -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

  -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
     ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
     which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
     assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
     ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
     LIBOR ranging from 0.6206%-12.5967%.

  -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
     coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
     diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
     rated notes' outstanding balance.

  -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
     failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
     certain amount of excess interest proceeds, that are
     available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
     fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
     manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments, to
     principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets
     during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XXI Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XXI LLC

Class                Rating               Amount
                                          (mil. $)
-----                ------              --------
X                    AAA (sf)               3.00
A                    AAA (sf)             223.20
B                    NR                    45.00
C (deferrable)       NR                    23.40
D (deferrable)       NR                    19.80
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)               16.20
Subordinated notes   NR                    30.90

NR--Not rated.


NEWCASTLE CDO VI: Moody's Hikes Cl. I-MM Debt Rating From 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Newcastle CDO VI, Limited ("Newcastle CDO VI"):

  Class I-MM Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
  previously on Mar 11, 2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class of notes due to the
combination of the high recoveries on sales of high credit risk
assets; positive credit migration within the underlying collateral
pool; the current distribution of near-term maturity assets; and
the redistribution of interest as principal due to the failure of
certain par value tests. This more than offset the reduction in
WARR. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

Newcastle CDO VI is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) including rake
bonds (81.8% of the current collateral pool balance); and ii)
residential mortgage backed securities, primarily in the form of
sub-prime certificates, (RMBS) (18.2%). As of the January 19, 2016
trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $214.4 million from
$500.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the senior
most outstanding class of notes, as a result of the combination of
regular amortization and interest proceeds re-diverted as principal
due to failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains ten assets totaling $33.8 million (49.2% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the January 19, 2016 trustee report. Four of these assets (68.2%
of the defaulted balance) are CMBS; and six (31.8%) are RMBS.
Moody's does expect significant losses to occur from these
defaulted securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4944,
compared to 5824 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 and 5.8% compared to 12.7% at
last review, A1-A3 and 22.9% compared to 0.0% at last review,
Baa1-Baa3 and 13.4% compared to 21.0% at last review, Ba1-Ba3 and
8.6% compared to 6.1% at last review, B1-B3 and 0.0% compared to
1.3% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 49.3% compared to 59.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 4.6%, compared to 9.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, compared to 5.0% at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and assessments.
Increasing the recovery rate of the collateral pool by 10% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
three notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Baa2). Decreasing the recovery rate of the collateral
pool to 0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of one notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


PEOPLE'S CHOICE 2004-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. M2 Debt Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class M2
from People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-1.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2004-1

  Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgraded is a result of the declining performance of
the related pool and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


PREFERRED TERM XXV: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B-1 Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd.:

  $482,600,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due June 22,
   2037, (current outstanding balance of $256,034,806), Upgraded
   to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 18, 2014, Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $129,400,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due June 22,
   2037, (current outstanding balance of $126,923,090), Upgraded
   to A2 (sf); previously on July 18, 2014, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  $61,400,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due June 22,

   2037 (current outstanding balance of $60,223,855), Upgraded to
   Ba2 (sf); previously on July 18, 2014, Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
   June 22, 2037, (current outstanding balance of $24,520,193),
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 18, 2014, Upgraded to
   B1 (sf)

  $82,300,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due June 22,

   2037 (current outstanding balance of $89,800,118, including
   deferred interest), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 24,

   2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  $18,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
   June 22, 2037, (current outstanding balance of $23,272,397,
   including deferred interest), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously
   on June 24, 2010, Downgraded to C (sf)

Moody's also upgraded the rating on the following combo notes
issued by PreTSL Combination Series P XXV Trust:

Series 2 (current rated balance of $8,588,861), Upgraded to Ca
(sf); previously on June 24, 2010, Downgraded to C (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

PreTSL Combination Series P XXV Trust, a combination note security,
was issued in March 2007 and originally comprised $10 million of
the Class C-1 notes and $10 million of the Income Notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, repayment of deferred interest
on the Class B notes, and resumption of interest payments of
previously deferring assets since February 2015.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 12.2% or $36.5
million since then, using principal proceeds from the redemption of
the underlying assets and the diversion of excess interest
proceeds.  The deal received recovery proceeds of $11.0 million, or
44.2% of par, from one defaulted asset.  In addition, one
previously deferring bank, with a par of $10 million, has resumed
interest payments on its trust preferred securities.  As a result,
the Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to 203.5% from
188.0% since February 2015, by Moody's calculations.  Based on the
trustee's December 2015 report, the OC ratios of the Class A, B, C
and D notes was 133.8% (limit 128.0%), 109.2% (limit 115.0%), 88.1%
(limit 105.5%), and 79.1% (limit 100.3%), respectively, versus
February 2015 levels of 130.4%, 106.6%, 87.5%, and 79.2%,
respectively.  The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from
the diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance (after treating deferring securities as
performing if they meet certain criteria) of $518.3 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $199 million, a weighted average default
probability of 8.46% (implying a WARF of 760), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 10%.  In addition to the
quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors
are part of rating committee considerations.  Moody's considers the
structural protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of
default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment and specific documentation features.  All
information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit
stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating
decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US
     banking and insurance sectors.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number

     of banks have resumed making interest payments on their
     TruPS.  The timing and amount of deferral cures could have
     significant positive impact on the transaction's over-
     collateralization ratios and the ratings on the notes.

  5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly.  To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc,
an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive
credit scores.  Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of
the bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial
data.  For insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit
analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory
financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 485)
Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +1
Class B-1: +2
Class B-2: +2
Class C-1: +1
Class C-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1138)
Class A-1: -1
Class A-2: -1
Class B-1: -2
Class B-2: -2
Class C-1: -1
Class C-2: -1


PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody’s Affirms Ba2 on Cl. K Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on seven classes
and affirmed the ratings on 13 classes in Protective Finance
Corporation REMIC, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-PL as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes, Classes C through J, were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 21%
since Moody's last review.

The ratings on ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on two P&I classes, Class P and Q, were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.5% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 67% to $334 million
from $1.02 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 111 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 35% of
the pool. All but three of the remaining loans (99% of the pool
balance) fully amortize throughout their loan term. The pool does
not contain any defeased loans or loans with a structured credit
assessment.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or in special
servicing. Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $5.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 67%).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.7% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.5 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 98% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 59%, compared to 61%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 2.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.94X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three exposures represent 16% of the pool balance. The
largest exposure consists of two cross collateralized loans ($21.8
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which are secured by adjacent
shopping centers located in Beckley, West Virginia. The
fully-amortizing loans have amortized over 33% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and 1.65X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.55X at last review.

The second largest exposure is secured by an anchored retail center
located in Conway, Arkansas ($17.7 million -- 5.3% of the pool).
Overall property performance has been stable for the past three
years. The three largest tenants lease a combined 46% of the NRA.
The fully-amortizing loan has amortized over 20% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and 2.28X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest exposure is secured by a 336-unit multifamily
located in Orlando, Florida, close to the Orlando International
Airport ($14.6 million -- 4.4% of the pool). The property was 98%
leased as of July 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and
1.22X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.21X at the last review.


PUTNAM CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Cl. A-2 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd. ("Putnam
CDO 2002-1"):

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MT -a Medium Term Floating Rate Notes Du
2038, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MT -b Medium Term Floating Rate Notes Due
2038, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MT -c Medium Term Floating Rate Notes Due
2038, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -d Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -e Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -f Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -g Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -h Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -i Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$176,000,000 Class A-1MM -j Floating Rate Notes Due 2038,
Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

US$80,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, Affirmed Caa3
(sf); previously on Mar 13, 2015 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. While
the WARF has increased slightly since last review, the increase in
WARR offsets any effects. The affirmation is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Putnam 2002-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (46.5% of the
pool balance); ii) asset backed securities (ABS) (43.3%; of which
18.3% of these are government-sponsored mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) and the remainder is primarily in the form of subprime and
Alt-A RMBS); and iii) CRE CDOs (10.2%). As of the trustee's January
4, 2016 report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, is $450.0 million, compared to $2
billion at issuance with the paydown directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes, as a result of full and partial
amortization of the underlying collateral.

The pool contains fourteen assets totaling $79.0 million (15.1% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's January 4, 2016 trustee report. Four
of these assets (69.8% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS, one
asset is CRE CDO (12.7%), and nine assets are ABS (primarily in the
form of non-government sponsored RMBS (17.5%). While there have
been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect low/moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3464, compared to 3383 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (26.5% compared to 30.5% at last
review); A1-A3 (10.2% compared to 9.1% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(2.0%, compared to 3.6% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (5.3% compared to
3.2% at last review); B1-B3 (25.7% compared to 19.5% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (30.3% compared to 34.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.0 years, same as last review. The WAL is
based on assumptions about extensions on the underlying
collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 29.3%, as compared to 23.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0%, same as last review.


SALOMON BROTHERS 1999-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. L Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of Salomon Brothers Mortgage
Securities VII, Inc., commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 1999-C1.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the pool's overall stable performance
since the last review in March 2015 and its concentration.  Three
loans/assets remain in the transaction from the original 213 loans:
one defeased (65.6%), one real estate owned (REO) asset (21.1%),
and one performing loan (13.3%).  The senior class, class K, is
fully covered by the defeased asset which matures in August 2016.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99.3% to $5.1 million from
$734.9 million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes L and M.

The REO asset is a 53,000 square foot (sf) mixed use property
(retail, office and residential) located in Troy, NY.  The
residential portion of the property was operated as an extended
stay hotel on the upper floors.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2008 due to payment default and has been REO
since November 2015.  The property is currently being marketed for
sale.

The remaining loan in the pool is secured by a 96 unit multifamily
property located in Oklahoma City, OK.  The fully amortizing loan
matures in 2028.  Performance at the property has been stable.  The
servicer reported occupancy and a debt service coverage ratio were
with 92.7% and 2.34x, respectively as of year to date
Sept. 30, 2015.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class K remains Stable.  Full repayment of
the class is supported by defeased collateral maturing in the next
six months.  Class L has already incurred losses.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $651,137 class K at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.
   -- $4.2 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 65%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class M certificate.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificate.


SASCO 2005-AR1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M2 Debt to Caa3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
issued by Structured Asset Securities Corporation (SASCO) Series
2005-AR1, which is backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2005-AR1

  Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (Insured
Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

  Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Confirmed at A1 (sf)
  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 12, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


SILVER SPRING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Silver Spring CLO Ltd.:

  $10,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $11,100,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $22, 700,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,700,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $4,100,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $258,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014, Definitive
   Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $36,900,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
   Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014, Definitive
   Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed
   Aa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 10, 2014, Definitive Rating
   Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Silver Spring CLO Ltd., issued in September 2014, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in October 2018.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades on the Class C-1, C-2, D, E and F notes
reflect the substantial credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio of the CLO and increased expected losses on the notes.
The credit deterioration in the CLO portfolio is primarily a result
of the transaction's large exposure to energy and commodity-linked
collateral assets whose ratings were recently downgraded, are
currently on review for downgrade or have negative credit
outlooks.

Moody's notes that this transaction has a large exposure to
obligors in the following industries:

   -- Energy -- Oil & Gas industry, 15%, including 8% in the
      Exploration & Production (E&P) and Oilfield Services (OFS)
      sectors; and

   -- Metals & Mining industry, 4%.

Companies in the energy and commodity related industries face
unfavorable market conditions which have adversely impacted the
credit quality and liquidity profiles of obligors.  E&P and OFS
companies, in particular, are struggling with difficult industry
fundamentals and operating environments, while Metals & Mining
companies face weakening demand and a prolonged period of
oversupply.  CLOs with large exposures to obligors in the energy
and commodity related industries face greater risk of defaults and
potential trading losses, putting negative pressure on par coverage
for the CLO notes.

By way of comparison, most outstanding CLO 2.0s have limited
exposures averaging about 6% to energy and commodity related
industries, and therefore have not yet experienced significant
deterioration in credit quality.  The exposure to these two
industries as well as realized and expected changes in credit
quality of CLO portfolios are part of the key focal points of our
current CLO rating reviews.

Based on Moody's calculation, reflecting adjustments for 27% of the
portfolio which carries Moody's ratings with a negative outlook or
are on review for downgrade, Silver Spring CLO Ltd. has a current
portfolio weighted average rating factor (WARF) of 3212 compared to
a covenant of 2822.  Moody's expects that conclusion of the ongoing
rating reviews of these weakened credits will result in
substantially larger holdings of collateral assets rated Caa1 or
lower.  At the same time, 15% of the portfolio consists of
securities from obligors with either Moody's weakest Speculative
Grade Liquidity (SGL) Rating of SGL-4 or a Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) of Caa1 or lower.  An increase in Caa-rated assets or
potential defaults could cause an overcollateralization (OC) breach
and lead to interest deferrals on the transaction's junior notes to
pay down the senior notes.  Finally, the transaction has
accumulated a higher than average 6% exposure in second lien loans
which are vulnerable to poor recoveries in the event of a default.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy,
     especially in the energy and commodity sectors, and b) the
     concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
     which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected by the
     manager's investment strategy and behavior, amid volatile
     market conditions.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.

  5) Other collateral quality metrics: Reinvestment is allowed and

     the manager has the ability to negatively affect the
     collateral quality metrics' existing buffers against the
     covenant levels, which could negatively affect the
     transaction.

  6) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): This transaction has a
     significant exposure to loans with LIBOR floors, and the
     inclusion of LIBOR floors in its determination of compliance
     with its WAS test can create additional ratings volatility.

  7) Exposure to assets with weak liquidity: The presence of
     assets with Moody's weakest SGL rating of SGL-4, exposes the
     notes to additional risks if these assets default.  The
     historical default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-
     4 ratings than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the
     deal's high exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute
     around $19.5 million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2570)
Class A: 0
Class B-1: +2
Class B-2: +2
Class C-1: +2
Class C-2: +2
Class D: +2
Class E: +1
Class F: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3854)
Class A: -1
Class B-1: -2
Class B-2: -2
Class C-1: -2
Class C-2: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1
Class F: -4

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $400.5 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 26.83% (implying a
WARF of 3212), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.9%, a diversity score of 50 and a weighted average spread of
3.76% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


SILVERMORE CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. C Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Silvermore CLO Ltd.:

  $29,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due May 15, 2026, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due May 15, 2026, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $26,200,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes Due May 15, 2026, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $5,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

   Due May 15, 2026, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
   May 29, 2014, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $322,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   May 15, 2026, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 29, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $57,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
   May 15, 2026, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 29, 2014,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Silvermore CLO Ltd., issued in May 2014, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period will end in May
2018.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades on the Class B, C, D and E notes reflect the
substantial credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio of the
CLO and increased expected losses on the notes.  The credit
deterioration in the CLO portfolio is primarily a result of the
transaction's large exposure to energy and commodity-linked
collateral assets whose ratings were recently downgraded, are
currently on review for downgrade or have negative credit
outlooks.

Moody's notes that this transaction has a large exposure to
obligors in these industries:

   -- Energy -- Oil & Gas industry, 14%, including 9% in the
      Exploration & Production (E&P) and Oilfield Services (OFS)
      sectors; and

   -- Metals & Mining industry, 6%.

Companies in the energy and commodity related industries face
unfavorable market conditions which have adversely impacted the
credit quality and liquidity profiles of obligors.  E&P and OFS
companies, in particular, are struggling with difficult industry
fundamentals and operating environments, while Metals & Mining
companies face weakening demand and a prolonged period of
oversupply.  CLOs with large exposures to obligors in the energy
and commodity related industries face greater risk of defaults and
potential trading losses, putting negative pressure on par coverage
for the CLO notes.

By way of comparison, most outstanding CLO 2.0s have limited
exposures averaging about 6% to energy and commodity related
industries, and therefore have not yet experienced significant
deterioration in credit quality.  The exposure to these two
industries as well as realized and expected changes in credit
quality of CLO portfolios are part of the key focal points of our
current CLO rating reviews.

Based on Moody's calculation, reflecting adjustments for 29% of the
portfolio which carries Moody's ratings with a negative outlook or
are on review for downgrade, Silvermore CLO Ltd. has a current
portfolio weighted average rating factor (WARF) of 3401 compared to
a covenant of 2970.  Moody's expects that conclusion of the ongoing
rating reviews of these weakened credits will result in
substantially larger holdings of collateral assets rated Caa1 or
lower.  At the same time, 16% of the portfolio consists of
securities from obligors with either Moody's weakest Speculative
Grade Liquidity (SGL) Rating of SGL-4 or a Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) of Caa1 or lower.  An increase in Caa-rated assets or
potential defaults could cause an overcollateralization (OC) breach
and lead to interest deferrals on the transaction's junior notes to
pay down the senior notes.  Finally, the transaction has
accumulated a higher than average 5% exposure in second lien loans
which are vulnerable to poor recoveries in the event of a default.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy,
     especially in the energy and commodity sectors, and b) the
     concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
     which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected by the
     manager's investment strategy and behavior, amid volatile
     market conditions.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.

  5) Other collateral quality metrics: Reinvestment is allowed and

     the manager has the ability to negatively affect the
     collateral quality metrics' existing buffers against the
     covenant levels, which could negatively affect the
     transaction.

  6) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): This transaction has a
     significant exposure to loans with LIBOR floors, and the
     inclusion of LIBOR floors in its determination of compliance
     with its WAS test can create additional ratings volatility.

  7) Exposure to assets with weak liquidity: The presence of
     assets with Moody's weakest SGL rating of SGL-4, exposes the
     notes to additional risks if these assets default.  The
     historical default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-
     4 ratings than those with other SGL ratings.  Due to the
     deal's high exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute
     around $22.6 million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case
     defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2721)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +3
Class B: +2
Class C: +2
Class D: +1
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4081)
Class A-1: -1
Class A-2: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1
Class E: -3

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $500.5 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 28.44% (implying a
WARF of 3401), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.27%, a diversity score of 51 and a weighted average spread of
3.75% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


TABERNA PREFERRED V: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to B3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Taberna Preferred Funding V, Ltd.:

  $100,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due August 2036
   (current balance of $66,181,333), Upgraded to B3 (sf);
   previously on December 8, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  $250,000,000 Class A-1LAD Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
   August 2036 (current balance of $165,453,331), Upgraded to
   B3 (sf); previously on Dec. 8, 2010, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Taberna Preferred Funding V, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of REIT trust
preferred securities, CMBS, corporate debts and CRE CDO tranches.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since February
2015.

The Class A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes have collectively paid down
by approximately 18.2% or $51.6 million since February 2015 using
principal proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds.  As a result, the Class
A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes' par coverage has thus improved to
123.9% from 115.8% since then by Moody's calculations.  Based on
the trustee's January 2016 report, the over-collateralization ratio
of the Class A-1LB notes was 102.6% (limit 125.0%), versus 100.5%
on February 2015 and that of the Class A-2L notes, 78.3% (limit
125%), versus 79.0% in February 2015.

In addition, diversion of excess interest to pay down the notes
will increase materially after the interest rate swap matures in
February 2016.  On the last payment date in February 2016, the deal
paid $2.8 million of interest proceeds to the swap counterparty. As
a result of the acceleration of the notes' payments, the Class
A-1LA and Class A-1LAD notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio.  According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 3659 in
February 2016.

The action takes into consideration the Event of Default (EoD) and
subsequent acceleration that occurred in January 2011.  The
transaction declared an EoD according to Section 5.1 (a) of the
indenture due to a default in the payment of interest due on the
Class A-1LA, Class A-1LAD, and Class A-1LB notes.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $287.0
million, defaulted and deferring par of $109.2 million, a weighted
average default probability of 54.26% (implying a WARF of 3659),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 9.55%. In
addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features.  All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized REIT that Moody's does not rate publicly.  For REIT
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses
their credit quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2190)
Class A-1LA: +3
Class A-1LAD: +3
Class A-1LB: +1
Class A-2L: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 5497)
Class A-1LA: -2
Class A-1LAD: -2
Class A-1LB: 0
Class A-2L: 0


TABERNA PREFERRED VI: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-1A Debt Rating to B2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Taberna Preferred Funding VI, Ltd.:

  $50,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes due December 2036 (current outstanding balance of
   $27,781,742.34), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 27,
   2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  $305,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
   Secured Floating Rate Notes due December 2036 (current
   outstanding balance of $169,468,628.31), Upgraded to B2 (sf);
   previously on May 27, 2015, Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Taberna Preferred Funding VI, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by a portfolio of REIT
trust preferred securities (TruPS), with exposure to corporate
bonds.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A-1A and A-1B notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios since May 2015.

The Class A-1A and A-1B notes have paid down by approximately 20.2%
or $7.0 million and $42.8 million, respectively, since May 2015,
using principal proceeds from the redemption of underlying assets
and the diversion of excess interest proceeds.  Based on Moody's
calculations, the Class A-1 and Class A-2 OC ratios are 140.5% and
96.5%, respectively, versus May 2015 levels of 127.5% and 93.5%.
The credit quality of the portfolio, as indicated by the weighted
average rating factor (WARF), is also stable since the last rating
action.

In 2009, the transaction declared an Event of Default because of a
missed interest payment on the Class C notes, and a majority of the
controlling class directed the trustee to declare the notes
immediately due and payable.  As a result of the declaration of
acceleration of the notes, all proceeds after paying interest on
the Class A-1A, A-1B and A-2 notes are currently used to pay down
the principal of the Class A-1A and A-1B Notes.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
WARF, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.
In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
as having a performing par of $277.2 million, defaulted and
deferring par of $195.2 million, a weighted average default
probability of 43.9% (implying a WARF of 3273), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 13.1%.  In addition to the
quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors
are part of rating committee considerations.  Moody's considers the
structural protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of
default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment and specific documentation features.  All
information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit
stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating
decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit estimates.  Because these are not
     public ratings, they are subject to additional uncertainties.

                    Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge™ cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by Real
Estate Investment Trusts that Moody's does not rate publicly.  To
evaluate the credit quality of REIT TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit quality using the
REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1984)
Class A-1A: +4
Class A-1B: +4
Class A-2: +4
Class B: 0
Class C: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 4501)
Class A-1A: -3
Class A-1B: -3
Class A-2: -4
Class B: 0
Class C: 0



UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C6: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Securities LLC's UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust
2013-C6, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-C6.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool.  There have been no delinquent or specially
serviced loans since issuance.  The pool has experienced no
realized losses to date and Fitch has not designated any loans as
Fitch Loans of Concern.

As of the February 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 2.6% to $1.26 billion from
$1.3 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(0.1% of the pool) is defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class G.

The largest loan in the pool (10%) is the 575 Broadway loan; a
169,450 square-foot (sf) mixed-use property located at 575 Broadway
in Manhattan, New York, NY.  Originally purchased by the sponsor in
1989 for $9.6 million, the property is now occupied by a mix of
retail and office tenants including Prada (retail), Estee Lauder,
Inc. (office), Code and Theory (office) and Coldwater Creek
(office).  According to the January 2016 rent roll, the property is
100% occupied.  The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the
interest-only loan was reported to be 3.64x as of year-end (YE)
2014.  At issuance, the occupancy and DSCR was 93% and 3.54x,
respectively.

The second largest loan (6.1%) is the Shoppes at River Crossing
loan, which is secured by a 727,963 sf shopping center, of which
527,963 sf is collateral.  The property, located in Macon, GA,
which is roughly 75 miles south of Atlanta, is a lifestyle center
with a power center component.  Built in 2008, the subject is
anchored by Belk's (ground lease) and Dillard's (not part of
collateral).  Other tenants include Dick's, Barnes & Noble and
Joann Fabrics.  As of YE 2014, occupancy was reported to be 95% and
a 2.62x DSCR.

The third largest loan (6%) is the 2000 Market Street loan, which
is secured by a 29-story, 665,649 sf office building located in the
central business district of Philadelphia, PA.  The property has a
mix of 65 office tenants with the largest tenants including law
firms Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, and Fox
Rothschild, LLP as well as the Board of Pensions of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), who are all on long-term leases and
combine to occupy 49% of the net rentable area.  Occupancy was
reported to be 96% as of September 2015 and the DSCR was 2.18x,
both in-line with issuance.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks remain Stable.  Due to the recent issuance of the
transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee positive
or negative ratings migration until a material economic or asset
level event changes the transaction's overall portfolio-level
metrics.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $32 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $43 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $155 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $461.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $87 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $95 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $111.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $984.9 million* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $140.9 million* class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.
   -- $90.7 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $48.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.4 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-C or class G
certificates.


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: S&P Affirms B- Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from the
same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade of the class A-4 certificates to 'AAA (sf)' reflects
the results of S&P's cash flow analysis. S&P's cash flow analysis
indicates that this class should receive its full repayment of
principal due to time tranching, as described in "U.S. CMBS 'AAA'
Scenario Loss and Recovery Application," published July 21, 2009.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-5, A-5FL, A-1A, and A-M to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for
these classes, which it believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels. The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral and
available liquidity support. The upgrades also reflect the trust
balance's reduction as well as the full repayment, with lower
expected loss, of the previously specially serviced asset, Peter
Cooper Village & Stuyvesant Town asset ($247.7 million original
pool trust balance).

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the class A-J, B, and C
certificates reflect its views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

The ratings on classes D through G remain at 'D (sf)' in accordance
with its interest shortfall criteria. Under these criteria, a
potential upgrade can be considered after a class has experienced a
reimbursement of all past interest shortfalls and the subsequent
payment of timely interest over at least the subsequent six months.
In addition, any potential upgrade following an interest shortfall
would also depend upon S&P's determination that no future
shortfalls are likely to occur, considering the underlying
creditworthiness of the securities.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class IO interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $4.3 billion, which is 73.6% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 116 loans (adjusting for
crossed loans), 15 real estate owned assets, and three subordinated
notes, down from 181 loans at issuance. Nineteen of these assets
($308.6 million, 7.1%) and one subordinate note ($6.0 million,
0.1%) are with the special servicer, nine ($175.4 million, 4.1%)
are defeased, and 26 ($794.6 million, 18.5%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported financial information for 98.5% of the non-defeased loans
in the pool, of which 49.2% was year-end 2014 data, 1.7% was
partial year 2014 data, and the remainder was partial year 2015
data.

S&P calculated a 1.15x Standard & Poor's weighted-average debt
service coverage(DSC) and 111.4% Standard & Poor's weighted-average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.45% Standard & Poor's
weighted-average capitalization rate.

The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate calculations exclude the 19
specially serviced assets, nine defeased loans, and three
subordinate B notes ($43.4 million, 1.0%). The top 10 non-defeased
loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $2.1
billion (49.7%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's weighted-average DSC and LTV of 1.11x and 118.1%,
respectively, for the top 10 non-defeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $160.6 million in
principal losses, or 2.7% of the original pool trust balance. We
expect losses to reach approximately 5.0% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of all
19 specially serviced assets. S&P estimated a 100% loss for the one
specially serviced subordinate note.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, 19 of these
assets ($308.6 million, 7.1%) and one subordinate note ($6.0
million, 0.1%) in the pool are with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC. A total of $110.6 million in appraisal reduction
amounts (ARAs) are in effect against the specially serviced
assets.

Details of the three largest specially serviced assets are as
follows:

The Corporate Plaza loan ($44.6, 1.0%) has $44.9 million in total
reported exposure and is secured by a 277,799 - sq.-ft. office
property in Wilmington, Del. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in November 2014, for imminent default due to
tenancy issues at the property. The reported DSC was 1.37x as of
June 30, 2015. Occupancy as of July 2015 was 72.7%. There is no ARA
in effect against this loan, and S&P expects a moderate loss upon
its eventual resolution.

The Scottsdale Medical Office real-estate owned (REO) asset ($36.5,
0.9%) has $39.0 million in total reported exposure and is secured
by a 154,136-sq.-ft. medical office property in Scottsdale, Ariz.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer in October 2013
for imminent payment default. The loan became REO on June 4, 2014.
The reported DSC and occupancy were 0.15x and 66%, respectively, as
of Sept. 30, 2015. An ARA of $24.3 million is in effect against
this asset, and S&P expects a significant loss upon its eventual
resolution.

The Whittier Center REO asset ($26.1, 0.6%) has $29.3 million in
total reported exposure and is secured by a 143,450-sq.-ft.
suburban office property in Los Angeles, Calif. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2012 for payment default.
The loan became REO on May 23, 2014. The reported DSC and occupancy
were 0.34x and 48%, respectively, as of Sept. 30, 2015. An ARA of
$12.6 million is in effect against this asset, and S&P expects a
moderate loss upon its eventual resolution.

The remaining assets with the special servicer have individual
balances that represent 0.6% or less of the total pool trust
balance. S&P estimated losses for all the 19 specially serviced
assets and one subordinate note, arriving at a weighted-average
loss severity of 41.0%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C31

                                     Rating        Rating          
             
Class           Identifier           To            From            
     
A-3             92978TAC5            AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)        
     
A-PB            92978TAD3            AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)        
     
A-4             92978TAE1            AAA (sf)      BBB- (sf)       
     
A-5             92978TAF8            A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)       
     
A-1A            92978TAG6            A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)       
     
A-M             92978TAH4            BB- (sf)      B (sf)          
     
A-J             92978TAJ0            B- (sf)       B- (sf)         
     
B               92978TAK7            B- (sf)       B- (sf)         
     
C               92978TAL5            CCC (sf)      CCC (sf)        
     
A-5FL           92978TAQ4            A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)       
     
IO              92978TBU4            AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)  


WELLS FARGO 2005-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. M-1 Debt to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
from Wells Fargo Alternative Loan 2005-2 Trust, backed by Alt-A
RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Alternative Loan 2005-2 Trust

  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2013,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 11, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


WIRELESS CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Class 2013-1B Debt Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for Wireless Capital
Partners LLC secured wireless site contract revenue notes series
2013-1 and 2013-2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to stable performance and continued cash
flow growth since issuance. The Stable Outlooks reflect the limited
prospect for upgrades given the provision to issue additional
notes.

The certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 740 wireless sites securing one
fixed-rate loan. As of the February 2016 distribution date, the
aggregate principal balance of the notes has been reduced by 0.5%
to $149.3 from $150 million since issuance.

The transaction is structured with scheduled monthly principal
payments that will amortize down the principal balance 10% by the
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in year seven, reducing the
refinance risk. The scheduled monthly principal payments are paid
sequentially beginning in the third year from closing until the
note's ARD.

The ownership interest in the wireless sites consists of lease
purchase sites, easements and fee interests in land, rooftops or
other structures on which site space is allocated for placement of
tower and wireless communication equipment. Unlike typical cell
tower securitizations in which the towers serve as collateral, the
collateral for this securitization generally consists of lease
purchase sites, easements and the revenue stream from the payments
the owner of the tower and/or tenants of the site pay to MelTel II
Issuer LLC, formerly known as WCP Issuer LLC.

Fitch analyzed the collateral data and site information provided by
the issuer, MelTel II Issuer LLC. As of February 2016, aggregate
net cash flow increased 19.4% to $19.9 million since the issuance
of the 2013-2 notes. The Fitch stressed DSCR increased from 1.23x
at issuance to 1.47x as a result of the increase in net cash flow.
Telephony/broadband tenants represented 96.6% of the annualized run
rate revenue (ARRR).

MelTel II Issuer LLC, an affiliate of Melody Wireless
Infrastructure, acquired Wireless Capital Holdings, LLC, the
ultimate parent of WCP Guarantor LLC, now known as MelTel II
Guarantor LLC, in January 2015. The manager was replaced by an
affiliate of the new issuer.

Funds in the site acquisition account have been fully deployed
after the acquisition of additional collateral during the
acquisition period. The increase in revenue from the acquired sites
exceeds the forecasted revenue underwritten at issuance as the
revenue at issuance was stressed to the most conservative
parameters to meet the pool composition tests outlined in the
transaction documents.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on all classes are expected to remain Stable.
Downgrades are unlikely due to continued cash flow growth from
annual rent escalations and automatic renewal clauses resulting in
higher debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) since issuance. The
ratings have been capped at 'A' and upgrades are unlikely due to
the specialized nature of the collateral and the potential for
changes in technology to affect long-term demand for wireless tower
space.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $94,370,000 class 2013-1A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,000,000 class 2013-1B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,880,000 class 2013-2A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,000,000 class 2013-2B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.


[*] Moody's Cuts Ratings on $127.8MM FHA/VA RMBS Issued 1999-2005
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
issued from three transactions.  The collateral backing these deals
consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate mortgage loans
insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of
the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, 1999-CB2

  1M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-1

  Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 1A5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  AX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  PO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series
2004-R1

  Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. PT, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools and the structural nuances of the
transactions.  The ratings downgraded are primarily due to the
erosion of credit enhancement supporting these bonds due to the
amortization of the subordinate bonds and losses incurred by the
subordinate bonds.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults.  A VA guarantee
covers only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of
either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid
interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount.
HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers
submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties on
servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits.  This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty.  The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses they
deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $356.7MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 18 tranches
from seven deals issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC 2007-NC1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-ASAP1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2015 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 16, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R4

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Funding Corporation Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-OPT2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.


[*] Moody's Raises $328.5MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2005
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 tranches
from 14 transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-13

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2013
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS 2002-CB5 Trust

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS 2003-CB3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB4

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2004-CB5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-CB1

Cl. AF, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Series 2003-CB5, C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-3

Cl. IIM-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. IA-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-3

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2014
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-5

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2014
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2014
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.



[*] Moody's Raises $468MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches,
from 6 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-FRE1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2007-MLN1

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2007-RZ1 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $496.6MM Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Feb. 23, 2016, downgraded the ratings
of five tranches from two transactions and upgraded the ratings of
25 tranches from seven transactions backed by Alt-A and Option ARM
RMBS loans, and issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

  Cl. I-A2A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2010,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. I-A2B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 19, 2010,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. II-A1-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,

   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. II-A1-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,

   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. II-PO2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2003-2XS

  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 3, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-8

  Cl. A2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. A3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Homebanc Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept 5, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept 5, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 20, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 31, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-1

  Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 17, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6AR

  Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 12, 2013,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. 1-B-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6XS

  Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2013,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 20, 2009,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The ratings upgraded are due to the stronger
performance of the underlying collateral and the credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The ratings downgraded are due to the
weaker performance of the underlying collateral, the depletion of
credit enhancement available to the bonds, and the availability of
principal remaining in the waterfall for distribution to
subordinate bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015.   Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF427192

A list of updated estimated transaction pool losses are being
posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this review period
and may be found at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF198174

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $72.8MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued 2002-2003
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches from three transactions issued by GSMPS Mortgage Loan
Trust 2002-1, Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R2 and
Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R4.  The collateral backing
these deals consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate
mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) or
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).
Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 24, 2013,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 24, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R2

  Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2013,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R4

  Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 1A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 1A-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 2A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools and the structural nuances of the
transactions.  The ratings were downgraded due to the erosion of
credit enhancement supporting these bonds.  The current delinquent
pipeline includes loans that have been delinquent for several
years, and the liquidation of these delinquent loans can result in
higher losses that could significantly affect a transaction's
credit enhancement.  Moody's believes the severity on some of these
loans could be much higher than the FHA-VA expected severity.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults.  A VA guarantee
covers only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of
either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid
interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount.
HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers
submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties on
servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits.  This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty.  The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses they
deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $77MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of nine tranches
from five transactions and downgraded the rating of one tranche
from one transaction, backed by Subprime loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, SPMD
2001-A

MF-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC10

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC7

Cl. 3-A2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 15, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds. The rating downgraded is a result of the declining
performance of the related pools and/or a decrease in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in January 2016 from 5.7% in
January 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 14 Classes From 8 CDO Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 23, 2016, discontinued
its ratings on 11 classes from six cash flow (CF) collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transactions, two classes from one CF
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and one class from
one CF Mezzanine Structured Finance (SF) CDO transaction.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- Apidos CDO IV (CF CLO): optional redemption in January 2016.

   -- Gemstone CDO II Ltd. (CF mezzanine SF CDO): senior-most
      tranche paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Jasper CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Jersey Street CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-RR2 (CF CDO of CMBS):
      last remaining rated tranches paid down.

   -- Nob Hill CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Southfork CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      last remaining rated tranche still outstanding.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

Apidos CDO IV
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR                  A- (sf)/Watch Pos
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Gemstone CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Jasper CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Jersey Street CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-RR2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
L                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
M                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Nob Hill CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Southfork CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 58 Classes from 36 U.S. RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered 33 ratings (including 22
to 'D (sf)') on 20 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions.  S&P also removed four ratings from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on
Oct. 30, 2015, and Dec. 14, 2015.  In addition, S&P placed seven
ratings from four transactions on CreditWatch with negative
implications while three ratings from two transactions remain on
CreditWatch negative.  S&P also affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative 11 classes from eight transactions after it
received information to successfully assess the impact of interest
shortfalls on these classes.  Lastly, S&P discontinued its ratings
on four classes from four transactions after they were paid in
full.

The CreditWatch placements reflect that the trustee reports cited
interest shortfalls on the affected classes in recent remittance
periods, which could negatively affect our ratings on those
classes.  After verifying these possible interest shortfalls, S&P
will adjust the ratings as it considers appropriate according to
its criteria.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2002 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate loans
secured primarily by one- to four-family residential properties.

Some combination of subordination, overcollateralization (when
available), excess interest, and bond insurance (as applicable)
provide credit enhancement for all of the transactions in this
review.  Where the bond insurer is no longer rated, S&P solely
relied on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the ratings.

                     ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Application Of Interest Shortfall Criteria

In reviewing these classes, S&P applied its interest shortfall
criteria as stated in "Structured Finance Temporary Interest
Shortfall Methodology," Dec. 15, 2015, which impose a maximum
rating threshold on classes that have incurred interest shortfalls
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.  In applying the
criteria, S&P looked to reimbursement provisions within each
payment waterfall for the applicable class to determine whether the
reimbursement must be made immediately.  In instances where
immediate reimbursement is required, S&P used the maximum length of
time until full interest repayment as part of its analysis to
assign the rating on the class.

In instances where reimbursement may be delayed by other factors
within the payment waterfall, S&P used its cash flow projections
when determining the likelihood that the shortfall would be
reimbursed.

                             DOWNGRADES

Each of the 33 lowered ratings reflects the application of S&P's
interest shortfall criteria, except for one rating that S&P lowered
based on a principal write-down received in the recent remittance
period.  For those classes that feature delayed reimbursement
provisions, S&P projected the transactions' cash flows to assess
the likelihood of the interest shortfalls' reimbursement.  Where
these projections led to ratings that were significantly lower than
their current ratings, the transactions exhibited one or more of
these characteristics:

   -- Multiple credit- or liquidity-related interest shortfalls;
   -- Eroded overcollateralization amounts;
   -- The underlying collateral's decreased weighted average
      coupon; and
   -- Increased lifetime projected losses.

Of the lowered ratings in this review, four moved to
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-)'
or higher), and one remained at investment-grade.  The remaining 28
lowered ratings were already speculative-grade before today's
rating actions.

                           DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on four classes from four transactions
because these classes were paid in full during recent remittance
periods.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
  -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://is.gd/pHiCFk


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 U.S. RMBS Re-REMIC
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 25, 2016, took various
actions on 64 classes from 17 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit (re-REMIC) transactions.  S&P raised 18 ratings; lowered
five ratings; affirmed 40 ratings, with one affirmed rating
remaining on Creditwatch Negative; and discontinued one rating.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and
2010 and are supported by underlying classes from RMBS transactions
backed by a mix of various mortgage loan collateral types.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, as applicable, and bond insurance, provide credit support
for the re-REMIC transactions' underlying securities. Where the
bond insurer is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective
class, it relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating. In
addition, the re-REMICs' capital structures contain subordination.

                    ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 18 classes as the projected credit
support for these classes is sufficient to cover S&P's projected
losses at these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect these (among
other reasons):

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends in the
      underlying transactions; and/or
   -- Increased credit support to the class.

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on five classes due to deteriorated
collateral performance, an increase in delinquencies and/or an
increase in re-performing loans within the underlying transactions,
as well as a decrease in credit support to these classes, among
other reasons.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to S&P's
loss assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by its cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- A high proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 32 ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' categories.  These
affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover its projected losses in those rating
scenarios.

S&P also affirmed eight 'CCC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its
projected losses to these classes.

One of the affirmations, S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating on class 1-A-1
from Wells Fargo Mortgage Loan 2010-RR1 Trust, remains on
CreditWatch Negative to reflect the lack of information necessary
to apply S&P's loan modification criteria.

                           DISCONTINUANCE

S&P discontinued its rating on class A-2 from WaMu Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-RS1 Trust because this class
has been paid in full.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.4% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://is.gd/pjNZsq


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 U.S. Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 25, 2016, completed its
review of 22 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions issued between 1998 and 2007.  The review yielded
eight upgrades, 13 downgrades (including two to 'D (sf)'), and 99
affirmations.  S&P updated the CreditWatch placements of one of the
lowered ratings and 10 of the affirmed ratings, which were all
placed on CreditWatch with negative implications on Jan. 20, 2016.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate subprime mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

Subordination, overcollateralization (when available), excess
interest, and bond insurance (as applicable) provide credit
enhancement for the reviewed transactions.  Where the bond insurer
is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective class
without bond insurance, or is not rated, it relied solely on the
underlying collateral's credit quality and the transaction
structure to derive the rating.

The six classes listed below are insured:

   -- 2004-CB6 Trust's class AF-3 ('AA+ (sf)'), insured by Syncora

      Guarantee Inc. (not rated).  Terwin Mortgage Trust Series
      TMTS 2005-16HE's classes AF-2, AF-4, and AF-5
      ('AA (sf)/Watch Neg'), insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal

      Corp. ('AA').

   -- UCFC Loan Trust 1998-C's classes A6 and A-7 ('CC (sf)'),
      insured by Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. (not rated).

                     ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Application Of U.S. RMBS Pre-2009 Criteria When Loan-Level Data Are
Not Available

When performing S&P's credit analysis to determine the foreclosure
frequency for all pools within this review, S&P segmented the
collateral into current loans (including reperforming) and
delinquent loans.  S&P further segmented the "current" bucket based
on payment pattern.

Where loan-level data was available, S&P derived the foreclosure
frequency as described in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash
Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," published Feb. 18, 2015.
When loan-level data were not available, to derive the current
bucket's foreclosure frequency, S&P made certain assumptions
regarding the percentage of current loans that are reperforming,
the percentage of current loans that have impaired credit history,
and the adjusted loan-to-value of perfect payers.

S&P used pool-level data to compare each pool's performance with
the cohort average.  For pools with high delinquencies and
normalized cumulative losses relative to the cohort average, S&P
assumed a higher foreclosure frequency than that of the cohort
average.  Conversely, S&P assumed a lower foreclosure frequency for
pools with better observed performance relative to the cohort
average.

S&P used pool-level data to derive the foreclosure frequency for
delinquent loans because it uses cohort-specific roll rate
assumptions as set forth in S&P's pre-2009 RMBS surveillance
criteria.

In this review, S&P did not have loan-level data available for
Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust LLC's series 2005-WMC1.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on eight classes from six transactions based
on improved collateral performance, increased credit support,
decreased delinquency levels and/or payment allocation mechanics.
The upgrades reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support for the classes will be sufficient to cover the projected
losses at the higher rating levels.

                             DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on 13 classes from nine transactions (one
of which will remain on CreditWatch negative).  Of the 13
downgrades, nine remained at an investment-grade level, and the
remaining four downgraded classes already had speculative-grade
ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected
credit support for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover its remaining projected losses for the related transactions
at a higher rating.  The downgrades also reflect one or more of:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased credit support; and/or
   -- Application of our interest shortfall criteria.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and in turn to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash flow
projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather than
raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings stability.
In general, the bonds that were affected reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority of principal payments;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline;
   -- Low subordination; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

Of the 99 affirmed ratings, 29 are investment-grade and 70 are
speculative-grade.  The affirmations of classes rated above 'CCC
(sf)' reflect the classes' relatively senior positions in payment
priority and S&P's opinion that its projected credit support is
sufficient to cover its projected losses at those rating levels.

Ten of the affirmed ratings will remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications and had initially been placed on CreditWatch
on Jan. 20, 2016.

                        CREDITWATCH UPDATES

Eight of the CreditWatch updates reflect S&P's lack of information
necessary to apply its loan modification criteria after it made
multiple requests to the applicable trustees or servicers for such
information.

The remaining three CreditWatch updates reflect the likely
application of S&P's loan modification criteria.  S&P needs to
further investigate the weighted average coupon deterioration in
the affected pools before determining what effect such
deterioration may have on S&P's ratings for those classes.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://is.gd/9FQ4Zq


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 25 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 24, 2016, took various
actions on 157 classes from 25 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P lowered 22 ratings, removing
one lowered rating from CreditWatch with negative implications;
raised 35; affirmed 96; and discontinued four.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2002 and
2008 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
alternative-A, closed-end second lien, negative amortization, and
prime jumbo mortgage loan collateral.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, as applicable, and bond insurance, provide credit
enhancement for the transactions in this review.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective
class, it relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating.

                    ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

APPLICATION OF U.S. RMBS PRE-2009 CRITERIA WHEN LOAN-LEVEL DATA IS
NOT AVAILABLE

When performing S&P's credit analysis to determine the foreclosure
frequency for all pools within this review, S&P segmented the
collateral into current loans (including reperforming), and
delinquent loans.  S&P further segmented the current bucket based
on payment pattern.

Where loan-level data was available, S&P derived the foreclosure
frequency as described in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash
Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," published Feb. 18, 2015,
(pre-2009 surveillance criteria).  In instances where loan-level
data was not available, to derive the foreclosure frequency for the
current bucket, S&P made certain assumptions regarding the
percentage of current loans that are reperforming, the percentage
of current loans that have impaired credit history, and the
adjusted loan-to-value ratio of perfect payers.

S&P used pool-level data to compare each pool's performance to the
cohort average.  For pools with high delinquencies and normalized
cumulative losses relative to the cohort average, S&P assumed a
higher foreclosure frequency than that associated with the cohort
average.  Conversely, S&P assumed a lower foreclosure frequency for
pools with better observed performance relative to the cohort
average.

With respect to delinquent loans, because S&P uses cohort-specific
roll rate assumptions, it used pool-level data to derive the
foreclosure frequency of these loans as set forth in S&P's pre-2009
surveillance criteria.

In this review, S&P did not have loan-level data available for
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2004-AR6,
First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AA1, and
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2004-HYB4.

                             DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on 22 classes from nine transactions,
removing one from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The 22
downgrades primarily reflect one or more of:

   -- Deteriorating credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased prepayment speeds;
   -- Higher observed loss severities;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and
   -- Insufficient credit enhancement relative to our projected
      losses.

Among the downgrades, the ratings on two classes were downgraded to
speculative grade from investment grade, and the ratings on four
classes remained at investment grade.  The additional 16 lowered
ratings were already speculative grade before the rating actions.

S&P removed the CreditWatch Negative designation on Deutsche
Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-1's class
III-M-1 after downgrading it from 'B- (sf)' to 'CCC (sf)'.  The
CreditWatch reflected uncertainty about historical interest
shortfalls which S&P resolved during the course of this review.

Of the 22 downgrades, one class, Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-1's class III-A-5, reflects the
application of S&P's imputed promises criteria.

             Application Of Interest Shortfall Criteria

Of the 22 downgrades, one class reflects the application of S&P's
interest shortfall criteria.  S&P lowered its rating on class M-1
from Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust's series
2004-2 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' to reflect the fact that this
class has had interest shortfalls outstanding since August 2014.

                              UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 35 classes from 10 transactions,
including one rating that was raised seven notches.  The projected
credit enhancement for the affected classes is sufficient to cover
our projected losses at these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect
one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support;
   -- Expected short duration; and
   -- Increased prepayments.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- A high proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 37 ratings in the 'AAA' through 'A' categories on
classes from eight transactions.  In addition, S&P affirmed ratings
in the 'BBB' through 'B' categories on 28 classes from nine
transactions.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support is sufficient to cover its projected
losses in those rating scenarios.

S&P also affirmed 31 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected losses to these classes.  As defined in "Criteria For
Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct.
1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations indicate that S&P believes
these classes are still vulnerable to default, and the 'CC (sf)'
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

                           DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on four classes from two transactions.
S&P discontinued its 'D (sf)' rating on American Home Mortgage
Investment Trust 2006-2's class III-M-1 because the class has been
fully written down since August 2009.  The remaining three classes
were discontinued because the transaction was redeemed in June
2015.

                        ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://is.gd/Iynqje


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 7 US RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 23, 2016, took various
actions on 19 classes from seven U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P raised six ratings from three
transactions, and affirmed 11 ratings from five transactions.  One
rating remained on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
also discontinued its rating on one class from one transaction
after it was paid in full.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2000 and
2006 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
second-lien high loan-to-value (LTV), closed-end second-lien, home
equity line of credit (HELOC), and alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage
loans originated primarily between 2000 and 2006.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, as applicable, seller's loss coverage, pool policies, and
bond insurance provide credit enhancement for the transactions in
this review.  Where the bond insurer is rated lower than what S&P
would rate the respective class, it relied solely on the underlying
collateral's credit quality and the transaction structure to derive
the rating.

                    ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on six classes from three transactions.  The
projected credit enhancement for the affected classes is sufficient
to cover S&P's projected losses at these rating levels. The
upgrades reflect one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased prepayments; and
   -- Increased credit support.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- A high proportion of interest-only HELOCs that have not yet
      reset;
   -- A high proportion of balloon loans in the pool that are
      approaching their maturity date; and
   -- Low levels of available credit enhancement.

In addition, classes M-1 and M-2 from Home Loan Trust 2006-HI1 were
limited to a rating of 'A+ (sf)' due to S&P's assessment of the
operational risk, in accordance with S&P's operational risk
criteria.

S&P affirmed five ratings in the 'AAA' through 'A' categories on
classes from four transactions.  In addition, S&P affirmed ratings
in the 'BBB' through 'B' categories on two classes from two
transactions.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support is sufficient to cover its projected
losses in those rating scenarios.

S&P affirmed four 'CC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its
projected losses to these classes.  As defined in "Criteria For
Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published
Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's belief that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                           CREDITWATCH

The rating on class A from GreenPoint Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-1
was placed on CreditWatch negative on Jan. 20, 2016, due to a lack
of information necessary to apply S&P's loan modification criteria.
This rating remains on CreditWatch negative.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its rating on class A-I-7 from Home Loan Trust
2000-HI1 because this class has been paid in full.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.4% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://is.gd/WY9ggE


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 8 U.S. RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Feb. 25, 2016, took various
actions on 27 classes from eight U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P lowered four ratings, raised
two ratings, and affirmed 21 ratings.

Subordination, overcollateralization, excess interest, and bond
insurance, as applicable, provide credit enhancement for the
transactions in this review.  Where the bond insurer is rated lower
than what S&P would rate the respective class, it relied solely on
the underlying collateral's credit quality and the transaction
structure to derive the rating.  In addition, certain transactions
benefit from an interest reserve fund.

All of the transactions in this review are backed by a mix of
fixed- and adjustable-rate seasoned subprime mortgage loans and
residential retail installment contracts, some of which were
delinquent at the time the transactions closed.

                             DOWNGRADES

The downgrades on Mid-State Capital Corp. 2006-1 Trust's class M-1
notes and Mid-State Trust XI's class M-2 notes reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transaction at a higher rating.  S&P's view primarily reflects
higher delinquencies for each transaction.

S&P also lowered its ratings on the class A notes from Mid-State
Capital Corp. 2004-1 Trust and Mid-State Capital Corp. 2006-1 to
'AA+ (sf)' based on S&P's assessment of the disruption risk
associated with the transactions' servicer (Ditech Financial LLC;
not rated) and S&P's severity and portability assessments
associated with the collateral.  S&P ranked the servicer's
disruption risk, which reflects S&P's view of the likelihood of a
material disruption in its services, as moderate.  S&P also ranked
the severity and portability risks for this transaction as
moderate, given the unique nature of the collateral and the limited
number of active servicers for this collateral.  Given these risk
assessments, S&P's operational risk criteria cap the ratings on
this transaction at 'AA (sf)', but also allow for a one notch
increase to 'AA+ (sf)' because S&P views the trustee for the
transactions as a qualified back-up key transaction party.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on two classes from two transactions to
reflect increased credit enhancement and the diminished likelihood
that the classes will experience interest shortfalls or principal
write-downs before their expected final payment date.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- A high proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 21 ratings on classes from eight transactions.  These
affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover S&P's projected losses in those
rating scenarios.

                       ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations in its decisions
to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

APPLICATION OF U.S. RMBS PRE-2009 CRITERIA FOR TRANSACTIONS THAT
CONTAIN RESIDENTIAL RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS

Each of the reviewed transactions contains a portion of residential
retail installment contracts, which S&P considers subprime
collateral.  As such, for this surveillance review, S&P applied its
"U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For Pre-2009
Originations," criteria published Feb. 18, 2015, which address the
surveillance methodology for subprime collateral, including
delinquent collateral, originated before 2009.

APPLICATION OF U.S. RMBS PRE-2009 CRITERIA WHEN LOAN-LEVEL DATA ARE
NOT AVAILABLE

When performing S&P's credit analysis to determine the foreclosure
frequency for all pools within this review, S&P segmented the
collateral into current (including reperforming) and delinquent
loans.  S&P further segmented the current bucket based on payment
pattern.

Because loan-level data were not available, to derive the
foreclosure frequency for the current bucket, S&P made certain
assumptions regarding the percentage of current loans that are
reperforming, the percentage of current loans that have impaired
credit history, and the adjusted loan-to-value ratio of perfect
payers.

S&P used pool-level data to compare the transaction pool's
performance to the cohort average.  For pools with high
delinquencies and normalized cumulative losses relative to the
cohort average, S&P assumed a higher foreclosure frequency than
that associated with the cohort average.  Conversely, S&P assumed a
lower foreclosure frequency for pools with better observed
performance relative to the cohort average.

For delinquent loans, because S&P uses cohort-specific roll rate
assumptions, it used pool-level data to derive the foreclosure
frequency of these loans as set forth in S&P's U.S. RMBS pre-2009
criteria.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% for 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.7% for 2016;
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016;
      and
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 2.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                 http://is.gd/3Lj0VG


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
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Editors.

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                   *** End of Transmission ***