TCR_Public/160207.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 7, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 38

                            Headlines

AGATE BAY 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
AGATE BAY 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certificate
AJAX TWO: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes
AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
ATLAS SENIOR: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class B-3L Notes

BAMLL 2016-SS1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
BEAR STEARNS 2003-PWR2: Fitch Hikes Class L Debt Rating to BBsf
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Cuts Class D Rating to C(sf)
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 10 Certs.
COBALT 2007-C2: Fitch Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'

COMM 2014-LC15: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on H Debt
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2015-C20: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
CPS AUTO 2016-A: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Debt
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to D

CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: Fitch Hikes Class F Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Cl. D Debt
DORCHESTER PARK: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
ECP CLO 2013-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on D Notes

EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
FIRST UNION 1999-C1: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to Caa2
GOLFSMITH INT'L: DBRS Confirms 'B' Issuer Rating
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: Fitch Hikes Class D Ratings to CCCsf

GS MORTGAGE II 2006-GG8: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 3 Tranches
GSMPS MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Cl. B1 Debt Rating to Caa1
H/2 ASSET FUNDING 2014-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. C Debt
HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
HERTZ VEHICLE II: Fitch to Assign 'BB' Rating to 2016-1 Cl. D Debt

JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Affirms D Rating on 3 Classes
JP MORGAN 1999-C8: Moody's Affirms C (sf) Rating on Class H Debt
JP MORGAN 2001-C1: Fitch Hikes Class J Debt Rating to 'CCCsf'
KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Cuts Class A-2 Debt Rating to BBsf
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating to Ba3

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Fitch Lowers Class D Certs Rating to 'D'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. AM Certs
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on AM Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. F Debt

MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP13: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Debt Rating to Ba1
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ10: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Caa2
ONDECK ASSET 2014-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B Tranche
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-1: DBRS Rates Class D Debt Prov. BBsf
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ Rating on D Notes

SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
SHERIDAN FUND I: S&P Releases Corrected Press Release
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Debt
UNITED AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
UNITED AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes

WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Raises Cl. A-J Debt Rating to 'Bsf'
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to B1
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba2
WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B1
WINWATER 2016-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Debt

[*] Moody's Raises $1.1-Bil. of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Raises $353MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Issuers
[*] S&P Raises Ratings on 15 Tranches From 15 CDO Transactions
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 20 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 12 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 US RMBS Transactions

                            *********

AGATE BAY 2016-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. B-4 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns these ratings to Agate Bay Mortgage Trust
2016-1:

  -- $194,380,000 class A-6 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $64,793,000 class A-8 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,051,000 class A-10 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $279,224,000 class A-X-1 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $194,380,000 class A-X-4 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $64,793,000 class A-X-5 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,051,000 class A-X-6 notional certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $6,883,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5,237,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3,891,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1,646,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Exchangeable Certificates:

  -- $279,224,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $279,224,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $259,173,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $259,173,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $194,380,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $64,793,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $20,051,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable;
  -- $279,224,000 class A-X-2 exchangeable notional certificates
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $259,173,000 class A-X-3 exchangeable notional certificates
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The $2,394,702 class B-5 certificates and $299,275,702 class A-IO-S
notional certificates will not be rated.

Fitch's ratings reflect the high quality of the underlying
collateral, the clear capital structure and the high percentage of
loans reviewed by third party due diligence companies.  In
addition, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the master servicer
and Christina Trust will act as the trustee for the transaction.
For federal income tax purposes, elections will be made to treat
the trust as one or more real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs).

On June 16, 2015, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) entered into an amended consent order (the ACO) with Wells
Fargo Bank.  Under the terms of the ACO, Wells Fargo Bank is
prohibited, during the continuation of the ACO, from assuming the
servicing of mortgage loans on behalf of the Trust, and will not
perform such servicing activities in the event of the resignation,
removal or termination of any Servicer.  The duration of the ACO
will be determined by the OCC based on its assessment of compliance
by Wells Fargo Bank with the requirements set forth in the ACO.
The ACO does not prohibit Wells Fargo from providing servicer
advances if deemed necessary per the transaction documents.

Although during this period Wells Fargo is prohibited to take on
servicing, Fitch does not consider this a material risk as Cenlar
is the primary servicer for the entire pool and is rated 'RPS2' by
Fitch.  In addition, transaction documents reflect the prohibition
of Wells Fargo from acting in such capacity if the ACO is in
effect.  The successor servicer is also subject to the approval of
the trustee and servicing administrator.

ABMT 2016-1 will be Agate Bay Mortgage Trust's first transaction of
prime residential mortgages in 2016.  The certificates are
supported by a pool of prime 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM)
loans.  The mortgages in the pool were originated by various
entities, all of which contributed less than 15% of the pool.

As of the cut-off date, the aggregate pool consisted of 411 loans
with a total balance of $299,275,703; an average balance of
$728,165; a weighted average original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) of 67.4%, and a weighted average coupon (WAC) of 4.10%.
Rate/term and cash out refinances account for 23.5% and 16.4% of
the loans, respectively.  The weighted average original FICO credit
score of the pool is 772.  Owner-occupied properties comprise 97.4%
of the loans. The states that represent the largest geographic
concentration are California (49.6%), Massachusetts (8.5%), and
Texas (5%).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of very
high-quality 30-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans to
borrowers with strong credit profiles, low leverage and liquid
reserves.  The pool has a weighted average (WA) FICO score of 772
and an original combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio of 67.4%. While
the average amount of liquid reserves is slightly lower for this
pool relative to other recent Agate Bay transactions with
comparable profiles, more than 28% of the borrowers still have
reserves in excess of 30% of their mortgage amount.

Geographic Concentration Risk: The pool's primary concentration
risk is California, where 49.6% of the properties are located.  In
addition, the metropolitan areas encompassing San Francisco, Los
Angeles, San Jose and San Diego combined for 40% of the collateral
balance and represent four of the top 10 regions.  While this is a
slight improvement over prior Agate Bay transactions, the regional
concentration resulted in an additional penalty to the pool's
lifetime probability of default (PD) of roughly 3%.

Robust Representation Framework: Fitch considers the transaction's
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism framework
to be consistent with Tier 1 quality.  The transaction benefits
from life-of-loan representations and warranties (R&W), as well as
a backstop by the seller, TH TRS, in case of insolvency or
dissolution of the related originator.  Similar to recent
transactions rated by Fitch, ABMT 2016-1 contains binding
arbitration provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution
to R&W disputes.

Originators with Limited Performance History: Many of the loans
were originated by lenders with a limited non-agency performance
history.  However, all the loans were originated to meet TH TRS's
purchase criteria and were reviewed by a third-party due diligence
firm to TH TRS's guidelines with no material findings.  TH TRS is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Two Harbors Investment Corp.  In
addition, Fitch conducted an onsite review or in-depth call with
two of the top five originators which account for approximately
25.4% of the pool.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment: The trust provides for expenses,
including indemnification amounts and costs of arbitration, to be
paid by the net WA coupon (WAC) of the loans, which does not affect
the contractual interest due on the certificates. Furthermore, the
expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at $300,000 per annum
($125,000 for the trustee), which can be carried over each year,
subject to the cap until paid in full.

Safe-Harbor Qualified Mortgages: All the loans in the pool have
application dates of Jan. 10, 2014 or later and are, therefore,
subject to the ability-to-repay (ATR)/qualified mortgage (QM) Rule.
All the loans subject to this rule were classified as safe harbor
QM (SHQM), for which no adjustment was made.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

After Fitch determines credit ratings through a rating stress
scenario analysis, additional sensitivity analyses are considered.
The analyses provide a defined stress sensitivity to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declined (MVDs)
than assumed at issuance as well as a defined sensitivity that
demonstrates the stress assumptions required to reduce a rating by
one full category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

The defined stress sensitivity analysis focuses on determining how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 7.8% for this pool.  The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivity analyses which
determine the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one
full category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For
example, additional MVDs of 6%, 30% and 48% could potentially lower
the 'AAAsf' rated class one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf'.



AGATE BAY 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Certificate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Agate
Bay Mortgage Trust 2016-1's $296.881 million mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by first-lien, fixed residential
mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family residential
properties, condominiums, cooperatives, and planned unit
developments to primarily prime borrowers.

The ratings reflect our view of the high-quality collateral in the
pool, available credit enhancement, and the transaction's
associated structural mechanics.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Agate Bay Mortgage Trust 2016-1
Class           Ratings      Amount (mil. $)
A-1             AAA (sf)             279.224
A-2             AAA (sf)             279.224
A-3             AAA (sf)             259.173
A-4             AAA (sf)             259.173
A-5             AAA (sf)              194.38
A-6             AAA (sf)              194.38
A-7             AAA (sf)              64.793
A-8             AAA (sf)              64.793
A-9             AAA (sf)              20.051
A-10            AAA (sf)              20.051
A-X-1           AAA (sf)            Notional
A-X-2           AAA (sf)            Notional
A-X-3           AAA (sf)            Notional
A-X-4           AAA (sf)            Notional
A-X-5           AAA (sf)            Notional
A-X-6           AAA (sf)            Notional
B-1             AA (sf)                6.883
B-2             A (sf)                 5.237
B-3             BBB (sf)               3.891
B-4             BB (sf)                1.646
B-5             NR                     2.395

NR--Not rated.


AJAX TWO: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
notes issued by Ajax Two Limited:

Cl. C Floating Rate Notes, Due 2032, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously
on Mar 25, 2015 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed a rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating actions are the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

Ajax Two Limited is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio
of: i) asset backed securities (ABS) (64.9% of collateral pool
balance); and ii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(35.1%). As of the trustee's December 30, 2015 report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction has decreased to $22.6
million from $360.9 million at issuance, with the paydown primarily
due to a combination of pre-payments and regular amortization of
the underlying collateral, recoveries from defaulted collateral,
and principal proceeds resulting from the failure of certain
coverage tests.

Nine assets with a par balance of $17.9 million (95.9% of the pool
balance) were listed as defaulted assets as of the December 30,
2015 trustee report. Moody's expects moderate/high losses to occur
on the defaulted assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 9783, compared to 8879 at last review.
The current distribution of Moody's rated collateral and
assessments for non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: A1-A3
and 0.0% compared to 9.4% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 100.0%
compared to 90.6% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.3 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through loan exposures.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 1.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral. Holding all
other key parameters static, increasing the recovery rates of 100%
of the collateral by 10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch
up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.




AMERICAN CREDIT 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-1's $188.53 million
asset-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 57.1%, 47.4%, 39.5%, and
      35.1% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.15x, 1.75x, 1.40x, and 1.25x S&P's 25.50%-
      26.50% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated

      notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under S&P's
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that it believes are
      appropriate for the assigned ratings.  The expectation that
      under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario, the ratings on the

      class A and B notes would remain within one rating category
      of S&P's 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on
      the class C and D notes would remain within two rating
      categories of S&P's 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These

      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA' rated securities, and a two
      rating category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      through 'BB' rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,

      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class    Rating       Type            Interest          Amount
                                      rate            (mil. $)
A        AA (sf)      Senior          Fixed             110.25
B        A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed              34.18
C        BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              29.77
D        BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed              14.33


ATLAS SENIOR: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class B-3L Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2L, A-3L, and A-3F notes from Atlas Senior Loan Fund Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Crescent
Capital Group LP.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class A-1L, B-1L, B-2L, and B-3L notes from the same
transaction.

The upgrades on the class A-2L, A-3L, and A-3F notes mainly reflect
an improvement in the credit quality of the underlying collateral
pool since S&P's effective date analysis.  Since then, according to
S&P's analysis, the weighted average rating of the portfolio has
improved to 'B+' from 'B', increasing the credit support available
to the notes.

The upgrades also reflect a slight improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the notes.  The
trustee reported these O/C ratios in the December 2015 monthly
report:

   -- The class A-2L O/C ratio was 139.68%, up from 139.18% in
      August 2012, the report referenced for our effective date
      analysis.

   -- The class A-3L O/C ratio was 125.19%, up from 124.75% in
      August 2012.

   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 117.86%, up from 117.44% in
      August 2012.

   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 110.82%, up from 110.43% in
      August 2012.

   -- The class B-3L O/C ratio was 108.04%, up from 107.66% in
      August 2012.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period until August.
Therefore, to determine whether or not to upgrade the notes above
their original ratings, S&P used the covenanted minimum spread and
recoveries in its cash flow runs.  Based on these results, all of
the ratings on the notes passed at higher rating levels; however,
to maintain relatively similar rating cushions on the class B-1L,
B-2L, and B-3L notes to the cushions as of the transaction's
effective date, S&P affirmed these ratings at this time.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Atlas Senior Loan Fund Ltd.

                      Cash flow
         Previous     implied     Cash flow      Final
Class    rating       rating(i)   cushion(ii)    rating
A-1L     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    16.15%         AAA (sf)
A-2L     AA (sf)      AAA (sf)    4.82%          AA+ (sf)
A-3F     A (sf)       AA+ (sf)    1.96%          A+ (sf)
A-3L     A (sf)       AA+ (sf)    1.96%          A+ (sf)
B-1L     BBB (sf)     A+ (sf)     0.94%          BBB (sf)
B-2L     BB- (sf)     BB+ (sf)    5.37%          BB- (sf)
B-3L     B (sf)       B+ (sf)     3.21%          B (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario           Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                  10% Recovery    Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease        increase     decrease
       implied    implied         implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating          rating       rating     rating
A-1L   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2L   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
A-3F   AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)        AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
A-3L   AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)        AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
B-1L   A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)       A- (sf)      A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
B-2L   BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)        BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)
B-3L   B+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)       B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)    B (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow   compression   compression
        implied     implied       implied       Final
Class   rating      rating        rating        rating
A-1L    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2L    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
A-3F    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)       A+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
A-3L    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)       A+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
B-1L    A+ (sf)     A (sf)        BBB- (sf)     BBB (sf)
B-2L    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      B- (sf)       BB- (sf)
B-3L    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)       CC (sf)       B (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Atlas Senior Loan Fund Ltd.
Fixed- and floating-rate notes
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1L    04941CAA5    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2L    04941CAC1    AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)
A-3L    04941CAE7    A+ (sf)    A (sf)
A-3F    04941CAJ6    A+ (sf)    A (sf)
B-1L    04941CAG2    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)
B-2L    04941EAA1    BB- (sf)   BB- (sf)
B-3L    04941EAC7    B (sf)     B (sf)


BAMLL 2016-SS1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-SS1 (the
Certificates) to be issued by BAMLL 2016-SS1 Mortgage Securities
Trust. The trends are Stable.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in a 501,650
sf office building and fee interest in a nearby 965-space parking
garage, both of which are located in the Seaport Submarket of
Boston, Massachusetts. In December 2015, both properties were
purchased by U.S. Core Office Holdings, L.P. for $316.5 million or
approximately $630 psf. Loan proceeds of $166.0 million are being
used for the acquisition of the properties. The mortgage loan has
an interest rate of 4.24% and is interest-only over the ten-year
term.

The office building was constructed in 2014 as a build-to-suit for
State Street Corporation (State Street) (AA (low)/DBRS). This
location houses back office operations for State Street,
consolidating employees from multiple office locations scattered
around the city when it opened. State Street's lease is for 100% of
the office building and has an initial lease term through December
2029, with no early termination options. The nearby parking garage
was also constructed in 2014 and is leased to a third-party parking
garage operator for a term of three years. The parking garage is
conveniently located near the subject property, with State Street
leasing 250 of the total 965 parking spaces.

The sponsor of the loan, U.S Core Office Holdings, L.P. is majority
owned by nation pension funds of Sweden and the Republic of Korea.
The sponsor is minority owned, and indirectly controlled, by
affiliates of Tishman Speyer Properties. Tishman Speyer is a global
owner, developer and operator of commercial real estate. The
sponsor also contributed $152.7 million of cash equity into the
transaction.

The DBRS LTV and DBRS Refi LTV are 92.0%, based on an 8.0% cap
rate. The DBRS value represents a 43.0% discount to the appraised
value. The DBRS cap rate is far above the current market cap rate
(as estimated by the appraisal) of 4.5% and 387 basis points above
the cap rate implied by the sponsor's $316,500,000 purchase price
and the Issuer's UW NCF of $13,070,929. Given the property's
excellent quality and lease to a long-term credit-tenant, there is
limited term default risk.



BEAR STEARNS 2003-PWR2: Fitch Hikes Class L Debt Rating to BBsf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded seven classes and affirmed two classes
of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PWR2 (BS 2003-PWR2).


KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the stable performance of the pool and
strength of the underlying collateral. The pool has sustained
losses totaling 1.2% of the original pool balance or $12.4 million
since origination. As of the January 2015 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 94.3% to
$60.5 million from $1.07 billion at issuance. There are eight
assets remaining, one is a Fitch Loan of Concern (2.6%) and one
loan (0.8% of the pool) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes N through P.

The largest loan in the pool is the $47 million (77.7% of pool)
pari-passu portion of 3 Times Square (totaling $79.9 million). The
loan is fully amortizing through its October 2021 maturity date and
is secured by an 883,405 square foot 30-story class-A office
building located in Manhattan. Built in 2001, the property's major
tenants include Thomson Reuters, BMO Harris Bank and JP Morgan
Chase. As of September 2015, the year to date debt service coverage
ratio was reported to be 1.74x. Occupancy has been 100% for the
past several years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks are expected to remain Stable given the stable
performance of the pool and low expected losses on a loan-by-loan
basis as leverage continues to decrease given substantial
amortization. Downgrades are not likely due to the fully amortizing
nature of the majority of the loans and the low leverage.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes and assigned Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $10.7 million class F to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class G to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $13.3 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $5.3 million class J to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $5.3 million class K to 'AAsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $4 million class L to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $5.3 million class M to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $4.9 million class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $2.2 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, and D certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only classes X-1 and
X-2.



BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: DBRS Cuts Class D Rating to C(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the rating of the following class of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR18
issued by Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series
2007-PWR18 (BSCMS 2007-PWR18 or the Trust):

-- Class C to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the ratings of the remaining
classes in the transaction as follows:

-- Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class AM-A at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class AJ-A at CCC (sf)
-- Class A-J at CCC (sf)
-- Class B at CCC (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class AJ-A through
Class D, which have ratings that do not carry trends. The Interest
in Arrears designation was removed from Class C, while Class D
continues to have Interest in Arrears.

The Class C rating downgrade is the result of the uncertainties
surrounding the modification and subsequent collateral releases
regarding the largest loan in the transaction, DRA/Colonial Office
Portfolio. The increased credit concerns revolve around executed
sales prices compared against allocated loan balances on individual
properties that have been released from the portfolio. This loan is
highlighted in detail below. Since issuance, 33 loans have been
liquidated from the trust at a combined realized loss of $205.7
million.

Since issuance, the transaction has experienced collateral
reduction of 43.1% from loan amortization, successful loan
repayment, principal recovered from liquidated loans and realized
losses from defaulted loans. As of the January 2016 remittance
report, 135 loans remain out of the original loan count of 185. In
the last 12 months, three loans have left the trust, contributing
to a principal paydown of $98.1 million. Based on the most recent
year-end reporting available for the individual loans, the pool is
reporting a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.30 times (x) and 9.6%, respectively. Five loans are
fully defeased, representing 3.0% of the current pool balance, and
five loans with a current outstanding principal balance totalling
$41.2 million have maturity dates within the next 12 months. The
individual DSCR and exit debt yield for these loans range from
0.31x to 2.08x, and 2.5% to 14.0%, respectively.

As of the January 2016 remittance report, there is one loan in
special servicing and 43 loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 0.6% and 28.4% of the current pool balance,
respectively. The specially serviced loan, Campus Business Park
(Pros ID#69), is secured by four mixed-use properties in Federal
Way, Washington. The borrower is seeking a loan modification and
continues to remit monthly debt service payments. Of the loans on
the servicer’s watchlist, five loans, representing 13.9% of the
current pool balance, are within the Top 15. One loan on the
watchlist is highlighted below.

The DRA/Colonial Office Portfolio (Pros ID#1, representing 11.4% of
the current pool balance) is currently secured by 11 crossed office
and retail properties concentrated in Lake Mary, Florida, and
Birmingham, Alabama. The collateral originally consisted of 19
office properties. The whole loan is split pari passu among three
CMBS transactions with equal principal balances of $161.0 million.
The loan previously transferred to special servicing in August 2012
after DRA’s capital partner, Colonial Properties, sold its
ownership interest in the assets, leaving the sponsor with limited
capital and a struggling portfolio. Subsequently, the loan
underwent a modification in December 2012, which extended the loan
maturity by two years to July 2016 and required the sponsor to
contribute $15 million into a Master Account for purposes of
funding tenant improvement/leasing commission cost operating
shortfalls. Additionally, the borrower has the option to extend the
loan maturity to July 2017, provided certain conditions are met,
including paying down the whole loan to approximately $371.0
million. Currently, the whole loan balance is $483.0 million;
however, according to the servicer, the borrower plans to execute
the extension option, as the loan continues to perform per the
terms of the modification.

Over the last 12 months, the borrower has released three properties
from the collateral, with a total of eight property releases since
the loan was modified. Proceeds from the property sales have been
used to pay down the loan’s outstanding principal trust balance
by $86.3 million and to continue to fund the Master Account;
however, as of January 2016, the loan no longer has an outstanding
reserve balance. According to the servicer, none of the eight
released properties have been sold below their respective release
price; however, the allocated trust loan balance for these
properties totals approximately $124.0 million, implying a loss of
$37.7 million, which has yet to be passed through to the trust. The
outstanding portfolio is 88.2% occupied, according to the September
2015 rent roll, an increase compared with YE2014 occupancy of
84.0%. The third-largest tenant across the portfolio, Deloitte &
Touche LLP (Deloitte), represents 3.5% of the net rentable area
(NRA) on a lease scheduled to expire in May 2024. Deloitte assumed
the space previously occupied by American Pioneer, which vacated
upon its September 2015 lease expiration. The subject's performance
has steadily improved following the modification, and the loan was
removed from the servicer’s watchlist with a Q2 2015 DSCR of
1.15x compared with a YE2014 DSCR of 1.02x and a YE2013 DSCR of
0.98x. DBRS modeled the loan based on the most recently reported
cash flow with a haircut to account for potential adverse selection
and the fact that the special servicer will be due a 1.0%
resolution fee when the portfolio loan ultimately pays out of the
trust.

The Ingram Festival Shopping Center (Pros ID#20, representing 1.8%
of the current pool balance) is secured by an anchored retail
property in San Antonio, Texas. The loan has been on the
servicer’s watchlist since February 2010 because of ongoing
tenant rollover issues, which were compounded when the JC Penney
Home (JC Penney) anchor tenant vacated its space upon lease
expiration in October 2013. The tenant formerly occupied 19.0% of
the NRA. Three prospective tenants have previously provided letters
of intent to assume a portion of the JC Penney space; however, as
of January 2016, only one of those prospects is in the process of
negotiating a lease agreement. As a result of JC Penney’s
departure, the occupancy has declined to 80.5% as of the August
2015 rent roll with a correspondingly low YE2014 DSCR of 0.81x. The
property’s occupancy rate has remained relatively unchanged since
March 2014. Both the largest tenant, Marshall’s, representing
13.8% of the NRA, and the third-largest tenant, Michaels,
representing 10.4% of the NRA, have extended their respective
leases by ten years with leases that are now scheduled to expire in
January 2026 and February 2026, respectively. Despite the low cash
flow coverage, the loan remains current, and the property remains
in average condition with no deferred maintenance noted, according
to the August 2015 site inspection.

DBRS maintains an investment-grade shadow rating on one loan in the
pool, Stor-It Self Storage (Prospectus ID#112, 0.3% of the current
pool balance). DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of
this loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction in its Monthly CMBS
Surveillance Report, with additional information on the DBRS
viewpoint for this transaction. The January 2016 Monthly CMBS
Surveillance Report for this transaction will be published shortly.



CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 10 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2006-C5 (CGCMT 2006-C5).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the relatively stable performance of the
collateral pool since Fitch's last rating action.  Fitch modeled
losses of 13.1% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 14.6%, including $117.4 million (5.5%
of original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 55 loans (33.8% of current pool balance) as Fitch Loans
of Concern, which includes 16 specially serviced loans (17.2%). Ten
of the assets in special servicing are real-estate owned (REO;
5.4%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 30.8% to $1.47 billion from
$2.12 billion at issuance.  There are 166 loans remaining in the
pool, compared to 208 loans at issuance.  According to servicer
reporting, 17 loans (21.4%) have been defeased, including the
second and third largest loans, which account for 8.2% and 6.8% of
the current pool, respectively.  Total defeasance has increased
from just one loan (8.2%) since the last rating action.  Cumulative
interest shortfalls totaling $10.3 million are currently affecting
classes B through K and classes M through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses, which remains the
same since the last rating action, is the IRET Portfolio (8.4% of
pool).  The loan, which was transferred to special servicing in
July 2014 for imminent default, is secured by a portfolio of nine
suburban office properties totaling approximately 937,000 square
feet (sf) located in the Omaha, NE metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) (four properties); the greater Minneapolis, MN MSA (two), the
St. Louis, MO MSA (two), and Leawood, KS (one).

As of the September 2015 rent roll, the overall portfolio occupancy
declined to 83.5% from 87.4% at Fitch's last rating action as of
October 2014.  Individual property occupancies ranged from 24.6% to
100%.  Current portfolio occupancy represents a significant decline
from the above-90% occupancy reported during 2010 and early 2011
and the 95.7% reported at issuance.  Occupancy declined drastically
between 2010 and 2012 when three of the portfolio's largest tenants
either vacated or downsized at their scheduled lease expiration.

The majority of the portfolio occupancy decline since the last
rating action was associated with Hewlett Packard (HP) downsizing
at the Farnam Executive Center property in Omaha, NE.  Occupancy at
this property declined to 24.6% from 63.9% as a result of HP
downsizing its square footage by nearly 40%.  However, HP extended
its lease on 23% of that property's net rentable area (NRA) to July
2018 from July 2015.

Upcoming near-term rollover risk remains significant over the next
two years with 17% of the portfolio square footage rolling in 2016
and 22% in 2017.  According to REIS and as of third quarter 2015,
the underlying property submarkets reported high vacancies ranging
between 10.4% and 27.3%.  The weighted average portfolio in-place
base rent is approximately $19 per square foot (psf) compared to
REIS-reported submarket asking rents ranging between $15 and $25
psf.  According to the special servicer, a deed-in-lieu appears to
be the likely workout strategy for the loan.

The next largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
specially serviced, North Campus Crossing Phase I loan (1.7%).
North Campus Crossing is an off-campus student housing property
which mainly caters to students at East Carolina University,
located in Greenville, NC.  The property was built in two phases.
Phase I, which serves as loan collateral, consists of 876 beds,
while Phase II consists of 816 beds.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in November 2015 due to imminent default.  The
borrower's representative advised the lender that the borrower
would not be able to refinance the loan at the September 2016
maturity date.  As of the January 2016 distribution date, the loan
is 30 days delinquent as the borrower failed to make the December
2015 debt service payment.

As of the October 2015 rent roll, the property was 63.1% occupied,
which is down from 95% at issuance.  The debt service coverage
ratio has fallen below 1x since 2007 due to declining rental rates,
declining and low occupancy, as well as high operating expenses.
The property suffers from increased competition within the
Greenville market and as a result, the borrower has offered
concessions in order to attract new tenants and maintain occupancy.
In 2014, electricity was included with rent at no additional cost,
which caused utility expenses to rise during the year.  New leases
have also been renewed at lower rates from the prior years, causing
base rent to decrease.  Net operating income in 2014 is down 20%
from 2013 and down nearly 50% from issuance. According to the
special servicer, the lender has retained legal counsel and is
proceeding with foreclosure.  The special servicer indicated a
possible note sale may occur in the upcoming months.

The third largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the REO
Northmont Business Park asset (1.1%).  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2012 for imminent default.  The asset
became REO in May 2014.  The asset consists of three, single-story
industrial flex buildings, totaling 229,726 sf located in Duluth,
GA.  As of the December 2015 rent roll, the property was 62.6%
leased, but 60.1% occupied.  One tenant, Polaris Laboratories LLC
(2.4% of NRA), is dark.  This compares to 67.5% occupied one year
earlier and 88% at issuance.  Near-term lease rollover risk
consists of 10.9% of the NRA in 2016 and 5.7% in 2017.  According
to the special servicer, the asset is scheduled for auction in the
upcoming spring.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on the super senior 'AAAsf' classes remain
Stable due to these classes' seniority, increasing credit
enhancement and expected continued paydown.

The Rating Outlook on class A-M was revised to Stable from Negative
to reflect increased defeasance and lower expected losses on the
overall pool due to better recoveries than previously modeled on
loans disposed since the last rating action.

Distressed classes (those rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to
downgrades as losses are realized or if realized losses are greater
than Fitch's expectations Conversely, class A-J may be upgraded if
recoveries on the specially serviced assets, especially the IRET
Portfolio, are better than expected.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Rating Outlooks on these classes as
indicated:

  -- $765.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $184.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $212.4 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $172.6 million class A-J at 'CCsf'; RE 75%;
  -- $42.5 million class B at 'Csf''; RE 0%;
  -- $21.2 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $26.5 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $29.2 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $15.3 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'' RE 0%;
  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'' RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-SB, AMP-1, AMP-2, and AMP-3 have paid in
full. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only
class XP and XC certificates.  Fitch does not rate class P.



COBALT 2007-C2: Fitch Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded five classes and affirmed 16 classes of
COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust's (COBALT) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Although the credit enhancement has increased due to the payoff of
the transaction's pari passu portion of the Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village (ST/PCV) loan (formerly 13.1% of the pool), there
remain concerns with the ultimate resolution of the specially
serviced loans (10.1%), of which 48% transferred to the special
servicer in 2015.

The recent sale of the ST/PCV asset and the paydown as of the
January 2016 remittance resulted in a full recovery of the
transaction's $250 million portion of the $3 billion former loan
amount and additional 'gain-on sale' proceeds in excess of the
total loan balance.  The A-1A class balance was reduced by 56% from
the principal proceeds, while the 'gain on sale' proceeds of $19
million were used to reimburse interest shortfalls to classes C
through K.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes K
through S.

Fitch modeled losses of 11.3% of the remaining pool.  Expected
losses on the original pool balance total 11.1%, which is down
15.8% from Fitch's last rating action in February 2015 and includes
$83.2 million (3.4% of the original pool balance) in realized
losses to date.  Fitch has designated 16 loans (14.6%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes 12 specially serviced assets
(10.1%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 32.6% to $1.63 billion from
$2.42 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, seven loans
(7.4% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes K through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced 275 Broadhollow Road loan (2% of the pool),
which is secured by 126,770-square foot (sf) class-B+ office
property located in Melville, NY (Long Island).  The property is
100% occupied by a single tenant, Capital One N.A.  The lease
expires December 2018, approximately 23 months after the loan's
maturity date in February 2017.  The loan transferred to the
special servicer in June 2015 due to imminent maturity default.
The borrower forwarded a modification proposal, by way of 18 month
maturity extension.  However, negotiations have concluded, and a
modification could not be agreed upon.  The current strategy is to
correct the loan and return back to the master servicer.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the 300
Broadhollow Road loan (2.3%), which is secured by a 242,292 sf,
class-A, office building also located in Melville, NY.  The loan
was previously in special servicing between March 2011 and March
2013 due to monetary default.  The loan was modified in December
2012 and a bifurcated into an A/B note structure with a $22 million
A note and $14.8 million B note.  The modification also included an
interest-only payment extension until maturity in February 2017, a
new equity contribution of $3.15 million for TI/LC reserve and a
50/50 split between borrower and B note capital event.  The loan is
performing under the modification and the servicer-reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 2.21x on the A note.  As per the
property's rent roll, the occupancy was 98% as September 2015.  The
expected loss on this loan is primarily due to the A/B note
structure making a recovery to the B-note component unlikely in
Fitch's view.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Medwick Marketplace loan (1.1%), which is
secured by a 183,877-sf retail center in Medina, OH, which is
approximately 30 miles south of Cleveland.  The property was
formerly anchored by K-Mart (non-collateral), but the store closed
in May 2012, which has caused decreased demand for the space in the
center and declining rents.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in May 2012 due to imminent default.  A loan modification
was discussed, but terms could not be agreed upon.  The loan is now
in monetary default and a receiver has been appointed.  The
servicer is dual-tracking foreclosure and workout.  Major tenants
at the property include Marc's (23% of net rentable area; lease
expires May 2021), Marshall's (13.6%, November 2019) Deals (6.5%,
September 2017) and Shoe Carnival (5.5%, January 2023).  According
to the September 2015 rent roll, the property is 91% occupied.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 and A-1A remain Stable due to
the senior payment priority in the capital structure and increased
credit enhancement.  Classes A-MFX through A-JFL have also been
assigned Stable Outlooks due to increased credit enhancement.
Upgrades to classes A-JFX and A-JFL are possible if the specially
serviced assets are disposed and losses are lower than expected.
Conversely, downgrades are possible if losses are higher than
expected.  Additional downgrades to the distressed classes (those
rated below 'B') are expected as losses are realized on specially
serviced loans.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades, removes from Rating Watch Positive and assigns
Rating Outlooks to the following classes as indicated:

  -- $221.9 million class A-MFX to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Rating
     Watch Positive removed; assigned Outlook Stable;

  -- $20 million class A-M to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Rating Watch
     Positive removed; assigned Outlook Stable;

  -- $102.6 million class A-JFX to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Rating
     Watch Positive removed; assigned Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-JFL to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Rating Watch
     Positive removed; assigned Outlook Stable;

  -- $21.2 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch affirms this class and revises the RE as indicated:

  -- $27.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 25%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $786.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $200 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.2 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $15.1 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $18.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $30.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24.2 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $16.6 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes L, M, N, O, P and Q have been reduced to zero due to
realized losses and are affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0%.  The class A-1,
A-2 and A-AB certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class S certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X certificates.


COMM 2014-LC15: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC15 (the
Certificates), issued by COMM 2014-LC15 Mortgage Trust (the Trust)
as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance, with cash flows remaining
generally in line with the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. At
issuance, the transaction had a DBRS weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS WA debt yield of 1.37
times (x) and 8.9%, respectively. As of the January 2015
remittance, all loans are reporting YE2014 cash flows, while 40
loans (69.4% of the pool) are reporting partial-year 2015 cash
flows (most loans reporting a Q3 2015 figure). For the nine loans
reporting 2015 cash flows in the Top 10, the WA amortizing DSCR was
1.37x, with a WA net cash flow growth over the respective DBRS UW
figures of 8.9%. All 48 loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate
balance of $913 million, representing a collateral reduction of
approximately 1.6% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization.

As of the January 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and nine loans, representing 10.0% of the pool, on the
servicer's watchlist. Five of these loans, representing 5.0% of the
pool, were flagged due to items of deferred maintenance, while one
loan, representing 0.6% of the pool, was flagged due to late
principal and interest payments in both December 2015 and January
2016. The three remaining loans on the watchlist, representing 4.4%
of the pool, were flagged due to performance-related reasons.
According to the 2015 cash flows reported (both Q2 and Q3 2015),
these three loans had a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 0.95x and
10.1%, respectively, compared to the DBRS UW figures of 1.57x and
9.8%, respectively. Two of these loans are highlighted below.

The Dorchester at Forest Park loan (Prospectus ID#13, 2.7% of the
pool) is secured by a 189-unit, high-rise apartment building
located in St. Louis, Missouri. The subject was originally
constructed in 1962, with renovations totaling approximately $7.1
million, occurring between 2004 and 2007. These renovations
included upgrades to over 175 of the units, new furnishing and
fixtures in common areas, a new resident lounge and a new fitness
center. The subject also contains 4,809 square feet (sf) of
commercial space, which is occupied by smaller professional tenants
on short-term leases. The loan was added to the servicer’s
watchlist in June 2015 because of a low YE2014 DSCR of 0.95x, a
decline from the DBRS UW figure of 1.16x. According to Q2 2015
financials, performance had further declined as the loan reported
an annualized DSCR of 0.90x. In comparison to DBRS UW figures,
operating expenses had risen by approximately 29.2%, primarily as a
result of increases to Repairs & Maintenance (78.8%), Utilities
(43.1%) and Payroll & Benefits (18.2%). At this time it is unclear
if the increases in expenses are an ongoing issue or a one-time
occurrence. The servicer has reportedly contacted the borrower
regarding the increase. As of the September 2015 rent roll, the
property was 97.5% occupied with an average rental rate of $1,504
per unit, compared to 90.5% occupied with an average rental rate of
$1,550 per unit in September 2014. According to Reis, as of Q3
2015, the submarket of Clayton/Mid-County reported a vacancy rate
of 2.3% with an average rental rate of $962 per unit. While the
property is operating with rental rates well above its general
submarket, it should be noted that the subject offers larger units
in addition to higher-end finishes and amenities that attract a
more upscale resident base, including professionals and students
from nearby Washington University. DBRS modeled this loan using the
current in-place cash flow to account for the continued decline in
performance since issuance.

The University Plaza & Centre Circle loan (Prospectus ID#20, 1.2%
of the pool) is secured by two properties, a 221,365 sf mixed-use
property constructed in 1969 (University Plaza) and a 72,400 sf
industrial property constructed in 1979 (Center Circle). Both
properties are located in Downers Grove, Illinois, approximately 22
miles west of Chicago. The loan was originally added to the
servicer’s watchlist in October 2014 as a result of a low Q2 2014
annualized DSCR of 0.68x, a decline from the DBRS UW figure of
1.60x. The decline in performance was caused by a drop in rental
revenue at the University Plaza property. According to the
September 2015 rent roll, the property was 92.7% occupied with an
average rental rate of $8.25 psf, compared to 96.8% occupied with
an average rental rate of $8.77 psf in September 2014. The largest
tenant, Marketing Card Technology (34.6% of the net rentable area
(NRA)), recently negotiated a new leasing agreement, extending its
lease from January 2015 through September 2021 at $4.72 per square
foot (psf), a drop from its former rental rate of $5.03 psf.
According to the servicer, the tenant also received a partial
rental abatement period over the first six months, which has now
ended. Adding to the decline in rental revenue was Halloween
Express's (6.3% of the NRA) decision to vacate upon its November
2014 lease expiration, as it was a seasonal temporary tenant. As a
result of the decrease in rental revenue, the property had a Q2
2015 DSCR of 0.67x; however, this is an improvement over the Q1
2015 DSCR of 0.38x. The Center Circle property is 100% occupied by
RR Donnelly through November 2017 and reported a Q2 2015 DSCR of
1.87x. The portfolio as a whole reported a Q2 2015 DSCR of 0.96x, a
slight improvement from the YE2014 DSCR of 0.90x. Performance is
further expected to improve as Marketing Card Technology’s rental
abatement period has ended; however, DBRS also modeled this loan
using the current in-place cash flow to account for the continued
decline in performance since issuance.



COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on H Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the Classes F and G were affirmed at Aaa (sf)
because they are fully covered by defeased loans. Defeasance
represents 87% of the current pool balance.

The rating on the Class H was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and the cumulative
certificate loss from previously liquidated loans. Class H has had
an aggregate certificate loss of 26% based on its original
balance.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 1, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $28.9 million
from $775.2 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans. Three loans, constituting
87% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Currently, there are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or
in special servicing. Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the
pool, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $61 million (52%
loss severity on average).

The sole remaining non-defeased loan is the Regal Cinema Loan ($3.7
million -- 12.6% of the pool), which is secured by a stadium-style
movie theater in Medina, Ohio. The lease expires in December 2018,
approximately nine months prior to the loan's anticipated repayment
date of September 2019. The loan has amortized 48% since
securitization and Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 57%
and 2.11X, respectively, compared to 62% and 1.93X at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress
rate the agency applied to the loan balance.




COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2015-C20: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C20
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2015-C20:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class PST certificates are exchangeable for the
Classes A-S, B and C certificates (and vice versa). Classes D, E,
F, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F are privately placed.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. The transaction consists of 88 fixed-rate loans
secured by 102 commercial properties. Since issuance, the
transaction has experienced collateral reduction of 0.6% as a
result of scheduled amortization, with all of the original 88 loans
remaining in the pool. Given the early 2015 closing date, updated
financial reporting for the pool is limited. Approximately 21.7% of
the loans are reporting YE2014 financials; however, this data
reflects performance prior to securitization. For those loans, the
weighted-average (WA) DSCR was 1.40 times (x) with a WA debt yield
of 8.3%. At the time of this DBRS review, 18.2% of the pool was
reporting 2015 cash flows (with most of them reporting a Q3
figure), and for those loans, the annualized WA DSCR was 1.51x,
with a WA debt yield of 9.6%.

As of the January 2016 remittance, there is one loan on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 0.5% of the current pool
balance, and there are no loans in special servicing.

The loan on the watchlist is Prospectus ID#68, Presidio Office
Building. This loan is secured by an 81,222 square foot four-story
Class A office building located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
building is architecturally unique and is located in close
proximity to restaurants and retail from a neighboring mall. This
loan is on the watchlist due to upcoming rollover, including the
largest tenant. The property was 79.0% occupied at issuance.
According to Q2 2015 reporting, the property was 76.8% occupied
with leases representing 11.0% of net rentable area (NRA) expiring
in 2015. DBRS has requested a copy of the Q2 2015 rent roll used to
calculate the occupancy rate shown in the servicer's reporting, but
that file has not been received to date. According to the most
recent rent roll from issuance dated November 2014, the largest
tenant, eSuite 360, representing 9.5% of NRA, had a lease set to
expire in October 2016. According to CoStar, the property is 80.4%
occupied and the largest space, which matches the square footage of
eSuite 360, is currently occupied by Executive Systems, Inc. DBRS
has requested a leasing update from the servicer. The asking rental
rates for the available space as shown on CoStar is $13.00 to
$14.00 NNN, which is in line with the average rental rates in place
at issuance of $13.45 per square foot. According to the most recent
financials available, the annualized Q2 2015 DSCR is 1.74x, which
is higher than the DBRS underwritten DSCR of 1.23x. Given that
occupancy is in line with issuance and cash flows are strong, DBRS
expects the loan to be removed from the watchlist once updated rent
rolls are provided.

DBRS continues to monitor this transaction in its Monthly CMBS
Surveillance Report with additional information on the DBRS
viewpoint for this transaction, including details on the largest
loans in the pool and loans on the servicer's watchlist. The
January 2016 Monthly CMBS Surveillance Report for this transaction
will be published shortly.



CPS AUTO 2016-A: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-A:

-- Series 2016-A, Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-A, Class B rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2016-A, Class C rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-A, Class D rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2016-A, Class E rated BB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2016-A, Class F rated B (low) (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
    under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services (CPS) with
    regards to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
    the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
    subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
    servicer.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and

    a successful track record within the auto finance industry,
    having managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for CPS originations and performance of the CPS auto loan

    portfolio.

-- The May 29, 2014, settlement of the Federal Trade Commission
    (FTC) inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade practices.

-- CPS paid imposed penalties and restitution payments to
    consumers.

-- CPS has made considerable improvements to the collections
    process, including management changes, upgraded systems and
    software, as well as implementation of new policies and
    procedures focused on maintaining compliance.

-- CPS will be subject to ongoing monitoring of certain processes

    by the FTC.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that
    the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets and the consistency with DBRS’s Legal Criteria for
U.S.
    Structured Finance methodology.



CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. H Certs to D
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class F
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In
addition, S&P lowered its rating on class H and affirmed its rating
on class G from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions reflect its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its rating on class F to 'AAA (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' to
reflect its expectation of the available credit enhancement for the
class, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimate
of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating level.
The upgrade also follows S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral, available
liquidity support, and the reduced trust balance.

S&P lowered its rating on class H to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'
because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future, and S&P expects credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the two specially
serviced assets ($24.7 million, 52.2%).  Class H had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for seven consecutive months.

According to the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthlyinterest shortfalls totaled $49,404 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $34,613;

   -- Interest reductionsbecause of nonrecoverability
      determinations totaling $9,507; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $5,330.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class H.

The affirmation on class G reflects S&P's expectation that the
available credit enhancement for the class will be within its
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating, as well as S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral and available
liquidity support.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest positive rating
movement on class G, S&P's analysis also considered the reported
declining performance and liquidation timing of the largest asset
with the special servicer, the Northfield Square Mall real
estate-owned (REO) asset ($22.9 million, 48.4%), as well as the
class' susceptibility to reduced liquidity support from the
specially serviced assets.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $47.2 million, which is 2.9% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 11 loans and one REO
asset, down from 262 loans at issuance.  Two of these assets are
with the special servicer, one loan ($3.9 million, 8.3%) is
defeased, two loans ($2.0 million, 4.3%) are residential
cooperatives (co-ops), and two loans ($992,042, 2.1%) are on the
master servicers' combined watchlist.  The master servicers,
KeyBank N.A. and National Cooperative Bank N.A., reported financial
information for 95.0% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 82.5% was year-end 2014 data, and the remainder was
partial-year 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.46x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 50.1% Standard & Poor's weighted average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.57% Standard & Poor's weighted
average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the two specially serviced assets, one
defeased loan, and two co-op loans.  The top 10 nondefeased assets
have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of $43.0 million
(91.0%).  Excluding the two specially serviced assets and two co-op
loans, using servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a Standard &
Poo'’s weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.46x and 50.8%,
respectively, for six of the top 10 nondefeased assets.

To date, the transaction has experienced $51.7 million in principal
losses, or 3.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 3.7% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the two
specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, trustee remittance report, two assets were
with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC. Details
on the two specially serviced assets are:

The Northfield Square Mall REO asset, the larger of the two assets
with the special servicer, is a 381,877-sq.-ft. regional enclosed
mall in Bourbonnais, Ill. and has a reported $25.2 million in total
exposure.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Jan.
24, 2014, because of maturity default, and the property became REO
on Sept. 10, 2014.  The reported occupancy and DSC for the six
months ended June 30, 2015, were 92.5% and 0.82x, respectively. A
$6.7 million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against
the asset, and S&P expects a moderate loss (26%-59%) upon its
eventual resolution.

The Hidden Hollow Apartments loan ($1.8 million, 3.8%), the
smallest asset with the special servicer, is secured by a 84-unit
multifamily apartment complex in Saginaw, Mich. and has a reported
$2.4 million total exposure.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing on July 24, 2013.  CWCapital Asset Management LLC stated
that the foreclosure sale took place on July 17, 2015, and transfer
of title to the trust is expected this month.  CWCapital Asset
Management LLC indicated that the occupancy is currently at 95.0%,
and it expects to liquidate the asest in the first half of 2016. A
$478,084 ARA is in effect against the loan, and S&P expects a
moderate loss upon its eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

                                   Rating            Rating
Class          Identifier          To                From
F              22541SBH0           AAA (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
G              22541SBJ6           BB- (sf)          BB- (sf)
H              22541SBK3           D (sf)            CCC- (sf)



CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: Fitch Hikes Class F Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded seven and affirmed nine classes of
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2006-C1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Upgrades to classes A-J through G reflect increased credit
enhancement to the classes from significant loan payoffs as 206
loans, $1.3 billion, have paid in full since the last rating
action. An additional $12.8 million in proceeds were received in
connection with the liquidation of two specially serviced assets
and the late payoff of one maturing loan.

Fitch modeled losses of 16.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.1%, including $103.3
million (3.4% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. There are currently 14 loans (14.9% of the pool) in special
servicing, seven of which are new transfers since the prior review
in September 2015. Loan maturities are concentrated over the next
year, with approximately 48% of the pool maturing through the end
of February (including loans maturing this month) and 12% through
the remainder of 2016.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 90% to $300.7 million from
$3.01 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes H through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses (5.6% of the pool) is a
multi-note loan secured by a 179,947 square foot (sf) office
property located in Tampa, FL. The loan was previously in special
servicing between April 2010 and April 2013 due to imminent
default. The loan was modified in November 2011 and bifurcated into
an A/B note structure with a $12 million A note and $4.7 million B
note. The modification also included a 12-month term extension to
March 2017. The loan is performing under the modification and the
servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.13x on
the A note as of second quarter 2015. Times Publishing Company
occupies 12% of the property's net rentable area (NRA) with a lease
expiration date in February 2016. Per servicer watchlist
commentary, the borrower has been contacted for property updates
and the latest rent roll, but no other information was provided.
Occupancy at the property remains low and was reported at 66% as of
July 2015, compared to 63.6% at year-end (YE) 2014. Fitch modeled a
significant loss based on the loan's total leverage.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a Fitch Loan
of Concern (5.5% of the pool) secured by a 439,224 sf regional mall
located in Muskogee, OK. The mall is anchored by Dillard's (17.1%
NRA through May 2019), JC Penney (11.8% NRA through September
2017), and Dickinson Theaters (7.5% NRA through January 2018). The
property's performance declined in 2015 after Sears (17.5% NRA)
vacated upon their December 2014 lease expiration. The
servicer-reported occupancy and DSCR were 69.3% and 1.11x,
respectively, as of third quarter 2015, down from 88% and 1.31x at
YE 2014. The loan is scheduled to mature on March 1, 2016. Per
servicer commentary, the borrower has stated that they will not be
able to refinance or sell the property to pay off the loan. While
not currently on the servicer's watchlist, the loan has been
designated as a Fitch Loan of Concern due to the uncertainty of the
upcoming maturity and declining property performance.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a
specially-serviced loan (2.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
129,899 sf office building located in Arlington, TX. The loan
initially transferred to special servicing between May 2010 and
January 2011 due to imminent default, during which time a loan
modification was completed, including a 72-month term extension to
a new maturity date of November 2016. The loan transferred back to
special servicing in July 2015 due to imminent default. Per special
servicer commentary, the property was 8% occupied as of December
2015, as the largest tenant, Southwestern Bell Telephone (53% NRA)
vacated upon their lease expiration in June 2015. The special
servicer is now reportedly pursuing foreclosure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-J through G reflect the increasing
credit enhancement and expected continued paydown of the classes.
Upgrades were limited due to the significant percentage of Fitch
Loans of Concern, including upcoming maturities and several of the
top 15 loans with occupancy declines, as well as specially serviced
loans. Further upgrades to classes A-J through G are possible if
the specially serviced assets are disposed and losses are lower
than expected. Downgrades are possible if additional loans transfer
to special servicing and losses are higher than expected. Fitch
will continue to monitor the changing collateral given the large
percentage of the pool maturing in the near future. Ratings on the
distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades as losses
are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks as indicated:

-- $40 million class A-J to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.8 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.5 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.8 million class D to 'AAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.5 million class E to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.8 million class F to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30 million class G to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $33.8 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%.
-- $30 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.6 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes L, M, N, O, P, and Q have been reduced to zero due to
realized losses and are affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0%. The class A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1-A, and A-M certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class S or CCA certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class A-X and
A-Y certificates.



CREST G-STAR 2001-1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Cl. D Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Crest G-Star 2001-1, LP ("Crest G-Star 2001-1"):

US $20,000,000 Class C Third Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due
2035, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

US $15,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Due
2035, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class due to upgrades within
the underlying collateral pool; combined with greater than expected
recoveries on high credit risk defaulted collateral. Moody's has
affirmed the rating on one class because the key transaction
metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The affirmation is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic)
transactions.

Crest G-Star 2001-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (100.0% of the
current pool balance). As of the November 25, 2015 note valuation
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $66.1 million from $500.4
million at issuance as a result of pay-downs due to regular
amortization, prepayments, and recoveries from defaults on the
underlying collateral.

The pool contains eight assets totaling $30.7 million (100.0% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the December 31, 2015 trustee report. While there
have been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to
date, Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,560
compared to 2,354 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (16.5% compared to 31.4% at last
review), A1-A3 (38.1% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(11.6% compared to 39.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0%, the same
as that at last review), B1-B3 (0.0%, the same as that at last
review), and Caa1-Ca/C (33.8% compared to 29.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.3 years, compared to 2.6 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
loans within the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 8.3%, compared to 8.7% at last review.


Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other parameters constant, notching down 100% of the
collateral pool by one notch would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch downward
(e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).
Notching up 100% of the collateral pool by one notch would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero
notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.




DORCHESTER PARK: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these ratings for Dorchester Park CLO
Limited/ LLC (Dorchester Park) as:

   -- $312,500,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $62,750,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27,250,000 class C notes 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19,000,000 class D notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $25,000,000 class E notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17,000,000 class F notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation is based on the credit enhancement (CE) available
to the notes, the stable performance of the underlying portfolio
since the transaction's inception in February 2015, and the
cushions available in the collateralized loan obligation's (CLO)
cash flow modeling results.

The loan portfolio par amount plus principal cash is approximately
$500.6 million (excluding PIK and capitalized interest amounts), as
of the January 06, 2016 trustee report, resulting in a marginal
increase in CE for all classes of rated notes.

The current weighted average spread (WAS) is 4.47% versus a minimum
WAS trigger of 4.30%, as reported by the trustee. Additionally, the
Fitch weighted average rating factor has remained stable at 'B' as
compared to the closing date.  Fitch currently considers 2.9% of
the collateral assets to be rated in the 'CCC' category versus 0.2%
in the indicative portfolio at closing, based on Fitch's Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) Equivalency Map.  Approximately 90.6% of the
performing portfolio is considered to have strong recovery
prospects or a Fitch-assigned Recovery Rating of 'RR2' or higher.

Fitch's cash flow analysis indicates each class of rated notes is
passing all nine interest rate and default timing scenarios at or
above their current rating levels.  The ratings for classes B, C,
D, E and F deviate from those corresponding to the breakevens from
the cash flow model.  Fitch does not recommend upgrading the notes
at this review to provide some cushion to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio.

The Stable Outlook on each class of rated notes of Dorchester Park
reflects the expectation that the notes have sufficient levels of
credit protection to withstand any potential deterioration in the
credit quality of the portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the notes may be sensitive to the following: asset
defaults, significant negative credit migration, which includes
assets being downgraded to 'CCC', portions of the portfolio being
placed on Rating Watch Negative, lower than historically observed
recoveries for defaulted assets, overcollateralization or interest
coverage (IC) test breaches, or breach of concentration limitations
or portfolio quality covenants.  Rating sensitivity analysis was
conducted at close and the results were disclosed in the new issue
report.  Initial Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivity are
further described in the New Issue Report published on Aug. 17,
2015.

A comparison of the transaction's Representations, Warranties, and
Enforcement Mechanisms (RW&Es) to those of typical RW&Es for that
asset class is also available by accessing the reports and links
indicated below.

Dorchester Park CLO Limited/LLC is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by GSO/Blackstone Debt
Funds Management LLC (GSO).  The transaction will remain in its
reinvestment period until January 2019 and will mature in January
2027.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for CLOs and Corporate CDOs' using
Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) to project future default and
recovery levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default and
recovery levels were then utilized in Fitch's cash flow model under
various combinations of default timing and interest rate stress
scenarios, as described in the report.  The cash flow model was
customized to reflect the transaction's structural features.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was reviewed in relation to this
rating action.



ECP CLO 2013-5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
E notes from ECP CLO 2013-5 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by Silvermine Capital Management LLC.  At
the same time, Standard & Poor's removed this rating from
CreditWatch negative, where it was placed on Dec. 23, 2015.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C, and
D notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 9, 2015, trustee report.

The transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period
until January 2017, and S&P anticipates the manager will continue
to reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.  The transaction has benefited from a decrease in
reported weighted average life since the effective date (to 4.73
years from 5.50 years) and an increase in the weighted average
spread (to 4.25% from 3.95%).  However, this benefit has been more
than offset by deterioration in the credit quality of the
portfolio, with 'CCC' rated and defaulted collateral going from 0%
of the aggregate principal balance to 5.10% and 0.48%,
respectively.  In addition, the weighted average recovery rates
assumptions indicated by S&P's recovery ratings on the loans in the
portfolio have dropped.

The portfolio continues to have significant exposure to loans in
the energy sector (13.31%).  By specific industry, its
second-largest exposure is to the oil and gas subsector (10.97%).
This contributes in large part to the approximately 15.86% of
assets that have a negative Standard & Poor's rating outlook and a
weighted average portfolio market value of approximately 88.87%.

While the cash flow analysis indicated a lower rating, the
downgrade to 'B- (sf)' was based on S&P's belief that this tranche
does not meet its criteria for assigning 'CCC' ratings.  If the
transaction realizes par losses in the future, the rating on the
class E notes could be vulnerable to further downgrade. Conversely,
if the par losses are not realized and the ratings on the current
'CCC' rated obligors were to be raised, or loans from the 'CCC'
rated obligors pay off without defaulting, S&P could raise the
rating on the class E notes back to the original rating.

The affirmation of the ratings assigned to the other classes of
notes reflects S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

ECP CLO 2013-5 Ltd.

                           Cash flow
       Previous            implied     Cash flow     Final
Class  rating              rating (i)  cushion (ii)  rating
A-1    AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)    3.22%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)             AA+ (sf)    6.58%       AA (sf)
B      A (sf)              A+ (sf)     4.51%       A (sf)
C      BBB (sf)            BBB+ (sf)   4.31%       BBB (sf)
D      BB (sf)             BB+ (sf)    0.78%       BB (sf)
E      B (sf)/Watch Neg    CCC (sf)    0.01%       B- (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

  (ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche
break-even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
scenario           Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case           15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating   20.0                      7.5
Above base case           25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A (sf)     A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)    A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)
E      CCC (sf)   CC (sf)    CCC (sf)    CCC- (sf)   B- (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB (sf)      A (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC (sf)      BB (sf)
E      CCC (sf)     CC (sf)       CC (sf)       B- (sf)

RATING LOWERED

ECP CLO 2013-5 Ltd.

                Rating
Class       To          From
E           B- (sf)     B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ECP CLO 2013-5 Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2         AA (sf)
B           A (sf)
C           BBB (sf)
D           BB (sf)



EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1:

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transactions
    benefit from credit enhancement in the form of OC,
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss (CNL) assumptions
    under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- Exeter's capabilities with regards to originations,
    underwriting, servicing and ownership by the Blackstone Group
    (Blackstone), Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. (Navigation
    Capital) and Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
    servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
    acceptable backup servicer.

-- Exeter senior management team has considerable experience and
    a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    Exeter's auto loan portfolio.

-- The improvement of performance demonstrated in monthly
    origination vintage static pools and improving pool
    statistics.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter, and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS methodology Legal

    Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance.




EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1's $350.00 million
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 28,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 50.64%, 41.77%, 35.34%,
      and 26.12% credit support for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
      (including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 2.55x, 2.10x, 1.77x, and 1.30x our 18.50%-19.50%
      expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments that S&P believes

      will be made to the preliminary rated notes by the assumed
      legal final maturity dates under stressed cash flow modeling

      scenarios that S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned

      preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes will remain within one rating category of S&P's
      preliminary 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively,
      during the first year and that S&P's ratings on the class C
      and D notes will remain within two rating categories of its
      preliminary 'BBB+ (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings during the
      first year.  These potential rating movements are consistent

      with S&P's credit stability criteria, which outline the
      outer bound of credit deterioration as a one-category
      downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated securities
      and a two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      through 'BB' rated securities under the moderate stress
      conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class   Rating      Type            Interest           Amount
                                    rate(i)          (mil. $)
A       AA (sf)     Senior          Fixed              215.69
B       A (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed               55.57
C       BBB+ (sf)   Subordinate     Fixed               32.02
D       BB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed               46.72

(i)The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
determined on the pricing date.



FIRST UNION 1999-C1: Moody's Hikes Class G Debt Rating to Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed one class in First Union Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C1 as
follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2015 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. G, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2015 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IO-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to
paydown, amortization, and an increased share of defeasance in the
pool, as well as an improved deal credit profile following the
resolution and liquidation of the former Prince George's Metro
Center Loan, which at last review comprised 25% of the pool and was
in special servicing. The deal has paid down 29% since Moody's last
review and defeasance now represents 40% of the pool compared to
31% at last review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance of the referenced classes is consistent with Moody's
expectations.

The rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 3 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12% of the
current balance compared to 34% at Moody's last full review in
January 2015. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 3.7% of the original pooled balance, compared to 4.0% at the
last full review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.




GOLFSMITH INT'L: DBRS Confirms 'B' Issuer Rating
------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the Issuer Rating of Golf Town Canada Inc.
(Golf Town) & Golfsmith International Holdings, Inc. (Golfsmith;
collectively, Golfsmith International or the Company) at B and the
Senior Secured Second Lien Notes (the Notes) rating at CCC (high)
with a recovery rating of RR6. The trend remains Negative. The
continuation of the Negative trend reflects near-term liquidity
concerns, weakness in the Company’s operating performance despite
positive signs in same-store sales (on a constant-currency basis)
and uncertainty around Golfsmith International's ability to return
earnings and credit metrics to levels considered acceptable for the
current Issuer Rating of B. DBRS also recognizes the support of the
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS) evidenced by
its pledge of collateral to ensure sufficient liquidity for the
Company during seasonal periods in 2015. The ratings continue to
reflect the discretionary and cyclical nature of the golf retail
business, intense competition, sensitivity to weather and risks
surrounding longer-term profitability and growth. The ratings are
supported by the Company’s well-established market position,
differentiating full-service format, geographic diversification
across North America and sponsorship from OMERS.

Golfsmith International's earnings profile remained pressured
through the first nine months of 2015 primarily because of further
weakening of the Canadian dollar, which negatively affects the
translation of Golf Town sales as well as margins and earnings, and
lower eCommerce sales despite improving trends (on a
currency-neutral and comparable-period basis) in same-store sales
performance. The Company’s financial profile and liquidity
remained under significant pressure from challenges to operating
performance despite capital-conserving policies related to capital
expenditure (capex) and the disposition of Accolade Promotion
Group, the proceeds of which helped to fund the free cash flow
deficit. Nevertheless, balance-sheet debt declined moderately
because of the currency translation of the Canadian
dollar-denominated portion of the Notes.

DBRS continues to believe that a meaningful recovery in the
Company's earnings profile in the near term will remain a
challenge; however, operating performance could stabilize and
improve modestly over the near to medium term based on positive
sales trends and merchandising initiatives undertaken by Golfsmith
International's new management team. DBRS believes that sales could
increase in the low-single digit range in the near term, largely
driven by same-store sales growth and eCommerce. Over the longer
term, sales growth and profitability could benefit from the
Company's focus on developing its omni-channel capabilities and
optimizing its real estate portfolio. Golfsmith International is
not expected to have positive net new store openings over the near
to medium term. EBITDA margins should benefit from operating
leverage in the near term if the Company is successful in growing
sales. Gross margins could improve modestly as Golfsmith
International and its vendors adjust prices in Canada in response
to the weaker Canadian dollar. As such, DBRS believes that EBITDA
could stabilize and begin to recover in the near to medium term and
should increase at a faster pace than sales, albeit from a very low
baseline.

DBRS believes that Golfsmith International's financial profile and
liquidity will remain pressured until operating performance
stabilizes and the Company can display meaningful and sustainable
growth in operating income and cash flow. Cash flow from operations
should track operating income while capex could increase modestly,
but will remain low relative to historical levels as the Company
invests in improving its information technology systems and
omni-channel capabilities. Working capital management is expected
to continue to improve modestly over the near term as Golfsmith
International remains focused on working with vendors to optimize
payable terms and inventory management. If the Company is
successful in stabilizing operating performance, combined with its
capital conservation measures including improved working capital
management, DBRS believes that the Company could approach free cash
flow break-even in 2016 and positive free cash flow in the medium
term. DBRS believes that any free cash flow generated over the
medium term will be used to repay amounts drawn on the Company’s
Asset-Backed Loan which, combined with earnings growth, should
result in improved credit metrics and could lead to a trend change
on the rating to Stable from Negative. However, should Golfsmith
International continue to be challenged in managing near-term
liquidity concerns as well as improving its credit risk profile and
operating performance (in terms of same-store sales, operating
income and key credit metrics), a downgrade of the ratings would
likely result.



GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 10 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial
Funding Corp. (GCCFC), series 2004-GG1 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Although credit enhancement is high, the affirmations reflect the
high concentration with only seven loans remaining, three of which
are in special servicing (36.6%), as well as the continued
underperformance of the largest remaining loan (61.7%).  Fitch
modeled losses of 39.9% for the remaining pool; expected losses as
a percentage of the original pool balance are at 4%, including
losses already incurred to date (1.4%).  Fitch has designated the
three loans in special servicing and the largest loan (98.3%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 93.6% to $167.1
million from $2.63 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls total
$13.3 million and affect class P through H.  No loans are currently
defeased.

The largest contributor to modeled losses, 400 West Market Street,
formerly known as the Aegon Center (61.7%), is secured by a
35-story, 633,650 square foot (sf) multi-tenant office tower in the
Louisville, KY central business district.  A loan modification was
completed in November 2013 after the building lost the largest
tenant, Aegon, and imminent default was expected due to the
upcoming loan maturity of April 2014.  The terms of the
modification included an A/B Note split of $82 million for the A
portion and $21.8 million for the B portion, a reduced interest
rate of 4% with periodic step-ups and a loan extension of 60 months
to April 2019.  The sponsor rebranded the building in 2014 and is
working diligently to secure new tenants in order to increase
occupancy.  Occupancy, as of third quarter 2015 (3Q15), was
reported at 72%.  The building is considered the premier location
for corporate tenants and the subject's rental rates are 20% higher
than the listed class A rate according to REIS.  Only two tenant
leases, Humana Insurance Company (6.28% of the net rentable area
[NRA]) and Ernst & Young (4.4%), are scheduled to expire prior to
the loan maturity.  The loan continues to perform under the
modified terms.  Fitch's losses assumed a stressed cash flow based
on the most recent reported net operating income (NOI) and a
stressed cap rate.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses, Severance Town
Center (12.3%), is secured by a 644,501 sf retail center located in
Cleveland Heights, OH, along Mayfield Road in close proximity to
the Cleveland Clinic and John Carroll University.  The subject was
transferred to the special servicer January 2014 after an anchor
tenant, Wal-Mart, relocated to a stand-alone site in the area.
Wal-Mart continues to make lease payments; its lease expires in
January 2019.  A number of new leases were signed in an attempt to
stabilize the property after the sponsor failed to pay off the loan
by the scheduled maturity in April 2014.  As of 3Q15, economic
occupancy was 81% and physical occupancy was 62%.  A note sale was
unsuccessful during the summer of 2015.  The foreclosure process is
nearing completion and the special servicer is anticipating that
the title will transfer to the trust in 1Q16.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses is the real estate
owned Skillman Abrams Shopping Center (4% of the pool), a 133,088
sf anchored retail center located in Dallas, TX.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 12, 2013 for imminent
monetary default after the grocery anchor vacated the center to
relocate to a new location in the market.  The occupancy dropped to
27% during 4Q13 after another tenant vacated as result of the
anchor leaving the property.  The most recent reported occupancy
was 18% as of December 2015.  Foreclosure was completed in 2H13 and
the special servicer is working to find a new anchor tenant before
exploring disposition options.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating on class E has a Stable Outlook due to high credit
enhancement.  Given the significant concentrations, upgrades to
class E are unlikely.  The revisions of Outlooks to Stable on
classes F and G reflects the increase in credit enhancement due to
paydown.  Classes H through O may incur additional downgrades if
higher than expected losses are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $6.4 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.5 million class F at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable from
     Negative;
  -- $26 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable from Negative;
  -- $39 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 80%;
  -- $6.5 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13 million class K at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $13 million class L at 'Csf''; RE 0%;
  -- $9.8 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $9.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $6.5 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, B, C, D, OEA-B1, and
OEA-B2 have repaid in full.  Fitch does not rate $4.5 million class
P.  Classes XC and XP were previously withdrawn.



GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: Fitch Hikes Class D Ratings to CCCsf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four classes and affirmed 12 of GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation II commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2006-GG6 (GSMSC 2006-GG6).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades to classes A-J through D reflect significantly
increased credit enhancement from the full payoff of approximately
100 loans since the last rating action in September 2015; classes
A-1, A-1A and A-M were paid in full for a total of $1.2 billion,
class A-J has been reduced by approximately 70%. The pool is very
concentrated with only 22 assets remaining. Fitch has designated 16
(53.8%) Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes seven specially
serviced assets (19.6%) as of the January 2016 remittance report,
and four loans (23.9%) that have recently matured but have not yet
transferred to special servicing. All performing loans are
scheduled to mature by March 2016.

Fitch modeled losses of 25.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 9.3%, including $288.4
million (7.4% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.5% to $292.5 million from
$3.9 billion at issuance. The servicer reported an additional $35.1
million loan also repaid after the distribution date. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes F through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 123,461 square foot
(sf) office building located in Coral Springs, FL (5.5% of the
pool). The asset has been real estate owned since January 2013 and
as of the April 2015 rent roll is only 36.8% occupied. The property
is currently being marketed for sale.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is secured by an
84,724 sf office property located in Santa Monica, CA (11.2% of the
pool). Occupancy has been trending down at 77.3% per the September
2015 rent roll, compared to 81.8% at year-end 2014 and 92.2% at
year-end 2013. The servicer reported debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) remained below 1.0x over the same period. According to REIS,
as of the third quarter of 2015, the overall Santa Monica office
market reported a 9.4% vacancy rate. While Fitch modeled losses
reflect the property's poor recent performance, actual losses
appear unlikely given the market location and reported upcoming
sale of the property. While the loan matured in January 2016
without repayment, the borrower requested a forbearance period in
order to complete a sale of the property.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a specially
serviced loan secured by an 115,558 sf office building located in
Bridgewater, NJ (4.7% of the pool). The loan transferred to special
servicing in November 2014 due to imminent default as its sole
tenant vacated the property upon its October 2014 lease expiration.
A tenant partially sub-leases a portion of the space. The servicer
is pursuing a foreclosure action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The upgrades reflect the significant de-levering of the transaction
as loans paid off at or near their scheduled loan maturities. The
Stable Rating Outlook on classes A-J through C reflect the
increasing credit enhancement and expected continued pay down to
the classes. Should loans continue to pay down with limited losses,
further upgrades to classes C through E may be possible; however,
upgrades may be limited due to pool's maturity concentration and
high percentage of loans of concern. Downgrades are possible to the
distressed classes should additional losses be realized. Fitch will
continue to monitor the changing collateral given the large
upcoming maturities in the near future.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

-- $93.3 million class A-J to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook to
    Stable from Positive;

-- $19.5 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;

-- $48.8 million class C to 'BBBsf' from 'CCCsf, Assign Stable
     Outlook;

-- $39 million class D to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf', RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $29.3 million class E at 'CCsf', RE 20%;
-- $43.9 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $18.8 million class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, and A-M have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and X-C
certificates.



GS MORTGAGE II 2006-GG8: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation II (GSMSC II) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2006-GG8.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement on the
non-distressed classes based on Fitch's modeled losses of 11% of
the remaining pool.  Expected losses on the original pool balance
total 14.3%, including $346.1 million (8.2% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 52 loans
(45.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes three specially
serviced assets (7.4%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.6% to $2.39 billion from
$4.24 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(10.6% of the pool) are defeased, including the largest loan, 222
South Riverside Plaza.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes D through S.  All of the non-specially serviced loans
(92.6% of the pool) are scheduled to mature between June 2016 and
November 2016.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the real estate owned
(REO) Ariel Preferred Portfolio (2.2% of the pool), the remaining
asset is a retail outlet located in Medford, MN.  Five of the
original six properties were previously sold.  The outlet portfolio
had transferred to special servicing in June 2009 for imminent
default.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is The Alhambra
loan (5.4% of the pool), which is secured by an office park
containing 22 buildings totaling 846,541 square feet (sf) located
in Alhambra, CA.  The servicer-reported occupancy is approximately
73% with the largest tenant on a month to month lease.  The loan is
scheduled to mature in July 2016.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the specially
serviced Fair Lakes Office Park loan (4.9% of the pool).  The pari
passu loan is secured by an approximately 1.25 million sf,
nine-building office property located in Fairfax, VA near I-66 and
the Fairfax County Parkway.  The reported occupancy as of March
2015 was 82% (down from 99% at issuance).  A large tenant
representing 21% of the net rentable area (NRA) vacated two
buildings in 2015. The loan is scheduled to mature in August 2016.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Positive Outlook on class A-M reflects the possibility of a
future upgrade if the transaction de-levers as loans payoff at
their scheduled maturity.  Conversely, if maturity defaults and
transfers to special servicing increase, the likelihood of an
upgrade is low in the near term.  Fitch will monitor the
transaction as loan maturity dates approach.  Downgrades to the
distressed classes are likely if loans default at maturity and loss
expectations increase.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms this class with a revised Rating Outlook:

  -- $424.3 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive from
     Stable.

Fitch affirms these ratings as indicated:

  -- $1.34 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $126.7 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $302.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 85%.
  -- $26.5 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $53 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $37.1 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $37.1 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $42.4 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $3.9 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q are fully depleted and are
affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized losses.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-AB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the fully depleted class S certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.



GSMPS MORTGAGE 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Cl. B1 Debt Rating to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from two transactions issued by GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust
2003-1 and GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3. The collateral
backing these deals consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable
rate mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD)
or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the FHA-VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools and the structural nuances of the
transactions. The ratings were downgraded due to the erosion of
credit enhancement supporting these bonds. The current delinquent
pipeline includes loans that have been delinquent for several
years, and the liquidation of these delinquent loans can result in
higher losses that could significantly affect a transaction's
credit enhancement. Moody's believes the severity on some of these
loans could be much higher than the FHA-VA expected severity.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA guarantee covers
only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of either the
sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid interest, and
foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount. HUD usually pays
claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers submit the claims, but
can impose significant penalties on servicers if it finds
irregularities in the claim process later during the servicer
audits. This can prompt servicers to push more expenses to the
trust that they deem reasonably incurred than submit them to HUD
and face significant penalty. The rating actions consider the
portion of a defaulted loan normally not covered by the FHA or VA
guarantee and other servicer expenses they deemed reasonably
incurred and passed on to the trust.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.





H/2 ASSET FUNDING 2014-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by H/2 Asset Funding 2014-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

H/2 Asset Funding 2014-1, Ltd. is a managed cash transaction with
the reinvestment period ending in March 2018. The transaction can
be backed by a portfolio of: i) single asset/single borrower
commercial real estate bonds (CMBS); ii) senior corporate bonds,
and iii) bank loans. As of the January 12, 2016 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including income notes,
is $515.9 million, the same as that at issuance.

No assets are defaulted as of the trustee's January 12, 2016
report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,350,
compared to 2,350 at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 8 years, as compared to 10 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 34.7%, the same as that at
securitization.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 32%, the same as that at securitization.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating.
The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in ratings or credit assessments of the underlying collateral.
Holding all other key parameters static, stressing the WARF from
2350 to 3100 would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of 0 to 2 notches downward (e.g., one notch down
implies a ratings movement from Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.



HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
medium-term notes issued by Hertz Vehicle Financing II LP:

-- Series 2016-1, Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class D Notes at BB (sf)

-- Series 2016-2, Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-2, Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Series 2016-2, Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-2, Class D Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the transaction is dynamic depending on
    the composition of the vehicles in the fleet and certain
    market value tests.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The transaction parties’ capabilities to effectively manage
    rental car operations and disposition of the fleet to the
    extent necessary.

-- Collateral credit quality and residual value performance.

-- The legal structure and its consistency with the DBRS “Legal

    Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance” methodology and the
    presence of legal opinions (to be provided) that address the
    treatment of the operating lease as a true lease, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicles with Hertz
    Corporation and its affiliates as well as that the trust has a

    valid first-priority security interest in the assets.



HERTZ VEHICLE II: Fitch to Assign 'BB' Rating to 2016-1 Cl. D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to the series 2016-1 and 2016-2 notes issued by Hertz Vehicle
Financing II LP (HVF II):

Series 2016-1*
-- $TBD class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Series 2016-2*
-- $TBD class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $TBD class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Final note amounts will be sized to market demand for both
series. TBD - To be determined.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Diverse Vehicle Fleet: HVF II is deemed diverse under the criteria
due to the high degree of manufacturer, model, segment, and
geographic diversification in Hertz's rental fleet.

Concentration limits, based on a number of fleet characteristics,
are present to help mitigate the risk of individual manufacturer
defaults and losses.

OEM Financial Stability: OEMs with PV concentrations in the trust
have all improved their financial position in recent years and have
positioned themselves well to meet their respective repurchase
agreement obligations. Fitch upgraded GM, the largest concentration
in HVF II, to investment grade ('BBB') in June 2015.

Consistent Performance: Hertz's historical vehicle fleet
depreciation has been relatively stable, despite recent increases
in 2014 and 2015 for NPV vehicles due to higher aging of the fleet.
Historical vehicle disposition losses have been minimal for PV and
have recorded mostly gains for NPV, though dispositions are
expected to come under pressure from the increasing vehicle supply
in the U.S. wholesale market.

Additional Rating Drivers

Enhancement Covers Fitch's Expected Loss: Initial credit
enhancement (CE) for the notes is dynamic and based on the HVF II
fleet mix, with maximum and minimum levels. The dynamic CE levels
proposed for all class of notes of each series covers Fitch's
maximum and minimum expected loss levels for all classes under the
requested ratings.

Structural Features Mitigate Risk: Vehicle market value tests,
amortization triggers, and events of default all mitigate risks
stemming from ongoing vehicle value volatility and weakness,
ensuring parity between asset values and ongoing market values
resulting in low historical fleet disposition losses and stable
depreciation rates.

Adequate Fleet Servicer and Fleet Management: Hertz is deemed as
adequate servicer and administrator for the master trust as
evidenced by its fleet management abilities and securitization
performance to date. Fiserv is the backup disposition agent, while
Lord Securities the backup administrator.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
provides that a bankruptcy of Hertz would not impair the timeliness
of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's rating sensitivity analysis focuses on two scenarios
involving potentially extreme market disruptions that would force
the agency to redefine its stress assumptions. The first examines
the effect of moving Fitch's bankruptcy/liquidation timing scenario
to eight months at 'AAAsf' with subsequent increases to each rating
level. The second considers the effect of moving the disposition
stresses to the higher end of the range at each rating level for a
diverse fleet. For example, at 'AAAsf', the stress would move from
24% to 28%. Finally, the last example shows the impact of both
stresses on the structure. The purpose of these stresses is to
demonstrate the potential rating impact on a transaction if one or
a combination of these scenarios occurs.

Fitch determined ratings by applying expected loss levels for
various rating categories until the enhancement proposed exceed the
expected loss from the sensitivity.

Sensitivity scenarios were run on the 2016-2 five-year maturity
structure, as this series has a slightly higher interest expense
cost and therefore, a slightly higher EL level than 2016-1. For all
sensitivity scenarios, the notes show little sensitivity to the
class A notes under each of the scenarios with downgrades occurring
under the combined scenario only. One notch to one level downgrades
would occur to the subordinate notes under each scenario with
greater sensitivity to the disposition stress scenario. Under the
combined scenario, the subordinate notes would be placed under
greater stress.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE
Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC). The third-party due diligence
focused on a review of the procedures and related data for
approximately 59 vehicles in the pool for each series, including
the following areas:

-- Title, Lien and OEM;
-- Capital Costs;
-- Mark-to-Market and Disposition Proceeds.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis, but the findings
had no impact on the recommended ratings.


JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: S&P Affirms D Rating on 3 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
10 classes from Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2008-R3, a U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.  S&P
raised two ratings and affirmed eight.

These 10 re-REMIC classes belong to three separate groups, with
each group supported by one underlying class.  Group 1 is supported
by class 5-A-1 from Banc of America Funding 2006-B Trust, Group 2
is supported by class 3-A-1 from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-AR11, and Group 3 is supported by class 3-A-1 from CHL
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HYB2.  All three of the underlying
securities are primarily backed by adjustable-rate prime and
Alternative-A mortgage loans.

S&P's ratings on these classes address the likelihood, in its view,
of timely interest and ultimate principal payments.  S&P reviewed
the interest and principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed through to the applicable
re-REMIC classes.  S&P applied its loss projections to the
underlying collateral to identify the magnitude of losses that it
believes the underlying securities could pass through to the
applicable re-REMIC classes.  In addition, S&P stressed its loss
projections at various rating categories to assess whether the
re-REMIC classes could continue to pay the interest and principal
due if they were to experience such losses.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations in its decisions
to raise, lower, and/or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance and/or structural
characteristics and their potential effects on certain classes.

UPGRADES

The two upgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be sufficient to cover
S&P's projected losses at their rating levels due to increased
credit support and improved underlying collateral performance.

AFFIRMATIONS

The four affirmations above 'CCC (sf)' reflect S&P's assessment
that these re-REMIC classes will likely receive timely interest and
ultimate principal payments under the applicable stressed
assumptions.  It also reflects S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support is sufficient to cover our projected losses in those
rating scenarios.

The one 'CCC (sf)' affirmation reflects S&P's belief that the
projected credit support for these affected classes will remain
insufficient to cover the base-case projected losses allocable to
the underlying classes, which will then flow to these re-REMIC
classes.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate declining to 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth increasing to 2.7% in 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

RATINGS RAISED

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2008-R3
Series 2008-R3
                                Rating
Class      CUSIP        To                  From
I-A1       47232AAA6    A (sf)              BB (sf)
I-A2       47232AAB4    BBB (sf)            B (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2008-R3
Series 2008-R3
                                Rating
Class      CUSIP        To                  From
I-A3       47232AAC2    CCC (sf)            CCC (sf)
I-A4       47232AAN8    D (sf)              D (sf)
II-A1      47232AAD0    A (sf)              A (sf)
II-A2      47232AAE8    BB (sf)             BB (sf)
II-A3      47232AAF5    B (sf)              B (sf)
II-A4      47232AAQ1    D (sf)              D (sf)
III-A1     47232AAG3    A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
III-A2     47232AAH1    D (sf)              D (sf)



JP MORGAN 1999-C8: Moody's Affirms C (sf) Rating on Class H Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C8 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with realized losses and Moody's expected loss. As a
result of previously liquidated loans, Class H has realized a
cumulative certificate loss of 46%

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.2% of the
current balance, compared to 7.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 7.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $6.7 million
from $731.5 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to
25% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 50% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $55 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2013 and fully year 2014 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 42%, compared to 53% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
8.7% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.21X and 4.73X,
respectively, compared to 1.22X and 3.76X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 59% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Ridge Terrace Heath Care Ctr. Loan ($1.7
million -- 25.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 120-bed heath
care center located in Lantana, Florida. The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR. Performance has been very
weak due to a significant increase in expenses. The property's
valuation is based on a floor value. The loan is fully amortizing
and has amortized 68% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 108% and 1.36X, respectively, compared to 132%
and 1.10X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bayshore Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($1.2 million -- 18.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 52,000
square foot (SF) retail property in Huntersville, North Carolina.
As of September 2015, the property was 58% leased compared to 97%
at last review. The top tenant, Tony Fine Decor Fabrics (19,777 sf,
38% NRA) vacated the property after their lease expiration on
12/31/2014. According to the servicer, several prospective tenants
are interested in the space. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 70% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 23% and 4.62X, respectively, compared to 28% and 3.83X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Plaza De Las Palmas Loan ($1.0
million -- 15.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 47,000 SF
retail property in El Cajon, California. As of September 2015, the
property was 79% leased, compared to 83% at last review. The loan
is fully amortizing and has amortized 77% since securitization.
Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 16%
and >4.00X, respectively, compared to 20% and >4.00X at the
last review.




JP MORGAN 2001-C1: Fitch Hikes Class J Debt Rating to 'CCCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s (JPMC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2001-C1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect high defeasance concentration in the pool
coupled with lower expected losses due to the change in pool
composition. This change is largely the result of the disposal of a
large specially serviced asset with better-than-expected
recoveries. There are five loans remaining in the pool, two of
which are defeased (87.4%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.5% to $15.1 million from
$1.07 billion at issuance. The pool has experienced $46 million
(4.3% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes J through NR.

Since last review, Quail Hollow at the Lakes Apartment (formerly
37.9% of the pool), has liquidated. The asset was previously in
special servicing and was eventually foreclosed upon in July 2015
after the loan's initial monetary default in June 2010. Despite the
sponsor's multiple attempts to forestall the process, the property
was eventually sold and the proceeds paid in full. As a result, the
pool reflects improved credit characteristics.

The largest driver of potential losses is the Chapel Ridge
Apartments (11.9%). Refinance challenges at maturity in October
2016 could result in loss to the trust. However, the loan is
currently performing and reflects a YE 2014 debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.27x, down slightly from 1.34x at YE 2013.
Occupancy at the property was reported at 91.7% as of YE 2014, with
no occupancy number reported as of YE 2013.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class H is expected to remain Stable given
defeasance covering the entirety of the class. Class J may be
subject to downgrade if losses are realized from a material
negative credit event related to the largest non-defeased loan in
the pool, Chapel Ridge Apartments.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch upgrades the following classes and revises the RE as
indicated:

-- $5.7 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9 million class J to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf', RE 100%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $333,431 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The balances on classes L, M and N have been reduced to zero due to
realized losses. The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G, NC-1,
NC-2 and X-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class X-1 certificates.



KEY COMMERCIAL 2007-SL1: Fitch Cuts Class A-2 Debt Rating to BBsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed six classes of Key
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-SL1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect the highly concentrated nature of the pool
with the substantial risk of adverse selection. Fitch expects high
losses given the small loan balances and relatively high fixed
costs of disposal. Within the next 15 months, all of the loans in
the pool will have reached their maturity date with many reflecting
weak credit metrics that will present challenges with refinancing.
Fitch modeled losses of 21% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 9%, including $12.5 million
(5.3% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Seventeen loans (64.1 %) are presently on the Servicer Watch List,
which includes two specially serviced assets (5.9%).

As of the January 2015 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 85.9% to $33.4 million from
$237.5 million at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through L.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 72,374
square foot (sf) mixed-use property (retail/self-storage) (17% of
the pool) located in Kent, WA, which is approximately 20 miles
south of Seattle. The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of
year-end (YE) 2014 was reported to be 0.71x which is a substantial
decrease from the 0.97x reported at YE 2013. The loan has been
operating below 1x since 2010 due to soft market conditions. The
property occupancy has declined slightly to 95.7% as of YE 2014
from 100% at YE 2013. Additionally, it is worth noting that many of
the leases, totaling 35.2% of net rentable area (NRA) were renewed
in 2014. Rental revenue for this year may be understated as a
result of abatements. The servicer commentary indicated recovering
performance in 2015; however, no financials were provided.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
13,775 sf retail property (7.8%) located in the downtown shopping
district of Kirkland, WA. Occupancy was reported to be 100% as of
YE 2014 with most of the boutique tenants on short-term leases. As
of YE 2014, the DSCR was reported to be 1.03x which is slightly
above YE 2013 DSCR of 0.93x. The modeled loss is the result of high
lease-rollover risk. Four of the tenants reflect leases (32.3% of
NRA) which expire prior to the February 2017 loan maturity. One
tenant (3.5%) has recently vacated and another (19.7%) is operating
month-to-month.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks reflect the potential for further downgrade
should underperforming loans not refinance and transfer to special
servicing. Classes A-1A and A-2 are pari-passu with respect to
losses. The A-1A class is a multi-family directed class which is
supported by some of the worst-performing assets in the pool. The
Distressed classes (those rated below 'B') may be subject to
further downgrades as additional losses are realized or if losses
exceed Fitch's expectations.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and maintains Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $8.1 million class A-2 to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $9.7 million class A-1A to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $5.6 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $4.7 million class D to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.3 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class L, R and LR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.



MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes,
upgraded the ratings on three classes and placed the ratings on two
classes under review for possible upgrade in Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL
as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 3, 2015 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to A2 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Nov 3, 2015 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Nov 3, 2015 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Cl. IO, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2015 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on P&I Classes A-3, A-PO and B were affirmed due to the
sufficiency of the credit support level relative to Moody's
expected loss and the transaction's key metric, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF), being within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I Classes C, D and E were upgraded because of
increased credit support resulting from amortization and decreased
Moody's expected loss. The pool has paid down 15% since the last
full review in March 2015. Moody's expected loss decreased to 9.0%
from 10.5% at last full review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes D and E remain on review for
possible upgrade due to the possible upgrade of Rite Aid
Corporation, whose credit backs a sizeable share of this
transaction. Due to the potential acquisition of Rite Aid
Corporation (Moody's Senior Unsecured Rating B3/Caa1, Rating Under
Review for Possible Upgrade) by Walgreen Co. (Moody's Senior
Unsecured Rating Baa2, Rating Under Review for Possible Downgrade),
and a subsequent possible improvement in the Rite Aid Corporation
credit, the CTL weighted average rating factor (WARF) may be
positively affected. This may be credit positive for these two
classes.

The rating on the IO Class was affirmed due to the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.0% of the
current balance compared to 10.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.5% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.4% at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a higher
dark loan to value. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

DESCRIPTION OF MODEL USED

Moody's used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model to generate a portfolio loss distribution to
assess the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72% to $176 million
from $630 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 84 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 18% of the pool. Sixty-six of the loans are CTL loans secured
by properties leased to ten corporate credits. Eighteen loans,
representing 30% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Three loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans currently in special servicing. Twenty-one loans
have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $38 million (56% loss severity on average). Due to
realized losses, Classes G, H, J and K have been wiped out and
Class F has experienced a 37% principal loss.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($47.7
million -- 27.1% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: B3/Caa1 --
on review for possible upgrade), Georgia Power Company ($32.4
million -- 18.4% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: A3 -- stable
outlook), and Kroger Co. (The) ($16.0 million -- 9.1% of the pool;
senior unsecured rating: Baa2 -- stable outlook). The bottom-dollar
WARF for this pool is 2108 compared to 2250 at the last review.
WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse
credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Fitch Lowers Class D Certs Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes, downgraded one distressed
class, and affirmed 15 classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect recent pay down from the Peter Cooper
Village/Stuyvesant Town (PCV/ST) sale.  The downgrade to the
already distressed class is due to realized losses from the
disposition of other specially serviced assets.  Fitch modeled
losses of 10.7% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 13.9%, including $363 million (8.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 61 loans (23.5% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 11 specially serviced assets (8% of the pool).

PCV/ST was formerly the largest loan in the transaction (previously
24.2% of the pool).  The recent sale of PCV/ST resulted in a full
recovery of the transaction's former $800 million portion of the $3
billion loan and additional 'gain on sale' proceeds of $64.1
million were used to pay back interest shortfalls to classes AJ
through D.

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 46.2% to $2.39 billion from
$4.44 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, 20 loans
(14.5% of the pool) are defeased.  There are currently 225 loans
remaining in the pool with the top 10 loans accounting for 30.3%;
the largest loan represents 7.1% of the pool and is defeased.
Remaining maturities are concentrated in 4Q16 (25.8% of the pool)
and 1Q17 (68.7%).  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes E through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially
serviced HSA Memphis Industrial Portfolio loan (2.6% of the pool).
At issuance the loan was secured by 15 industrial/flex/office
buildings (1,586,544 sf) located in Memphis, TN.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2010 due to imminent
monetary default and foreclosure was held in October 2011.  One of
the properties was sold in late 2013, five of the properties were
sold in early 2014, and four of the buildings were sold in late
2014 leaving five properties as the remaining collateral.  Proceeds
from the previous property sales were applied to servicing advances
and delinquent P&I payments.  The special servicer continues to
lease/manage the assets in order to stabilize the properties.  The
remaining five properties are approximately 19% occupied per the
November 2015 rent rolls. Limited to no recovery is anticipated on
the outstanding principal balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-4, A-4FL, and A-1A are expected to
remain Stable as it is anticipated that credit enhancement will
increase due to scheduled pay down from amortization and loan
pay-offs at maturity.  Despite high credit enhancement, further
upgrades on classes AM and AM-FL are not anticipated due to adverse
selection.  The distressed classes are subject to downgrades should
losses increase on the remaining specially serviced loans and Fitch
Loans of Concern.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Positive and upgraded these
classes:

  -- $341.7 million class AM to 'Asf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class AM-FL to 'Asf' from 'BBsf', Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

  -- $23.4 million class D to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%;

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $951.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $213.8 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $264.7 billion class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $211.5 million class AJ at 'CCCsf', RE 80%;
  -- $175 million class AJ-FL at 'CCCsf', RE 80%;
  -- $77.3 million class B at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $33.1 million class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-2FL, A-2FX, A-3, and A-SB certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class M, P and Q
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded two classes, affirmed six
classes, confirmed two classes and downgraded one class of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, 2007-5 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AM-FL, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AJ, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AJ-FL, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes, Classes A-4, A-4FL and A-1A, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes A-M and AM-FL, were
upgraded primarily due to an increase in credit support resulting
from the $800 million paydown of the Peter Cooper Village and
Stuyvesant Town loan in this pool. This loan was the main
contributor to the overall pool paydown of 27% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes, Class AJ and AJ-FL, were confirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The
ratings on three P&I classes, Classes B, C and D, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded based on the
decline in credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its reference classes from the principal paydown
of highly rated classes.

Today's rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 12 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.6% of the
current balance compared to 7.2% at last review. The deal has paid
down 27% since last review and 46% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 12.9% compared to 12.4% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to $2.4 billion
from $4.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 225 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 37% of
the pool. Nineteen loans, constituting 13% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Sixty-five loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $363.1 million. Eleven loans,
constituting 8% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $127.6 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (67% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 30 poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $30.8 million (a 15% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 94% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, compared to 100% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 11% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Hotel Gansevoort Loan ($112.4 million
-- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 187-key full service
boutique hotel located in the Meatpacking District in Manhattan,
New York. Occupancy as of June 2015 was 85%, consistent with prior
year results. The loan remains on the watchlist due to low DSCR.
The loan has amortized 10% since securitization and Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 116% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 117%
and 0.95X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the is the Renaissance Austin
Hotel Loan ($83.0 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by
a 492-key full service hotel located in Austin, Texas. Property
performance declined from 2008 through 2012 but has rebounded
significantly. Renovations to all guestrooms and the lobby totaling
approximately $13 million were completed in 2012. The most recent
September 2015 occupancy figure was 68%, consistent with results
since December 2012. The loan is interest-only throughout the
entire term and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 1.03X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Medical Center of Santa
Monica Loan ($62.0 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 204,747 square foot medical office building located in Santa
Monica, California. Property performance has been steady for
several years with the most recent occupancy reported at 94% as of
year-end 2014. The loan is interest-only throughout the entire term
and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.22X, respectively,
the same as at last review.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. AM Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 21 classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Although the credit enhancement has increased due to the payoff of
the transaction's pari passu portion of the Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village (ST/PCV) loan (formerly 11.2% of the pool), there
remain concerns with the percentage of specially serviced loans
(17.8%), of which 43% are real estate owned (REO).  Five of the top
15 loans are in special servicing (12.9%) and one loan in the top
15 is considered a Fitch Loan of Concern (2.5%).

The recent sale of the ST/PCV asset and the paydown as of the
January 2016 remittance resulted in a full recovery of the
transaction's $202.3 million portion of the $3 billion former loan
amount and additional 'gain-on sale' proceeds in excess of the
total loan balance.  The A-1A class balance was reduced by 64% from
the principal proceeds, while the 'gain on sale' proceeds of
approximately $15 million were used to reimburse interest
shortfalls to classes AJ through D.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes D through Q.

Fitch's modeled losses are 21% of the remaining pool.  Expected
losses on the original pool balance total 18.4%, which is down
11.7% from Fitch's last rating action in September 2015 and
includes $61.4 million (2.9% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 14 loans (12.6%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the 12 specially serviced
assets (17.8%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 26.1% to $1.59 billion from
$2.15 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, seven loans
(3.7%) are defeased.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the MSKP Retail
Portfolio A loan (14.1% of the pool), which is secured by eight
regional and neighborhood retail centers located in four distinct
markets in Florida totalling 1.2 million square feet (sf).  Five
properties are located in the Orlando metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), one in the Palm Beach MSA, one in the Ft. Lauderdale MSA,
and one in Port Charlotte in southwest Florida.  Overall property
performance declined significantly from issuance to 2012 due to
weak local retail markets, which resulted in lower rents and a drop
in overall occupancy from 88% at issuance to 78% at year-end 2012.


After initially being transferred to the special servicer in March
2011, the portfolio was modified and returned to the master
servicer in October 2012.  Terms of the modification included the
bifurcation of the loan into a senior ($130.3 million) and junior
($93.1 million 'hope note') component with maturity being extended
to March 2019; both notes retained the original note rate of 5.6%
and remain as interest only through maturity.  Recent performance
has improved, with a third quarter 2015 (3Q 2015) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.59x (based on the A-1 Note only) and
occupancy of 82%.  Although losses are not expected imminently, any
recovery to the B-note is contingent upon full recovery to the
A-note proceeds at the loan's maturity in March 2019.  Fitch
modeled losses based on the stressed annualized net operating
income (NOI) from September 2015.  Unless collateral performance
improves more significantly, recovery to the B-note component is
unlikely.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Blackpoint Puerto Rico Retail loan (5.3%), which
is secured by six retail properties totaling approximately 857k sf
located within the greater San Juan, Puerto Rico area.  The
portfolio properties range from two to 20 miles from the city of
San Juan, and three of the six properties are supermarket anchored.
The loan was transferred for imminent default in February 2012 due
to upcoming maturity and borrower expressing inability to payoff
loan at maturity.  The portfolio was approximately 74% occupied as
of June 2015.  The special servicer is dual-tracking foreclosure
and a potential loan modification. Discussions with the borrower
concerning a resolution are ongoing as the borrower prepares a loan
modification proposal.  According to the servicer, an estimate on
timing of a resolution is not available at this point.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced MSKP Retail Portfolio B loan (3.8%), which is
secured by two retail centers located in Florida.  One property is
a grocery-anchored (Winn-Dixie) center located in Ft. Lauderdale,
and the other is an unanchored center located in the Manalapan
section of Palm Beach County.  The portfolio contains a total of
207,715-sf.

Similar to the MSKP Retail Portfolio A loan, the portfolio has
suffered occupancy declines since issuance due to weak local retail
markets and the loan was bifurcated in October 2012 into a senior
($29.7 million) and junior ($29.7 million 'hope note') component.
The loan transferred back to special servicing effective Dec. 30,
2015, due to imminent default.  The special servicer is currently
reviewing proposals for an additional loan modification.  Portfolio
occupancy has declined to 70% at year-end (YE) 2014 from 92% at
issuance.  Performance has improved, with a 3Q 2015 DSCR of 1.25x
(based on the senior note only) and occupancy of 83%.  Fitch has
also deemed recovery on the B-note component unlikely unless the
collateral performance improves significantly.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through A-1A remain Stable due
to the senior payment priority in the capital structure and the
significant pool deleveraging from the ST/PCV payoff.  With 75.7%
of the pool maturing in the first quarter of 2017, additional
deleveraging is expected.  Class AM has been assigned a Stable
Outlook to reflect the increase in credit enhancement and the
overall decline in expected losses from Fitch's last review.  The
class may be upgraded in the future as the special servicer
resolves assets and credit enhancement increases.  However, there
are concerns with the high percentage of assets in special
servicing and continued underperformance of certain loans in the
top 15.  The class may be subject to downgrades if pool performance
deteriorates, or losses on the specially serviced assets are
greater than expected.  Additional downgrades to the distressed
classes (those rated below 'B') are expected as losses are realized
on specially serviced loans.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms and removes this class from Rating Watch Positive and
assigns a Rating Outlook as indicated:

  -- $214.6 million class AM at 'BBsf'; removed from Rating Watch
     Positive; assigned Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $52.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46 million class A-2FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $60.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $729 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $115.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $107.4 million class AJ at 'CCCsf'; RE 10%;
  -- $75 million class AJ-FL at 'CCCsf'; RE 10%;
  -- $42.9 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $16.1 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $34.9 million class D at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $18.8 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $24.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes J, K, L, M, N and P have been reduced to zero due to
realized losses and are affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0%.  Class A-1 has
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on AM Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
confirmed the rating on one class, affirmed the ratings on 11
classes and downgraded the ratings on two classes in ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-6 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AM, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. AJ, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. AJ-FL, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from the $202 million paydown
of the Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan. This loan was
the main contributor to the overall pool paydown of 12% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on three investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on eight P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on Class AM was confirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on Class D was downgraded due to higher anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

The rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 12 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.2% the
current balance, compared to 16.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 16.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $1.59 billion
from $2.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 122 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 45% of
the pool. Seven loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities. The Peter Cooper
Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan has paid off in full with no loss.
In addition to the principal proceeds, outstanding interest
shortfalls for this deal were paid down in full through Class C.

Thirty-five loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $61.3 million. Twelve loans,
constituting 18% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Blackpoint Puerto Rico
Mall Loan ($84.7 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by
six retail properties located throughout Puerto Rico. The
properties range in size from 59,000 to 306,000 square feet (SF)
and total 855,000 SF. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2012 due to imminent maturity default after the borrower
was unable to pay off the loan at maturity. The special servicer
indicated discussions with the Borrower regarding a potential
resolution are ongoing.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $159 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (56% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans, constituting 19% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $126 million (a 42% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 98% of the
pool and partial year 2015 operating results for 91% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.03X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the South Park Mall Loan ($150.0 million -- 9.5% of
the pool), which is secured by an 887,000 SF portion of a 1.6
million SF regional mall in Strongsville, Ohio. The loan was
formally known as Westfield Southpark but a majority interest in
the property was acquired by Starwood Capital Group as part of a
portfolio sale in 2012. Non-owned anchors include Dillard's,
Macy's, Sears and JC Penney. As of December 2014, the collateral
portion was 98% leased. The loan is interest-only throughout its
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.14X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the A-1 Note related to the MSKP Retail
Portfolio -- A Loan ($130.3 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is
secured by eight retail properties located throughout four separate
markets in Florida. The properties range in size from 63,000 to
230,000 SF and total 1.28 million SF. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2011 due to imminent monetary default
and a loan modification was executed in March 2012. Terms of the
modification include a bifurcation of the original loan into a
$130.3 million A-Note and $93.1 million B-Note along with an
extension of the maturity date of two years to March 2019. The new
B-Note has a 0% pay rate and has created ongoing interest
shortfalls to the trust in the amount of approximately $435,000 per
month. The loan returned to the master servicer in November 2012
and is performing under the modified terms. The portfolio was 87%
leased as of March 2015. Moody's considers the $93.1 million B-Note
a troubled loan and recognized a significant loss against it.
Moody's A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.83X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Steuart Industrial Portfolio Loan
($63.6 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by ten
industrial buildings located in three industrial parks. Nine of the
buildings are located in northern Virginia (eight of which are in
the Woodbridge submarket) and one in Maryland. The portfolio was
69% leased as of December 2014 compared to 84% as of December 2013.
The largest property (representing 23% of the portfolio's NRA) was
leased to a single tenant that vacated at its lease expiration in
December 2013. Due to the decrease in occupancy, Moody's views this
as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 141% and
0.69X, respectively, the same as at the last review.



MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes in Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-TOP3 as follows:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes were upgraded due to an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
deal has paid down 33% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class F was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed because the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes are consistent with Moody's
expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance, compared to 1.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.7% at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP13: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Debt Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes,
upgraded the ratings on five classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-TOP13 as follows:

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 13% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on three investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on three P&I classes (Class
M, N and O) were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance, compared to 3.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.0% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 13, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $76.8 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 78% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Three loans,
constituting 7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Two loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of approximately $10 million (for an
average loss severity of 12%). No loans are currently in special
servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one
poorly performing loan, constituting 4.6% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 84% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 32% compared to 55%
at last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.81X and 4.97X,
respectively, compared to 1.66X and 2.82X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Gallup
Headquarters Loan ($10.8 million -- 14% of the pool), which is
secured by a 296,000 square foot (SF) office building located in
Omaha, Nebraska. The property is 100% leased to Gallup, Inc. under
a triple net lease that expires in October 2018. The lease
expiration is co-terminus with the loan's maturity date. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa1 (sca.pd) and
4.77X, respectively, compared to aa1 (sca.pd) and 3.71X at the last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 41% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Highlander Plaza Loan ($12.1 million -- 15.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 162,000 SF grocery-anchored
retail property in Salem, Massachusetts. The anchor is Shaw's
Supermarket, which leases approximately 39% of the NRA through
February 2021. As of September 2015, the property was 100% leased,
the same as at last review. After an initial ten year interest-only
period, the loan is now benefitting from a 30-year amortization
schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43% and 2.25X,
respectively, compared to 51% and 1.90X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Faisal Apartment Portfolio Loan
($10.7 million -- 13.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of multifamily buildings totaling 116 units and built
between 1899 and 1940. The properties are located in the
Allston-Brighton and South End sections of Boston as well as in
Brookline, Massachusetts. The majority of tenants are students with
leases that run from September 1 through August 31. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to 87% and
1.18X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Highlands Village Center Loan ($8.5
million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property
in Basking Ridge, New Jersey. The property was 97% leased as of
April 2015. The largest tenant is Rite Aid, which leases
approximately 18% of the NRA through October 2019. This loan had an
original 15 year term and is benefitting from a 25-year
amortization schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and
1.21X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.92X at the last
review.



MORGAN STANLEY 2005-IQ10: Moody's Cuts Cl. X-1 Debt Rating to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four classes,
affirmed the ratings on two classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-IQ10 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 75% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I class (Class F) was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on
one IO class (Class X-Y) was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced loans.

The rating on one IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.4% of the
current balance, compared to 1.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.0% at the last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $72 million
from $1.55 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 58.7%
of the pool. Seven residential cooperative loans, constituting
18.3% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments of aaa (sca.pd). One loan, constituting 9.9% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Eleven loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $89.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). One loan, constituting 1.9% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The Saratoga Crossings Office Loan
($1.3 million -- 1.9% of the pool), is secured by a 13,254 square
foot (SF) office building built in 2004 and is located in Saratoga
Springs, Utah. The loan transferred to special servicing in October
2015 for maturity default. The special servicer has indicated that
they are now pursuing foreclosure.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 1.1% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 53% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 57%, compared to
68% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 1.97X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.59X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Arbor Pointe Apartments Loan ($4.97 million
-- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 216-unit multifamily
property located east of Ann Arbor in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The
property consists of one, two and three bedroom units with in-unit
laundry machines. As of September 2015, the property was 93% leased
compared to 95% at yearend 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
39% and 2.42X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.38X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Villas of Mission Bend Loan ($4.95
million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 135-unit
multifamily property located in Plano, Texas. The property consists
of one and two bedroom units and onsite amenities include a
swimming pool and fitness center. As of September 2015, the
property was 98% leased compared to 97% at yearend 2014. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.46X, respectively, compared to
64% and 1.44X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Willow Trace Apartments Loan ($3.6
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by an 88-unit
multifamily property located in Plainville, Massachusetts. The
property consists of one, two and three bedroom units and amenities
include in-unit laundry machines, a fitness facility and a
clubhouse. As of September 2015, the property was 100% leased
compared to 94% at yearend 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
54% and 1.81X, respectively, compared to 54% and 1.79X at the last
review.




ONDECK ASSET 2014-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B Tranche
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. conducted a review of the OnDeck Asset Securitization
Trust LLC 2014-1 small business loan transaction and has upgraded
the rating on the Series 2014-Notes, Class A tranche to A (low)
(sf) from BBB (sf). The Series 2014-Notes, Class B tranche was
confirmed at its current rating of BB (sf).

For the Class A securities, performance trends are such that credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses
at the new rating level. For the Class B securities, credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses
at their current respective rating levels.



ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-1: DBRS Rates Class D Debt Prov. BBsf
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1:

-- Series 2016-1 Notes, Class A rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1 Notes, Class B rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-1 Notes, Class C rated BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-1 Notes, Class D rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- OneMain's capabilities with regards to originations,
    underwriting and servicing.

-- Acquisition of OneMain by Springleaf Holdings, Inc.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    OneMain's consumer loan portfolio. DBRS has used a hybrid
    approach in analyzing the OneMain portfolio that incorporates
    elements of static pool analysis, employed for assets such as
    consumer loans, and revolving asset analysis, employed for
    such assets as credit card master trusts.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions which
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with OneMain and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and is consistent with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
    U.S. Structured Finance' methodology.



ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1's $500.000 million
2016-1.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by personal
consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 29,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.1%, 47.6%, 40.20%, and
      34.0% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

      These credit support levels are sufficient to withstand
      stresses commensurate with the preliminary ratings on the
      notes based on S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within two rating categories of S&P's preliminary
      'A+ (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings, respectively.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bounds of

      credit deterioration as equal to a two-category downgrade
      within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities
      under moderate stress conditions.

   -- S&P's expectation of the timely payment of periodic interest

      and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity
      date according to the transaction documents, based on
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, using assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   -- OneMain's established management and its experience in
      origination and servicing consumer loan products.

   -- Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s (Wells Fargo; the backup servicer)
      consumer loan servicing experience.

   -- The operational risks associated with OneMain Financial
      Group LLC's (OneMain's) decentralized business model.

   -- The uncertainty concerning the integration of OneMain's
      operations with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s operations.  OneMain

      Holdings Inc. (formerly known as Springleaf Holdings Inc.)
      acquired OneMain from CitiFinancial Credit Co., a wholly
      owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., on Nov. 15, 2015.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1

         Preliminary      Preliminary
Class    rating        amount (Mil. $) (i)
A        A+ (sf)               353.050
B        BBB (sf)               60.840
C        BB (sf)                45.000
D        B+ (sf)                41.110

(i) The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
    pricing date.



SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of one
interest-only class of Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2000-C3 as
follows:

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 19, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $15.2 million
from $915 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 6 mortgage loans. One loan, representing 2% of
the pool has defeased and is secured by US Government securities.
There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of approximately $49 million (26% loss
severity on average). Two loans, representing 89% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The two specially serviced loans are the
A-Note and B-Note for the Granite State Marketplace Loan, which was
previously modified to include an A/B note split. The A-Note is
$10.5 million (representing 67% of the pool) and the B-Note is $3.3
million (representing 22% of the pool). The mortgage loan is
secured by a 250,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail center
located in Hooksett, New Hampshire. The loan originally transferred
to special servicing in September 2008 for maturity default and a
loan modification was subsequently executed that included a note
split and maturity date extension. The loan was not able to
refinance at the extended maturity date in November 2012 and the
asset is currently REO.

There are three performing non-defeased loans that represent 9% of
the pool balance. All three loans are fully amortizing. The largest
loan is the K-Mart Shopping Center -- Salt Lake City Loan ($1.0
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant
retail center located in Murray, Utah. The property is 100% leased
to the Kmart Corporation until May 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 30% and 3.46X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.55X at
the last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance

The second largest loan is the Edgewood Apartments Loan ($200,790
  -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-unit multifamily
property in Duluth, Minnesota, approximately 160 miles north of
Minneapolis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 20% and >4.00X,
respectively.

The third largest loan is the Rite Aid - Hillside Loan ($96,576 --
0.6% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant retail
property located in the neighborhood of Jamaica in Queens, New
York. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 4.0% and >4.00X,
respectively.



SHERIDAN FUND I: S&P Releases Corrected Press Release
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its previous press
release by lowering its rating on the 2018 tranches of the senior
secured term loan issued by Sheridan Production Partners I-A and
Sheridan Production Partners I-M to 'B-' from 'B+'.  At the same
time, S&P revised the recovery ratings from '3H' to '1'.  S&P
lowered its issuer credit and debt ratings on the company on Dec.
29, 2015, but failed to downgrade two tranches of the term loan.
Standard & Poor's is also reinstating the rating on the revolving
credit facility at 'B-', which was incorrectly withdrawn on Jan. 1,
2016.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust (UBS-BB) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-C5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. As of the January 2015 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 3%
to $1.44 billion from $1.49 billion at issuance. Per the servicer,
one loan (0.9% of the pool) is defeased. Fitch has designated five
loans (1.5% of the pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes
two specially serviced assets (0.6%); and three other loans with
servicer reported debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) at or below
1.0x generally related to occupancy issues. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting the non-rated class G.

The largest loan (14.9% of the pool) is secured by 950,000 square
feet (sf) of the 1.2 million sf Santa Anita Mall located in
Arcadia, CA. The property rent roll is diverse, with over 200
tenants in occupancy. Anchors include Macy's, Nordstrom and J.C.
Penney, which are not part of the collateral. As of year to date
(YTD) Sept. 30, 2015, the servicer reported occupancy and debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) were 91% and 2.88x, respectively.

The second largest loan (13.5% of the pool) is secured by 650,000
sf of a 1.1 million sf regional mall located in Valencia, CA.
Anchors include Macy's, J.C. Penney and Sears, which are not part
of the collateral. Edwards Theatres is the largest collateral
tenant at 10% of net rentable area (NRA). As of YTD Sept. 30, 2015,
the servicer reported occupancy and DSCR were 94.3% and 3.01x,
respectively.

Of the Top 15 loans, three have significant tenant rollover risk
through 2016. The Starwood Office Portfolio (9% of the pool) and
155 Fifth Avenue (1.9% of the pool) each have approximately 30% of
their leases expiring in 2016. Tisch Tower (1.8% of the pool) has
over 40% of its leases through 2016, respectively. Cash management
triggers have been activated for the Starwood Office Portfolio and
155 Fifth Avenue. Fitch will monitor the performance of each loan
as leasing status updates are received.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks. Due to the recent issuance of
the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $37.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $629.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $120.7 million class A-S* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96.5 million class B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57.5 million class C* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.8 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.8 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $1,160.2 million** class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $96.5 million** class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be exchanged
for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.
**Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.



UNITED AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2016-1:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The finalized provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS of
the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumptions under
    various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms in
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
    address the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and
    principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    originations, underwriting and servicing and the existence of
    an experienced and capable backup servicer.

-- DBRS has performed an operational risk review of United Auto
    Credit Corporation (UACC or the Company) and considers the
    entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of subprime

    automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup servicer.

-- The UACC senior management team has considerable experience
    and a successful track record within the auto finance
    industry.

-- The Company successfully consolidated its business into a
    centralized servicing platform and has consolidated
    originations to two regional buying centers. UACC retained
    experienced managers and staff at the servicing center and
    buying centers, most of whom were associated with the Company
    prior to the reorganization. -- UACC has tightened its
    underwriting standards and has implemented a risk management
    system, centralized oversight of all underwriting and improved

    its technology system to provide daily metrics on all
    originations, servicing and collections of loans.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
UACC’s
    auto loan portfolio.

-- UACC's origination of collateral, which has a shorter term,
    higher down payment, lower book value and higher income
    requirements.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions, which
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with UACC, that
    the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets and consistency with the "DBRS Legal Criteria for U.S.
    Structured Finance" methodology.



UNITED AUTO 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to United
Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2016-1's $161.75 million notes
series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 61.6%, 53.4%, 43.7%,
      33.5%, and 27.7% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit
      support levels provide coverage of approximately 2.90x,
      2.50x, 2.05x, 1.55x, and 1.27x our expected net loss range
      of 20.00%-21.00% for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- The likelihood of timely interest and principal payments by
      the assumed legal final maturity dates under stressed cash
      flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the
      assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      not decline by more than one rating category and on the
      class D would not decline by more than two rating
      categories.  Under this scenario, the 'BB (sf)' rated class
      E notes would not decline by more than two rating categories

      in the first year, but would ultimately default in a 'BBB'
      stress scenario, as expected.  These potential rating
      movements are consistent with S&P's credit stability
      criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration as a one-category downgrade within the first
      year for 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' rated securities, a two-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'A (sf)'
      through 'BB (sf)' rated securities under moderate stress
      conditions, and default for 'BB (sf)' rated securities over
      a three year period.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized.  It is approximately five-months seasoned, with

      a weighted average original term of approximately 41 months
      and an average remaining term of about 36 months.
      Approximately 17.21% of the loans have an original term of
      49-60 months, and as a result, S&P expects the pool will pay

      down more quickly than many other subprime pools with longer

      loan terms.

   -- S&P's analysis of six years of static pool data following
      the credit crisis and after United Auto Credit Corp. (UACC)
      centralized its operations and shifted toward shorter loan
      terms.  S&P also reviewed the performance of UACC's two
      outstanding securitizations and its paid-off transactions
      (2012-1 and 2013-1).

   -- UACC's 19-plus-year history of originating, underwriting,
      and servicing subprime auto loans.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS LIST

United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2016-1
Automobile receivables-backed notes series 2016-1

Amount
Class     Rating                           (mil. $)
A         AAA (sf)                         73.14
B         AA (sf)                          24.38
C         A (sf)                           24.20
D         BBB (sf)                         24.38
E         BB (sf)                          15.65



WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Raises Cl. A-J Debt Rating to 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes and affirmed 14 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2007-C30.  Additionally, Fitch
removed five classes from Rating Watch Positive.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are the result of increased credit enhancement due to
the payoff of the transaction's pari passu portion of the
Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village (ST/PCV) loan (formerly 22.4%
of the pool).

Although Fitch had previously placed five classes on Rating Watch
Positive, classes B and C were affirmed as the concentration of
specially serviced loans remains high at 14.8%, which 28% are real
estate owned (REO).

The recent sale of the ST/PCV asset and the paydown as of the
January 2016 remittance resulted in a full recovery of the
transaction's $1.5 billion portion of the $3 billion former loan
amount and additional 'gain-on sale' proceeds in excess of the
total loan balance.  The A-1A class balance was reduced by 70% from
the principal proceeds, while the 'gain on sale' proceeds of
approximately $96 million were used to reimburse interest
shortfalls to classes A-J through G and partial recoveries to class
H.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through
S.

Fitch modelled losses of 15.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 11.5%, which is down
27.5% from Fitch's last full rating action in March 2015 and
includes $128.8 million (1.6% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 56 loans (26.1%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 22 specially serviced assets
(14.8%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 35.1% to $5.13 billion from
$7.9 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, 14 loans
(2.4% of the pool) are defeased.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Four Seasons Aviara Resort - Carlsbad, CA loan
(3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a resort hotel with 329
rooms and an Arnold Palmer designed 18-hole golf course.  The
property is now known as the Park Hyatt Aviara.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in April 2013 for a second time
due to monetary default after originally being modified and
returned to the master servicer in May 2011.  The loan modification
included a maturity extension from February 2012 to February 2017,
additional reserves, and a reduction in interest rate to 2% for the
first year, 2.75% for the second year, 4.5% for the third year, and
a coupon rate of 5.94% thereafter.  The servicer reported net
operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as June
2015 was 0.50x.  The reported occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR as of
November 2015 was 70%, $238 and $167 respectively compared to the
competitive set of 70%, $297, $208.

The property underwent an inspection in May 2015 and no immediate
repairs were indicated.  Hyatt has submitted an extensive six-year
capital plan for several million dollars of upgrades and
replacements that is under review.  According to the servicer,
disposition options continue to be evaluated.  The loan is now
listed as being in foreclosure.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the Bank One
Center loan (2.8%), which is secured by 1,530,957 square foot(sf),
60-story office building in the Dallas, Texas CBD.  The loan was
previously with the special servicer before being returned to the
master servicer in December 2013.  While at the special servicer
the loan was assumed by M-M Properties Inc. and CBRE Global
Investors and was modified.  The loan modification included a
bifurcation into an A-note ($143.5 million) and B-note ($33.7
million), maturity extension from January 2017 to January 2020, and
additional reserves.  In addition, the A-note is interest only
until maturity, with a reduction in the interest rate to 4.5% for
the first four years, and a coupon rate of 5.767% thereafter.  The
servicer reported a year-end 2014 NOI DSCR of 1.18x and a September
2015 NOI DSCR of 1.04x.  As of the September 2015 rent roll
occupancy was 64.7% and only 5% of the leases expire through 2017.
The loan remains current according to the terms of the
modification.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Five Times
Square loan (10.5%), which is secured by a leasehold interest in a
1.1 million square foot (sf) office property located in the heart
of Times Square in New York City.  The servicer reported year-end
2014 NOI DSCR was 1.16x and the September 2015 DSCR was 1.15x with
an occupancy of 100%.  The largest tenant is Ernst & Young (88.5%)
through 2022 with two 10-year extension options.  All retail
tenants including Red Lobster, the largest retail tenant, have
leases that extend until at least 2018.  The loan is highly
leveraged, with the A-note at $973 per sf and total debt at $1,095
per sf.  Fitch modeled losses based on the existing NOI and a
stressed cap rate; however, given the location and quality of the
asset, losses are unlikely.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 through A-1A remain Stable due
to the senior payment priority in the capital structure and
increased credit enhancement.  Classes A-M, A-MFL, and A-J have
also been assigned Stable Outlooks due to increased credit
enhancement.  Additional upgrades to these classes and classes B
and C are possible if losses on specially serviced assets are at or
lower than expected and with continued paydown.  Conversely,
downgrades are possible if pool performance continues to
deteriorate and losses are higher than expected.  Additional
downgrades to the distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected as losses are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action

Fitch upgrades and removes these classes from Rating Watch
Positive:

  -- $540.3 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $250 million class A-MFL to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
     Stable;
  -- $671.8 million class A-J to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch affirms and removes these classes from Rating Watch
Positive:

  -- $49.4 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 55%;
  -- $79 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $151.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.6 million class A-PB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.9 billion class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $644.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $69.2 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $59.3 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $69.2 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $98.8 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $79 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $88.9 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
  -- $79 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the class L, M, N, O, P, Q and S certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P, X-C
and X-W certificates.



WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded eight classes, affirmed twelve
classes and confirmed three classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-C30 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-MFL, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. E, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-W, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes, Classes A-3, A-4 and A-PB were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on eight P&I classes, Classes A-5, A-1A, A-M, A-MFL,
A-J, B, C and D, were upgraded primarily due to an increase in
credit support resulting from the $1.5 billion paydown of the Peter
Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan in this pool. This loan was
the main contributor to the overall pool paydown of 23% since
Moody's last review.

The rating on one P&I class, Class E, was confirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on nine P&I classes, Classes F through O, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO Classes, Classes X-C and X-W, were confirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their reference classes.

Today's rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 12 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.8% of the
current balance compared to 9.3% at last review. The deal has paid
down 23% since last review and 35% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 8.6% compared to 9.5% at last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $5.1 billion
from $7.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 213 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 43% of
the pool. Fourteen loans, constituting 2% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. The Peter
Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan has paid off in full with
no loss. In addition to the principal proceeds, outstanding
interest shortfalls for this deal were paid down in full through
class G.

Forty-two loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $128.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). Twenty-two loans, constituting 15% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loans
are secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $346.3 million loss for the specially serviced loans (46%
expected loss on average). Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for sixteen poorly performing loans, constituting 8% of
the pool, and has estimated an aggregate $107.4 million loss (25%
expected loss on average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 86% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 83% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106%, compared to 108% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 0.90X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Five Times Square Loan ($536 million -- 10.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1 million SF Class A office
building located in the Times Square submarket of Manhattan, New
York. The loan represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a $1.07
billion senior first mortgage loan. The property has maintained
100% occupancy since securitization. The office component
represents 97% of the total building's net rentable area (NRA) of
which the majority is leased to Ernst and Young through May 2022
and serves as its U.S. Headquarters. Property performance improved
significantly in 2013 due to a nearly 11% rent bump in Ernst &
Young lease that occurred in May 2012. The loan was previously on
the servicer's watchlist due to a low DSCR, but was removed in 2013
when the in-place DSCR increased above 1.10X. The loan is interest
only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
114% and 0.67X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the State Street Financial Center Loan
($387.5 million -- 7.6% of the pool), which represents a 50%
pari-passu interest in a $775 million first mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a 1.0 million SF Class A office building located in
the Financial District of Boston, Massachusetts. The property is
100% leased to State Street Corporation (senior unsecured rating:
A2, stable outlook) through September 2023 and serves as its
headquarters. The loan is interest only throughout its entire term.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 136% and 0.70X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the 485 Lexington Avenue Loan ($315
million -- 6.1% of the pool), which represents a 70% pari-passu
interest in a $450 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured
by a 915,000 SF Class A office building located near Grand Central
Station in Manhattan, New York. The property was essentially 100%
leased as of March 2015, which is the same as last review. The
largest tenants include Citibank, N.A. (32% of the NRA; lease
expiration February 2017) and Travelers Indemnity Company (19% of
the NRA; lease expiration August 2021). Nearly a third of
Citibank's space is subleased to Xerox Corp. The loan is interest
only throughout its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
121% and 0.74X, respectively, the same as at last review.




WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C31: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on six classes,
affirmed the ratings on 12 classes and confirmed the rating on one
class in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C31 as follows.
Moody's has also assigned a rating to one previously withdrawn
class:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. C, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Caa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. E, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. F, Confirmed at C (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2015 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Assigns to C (sf); previously on May 29, 2015 Withdrawn
(sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2015 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes (Classes A-J through E) were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from the $248 million paydown of the Peter Cooper Village and
Stuyvesant Town Loan. This loan was the main contributor to the
overall pool paydown of 8% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on six investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on five P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The rating on Class F was confirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class IO, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Class M was assigned a rating of C (sf) following the reinstatement
of principal to the class as reflected in the trustee's report
dated January 15, 2016. Class G has previously had a zero balance.
Due to the zero balance, in a prior action on May 29, 2015, Moody's
withdrew its rating for the Class. Prior to the withdrawal, the
Class had a rating of C (sf).

Today's rating action concludes the rating review implemented by
Moody's on 12 November 2015.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.7% of the
current balance, compared to 9.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $4.31 billion
from $5.85 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 139 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 49% of
the pool. Nine loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities. The Peter Cooper
Village and Stuyvesant Town Loan has paid off in full with no loss.
In addition to the principal proceeds, outstanding interest
shortfalls for this deal were paid down in full through Class G.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $161 million. Twenty-one loans,
constituting 7% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $164 million loss for specially
serviced loans (53% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 13 poorly
performing loans, constituting 12% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $117 million (a 22% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 98% of the
pool and partial year 2015 operating results for 89% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110%, compared to 111% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 8% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 0.90X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Five Times Square Loan ($536.0 million -- 12.5%
of the pool), which represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a $1.07
billion senior first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.1
million square foot (SF) Class A office building located in the
Times Square submarket of Manhattan, New York. The property has
maintained 100% occupancy since securitization. The office
component represents 97% of the total building's net rentable area
(NRA) of which the majority is leased to Ernst and Young through
May 2022 and serves as its U.S. Headquarters. The loan is interest
only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
114% and 0.67X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the A Note related to the 666 Fifth
Avenue Loan ($357.6 million -- 8.3% of the pool), which represents
a pari-passu interest in a $1.215 billion first mortgage loan. In
December 2011, as part of a modification, the original loan was
bifurcated into $1.1 billion A-Note and a $115 million B-Note. The
B-Note interest was reduced to 0%, while the A-Note interest pay
rate was initially reduced to 3%. The current A-Note pay rate is
5.0% and the pay rate increases annually until it returns to the
original 6.353%. The property was recapitalized with $110 million
of new equity as part of the modification. The borrower contributed
$30 million, while Vornado contributed $80 million. The loan is
secured by a 1.5 million SF Class A office building located in
Midtown Manhattan, New York. The loan returned to the master
servicer in March 2012 and is performing under the modified terms.
Moody's considers the B-Note ($37.4 million) as a troubled loan.
Moody's A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.63X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Mall at Rockingham Park Loan ($260.0
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 382,000 SF in a
1.2 million SF regional mall in Salem, New Hampshire. The property
is the dominant mall in its trade area and the non-collateral
anchors include Sears, Macy's, J.C. Penney and Lord & Taylor. The
collateral was 94% leased as of September 2015 compared to 96% at
the last review. Financial performance has been stable over the
past three years. The loan is interest only for its entire ten-year
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.87X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.



WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on these notes
issued by Westchester CLO, Ltd.:

  $37,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance

   of $27,137,308), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 12,
   2015, Affirmed B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $570,500,000 Class A-1-A Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable

   Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding balance of $288,063,991),
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $142,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable

   Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $80,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
   Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $53,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Baa1 (sf);
   previously on May 12, 2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  $36,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
   Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
   previously on May 12, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Westchester CLO, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in August
2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are a result of deleveraging of the senior
notes since May 2015.  The Class A-1-A notes have been paid down by
approximately 24% or $91.8 million since that time.

The rating actions also reflect corrections to Moody's modeling. In
previous rating actions, the balances of the Class I and II
Preference Shares and the use of principal proceeds to pay the most
junior tranche in the event of a failure of the junior
overcollateralization test were modeled incorrectly.  These errors
have now been corrected, and today's rating actions reflect these
changes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Higher-than-average exposure to assets with weak liquidity:
     The presence of assets with the worst Moody's speculative
     grade liquidity (SGL) rating, or SGL-4, exposes the notes to
     additional risks if these assets default.  The historical
     default rate is far higher for companies with SGL-4 ratings
     than those with other SGL ratings. Due to the deal's high
     exposure to SGL-4 rated assets, which constitute around $19.3

     million of par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case defaulting
     those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2105)
Class A-1-A: 0
Class A-1-B: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +2
Class D: +1
Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3157)
Class A-1-A: 0
Class A-1-B: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $628.0 million, defaulted par
of $76.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 17.18%
(implying a WARF of 2631), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.40%, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted average
spread of 3.07% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates.  Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 5.4% of the collateral pool.



WINWATER 2016-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Cl. B-4 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1 issued by
WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1:

-- $349.5 million Class 1A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $174.8 million Class 1A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $174.8 million Class 1A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $160.6 million Class 1A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $160.6 million Class 1A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $240.9 million Class 1A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-X-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.3 million Class 1A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-X-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $28.3 million Class 1A-X-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-X-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $321.2 million Class 1A-X-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $349.5 million Class 1A-X-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class 2A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class 2A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class 2A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class 2A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $2.3 million Class 2A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $2.3 million Class 2A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class 2A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class 2A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $2.3 million Class 2A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $27.8 million Class 2A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.6 million Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.7 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $5.1 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes 1A-X-1, 1A-X-2, 1A-X-3, 1A-X-4, 1A-X-5, 1A-X-6, 1A-X-7,
1A-X-8, 1A-X-9, 1A-X-10, 1A-X-11, 1A-X-12, 1A-X-13, 1A-X-14,
1A-X-15, 1A-X-16, 1A-X-17, 1A-X-18, 1A-X-19, 2A-X-1, 2A-X-2, 2A-X-3
and 2A-X-4 are interest-only certificates. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes 1A-1, 1A-2, 1A-3, 1A-4, 1A-5, 1A-6, 1A-7, 1A-8, 1A-10,
1A-11, 1A-13, 1A-14, 1A-15, 1A-16, 1A-17, 1A-18, 1A-X-2, 1A-X-3,
1A-X-4, 1A-X-5, 1A-X-6, 1A-X-13, 1A-X-14, 1A-X-15, 1A-X-16,
1A-X-17, 1A-X-18, 1A-X-19, 2A-1, 2A-2, 2A-3, 2A-5, 2A-X-4 and A-M
are exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of exchange certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes 1A-4, 1A-5, 1A-6, 1A-7, 1A-8, 1A-9, 1A-10, 1A-11, 1A-12,
1A-15, 1A-16, 2A-3 and 2A-4 are super senior certificates. These
classes benefit from additional protection from senior support
certificates (Classes 1A-17, 1A-18, 1A-19, 2A-5, 2A-6 and A-M
certificates) with respect to loss allocation. The AAA (sf) ratings
in this transaction reflect the 7.50% of credit enhancement
provided by subordination.

The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 6.15%,
4.50%, 2.65% and 1.40% of credit enhancement, respectively. Other
than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any other
classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 510 loans with a total principal
balance of $407,953,835 as of the Cut-Off Date (January 1, 2016).
The mortgage loans were acquired by WinWater Acquisition Trust VII,
WinWater Acquisition Trust BA4, WinWater Acquisition Trust CS-5 and
WinWater Acquisition Trust W-5 (collectively, the WinWater
Acquisition Trusts), either directly or indirectly from an
originator. The Sponsor, WinWater Home Mortgage, LLC, established
the WinWater Acquisition Trusts to aggregate and acquire certain
mortgage loans on behalf of the Sponsor.

The loans are divided into two pools. Pool 1 consists of 100% fully
amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with original terms to
maturity of 30 years, while Pool 2 consists of 100% fully
amortizing FRMs with original terms to maturity of 15 years. The
originators for Pool 1 loans are Caliber Home Loans (12.6%), Ditech
Mortgage Corp. (Ditech, 9.7%), LoanDepot.com, LLC (LoanDepot,
8.1%), Stonegate Mortgage Corporation (7.2%), and various other
originators, each comprising less than 5.0% of the Pool 1 mortgage
loans. The originators for Pool 2 loans are Ditech (13.5%), Banc of
California (11.7%), Homeowners Financial Group USA, LLC (11.4%),
LoanDepot (7.2%), Mega Capital Funding, Inc. (6.3%) and various
other originators, each comprising less than 5.0% of the Pool 2
mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced by Cenlar FSB. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator and
Custodian. Wilmington Trust, National Association will serve as
Trustee. WinWater Residential Acquisition Corp. will act as the
Servicing Administrator. The transaction employs a
senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash flow structure that is
enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Each originator has made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans. The enforcement mechanism for
breaches of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a
third-party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and
resolution of disputes may ultimately be subject to determination
in an arbitration proceeding.

DBRS views the representations and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with recent DBRS-rated prime jumbo
transactions; however, some originators may potentially experience
financial stress that could result in their inability to fulfill
repurchase obligations, and the backstop to fulfill some of the
obligations is being provided by an unrated entity (the Seller). To
capture the above perceived weakness, DBRS adjusted the originator
scores of the lenders in the portfolio downward. Such an adjustment
(and consequent increases in default and loss rates) is to account
for the originators' or the Seller’s potential inability to
fulfill repurchase obligations. The full description of the
representations and warranties standard, the mitigating factors and
the DBRS analysis are detailed in the related report. Please see
the attached appendix for additional information regarding
sensitivity of assumptions used in the rating process.



[*] Moody's Raises $1.1-Bil. of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Jan. 27, 2016, upgraded the ratings
of 26 tranches, from 10 transactions issued by various issuers,
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-10

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-6

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-NC1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-BC1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-BC2

Cl. A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-BC6

Cl. A1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 6, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-OSI

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.



[*] Moody's Raises $353MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Issuers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches
from 5 deals issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC2

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 17, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-1

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 9, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. A-2b, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-6

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 23, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on April 23, 2012,
   Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 23, 2012,
   Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-5

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2014,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2014,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2002-1

  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Raises Ratings on 15 Tranches From 15 CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Jan. 28, 2016, took various
rating actions on 15 tranches from 15 synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions.  The rating actions followed S&P's
periodic review of synthetic CDO transactions.

The upgrades reflect the transactions' seasoning, the rating
stability of the obligors in the underlying reference portfolio
over the past few months, and a synthetic rated
overcollateralization (SROC) ratio that rose above 100% at the next
highest rating level as of the January 2016 run, passing with
sufficient cushion per S&P's criteria.

The upgrade of the White Knight Investment Trust transaction rating
follows S&P's receipt of redemption notifications on five of six
underlying SCDOs.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Athenee CDO PLC
Series 2007-12
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche B           BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             BB+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             BB+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             BB+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 4
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             BB+ (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Cloverie PLC
Series 43
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Cloverie PLC
Series 44
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2007-8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  B+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
Series 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A Series18          BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
Series 2008-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
Segregated Portfolio of Dryden XVII Notes
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 37           BB (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2007-5
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS RAISED

Marvel Finance 2007-1 LLC
US$115 mil Marvel Finance 2007-1 LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
IA                  BBB+ (sf)           BBB (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-27
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Class A             A- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

White Knight Investment Trust
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
1                   AA- (sf)            BB+ (sf)



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 20 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Jan. 29, 2016, took various
rating actions on 20 ratings from 18 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by
adjustable- and/or fixed-rate negative amortization (NegAm) prime
jumbo and Alternative-A
(Alt-A) mortgage loans.  Three of the 20 ratings are from a
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction backed by Alt-A collateral.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on 17 classes from 15 transactions, raised its ratings on two
classes from two transactions, and placed one rating on CreditWatch
negative.

Each class in this review consists of at least one interest-only
(IO) component and at least one principal-only (PO) component (some
of the classes include multiple IO and/or PO components that
reference multiple groups) that are paid through different payment
streams within the same transaction.  For these classes, the IO
components are similar to traditional IO classes where the interest
paid is based on a notional balance, generally related to the
transaction's underlying collateral.  The PO components of these
classes, however, differ from traditional PO classes in that all
but three of the PO components had a starting balance of zero,
whereas traditional PO classes generally have positive balances at
their initial issuance.  The other two classes each had a $1,000
principal balance at issuance, which is generally much lower than
the initial balance of a traditional PO class.  Based on S&P's
initial cash flow analyses and expectations of collateral
performance, for the classes in this review, S&P based its initial
ratings in part on its expectation that the PO components would
accrete a positive principal balance through certain loan features,
such as the capitalization of unpaid interest, and analyzed the IO
and PO components separately.

However, the PO components of seven of these classes have not
accreted positive principal balances, and the accretion period for
these classes' PO components has ended.  Because these seven
classes have not and cannot now accrete a principal balance, S&P
analyzed them in this surveillance review as IO classes and applied
its methodology, "Global Methodology For Rating Interest-Only
Securities," published April 15, 2010 (IO Criteria).  Pursuant to
the application of S&P's IO criteria, it affirmed its ratings on
these seven classes.

For 12 other classes, S&P continued to analyze the PO and IO
components separately.  Specifically, S&P applied its IO Criteria
to determine the credit risk of the IO components.  Also, the
credit risk of these types of PO components, in S&P's view and as
is the case with traditional PO classes, is typically commensurate
with the credit risk of the lowest-rated senior classes in their
related structures.  S&P's ratings on these 12 classes reflect the
lower of its assessment of the PO and IO components.  Pursuant to
this analysis, S&P affirmed 10 of the 12 classes and raised its
ratings on the other two.

S&P has placed class A-X from HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3
on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The CreditWatch action
reflects outstanding questions S&P has regarding class A-X's
deferred interest payments and their effect on the future principal
balance of class A-X's PO component.  However, because class A-X
receives principal payments that are subordinate to the other
senior classes in the related transaction, it is likely that S&P
will lower the rating to speculative-grade based on class A-X's
position in the capital structure.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that we believe could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      And

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                  http://is.gd/NTNXGM


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 12 US RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Jan. 29, 2016, took various
actions on 75 classes from 12 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P lowered four ratings, one of
which it placed on CreditWatch with negative implications, raised
14 ratings, and affirmed 57 ratings.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
Alternative-A (Alt-A), subprime, and scratch-and-dent mortgage loan
collateral.  Scratch-and-dent transactions generally fall into four
categories: outside-the-guidelines, document-deficient,
reperforming, and nonperforming liquidation trusts.  The
scratch-and-dent deals in this review are backed predominantly by
reperforming and outside-the-guidelines residential mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, as applicable, and bond insurance, provide credit
enhancement for the transactions in this review.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective
class, it relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics or both and their potential effects on certain
classes.

APPLICATION OF U.S. RMBS PRE-2009 CRITERIA WHEN LOAN-LEVEL DATA IS
NOT AVAILABLE

When performing S&P's credit analysis to determine the foreclosure
frequency for all pools within this review, S&P segmented the
collateral into current loans (including reperforming) and
delinquent loans.  S&P further segmented the current bucket based
on payment pattern.

Where loan-level data was available, S&P derived the foreclosure
frequency as described in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash
Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," published Feb. 18, 2015,
(pre-2009 surveillance criteria).  In instances where loan-level
data was not available, to derive the foreclosure frequency for the
current bucket, S&P made certain assumptions regarding the
percentage of current loans that are reperforming, the percentage
of current loans that have impaired credit history, and the
adjusted loan-to-value ratio of perfect payers.

S&P used pool-level data to compare each pool's performance to the
cohort average.  For pools with high delinquencies and normalized
cumulative losses relative to the cohort average, S&P assumed a
higher foreclosure frequency than that associated with the cohort
average.  Conversely, S&P assumed a lower foreclosure frequency for
pools with better observed performance relative to the cohort
average.

With respect to delinquent loans, because S&P uses cohort-specific
roll rate assumptions, S&P used pool-level data to derive the
foreclosure frequency of these loans as set forth in S&P's pre-2009
surveillance criteria.

In this review, S&P did not have loan-level data for BayView
Financial Securities Company LLC series 2004-A.

DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on four classes from three transactions,
one of which S&P placed on CreditWatch Negative.  The four
downgrades primarily reflect one or more of:

   -- Deteriorating credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased prepayment speeds;
   -- Higher observed loss severities;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and
   -- Insufficient credit enhancement relative to our projected
      losses.

Among the downgrades, the ratings on two classes remained at
investment-grade.  The additional two lowered ratings were already
speculative-grade before the rating actions.

Application Of Interest Shortfall Criteria

Of the four downgrades, one class reflects the application of S&P's
interest shortfall criteria.

S&P lowered its rating on class 5-A-1 from MASTR Adjustable Rate
Mortgages Trust 2003-6 to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and placed it
on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P lowered its rating
because this class has experienced interest shortfalls since
September 2015.  S&P also placed its rating on the class on
CreditWatch Negative as the rating may continue to be lowered in
accordance with S&P's interest shortfall criteria if the
accumulated interest shortfall amounts remain outstanding.

UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 14 classes from five transactions,
including one rating that was raised seven notches.  The projected
credit enhancement for the affected classes is sufficient to cover
S&P's projected losses at these rating levels.  The upgrades
reflect one or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support;
   -- Expected short duration; and
   -- Increased prepayments.

S&P also raised two of the 14 ratings to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'
because it believes these classes are no longer virtually certain
to default, as set forth in "Standard & Poor's Ratings
Definitions," published Nov. 20, 2014.

AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in S&P's view, could add volatility to its
loss assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's
cash flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed,
rather than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- A high proportion of reperforming loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed its ratings in the 'AAA' through 'A' categories on 19
classes from seven transactions.  In addition, S&P affirmed ratings
in the 'BBB' through 'B' categories on 19 classes from seven
transactions.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support is sufficient to cover its projected
losses in those rating scenarios.

S&P affirmed 19 additional 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings.  S&P
believes that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its projected losses to these classes.  As defined in
"Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings,"
published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations indicate that
S&P believes these classes are still vulnerable to default, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's belief that these classes
remain virtually certain to default.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that we believe could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://is.gd/V4qHC4


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 17 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Jan. 28, 2016, took various
rating actions on 89 ratings from 17 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by
adjustable- and/or fixed-rate prime jumbo mortgage loans.  S&P
lowered its ratings on six classes, raised its ratings on 15, and
affirmed its ratings on 68.

Subordination and bond insurance (as applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the reviewed transactions.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what the rating would be for the class,
S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and
the transaction structure to derive the rating.

                     ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations in its decisions
to raise, lower, and/or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance and/or structural
characteristics and their potential effects on certain classes.

                            DOWNGRADES

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
S&P's projected losses for the related transactions at higher
rating levels.  S&P's view is primarily due to:

   -- Deteriorated collateral performance;
   -- A substantial change in delinquency levels;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

Among the downgrades, one of the lowered ratings remained at
investment-grade.  Three ratings were lowered to speculative-grade.
The remaining two lowered ratings were already speculative-grade
before the rating actions.

                        Interest Shortfalls

S&P lowered its rating on class B1-I from Structured Asset
Securities Corp.'s Series 2003-17A to 'D(sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' after
it applied its interest shortfall criteria, which imposes a maximum
rating threshold on classes that have incurred interest shortfalls
resulting from credit or liquidity erosion.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 15 classes from six transactions based on
factors that include improved collateral performance, decreased
delinquency, and/or increased credit support.  The upgrades reflect
S&P's opinion that its projected credit support for the classes
will be sufficient to cover the projected losses at the higher
rating levels.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to S&P's
loss assumptions and in turn to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low subordination;
   -- A substantial change in constant prepayment rates;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline; and/or
   -- S&P's imputed promises criteria.

Of the 68 affirmed ratings, 39 are investment-grade and 29 are
speculative-grade.  The affirmations of classes rated above 'CCC
(sf)' reflect the classes' relatively senior positions in payment
priority and S&P's opinion that its projected credit support is
sufficient to cover its projected losses at those rating levels.

Regarding the 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' affirmations, S&P believes
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected base-case losses to these classes.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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                   *** End of Transmission ***