TCR_Public/160131.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 31, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 31

                            Headlines

ACAPULCO FUNDING 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A Debt Rating to Caa3
ATTENTUS CDO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to Caa3
ATTENTUS CDO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to B1
AVIATION CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class A-1 Debt
BAMLL 2016-SS1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Certs

BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. M Debt
BANC OF AMERICA 2008-LS1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to D
BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A Debt to Ba3
BUSINESS LOAN 2007-A: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A Debt to B3
CENTURION CDO 9: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes

CIGAR 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(sf) Ratings on Cl. C Debt
CIT HOME 2002-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. MV-1 Debt to Ba1
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-GC36: Fitch to Rate Cl. F Certs 'B-'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2004-CB3: Moody's Hikes M-2 Debt Rating to Ba3
COMM 2001-J2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certificates

COMM 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certificates
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Tranches
CPS AUTO 2016-A: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class F Debt
CRAFT TRUST 1 1998-A: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Debt to C
DENALI CAPITAL VII: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class B-2L Notes

DRYDEN 42: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class E Notes
FLAGSHIP CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
HALCYON LOAN 2012-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
ICE GLOBAL: S&P Puts BB Rating on Cl. E Notes on CreditWatch Neg.
JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Certs to BB

JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Moody's Lowers Cl. K Debt Rating to Csf
JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Certificates
JP MORGAN CHASE 2010-C1: Moody's Cuts Class C Debt Rating to Ba2
LEASE INVESTMENT 2001-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ca
LOMBARD PUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on Series 2005A-2 Bonds

MASTR ALTERNATIVE 2004-5: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1
MBIA INSURANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B-1A Debt to Caa1
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. K Certs
NATIONS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class C Notes Ba2
RAIT CRE CDO I: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class A-1A Debt

SARM LOAN 2005-3XS: Moody's Hikes Cl. M2 Debt Rating to Caa3
SASCO: Moody's Cuts $167.11MM RMBS Debt Issued 2001-2003
SLM PRIVATE 2005-A: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
STACR 2016-DNA1: Moody's Assigns B1(sf) Rating to Class M-3 Notes
SYMPHONY CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+

TRITON AVIATION: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Debt to Ca
UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-1-A Debt to Caa2
VITALITY RE VI: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to BB-
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C21: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 2 Cert. Tranches
WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on E Certs

WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
[*] Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 15 SF CDOs Issued 2000-2005

[*] Loan Leverage in US Conduit CMBS to Rise Further, Moody's Says
[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $92.2MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 US RMBS Transactions

                            *********

ACAPULCO FUNDING 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A Debt Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A
issued by Acapulco Funding 2005-1.

Issuer: ACAPULCO Funding 2005-1

  Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 13, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on Class A reflects a decline in
expected bond recoveries on the underlying Class A-1 issued by
Aviation Capital Group (ACG) Trust, Series 2000-1 (the underlying
ACG Notes).

Interest and principal payments on the underlying ACG Notes are
allocated to pay ACAPULCO's Class A interest and principal.
Interest payments on the underlying ACG Notes are greater than
interest payments due to the ACAPULCO Notes, and the resulting
excess spread is applied as principal to pay down the ACAPULCO
Notes.

Based on the expected bond recoveries on the underlying ACG Notes
and limited excess spread associated with current low interest
rates, Moody's estimated that Class A issued by Acapulco Funding
2005-1 would recover roughly half of its outstanding balance.
However, the actual recovery rate will vary depending on the future
interest rates, and leasing and sale proceeds associated with the
aircraft in the ACG portfolio.  Rising interest rates are positive
for the ACAPULCO Notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft lease income generating ability, aircraft
maintenance and other expenses to the trust, and valuation for the
aircraft backing the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes to lease rates or aircraft values that differ from
historical and current trends.



ATTENTUS CDO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on these notes
issued by Attentus CDO II, Ltd:

  $60,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2041 (current outstanding balance, including
   defaulted interest, of $63,272,545.40), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
   previously on March 11, 2010, Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of $16.7 million of notes:

  $235,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2041 (current outstanding balance of
   16,732,113.60), Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 18, 2013,
   Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Attentus CDO II, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's Class A-1 and
Class A-2 overcollateralization (OC) ratios since February 2015.
Consistent with Moody's current methodology for rating structured
finance securities insured by financial guarantors, the rating of
the Class A-1 notes is the higher of the guarantor financial
strength rating and the current underlying rating on the security.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 65.0% or $31.0
million since February 2015, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of underlying assets and the diversion of interest
proceeds due to acceleration of maturity declared in April 2009.
Based on Moody's calculations, the Class A-1 and Class A-2 OC
ratios are currently 642.7% and 134.4%, respectively, compared to
February 2015 levels of 276.8%, and 122.7%, respectively.  The
Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool until they are paid in full.

Today's actions take into consideration the Event of Default (EoD)
and subsequent acceleration that occurred in April 2009.  The
transaction declared an EoD according to Section 5.1 (h) of the
indenture due to the failure of the Class A Overcollateralization
Ratio to be equal or greater than 102.0%.

The actions also reflect the correction of a prior error.  In the
February 2015 rating action, the loss distribution was modeled
incorrectly.  The error has now been corrected, and today's actions
reflect this change.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool as having a performing par and of $107.5
million, defaulted and deferring par of $121.7 million, a weighted
average default probability of 62.5% (implying a WARF of 4709), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.7%. In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge™ cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by REITs
that Moody's does not rate publicly.  For REIT TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit
quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2722)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +5
Class A-3A: 0
Class A-3B: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 6500)
Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -3
Class A-3A: 0
Class A-3B: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0



ATTENTUS CDO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B Notes to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Attentus CDO III, Ltd.:

  $100,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2042 (current outstanding balance of
   $39,477,655.19), Upgraded to Aaa (sf), previously on Jan. 18,
   2013, Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  $100,000,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2042, Upgraded to A1 (sf), previously on
   Feb. 11, 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  $34,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2042, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2015, Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Attentus CDO III, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of REIT trust
preferred securities (TruPS), with exposure to corporate bonds,
bank and insurance TruPS, as well as public finance and project
finance securities.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A-1B notes, an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, and the improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since July 2015.
Consistent with Moody's current methodology for rating structured
finance securities insured by financial guarantors, the rating of
the Class A-1B notes is the higher of the guarantor financial
strength rating and the current underlying rating on the security.

The Class A-1B notes have paid down by approximately 40.9% or $27.3
million since July 2015, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds.  Based on Moody's calculations, the Class A-1B
OC ratio has improved to 578.85% from 381.77% in July 2015.  Based
on the trustee's January 2016 report, the Class A OC ratio is
170.60% (limit 122.86%), versus 159.14% in July 2015.  The Class
A-1B notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio.  According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 3436.
Additionally, assets with a total par of $26.6 million have
redeemed at par.

These rating actions also reflect corrections to Moody's modeling.
In the February 2015 rating action, there were errors in the stated
maturity of the notes, the Class B interest coverage ratio, the
assumed administrative fees paid by the deal, and the loss
distribution.  The errors have now been corrected, and today's
rating actions reflect these changes.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool as having a performing par of $228.5
million, defaulted and deferring par of $67.9 million, a weighted
average default probability of 49.9% (implying a WARF of 3436), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 17.1%. In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US
     banking and insurance sectors.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number

     of banks have resumed making interest payments on their
     TruPS.  The timing and amount of deferral cures could have
     significant positive impact on the transaction's over-
     collateralization ratios and the ratings on the notes.

  5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by REITs that
Moody's does not rate publicly.  For REIT TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit quality
using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1968)
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +3
Class C-1: +4
Class C-2: +4

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 4651)
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -4
Class C-1: 0
Class C-2: 0



AVIATION CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class A-1 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn Aviation Capital Group
Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at 'Csf', RE 10%;
-- Class B-1 at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- Class C-1 at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- Class D-1 at 'Csf', RE 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the notes at 'Csf' reflects Fitch's view that
default is considered inevitable. The pool of aircraft consists
predominately of aged, lower tier aircraft, which Fitch believes
will be unable to generate sufficient cash flow to repay the notes
in full as leasing potential is minimal and the size of the trust's
remaining debt obligations far exceeds the value of the collateral.
Fitch estimates senior note principal recoveries to be 10% of the
current A-1 balance. The recovery estimates for classes B-1, C-1,
and D-1 are 0% as the subordinate notes have interest shortfalls
and no principal is expected to be paid as collections will be
applied to senior principal only.

Fitch is withdrawing the ratings of Aviation Capital Group Trust as
they are no longer considered to be relevant to the agency's
coverage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

No longer relevant as the ratings have been withdrawn.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.



BAMLL 2016-SS1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1's $166.0
million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2016-SS1.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $166.0 million, 10-year fixed-rate,
interest-only mortgage loan secured by a first-priority mortgage on
the borrowers' fee-simple and leasehold interest in One Channel
Center (a 501,650 sq. ft. office building) and the adjacent Channel
Center Garage (a free-standing 965-stall parking garage), both
located in Boston.  The One Channel Center collateral includes the
borrowers' leasehold and leased fee interests in both the
improvements and underlying land.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 26,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a beginning and ending
loan-to-value ratio of 95.3% based on Standard & Poor's value and
the $166.0 million mortgage loan balance.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1

Class       Rating          Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)        78,300,000
B           AA- (sf)        17,400,000
C           A- (sf)         13,100,000
D           BBB- (sf)       16,000,000
E           BB- (sf)        21,800,000
F           B- (sf)         19,400,000
X-A         AAA (sf)     78,300,000(i)
X-B         A- (sf)      30,500,000(i)

(i)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be equal to the principal amount of the class A
certificates.  The notional amount of the class X-B certificates
will be equal to the principal amount of the class B and C
certificates.



BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. M Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Series 2001-PB1 as:

  Cl. M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Upgraded
   to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.  The deal
has paid down 9% since Moody's last review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's doesn't estimate any losses to the pool at this review, the
same as at Moody's prior review.  Moody's base expected loss plus
realized losses is now 3.9% of the original pooled balance the same
as at the prior review.  Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Jan. 1, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $4.2 million
from $938.3 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans in size 51% and 49% of the
pool.

One loan, constituting 51% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $36.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 42%).  Currently, there are no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 and partial year 2015 operating
results for 100% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV is 60%,
compared to 64% at Moody's last review.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.97X and 1.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.05X and 2.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the 1284-1292 West San Marcos Blvd.
Loan (formerly known as the Coleman Center Loan) ($2.1 million --
50.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 65,000 square foot retail
center located in San Marcos, California.  The property was 65%
leased as of September 2015 compared to 90% at last review.
Performance has declined due to higher vacancy.  The Borrower is
trying to find a tenant for the 13,150 SF (20% NRA) space vacated
by Coleman College.  The loan has amortized 51% since
securitization.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 55% and
2.11X, respectively, compared to 46% and 2.66X at the last review.

The second loan is the 6403-6405 El Cajon Boulevard Loan ($2.1
million -- 49.4% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
single-tenant retail property located in San Diego, California.
The tenant is Rite Aid Corporation.  The Rite Aid lease is
scheduled to expire in Februrary 2018, ahead of the loan's maturity
date in September 2019.  Moody's value is based on a dark-lit
analysis, which considers the risk of losing the single tenant
prior to loan maturity.  This loan has amortized 38% since
securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and
1.45X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.36X at the last review.



BANC OF AMERICA 2008-LS1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to D
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
on five classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.  In addition, S&P discontinued its rating on the
class E commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-HQ5.

Discussions of the individual transactions:

BANC OF AMERICA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2008-LS1

S&P lowered its rating on class A-M to 'D (sf)' to reflect
principal losses as detailed in the January 2016 trustee remittance
report.  The reported net principal losses totaled $213.8 million
and resulted primarily from the liquidation of 11 assets.  The
largest asset to liquidate was the COPT Office Portfolio, which
liquidated at a loss severity of 73.0% of its original trust
balance. Consequently, class A-M experienced a 8.0% loss of its
$234.5 million original principal balance, and classes A-J, B, C,
D, and E (not rated by Standard & Poor's) lost 100% of their
beginning balances.

CD 2007-CD4 COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST

S&P lowered its rating on classes A-J and B to 'D (sf)' to reflect
principal losses as detailed in the January 2016 trustee remittance
report.  The reported net principal losses totaled $620.0 million
and resulted primarily from the liquidation of 21 assets.  The
largest asset to liquidate was the Riverton Apartments loan, which
liquidated at a loss severity of 50.0% of its original trust
balance.  Consequently, class A-J experienced a 7.0% loss of its
$585.7 million original principal balance, and class B took a 100%
principal loss of its $41.2 million original principal balance.  In
addition, classes C, D, E, F, G, H, and J (not rated by Standard &
Poor's) lost 100% of their beginning balances.

MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL I TRUST 2005-HQ5

S&P discontinued its rating on class E to reflect the full
repayment of the commercial mortgage pass-through certificate and
lowered its ratings on classes G and H to 'D (sf)' to reflect
principal losses as detailed in the January 2016 trustee remittance
report.  The reported principal losses totaled $26.0 million and
resulted primarily from the liquidation of five assets and one
B-note.  The largest asset to liquidate was Richmond Square Mall,
which liquidated at a loss severity of 61.8% of its original trust
balance.  Consequently, class G experienced a 24.4% loss of its
$15.2 million original principal balance, and class H took a 100%
principal loss of its $13.3 million original principal balance.  In
addition, class J (not rated by Standard & Poor's) lost 100% of its
beginning balance.

RATINGS LOWERED

Banc of America commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-LS1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
A-M                   D (sf)          CCC- (sf)

CD 2007-CD4
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
A-J                   D (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
B                     D (sf)          CCC (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-HQ5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-HQ5
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
G                     D (sf)          BB (sf)
H                     D (sf)          CCC- (sf)

RATING DISCONTINUED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-HQ5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-HQ5
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
E                     NR (sf)         BBB (sf)

NR--Not rated.



BUSINESS LOAN 2003-A: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A Debt to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on seven
tranches from four securitizations of small business loans
originated by BLX Capital LLC.  Additionally, Moody's upgraded, and
placed on review for possible upgrade, two tranches from one
securitization.  The loans are secured primarily by small
commercial real estate properties.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2003-A

  Class A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
   Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 1, 2013 Downgraded to
   B1 (sf)

  Class B, Upgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
   Possible Upgrade; previously on April 19, 2012, Downgraded to
   Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2001-2

  Class A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 10, 2015,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Class M, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2002-1

  Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2014,
   Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  Class M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-1

  Class A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  Class M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 10, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-2

  Cl. M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2013, Upgraded

   to A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions in the 2001-2, 2002-1, 2003-1, 2003-2, and
2003-A transactions were primarily due to increased credit
enhancement coupled with stable performance since the January 2015
remittance date, around which time Moody's last took rating action
on BLX transactions.  The reserve account balances for these five
deals, as a percentage of outstanding pool balances, increased by 9
to 27 percentage points since January 2015.  Additionally,
delinquencies were relatively stable for each transaction as
compared to January 2015.  The various transactions' 60+ day
delinquency levels, including foreclosure and REO, range from 0 to
14% as a percentage of outstanding pool balance; in January 2015
these levels ranged from 0 to 8%.  As a credit negative, the
2001-2, 2002-1, 2003-1, and 2003-A transactions have very
concentrated pools, with loan counts ranging from just 8 to 46
loans.  The 2003-2 transaction has 99 loans remaining in the
collateral pool.

The review for potential upgrade on the 2003-A transaction reflects
that the transaction stands to benefit from potential recoveries on
charged-off loans, which Moody's will further investigate during
the review period.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations" published in
October 2015.

The methodology used in the rating action for the deal with more
than 50 loans remaining included an analysis of the loan collateral
to arrive at a projected remaining net loss.  For the 2003-2
securitization, Moody's determined the expected remaining loss
using representative delinquency roll rates and an estimate of
market recoveries.  Because of the hard charge-off policy by which
a loan must be charged off after being a certain number of days
past due, Moody's also considered potential benefit of future
recoveries on charged-off loans whose collateral has not yet been
sold.

For deals with 50 loans outstanding or less, including Series
2001-2, 2002-1, 2003-1, and 2003-A, the methodology included a loan
level analysis to determine a range of expected net losses. Moody's
evaluated scenarios that take into account an updated or estimated
market value of each property in relation to the outstanding loan
amount, using the non-major market Moody's/RCA Commercial Property
Price Index (CPPI) from the date of the most recent appraised value
or broker's price opinion to January 22. Additionally, Moody's
evaluated stress scenarios, such as the top five loans defaulting
with a market recovery rate of 30%.  Similar to the approach used
for deals with more than 50 loans outstanding, we considered
potential future recoveries on charged-off loans whose collateral
has not yet been sold.  Moody's also considered the credit
enhancement relative to pool concentrations.

Moody's also considered the condition of the commercial property
market and the potential volatility associated with the small
number of loans in these securitizations to evaluate protection
against future collateral losses for a given rating.

For all securitizations, the projected net losses or range of
projected net losses were evaluated against the available credit
enhancement provided by subordination, the reserve account, excess
spread, and if available, overcollateralization.  Sufficiency of
coverage was considered in light of the credit quality of the
collateral pools, industry, geographical and loan concentrations,
historical variability of losses experienced by the issuer, and
servicer quality.

Other methodologies and factors that Moody's may have considered in
the process of rating these transactions appear on Moody's
website.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline below Moody's expectations as
a result of a decrease in seriously delinquent loans and lower
severities than expected on liquidated loans.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of an increase in seriously delinquent loans and higher
severities than expected on liquidated loans.



BUSINESS LOAN 2007-A: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A Debt to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of Class A and B
on Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2007-A, a
securitization of small business loans originated by BLX Capital
LLC.  Additionally, Moody's placed on review for possible upgrade
the rating of the Class A certificates.  The securitized loans are
secured primarily by small commercial real estate properties.

The complete rating actions are:

  Cl. A, Upgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade; previously on April 19, 2012, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. B, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 26, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions were prompted by the improving credit
enhancement of the certificates and the stable pool performance
over the past 12 months.  The transaction has become less
undercollateralized as recoveries from previously charged-off loans
have paid down the Class A principal balance.  The outstanding pool
balance is now larger than the Class A certificates plus a portion
of the Class B certificates.  In addition, the Class A carryforward
principal amount is almost fully repaid.  The 60+ day delinquency
level has been around 2% of the outstanding pool balance over the
past 12 months and no foreclosure or REO was reported as of the
December 2015 remittance date report.

The placement on review for possible upgrade of the Class A
certificates reflects the potential benefit of future recoveries on
charged-off loans, which Moody's will investigate during the review
period.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up.  Losses could decline below Moody's expectations as
a result of a decrease in seriously delinquent loans and lower
severities than expected on liquidated loans.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down.  Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of an increase in seriously delinquent loans and higher
severities than expected on liquidated loans.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations" published in
October 2015.

The methodology used in the rating actions included an analysis of
the loan collateral to arrive at a projected remaining net loss.
Moody's determined the expected remaining loss using representative
delinquency roll rates and an estimate of market recoveries.
Because of the hard charge-off policy by which a loan must be
charged off after being a certain number of days past due, we also
considered potential future recoveries on charged-off loans whose
collateral has not yet been sold.

The projected net loss was evaluated against the available credit
enhancement provided by subordination, the reserve account, if
funded, the excess spread, and if available, overcollateralization.
Sufficiency of coverage was considered in light of the credit
quality of the collateral pool, the largest loans concentration in
the pool, historical variability of losses experienced by the
issuer, and servicer quality.


CENTURION CDO 9: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. D-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Centurion CDO 9 Limited:

  $38,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 17,
   2019, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015,
   Affirmed A1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  $40,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
   (current outstanding balance of $22,291,237), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $586,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
   (current outstanding balance of $326,566,624), Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $35,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  $55,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 17,
   2019, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed
   Baa3 (sf)

  $9,500,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July 17,

   2019, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)

  $4,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due July 17,
   2019, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015, Affirmed
   B1 (sf)

Centurion CDO 9 Limited, issued in June 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July
2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since May 2015.  The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 21.7% or $96.6 million
since then.  Based on the trustee's January 2016 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are
reported at 135.18%, 123.72%, 110.20% and 107.32%, respectively,
versus May 2015 levels of 130.67%, 121.09%, 109.47% and 106.96%,
respectively.  Moody's notes that the trustee reported January 2016
OC ratios do not reflect $26.3 million of principal proceeds that
were paid to the Class A-1 notes on the January payment date.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do.  Based on the trustee's January 2016
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 22.4% of the portfolio.  These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.  Despite the increase in the OC ratios of the
Class C and D notes, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the Class C
and D notes owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to
these long-dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
     uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
     and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade
     debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
     issuers.

  2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
     positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
     strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
     interpretation of CLO documentation by different
     transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

  3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
     credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
     collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
     expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
     Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance

     of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
     performance.

  4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
     transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
     principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
     prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales
     by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

     current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
     CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
     priority.

  5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
     value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
     that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
     volatility in the deal's OC levels.  Further, the timing of
     recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
     defaulted assets create additional uncertainty.  Moody's
     analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
     market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Realization of higher

     than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

  6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation

     risk on those assets.  This risk is borne first by investors
     with the lowest priority in the capital structure.  Moody's
     assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
     at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
     liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
     asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's

     current market value.  The deal's increased exposure owing to

     amendments to loan agreements extending maturities continues.

     In light of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets,

     which increases its sensitivity to the liquidation
     assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios
     using a range of liquidation value assumptions.  However,
     actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market
     prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the
     deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

  7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
     requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
     the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
     has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
     metrics to the covenant levels.  Such reinvestment could
     affect the transaction either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1786)
Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +1
Class D-1: 0
Class D-2: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2680)
Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D-1: 0
Class D-2: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $525.2 million, defaulted par
of $14.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 9.54%
(implying a WARF of 2233), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.78%, a diversity score of 49 and a weighted average
spread of 2.84% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed.  Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



CIGAR 2016-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(sf) Ratings on Cl. C Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by CIG Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1 (CIGAR 2016-1):

-- Series 2016-1, Class A rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class B rated BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class C rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The Transaction's capital structure and the form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- CIGAR 2016-1 has the ability to withstand stressed cash flow
    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. The rating addresses the timely
    payment of interest on a monthly basis and the ultimate
    payment of principal.  

-- Quality and experience of CIG management, as well as financial

    wherewithal made available to CIG by its ownership.

-- The capabilities of the transaction parties regarding
    originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral.

-- DBRS analyzed and for vintages that are not paid down in full,

    forecasts CNLs in its development of an expected loss for
    CIGAR 2016-1.

-- The presence of a hot backup servicer in the transaction.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer; the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CIG; that
    the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets; and consistency with the DBRS Legal Criteria for U.S.
    Structured Finance.



CIT HOME 2002-2: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. MV-1 Debt to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches,
from 5 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CIT Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-2

  Cl. MV-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 8, 2012,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. AF, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012,
   Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-15

  Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-2

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 14, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. A-2b, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-2e, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. A-2f, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Insured Rating
Withdrawn Apr 7, 2011)

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 29, 2010,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2016-GC36: Fitch to Rate Cl. F Certs 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report for Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-GC36 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $42,973,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $22,079,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $33,518,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $225,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $415,175,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70,409,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $861,171,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75,136,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $52,017,000c class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75,136,000c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $182,060,000c class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54,907,000c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $65,021,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $65,021,000b class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,898,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,560,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
     exchanged for class EC certificates, and class EC
     certificates may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and
     class C certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 20, 2016.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$15,894,000 class G or the $43,347,829 class H certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 58 loans secured by 104
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.2 billion as of the cut-off date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company,
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Cantor Commercial Real
Estate Lending, L.P., and Starwood Mortgage Funding I LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.4%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans comprise 59.4% of the
pool, which is above the 2015 and 2014 averages of 49.3% and 50.5%,
respectively.  Additionally, the LCI is 489, which is well above
the 2015 and 2014 averages of 367 and 387, respectively.

Higher Leverage than Other Recent Deals: The pool demonstrates
leverage statistics that are worse than most recent Fitch-rated
transactions.  The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.08x is below both the
2015 average of 1.18x and the 2014 average of 1.19x.  The pool's
Fitch LTV of 113.5% is above both the 2015 average of 109.3% and
the 2014 average of 106.2%.

Above Average Collateral Quality: As a percentage of
Fitch-inspected properties, 46.6% of the pool received a property
quality grade of 'B+' or higher.  Three loans (18.6% of the
inspected properties) received property quality grades of 'A-' or
higher.  Eleven inspected properties (6.7%) received a property
quality grade of 'B-' or below.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down just 10.3%, which is less than the 2015 and
2014 averages of 11.7% and 12.05, respectively.  Eight loans,
representing 29.5% of the pool, are full-term interest only, and 33
loans representing 42.3% of the pool are partial interest only. The
remainder of the pool consists of 17 balloon loans representing
28.2% of the pool, with loan terms of five to 10 years.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 3.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which such information was provided).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT
2016-GC36 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
Ernst & Young LLP.  The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison
and re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each
of the 58 mortgage loans.  Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.



CITIGROUP MORTGAGE 2004-CB3: Moody's Hikes M-2 Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches from four transactions and downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from one transaction, backed by Subprime loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-CB3, C-Bass
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2001-AM1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2004-BC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2004-BC4

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Confirmed
at A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds. The ratings downgraded are due to the increase of
under collateralization and weaker performance of the underlying
collateral. The rating actions reflect the recent performance of
the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pools.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



COMM 2001-J2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes of
COMM 2001-J2 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-J2 as:

  Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. E-CS, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. E-IO, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015,
   Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Ca (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 12, 2015, Affirmed

   Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of seven principal and interest (P&I) classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.  The ratings of interest-only (IO) classes, Class X and Class
XC, were affirmed based on the weighted average rating factor or
WARF of their referenced classes.  The rating of IO Class E-IO was
affirmed based on the credit performance of its referenced class.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Jan. 19, 2016, Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance decreased by 88% to $175.0 million from $1.5
billion at securitization.  The certificates are collateralize by
one loan, the AT&T Building loan ($175.0) which is fully defeased
and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

As of the January 19, 2016 Payment Date, cumulative bond losses to
the trust total $770,433, affecting pooled Class H.  Outstanding
interest shortfalls total $4.5 million and affect Class H with a
very small amount affecting non-pooled Class OM3 that has a current
outstanding principal balance of $0.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERS) and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Interest shortfalls and bond losses increased in March 2013 upon
payment of a workout fee for the Willowbrook Mall loan that paid
off in March 2013.  Approximately one-half of the workout fee was
applied as interest shortfalls, affecting Classes D through H, and
the balance was applied as a loss to Class H.

The defeased AT&T Building loan matures in August 2016 and is
closed to prepayment until three months prior to the maturity date.
The AT&T Building loan was in special servicing and was modified
in March 2003.  Upon payoff of the AT&T Building loan an additional
workout fee will be due equal to 1% of the outstanding loan
balance.



COMM 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of German American Capital
Corp.'s COMM 2012-LC4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are primarily due to overall stable performance of
the collateral pool since Fitch's last rating action.  The
transaction has high retail exposure, representing 52.3% of the
collateral pool.  Seven of the top 15 loans (41.3% of the pool) are
secured by retail properties.  Currently, there are no delinquent
or specially serviced loans.  As of the January 2016 distribution
date, the transaction's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 6.7% to $887.1 million from $951.3 million at issuance.


Fitch has identified two loans (3.7%) as Fitch loans of concern
(LOC).

The first Fitch LOC (3% of the pool) is secured by a 628,063 square
foot (sf) interest in Susquehanna Valley Mall, a 744,790 sf
regional mall located in Selinsgrove, PA, approximately 50 miles
north of Harrisburg, PA.  Sears, Taco Bell, Applebee's, and
Friendly's are not part of the collateral as these tenants own
their stores.  As of the September 2015 rent roll, the property was
91% leased but 82% occupied.  JC Penney (9.1% of net rentable area
[NRA]) did not renew its lease when it expired in November 2015 and
has vacated as expected.  Per co-tenancy clauses, the departure of
JC Penney had immediate impact on the leases of two small tenants
(1% of NRA).  JC Penney's vacancy has also triggered the full sweep
of tenants lease payments.  The borrower is actively marketing the
vacated space.  The remaining major tenants include Boscov's (21%
of NRA; with lease expiring April 2023) and Bon-Ton (12.1% of NRA),
which has extended its lease for three years till January 2017.
The servicer reported third quarter 2015 (3Q15) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.95x, compared to 1.96x at year-end 2014
(YE2014), 1.98x at YE2013, 2.0x at YE2012 and 2.15x at UW.  Fitch
anticipates DSCR will decrease further with the loss of JP Penney
rents and the effects from the co-tenancy clauses.

The second Fitch LOC (0.7%), which is also a servicer watchlist
loan, is secured by a 152-unit, Class B student housing community
located in Nacogdoches, TX.  The property suffered a significant
occupancy decline in 2013 due to poor property management.  The
borrower removed the previous manager and has been actively
managing the property.  As a result, the occupancy rate has
recovered from its lowest point and the borrower expects the
property performance to improve.  As of 3Q15, the property was 88%
occupied, compared to 93% at YE2014, 83% at YE2013, 89% at YE2012,
and 99.3% at UW.  The servicer reported 3Q15 DSCR was 0.85x,
compared to 0.99x at YE14, 0.91x at YE2013, 1.15x at YE2012 and
1.51x at UW.  The loan remains current since Mach 2014, when it
defaulted last.

The largest loan in the pool (10.4%) is secured by 541,128 square
feet of a 928,667 sf two-level regional mall located in Saugus, MA,
approximately 10 miles north of Boston.  The collateral is anchored
by Sears and Macy's, which own their stores.  The largest tenants
include Dick's Sporting Goods (12.7% of NRA) and Best Buy (11.1%).
As of 3Q15, the property was 92% occupied, compared to 95% at
YE2014, and 90% at UW.  The servicer reported 3Q15 DSCR was 2.14x,
compared to 2.29x at YE2014 and 1.93x at UW.

The second largest loan (8%) is secured by the leasehold interest
in a 236,215 sf multi-level anchored retail center located in the
Union Square area of Manhattan.  The property is 100% occupied by
seven tenants, including a 14-screen Regal Cinemas theater (50.3%),
Best Buy (19.5%), and Nordstrom Rack (13.6%).  The nearest lease
expiration date is January 2017 (3.8%).  The loan was assigned a
stand-alone investment grade credit opinion by Fitch at issuance.
The servicer reported 2Q15 DSCR was 4.9x, compared to 4.22x at
YE2014 and 4.34x at UW.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
The Outlook remains Stable for all classes.  Due to the stable
performance, Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset-level event changes
the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $63.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $115.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $416.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $93 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
   -- $44.7 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.9 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $52.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.3 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.8 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class G and HP
certificates, or the interest-only class X-B.



COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Commercial Mortgage
Acceptance Corp. (CMAC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 1998-C2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The pool has become increasingly concentrated with 29 loans
remaining, the majority of which are fully amortizing.  The pool
has experienced 98.8% collateral reduction since issuance and the
largest 10 loans make up 72.3% of the current pool balance.  Two
loans have paid out of the pool since the last rating action. There
are no loans in special servicing and two loans (2.7% of the pool)
are on the servicer's watchlist.  Seven loans (23.1% of the pool)
are fully defeased.

Fitch has identified one Loan of Concern, the Sudbury Pines
Extended Care Facility (4.7% of the pool).  The loan is secured by
a 92-unit assisted living facility in Sudbury, Massachusetts.  The
subject was previously damaged by a flood, rendering many units
unusable.  Although repairs were completed nearly three years ago,
the property has been slow to recover from the loss of occupancy.
Historical cash flow reporting has shown volatile swings in the
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), from reported net operating
income (NOI) coverage of 1.18x at YE2011 to -0.53x at YE2013 to
1.42x at YE2014, due to occupancy shifts as well as dramatic shifts
in operating expenses.  Fitch will continue to monitor this loan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

One loan is the primary driver of Fitch's projected losses for the
pool.  An upgrade to the class J certificate is possible should the
performance of this loan warrant such an action.  Conversely, the
class may be downgraded should any loss be realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirmed these ratings:

   -- $33.7 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 95%;
   -- $765,059 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, G and H certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class F and M certificates. The
rating on the interest-only class X certificate was previously
withdrawn.



CPS AUTO 2016-A: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to CPS Auto
Receivables Trust 2016-A's $340.0 million asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 53.3%, 46.4%, 36.6%,
      28.9%, 24.9%, and 23.1% of credit support for the class A,
      B, C, D, E, and F notes, respectively, based on stressed
      cash flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit

      support levels provide coverage of approximately 3.25x,
      2.80x, 2.00x, 1.65x, 1.27x, and 1.00x our 16.0%-16.5%
      expected cumulative net loss (CNL) range for the class A, B,

      C, D, E, and F notes, respectively.

   -- S&P's expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.65x its expected net loss level, the ratings on the class
      A and B notes will not decline by more than one rating
      category during the first year, and the ratings on the class

      C through F notes will not decline by more than two rating
      categories during the first year, all else being equal,
      which is consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The rated notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form
      of subordination, overcollateralization (O/C), a reserve
      account, and excess spread for the class A, B, C, D, E, and
      F notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated

      notes under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios,
      which S&P believes is appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2016-A

Class    Rating       Type          Interest         Amount
                                    rate           (mil. $)
A        AAA (sf)     Senior        Fixed            177.65
B        AA (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed             42.50
C        A- (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed             51.85
D        BBB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             36.55
E        BB- (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed             20.91
F        B (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed             10.54



CRAFT TRUST 1 1998-A: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Debt to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A
issued by Craft No. 1 Trust 1998-A.

Issuer: Craft No. 1 Trust 1998-A

  Class A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 31, 2011,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on Class A issued by Craft No. 1 Trust
1998-A reflects the limited value of the aircraft backing the deal
and our expectation about future note amortization of Class A.

The Craft No. 1 Trust 1998-A Class A Notes have paid down nearly
89% of their original balance, and the remaining aircraft portfolio
backing the transaction contains only four CRJ 200 regional jet
aircraft manufactured in 1998 and 1999.  The operating leases on
all four aircraft will expire in 2018.  Using the most recent
appraisal values as a rough proxy for expected Class A Note
principal paydown, Moody's estimated that the note holders would
recover around 17% of their notes outstanding. Moody's used
appraisal values based on the most recent annual appraisals
completed as of January 2015 and adjusted them down by assuming 10%
per annum depreciation.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in March 1999.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft lease income generating ability, aircraft
maintenance and other expenses to the trust, and valuation for the
aircraft backing the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

-- Changes to lease rates or aircraft values that differ from
historical and current trends.



DENALI CAPITAL VII: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class B-2L Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1L, A-1LR, A-2L, and A-3L notes from Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.
and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class B-1L and B-2L notes.  Denali
Capital CLO VII Ltd. is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that that closed in May 2007 and that is managed by
Denali Capital LLC.

The upgrades reflect $225.4 million in paydowns to the class A-1L
and A-1LR notes since S&P's January 2015 rating actions, which have
reduced the class's outstanding balance to 58.2% of its original
balance.  In addition, the transaction has benefited from
improvement in the underlying portfolio's credit quality.  As of
the Dec. 7, 2015, trustee report, the transaction held
$1.05 million defaulted assets, down from $4.33 million as of the
Nov. 7, 2014, trustee report, which was used in S&P's January 2015
analysis.  In addition, the amount of 'CCC' rated assets decreased
to $7.77 million from $12.46 million over the same time span. These
improvements are also evident in the higher senior class A (A-1L,
A-1LR, and A-2L), A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L par value ratios.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating (i)  cushion (ii) rating
A-1LR  AA+(sf)/Watch Neg    AAA (sf)    7.38%        AAA (sf)
A-1L   AA+(sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)    7.38%        AAA (sf)
A-2L   AA(sf)/Watch Neg    AA+ (sf)    9.21%        AA+ (sf)
A-3L   A-(sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)     7.03%        AA- (sf)
B-1L   BBB+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)   7.01%        BBB+ (sf)
B-2L   BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)    4.25%        BB+ (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

            RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1LR  AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1L   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2L   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-3L   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA (sf)     AA- (sf)
B-1L   BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
B-2L   BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)

                   DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery     
       Cash flow    compression   compression       
       implied      implied       implied       Final     
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating      
A-1LR  AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1L   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2L   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
A-3L   A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
B-1L   BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
B-2L   BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.
                  Rating
Class       To            From
A-1L        AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LR       AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L        AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L        AA- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.

Class       Rating
B-1L        BBB+ (sf)
B-2L        BB+ (sf)



DRYDEN 42: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings
to Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund LLC's
$459.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 25,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to

      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests

      (not including excess spread).

   -- The cash flow structure, which can withstand the default
      rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model,
      assessed using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.  The transaction's
      interest diversion test, a failure of which, during the
      reinvestment period, will lead to the reclassification of up

      to 50.0% of available excess interest proceeds (before
      paying certain uncapped administrative expenses, subordinate

      and incentive management fees, hedge amounts, supplemental
      reserve account deposits, and subordinated note payments)
      into principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral
      assets; or, after the end of the noncall period, to pay
      principal on the notes sequentially, at the option of the
      collateral manager.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 42 Senior Loan Fund LLC

Class                  Rating             Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)           310.00
B                      AA (sf)             60.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)              37.50
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)            27.50
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)             24.00
Subordinated notes     NR                  48.75

NR--Not rated.



FLAGSHIP CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D, and E notes from Flagship CLO V and removed them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Dec. 18, 2015.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)'
ratings on the class A and B notes.  Flagship CLO V is a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that that closed
in October 2006 and is managed by Deutsche Asset Management Inc.

The upgrades reflect $180.1 million in paydowns to the class A
notes since S&P's June 2014 rating actions, which have reduced the
class A outstanding balance to 13.3% of its original balance.  In
addition, the transaction has benefited from improvement in the
underlying portfolio's credit quality.  As of the Dec. 11, 2015,
trustee report, the transaction held no defaulted assets, down from
$4.47 million as of the May 8, 2014, trustee report, which was used
in S&P's June 2014 analysis.  In addition, the amount of 'CCC'
rated assets has decreased to $2.78 million from $5.46 million over
the same time span.  These improvements are also evident in the
higher class A/B, C, D, and E par value ratios.

The ratings on the class D and E notes are constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria.  As of the December 2015 trustee report, only
50 unique obligors remain in the portfolio, with the top five
obligors representing 23.82% of the transaction's performing
collateral.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to S&P's May 2014 criteria "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other NRSRO's for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by Standard &
Poor's.  The criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of
corporate assets not rated by Standard & Poor's, while the
interpretation outlines treatment of securitized assets.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Flagship CLO V

                             Cash flow
        Previous             implied      Cash flow      Final
Class   rating               rating (i)   cushion (ii)   rating
A       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)     26.74%         AAA (sf)
B       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)     26.74%         AAA (sf)
C       AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)     19.04%         AAA (sf)
D       BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)     10.43%         A+ (sf)
E       CCC+(sf)/Watch Pos   BB+ (sf)     3.11%          B- (sf)

  (i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  
(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating
for a given class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon,
and recovery.

              RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario            Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                    10% recovery  Correlation  Correlation
        Cash flow   decrease      increase    decrease
        implied     implied       implied     implied   Final
Class   rating      rating        rating      rating    rating
A       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)
B       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)
C       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)  AAA (sf)
D       AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)  A+ (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)  B- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow   compression   compression
        implied     implied       implied      Final
Class   rating      rating        rating       rating
A       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
C       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
D       AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)    B- (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Flagship CLO V
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A       33842RAA1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       33842RAB9    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
C       33842RAC7    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D       33842RAD5    A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E       33842RAE3    B- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos



HALCYON LOAN 2012-2: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A, B, C, D, and E notes from Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding
2012-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that
closed in November 2012 and is managed by Halcyon Loan Advisors
2012-2 LLC, owned by Halcyon Loan Management LLC.

The affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available to the rated notes is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period until December
2016.  As such, to determine whether or not to upgrade the notes
above their original ratings, in S&P's cash flow runs it used the
covenanted minimum spread and recoveries.  Based on these cash flow
runs, the ratings on the class C, D, and E notes were unable to
pass S&P's stresses at the higher rating levels.  Although the cash
flows results for the class B notes did pass at a higher rating
level under this scenario, S&P affirmed its rating because the
notes had a similar rating cushion at the transaction's effective
date.  Furthermore, S&P considered the percentage of assets held
within the transaction's underlying portfolio that are exposed to
the oil and gas sector and the volatility and stress currently
being observed in the market.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-2 Ltd.

                    Cash flow
         Previous   implied      Cash flow       Final
Class    rating     rating (i)   cushion (ii)    rating
A        AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     7.10%           AAA (sf)
B        AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)     11.63%          AA (sf)
C        A (sf)     A+ (sf)      6.33%           A (sf)
D        BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)    5.02%           BBB (sf)
E        BB (sf)    BB (sf)      1.64%           BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread and
recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

             RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario           Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case             15.0                    5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                    7.5
Above base case             25.0                    10.0

                  10% recovery  Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease      increase     decrease
       implied    implied       implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating        rating       rating     rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)   AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)       A+ (sf)      AA (sf)    A (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)    A- (sf)    BBB (sf)
E      BB (sf)    B+ (sf)       BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                     Spread        Recovery
         Cash flow   compression   compression
         implied     implied       implied     Final
Class    rating      rating        rating      rating
A        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)
B        AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)     AA (sf)
C        A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)   A (sf)
D        BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     BB (sf)     BBB (sf)
E        BB (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)   BB (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-2 Ltd.
                           Rating
Class      Identifier      To            From
A          40537VAC3       AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B          40537VAE9       AA (sf)       AA (sf)
C          40537VAG4       A (sf)        A (sf)
D          40537VAJ8       BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
E          40537WAA5       BB (sf)       BB (sf)



ICE GLOBAL: S&P Puts BB Rating on Cl. E Notes on CreditWatch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BBB (sf)' and
'BB (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes, respectively, from
ICE Global Credit CLO Ltd., a cash flow emerging market
collateralized debt obligation (CDO), on CreditWatch with negative
implications following S&P's recent surveillance review.  The
affected tranches, which are subordinate to the other rated
tranches in the transaction, had an original issuance amount and
current balance of $39 million and $24 million, respectively.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, and C
notes to reflect adequate credit support at their current
respective rating levels.

Since the transaction's effective date, there has been a moderate
decline in the assets' credit quality as the balance of 'CCC' rated
and defaulted assets have increased, resulting in a modest decline
in the overcollateralization ratios.  Additionally, the transaction
has significant exposure to issuers in the energy sector and
exposure to assets from companies with a Standard & Poor's
corporate rating on negative outlook.  S&P placed its ratings on
the class D and E notes on CreditWatch with negative implications
because S&P believes the credit support available to these notes
may no longer be commensurate with their current ratings.

Mitigating the above is the sizeable cash balance in the
transaction's principle collection account, and the equity
positions it holds (which are currently given zero value).

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch negative placement within 90
days after it completes a cash flow analysis and committee review.
S&P will continue to monitor this transaction, and it will take
rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems
appropriate.

RATINGS LIST

ICE Global Credit CLO Ltd.

                               Rating
Class          Identifier      To                   From
A              44927TAA2       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
B              44927TAD6       AA (sf)              AA (sf)
C              44927TAG9       A (sf)               A (sf)
D              44927TAK0       BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)
E              44927UAA9       BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)



JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Certs to BB
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series
2004-CIBC8, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  S&P raised
its ratings on classes G, H, and J to also reflect its expectation
of the available credit enhancement for these classes, which S&P
believes is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the respective rating levels, as well as the
trust balance's significant reduction.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on these classes, S&P's analysis also considered
the transaction's high exposure to loans secured by retail and
industrial properties (76.2.%), concentration of loans secured by
single-tenant-occupied properties (The Precise Technology Inc.
loan, the 11798 East Oswego St. loan, and the Walgreens-Terre Haute
loan (aggregate balance of $15.0 million, 29.3%)), and magnitude of
upcoming lease rollovers risk for certain loans, such as the
largest loan in the transaction, the Canyon Park loan ($11.2
million, 21.9%), which has approximately 50% of leases that expires
in 2017.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $51.1 million, which is 4.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 12 loans and one real
estate-owned (REO) asset, down from 105 loans at issuance.  One of
these assets ($5.6 million, 11.0%) is with the special servicer,
one ($3.8 million, 7.3%) is defeased, and no loans were reported on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported financial information for 88.1%
of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 51.7% was year-end
2014 data, and the remainder was partial-year 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.56x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 36.7% Standard & Poor's weighted average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.78% Standard & Poor's weighted
average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the specially serviced asset and the defeased
loan.

To date, the transaction has experienced $26.9 million in principal
losses, or 2.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 2.3% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
specially serviced asset.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 12, 2016, trustee remittance report, the Holualoa
Centre East REO asset ($5.6 million, 11.0%) was the sole asset in
the pool with the special servicer, ORIX Capital Markets LLC.  The
asset is the third-largest nondefeased asset in the pool and has a
total reported exposure of $6.6 million.  The asset is a suburban
office property totaling 95,210-sq.-ft. and located in Tucson,
Ariz.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Feb. 13, 2014, because of imminent maturity default (loan matured
on March 1, 2014), and the loan became REO on Oct. 15, 2015.  A 1.5
million appraisal reduction amount is in effect against the asset,
and S&P expects a moderate loss (26% to 59%) upon this asset's
eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC8

                                     Rating             Rating
Class           Identifier           To                 From
G               46625M2Q1            AA+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)
H               46625M2S7            BBB (sf)           B+ (sf)
J               46625M2U2            BB (sf)            CCC (sf)



JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Moody's Lowers Cl. K Debt Rating to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on six classes and downgraded the ratings on
three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp. Series 2005-LDP5 as:

  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 31, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015, Upgraded

   to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)

  Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on July 31, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes C and D were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization.  The deal has paid down 75% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-J, B, and E through H were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes J and K were downgraded due to
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans that were higher than Moody's had previously
expected.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 39.9% of the
current balance, compared to 9.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 10, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $493 million
from $4.2 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 80% of
the pool.

Six loans, constituting 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $52 million (for an average loss
severity of 36%).  Fifteen loans, constituting 58% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Atlantic Development Portfolio loan (for $80 million
16% of the pool), which is originally secured by 6 office and 2
industrial buildings in Warren and Somerset, New Jersey.  The loan
transferred to special servicing effective in July 2015 due to
imminent monetary default.  Cash flow has been significantly
impacted by the vacancy of two tenants in 2015 totaling 153
thousand square foot(SF), reducing occupancy to 56% overall as of
December 2015.

The remaining 14 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $176 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $17 million (a 37% expected loss based on a 78%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 63% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 88% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.62X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.49X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the DRA - CRT Portfolio II - A note Loan ($79
million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by 30 office
properties located throughout Memphis, Orlando and Jacksonville.
The loan was previously modified in June 2013.  The modification
split the loan into a $111 million A-note and a $25.6 million
B-note.  Additionally, the maturity date was extended to November
2019.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.22X,
respectively, the same as Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Mellon Trust Center Loan($45 million
-- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 384,000 SF suburban
office building located 5 miles north of Boston CBD.  The property
is fully leased to BNY Mellon through April 30, 2019.  Due to the
single tenant exposure Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis on this
loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.91X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 0.95X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Precise Technology, Inc. - Buffalo
Grove, IL Loan ($6.8 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 264,695 SF industrial building located 33 miles north west of
Chicago CBD.  The property was fully leased to Berry Plastics Group
through Jan. 31, 2025.  The fully-amortizing loan has amortized 36%
since securitization.  Due to the single tenant exposure Moody's
utilized a lit/dark analysis on this loan. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 47% and 2.18X, respectively, compared to 42% and 2.43X at
the last review.



JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C6 as:

  Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   A1 (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   A3 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed

   Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)

  Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 22 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Jan. 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7.4% to $1.05
billion from $1.13 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 46 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 53% of
the pool.

Six loans, constituting 8.2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 98% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 89%, compared to
91% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.66X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the 200 Public Square Loan ($123.7 million -- 11.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.3 million square foot (SF)
class-A office tower located in downtown Cleveland, Ohio.  The
property is on Public Square, close to the RTA Rapid Transit
Terminal.  Amenities at the property include a fitness center,
retail and dining options and an attached 757-car parking garage.
As of September 2015, the property was 81% leased, compared to 77%
at Moody's prior review.  Despite the increase in occupancy,
property performance has declined due to a decrease in rental
revenue.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.08X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Place Mall Loan ($115.4
million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a 546,374 SF
portion of a 1.2 million SF regional mall located in Douglasville,
Georgia.  JC Penney is the only anchor that is a part of the
collateral; non-collateral anchors include Dillard's, Belk, Macy's,
and Sears.  As of September 2015, the property was 95% leased,
compared to 99% at year-end 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 104% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.97X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Northwoods Mall Loan
($68.9 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 403,671
SF portion of a 790,000 SF regional mall located in North
Charleston, South Carolina.  JC Penney is the only anchor that is a
part of the collateral; non-collateral anchors include Dillard's
and Belk.  As of September 2015, the property was 97% leased,
compared to 99% at year-end 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 86% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.12X at the
last review.


JP MORGAN CHASE 2010-C1: Moody's Cuts Class C Debt Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on six classes
and placed the ratings on 11 classes under review for possible
downgrade in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1 as:

  Cl. A-1, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-3, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Remains On Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to
   Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible

   Downgrade; previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
   Downgrade; previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
   and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to
   B1 (sf)

  Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to
   Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. G, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. X-A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
   previously on Oct. 28, 2015, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
   Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct 28, 2015, Downgraded to
   B3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were downgraded due to anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans that are higher than Moody's
had previously expected.  The downgrades stem primarily from the
declining performance of the Gateway Salt Lake Loan which is
collateralized by a troubled mall and comprises 30% of the pool.

The rating on one IO Class was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

The ratings on nine P&I classes were placed on review for possible
downgrade resulting from uncertainty regarding potential
resolutions of the Gateway Salt Lake loan.  The rating on two IO
classes whose referenced classes include some of those P&I classes
were placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.8% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review.  Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.4% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.  

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of seven, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 12/17/15 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 57% to $309 million from $716
million at securitization.  The certificates are collateralized by
14 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 31% of the pool.  Two
loans, constituting 21% of the pool, have investment-grade
structured credit assessments.

One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Gateway Salt Lake Loan
($94.5 million -- 30.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 623,973
square foot (SF) open-air lifestyle shopping mall in Salt Lake
City, Utah.  The collateral mall, developed in 2001, has suffered
from intense competition with the newer City Creek Center mall,
which opened in 2012 just 0.6 miles from the subject property.
Gateway Mall has lost important tenants to the competing shopping
center, including the only Apple store in Salt Lake City, and
occupancy has fallen to 76% as of August 2015, down from 96% at
securitization.  The retail center's largest tenants, which serve
as non-traditional anchors, are Dick's Sporting Goods, Gateway
Theaters (a movie theater), and Barnes and Noble.  The loan
sponsor, Retail Properties of America, announced that it had
written the loan down to $75 million.  The loan transferred to the
Special Servicer on Aug. 4, 2015, due to imminent default.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 100% of the
pool and partial year 2015 operating results for 56% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 58%, the same as at Moody's
last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.98X and 1.86X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the
agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Cole
Portfolio Loan ($41.4 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of 16 cross-collateralized retail properties
located across ten U.S. states.  All properties are occupied by
single tenants, which include Walgreens, FedEx, and LA Fitness.
Portfolio NOI performance has been relatively stable for the past
three years of reporting.  Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.61X, respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Berry Plastics Portfolio ($25.1 million -- 8.1%), which is secured
by a portfolio of industrial properties occupied by a single
tenant.  The properties are located in Evansville, Indiana;
Lawrence, Kansas; and Baltimore, Maryland.  The properties total
1,404,986 SF.  The leases with Berry Plastics expire eight years
beyond the scheduled loan maturity.  The loan metrics have improved
since securitization due to improved financial performance as well
as amortization of the loan balance.  Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 2.10X,
respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance.  The
largest conduit loan is the Columbia Center I & II Loan ($29.7
million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 507,000 SF
office property in Troy, Michigan, a suburb north of Detroit.  The
property was 85% leased as of June 2015.  Moody's A note LTV and
stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.20X, respectively, compared to 47% and
2.19X at the last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Ramco Retail Portfolio
($28.1 million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by two retail
properties, West Oaks II and Spring Meadows.  West Oaks II is
located in Novi, Michigan, and has approximately 170,000 SF of NRA.
As of March 2015, West Oaks II was 99% leased.  Spring Meadows is
located in Holland, Ohio, and has approximately 212,000 SF of NRA.
As of March 2015, Spring Meadows was 90% leased. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.76X, respectively, the same as at the
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Palm Plaza Loan ($18.4
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a Kmart-anchored
retail center located in Temecula, California.  The property was
99% leased as of June 2015, compared to 98% as of December 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.68X, respectively,
compared to 63% and 1.67X at the last review.



LEASE INVESTMENT 2001-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of Classes A-1
and A-2 Notes issued by Lease Investment Flight Trust, Series
2001-1.  The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT), Series 2001-1

  Class A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Class A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating actions on Classes A-1 and A-2 issued by Lease
Investment Flight Trust, Series 2001-1 reflect the value of the
aircraft backing the deal and our expectation about future note
amortization of Classes A-1 and A-2.

As of the January 2016 monthly report to noteholders, the aircraft
portfolio backing Lease Investment Flight Trust, Series 2001-1
consists of 14 aircraft with a weighted average age of about 16
years, with a 40% concentration in Boeing B767s, 34% in Boeing
737s, and 26% in Airbus 320s weighted by aircraft value.  All of
the aircraft in the portfolio were manufactured between 1994 and
2000.

Using the lower of the mean or median of the most recent appraisal
values and the reserve account as a rough proxy for expected
principal paydown of Classes A-1 and A-2, Moody's estimated that
note holders would recover around 57% of their notes outstanding.
For the appraisal values, Moody's used appraisal values as of April
2015 and adjusted them down by assuming 10% per annum depreciation.
Last year, the expected recoveries on the Classes A-1 and A-2 were
estimated to be much higher at around 76%.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in March 1999.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft lease income generating ability, aircraft
maintenance and other expenses to the trust, and valuation for the
aircraft backing the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes to lease rates or aircraft values that differ from
historical and current trends.



LOMBARD PUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on Series 2005A-2 Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its issue-level rating
on the Lombard Public Facilities Corp. series 2005A-2 bonds at
'CC'.  At the same time, S&P assigned its '4L' recovery rating to
the three bond issues, indicating its expectation of recovery at
the lower end of the 30%-50% range in the event of a payment
default.  The outlook is negative.

"The rating reflects our view of the project's weak liquidity
position and our view that, without debt restructuring or external
support, payment default is inevitable at the next debt service
payment date in June 2016 for the series 2005A-2 bonds," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ben Macdonald.

Although the Village of Lombard agreed to pay as much as
$2 million annually (subject to appropriation) to cover shortfalls
in series A debt service, it chose not to appropriate requested
funds each time it has been called on to do so since December 2011,
and S&P do not expect the village to appropriate for this payment
in the future.

Given continuing debt service coverage below 1.0x and the absence
of appropriations to bridge the gap, the project drew on the series
A debt service reserve fund to cover shortfalls in debt service
beginning in January 2012, and that reserve was exhausted in July
2014.

The project has made its last three debt service payments (January
2015, July 2015, and January 2016) for the series 2005A-2 bonds
with a combination of funds from operations and a payment from ACA,
the bond insurer on that series.  However, all other series of
bonds, including the pari passu but uninsured and unrated 2005A-1
bonds, did not receive full payment.

Under the project's bond indenture, ACA is the controlling party,
and it has instructed the trustee to take no remedial action on the
event of default caused by nonpayment of other series of debt.

The Westin Lombard Yorktown Center is a full-service hotel located
in the Village of Lombard in DuPage County, Ill., about 20 miles
west of downtown Chicago and adjacent to the Yorktown Shopping
Center.  The 18-story hotel commenced operations in August 2007,
and the project consists of a 500-room hotel; a 55,500-square-foot
convention center; two restaurants (Harry Caray's and Holy
Mackerel); 8,000 square feet of additional banquet space; a
635-spot parking garage; and additional surface parking.



MASTR ALTERNATIVE 2004-5: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of four tranches
from MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-5, backed by Alt-A RMBS
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2004-5

  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. 30-AX-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2012,

   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is primarily the result of the recent performance
of the underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the
stronger collateral performance of the underlying collateral and
the increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MBIA INSURANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. B-1A Debt to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 4 tranches
from 2 deals issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
1999-LB1

  A-3A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19, 2016)

  A-5A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3,
Outlook Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade on Jan. 19, 2016)

  B-1A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 5, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF7

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. K Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series
2003-IQ4 as:

  Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015, Upgraded
   to B1 (sf)

  Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015, Upgraded

   to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 23, 2015,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes H and J were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization.  The deal has paid down 14% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on P&I classes G and K were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes L, M and N were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16% of the
current balance, compared to 13% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.5% at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 11, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship.  Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Jan. 15, 2015, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $26.9 million
from $723 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 72% of
the pool.

Five loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7 million (for an average loss severity
of 28%).  Two loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
North Mayfair loan (for $5.1 million 18.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 101,000 SF, Class B mid-rise office building in
northwest Milwaukee, WI.  As of October 2015, occupancy was 60% and
and will increase to 63% with the signing of a new 3,050 sf lease.
The current strategy is to increase occupancy at the property to
position for sale.

The remaining one specially serviced loan is secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $4.4 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (48% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2015 operating results for 41% of
the pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 35%, compared to
39% at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 3.69X,
respectively, compared to 1.26X and 3.13X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Timber Sound II Apartments Loan ($2.1 million
-- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 160-unit multifamily
property located in Orlando, FL.  As of September 2015, the
property was 96% leased, compared to 94% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.74X, respectively, compared to
52% and 1.89X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Plainview Commons Loan ($1.7 million
-- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property located
in Plainview, NY (Nassau county).  At year-end 2014, occupancy was
100%, compared to 85% at prior review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 34% and 3.3X, respectively, compared to 45% and 2.51X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the Boardwalk Plaza Loan ($1.7
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 49,000 SF
anchored retail property located east of Detroit.  Subject is
anchored by a CVS, which occupies 22% of GLA, and the lease expires
on 1/31/23.  As of June 2015, occupancy was 80%.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 51% and 2.01X, respectively, compared to 68% and
1.52X at the last review.



NATIONS EQUIPMENT 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class C Notes Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has assigned provisional ratings to the Equipment Contract
Backed Notes, Series 2016-1 to be issued by Nations Equipment
Finance Funding III, LLC.  The transaction is a securitization of
equipment loans and leases sponsored by Nations Equipment Finance,
LLC (NR, NEF), which will also act as the servicer.  The issuer,
Nations Equipment Finance Funding III, LLC is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of NEF Holdings, LLC. an affiliate of the servicer.  The
equipment loans and leases were originated by Nations Fund I, LLC
(the originator), a subsidiary of the transferor, and are backed by
collateral including trailers, trucks and various types of
construction and manufacturing equipment.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Nations Equipment Finance Funding III, LLC, Series 2016-1

  $131,046,000, Fixed-rate Class A Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  $11,063,000, Fixed-rate Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)
  $9,360,000, Fixed-rate Class C Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Series 2016-1 is the third securitization sponsored by NEF, which
was founded and is led by a team of former GE Capital executives.

The provisional ratings that we assigned to the notes are primarily
based on:

  (1) Limited historical performance of Nations' portfolio, with
      relatively low incidence of default and low net loss rate
      since 2010;

  (2) Weak credit quality and small number of obligors backing the

      loans in the pool;

  (3) Assessed value of the collateral backing the loans in the
      pool;

  (4) Credit enhancement including overcollateralization, excess
      spread, and a non-declining reserve account;

  (5) The sequential pay structure;

  (6) The experience and expertise of NEF as the servicer; and

  (7) US Bank National Association (rated long-term deposits Aa1/
      long-term CR assessment Aa2 (cr), short-term deposit P-1,
      BCA aa3) as backup servicer for contracts.

Credit enhancement to the notes includes (i) initial
overcollateralization of 11.0%, which is expected to grow with time
as the notes pay down, (ii) annual excess spread of approximately
4.0%, (iii) a non-declining reserve account funded at 1.5% of the
initial collateral balance, and (iv) subordination in the case of
the Class A and Class B notes (12.0% and 5.5%, respectively).

The equipment loans and leases backing the notes transaction were
extended primarily to middle market obligors and are secured by
various types of equipment including tractors (18.7%), construction
equipment (14.0%), cranes (8.1%), machining centers (6.8%), and
aircraft (6.5%).

The pool consists of 128 contracts with 62 unique obligors and an
initial balance of $170,190,781.  The average contract balance is
$1,329,615.  The weighted average original and remaining terms to
maturity are 58 and 47 months, respectively.  The largest obligor
is 6.7% of the initial pool balance and the top five obligors
comprise 24.4% of the initial pool balance.  Nearly all of the
contracts in this deal are fixed interest rate and monthly pay.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss.  Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of
payment.  As the primary drivers of performance, positive changes
in the US macro economy and the performance of various sectors
where the lessees operate could also affect the ratings.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss.  Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the contracts or
a greater than expected deterioration in the value of the equipment
that secure the obligor's promise of payment.  As the primary
drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro economy
could also affect Moody's ratings.  Other reasons for worse
performance than Moody's expectations could include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.



RAIT CRE CDO I: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class A-1A Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1A, A-1B, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and J notes from RAIT
CRE CDO I Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transaction managed by RAIT Partnership L.P.

The transaction has continued to paydown the classes A-1A and A-1B
notes, which are currently at 59.99% of their original balance.
Though cash flows indicate a higher rating for some of the
tranches, our analysis considered the credit quality of the assets
backing the notes.  

In addition, this transaction had a note cancellation, as
referenced in prior rating action press releases on this deal.
S&P's review of this transaction also relied in part upon a
criteria interpretation in connection with transactions that have
experienced note cancellations; for this purpose, cash flows were
generated without giving credit to any coverage test below the
senior-most coverage tests.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the classes to reflect the available
credit support consistent with the current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS

RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd.
                        Cash flow
         Previous       implied        Cash flow      Final
Class    rating         rating(i)      cushion(ii)    rating
A-1A     BB- (sf)       BB- (sf)       2.57%          BB- (sf)
A-1B     BB- (sf)       BB- (sf)       2.57%          BB- (sf)
A-2      B- (sf)        B+ (sf)        9.17%          B- (sf)
B        CCC+ (sf)      B- (sf)        6.01%          CCC+ (sf)
C        CCC+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)      19.05%         CCC+ (sf)
D        CCC (sf)       CCC+ (sf)      11.09%         CCC (sf)
E        CCC (sf)       CCC+ (sf)      4.82%          CCC (sf)
F        CCC (sf)       CCC+ (sf)      4.62%          CCC (sf)
G        CCC- (sf)      CC (sf)        10.72%         CCC- (sf)
H        CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)       4.88%          CCC- (sf)
J        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)      0.72%          CCC- (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd.

Class          Rating
A-1A           BB- (sf)
A-1B           BB- (sf)
A-2            B- (sf)
B              CCC+ (sf)
C              CCC+ (sf)
D              CCC (sf)
E              CCC (sf)
F              CCC (sf)
G              CCC- (sf)
H              CCC- (sf)
J              CCC- (sf)



SARM LOAN 2005-3XS: Moody's Hikes Cl. M2 Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of five tranches
from two transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by CSFB
and SARM.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5

Cl. 6-A-1-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3XS

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 17, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools. The rating upgrades are due to the stronger collateral
performance and improvement in credit enhancement available to the
bonds.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



SASCO: Moody's Cuts $167.11MM RMBS Debt Issued 2001-2003
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 28 tranches
from four transactions issued by Structured Asset Securities
Corporation (SASCO).  The collateral backing these transactions
consists of loans originated by the Small Business Administration
to borrowers who have experienced property losses in disasters
recognized by the United States federal government.  The loans are
primarily backed by single-family homes but are also backed by
commercial properties, manufactured homes, multi-family homes,
townhomes, land and developed lots, and prefabricated homes.  The
vast majority of these loans are junior liens.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-AL1

  Cl. A1(B), Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,

   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. A2(1), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. A2(2), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. A3(1), Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,

   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. A3(2), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. A3(3), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. AIO(2), Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. AIO(3), Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. APO(1), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,

   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. APO(2), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,

   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. APO(3), Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,

   Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation 2001-SB1

  Cl. A2 Component 1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 19, 2015, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. A2 Component 2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 19, 2015, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. A5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. APO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Assistance Loan
Trust 2003-AL1

  Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. APO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 29, 2011,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug. 1, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 19, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Assistance Loan
Trust 2003-AL2

  Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
collateral and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools.  The ratings downgraded are primarily due to the
deterioration of credit enhancement resulting from realized losses
and amortization of the subordinate tranches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SLM PRIVATE 2005-A: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all ratings of the outstanding student loan
notes issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-A (SLM
2005-A). The Rating Outlook remains Stable on all the notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$649.38 million of private student loans for 2005-A trust. The
loans were originated by Navient Corp (fka SLM Corp) under the
Signature Education Loan Program, LAWLOANS program, MBA Loans
program, and MEDLOANS program. The projected remaining defaults are
expected to range between 8%-10%. A recovery rate of 11% was
applied, which was determined to be appropriate based on data
provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement (CE): Transaction CE is sufficient to provide
loss coverage for the class A, B, and C notes at each respective
rating category. CE is provided by a combination of
overcollateralization (the excess of the trust's asset balance over
the bond balance), excess spread, and subordination. The total
parity ratio as of the December 2015 distribution is 105.77%.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account sized at approximately $3.76 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms and maintains Outlook Stable on the following:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-A

-- Class A-3 at 'AA-sf';
-- Class A-4 at 'AA-sf';
-- Class B at 'Asf';
-- Class C at 'BBsf'.



STACR 2016-DNA1: Moody's Assigns B1(sf) Rating to Class M-3 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eleven
classes of notes on STACR 2016-DNA1, a securitization designed to
provide credit protection to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) against the performance of approximately
$35.7 billion reference pool of mortgages. All of the Notes in the
transaction are direct, unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac and as
such investors are exposed to the credit risk of Freddie Mac
(currently Aaa Stable).

The complete rating action is as follows:

$252 million of Class M-1 notes, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

The Class M-1 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$252 million of Class M-1F exchangeable notes, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

$252 million of Class M-1I exchangeable notes, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

$240 million of Class M-2 notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

The Class M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$240 million of Class M-2F exchangeable notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$240 million of Class M-2I exchangeable notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$468 million of Class M-3 notes, Assigned B1 (sf)

The Class M-3 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$468 million of Class M-3F exchangeable notes, Assigned B1 (sf)

$468 million of Class M-3I exchangeable notes, Assigned B1 (sf)

The Class M-1 and M-2 note holders can exchange their notes for the
following notes:

$492 million of Class M-12 notes, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

The Class M-1, M-2, and M-3 note holders can exchange their notes
for the following note:

$960 million of Class MA notes, Assigned B1 (sf)

STACR 2016-DNA1 is the fourth transaction in the DNA series issued
by Freddie Mac. Similar to STACR 2015-DNA2, STACR 2016-DNA1's note
write-downs are determined by actual realized losses and
modification losses on the loans in the reference pool, and not
tied to a pre-set tiered severity schedule. In addition, the
interest amount paid to the notes can be reduced by the amount of
modification loss incurred on the mortgage loans. STACR 2016-DNA1
is also the sixth transaction in the STACR series (including
STACR-HQA) to have a legal final maturity of 12.5 years, as
compared to 10 years in STACR-DN and STACR-HQ securitizations.
Unlike typical RMBS transactions, STACR 2016-DNA1 note holders are
not entitled to receive any cash from the mortgage loans in the
reference pool. Instead, the timing and amount of principal and
interest that Freddie Mac is obligated to pay on the Notes is
linked to the performance of the mortgage loans in the reference
pool.

Moody's rating on the transaction is based on both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. This included a quantitative evaluation of
the credit quality of the reference pool and the impact of the
structural mechanisms on credit enhancement. In addition, Moody's
made qualitative assessments of counterparty performance.

Moody's base-case expected loss on for the reference pool is 1.10%
and is expected to reach 9.10% at a stress level consistent with a
Aaa rating.

The Notes

The M-1 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-1 notes can
exchange those notes for an M-1I exchangeable note and an M-1F
exchangeable note. The M-1I exchangeable notes are fixed rate
interest only notes that have a notional balance that equals the
M-1 note balance. The M-1F notes are adjustable rate P&I notes that
have a balance that equals the M-1 note balance and an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

The M-2 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-2 notes can
exchange those notes for an M-2I exchangeable note and an M-2F
exchangeable note. The M-2I exchangeable notes are fixed rate
interest only notes that have a notional balance that equals the
M-2 note balance. The M-2F notes are adjustable rate P&I notes that
have a balance that equals the M-2 note balance and an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

Holders of the M-1 and M-2 notes can exchange those notes for an
M-12 exchangeable note. The M-12 exchangeable notes are P&I notes
that have a balance equal to the sum of the M-1 and M-2 note
balance, and a note rate equal to the weighted average of M-1 and
M-2 note rates.

The M-3 notes are adjustable rate P&I notes with an interest rate
that adjusts relative to LIBOR. The holders of the M-3 notes can
exchange those notes for an M-3I exchangeable note and an M-3F
exchangeable note. The M-3I exchangeable notes are fixed rate
interest only notes that have a notional balance that equals the
M-3 note balance. The M-3F notes are adjustable rate P&I notes that
have a balance that equals the M-3 note balance and an interest
rate that adjusts relative to LIBOR.

Holders of the M-1, M-2, and M-3 notes can exchange those notes for
an MA exchangeable note. The MA exchangeable notes are P&I notes
that have a balance equal to the sum of the M-1, M-2 and M-3 note
balance, and a note rate equal to the weighted average of M-1, M-2
and M-3 note rates.

Freddie Mac will only make principal payments on the notes based on
the scheduled and unscheduled principal payments that are actually
collected on the reference pool mortgages. Losses on the notes
occur as a result of credit events, and are determined by actual
realized and modification losses on loans in the reference pool,
and not tied to a pre-set loss severity schedule. Freddie Mac is
obligated to retire the Notes in July 2028 if balances remain
outstanding.

Credit events in STACR 2016-DNA1 occur when a short sale is
settled, when a seriously delinquent mortgage note is sold prior to
foreclosure, when the mortgaged property that secured the related
mortgage note is sold to a third party at a foreclosure sale, when
an REO disposition occurs, or when the related mortgage note is
charged-off. This differs from STACR-DN and STACR-HQ
securitizations, where credit events occur as early as when a
reference obligation is 180 or more days delinquent.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

As part of its analysis, Moody's considered historic Freddie Mac
performance and severity data, the eligibility criteria of loans in
the reference pool, and the high credit quality of the underlying
collateral. The reference pool consists of loans that Freddie Mac
acquired between April 1, 2015 and June 30, 2015, and have no
previous 30-day delinquencies. The loans in the reference pool are
to strong borrowers, as the weighted average credit score of 754
indicates. The weighted average CLTV of 76% is higher than recent
private label prime jumbo deals, which typically have CLTVs in the
high 60's range, but is similar to the weighted average CLTV of
other STACR-DN and STACR-DNA transactions.

Moody's said, "We adjusted our Aaa-stressed expected loss to
account for a number of findings in the initial diligence results.
Although the final diligence results showed that almost all these
findings were cured, we believe that an adjustment was appropriate
to reflect that the non-sampled portion of the pool did not have
the benefit of the process between the diligence firm and the
lender to cure whatever defects might exist in those loan files."

Structural considerations

Moody's said, "We took structural features such as the principal
payment waterfall of the notes, a 12.5-year bullet maturity,
performance triggers, as well as the allocation of realized losses
and modification losses into consideration in our cash flow
analysis. The final structure for the transaction reflects
consistent credit enhancement levels available to the notes per the
term sheet provided for the provisional ratings.

"For modification losses, we have taken into consideration the
level of rate modifications based on the projected defaults, the
weighted average coupon of the reference pool (3.98%), and compared
that with the available credit enhancement on the notes, the coupon
and the accrued interest amount of the most junior bonds. Class B
and Class B-H reference tranches represent 1.00% of the pool. The
final coupons on the notes will have an impact on the amount of
interest available to absorb modification losses from the reference
pool."

The ratings are linked to Freddie Mac's rating. As an unsecured
general obligation of Freddie Mac, the rating on the notes will be
capped by the rating of Freddie Mac, which Moody's currently rates
Aaa (stable).

Collateral Analysis

The reference pool consists of approximately 144,144 loans that
meet specific eligibility criteria, which limits the pool to first
lien, fixed rate, fully amortizing loans with 30 year terms and
LTVs that range between 60% and 80% on one to four unit properties.
Overall, the reference pool is of prime quality. The credit
positive aspects of the pool include borrower, loan and geographic
diversification, and a high weighted average FICO of 754. There are
no interest-only (IO) loans in the reference pool and all of the
loans are underwritten to full documentation standards.

While assessing the ratings on this transaction, Moody's did not
deviate from its published methodology. The severities for this
transaction were estimated using the data on Freddie Mac's actual
loss severities.

Reps and Warranties

Freddie Mac is not providing loan level reps and warranties (RWs)
for this transaction because the notes are a direct obligation of
Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac commands robust RWs from its
seller/servicers pertaining to all facets of the loan, including
but not limited to compliance with laws, compliance with all
underwriting guidelines, enforceability, good property condition
and appraisal procedures. To the extent that Freddie Mac discovers
a confirmed underwriting defect or a major servicing defect, in the
reference pool prior months' credit events will be reversed.
Moody's expected credit event rate takes into consideration
historic repurchase rates.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud. As an unsecured general obligation of Freddie Mac, the
ratings on the notes depend on the rating of Freddie Mac, which
Moody's currently rates Aaa.



SYMPHONY CLO V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Symphony CLO V Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
December 2007 and is managed by Symphony Asset Management LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 5, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect $13.3 million in paydowns to the class A-1
notes since S&P's January 2013 rating actions, which have reduced
the class's outstanding balance to 95.7% of its original balance.
The transaction exited its reinvestment period in January 2015.  In
addition, the transaction has benefited from improvement in the
underlying portfolio's credit quality.  As of the Jan. 5, 2015,
trustee report, the transaction held $10.94 million in 'CCC' rated
assets, down from $12.59 million as of the Jan. 3, 2013, trustee
report, which S&P used in its January 2013 analysis.  In addition,
the weighted average rating of the portfolio increased to 'B+' from
'B'.  These improvements are also evident in the higher
overcollateralization ratios for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

On the Jan. 15 payment date, the manager retained $18.97 million in
principal proceeds, which may be used to purchase additional
collateral in accordance with its post-reinvestment investment
criteria.

S&P's transaction review included a cash flow analysis, based on
the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the aforementioned
trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults and
recoveries upon default under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSATIVITY ANALYSIS
Symphony CLO V Ltd.

                     Cash flow
       Previous      implied       Cash flow    Final
Class  rating        rating(i)   cushion(ii)    rating
A-1    AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)         14.01%    AA+ (sf)
A-2    A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)          3.93%    AA+ (sf)
B      A (sf)        A+ (sf)           5.71%    A+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)      BBB+ (sf)         4.71%    BBB+ (sf)
D      BB (sf)       BB+ (sf)          0.83%    BB+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.  (ii)The cash
flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even default rate
above the scenario default rate at the assigned rating for a given
class of rated notes using the actual spread, coupon, and
recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
scenario               Within industry (%)   Between industries
(%)
Below base case             15.0                      5.0
Base case equals rating     20.0                      7.5
Above base case             25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery  Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease  increase     decrease
       Implied    implied   implied      implied   Final
Class  rating     rating    rating       rating    rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)  AA+ (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)   AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)  AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A (sf)    A+ (sf)      AA (sf)   A+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)  BBB+ (sf)    A- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)   BB (sf)      BB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)

                    DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
        Cash flow   compression   compression
        implied     implied       implied     Final
Class   rating      rating        rating      rating
A-1     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-2     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B       A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
C       BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
D       BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)      B+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Symphony CLO V Ltd.

                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2         AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
B           A+ (sf)     A (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)



TRITON AVIATION: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Debt to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A-1
issued by Triton Aviation Finance.

Issuer: Triton Aviation Finance

  Class A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 15, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on Class A-1 issued by Triton Aviation
Finance reflects the value of the aircraft backing the deal and
Moody's expectation about future note amortization of Class A-1.

The aircraft portfolio backing Triton Aviation Finance consists of
10 aircraft with a weighted average age of about 22 years, with a
60% concentration in Boeing B737s, 22% in Boeing 757s, and 18% in
Airbus 320s weighted by aircraft value.  All of the aircraft in the
portfolio were manufactured between 1989 and 1995.

Using the most recent appraisal values as a rough proxy for
expected Class A-1 Note principal paydown, Moody's estimated that
note holders would recover around 55% of their notes outstanding.
For the appraisal values, Moody's used appraisal values as of
December 2015 and adjusted them down by assuming 10% per annum
depreciation.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in March 1999.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes to lease rates or aircraft values that differ from
historical and current trends.



UCAT 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-1-A Debt to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of Classes A,
B-1-A, B-1-B issued by UCAT 2005-1 (together, the UCAT Notes).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: UCAT 2005-1

  Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 29, 2009,
   Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  Cl. B-1-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. B-1-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2014,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating actions on the UCAT Notes reflect decline in
expected bond recoveries on the underlying Class A-1 and A-2 Notes
issued by Lease Investment Flight Trust (LIFT), Series 2001-1 Notes
(the underlying LIFT Notes).

The aircraft portfolio backing the underlying LIFT Notes consists
of 14 aircraft with a weighted average age of about 16 years, with
a 40% concentration in Boeing 767s, 34% in B737s, and 26% in Airbus
320s weighted by aircraft value.  All of the aircraft in the
portfolio were manufactured between 1994 and 2000.

The underlying LIFT Notes' expected recoveries are estimated to be
around 57% using the lowe of the mean or median of the most recent
appraisal values as of April 2015 and the reserve account as a
rough proxy for principal paydown.  The most recent appraisal
values were adjusted down by 10% per annum depreciation in order to
calculate the expected bond recoveries.  Last year, the expected
recoveries on the underlying LIFT Notes were estimated to be much
higher at around 76%.

Interest and principal payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are
allocated to pay UCAT's Class A-1 Interest, Class A-1 principal,
Class B-1-A principal and Class B-1-B principal, sequentially in
that order.  Interest payments on the underlying LIFT Notes are
greater than interest payments due to the UCAT Notes, and the
resulting excess spread is applied as principal to pay down the
UCAT Notes.

Based on the expected bond recoveries on the underlying LIFT Notes
and some excess spread associated with the current low interest
rate environment, classes A, B-1-A, B-1-B issued by UCAT 2005-1
would recover around 100%, 63%, and 0% respectively of their notes
outstanding.  Actual recovery rates will vary depending on future
interest rates, and leasing and sale proceeds associated with
aircraft in the LIFT portfolio.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft lease income generating ability, aircraft
maintenance, other expenses to the trust, and valuation for the
aircraft backing the underlying transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes to underlying lease rates or aircraft values that differ
from historical and current trends.



VITALITY RE VI: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to BB-
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its ratings
on Vitality Re V Ltd.'s Series 2014 Class A and B notes, and
Vitality Re VI Ltd.'s Series 2015 Class A and B notes by two
notches.

On Jan. 7, 2016, S&P affirmed its ratings on Vitality Re IV, V, and
VI Ltd. due to an additional criteria article being included in the
rating analysis.  The current action reflects updated information
we received from Milliman Inc. and Aetna Life Insurance Co. related
to the Vitality Re VII Ltd. issuance.

On Dec. 18, 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (CAA)
was signed into law.  The CAA amends certain provisions in the
Affordable Care Act, including suspending the industry-wide health
insurer fee (HIF) for the calendar year 2017.

Because the HIF is generally passed on to policyholders through
increased premiums, the suspension will likely reduce premiums.
This effect will phase in on a renewal basis for rating periods
that cross the 2017 calendar year.

S&P previously indicated that changes in the CAA could affect its
ratings on the Vitality Re V Ltd. and Vitality Re VI Ltd. notes.

Due to the changes, per Milliman Inc., the expected result would be
upward pressure on the covered business medical benefits ratio
(MBR) in 2016 and 2017 relative to the immediately preceding
calendar year (as premiums are likely to be reduced, reflecting the
one-year suspension of the industry-wide HIF) followed by a
downward movement in the covered business MBR in 2018 and 2019
relative to the immediately preceding calendar year (as premiums
are likely to be increased to re-incorporate the HIF after the
one-year suspension expires).

For 2017, based on the covered business renewal distribution and
the phase-in effects of the HIF suspension, all else being equal,
Milliman estimates that the covered business MBR impact will be an
increase of approximately 250 basis points (bps) for 2017 compared
to 2016.  For 2018, the suspension phase-out impact should reduce
the covered business MBR by 250 bps from 2017.

There is no provision for any CAA-related adjustment for the
Vitality Re V or VI notes.  S&P has requested and received updated
modeling from Milliman incorporating the estimated impact the 2017
HIF suspension would have on the attachment probability of each
class of notes based on the Vitality Re VII model, including all
assumptions and experience related to the covered business.  S&P
based its ratings on all outstanding Vitality Re issuances on the
same stress scenarios.

Vitality Re IV Ltd. Series 2013 Class A and B notes mature Jan. 9,
2017, so they are not affected by this change.

The Vitality Re V Ltd. notes mature in 2019. If the one-year
estimated increase of 250 bps in the covered business MBR for 2017
is followed by a similar decrease in 2018, S&P would expect to
raise the ratings on these notes back to their initial level.
Vitality Re VI Ltd. notes mature on Jan. 8, 2018, so S&P do not
anticipate taking any additional ratings actions related to the
CAA-adjustment at this time.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                            To               From
Vitality Re V Ltd.
Series 2014 Class A        BBB-(sf)         BBB+(sf)
Series 2014 Class B        BB-(sf)          BB+(sf)

Vitality Re VI Ltd.
Series 2015 Class A        BBB-(sf)         BBB+(sf)
Series 2015 Class B        BB-(sf)          BB+(sf)



WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C21: Fitch Affirms C Rating on 2 Cert. Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 10 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust (WBCMT) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-C21.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class B reflects the increase in credit enhancement
due to significant loan paydown since Fitch's last rating action.
Fitch modelled losses of 31.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 6.1%, including $62.2
million (1.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 10 loans (74.9%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes eight specially serviced assets (58.4%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 87% to $430.9 million from
$3.25 billion at issuance.  The pool is highly concentrated with
only 15 of the original 231 loans remaining in the transaction. Per
the servicer reporting, there is one defeased loan (0.8%). Interest
shortfalls are affecting classes H through P.  The remaining
non-specially serviced loans mature in August 2016 (28.8%), October
2020 (0.9%), September 2025 (0.2%), October 2030 (1.6%), and
September 2035 (9.4%).

The largest loan in special servicing is the NGP Rubicon GSA Pool,
the second largest loan in the pool (22.9%).  The total debt
exposure for the portfolio is $197.4 million split between two
identical pari passu notes in the subject transaction and the WBCMT
2005-C20 transaction.  The loan is currently secured by 10 office
properties located across 10 states, with over 2.2 million square
feet (sf) specifically built or tenanted by the General Services
Administration (GSA) representing various GSA agencies. Per the
servicer reporting, the portfolio was 87% leased but only 42%
occupied as of September 2015.  The loan went into maturity default
in June 2015 and subsequently a forbearance agreement was executed
with the borrower to allow additional time to market and sell the
properties.  The initial forbearance period ran through Dec. 31,
2015 and was further extended to Feb. 29, 2016.  The largest
property in the subject portfolio, a 1 million sf office building
in Burlington, NJ 100% occupied by the GSA, was sold at the end of
December 2015.  The property will be released and net proceeds from
the sale will be applied to pay down the debt. According to the
servicer, the borrower is cooperating and willing to have a
receiver appointed for the remaining nine properties.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially
serviced 6116 Executive Boulevard loan (11.8% of the pool), which
is a 207,055 sf office building in Rockville, MD.  The collateral
transferred to special servicing in January 2014 for imminent
default following the November 2013 lease expirations and vacancy
of the GSA, National Institute of Health (NIH) (90% of the net
rentable area [NRA]).  The loan had gone into payment default in
July 2014.  The foreclosure took place in September 2014, and
became real estate owned (REO) in February 2015.  According to the
servicer, the property is completely vacant and there are no
pending leases.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the
Metropolitan Square loan (28.8%), which is secured by a 1 million
sf office tower in St. Louis, MO.  The loan had previously
transferred to special servicing in August 2012, and was
subsequently modified in November 2012 and returned to the master
servicer in March 2013.  The loan has remained current under the
modified terms, which included an interest rate reduction and an
extension of the interest-only period and maturity date.  The loans
current maturity date is August 2016, with two, one-year extensions
remaining.  The December 2015 rent roll reported occupancy at 77%,
in-line with the St. Louis Downtown submarket which Reis reports at
20.1% vacancy.  The property's largest tenant is Bryan Cave LLP
(23.6% NRA) whose lease expires in June 2022.  Significant recent
leasing activity includes a new 22-year lease with the Bi-State
Development Agency (d/b/a Metro Transit) for 75,000 sf (7.5% NRA),
starting in August 2015 and expiring in August 2037.  Net operating
income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reported at 1.51x
as of year-to-date September 2015, compared to 1.60x at year end
(YE) 2014, 1.75x at YE 2013, and 1.05x at YE 2012.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-J through D are considered Stable
due to sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown.  The
Outlooks on classes E and F remain Negative due to concerns as to
the timing and ultimate resolutions of the specially serviced
loans.  In addition, the Negative Outlooks reflect concerns
surrounding the non-specially serviced loans including previously
modified debt and single-tenant occupancy, coupled with secondary
and tertiary market exposure and concentrations with only 15 loans
remaining.  These classes could be subjected to downward rating
migration should realized losses exceed Fitch's expectation on the
specially serviced assets, or performance declines on the
non-specially serviced assets.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded this rating:

   -- $65 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings and revised Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $58.4 million class A-J at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.5 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $60.9 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $36.6 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $40.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $32.5 million class G at 'CCCsf'; RE 25%;
   -- $40.6 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $16.3 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $16.3 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $16.3 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2PFL, A-2C, A-3, A-PB, A-4, A-1A, and A-M
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class M,
N, O and P certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on
the interest-only class IO certificates.



WASHINGTON MUTUAL 2007-SL3: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 11 classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Washington Mutual
Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-SL3 as:

  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015,
   Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Upgraded
   to Aa3 (sf)

  Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Upgraded
   to A3 (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Upgraded

   to Baa2 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed
   Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed
   B2 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed
   B3 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf))

  Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 29, 2015,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes (class A-1A through class E) were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining five P&I classes were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO, class X, was downgraded due to the decline
in the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.3% of the
current balance, compared to 7.3% at last review.  Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.7% at last review.  Moody's provides
a current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 195, compared to a Herf of 227 at Moody's last
review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Dec. 23, 2015, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72% to $359 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 359 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 2% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 14% of
the pool.  The average loan size is approximately $1 million.

One hundred and seventeen loans, constituting 36% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
that meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could affect performance.

Eighty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $45 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%).  Nine loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $2
million loss for specially serviced loans (34% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 76 poorly
performing loans, constituting 25% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $15.8 million (a 18% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 86% of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%, compared to 94%
at Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.50X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.



WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(WFRBS) Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2011-C3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance since last
review of the underlying collateral in the pool.  Fitch modeled
losses of 2.3% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 1.8%, including $433,804 (0.03% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated three loans (2.3% of the current balance) as Fitch Loans
of Concern, which includes two specially serviced assets (1.4%).

As of the January 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 23.3% to $1.11 billion from
$1.45 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(3.4%) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
class G.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially-serviced
loan secured by a 481 unit multifamily property.  The property,
located in Laramie, WY, caters to students at the University of
Wyoming.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
December 2013 due to the borrower filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Since that time the loan has been modified with the borrower
funding one million dollars for a debt service reserve, a capital
improvement reserve, legal fees and advances.  At this time,
however, the borrower and guarantor have still not provided audited
financials for 2014, which is a breach of the aforementioned
modification.  The lender is now in discussions with the obligors
regarding a second modification that would seek to remedy all
previous events of default.  The loan remains current.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is from a
non-specially serviced loan secured by 52,797 square foot (sf)
retail center located in Walnut Creek, CA.  Tenants include Office
Max (48% of GLA), Western Stone & Metal (16%) and Casa Belicoso
Inc. (6%).  The retail center experienced a drop in occupancy,
falling to 70% as of year-end (YE) 2014 from 96% as of YE 2013.
The servicer reported a net operating income (NOI) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.85x for the property as of September
2015.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the Trinity
Centre II loan, which is secured by a 151,492 sf office building in
Centreville, VA.  Vacancy increased at the property after the
second largest tenant departed upon their lease expiration in June
2015.  Previously, occupancy was 94% at year-end 2014.  As of
September 2015, the property had a physical occupancy of 77% and an
economic occupancy of just 60%, as a large tenant continues to
enjoy a free rent period offered as a condition of their lease
renewal.  The NOI DSCR dropped to 1.12x as of September 2015 from
1.51x as of YE 2014.  The rent concessions are scheduled to burn
off in August 2016, at which time the property should experience an
increase in revenue.  The vacant space continues to be marketed by
the borrower.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through A-4, as well as classes
C through F, are Stable due to increasing credit enhancement and
overall stable collateral performance.  A Rating Outlook Positive
has been assigned for Class B as a result of continued paydown,
defeasance, the pool's low leverage, and minimal realized losses to
date.  Further upgrades were not warranted given the concentration
of loans secured by retail properties in the pool which represent
53.2% of the current balance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $79.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $123.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $102 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $557 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $862 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $47 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $79.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the class G and X-B certificates.



WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. E Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1:

-- Series 2016-1, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class A-2-A rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class A-2-B rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class B rated AA (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class C rated A (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class D rated BBB (sf)
-- Series 2016-1, Class E rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date for each class.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the
    auto loan portfolio by origination channels.

-- The capabilities of Westlake with regards to originations,
    underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for Westlake originations and performance of the Westlake

    auto loan portfolio.

-- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA/R-1 (high)/Stable by DBRS)
    has served as a backup servicer for Westlake since 2003, when
    a conduit facility was put in place.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Westlake,
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS.



WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Westlake
Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1's $450.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2016-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 42.64%, 37.05%, 29.21%,
      22.89%, and 19.71% of credit support for the class A, B, C,
      D, and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These provide
      approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x,
      respectively, of our 11.50%-12.00% expected cumulative net
      loss range.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      principal payments under stressed cash flow modeling
      scenarios appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      and B notes would not be lowered from the assigned ratings,
      its ratings on the class C notes would remain within one
      rating category of the assigned ratings during one year, and

      S&P's ratings on the class D and E notes would remain within

      two rating categories of the assigned ratings, which is
      within the bounds of S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime automobile loans.

   -- The originator/servicer's long history in the
      subprime/specialty auto finance business.

   -- S&P's analysis of nine years (2006-2015) of static pool data

      on the company's lending programs.

   -- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
      structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class     Rating        Type          Interest        Amount
                                      rate            (mil. $)
A-1       A-1+ (sf)     Senior        Fixed           117.00
A-2A      AAA (sf)      Senior        Fixed           100.00
A-2B      AAA (sf)      Senior        Floating        88.86
B         AA (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed           32.81
C         A (sf)        Subordinate   Fixed           48.05
D         BBB (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed           38.67
E         BB (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed           24.61



WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 37, compared to 38 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5.5% to $874 million
from $925 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 89 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 38% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 2% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Nine loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, constituting 0.2% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. No loans have been liquidated from the pool.

Moody's received full year 2014 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and partial year 2015 operating results for 95% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 84%, compared to 86% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.66X and 1.34X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the National Cancer Institute Center Loan ($73
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 341,000 square
foot (SF) Class A office / lab facility located in Frederick,
Maryland. The property was constructed in 2011 as a build-to-suit
to support the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the oldest
Institute within the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
property entirely leased to Leidos Biomedical Research (formerly
Science Applications International) through September 2021. Due to
the single tenant exposure Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis on
this loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 110% and 1.01X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Windsor Hotel Portfolio II Loan ($62
million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by four full-service
hotels totaling 901 rooms. The portfolio consists of a 275-room
Renaissance Hotel in Asheville, North Carolina; a 286-room Embassy
Suites in Las Vegas, Nevada; a 190-room Embassy Suites in Arcadia,
California; and a 150-room Embassy Suites in Alpharetta, Georgia.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.59X, respectively,
compared to 77% and 1.55X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the WPC Self Storage Portfolio Loan ($48
million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by 26 self-storage
facilities located in four states. There are 18 properties located
in California, five in Illinois, two in Hawaii and one in Texas. As
of March 2015, the portfolio was 83% leased compared to 81% leased
as of September 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and
1.77X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.54X at the last review.



[*] Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 15 SF CDOs Issued 2000-2005
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on Jan. 22, 2016, downgraded and subsequently
withdrawn four classes and affirmed 72 classes of notes from 15
structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) with
exposure to various structured finance assets.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sixty-three classes rated 'Csf' are currently undercollateralized
or have credit enhancement levels exceeded by expected losses from
the distressed collateral (rated 'CCsf' and lower) in their
respective portfolios. For these classes, the probability of
default was evaluated without factoring potential losses from the
performing assets. In the absence of mitigating factors, default
for these notes at or prior to maturity continues to appear
inevitable.

The certificates issued by Blue Heron Funding VII, Ltd. are
affirmed at 'AAAsf'/Outlook Stable. The principal of the
certificates is protected by zero coupon bonds issued by the
Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCO), a U.S. government sponsored
agency, which are scheduled to mature in April 2030. According to
the transaction documents, no party other than the certificate
holders have claim against this protection asset.

Seven classes, affirmed at 'Dsf', are non-deferrable and continue
to experience interest payment shortfalls. The class A notes of
Crystal River CDO 2005-1, Ltd. had their defaulted interest paid
off in December 2014 and have been timely on their interest
payments since then. However, given the highly concentrated nature
of the portfolio, with only four assets remaining, and reliance on
principal proceeds to pay interest due on the timely classes,
re-occurrence of payment default remains a strong possibility for
the class A notes. As such, these notes have been affirmed at
'Dsf'.

The downgrades of the four classes of notes issued by Commodore CDO
II, Ltd. (Commodore II) are attributed to the inability of the
final sales proceeds to cover the remaining balances of the
outstanding notes. Since no assets remain in the portfolio, these
notes are not expected to be paid in full at maturity. Therefore,
all classes have been downgraded to 'Dsf'. Fitch is subsequently
withdrawing Commodore II's ratings as the notes were cancelled.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Classes already rated 'Csf' have limited sensitivity to further
negative migration given their highly distressed rating levels.
However, there is potential for non-deferrable classes to be
downgraded to 'Dsf' should they experience any interest payment
shortfalls.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. None of the
transactions have been analysed under a cash flow model framework,
as the effect of structural features and excess spread available to
amortize the notes were determined to be minimal.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was reviewed in relation to this
rating action.



[*] Loan Leverage in US Conduit CMBS to Rise Further, Moody's Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
The credit quality of US conduit/fusion commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) continued to deteriorate in the final quarter of
2015, and conduit loan leverage will continue to rise for some time
yet, Moody's Investors Service says in its latest report on US
CMBS, "US CMBS Q4 Review: Conduit Credit Continues to Slip, But at
a Slower Pace."

Conduit loan leverage as measured by Moody's loan-to-value (MLTV)
ratio rose to 118.9% in the fourth quarter of 2015 from 118.2% in
the prior quarter, exceeding its pre-crisis high of 117.5% for the
third time.

"We expect Moody's loan-to-value ratio to increase over the next
few quarters," says Moody's Director of Commercial Real Estate
Research, Tad Philipp.  "Thereafter, rising interest rates and risk
retention may help establish a floor for credit quality decline for
this cycle."

Rising rates will slow appreciation in property prices, given the
effect of interest rates on cap rates, Philipp says.  And risk
retention should be a net credit positive, given that the buyers of
most junior conduit classes will make a larger and longer term
capital commitment, reinforcing their incentive to help "shape" the
quality of the loan pool.  The share of the most highly leveraged
conduit loans has risen to meaningful levels, increasing risk for
all classes of CMBS.

In the fourth quarter of 2015 about 22% of conduit collateral had
an MLTV above 130%, of which about 7% had an MLTV above 140%.  The
growing portion of highly leveraged conduit collateral is a major
reason why Moody's has increased enhancement levels.

With this latest report Moody's introduces a new metric: the
effective interest-only term.  The metric takes into account both
the percentage of loans with an interest-only period and, for these
loans, the length of that period.  The effective interest-only
period for conduit loans currently exceeds 40 months, a level that
equates with issuance from late 2005 to early 2006.

Meanwhile, the cushion between super senior and natural Aaa (sf)
enhancement levels continues to shrink, making super senior bonds
much less "super," Philipp notes.  The cushion averaged about 3
percentage points in the past quarter, and in some instances was
less than 1 percentage point.

The credit enhancement assigned by other credit rating agencies to
class D to achieve their lowest investment-grade rating averaged 9
percentage points in the fourth quarter of 2015, which was about 5
percentage points less than Moody's assessed for Baa3 (sf).  The
level assigned by other agencies to class D roughly aligns with the
enhancement level Moody's would assess for B1 (sf).



[*] Moody's Raises Rating on $92.2MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Jan. 25, 2016, upgraded the rating of
12 tranches from four transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-4

  Cl. 6-A-2-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-1-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2012,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-1-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 24, 2013,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2012,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-3-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug. 8, 2012,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 24, 2013,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10

  Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2012,
   Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-12XS

  Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 5, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-17XS

  Cl. A3A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14,
   2012, Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

  Cl. A3B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. A4A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14,
   2012, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

  Cl. A4B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the stronger
collateral performance and the improvement in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The rating action on CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-4
Class 6-A-2-1 also reflects corrections to the cash-flow model used
by Moody's in rating this transaction.  The model used in the prior
rating actions on CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-4
applied incorrect interest and principal payments to the senior
tranche 6-A-2-1, which reduced the amount of interest and principal
available to the bond.  These errors have been corrected, and
today's rating action reflects the appropriate interest and
principal waterfalls for this transaction.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in December 2015 from 5.6% in
December 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Jan. 27, 2016, took various
actions on 21 classes from 11 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P lowered four ratings and
affirmed 17 ratings.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2003 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
"scratch-and-dent" and negatively amortizing (neg-am) mortgage
loans secured primarily by one- to four-family residential
properties.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), and excess
interest, as applicable, provide credit enhancement for the
transactions in this review.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

Where loan-level data was available, S&P derived the foreclosure
frequency as described in its pre-2009 RMBS surveillance criteria.
When loan-level data was not available, to derive the current
bucket's foreclosure frequency, S&P made certain assumptions
regarding the percentage of current loans that are re-performing,
the percentage of current loans that have impaired credit history,
and the adjusted loan-to-value of perfect payers.

S&P used pool-level data to compare each pool's performance with
the cohort average.  For pools with high delinquencies and
normalized cumulative losses relative to the cohort average, S&P
assumed a higher foreclosure frequency than that of the cohort
average.  Conversely, S&P assumed a lower foreclosure frequency for
pools with better observed performance relative to the cohort
average.

With respect to delinquent loans, because S&P uses cohort-specific
roll rate assumptions we used pool-level data to derive the
foreclosure frequency as set forth in S&P's pre-2009 RMBS
surveillance criteria.

In this review, S&P did not have loan-level data available for
these transactions:

   -- C-BASS 2007-RP1 Trust;
   -- GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1;
   -- MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2006-03;
   -- RAAC Series 2007-RP3 Trust;
   -- RAAC Series 2007-RP4 Trust;
   -- RFSC Series 2003-RP1 Trust; and
   -- SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GEL1.

DOWNGRADES

The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit
support for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
S&P's projected loss for the related transaction at a higher
rating.  S&P's view primarily reflects one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Increased number of re-performing loans; and
   -- Increased delinquencies.

Among the downgrades, three ratings remained investment-grade
('BBB-' or higher), while the remaining lowered rating was already
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) before the rating actions.

AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- A high proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 17 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes that
its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its
projected losses to these classes.  As defined in "Criteria For
Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct.
1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations indicate that S&P believes
these classes are still vulnerable to default, and the 'CC (sf)'
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.7% in 2016;
   -- Tinflation rate will be 1.9% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.4% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

RATINGS LOWERED

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2
Series 2003-SD2
                                     Rating
Class          CUSIP                 To                From
I-A            07384YLH7             BBB+ (sf)         AA+ (sf)
II-A           07384YLJ3             A (sf)            AA+ (sf)
III-A          07384YLK0             BBB+ (sf)         AA+ (sf)
B-1            07384YLL8             B- (sf)           BB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2
Series 2003-SD2

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
B-2                   07384YLM6             CCC (sf)
B-3                   07384YLN4             CCC (sf)
B-4                   07384YMH6             CCC (sf)
B-5                   07384YMJ2             CC (sf)

Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A-1                   07820QAY1             CCC (sf)
A-2                   07820QAZ8             CCC (sf)
A-3                   07820QBJ3             CCC (sf)

C-BASS 2007-RP1 Trust
Series 2007-RP1

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     1248M6AA4             CCC (sf)

GSAMP Trust 2006-SD3
Series 2006-SD3

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     36244RAA8             CCC (sf)

GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     362707AA9             CCC (sf)

MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2006-03
Series 2006-03

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     57643BAA6             CCC (sf)
M-1                   57643BAB4             CC (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2007-SD1
Series 2007-SD1

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     590232AA2             CCC (sf)

RAAC Series 2007-RP3 Trust
Series 2007-RP3

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     74978BAA6             CCC (sf)

RAAC Series 2007-RP4 Trust
Series 2007-RP4

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
A                     74919LAD0             CCC (sf)

RFSC Series 2003-RP1 Trust
Series 2003-RP1

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
M-2                   760985UJ8             CCC (sf)

SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-GEL1
Series 2003-GEL1

Class                 CUSIP                 Rating
M3                    80382UAF0             CCC (sf)



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
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                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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