TCR_Public/160103.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 3, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 3

                            Headlines

AIRCRAFT FINANCE 1999-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to CC
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl E Debt
AVERY POINT VII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class E Debt
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes

CARLYLE HIGH X: Moody's Hikes Class E Debt Rating to 'Ba2'
COMM 2013-LC6: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Certificates
CWMBS INC 2005-12: Fitch Keeps 'Bsf' Rating on Class 2-A-6 Debt
ECP CLO 2013-5: S&P Puts B Rating on Cl. E Notes on Watch Negative
FOUR CORNERS III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

FREMF 2015-K721: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. C Certificates
GS MORTGAGE 2013-KING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Certs
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C26: DBRS Confirms B Ratings on Cl. F Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP23: S&P Lowers Cl. G Certs Rating to D
OZLM XIV: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes

SLATER MILL: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. G Debt
STRATFORD CDO 2001-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class C Debt
TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-1LB Notes to Ba1
WELLS FARGO 2015-P2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class F Certs

[*] Moody's Hikes $125MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2005
[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $109MM of Subprime RMBS
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $108.6MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $295MM Prime Jumbo RMBS from 2005 - 200
[*] S&P Puts 171 Tranches From 46 CLO Deals on Watch Positive

[*] S&P Takes Actions on 217 Classes From 40 U.S. RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Actions on 6 RV & Marine Loan–Backed ABS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 41 U.S. RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 US Prime & Subprime RMBS
[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings From US Trust Preferred CDOs

[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings on 39 Classes From 11 RMBS Deals

                            *********

AIRCRAFT FINANCE 1999-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Aircraft
Finance Trust's series 1999-1 class A-1 notes to 'CC (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)'.  Aircraft Finance Trust's series 1999-1 issuance is an
asset-backed securities transaction collateralized primarily by the
lease revenue and sales proceeds from a commercial aircraft
portfolio.

The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion of the remaining eight
aircraft's significant value decline, which has resulted in the
class A-1 notes' increased loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (274% compared
with 199% in February 2014) and the aircraft collateral's reduced
ability to generate adequate cash flow.

The fleet in Aircraft Finance Trust's portfolio is significantly
concentrated in the A320 family and Boeing 737 classics aircraft
that were manufactured in the 1990s.  The remaining eight aircraft
have an appraised value of $72.6 million as of the Dec. 31, 2014,
appraisal date.  As of Sept. 30, 2015, eight aircraft were leased
to six lessees operating in six countries.

The class A-1 notes had a remaining balance of $267.7 million as of
Nov. 16, 2015.  Currently, the class A-1 notes are receiving only a
portion of their minimum principal payment each month.  The senior
reserve account, which provides liquidity to the class A-1 notes,
is funded at $25 million.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the rating
currently assigned to the notes remains consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Aircraft Finance Trust
Series 1999-1
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1     009341AL2    CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)



AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance, Fitch Ratings has taken
various rating actions on three AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables
Trusts transactions as follows:

2012-2
-- Class C affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to
    Stable from Positive;
-- Class E upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive;

2013-3
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to
    Stable from Positive;
-- Class D upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class E upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Positive;

2014-2
-- Class A-2a affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2b affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to
    Stable from Positive;
-- Class C upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Positive;
-- Class D affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive from
    Stable;
-- Class E affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive from
    Stable.




AVERY POINT VII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Avery Point VII CLO, Limited.

Moody's rating action is:

  $232,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $45,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028,

   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $21,800,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $26,650,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $21,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $7,200,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

   due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Avery Point VII CLO, Limited is a managed cash flow CLO.  The
issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
first lien senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and senior unsecured loans.  The portfolio is
approximately 95% ramped as of the closing date.

Sankaty Advisors, LLC will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue Class Y Notes
and subordinated notes.  The Issuer and/or Co-Issuer will also
issue one class of delayed draw notes corresponding to each class
of notes issued (other than the Class Y Notes), totaling eight
classes of delayed draw notes.  A delayed draw note corresponding
to a class of notes may be used (i) during the reinvestment period
in connection with an additional issuance of notes or (ii) after
the end of the non-call period in connection with a refinancing or
re-pricing.  Moody's is not assigning ratings to the delayed draw
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 55
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3043
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.20%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.68 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2015.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3043 to 3499)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0
Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3043 to 3956)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1
Class F Notes: -3



BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust series 2007-PWR18.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to the overall stable performance of the
collateral pool since Fitch's last review. Fitch modeled losses of
5.8% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 11.4%, including losses already incurred to date
(8.1%). Fitch has identified 32 loans (30.4%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern (LOC), one of which is in special servicing (0.6%).

As of the December 2015 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.1% to $1.42 billion from
$2.5 billion at issuance. Five loans are defeased (3%). Interest
shortfalls in the amount of $5.3 million are affecting classes C,
D, E, H, K, L, N and S.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the DRA/Colonial
Office Portfolio loan (11.3% of the pool). The current collateral
for the interest-only loan consists of 12 office and retail
buildings totaling 3.5 million square feet (sf), located across
five metropolitan statistical area (MSAs) in the states of New
Jersey and Alabama. At issuance, the collateral included 19
properties totaling 5.23 million square feet, seven of which were
subsequently released and sold, and the proceeds were applied to
pay down the loan balance. Currently, the loan has a total balance
of $483 million and is split into three equal pari passu notes.
Only the A3 note is securitized in this transaction.

The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2012 and a
modification was completed in January 2013. The loan modification
included an extended interest-only period for 24 months with a new
maturity of July 2016. Fitch has recalculated the weighted average
occupancy rate and net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) for the remaining properties in the portfolio based on
servicer-reported information. As of second quarter 2015, the
remaining portfolio DSCR was 1.51x, compared to 1.28x at year-end
(YE) 2014. The remaining portfolio was 88.5% occupied as of June
2015, compared to 84.3% at YE2014.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is the Trumbull
Marriott Hotel loan (2%). The collateral is a
323-key full-service hotel in Trumbull, CT. Property performance
declined in 2009 at the expiration of the interest-only period,
after which the debt service included principal and interest
payments. In recent years the property has recovered gradually from
its trough performance with an improving occupancy rate, resulting
in a higher net operating income. However, performance remains
below issuer underwriting expectations.

The 2Q'15 DSCR was 1.01x with an occupancy rate of 75%, compared to
a DSCR of 1.0x with an occupancy rate of 65.6% at YE2014. Per the
November 2015 STR report, the trailing twelve month (TTM) occupancy
rate was 75.4% with an ADR of $118.53 and RevPar of $89.34. The
property is performing above its comp set. The RevPar at issuance
was at $92.48.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings on all investment grade classes are expected to remain
stable due to sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown.
The distressed classes (rated below 'B') may be subject to further
rating actions as losses are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in in
relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $18 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $710 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $147.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $211.6 million class A-M at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.9 million class A-MA at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $182.5 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE80%;
-- $33.6 million class A-JA at 'CCCsf'; RE80%;
-- $25 million class B at' CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $25 million class C at' CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $18.8 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
-- $12.9 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

Classes F through Q have been depleted due to realized losses and
are affirmed at 'Dsf' RE 0%. Classes A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate class S. Fitch has withdrawn the ratings
assigned to the interest only classes X-1 and X-2 at the previous
review.



CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-5: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. has assigned ratings to these
classes of notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO
2015-5, Ltd.

  $209,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating assigned Aaa (sf)

  $47,800,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,

   Definitive Rating assigned Aaa (sf)

  $37,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2028, Definitive Rating assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $7,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2028,
   Definitive Rating assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $14,700,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating assigned A2 (sf)

  $5,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating assigned A2 (sf)

  $26,700,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,300,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2015-5, Ltd. is a managed cash
flow CLO.  The issued notes will be collateralized primarily by
broadly syndicated first lien senior secured corporate loans. At
least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans,
cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10.0% of the portfolio
may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio
is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.  The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000
Diversity Score: 60
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2930
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2930 to 3370)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1a Notes: 0
Class A-1b Notes: 0
Class A-2a Notes: -2
Class A-2b Notes: -2
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2930 to 3809)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1a Notes: -1
Class A-1b Notes: -1
Class A-2a Notes: -3
Class A-2b Notes: -3
Class B-1 Notes: -4
Class B-2 Notes: -4
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1



CARLYLE HIGH X: Moody's Hikes Class E Debt Rating to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners X, Ltd.:

US$16,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022
Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February 27, 2014
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on February 27,
2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022 Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on February 27,
2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on February 27, 2014
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$128,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 Notes (current outstanding balance of $95,047,091), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on February 27, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$155,000,000 Class A-2-A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 Notes (current outstanding balance of $110,092,399), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on February 27, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$17,500,000 Class A-2-B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 27, 2014
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Carlyle High Yield Partners X, Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since January 2015. Since then
the Class A-1 and Class A-2-A Notes have been paid down by
approximately 24.9% or $31.4 million and 27.7% or $42.2 million,
respectively. Based on the trustee's December 2015 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes are
reported at 129.9%, 119.4%, 112.5% and 107.8% respectively, versus
January 2015 levels of 124.0%, 115.9%, 110.4% and 106.6%,
respectively.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
    uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and

    b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
    maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
    issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
    positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
    strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
    interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional

    parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
    credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
    collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
    expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
    Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance
    of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
    performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
    transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal

    proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the
    CLO could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the
    loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which
    could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note
    repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations
    will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes, beginning
    with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
    requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the

    end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has
    the ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to

    the covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the
    transaction either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2034)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3050)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations".

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $310.0 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 16.7% (implying a WARF of
2542), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.6%, a
diversity score of 53 and a weighted average spread of 3.13%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



COMM 2013-LC6: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2013-LC6 Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction’s
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  The
affirmations also reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of
the necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings
and its views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings on the class X-A
and X-B interest-only (IO) certificates, respectively, based on
S&P's criteria for rating IO securities, which state that the
ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than the lowest
rated reference class.  The notional balance on class X-A
references classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-SB, and A-M, while the
notional balance on class X-B references classes B and C.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Dec. 11, 2015, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.44 billion, which is 96.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently has 70 loans outstanding, the same
as at issuance.  One loan ($17.7 million, 1.2%) is with the special
servicer, two ($33.5 million, 2.3%) are defeased, and six ($210.3
million, 14.6%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. The master
servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported financial information for
97.2% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 17.6% was
partial-year 2015 data, 78.0% was year-end 2014 data, and the
remainder year-end 2013 data.

S&P calculated a 1.73x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 79.2% Standard & Poor's weighted average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.74% Standard & Poor's weighted
average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the specially serviced loan and the two
defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate
outstanding pool trust balance of $730.2 million (50.6%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's
weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.80x and 81.1%, respectively, for
the top 10 nondefeased loans.

To date, the transaction has not experienced any principal losses.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Dec. 11, 2015, trustee remittance report, one loan in the
pool was with the special servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors LLC.
The Z New York Hotel loan has a total reported exposure of $18.0
million and is secured by a 100-room lodging property in Long
Island City, N.Y.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
in August 2014 as a result of litigation arising from the sponsor's
use of the borrower entity to execute a residential lease in New
York City.  According to the special servicer, a modification to
the loan is on hold due to the discovery of a lawsuit by a member
of the borrower entity.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of
year-end 2013 were 1.69x and 81.0%, respectively.

The largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist and the
second-largest loan in the transaction is the 540 West Madison
Street loan ($135.0 million, 9.4%).  The loan is secured by a 1.1
million-sq.-ft. office property in Chicago.  The loan appears on
the watchlist due to a low reported DSC because of low reported
occupancy.  As of the March 2015 rent roll provided by the master
servicer, the property was 74.3% occupied and reported DSC was
1.09x for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2015.  S&P noted
that this is primarily due to Bank of America, the largest tenant
at the property, exercising contraction options to give back
portions of their space at year-end 2013 and 2014.  A third
contraction option exists for Bank of America for year-end 2016.
According to the watchlist comments, the mortgage contains $30.0
million in tenant improvement and leasing commission holdback to
cover future leasing expenses.  S&P will continue to monitor the
performance of the property securing the loan, and may revise its
sustainable cash flow and value on this loan if occupancy and cash
flow do not improve.

RATINGS LIST

COMM 2013-LC6 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-LC6

                                Rating
Class            Identifier     To                   From
A-1              20048EAU5      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-2              20048EAV3      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-SB             20048EAW1      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-3              20048EAX9      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-4              20048EAY7      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
X-A              20048EAZ4      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-M              20048EBA8      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
B                20048EBB6      AA- (sf)             AA- (sf)
C                20048EBC4      A (sf)               A (sf)
X-B              20048EAA9      A (sf)               A (sf)
D                20048EAE1      BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
E                20048EAG6      BB (sf)              BB (sf)
F                20048EAJ0      B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)



CWMBS INC 2005-12: Fitch Keeps 'Bsf' Rating on Class 2-A-6 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained the Rating Watch Positive on class
2-A-6 from U.S. RMBS transaction CWMBS, Inc. 2005-12. The rating of
the class remains at 'Bsf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Rating Watch Positive reflects the potential for increased
credit enhancement (CE) resulting from a pro rata share of payment
from the pending $8.5 billion Countrywide/Bank of America
settlement. The class was placed on Rating Watch Positive in July
2015. Fitch will continue to monitor the progress of the
settlement. After the settlement's payments are made the
transaction will be analysed and the Rating Watch resolved.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.



ECP CLO 2013-5: S&P Puts B Rating on Cl. E Notes on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B(sf)' rating on the
class E notes from ECP CLO 2013-5 Ltd. on CreditWatch with negative
implications following S&P's recent surveillance review of U.S.
cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions.  The
affected tranche, which is subordinate to all the other rated
tranches in the transaction, had an original issuance amount of $8
million.

S&P placed the rating on the class E subordinate notes on
CreditWatch with negative implications because S&P believes the
credit support available to these notes may no longer be
commensurate with the 'B (sf)' rating currently assigned.  There
has been a moderate decline in the assets' credit quality; and S&P
notes that the transaction has significant exposure to issuers in
the oil and gas and nonferrous metals and mineral sectors (14%), as
well as exposure to assets with a Standard & Poor's corporate
rating with a negative outlook (11%).

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch negative placement within 90
days after it completes a comprehensive cash flow analysis and
committee review.  S&P will continue to monitor this transaction,
and we will take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
as it deems appropriate.



FOUR CORNERS III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Four Corners CLO III, Ltd:

US$9,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$230,400,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $39,493,006), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on Jul 1, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$9,600,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Four Corners CLO III, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since July 2015. Since then, the
Class A notes have been paid down by approximately 27% or $14.7
million. Based on the December trustee's report, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
188.7%, 137.6%, 121.2% and 107.5%, respectively, versus July 2015
levels of 168.3%, 131.0%, 118.0% and 106.6%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on Moody's calculation, securities
that mature after the notes do currently make up approximately 16%
of the portfolio. These investments could expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.
Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the Class E notes, Moody's
affirmed the rating on the Class E notes owing to market risk
stemming from the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
    uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and

    b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
    maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
    issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
    positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
    strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
    interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional

    parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
    credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
    collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
    expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
    Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or performance
    of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
    performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
    transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal

    proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the
    CLO could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the
    loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which
    could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note
    repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations
    will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes, beginning
    with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value

    of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that \  
    Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility

    in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and

    whether a manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets

    create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted
    recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the
    recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
    market prices. Realization of higher than assumed recoveries
    would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
    the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
    risk on those assets. This risk is borne first by investors
    with the lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's
    assumes that the terminal value of an asset upon liquidation
    at maturity will be equal to the lower of an assumed
    liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
    asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's
    current market value. However, actual long-dated asset
    exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions at the
    CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual losses, if any,
    from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1784)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2676)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $91 million, defaulted par of $1.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 12.20% (implying
a WARF of 2230), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.37%, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted average spread of
2.79%(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.



FREMF 2015-K721: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. C Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of CMBS securities, issued by FREMF 2015-K721 Mortgage
Trust and three classes of Structured Pass-Through Certificates
(SPCs) Series K-721 issued by Freddie Mac.

CMBS Classes

  Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)*
  Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
  Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
  Cl. X2-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)*

SPCs Classes**

  Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. X1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)*

* Interest-only classes.

** Each of the SPC Classes represents a pass-through interest in
its associated underlying CMBS Class.  SPC Class A-1 represents a
pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-1, SPC Class A-2
represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS A-2, and SPC
Class X1 represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS
Class X1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by 48 fixed rate loans secured
by 48 properties.  The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis.  Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis.  Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses.  Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:

1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.46X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X.  The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 0.77X is below the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction average
of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 124.8% is above the 2007 conduit/fusion
transaction average of 110.6%.  Moody's also considers subordinate
financing outside of the Trust when assigning ratings.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property level
diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

Moody's considers loan, borrower, and property level diversity when
selecting a ratings approach.  With respect to loan and property
level diversity, the pool's Herfindahl score for each measure is
26.  With respect to borrower level diversity, the pool's borrower
level Herfindahl score is materially lower at 20.8 as 21 loans
(32.8% of the pool balance) have a Sponsor in common with one or
more loans in the pool.  Borrower/sponsor concentrations among
multiple loans increase asset correlations which affect pool
default and loss distributions.  The transaction has a diversity
profile that is lower than what is represented in most previously
rated FreddieMac transactions issued since 2009. However, the
profile is in-line with most multi-issuer CMBS 2.0 conduit
securitizations.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment.  The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy.  The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 2.29, which is in-line with the
average property quality grade for multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published on December
2014.

Moody's analysis employed the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v3.0
to derive credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5%, 15%,
and 24%, the model-indicated rating for the currently rated Aaa
class would be Aa1, Aa3, A2, respectively.  Parameter Sensitivities
are not intended to measure how the rating of the security might
migrate over time; rather they are designed to provide a
quantitative calculation of how the initial rating might change if
key input parameters used in the initial rating process differed.
The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario from
a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are
also taken into consideration in the ratings process, so the actual
ratings that would be assigned in each case could vary from the
information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter.  Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer.  Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated.  Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance.  Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.



GS MORTGAGE 2013-KING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2013-KING, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's affirmations follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and the current and future performance of the retail collateral
securing the loan in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
also reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes is within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-A and X-B interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
under which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher
than their respective lowest-rated reference classes. The class X-A
certificates reference the class A certificates, and the class X-B
certificates reference the class B certificates.

S&P's analysis of stand-alone transactions is primarily a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, S&P's property-level analysis included a re-valuation of
the 1.2 million-sq.-ft. two-story super regional shopping mall, the
Kings Plaza Mall, in Brooklyn, N.Y., that secures the mortgage loan
in the trust.  Of the total mall square footage, 872,741 sq. ft.
serves as the loan's collateral.  S&P also considered the
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
past two years ending 2013 and 2014 for the retail property.  S&P's
expected case value, using a 6.25% capitalization rate, yielded a
79.9% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a 1.39x debt service coverage
(DSC) on the trust balance, based on a 30-year amortization
schedule.

According to the Dec. 11, 2015, trustee remittance report, the loan
has a $470.6 million trust principal balance, down from $498.5
million at issuance.  The loan has a seven-year term and is
scheduled to mature on Dec. 3, 2019.  The mortgage loan amortizes
on a 30-year amortization schedule and pays a per annum interest
rate equal to 3.44122%.  In addition, the loan has a reported
current payment status, and the transaction has not incurred any
principal losses to date.  According to the transaction documents,
the borrower is responsible for the special servicing fees,
work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs and expenses incurred
from appraisals and inspections conducted by the special servicer.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2014, 2013, 2012, and
2011, and the most recent rent rolls provided by the master
servicer to determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for
the retail property.

Based on the March 31, 2015, rent roll, the collateral space was
94.5% occupied, and the five largest tenants--Sears, Lowe's, Best
Buy, H&M, and Forever 21--accounted for 58.2% of the collateral's
total net rentable area (NRA) as calculated by Standard & Poor's.
In addition, 3.4% of the NRA has leases that expire in 2015, 6.2%
has leases that expire in 2016, and 4.7% has leases that expire in
2017.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2013-KING
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class          Rating
A              AAA (sf)
X-A            AAA (sf)
X-B            AA- (sf)
B              AA- (sf)
C              A- (sf)
D              BBB- (sf)
E              BB- (sf)



JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C26: DBRS Confirms B Ratings on Cl. F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited has confirmed the ratings for all classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C26 (the
Certificates) issued by JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2014-C26 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NR at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR.

This transaction closed December 2014 and comprises 69 fixed-rate
loans secured by 93 commercial properties. The pool is concentrated
with loans secured by office properties (43.5% of the pool), but
there is also a concentration of multifamily (16.8% of the pool),
hotel (16.3% of the pool) and retail (15.6% of the pool) property
types. Approximately 46.6% of the collateral is located in five
states (Florida, New York, Texas, Massachusetts and Georgia). There
are four loans, representing14.8% of the pool, with pari passu
debt: 500 Avenue (Prospectus ID#1, 6.9% of the pool), St. Louis
Premium Outlets (Prospectus ID#6, 3.3% of the pool), The Outlet
Shoppes of Bluegrass (Prospectus ID#8, 3.1% of the pool) and the
Florida Multifamily Portfolio (Prospectus ID#26, 1.5% of the pool).
Six loans, representing 12.5% of the pool, are structured with full
interest-only (IO) terms, while an additional 37 loans,
representing 63.3% of the pool, are structured with partial IO
periods. The transaction benefits from a concentration of
high-quality properties, as DBRS considers three loans,
representing 8.5% of the pool, to be secured by properties with
Above Average property quality.

The rating confirmations reflect the current performance of the
pool, which is stable from issuance, with cash flows generally in
line with the DBRS underwritten (UW) levels. At issuance, the
transaction had a DBRS weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and a DBRS WA debt yield of 1.49 times (x) and 8.4%,
respectively. As of the November 2015 remittance, 12 loans (22.3%
of the pool) reported YE2014 cash flows, while nine loans (30.7% of
the pool) reported 2015 cash flows (most loans reporting a Q2 2015
figure). All 69 loans remain in the pool, with an aggregate balance
of $1.46 billion, representing a collateral reduction of 0.34%
since issuance as a result of scheduled amortization. For the eight
loans reporting 2015 financials in the Top 10, the WA amortizing
DSCR was 2.02x, with a WA net cash flow growth from the respective
DBRS UW figures of 12.7%.

As of the November 2015 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and two loans, representing 1.2% of the pool, on the
servicer’s watchlist. The smaller of the two loans, ATR
Transmissions (Prospectus ID#61, 0.3% of the pool), was flagged as
a result of late payments in October 2015. To date, the borrower
has brought the loan current. The second loan is highlighted below.


The Hilton Garden Inn Westampton loan (Prospectus ID#37, 0.9% of
the pool) is secured by a 113-key limited-service hotel located in
Westampton, New Jersey, which is located approximately 24 miles
northwest of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The property was
constructed by the sponsor (BBL Hospitality Company (BBL)) in 2010.
Amenities include an indoor swimming pool, a fitness center, a
business centre and a banquet room. Additionally, guests have the
choice between two dining options, the Great American Grill
(franchise owned) and the Recovery Room Sports Grill (borrower
owned).

The loan was placed on the servicer’s watchlist in October 2015
as a result of a low Q2 2015 annualized DSCR of 0.91x, reflective
of a debt yield of 6.3%. At issuance, DBRS modeled the loan with a
term DSCR and term debt yield of 1.50x and 10.3%, respectively. In
comparison to the DBRS UW figures, departmental expenses rose by
approximately 14.8% ($388,000) as a result of increased Food &
Beverage (12.4%) and Room expenses (19.5%). According to the
servicer, Food & Beverage expenses rose following Hilton’s
decision to implement a company-wide policy in late 2014, which
requires all in-house restaurants to offer a three-meal menu. The
policy was initiated because many of the franchises were opting out
of providing three meals by claiming to have alternative options;
however, many of the alternative options were not considered
satisfactory for Hilton clientele. Conversely, for those Hiltons
that did offer suitable alternatives (subject property),
profitability has reportedly declined, which will likely trigger
Hilton to review its decision in the near future. Management
reports that it has taken time for staff to adjust to the new menu,
but Food & Beverage expenses should be begin to stabilize shortly.
According to the borrower’s June 2015 operating statement, the
property had a T-12 occupancy rate of 74.1%, an Average Daily Rate
of $115.20 and Revenue per Available Room of $85.10 compared with
October 2014 T-12 figures of 76.0%, $119.20 and $91.10,
respectively. In relation to the increase in Room expenses, the
hotel operated without a Director of Sales and a General Manager
for an extended period of time, but as of Q4 2014 and Q2 2015,
respectively, both positions have been filled. BBL was reportedly
very selective in its hiring process but is confident that the
performance of the property will rebound in 2016 under its new
management. DBRS modeled this loan with an elevated probability of
default to mitigate the recent increase in expenses and the decline
in overall performance.



MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP23: S&P Lowers Cl. G Certs Rating to D
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-TOP23, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
raised its rating on one class and affirmed its ratings on five
other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction’s structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

The downgrades on classes C, D, E, and G reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the two assets ($23.2 million, 2.1%) with the special
servicer (discussed below), as well as a reduction in the liquidity
support available to these classes due to ongoing interest
shortfalls.  Specifically, S&P lowered its rating on class G to 'D
(sf)' because it expects the accumulated interest shortfalls to
remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  The class has
experienced four consecutive months of interest shortfalls.

According to the Dec. 14, 2015, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $87,833 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $47,172;

   -- Interest not advanced due to nonrecoverable determination
      totaling $36,018; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $4,829.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class G.

S&P raised its rating on class A-M to reflect its expectation of
the available credit enhancement for the class, which S&P believes
is greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating level.  The upgrade also follows S&P's
views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral, the available liquidity support, and the
reduction in the trust balance.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Dec. 14, 2015, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.08 billion, which is 67.1% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 123 loans and two real
estate owned (REO) assets (reflecting cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans), down from 162 loans at issuance.  Two of
these assets ($23.2 million, 2.1%) are with the special servicer,
22 loans ($198.2 million, 18.3%) are defeased, and 34 loans ($219.3
million, 20.3%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information for
97.5% of the nondefeased loans in the pool (of which 90.3% was
year-end 2014 data and the remainder was partial-year 2015,
partial-year 2014, or year-end 2013 data).

S&P calculated a 1.41x Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 84.6% Standard & Poor's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio using a 8.05% Standard & Poor's weighted average
capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and capitalization rate
calculations exclude the two specially serviced assets, 22 defeased
loans, and seven ground lease loans ($58.7 million, 5.4%).  The top
10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $480.6 million (44.4%).  Excluding the 2021 K Street
ground lease loan ($40.0 million, 3.7%), using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted average DSC
and LTV ratio of 1.42x and 84.7%, respectively.

To date, the transaction has experienced $28.9 million in principal
losses, or 1.8% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 2.8% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of the
two specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Dec. 14, 2015, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III). Details are:

The Savannah Crossings I & II REO asset ($15.7 million, 1.4%) has a
total reported exposure of $19.0 million.  The asset consists of a
155,112-sq.-ft. mixed use (retail/office) property in Savannah, Ga.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on July 17, 2013,
due to a payment default, and the property became REO on
May 6, 2014.  The reported DSC and occupancy for year-end 2014 were
0.23x and 55.5%, respectively. C-III stated that it is working on
leasing up the property.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
$9.9 million is in effect against this asset, and S&P expects a
significant loss (60% or greater) upon its eventual resolution.

The South Suburban Industrial Portfolio REO asset ($7.5 million,
0.7%) has a total reported exposure of $9.2 million.  The asset
consists of three industrial properties totaling 423,043 sq. ft. in
various cities in Illinois.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing on Jan. 25, 2013, because of a payment default, and the
property became REO on Nov. 29, 2014.  The reported overall
occupancy as of June 30, 2014, was 57.4%, and reported cash flow
was insufficient to cover debt service for the same reporting
period.  The asset has been deemed nonrecoverable by the master
servicer. C-III stated that it is working on marketing the property
for sale.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the asset's eventual
resolution.

S&P calculated losses on the two specially serviced assets,
arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 69.8%.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-TOP23
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TOP23

                                  Rating
Class            Identifier       To                   From
A-4              61749MAV1        AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-M              61749MAW9        AA+ (sf)             AA (sf)
A-J              61749MAX7        BBB (sf)             BBB (sf)
B                61749MAB5        BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
C                61749MAC3        BB (sf)              BB+ (sf)
D                61749MAD1        B+ (sf)              BB- (sf)
E                61749MAE9        B (sf)               B+ (sf)
F                61749MAF6        B- (sf)              B- (sf)
G                61749MAG4        D (sf)               CCC (sf)
X                61749MAA7        AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)



OZLM XIV: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to one class of
loans and eight classes of notes issued by OZLM XIV, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $50,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Loans maturing in 2029,
   Assigned Aaa (sf)

  Up to $306,250,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes

   due 2029, Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $12,500,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029,

   Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $46,500,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $15,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029,

   Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $15,750,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned A2 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes

   due 2029, Assigned A2 (sf)

  $30,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $23,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Loans, the Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes,
the Class A-2a Notes, the Class A-2b Notes, the Class B-1 Notes,
the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Debt."

At closing, the Class A-1a Notes have a principal balance of
$256,250,000.  At any time, the Class A-1 Loans may be converted in
part or in whole to Class A-1a Notes.  Upon a conversion of the
Class A-1 Loans to Class A-1a Notes, the principal balance of the
Class A-1 Loans will reduce in an amount equal to the amount of
Class A-1 Loans that converted to Class A-1a Notes.  The aggregate
principal balance of the Class A-1a Notes following a conversion in
whole of the Class A-1 Loans will not exceed $306,250,000.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected losses posed
to debtholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on
the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

OZLM XIV, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes and
loans will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans.  At least 90% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and
up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans.  The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

Och-Ziff Loan Management LP will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes and loans in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2015.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000
Diversity Score: 55
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2830
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2830 to 3255)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Loans: 0
Class A-1a Notes: 0
Class A-1b Notes: 0
Class A-2a Notes:-2
Class A-2b Notes: -2
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -1
Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2830 to 3679)
Rating Impact in Rating Notches
Class A-1 Loans: -1
Class A-1a Notes: -1
Class A-1b Notes: -1
Class A-2a Notes: -3
Class A-2b Notes: -3
Class B-1 Notes: -4
Class B-2 Notes: -4
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1



SLATER MILL: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Slater Mill Loan Fund LP.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and E notes.  Slater Mill
Loan Fund LP is a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in June 2012 and is managed by Shenkman
Capital Management.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Nov. 6, 2015.

The transaction recently exited its reinvestment period in August
2015 and, on the November 2015 payment date, $4.69 million of the
$9.66 million in available principal proceeds was used to pay down
the class A notes.  This payment reduced the outstanding balance of
the class A notes to 97.53% of their original balance.  The
additional $4.97 million was reinvested in accordance with the
transaction documents regarding sale proceeds of credit risk
obligations and unscheduled principal payments.

Due to the class A paydown and a slight increase in par from
trading activity, the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios have improved since the Aug. 20, 2012 trustee report used in
S&P's effective date analysis.  The August 2015 trustee report
indicated these O/C increases:

   -- The senior O/C ratio increased to 133.69% from 132.60%,
   -- The class C O/C ratio increased to 122.02% from 121.03%,
   -- The class D O/C ratio increased to 115.10% from 114.16%, and
   -- Class E O/C ratio increased to 109.31% from 108.42%.

The credit quality of the underlying collateral has remained
relatively stable since S&P's effective date rating affirmations in
February 2013, with the trustee continuing to report no defaulted
assets as of the November 2015 report.  The weighted average rating
of the collateral pool has decreased one notch since the effective
date, to 'B' from 'B+'; however, the scenario default rates have
decreased across all rating levels, demonstrating positive
seasoning of the portfolio.  This is evidenced in a decrease in the
reported weighted average life, to 4.40 years from 5.55.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and on recoveries upon default, under various interest
rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with this rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW AND SENSATIVITY ANALYSIS
Slater Mill Loan Fund LP
                        Cash flow
            Previous    implied           Cash flow   Final
Class       rating (i)  rating (ii)       cushion     rating
A           AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)          12.64%      AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)          13.24%      AA+ (sf)
C           A (sf)      AA- (sf)          1.48%       AA-(sf)
D           BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)         6.61%       BBB+ (sf)
E           BB (sf)     BB (sf)           1.25%       BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow implied rating considers the actual spread,
coupon, and recovery of the underlying collateral.

(ii) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate (BDR) above the scenario default rate (SDR) at the
assigned rating for a given class of rated notes using the actual
spread, coupon, and recovery.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
scenario                  Within industry (%)    Between industries
(%)
Below base case                15.0                       5.0
Base case equals rating        20.0                       7.5
Above base case                25.0                      10.0

                    Recovery   Correlation   Correlation
        Cash flow   decrease   increase      decrease
        implied     implied    implied       implied    Final
Class   rating      rating     rating        rating     rating
A       AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B       AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)
C       AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)     A (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E       BB (sf)     B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                           Spread         Recovery
            Cash flow      compression    compression
            implied        implied        implied      Final
Class       rating         rating         rating       rating
A           AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B           AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)       AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C           AA- (sf)       A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)    AA- (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E           BB (sf)        BB- (sf)       CCC+ (sf)    BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED

Slater Mill Loan Fund LP

                Rating
Class       To          From
B           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C           AA- (sf)    A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Slater Mill Loan Fund LP

Class       Rating
A           AAA (sf)
E           BB (sf)



SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. G Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed eight classes of
Sovereign Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-C1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of class D is due to increased credit enhancement as a
result of continued principal paydown and overall stable pool
performance since Fitch's last rating action. The upgrade is
limited to 'BBsf' due to the highly concentrated nature of the
transaction and the growing risk of adverse selection. In addition,
the loans in this transaction do not have the same features as
typical commercial mortgage conduit loans originated for
securitization. The loans lack some of the structural features and
reporting requirements often seen in CMBS transactions.

Currently there are 21 loans remaining in the pool, 89% of which
are on the servicer watchlist due to lease rollover or the
borrowers' non-compliance of financial reporting.

Fitch modeled losses of 21% of the remaining pool; expected losses
on the original pool balance total 3.2%, including $25 million
(2.5% of the pool) in realized losses to date. Fitch has identified
18 loans (93.8%) as Fitch loans of concern, including one special
serviced loan (4.9%).

As of the November 2015 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
balance has been reduced by 96.3% to $37.3 million from $1.0
billion at issuance. Since the last review, the pool balance has
been reduced by $16.4 million (30.6%). Interest shortfalls of $0.8
million are currently affecting classes G through N.

The largest loan in the pool (32.1%) is secured by a 106,981 square
foot (sf) office property located in Dublin, OH. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2014 due to maturity
default. The borrower was unable to refinance the loan at its 2013
maturity due to concerns from prospective buyers on the near term
lease expiration of the sole tenant. A loan modification was
subsequently executed to extend the loan maturity to April 2016.
The property is 100% leased by Pacer Global Logistics until March
2016, and the space serves as the tenant's global headquarters. The
company was acquired by XPO Logistics in 2014. The borrower is in
negotiations with the tenant which has indicated that they will
downsize and therefore do not need the entire space at the
property.

The one specially serviced loan in the pool (4.9%) is
collateralized by a four story walk-up multifamily property in
Brooklyn, NY. The property contains 32 rent stabilized units. The
loan transferred to special servicing in 2012 due to a pending
maturity default. A foreclosure complaint was filed in January 2013
and was signed in by the court in February 2014. A receiver has
been in place since November 2014. The Environmental Phase II
investigation confirmed the presence of contamination from an
offsite dry cleaner, which has been razed. The foreclosure sale has
been postponed to February 2016. The appraisal value of the
property as of June 2015 is approximately $6.2 million (after
taking the consideration of the estimated costs of remediation).
Fitch expects minimal losses on this loan since the asset value is
significantly higher than the outstanding debt.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As a result of the limited financial reporting, Fitch applied
additional stresses to operating income and capitalization rates.
The rating on class D is expected to remain stable as it
incorporates these additional stressed assumptions; however, is
unlikely to be upgraded.

The distressed classes (rated below 'B') may be subject to further
rating actions as losses are realized.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in in
relation to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following class as indicated:

-- $17.9 million class D to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $10.1 million class E at 'CCsf; RE 90%;
-- $7.6 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $1.6 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A1-A, A-J, B and C certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class N certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.



STRATFORD CDO 2001-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class C Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of notes issued by NYLIM
Stratford CDO 2001-1 Ltd. as follows.

-- $15,000,328 class B notes at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $35,160,441 class C notes at 'Csf';
-- $16,000,000 preference shares at 'Csf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the class B notes is attributed to the stable
performance of the portfolio and continued amortization of the
notes offsetting the increasing portfolio concentration.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2015, the transaction
has received approximately $2.7 million in principal payments, $1.3
million of which has been used to pay down the class B notes'
balance, while approximately $1.4 million has been used to pay
interest due on the class C notes. This leakage of principal to pay
interest presents the risk of credit enhancement (CE) erosion. The
class B notes are also exposed to concentration risks, as the
higher rated assets in the portfolio have amortized at a faster
rate than the lower rated assets and the portfolio has become
increasingly concentrated, with only nine obligors remaining. The
ongoing leakage of principal to pay the class C interest and
concentration risks are offset by the credit quality of the
remaining obligors, since the class B notes' balance is supported
by collateral rated 'BBB' and higher. Given these risks, Fitch
believes the appropriate rating for the notes is 'Bsf'.

The Stable Outlook reflects the notes' ability to withstand the
leakage of principal to pay interest and rating migration given the
coverage of the notes by collateral rated 'BBB' and higher.

The class C notes and preference shares CE levels are exceeded by
the expected losses (EL) from the distressed collateral (rated
'CCsf' and lower). For these classes the probability of default was
evaluated without factoring in potential losses from the performing
assets. In the absence of mitigating factors, default for these
notes at or prior to maturity appears inevitable.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected in
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model as well as increasing
concentration in assets of a weaker credit quality could lead to
future downgrades. Continuing amortization accompanied by better
than expected cash flows from distressed assets could lead to an
upgrade.



TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-1LB Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Tropic CDO V, Ltd.:

  $220,000,000 Class A-1L1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
   (current balance of $169,187,038), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
   previously on July 25, 2014, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  $220,000,000 Class A-1L2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
   (current balance of $178,425,759), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
   previously on July 25, 2014, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  $94,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036,
   Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2014, Upgraded to
   Ba3 (sf)

Tropic CDO V Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of bank, insurance, and REIT trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes, resumption of interest
payments of previously deferring assets, and the improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio since December 2014.

The Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes have paid down by
approximately $15.5 million about 8.4% and $12.7 million about
6.6%, respectively, since December 2014, using principal proceeds
from the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds.  The Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes
will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest, due
to Senior Overcollateralization Test failure, and the use of
proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio.  According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 915 from 1031
in December 2014.  Since December 2014, three previously deferring
banks with a total par of $14.5 million have resumed making
interest payments on their TruPS; two assets with a total par of
$20 million have redeemed at par.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of a prior error. In
the July 2014 rating actions, Moody's used an incorrect weighted
average maturity of the underlying portfolio.  This error has now
been corrected, and today's rating actions reflect this change.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $496.5
million, defaulted/deferring par of $208.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 10.1% (implying a WARF of 915), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.  In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

  1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
     negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in

     the general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US
     banking sector.  Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the
     US insurance sector.

  2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
     collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
     current expectations could have a positive impact on the
     transaction's performance.  Conversely, asset credit
     performance weaker than Moody's current expectations could
     have adverse consequences on the transaction's performance.

  3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction
     is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds
     and excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace.
     Note repayments that are faster than Moody's current
     expectations could have a positive impact on the notes'
     ratings, beginning with the notes with the highest payment
     priority.

  4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number

     of banks have resumed making interest payments on their
     TruPS.  The timing and amount of deferral cures could have
     significant positive impact on the transaction's over-
     collateralization ratios and the ratings on the notes.

  5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
     large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
     assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or
     credit estimates.  Because these are not public ratings, they

     are subject to additional estimation uncertainty..

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.  The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.  Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks, insurance and REIT companies
that Moody's does not rate publicly.  To evaluate the credit
quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores.  Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC
financial data.  For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports For REIT TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit quality
using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes.  Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 592)
Class A-1L1: +1
Class A-1L2: +1
Class A-1LB: +1
Class A-2L: +2
Class A-3L: 0
Class A-3F: 0
Class B-1L: 0
Class B-2L: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1377)
Class A-1L1: -1
Class A-1L2: -2
Class A-1LB: -2
Class A-2L: -2
Class A-3L: 0
Class A-3F: 0
Class B-1L: 0
Class B-2L: 0



WELLS FARGO 2015-P2: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-P2 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

   -- $28,655,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70,000,000 class A-2A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $82,513,000 class A-2B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $209,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $253,790,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57,582,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47,605,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $749,145,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $61,385,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $61,385,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,110,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,373,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,373,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $22,550,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $11,275,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Since Fitch issued its presale report on Dec. 2, 2015, the balance
of the class A-3 certificates has increased from $170,000,000 to
$209,000,000 and the balance of the class A-4 certificates has
decreased from $292,790,000 to $253,790,000.  Fitch does not rate
the $51,363,025 class G certificates.

The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure. The
certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 71 loans secured by 115
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were
contributed to the trust by Principal Commercial Capital, Ladder
Capital Finance LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association, and Societe Generale.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 69.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 81.1%, and asset summary reviews
on 81.1% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.14x is below
both the year-to-date 2015 and 2014 averages of 1.18x and 1.19x,
respectively.  The pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 111.2% is
above both the year-to-date 2015 average of 109.4% and the 2014
average of 106.2%.

Below-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to pay down only
9.1% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity.  This is below
both the year-to-date 2015 and 2014 averages of 12.1% and 12%,
respectively.  There are 19 full-term interest-only loans (28.4%),
27 loans (48%) are partial interest only, and 25 loans (23.6%) are
balloon loans.

Property Type Diversity: The pool's largest property type is retail
and has the largest exposure at 25.7% of initial pool balance,
followed by multifamily at 19.1%.  No one property type has
exposure greater than 30%.  Industrial property type exposure is
higher than recent CMBS transactions at 11%.  Additionally, the
pool has below-average exposure for office at 7.6%, compared to
year-to-date 2015 and 2014 averages of 23.3% and 22.8%,
respectively.  However, hotel is higher than average at 17%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15.6% below
the most recent net operating income (NOI) for properties for which
a recent NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period.  Unanticipated further declines in
property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and could result in potential rating
actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to WFCM
2015-P2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the senior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 10-11.



[*] Moody's Hikes $125MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2002-2005
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 20 tranches,
from 8 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2002-HE2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2003-OP1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-FM1

Cl. 2004-FM1-M1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2004-FM1-M2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2004-FM1-M3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-HE4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-RM2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W8

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.



[*] Moody's Raises Ratings on $109MM of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Dec. 22, 2015, upgraded the ratings
of six tranches from four deals, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-HE1

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on March 12, 2013,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R1

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 23, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-5

  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug. 21, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2005-WMC2

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 16, 2015,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools and/or build-up in credit enhancement of the tranches.  The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in November 2015 from 5.8% in
November 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
5% to 6% for the 2015 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2015.  Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF422425

A list of updated estimated pool losses and recoveries is being
posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this review period
and may be found at:

Excel:
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF345728



[*] Moody's Takes Action on $108.6MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from four transactions
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, and issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC5

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 4, 2012,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 24, 2011,
   Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-11

  Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. 2A1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 20, 2012,
   Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2011,
   Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2014,
   Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7

  Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 22, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 29, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR11

  Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 31, 2011,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
these pools.  The rating upgrades are due to the stronger
collateral performance and improvement in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.  The rating downgrade is due to the weak
collateral performance and depletion of credit enhancement
available to the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.0% in November 2015 from 5.8% in
November 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
5% to 6% for the 2015 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.  House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance.  Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2015.  Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $295MM Prime Jumbo RMBS from 2005 - 200
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Dec. 21, 2015, downgraded the ratings
of 11 tranches and upgraded the ratings of five tranches backed by
Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S2

  Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 11, 2013,

   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-3

  Cl. IA-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sept 21, 2012,
   Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-6

  Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 2, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-3

  Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,

   Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 11,
   2013, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 11,
   2013, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June 11,
   2013, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26,
   2010, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM1

  Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept 12, 2012,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 6,
   2015, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 6, 2015,

   Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sept 12, 2012,
   Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust

  Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2014,
   Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.  The ratings downgraded are due to the weaker
performance of the underlying collateral and the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds.  The ratings upgraded are a
result of the improving performance of the related pools and an
increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.  In
addition, the downgrade rating action for Class 1-A2 from Chase
Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S2 reflects the current rating
on Class 1-A1.  Class 1-A2, an interest-only bond with a notional
balance linked to Class 1-A1, was inadvertently omitted from the
March 2, 2015 rating action on this deal.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 5% in November 2015 from 5.8% in
November 2014.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
5% to 6% for the 2015 year.  Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2015.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Puts 171 Tranches From 46 CLO Deals on Watch Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 171
tranches from 46 U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.  The
CreditWatch placements follow S&P's surveillance review of U.S.
cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.  The
affected tranches had an original issuance amount of $6.76
billion.

The CreditWatch positive placements resulted from enhanced
overcollateralization due to paydowns to the tranches among these
CLO transactions.  All of the transactions have exited their
reinvestment periods.  Of the 171 tranches, 33 have started to
receive paydowns.

The table below reflects the year of issuance for the 46
transactions whose ratings were placed on CreditWatch positive.

Year of issuance    No. of deals
2006                          15
2007                          29
2011                           2

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements within 90 days
after it completes a comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee
review for each of the affected transactions.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

ACA CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Apidos CDO IV
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Ares NF CLO XIV Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
E                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)

Atrium V
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-4                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

Baker Street CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Bridgeport CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1D                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-1T                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)

Carlyle Daytona CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-3L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
B-1L                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

Churchill Financial Cayman Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D-1                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
E                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

Clear Lake CLO Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

ColumbusNova CLO IV Ltd. 2007-II
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
E                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-1LR               AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2L                AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
A-3L                A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)

Flagship CLO V
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)

Grayson CDO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)

Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)

Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Halcyon Loan Investors CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

HarbourView CLO 2006-1
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)

Latitude CLO II Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)
D                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC- (sf)

LCM IX Ltd. Partnership
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Momentum Capital Fund Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
Class C Notes       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
Class D Notes       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
Class E Notes       B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
E                   B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)

Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C-1                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Nantucket CLO I Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Nob Hill CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners X Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners XI Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1A                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

OHA Park Avenue CLO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

One Wall Street CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)

Phoenix CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
C-1                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
C-2                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D-1                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)
D-2                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Phoenix CLO III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Primus CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

Shasta CLO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-3L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B-1L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
B-2L                BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

St. James River CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos     B+ (sf)

Symphony CLO IV Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Symphony CLO VII Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
C (def)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
D (def)             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
E (def)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)

Venture IX CDO Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Venture VII CDO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)

Venture VIII CDO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

Wasatch CLO Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A-1a                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-1b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)

Waterfront CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos     A- (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)

Westchester CLO Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos   CCC+ (sf)

Westwood CDO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                    From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
C                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)
E                   B- (sf)/Watch Pos     B- (sf)



[*] S&P Takes Actions on 217 Classes From 40 U.S. RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various actions on 217
classes from 40 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions.  S&P lowered 32 ratings (including 10 to 'D (sf)'),
raised 42 ratings, and affirmed 126 ratings.  S&P also withdrew its
ratings on 15 classes and discontinued our rating on one class.

All of the transactions in this review were issued between 2002 and
2007 and are supported by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate
subprime mortgage loans secured primarily by one- to four-family
residential properties.

Subordination, overcollateralization (where available), excess
interest, as applicable, and bond insurance provide credit
enhancement for the transactions in this review.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what S&P would rate the respective
class, it relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations into its
decisions to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance or structural
characteristics, or both, and their potential effects on certain
classes.

DOWNGRADES

The 32 downgrades primarily reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated collateral performance;
   -- Decreased credit enhancement;
   -- Reduced interest payments over time from loan modifications
      or other credit-related events; and
   -- Principal write-downs.

Imputed promises

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications or other credit-related events, S&P imputes an amount
of interest owed to that class of securities.  Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies a maximum potential rating (MPR) cap to those
affected classes of securities.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a
particular class, the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had
solely considered that class' paid interest based on the applicable
WAC.

Of the 32 downgrades, four reflect the application of S&P's imputed
promises criteria.

Of the four downgrades reflecting the application of S&P's imputed
promises criteria, classes A-1-W and A-3-W from Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS were lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from
'B (sf)'.  These classes are insurance-wrapped RMBS, and although
the insurer has made full interest payments under the insurance
policy terms, the interest payments to the bondholders have been
reduced from loan modifications or other credit related events.

UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 42 classes.  The projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes is sufficient to cover S&P's
projected losses at their rating levels.  The upgrades reflect one
or more of:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Decreased loss severities;
   -- Increased credit support; and
   -- Increased prepayments.

RATING PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

S&P placed the rating on class III-M-2 from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-26 on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's
ongoing review of the transaction's history of interest shortfalls,
and we will assess the potential impact to the interest imputed to
these classes.

AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather
than raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings
stability.  In general, the bonds that were affected reflect one or
more of:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- A low priority of principal payments;
   -- Increased loss severities
   -- A high proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
   -- Low subordination or overcollateralization, or both.

S&P affirmed 31 ratings in the 'AAA' through 'A' categories and 54
ratings in the 'BBB' through 'B' categories.  These affirmations
reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support is
sufficient to cover its projected losses in those rating
scenarios.

S&P also affirmed 41 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings.  S&P believes
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected losses to these classes.  The 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
indicate that S&P believes these classes are still vulnerable to
default, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's belief that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

WITHDRAWAL

S&P withdrew its ratings on 14 classes because the related pools
have a small number of loans remaining.  Once a pool has declined
to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of
credit instability that is incompatible with any rating level.  In
addition, S&P withdrew its rating on class A-X from Residential
Asset Securitization Trust 2002-A16 due to the application of S&P's
interest-only criteria.

DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its rating on one class from RALI Series 2003-QA1
Trust because it has been paid in full.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/1Px3Bie


[*] S&P Takes Actions on 6 RV & Marine Loan–Backed ABS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class B
certificates from Chase Manhattan RV Owner Trust 1997-A (Chase RV
1997-A) to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' and lowered its rating on the
class C notes from the SSB RV Trust 2001-1 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB+
(sf)'.  In addition, S&P has affirmed its existing ratings on the
outstanding classes from the remaining four transactions.

The rating actions reflect the transactions' collateral performance
to date, S&P's view regarding future collateral performance, each
transaction's structure, and the respective credit enhancement
levels supporting the notes.  In addition, S&P's analysis
incorporated secondary credit factors, such as credit stability,
payment priorities under various scenarios, and sector- and
issuer-specific analysis.

The upgrade on class B from the Chase RV 1997-A transaction also
reflects the fact that the reserve account is fully funded and
equal to 100% of the notes outstanding.

The downgrade on the class C notes from the SSB RV Trust 2001-1
reflects further deterioration in the pool performance; the class
will probably become undercollateralized over the next year.  S&P
believes this class is vulnerable and dependent on favorable
economic conditions to meet its financial commitments.

Our rating on CIT Marine Trust 1999-A is dependent on the long-term
rating of the bond insurer MBIA Insurance Corp. ('B/Stable').

S&P has revised its loss expectations for some transactions based
on its view of future collateral performance.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the December 2015 distribution date

                   Pool       Current    60+ day
Deal     Month     factor     CNL        delinq.
Chase Manhattan Marine Owner Trust 1997-A
         218       0.01       2.37       0.00
Chase Manhattan RV Owner Trust 1997-A
         218       0.01       2.91       0.00
CIT Marine Trust 1999-A
         202       0.22       6.75       5.73
CIT RV Trust 1998-A
         210       0.11       8.78      14.19
JPMorgan RV Marine Trust 2004-A
         132       1.82      12.56       9.86
SSB RV Trust 2001-1
         168       0.93       9.32       8.08
      
CNL--Cumulative net loss.

Table 2
CNL Expectations (%)
As of the December 2015 distribution month

             Former          Revised
             lifetime        lifetime
Deal         CNL exp.(i)     CNL exp.
Chase Manhattan Marine Owner Trust 1997-A
             2.30-2.40     Up to 2.38
Chase Manhattan RV Owner Trust 1997-A
             2.91-2.94     Up to 2.92
CIT Marine Trust 1999-A
             6.75-6.90      6.75-6.90
CIT RV Trust 1998-A
             8.80-9.00      8.80-9.00
JPMorgan RV Marine Trust 2004-A
             12.50-13.00  13.00-13.50
SSB RV Trust 2001-1
             9.55-9.75      9.55-9.75

(i) Former lifetime CNL exp. represents the expectation as of April
2013.  
CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.

Each transaction was originally structured with credit enhancement
in the form of some combination of overcollateralization,
subordination, cash reserves, and excess spread.  However,
higher-than-expected losses have reduced the amount of available
credit enhancement for each transaction.  As of the December 2015
distribution date, all forms of credit enhancement have been
depleted for CIT Marine Trust 1999-A, CIT RV Trust 1998-A, JPMorgan
RV Marine Trust 2004-A and SSB RV Trust 2001-1.  The Chase
Manhattan Marine and Chase Manhattan RV transactions have reserve
accounts that are currently at their target amounts and that fully
back the outstanding notes.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in S&P's view, to cover its revised cumulative
net loss expectations under its stress scenarios for each of the
rated classes.

RATING RAISED

                          Rating
Series     Class      To          From
Chase Manhattan RV Owner Trust 1997-A
           Certs B    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)

RATING LOWERED

                          Rating
Series     Class      To          From
SSB RV Trust 2001-1
           C          CCC (sf)    BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Series     Class          Rating

Chase Manhattan Marine Owner Trust 1997-A
           C          AAA (sf)
CIT Marine Trust 1999-A
           Certs      B (sf)
CIT RV Trust 1998-A
           B          CC (sf)
JPMorgan RV Marine Trust 2004-A
           A-2        CC (sf)



[*] S&P Takes Rating Actions on 41 U.S. RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Dec. 21, 2015, took various
rating actions on 277 ratings from 41 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by
adjustable- and/or fixed-rate prime jumbo and Alternative-A
mortgage loans.  S&P lowered its ratings on 30 classes, raised its
ratings on 32 classes, affirmed its ratings on 200 classes,
withdrew its ratings on nine classes, and discontinued its ratings
on six classes.

Subordination and bond insurance (as applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the reviewed transactions.  Where the bond
insurer is rated lower than what the rating would be for the class,
S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and
the transaction structure to derive the rating.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations in its decisions
to raise, lower, and/or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance and/or structural
characteristics and their potential effects on certain classes.

DOWNGRADES

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
its projected losses for the related transactions at higher rating
levels.  S&P's view is primarily due to:

   -- Deteriorated collateral performance;
   -- Decreased credit enhancement available to the classes;
   -- A substantial change in delinquency levels;
   -- A substantial change in constant prepayment rates;
   -- A substantial change in reperforming loans; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

Among the downgrades, three of the lowered ratings remained at
investment-grade.  An additional five ratings were lowered to
speculative-grade.  The remaining 22 lowered ratings were already
speculative-grade before the rating actions.

UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 32 classes from 12 transactions based on
factors that include improved collateral performance or delinquency
trends and/or payment allocation mechanics.  The upgrades reflect
S&P's opinion that its projected credit support for the classes
will be sufficient to cover the projected losses at the higher
rating levels.

AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and in turn to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash flow
projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather than
raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings stability.
In general, the bonds that were affected reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority of principal payments;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline; and/or
   -- Low subordination.

Of the 200 affirmed ratings, 100 are investment-grade and 100 are
speculative-grade.  The affirmations of classes rated above 'CCC
(sf)' reflect the classes' relatively senior positions in payment
priority and S&P's opinion that its projected credit support is
sufficient to cover our projected losses at those rating levels.

Regarding the 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' affirmations, S&P believes
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected base-case losses to these classes.

WITHDRAWALS AND DISCONTINUANCES

S&P withdrew its ratings on seven classes from four transactions
because the related pools have a small number of loans remaining.
Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes that
tail risk cannot be addressed because the high degree of credit
instability is incompatible with any rating level.

S&P withdrew an additional two ratings from two transactions due to
the application of its interest-only (IO) criteria, which state
that S&P maintains the rating on an IO class until the ratings on
all of the classes that the IO security references, in the
determination of its notional balance, are either lowered below
'AA-' or have been retired.

S&P discontinued its ratings on six ratings from four transactions
because these classes have been paid in full.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/1R3j8rE



[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 US Prime & Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Dec. 23, 2015, took various
rating actions on 114 ratings from 11 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by
adjustable- and/or fixed-rate prime jumbo and subprime mortgage
loans.  One of the transactions is backed by Ginnie Mae
certificates, of which the timely payment of interest and principal
are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae.  S&P lowered its ratings on 33
classes, raised its ratings on five classes, affirmed its ratings
on 61 classes, and withdrew its ratings on 13 classes.  In addition
S&P placed two ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.

Subordination provides credit enhancement for all of the reviewed
transactions.  In addition, Argent Securities Inc. series 2004-W2
has the benefit of excess interest and overcollateralization.

ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P routinely incorporates various considerations in its decisions
to raise, lower, and/or affirm ratings when reviewing the
indicative ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on specific performance and/or structural
characteristics and their potential effects on certain classes.

DOWNGRADES

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that its projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
its projected losses for the related transactions at higher rating
levels.  S&P's view is primarily due to:

   -- Deteriorated collateral performance;
   -- Decreased credit enhancement available to the classes;
   -- A substantial change in delinquency levels;
   -- A substantial change in constant prepayment rates; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

Among the downgrades, nine of the lowered ratings remained at
investment-grade.  An additional six ratings were lowered to
speculative-grade.  The remaining 18 lowered ratings were already
speculative-grade before the rating actions.

UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on five classes from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. series 2003-29 based on payment allocation
mechanics.  These classes benefit from limited principal payments
to more subordinate classes resulting in increasing credit support.
The upgrades reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support for the classes will be sufficient to cover the projected
losses at the higher rating levels.

AFFIRMATIONS

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and then to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash flow
projections.  In these circumstances, S&P affirmed, rather than
raised, its ratings on those classes to promote ratings stability.
In general, these affirmations reflect:

   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority of principal payments;
   -- Significant growth in the delinquency pipeline; and/or
   -- Low subordination, overcollateralization, or both.

Of the 61 affirmed ratings, 25 are investment-grade and 36 are
speculative-grade.  The affirmations of classes rated above
'CCC (sf)' reflects the classes' relatively senior positions in
payment priority and S&P's opinion that its projected credit
support is sufficient to cover its projected losses at those rating
levels.

The 'AA+ (sf)' affirmations of the ratings on classes A-4 and A-5
from Popular Securities-Mortgage Trust 2004-1 are based on the
Ginnie Mae certificates backing these classes.

Regarding the 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' affirmations, S&P believes
that its projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover
its projected base-case losses to these classes.

WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on 12 classes from one transaction because
the related pools have a small number of loans remaining. Once a
pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes that tail
risk cannot be addressed because the high degree of credit
instability is incompatible with any rating level.

S&P withdrew one additional rating due to the application of its
interest-only (IO) criteria, which state that S&P will maintain the
rating on an IO class until the ratings on all of the classes that
the IO security references, in the determination of its notional
balance, are either lowered below 'AA-' or have been retired.

CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE PLACEMENTS

S&P placed its 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' ratings on classes M-6 and
M-7, respectively, from Argent Securities Inc. series 2004-W2 on
CreditWatch negative.  The CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's
ongoing review of the transaction's loan modification history and
S&P's assessment of the potential impact to the interest imputed to
these classes.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 5.3% for 2015, declining to
      4.8% in 2016;

   -- Real GDP growth of 2.5% for 2015, increasing to 2.7% in
      2016;

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.8% in 2015 and 1.9% in 2016;
      and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.9% in
      2015, and rise to 4.4% in 2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 5.4% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.3% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate inches up to 4.0% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                    http://bit.ly/1ZGWHvm


[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings From US Trust Preferred CDOs
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed, then withdrew, most of
its ratings on U.S. TruPS CDO transactions.  At the same time, S&P
raised, then withdrew, 22 ratings from 10 U.S. TruPS CDO
transactions.  In all, the withdrawals affect 244 ratings from 76
U.S. TruPS CDO transactions.  Of these CDOs, 65 are backed mostly
by bank securities, four are backed mostly by insurance securities,
and seven are backed mostly by REIT securities.  The upgrades prior
to withdrawal were largely due to paydowns of the senior notes
within the transaction.  In accordance with S&P's internal
policies, it reviewed the ratings before withdrawing them.

The withdrawals reflect the additional effort required to surveil
these transactions as S&P continues to enhance our analytical
processes, in addition to S&P's view that there is limited market
interest in maintaining the ratings.  S&P's view of limited market
interest in maintaining the ratings takes into account a
significant aging of the subject deals, the low-investment-grade or
non-investment-grade ratings on many of the senior tranches, low
remaining pool factors, and a dearth of new-issue transactions both
for TruPS assets and TruPS CDOs.  The further effort required in
connection with our enhanced analytical processes includes work to
develop and validate an updated model for assessing the underlying
assets in the CDOs, a broader scope of review to periodically
update the analysis of the assets, and additional documentation
related to the update process.

The affected CDO transactions are collateralized predominantly by
TruPS securities, which are deeply subordinated hybrid instruments
issued by banks, insurance companies, and REITs.  A large majority
of the companies issuing the hybrid instruments that collateralize
TruPS CDOs are unrated, and the information that S&P typically has
access to is not of the same quality that S&P has on rated
entities, or even on unrated entities with debt held in other
transaction types.  In addition, unlike most CDO or CLO
transactions that hold unrated assets, many TruPS CDOs don't have a
collateral manager or other transaction party that can answer
questions or provide additional information where it might be
useful in S&P's analysis.

S&P did not withdraw ratings on 10 insured tranches and 34
principal-protected notes connected to its rated TruPS CDOs, as
these ratings are linked to the rating of the insurer or underlying
security, respectively.  The rating withdrawals are being
undertaken in accordance with S&P's policies and procedures.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://bit.ly/1mwzEVy


[*] S&P Withdraws Ratings on 39 Classes From 11 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Dec. 22, 2015, withdrew its
ratings on 39 classes from 11 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions.  S&P withdrew these ratings to
reflect the lack of sufficient information necessary to perform
ongoing surveillance per S&P's policies and procedures.

The actions follow S&P's attempts to obtain the necessary
information from the applicable transaction parties in order to
perform ongoing surveillance on the transactions.  However, in each
case, S&P was unsuccessful in collecting all of the necessary
information.

Of the 39 withdrawn ratings, 26 are from Structured Asset
Securities Corp. 2002-AL1, Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Assistance Loan Trust 2003-AL1, and Structured Asset Securities
Corp. Assistance Loan Trust 2003-AL2.  At issuance, a portion of
the underlying loans in these transactions were unsecured or
secured by non-real estate collateral.  S&P do not have sufficient
information on the composition of the current loan population in
these transactions to assess appropriate ratings.

For the remaining 13 ratings from eight transactions, S&P is
missing a combination, or have an insufficient amount, of the
following information necessary for it to apply its criteria:

   -- Loan-level data;
   -- 24-month pay history for underlying loans; and
   -- Cumulative net loss information.

Further, for five of the 13 ratings, S&P withdrew its ratings
because the related pools have a small number of loans remaining.
Once a pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there
is a high degree of credit instability that is incompatible with
any rating level.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/1VpqF4N


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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