TCR_Public/141012.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, October 12, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 284

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2005-4: Moody's Rating on 4 Note Classes to Ba1
ACAS CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 17 Note Classes
AGATE BAY 2014-2: DBRS Finalizes 'BB' Rating of Cl. B-4 Certs
AMERICAS AND PARK AVENUE: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Cl. F Certs
ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to Caa2

ARBOR REALTY 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class B Notes
ARCAP 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class F Certificates
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'C'
BLACKROCK SENIOR V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba1
BLCP HOTEL 2014-CLRN: S&P Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'

BLACK DIAMOND 2005-1: S&P Raises Class E Debt Rating to BB+
BURR RIDGE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $6.5MM Cl. E Notes
CAJUN GLOBAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2012-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-4: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. F Notes

CLEAR LAKE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
COBALT CMBS 2007-3: S&P Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to Dsf
COMM 2013-CCRE11: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs
COVENANT CREDIT I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
FOUR CORNERS III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $9MM Cl. D Notes

GALAXY XIII: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E Notes
GMAC 1997-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Rates $13MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
HIGH GRADE STRUCTURED 2004-1: Moody's Reviews 4 Tranches' Rating
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC11: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to C
JP MORGAN 2014-C22: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Certs
JP MORGAN 2014-OAK4: DBRS Rates Class B-4 Certs '(P)BB'
KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $18MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
LIME STREET: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes

LNR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
MADISON AVENUE I: Moody's Ups Rating on $21MM Cl. B Notes to Ba1
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. G Certs From Bsf
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating of Cl. E Certs
NATIONS EQUIPMENT: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes

REALT 2014-1: DBRS Rates Class G Certificates '(P)Bsf'
RESOURCE REAL 2006-1: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Notes
SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $18MM Cl. E Notes
SATURN CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
SATURN VENTURES 2004: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-3 Notes to Ca

SEAWALL 2006-4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A Notes
STRIPS III 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to C
SPARKS REGIONAL 2002: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
TOWER CLO V: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $24MM Class D Notes
VALHALLA CLO: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes

* Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of Subprime RMBS


                             *********

ABACUS 2005-4: Moody's Rating on 4 Note Classes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Abacus 2005-4, Ltd.:

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. E-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 31, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of six classes of notes due to
less reliance on below-investment-grade reference obligations
combined with multi-notch upgrades to several reference
obligations. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Abacus 2005-4, Ltd. is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100% of the reference obligation balance). All
of the CMBS reference obligations were securitized in 2004 (29.4%)
and 2005 (70.6%). Currently, 76% of the reference obligations are
publicly rated by Moody's. As of the August 28, 2014 Trustee
report, the aggregate notional balance of reference obligations
has decreased to $2.8 billion from $6.0 billion at issuance.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 54, compared to 85 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 76.3%
compared to 72.7% at last review; A1-A3 and 14.5% compare to 13.7%
at last review; Baa1-Baa3 and 7.2% compared to 10.3% at last
review; and Ba1-Ba3 and 2.0% compared to 3.4% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, compared to 1.8 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 34.3%, compared to 61.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 46.7%, compared to 38.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
estimates. Notching the reference obligations down by -1 notch
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of one to two notches downward (e.g. one notch downward
implies Baa3 to Ba1). Notching the reference obligations upward by
+1 notch would result in an average modeled rating movement of
zero to two notches upward (e.g. one notch upward implies Baa3 to
Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ACAS CRE 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 17 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
and Re-REMIC) transactions.

ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 is a static cash CRE CDO transaction. The
transaction is backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool balance). As of the August 25,
2014 payment date, the collateral par amount is $264.0 million,
representing a $910.1 million decrease since securitization
primarily due to realized losses to the collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9963,
compared to 9976 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follows: Caa1-Caa3 and 1.9% compared to 1.3% at
last review; and Ca/C and 98.1% compared to 98.7% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 5.0 years, compared to 6.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced
are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


AGATE BAY 2014-2: DBRS Finalizes 'BB' Rating of Cl. B-4 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-2 issued by Agate
Bay Mortgage Trust 2014-2:

-- $277.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.4 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.7 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.7 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

In addition, DBRS has assigned the following new ratings on the
Certificates issued by the Trust:
-- $336.9 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.7 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-19 at AAA (sf)

Class A-X-1, Class A-X-2, Class A-X-3, Class A-X-4, Class A-X-5,
Class A-X-6, Class A-X-7, Class AX-8, Class A-X-9, Class A-X-10,
Class A-X-11, Class A-X-12, Class A-X-13, Class A-X-14, Class AX-
15, Class A-X-16, Class A-X-17, Class A-X-18 and Class A-X-19 are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Class A-3, Class A-4, Class A-5, Class A-6, Class A-7, Class A-8,
Class A-9, Class A-10, Class A-11, Class A-12, Class A-13, Class
A-14, Class A-15, Class A-16, Class A-17, Class A-X-9, Class A-X-
10, Class A-X-11, Class A-X-12, Class A-X-13, Class A-X-14, Class
A-X-15, Class A-X-16, Class A-X-17, Class AX-18 and Class A-X-19
are exchangeable certificates.  These classes can be exchanged for
combinations of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

Class A-16 is a super senior certificate.  This class benefits
from additional protection from the senior support certificate
(Class A-17) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings in this transaction reflect the 7.40% of
credit enhancement provided by subordination. The AA (sf), A (sf),
BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 6.25%, 4.55%, 3.55% and 2.30%
of credit enhancement, respectively. Other than the specified
classes, DBRS does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 543 loans with a total principal
balance of $374,340,300 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1,
2014).  The mortgage loans were acquired by TH TRS Corp. (the
Sponsor) directly from originators pursuant to its direct loan
acquisition program.

The originators for the mortgage pool are Mortgage Master, Inc.
(14.8%), George Mason Mortgage, LLC (14.5%), American Pacific
Mortgage Corporation (10.3%), NYCB Mortgage Company, LLC (9.0%)
and various other originators, each comprising less than 9% of the
mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced by Cenlar FSB. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(rated AA (high) and R-1 (high) with Stable trends by DBRS) will
act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator and
Custodian.  Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings
Fund Society, FSB will serve as Trustee. Matrix Financial Services
Corporation will act as the Servicing Administrator.  The
transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Each originator has made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans.  The enforcement mechanism for
breaches of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a
third-party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and
resolution of disputes is generally subject to determination in an
arbitration proceeding.

DBRS views the representations and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with recent DBRS-rated prime jumbo
transactions.  However, some originators may potentially
experience financial stress that could result in their inability
to fulfill repurchase obligations and the backstop to fulfill some
of the obligations is being provided by an unrated entity (the
Sponsor).  To capture the above perceived weakness, DBRS adjusted
downward the originator scores of some of the lenders in the
portfolio.  Such adjustment (and hence increases in default and
loss rates) is to account for the originators' or the Sponsor's
potential inability to fulfill repurchase obligations.


AMERICAS AND PARK AVENUE: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from 1345
Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust's series FB
2005-1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions
and its review of the collateral securing the transaction, the
deal structure, and liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmed ratings reflect subordination and liquidity supports
that are consistent with the outstanding ratings and S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the collateral in
the trust.

The affirmed 'BB+ (sf)' rating on class F, specifically, reflects
S&P's criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which applies a credit enhancement minimum equal to 1% of the
transaction or loan amount to address the potential for unexpected
trust expenses that may be incurred during the life of the loan or
transaction. These potential unexpected trust expenses may include
servicer fees, servicer advances, workout or corrected mortgage
fees, and potential trust legal fees.

The affirmed 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates is based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities.

As of the Sept. 10, 2014, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of participation interests in two fixed-rate loans with
a pooled trust balance of $548.7 million. The pooled trust has not
incurred any principal losses to date.

S&P based its analysis of the office properties, in part, on a
review of the borrower's operating statements for the available
year-to-date ended March 31, 2014, and years ended Dec. 31, 2013,
2012, 2011, 2010, and 2009, as well as the May 31, 2014, rent
rolls. Details on the two loans are as follows:

The 1345 Avenue of the Americas loan, the larger of the two loans
in the pool, has a whole-loan balance of $649.2 million that
consists of senior A, subordinate B and subordinate C notes. The
$432.7 million senior A note is further divided into five pari
passu notes, of which the 1-A1 note ($6.4 million) is in Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-TOP20
(BSCMS 2005-TOP20), a U.S. CMBS transaction; the 1-A2 note ($6.4
million) is in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5 (LB-UBS
2005-C5), also a U.S. CMBS transaction; and the 1-A3 and 1-A4
notes ($338.4 million in aggregate) are in this transaction. The
$116.5 million B note, which is subordinate to the A note, is
split into three pari passu pieces, of which the 1-B1 and 1-B2
notes totaling $98.0 million are in this transaction. The $100.0
million C note, which is subordinate to the A and B notes, is
divided into four pari passu notes.

The 1345 Avenue of the Americas whole loan pays interest at 5.36%
per year, matures on Aug. 8, 2025, amortizes on a constant monthly
interest and principal payment and is IO for the first two and the
last three years of the loan term. The amortization amount is
currently used to pay down the 1-A1 and 1-A2 notes. In addition,
the equity interests in the mortgage borrower secure mezzanine
debt totaling $151.3 million. The whole loan is secured by a
1,896,140-sq.-ft. office property in midtown Manhattan. The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.87x on the whole loan for the year ended Dec. 31, 2013,
and occupancy was 99.7% according to the May 31, 2014, rent roll.
S&P's expected case valuation, using a 6.25% capitalization rate,
yielded a 51.0% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the whole loan.

The Park Avenue Plaza loan, the smaller of the two loans in the
pool, has a whole-loan balance of $218.0 million that consists of
senior A and subordinate B notes. The $215.8 million senior A note
is split into five pari passu notes, of which the 1-A1 note ($2.9
million) is in BSCMS 2005-TOP20; the 1-A2 note is in LB-UBS 2005-
C5 ($2.9 million); and the 1-A3 and 1-A4 notes ($111.0 million
in aggregate) are in this transaction. The $2.2 million B note,
which is subordinate to the A note, is divided into three pari
passu pieces, of which the 1-B1 and 1-B2 notes totaling $1.3
million are in this transaction.

The Park Avenue Plaza whole loan pays interest at 5.39% per year,
matures on Aug. 8, 2025, amortizes on a constant monthly interest
and principal payment and is IO for the first 30 months and the
last three years of the loan term.  The amortization amount is
currently used to pay down the 1-A1 and 1-A2 notes.  In addition,
the equity interests in the mortgage borrower secure mezzanine
debt totaling $225.0 million. The whole loan is secured by a
1,137,452-sq.-ft. office property in midtown Manhattan. Wells
Fargo reported a 2.01x DSC on the whole loan for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2013, and occupancy was 99.9% according to the May 31,
2014, rent roll. Our expected case valuation, using a 6.25%
capitalization rate, yielded a 33.0% LTV ratio on the whole loan.

RATINGS LIST

1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series FB 2005-1

                                 Rating           Rating
Class         Identifier         To               From
A-2           68275CAB4          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-3           68275CAC2          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
X             68275CAJ7          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
B             68275CAD0          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
C             68275CAE8          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
D             68275CAF5          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
E             68275CAG3          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
F             68275CAH1          BB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. Commercial Mortgage-
Related Securities, Series 2005-HY2:

  Cl. A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Affirmed
  Baa2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. Commercial
Mortgage-Related Securities, Series 2005-HY2.

  Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014
  Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. Commercial
Mortgage-Related Securities, Series 2005-HY2.

  Cl. C-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014
  Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. C-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014
  Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. D-FL, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Affirmed
  Ca (sf)

  Cl. D-FX, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Affirmed
  Ca (sf)

  Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Affirmed
  C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class of notes due to
higher than expected principal pre-payment of some high credit
risk collateral. Moody's has also downgraded the rating of one
class of notes due to future expected increases in implied losses.
Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the transaction because
key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing
ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. is a static cash CRE CDO transaction. The
transaction is backed by a portfolio of: 1) commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (87.6% of collateral pool balance); and
2) real estate investment trust (REIT) debt (12.4%). As of the
August 26, 2014 payment date, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $379.3
million from $478.1 million at issuance, as a result of the
principal paydown directed to the senior most outstanding class of
notes. The paydown was the result of the combination of regular
amortization and recoveries from high credit risk collateral.

Currently, the transaction is under-collateralization by $258.3
million primarily due to implied losses on the collateral as the
result of realized losses from CMBS collateral. As of the August
26, 2014 trustee report, there are thirteen CMBS assets with $63.3
million of par balance (52.3% of the pool balance) classified as
defaulted assets. Moody's does expect significant losses to occur
from these defaulted collaterals once they are realized, further
increasing the level of under-collateralization in the
transaction.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6995,
compared to 6440 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follows: A1-A3 and 4.1% compared to 2.0% at last
review; Baa1-Baa3 and 8.3% compared to 12.5% at last review; Ba1-
Ba3 and 7.9% compared to 10.9% at last review; B1-B3 and 10.2%
compared to 10.6% at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 69.5% compared
to 64.0% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.8 years, compared to 2.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.6%, compared to 9.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other key parameters static, reducing the recovery to
0.0% would result in modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to five notches downward (e.g., one notch implies a rating
movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate by 5% would
result in modeled rating movement on the rated notes of one to
three notches upward (e.g. one notch up implies a rating movement
from Ba1 to Baa3).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ARBOR REALTY 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed eight classes of Arbor
Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2006-1, Ltd./LLC (ARMSS 2006-1)
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 34.5%.  Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate (CRE) market value and cash flow declines.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are due to significant paydown of the collateral and
better than expected recoveries of liquidated assets.  ARMSS
2006-1 is a CRE collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managed by
Arbor Realty Collateral Management, LLC (Arbor).  As of the Aug.
2014 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was
substantially invested as follows: whole loans/A-notes (78.9%), B-
notes (3.1%), mezzanine debt (5.6%), preferred equity (9.1%), and
cash (3.3%).  Approximately 62% of the pool is either defaulted or
a Fitch loan of concern (FLOC).  Fitch expects significant losses
on many of the assets as they are highly leveraged subordinate
positions.

The CDO exited its reinvestment period in Dec. 2011.  Total
paydown to class A-1A and A-1AR from loan payoffs, scheduled
amortization, and asset sales since last review was approximately
$204 million.  No realized losses were reported over the same
period.  As of the Aug. 2014 trustee report, all par value and
interest coverage tests were in compliance.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 93.1% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 7.6% from, generally, trailing 12-months first-quarter
or second-quarter 2014.  Recoveries are above average at 62.9% due
to the significant percentage of senior debt.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
defaulted whole loan (8.4%) secured by 22.8 acres of waterfront
land located in Jacksonville, Florida.  Development plans for the
property have stalled.  Fitch modeled a significant loss on this
asset in its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to an A-note (14.6%) secured by a portfolio of five
full- and limited-service hotels located in Daytona Beach, FL.
The portfolio was previously in bankruptcy, and an Arbor affiliate
took title to the properties in Feb. 2011.  While new management
has been installed at the properties, it is expected to take time
for performance at all five properties to stabilize.  A sixth
poorly performing hotel was sold in Dec. 2012 with proceeds
applied to the senior debt.  Fitch modeled a term default and a
substantial loss on the loan in its base case scenario.

The transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The
default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
defaults timing and interest rate stress scenarios as described in
the report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
The breakeven rates for classes A-1 through B generally pass at or
above the ratings listed.  Further upgrades were not warranted at
this time given the transaction's increasing concentration, and
high percentage of defaults and FLOC.

The Positive and Stable Outlooks on classes A-1 through B
generally reflect the classes' seniority in the capital stack and
expectation of increasing credit enhancement from further paydowns
over the near term.  The ratings for classes C through H are based
on a deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and FLOC, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each classes' credit enhancement.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An additional stress scenario against the current cash flows of
the underlying collateral was considered in Fitch's ratings.

If the collateral continues to repay at or near par, the senior
classes may be upgraded.  The junior classes are subject to
further downgrade should realized losses begin to increase.

Fitch upgrades these classes as indicated:

   -- $14.1 million class A-1A to 'Asf from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $6.1 million class A-1AR to 'Asf from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable;

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Outlooks as indicated:

   -- $72.9 million class A-2 at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $41.1 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $31.2 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $13.35 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $14.25 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
   -- $13.65 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.
   -- $16.95 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $14.1 million class H at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.


ARCAP 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class F Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation Certificates, Series 2004-1 ("Arcap 2004-1").:

  Cl. A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  Baa1 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on five
classes of notes issued by ARCap 2004-1:

  Cl. B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  B1 (sf)

  Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  Ca (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2014 Affirmed
  C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class due to greater than
expected recoveries on defaulted assets combined with improvements
in the credit quality of the remaining collateral pool as
evidenced by WARF and WARR. Moody's has affirmed the ratings on
the remaining rated notes due to key transactions metrics being
commensurate with existing ratings. The affirmation is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate (CRE
CDO and Re-remic) transactions.

ARCap 2004-1 is a cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of the
portfolio balance). As of the trustee's September 18, 2014 report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, is $302.7 million, compared to $306.8 million at last
review with paydowns directed to the senior most outstanding class
of notes.

The pool contains 14 assets totaling $54.3 million (35.1% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted assets as of
the trustee's September 18, 2014 report. Moody's does expect
moderate/significant losses to occur on the defaulted assets.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,558,
compared to 6,089 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (3.9%, compared to 0.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (0%, compared to 3.5% at last review); Ba1-Ba3
(19.1%, compared to 14.3% at last review); B1-B3 (22.1%, compared
to 21.4% at last review); Caa1-Ca/C (54.8%, compared to 60.6% at
last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years, compared to 3.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 6.9%, compared to 3.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 29.3%, compared to 24.5% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes are subject to uncertainty, because
it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio,
which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are
subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master and
special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other key parameters static, reducing the recovery by
5% would result in modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero notches downward (e.g., one notch implies a rating movement
of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate by 5% would result
in modeled rating movement on the rated notes of one notches
upward (e.g. one notch up implies a rating movement from Ba1 to
Baa3).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Certs to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of nine classes
and downgraded the rating of one class in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-1 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2013
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the five investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the three below investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

The rating on Class C was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
are higher than Moody's had previously expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.5% of the
current balance compared to 17.6% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 13.3% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25 compared to 24 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the September 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 49% to $1.6 billion
from $3.15 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 52%
of the pool. One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, has
defeased is secured by US Government securities.

Thirty-five loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $285.6 million (41% loss severity on
average). There are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 26 poorly-
performing loans representing 24% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $112.1 million loss (30% expected loss based on a 69%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full-year 2013 operating results for 79% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 98% compared to 99%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.00X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Inland -- Bradley Portfolio A & B
Loan ($157 million -- 10% of the pool), which consists of two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans. The loans were
originally secured by 26 office, industrial, and retail properties
located across 13 states. One property with an original allocated
balance of $25.6 million has since been released from the
portfolio. The largest tenants include Pearson Education (1.1
million SF; October 2016 lease expiration), Dopaco Inc. (299,000
SF; December 2015 lease expiration) and Lamos Metal (224,000 SF;
January 2022 lease expiration). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
87% and 1.07X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Skyline Portfolio Loan ($140
million A-note -- 9% of the pool and a $131 million B-note -- 8%
of the pool), which represents a 40% pari passu interest in a
$678.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by eight
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties
totaling 2.6 million square feet (SF) which are located outside of
Washington, DC in Falls Church, Virginia. At securitization, over
55% of the net rentable area (NRA) was leased by the General
Services Administration (GSA). As a result of the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, the Department of
Defense (GSA tenant) and its subcontractors have vacated
approximately 800,000 SF of space since 2011. The portfolio is 61%
leased after including a recently signed 188,000 SF lease to Fish
& Wildlife Service (GSA tenant). A modification closed effective
October 30, 2013. The modification bifurcated the original $678.0
million first mortgage into a $350.0 million A-Note and a $328.0
million B-Note. The loan maturity was extended by five years to
February 1, 2022 with a one-year extension option. The A- Note
interest rate was unchanged, while the B-Note interest rate was
reduced to 0%. In exchange for the modification, the borrower
remitted over $35 million from operating cash flow to repay over
$32 million of outstanding interest payments, fund a $2 million
Working Capital Reserve and repay almost $1 million of interest on
advances. The borrower also funded $5.75 million to cover
modification costs, expenses and a $4.5 million modification fee.
Post-modification, the loan returned to the master servicer in
February 2014. Average weighted occupancy for the portfolio was
approximately 57% as of year-end 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR for the A-Note are 100% and 1.03X, respectively.

The third largest loan is The Shops at Tanforan Loan ($140 million
-- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property located
in San Bruno, California, between South San Francisco and
Millbrae. The property, originally constructed in 1969, was gut
renovated in 2004 and 2005. Of the four anchor tenants Century
Theatres, JC Penney, Target, and Sears, only Century Theatres is
part of the loan collateral. As of June 2014, the property was 98%
leased compared to 99% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 114% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.77X
at the last review.


BLACKROCK SENIOR V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by BlackRock Senior Income Series V,
Limited:

  $17,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $30,000,000 Class C Defferable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 3, 2013 Upgraded to
  A2 (sf)

  $28,000,000 Class D Defferable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 3, 2013 Upgraded to
  Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $75,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Multi-Currency Revolving Notes Due
  2019 (current outstanding balance of GBP1,968,931 and
  $34,609,726) Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2013
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $180,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Notes Due 2019 (current
  outstanding balance of $89,897,972), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on July 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2019, Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on July 3, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $110,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2019 (current
  outstanding balance of $60,443,939), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on July 3, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

BlackRock Senior Income Series V, Limited, issued in July 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in August 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2014. Since then, the
Class A notes have been paid down by approximately 39.6% or $123.5
million. Based on the trustee's August 29, 2014 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported
at 137.8%, 121.6%, and 109.6%, respectively, versus February 2014
levels of 123.9 %, 114.1%, and 106.3%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's August 29, 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 8.2% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2092)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3138)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $310.3 million, defaulted
par of $1 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.7%
(implying a WARF of 2615), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.4%, a diversity score of 54 and a weighted average
spread of 3.1%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


BLCP HOTEL 2014-CLRN: S&P Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to BLCP
Hotel Trust 2014-CLRN's $570 million commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2014-CLRN.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate
commercial mortgage loan totaling $570.0 million, with three one-
year extension options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 47 extended-stay hotels.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historic and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

BLCP Hotel Trust 2014-CLRN

Class      Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A          AAA (sf)              189,300,000
X-CP       B- (sf)           484,500,000(ii)
X-EXT      B- (sf)           570,000,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)               69,000,000
C          A- (sf)                51,300,000
D          BBB- (sf)              73,900,000
E          BB- (sf)              113,000,000
F          B- (sf)                73,500,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities
     Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP and
     X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated
     to the class A, B, C, D, E, and F certificates.


BLACK DIAMOND 2005-1: S&P Raises Class E Debt Rating to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D-1, D-2, and E notes from Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Black
Diamond Capital Management LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch,
where they were placed with positive implications on Aug. 29,
2014. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the
class A-1, A-1B, and B notes from the same transaction.

S&P raised its ratings on the C, D-1, D-2, and E notes after
paydowns to the senior notes improved the credit support at the
prior rating levels.

Since its December 2013 rating actions, the transaction has fully
paid down the class A-1A notes and commenced paying down the class
A-1 and A-1B notes.

After the most recent paydowns on Sept. 22, 2014, the class A-1
and A-1B note balances are at 16.60% and 83.00% of their
respective original issuanceamounts. The paydowns also improved
the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios in the transaction. The
trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the September 2014
monthly report:

  The class B ratio is 201.86%, up from 179.60% in the November
  2013 monthly report, which S&P used for its December 2013 rating
  actions;

  The class C ratio is 151.04%, up from 142.89% in November 2013;

  The class D-2 ratio is 121.71%, up from 119.52% in November
  2013; and

  The class E ratio is 110.51%, up from 110.10% in November 2013.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1, A-1B and B
notes to reflect the adequate credit support available at the
current rating levels.

The ratings on the class D-1, D-2, and E notes were driven by
S&P's largest-obligor default test, which intends to address the
potential concentration of exposure to obligors in the
transaction's portfolio.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as we deem necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating     cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   20.62%      AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   20.62%      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)   20.62%      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)   19.10%      AAA (sf)
D-1    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA (sf)    1.00%       A+ (sf)
D-2    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA (sf)    1.00%       A+ (sf)
E      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)  2.61%       BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to its base-case analysis, S&P generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate. S&P also generated other
scenarios by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations
to assess the current portfolio's sensitivity to different
correlation assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios
outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied    Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating     rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
D-1    AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
D-2    AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)     AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
D-1    AA (sf)      AA (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D-2    AA (sf)      AA (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
E      BBB- (sf)    BBB (sf)      CCC (sf)      BB+ (sf)


BURR RIDGE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $6.5MM Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Burr Ridge CLO Plus Ltd.:

$33,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2023, Upgraded to A1 (sf), previously on October 25, 2012
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$7,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2023, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf), previously on October 25, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$70,000,000 Class A-1D Senior Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes
Due 2023 (current outstanding balance of $49,200,595), Affirmed
Aaa (sf), previously on February 27, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$20,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Floating Rate Variable Funding
Notes Due 2023 (current outstanding balance of $14,057,313),
Affirmed Aaa (sf), previously on February 27, 2007 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

$120,000,000 Class A-1T Senior Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2023
(current outstanding balance of $84,343,876), Affirmed Aaa (sf),
previously on February 27, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$18,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due 2023,
Affirmed Aaa (sf), previously on October 25, 2012 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

$6,500,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2023, Affirmed Ba1 (sf), previously on October 25, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Burr Ridge CLO Plus Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in March 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2013. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 18.9% or $34.4 million
since October 2013. Based on the trustee's September 2014 report,
the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
notes are reported at 138.09%, 116.01%, 111.94% and 108.64%,
respectively, versus October 2013 levels of 133.04%, 114.2%,
110.64% and 107.73%, respectively. The September 2014 trustee-
reported OCs do not take into consideration the $7.75 million of
principal proceeds which were used to amortize the Class A-1 notes
on the 15 September 2014 payment date.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1956)

Class A-1D: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1T: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2934)

Class A-1D: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1T: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $230.8 million, defaulted
par of $73,507, a weighted average default probability of 15.58%
(implying a WARF of 2445), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.51%, a diversity score of 68 and a weighted average
spread of 3.04%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction.


CAJUN GLOBAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes of notes issued in the Cajun Global, LLC, whole-business
securitization. The transaction is backed by most existing and
future revenue-generating assets of Church's Holdings Corporation,
owner and operator of quick service restaurants under the brand
names of Church's Chicken and Texas Chicken, which operate in the
U.S. and internationally. Specific collateral assets include
intellectual property assets, franchise and development
agreements, company-owned restaurants, real estate assets and
rental income.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Cajun Global LLC, Series 2011-1

Cl. A-1 Senior Secured Revolving Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on May 14, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2 Senior Secured Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
on May 14, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are prompted by weaker than Moody's expected
revenue and net cash flows to the transaction. The debt service
coverage ratio (i.e., the ratio of the annual net cash flow to the
required interest and principal payments for the year) has
remained flat, although according to the projections provided by
the management at closing, Moody's expected it to rise. The number
of domestic franchised restaurants has declined from 982 at
closing to 939 as of the latest reporting date. Although the
decline has been partially offset by the growth in the number of
international restaurants, the domestic franchised restaurants are
a major driver of the deal's performance, since they contribute
approximately 45% to the transaction's revenue. In addition,
profit margin of the company-owned restaurants has been
significantly lower than the original projections. Finally,
although according to the original projections, the transaction's
leverage ratio (the ratio of total outstanding debt plus amounts
available under the Class A-1 notes to annualized net cash flow)
was supposed to decline over time due to the gradual amortization
of the debt with scheduled principal payments and growth in
revenue, the ratio has remained relatively flat.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Operating Company Securitizations' published in
February 2002.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Improvement in retained collections and net cash flow could prompt
an upgrade. Further reduction in retained collections and net cash
flow, leading to increase in leverage and decline in debt service
could lead to further downgrades.


CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2012-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2012-1 issued by Canadian Commercial
Mortgage Origination Trust 2012-1, as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

The trends on all classes are Stable.

The pool consists of 25 loans secured by 26 properties.  As of the
September 2014 remittance, the pool has experienced collateral
reduction of 3.92% since issuance as a result of amortization.
According to YE2013 reporting, the top 15 loans have experienced a
net cash flow growth of 3.21% over the DBRS underwritten (UW)
figures.  The weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
for the top 15 loans was 1.66 times (x) for the same time period.

The pool is concentrated by loan size, as the largest two loans
represent 26.8% of the current pool balance and the top 15 loans
represent 85.1% of the current pool balance.  As of the September
2014 remittance, there are five loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 22.9% of the current pool balance. Of these, only two
have been flagged for performance decline.  While there is one
loan on the servicer's watchlist that is not backed by a recourse
guaranty, the vast majority of the pool has full or partial
recourse, and eight loans, representing 35.2% of the current pool
balance, are sponsored by DBRS-rated entities.  The pool also
benefits from a relatively tight amortization schedule.  Over half
of the current pool balance amortizes on a schedule of 25 years or
less.

The largest loan on the servicer's watchlist reporting a
performance decline is Dundee Grande Allee Office (Prospectus
ID#10, 4.59% of the current pool balance).  The loan is secured by
a multi-tenant Class B office building in Qu'bec City, Qu'bec.
The servicer has placed the loan on the watchlist as a result of a
low DSCR, which was reported to be 1.02x at YE2013.  The DBRS UW
DSCR was 1.10x and the Issuer's UW DSCR was 1.28x.  Leases
representing 28.2% of the net rentable area (NRA) have expired
since issuance with several tenants opting not to renew, elevating
the subject's vacancy to 35.0%, per the Dream Office Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) website.  At issuance, the property was
18.0% vacant.  Leases representing an additional 24.9% of the NRA
are scheduled to expire in 2015.  The subject is well located
along a primary corridor and benefits from strong sponsorship as
the loan is full recourse to Dream Office REIT, formerly known as
Dundee REIT.  Dream Office REIT is currently rated BBB (low) by
DBRS.  DBRS will continue to monitor the loan for any further cash
flow deterioration.

DBRS is also monitoring Kensington Crossing (Prospectus ID#12,
4.15% of the current pool balance), which is on the servicer's
watchlist for fire damage to the property sustained in late 2012.
The non-recourse loan is secured by an anchored retail property in
Edmonton, Alberta.  The incident, which occurred on December 25,
2012, affected approximately 50.7% of the NRA and displaced eight
tenants, including the second- and third-largest tenants,
Dollarama (13.4% of NRA) and Bonanza Western Grill (11.9% of NRA).
According to a news release on September 22, 2014, by the
borrower, the exterior reconstruction process is nearing
completion and interior finishes are scheduled to follow.  The
entire reconstruction process on the spaces affected by the fire
is scheduled for completion in November 2014.  The property is
currently receiving full business interruption proceeds and the
YE2013 DSCR was reported to be 1.35x, which is flat from the DBRS
UW figure.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-4: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-4, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$350,375,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$58,210,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$29,245,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$34,535,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

$32,865,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

$5,570,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Carlyle 2014-4 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as
of the closing date.

Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $557,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2825 to 3249)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2825 to 3673)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


CLEAR LAKE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, and B notes from Clear Lake CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Babson
Capital Management LLC.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class C and D notes.  At the same time, S&P removed its
ratings on all of the classes from CreditWatch, where it had
placed them with positive implications on Aug. 29, 2014.

The upgrades reflect post-reinvestment period principal
amortization paydowns to the class A-1 notes.  Since May 2012,
when S&P upgraded all of the classes, the class A-1 notes were
paid down by a total of $124.39 million to 63.36% of their
original balance, increasing credit support for the subordinate
notes.

As of the Sept. 2014 trustee report, $4.00 million (1.13%) of the
assets were from obligors in the 'CCC' rating category, down from
$11.95 million (2.71%) in April 2012.  Also, defaulted assets
decreased to $0.00 as of Sept. 2014 from $3.56 million (0.80%) as
of April 2012.

The affirmations on classes C and D reflect the adequate credit
support available at their current ratings.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, as well as on recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.
The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with the
rating actions.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether they remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take further rating actions as
it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Clear Lake CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    12.41%      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    1.87%       AAA (sf)
B      A- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)    2.90%       AA- (sf)
C      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)   0.67%       BBB (sf)
D      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)     6.01%       B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
    default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
    implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.  S&P also generated
other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry
correlations to assess the current portfolio's sensitivity to
different correlation assumptions assuming the correlation
scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)    BBB (sf)
D      B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)     BB- (sf)      BBB (sf)
D      B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       CCC- (sf)     B+ (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Clear Lake CLO Ltd.

              Rating      Rating
Class         To          From
A-1           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA- (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D             B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


COBALT CMBS 2007-3: S&P Cuts Rating on Class G Certs to Dsf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In
addition, S&P lowered its ratings on two classes and affirmed its
ratings on five other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets
in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

"We raised our ratings on classes A-4, A-1A, and A-M to reflect
our expectation of the available credit enhancement for these
classes, which we believe is greater than our most recent estimate
of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.
The upgrades also follow our views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral and available
liquidity support. The upgrades also reflect the reduction of the
trust balance," said S&P.

The downgrades on classes F and G reflect a reduction in the
liquidity support available to these classes due to ongoing
interest shortfalls, as well as credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of the six
assets ($70.8 million, 4.8%) with the special servicer.
Specifically, S&P's downgrade on the class G certificates to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' reflects our expectation that the class'
accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.

As of the Sept. 17, 2014, trustee remittance report, the deal
experienced $1.07 million in net interest recoveries, owed
primarily to one-time interest and special servicing fee
recoveries of $1.32 million attributable to liquidated assets.
Excluding these one-time recoveries, the gross monthly
interest shortfalls totaled $249,716 this month, reflecting:

-- $106,703 of interest not paid on subordinate B hope notes;

-- $95,294 in appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
    amounts;

-- $18,938 in special servicing and workout fees; and

-- $28,781 in interest on advances.

The affirmations reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the current
ratings. The affirmations also reflect S&P's views regarding the
current and future performance of the transaction's collateral,
the transaction structure, and liquidity support available to the
classes.

As of the Sept. 17, 2014, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool balance was $1.47 billion, which is 73.0% of the
pool balance at issuance. The pool currently includes 88 loans and
four real estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 124 loans at
issuance. Six of these assets are with the special servicer,
one ($5.0 million, 0.3% of the pool) is defeased and 28 ($551.9
million, 37.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist. The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial information
for 97.2% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of which 79.3%
reflected year-end 2013 data, and 18.1% reflected partial-year
2014 data. We calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) of 1.12x and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
98.1% using a Standard & Poor's weighted average capitalization
rate of 7.86%.

The DSC and LTV calculations exclude the six specially serviced
assets, one defeased loan, and two subordinate B hope notes ($20.9
million, 1.4%). The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding
pool trust balance of $644.4 million (43.7%). Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted
average DSC and LTV of 0.97x and 100.9%, respectively, for the top
10 loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling $77.97
million, or 3.9% of its original certificate balance. S&P expects
losses to reach approximately 4.9% of the original pool trust
balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date and
additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution or
liquidation of the six specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Sept. 17, 2014, trustee remittance report, six assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC (CWCapital).  Details of the two largest specially
serviced assets, which each reflect greater than 1.0% of the total
pool trust balance, are as follows:

The Semoran North Apartments REO asset ($21.5 million, 1.5%) is a
348-unit apartment complex in Winter Park, Fla. The asset has a
reported total exposure of $24.0 million. The loan was transferred
to CWCapital on October 13, 2010, due to payment default and the
property became REO on Nov. 30, 2011. A $2.0 million appraisal
reduction amount (ARA) is in effect against this asset and S&P
expects a minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

The 1111 & 1177 Summer Street REO asset ($16.6 million, 1.1%) is a
124,078-sq.-ft., two-building office complex in Stamford, Conn.
The asset has a reported total exposure of $18.0 million. The loan
was transferred to CWCapital on April 10, 2013, due to monetary
default, and the property became REO on June 18, 2014. The
reported occupancy as of July 2014 was 72.0% and according to
CWCapital, the largest tenant, Patriot National Bank (15,629 sq.
ft., or 12.6% of the net rentable area), has given notice that
they will not be renewing after their lease expires in 2015. A
$3.4 million ARA is in effect against this asset and S&P expects a
minimal loss upon its eventual resolution.

The four remaining assets with the special servicer have
individual balances that represent less than 0.8% of the total
pool trust balance. S&P estimated losses for all six specially
serviced assets, arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of
29.3%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a
significant loss is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3

                       Rating       Rating
Class    Identifier    To           From
A-4      19075DAE1     AA+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
A-1A     19075DAF8     AA+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
A-M      19075DAH4     BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)
A-J      19075DAJ0     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
B        19075DAK7     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
C        19075DAL5     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
D        19075DAM3     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
E        19075DAN1     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
F        19075DAP6     CCC- (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
G        19075DAT8     D (sf)       CCC- (sf)


COMM 2013-CCRE11: DBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed the following classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE11 issued by
COMM-2013 CCRE11 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the pool since issuance.  The pool consists of 46 loans secured by
82 commercial properties.  Since issuance, the transaction has
experienced collateral reduction of 0.40% as a result of scheduled
loan amortization.  According to YE2013 reporting, the pool has a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
Exit Debt Yield of 1.62 times (x) and 9.64%, respectively.

The One & Only Palmilla (Prospectus ID#3, 7.1% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a first priority in the security trust,
which was established to hold the real and personal property for
the One & Only Palmilla Resort, a luxury hotel with 173 rooms
located in Mexico's Baja California peninsula.  On September 14,
2014, Hurricane Odile made landfall on the Baja peninsula, causing
widespread damage to the area and to the subject property.
According to the property's website, there were no guests present
at the time of the storm as they had all been evacuated.  The
hotel will be closed for the foreseeable future, and the hotel
operator is expected to make an upcoming announcement regarding
whether or not the property will re-open for the December holiday
season.  DBRS has confirmed that the current insurance policy
provides full coverage for windstorm damage and 18 months of
business interruption proceeds, with the loss amount capped at the
policy limit of $150 million.  According to the servicer, the
initial estimate for the cost of repairs is approximately $100
million and the timeline for total completion is four to six
months.  The deductible is to be calculated at 2.0% of total
property damage.  Although the cost of repairs seems high, given
the trust loan's outstanding balance of $90 million, the sponsors
are well capitalized and the property has had strong historical
performance, outperforming its competitive set with an occupancy
rate of 75.2%, an average daily rate of $684 and a revenue per
available room of $788 for the trailing 12-month period ending
June 30, 2014.  DBRS will continue to monitor the property-level
repairs and loan performance.

As of September 2014 remittance, there were seven loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 6.35% of the current pool
balance.

The largest of the seven loans, Parkview Tower (Prospectus ID#12,
2.37% of the current pool balance) is secured by the fee simple
interest in a ten-story Class B office building located in King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania.  The loan was placed on the watchlist in
July 2014 for a low DSCR of 0.85x as of the YE2013 reporting.  The
low coverage is a result of a eight tenants with new leases signed
in 2013, which were offered concessions in the form of rent
abatement periods.  As of YE2013, rental concessions totaled
approximately $490,000 in lost income.  At issuance, the loan was
structured with a Rental Concession Reserve that had an upfront
balance of $336,655.  As of September 2014, the remaining balance
in this reserve totaled approximately $6,000.  The majority of
these rent abatement periods have burned off, and DBRS expects the
cash flow to stabilize in the subsequent reporting periods.

At issuance, DBRS assigned investment-grade shadow ratings to
three loans.  DBRS has confirmed that the performance of these
three loans, representing 16.2% of the pool balance, remains
consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics and has
confirmed the shadow ratings.


COVENANT CREDIT I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Covenant Credit Partners CLO I Ltd./Covenant Credit Partners CLO I
LLC's $466.00 million floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of July 29, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached. The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that it assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that S&P used in its analysis and the results of its
review based on the information presented to it.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period." Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," said S&P.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to it by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receives a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it performs quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
its supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In its published effective date report, S&P discusses its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after it issues an effective date rating
affirmation, S&P will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Covenant Credit Partners CLO I Ltd./
Covenant Credit Partners CLO I LLC

Class                 Rating                  Amount (mil. $)
X                     AAA (sf)                          3.50
A                     AAA (sf)                        305.00
B                     AA (sf)                          65.00
C (deferrable)        A (sf)                           40.00
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)                         26.00
E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)                         26.50


FOUR CORNERS III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $9MM Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Four Corners CLO III, Ltd.:

  $18,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
  Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2013 Upgraded to
  Aa3 (sf);

  $9,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2013 Upgraded to
  Baa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $230,400,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
  outstanding balance of $68,946,500), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on July 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

  $9,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on July 2, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  $9,600,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
  Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2013 Affirmed
  Ba3 (sf).

Four Corners CLO III, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since last transaction review in
April 2014. The Class A notes have been paid down by approximately
14.8% or $12.0 million since then. Based on the trustee's August
2014 report, the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E notes are reported at 156.4%, 127.0%, 116.1% and 106.4%,
respectively, versus levels of 148.9%, 124.0%, 114.5% and 105.8%,
respectively.

The deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit quality
of the portfolio since April 2014. Based on Moody's calculation,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2460
compared to 2536 in April 2014.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's August 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 8.5% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class E notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class E notes
owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable
exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1968)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2952)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $122.0 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 15.7% (implying a
WARF of 2460), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.1%, a diversity score of 35 and a weighted average spread of
2.9%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GALAXY XIII: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C and D notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, and E
notes from Galaxy VIII CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by PineBridge Investments LLC. At
the same time, S&P removed the class C, D, and E notes ratings
from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on Aug. 29, 2014.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the trustee report dated Aug. 25,
2014.

The transaction ended its reinvestment period in April 2013. The
upgrades reflect the increased credit support following paydowns
of senior notes since S&P's rating action in November 2013. On the
July 25, 2014 payment date, class A-1L was paid down by $33.83
million, which reduced the outstanding balance to 19.94% of its
original balance.

The lower balance of the senior note improved the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support all of the notes.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the August 2014
monthly report:

The senior (class B) O/C ratio was 167.18%, up from 127.36% in
October 2013, which S&P used for its November 2013 rating
actions.

The class C O/C ratio was 136.37%, up from 116.72% in October
2013.

The class D O/C ratio was 119.50%, up from 109.69% in October
2013.

In addition, the transaction continues to have a low level of
defaults:

According to the August 2014 monthly trustee report, the
transaction has $0.11 million in defaulted obligations. This has
decreased from $1.76 million in defaulted obligations noted in the
October 2013 trustee report.

S&P's rating on the class C, D, and E notes are limited by its
largest obligor default test, which intends to address the
potential concentration of exposure to obligors in the
transaction's portfolio. Based on its review, the top 10
obligors constitute about 37% of the total performing portfolio.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Galaxy VIII CLO Ltd.
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating       cushion(i)  rating

A      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)     38.08%      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)     33.60%      AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)     6.81%       AA+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)      0.29%       BBB+ (sf)
E      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)    1.55%       B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to its base-case analysis, S&P generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted-average recovery rate.

It also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions, assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below:

Correlation
scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)

Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating

A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
E      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)

RATING LIST

Galaxy VIII CLO Ltd.

       Rating         Rating
Class  To             From
A      AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D      BBB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E      B+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos


GMAC 1997-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class X Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. 1997-C1 as follows:

  Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Affirmed
  Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating of the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of
its referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a
lower weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review utilized the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64
which is used for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate used by Moody's to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual
loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at
the credit assessment level, is incorporated for loans with
similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of nine compared to ten at prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the
results from the Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $62.8
million from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 61% of
the pool. Two loans, representing 33% of the pool have defeased
and are secured by US Government securities.

Four loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $65 million (61% loss severity on
average). Two loans, representing 12% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $1.5
million loss for the specially serviced loans (37% expected loss
on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2013 financials for 67% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 54%, the same as at
Moody's prior review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 10.5% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.15X and 2.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.18X and 2.43X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Central Valley Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($10.3 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center in Modesto, California. The property was 88% leased as of
March 2014 compared to 91% at last review. The loan has been on
the watchlist since October 2009 for low DSCR and the borrower has
threatened to walk away several times. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in September 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 69% and 1.57X, respectively, the same as at the prior
review.

The second largest loan is the CarMax Loan ($3.6 million -- 5.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant retail store in
Southeast Houston, Texas. The property is 100% occupied by CarMax.
The loan is fully amortizing and matures in August 2019. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.75X, respectively, compared to
77% and 1.54X at the prior review.

The third largest loan is the Morris Heights Apartments Loan ($3.3
million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 158 unit
multi-family property located in the Bronx, New York. Reported
year-end 2013 occupancy was 99%, the same as at the prior review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 31.5% and 3.26X, respectively,
compared to 39.4% and 2.61X at prior review.


GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Rates $13MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of notes to be issued by GoldenTree Loan
Opportunities IX, Limited:

$409,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$39,750,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$39,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$30,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$43,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$36,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$13,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

GoldenTree IX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and senior secured notes, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, DIP
collateral obligations, non-senior secured notes and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is expected to be at least 65% ramped as of
the closing date.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $650,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3120

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 50.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3120 to 3588)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3120 to 4056)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


HIGH GRADE STRUCTURED 2004-1: Moody's Reviews 4 Tranches' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed following
notes issued by High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2004-1 Ltd. on
review for downgrade:

$68,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding
balance of $10,750,000), Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf);

$40,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding
balance of $25,000,000), Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$10,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 27, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$10,000,000 Class F Floating Rate Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 27, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf).

High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2004-1 Ltd. is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation issuance referencing a portfolio of
US Dollar-denominated RMBS, CMBS and SF CDO tranches, which
originated between 2003 and 2004.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are primarily driven by the deterioration in the
credit quality of the reference pool of the deal. Moody's believes
that a significant number of reference obligations have failed to
make cash interest payments to an extent expected to result in
multiple "Credit Events" in accordance with the transaction's
governing documents. Moody's anticipates that the issuer, as the
protection provider, will take significant additional losses as a
result of declaring such Credit Events. Moody's review will
identify the total amount of Credit Events to be declared based on
the credit swap agreement, and assess the final ratings impact of
the related losses.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Moody's notes that this transaction is generally subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainties affecting the credit
performance of RMBS, CMBS, and structured finance securities.
Primary causes of uncertainty about assumptions are the extent of
any slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment
and in the commercial and residential real estate property
markets. Although the commercial real estate property markets are
gaining momentum, consistent growth will be unlikely until the
volume of transactions increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline and job creation rebounds. The
residential real estate property market is subject to uncertainty
about housing prices; the pace of residential mortgage
foreclosures, loan modifications and refinancing; the unemployment
rate; and interest rates. In addition, the transaction is directly
impacted by the decisions of transaction parties relating to the
assessment of Credit Events and the timing of declaring such
Credit Events.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's did not model the transactions and no additional
sensitivities or stress scenarios were run on the affected
transactions because the rating actions are primarily driven by
the preliminary assessment of the impact of the Credit Events yet
to be declared.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC11: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed the ratings of ten classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC11 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-JFX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I Classes B through F were upgraded primarily
due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last review,
resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 10% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 52% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 12 months.

The ratings on P&I Classes A-4, A-1A, A-J and A-JFX were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I Classes G through L were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on
the credit performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance compared to 3.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.1% of the
original pooled balance compared to 4.5% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 31 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the September 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to $1.06
billion from $1.80 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 111 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 42%
of the pool. Sixteen loans, constituting 15% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. There are no
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Twenty-seven loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $45.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 43.6%). Six loans, constituting 2.4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing and secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (29% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $7.0 million (an 18% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 88% of the
pool and full year 2013 operating results for 95% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 79% compared to 78% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.32X,
respectively, compared to 1.55X and 1.34X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Airport Industrial Park Loan ($97.2 million --
9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 826,390 square foot (SF)
multi-level warehouse and office complex located in Honolulu,
Hawaii. As of May 2014, the property was 95% leased compared to
94% as of June 2013. Property performance has improved since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.28X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.24X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Palm Spring Mile Loan ($91.7
million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.18 million
SF anchored retail center located in Hialeah, Florida. The multi-
building complex and was constructed in four phases. Phase I is
commonly known as Mall on the Mile; Phase II is commonly known as
Palms Springs Village; and Phases III and IV are commonly known as
Philips Plaza and Shoppes at 49th, respectively. As of May 2014,
the weighted average occupancy was 97%, the same in July 2013.
About 20% of the net rentable area (NRA) is scheduled to expire
within the next two years. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 59%
and 1.66X, respectively, compared to 60% and 1.62X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 90 Fifth Avenue Loan ($60.6 million
-- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 129,418 SF, Class B
office building located between 14th and 15th streets on 5th
avenue in the Flatiron district of Manhattan. The loan returned to
the master servicer in January 2014 after having transferred to
special servicing in January 2013 for delinquent payments. The
property was slated for sale in 2012 but fell through when Forbes,
occupying 77% of the NRA, stopped paying and has since left. As of
June 2014, the property was 9% leased. Moody's value is based on a
stabilized approach. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and
0.91X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.9X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP8: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
classes, downgraded the rating of one class, and affirmed ten
classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-LDP8 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I Classes A-J, B and C were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 6% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 28% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 24 months.

The ratings on the P&I Classes A-1A, A-4, A-SB and A-M were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I Classes D, E, F,
G and J were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss. The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was
affirmed based on the credit performance of the referenced
classes.

The rating on the P&I Class H was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.6% of the
current balance compared to 7.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.2% of the
original pooled balance compared to 7.5% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6% to $2.15 billion
from $3.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 115 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
66% of the pool. Four loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. There are no
loans that have investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Thirty-one loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $86.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 52.8%). Five loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing and secured by a mix of property
types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $25.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (63% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly
performing loans, constituting 15% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $51.2 million (16% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full year 2013 operating results for 98% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100% compared to 107% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 0.90X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Park La Brea Apartments Loan ($387.5 million -- 18.0%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $775
million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 4,238-unit
multifamily property located in Los Angeles, California, a strong
multifamily market with a Moody's Red-Yellow-Green score of 89. As
of August 2014, the property was 97% leased compared to 96% as of
April 2013. Despite performance improving/stable, property NOI has
not achieved expectations at securitization. The loan is interest-
only for the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104%
and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.76X, at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 53 State Street Loan ($280.0
million -- 13.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.12 million
square foot (SF) Class A office building located in the financial
office submarket in Boston, Massachusetts. As of June 2014, the
property was 84% leased compared to 81% as of June 2013. The
property was purchased by UBS Realty Investors in December 2011
for $610 million. The loan is interest-only for the entire term.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.87X, respectively,
compared to 108% and 0.85X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Gas Company Tower Loan ($229.0
million -- 10.6% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $458 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 1.3 million SF Class A office building located in
downtown Los Angeles, California. The loan is on the watchlist due
to declining occupancy and base rent. The largest tenant, Southern
California Gas Company (senior unsecured rating A1, stable
outlook) significantly reduced both its space footprint and base
rent in November 2011. Additionally, a tenant representing 11% of
the net rentable area vacated in September 2013, while Sidley
Austin reduced their space by 27,783 SF. As of June 2014, the
property was 69% leased, but with recent news of Deloitte taking
113,000 SF by the end of the year, occupancy will be move back up
to about 80%. The property was recently sold to Brookfield Office
Properties for approximately $430 million. The loan is interest
only for the entire term. Moody's views this loan as a troubled
loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 145% and 0.65X,
respectively, compared to 155% and 0.61X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-C22: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has finalized its ratings of the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C22
(the Certificates), to be issued by JPMBB Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-C22.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class EC at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes A-3A2, X-C, X-D, X-E, D, E, F and G have been privately
placed pursuant to Rule 144A.  Additionally, Class X-B has been
discontinued, as this class has been withdrawn.

The Class X balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on interest-only
(IO) certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest
based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers the IO
certificates' position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.  Up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C
certificates may be exchanged for Class EC certificates.  Class EC
certificates may be exchanged for up to the full certificate
balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates.

The collateral consists of 76 fixed-rate loans secured by 120
commercial and multifamily properties.  The transaction has a
balance of $1,120,314,270.  One loan in the pool, U-Haul Self
Storage Whole Loan, is a split loan consisting of a $27.4 million
(2.4% of the pool) pooled note and a $15.1 million pari passu non-
pooled note.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 31 equally
sized loans, despite the largest loan representing 8.0% of the
pool.  Increased pool diversity helps to insulate the higher-rated
classes from event risk.  The combined partial IO and full-term IO
concentration is 72.1%. Six loans, representing 12.9% of the
initial pool balance, provide for monthly payments of IO for their
entire terms, two of which are top 15 loans.  Thirty-eight loans,
representing 62.4% of the pool, have a DBRS calculated Refi debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of less than 1.00 times.  However,
these DSCRs are based on a weighted-average stressed refinance
constant of 9.9%, which implies an interest rate of 9.3%,
amortizing on a 30-year schedule.  This represents a significant
stress of nearly 4.7% over the weighted-average contractual
interest rate of the loans in the pool.


JP MORGAN 2014-OAK4: DBRS Rates Class B-4 Certs '(P)BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-OAK4 issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2014-OAK4:

-- $320.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $320.4 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $302.3 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $302.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $226.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $226.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $60.5 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.1 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $75.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $241.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $241.8 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $45.3 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $60.5 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.1 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.1 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.1 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.1 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $320.4 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $320.4 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $18.1 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $302.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $226.7 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $15.1 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $320.4 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $241.8 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $8.4 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $7.8 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Class A-X-1, Class A-X-2, Class A-X-3, Class A-X-4, Class A-X-5,
Class A-X-6, Class A-X-7 and Class A-X-8 are interest-only
certificates.  The class balances represent notional amounts.

Class A-1, Class A-2, Class A-3, Class A-4, Class A-6, Class A-7,
Class A-9, Class A-10, Class A-11, Class A-13, Class A-14, Class
A-16, Class A-X-2, Class A-X-7 and Class A-X-8 are exchangeable
certificates.  These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
base certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Class A-5, Class A-8, Class A-12 and Class A-15 are super senior
certificates.  These classes benefit from additional protection
from senior support certificates (Class A-17) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf), AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) ratings on the
certificates reflect 9.90%, 7.55%, 5.45%, 3.25% and 1.70% of
credit enhancement, respectively.  Other than the specified
classes, DBRS does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 434 loans with a total principal
balance of $355,640,626 as of the Cut-off Date (September 1,
2014).

The mortgage loans were originated or acquired by RPM Mortgage,
Inc. (RPM, 21.8%), Opes Advisors, Inc. (Opes, Advisors, 16.1%),
Homestreet Bank (Homestreet, 9.2%), Stonegate Mortgage Corp.
(Stonegate, 5.8%) and various other originators, each comprising
less than 5% of the mortgage loans.  The loans will be serviced or
subserviced by RPM (19.8%), PHH Mortgage (PHH, 16.6%), Dovenmuehle
Mortgage Inc. (Dovenmuehle, 15.4%), Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(Shellpoint, 15.2%), Homestreet (8.3%) and various other
servicers, each comprising less than 5% of the mortgage loans.
For this transaction, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will
act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator and
Custodian.  The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-
interest cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis
structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include high-
quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

Compared to other recent prime jumbo securitizations, the JPMMT
2014-OAK4 pool has a high concentration of loans in California,
particularly the San Francisco area.  Performance of loans that
are highly concentrated in a particular region may be more
sensitive to any deterioration in economic conditions or the
occurrence of a natural disaster in that region.  In addition to
model-calculated pool asset correlation, which was already
elevated, DBRS increased the market value decline assumption for
all properties in the San Francisco area by an additional 50% at
the AAA-rating level when performing its analysis.  DBRS's given
expected losses were then adjusted upward to be able to withstand
such sensitivity test.

Compared with other post-crisis representations and warranties
framework, this transaction employs a relatively weak standard,
which includes materiality factors, the use of knowledge
qualifiers as well as sunset provisions that allow for certain
representations to expire within three to six years after the
closing date.  The framework is perceived by DBRS to be weak and
limiting as compared with the traditional lifetime representations
and warranties standard in other DBRS-rated securitizations.  To
capture the perceived weaknesses in the representations and
warranties framework, DBRS reduced the origination scores for each
of the originators in this pool.  A lower originator score results
in increased default and loss assumptions and provides additional
cushions for the rated securities.


KINGSLAND IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $18MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Kingsland IV, Ltd:

  $22,900,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  April 16, 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 5,
  2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due April 16, 2021,Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
  March 5, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due April 16, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
  March 5, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also confirms the rating on the following notes:

  $14,900,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  April 16, 2021, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on July 18,
  2014 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Lastly, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $308,100,000 Class A-l Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  April 16, 2021 (current outstanding balance of
  $262,768,382.84), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 5,
  2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $60,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
  Notes due April 16, 2021 (current outstanding balance of
  $51,172,031.71), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 5, 2014
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Kingsland IV, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans, bonds and CLO tranches. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in April 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in March
2014.The Class A notes have been paid down by approximately 13.5%
or $49.6 million since March 2014. Based on the trustee's August
2014 report, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization (OC) ratios are reported at 124.93%,
116.30%, 110.79%, and 106.61%, respectively, versus March 2014
levels of 121.75%, 114.35%, 109.56%, and 105.89%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on Moody's calculations,
securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 5.3% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.

Moody's also concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's
Class E notes, which it had placed on review for downgrade on July
18, 2014, due to a change in the methodology Moody's uses to
estimate recovery rates for structured finance securities,
including CLO notes in a CLO transaction. However, although the
updated recovery rate assumption for CLO investments in Kingsland
IV is lower than previously assumed, it is more than offset by the
increase in recovery rates for other types of collateral, in
particular senior secured loans. Moody's calculates the current
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio to be 48.92%,
versus 48.10% in March 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology Moody's used in this rating was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2091)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3136)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $416.9 million, defaulted
par of $7.7 million, a weighted average default probability of
17.99% (implying a WARF of 2613), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 48.92%, a diversity score of 59 and a weighted
average spread of 3.05%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


LIME STREET: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on four
classes of notes from Lime Street CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction, and removed them from CreditWatch,
where S&P placed them with positive implications on Aug. 29, 2014.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class E notes
from the same transaction.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in Sept. 2013, and it
is currently in its amortization period.  The upgrades reflect
paydowns of $108.2 million to the class A notes, which are now at
62.7% of their original class balance.  These paydowns led to
increased overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each outstanding
class.

The affirmation on the class E notes reflects the sufficient
credit support available to the class at its current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Lime Street CLO Ltd.
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    2.36%        AAA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    3.08%        AA+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  A (sf)      1.14%        A (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB- (sf)   1.08%        BBB- (sf)
E      B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)     2.85%        B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

                             Notional balance (mil. $)
Class                 April 2012             September 2014
A                         290.00                     181.80
B                          30.00                      30.00
C                          22.00                      22.00
D                          15.00                      15.00
E                          12.60                      12.60

Coverage tests (%)
A/B O/C                   119.90                     126.05
C O/C                     112.19                     115.66
D O/C                     107.47                     109.50
E O/C                     103.81                     104.81
WAS (%)                     3.73                       3.98

O/C--Overcollateralization.
WAS--Weighted average spread.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)     BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     A+ (sf)     A (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)    BBB- (sf)
E      B+ (sf)    B (sf)     B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)       A- (sf)       BBB (sf)      A (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E      B+ (sf)      B- (sf)       CCC (sf)      B+ (sf)

RATINGS ACTIONS

Lime Street CLO Ltd.

                    Rating            Rating
Class               To                From
A                   AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                   AA+ (sf)          A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                   A (sf)            BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   BBB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E                   B+ (sf)           B+ (sf)


LNR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.:

  Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2014
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. D-FX, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2014
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.:

  Cl. E-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2014
  Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. E-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2014
  Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of two classes of notes due to
principal repayments from high credit risk collateral combined
with stable credit quality of the remaining asset pool as
evidenced by the WARF and WARR. Moody's has also affirmed the
ratings on the transaction because key transaction metrics are
commensurate with the existing ratings. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC)
transactions.

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. is a static cash CRE CDO transaction. The
transaction is backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100% of the pool balance). As of the August 25,
2014 payment date, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $539.9 million from
$762.7 million at issuance, as a result of the principal paydown
directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes. The
paydown was the result of the combination of regular amortization
and recoveries from defaulted collateral, the re-classification of
interest received on defaulted securities as principal, and the
failing of certain par value tests.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7140,
compared to 7270 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follows: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.9% compared to 2.6% at
last review; A1-A3 and 2.0% compared to 1.9% at last review; Baa1-
Baa3 and 1.7% compared to 3.4% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 8.2%
compared to 9.9% at last review; B1-B3 and 11.6% compared to 9.3%
at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 73.6% compared to 72.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, compared to 1.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other key parameters static, increasing the recovery
rate from 0% to 5% would result in modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of one to three notches upward (e.g. one notch up
implies a rating movement from Ba1 to Baa3). Decreasing the
weighted average collateral coupon to 2.0% would result in modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of zero to three notches
downward (e.g., one notch implies a rating movement of Baa3 to
Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


MADISON AVENUE I: Moody's Ups Rating on $21MM Cl. B Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one note
issued by Madison Avenue Structured Finance CDO I, Limited:

  $21,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current
  outstanding balance of $12,446,631.66), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
  previously on March 20, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf).

Madison Avenue Structured Finance CDO I, Limited, issued in
December 2001, is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of ABS, RMBS and CLOs originated in 2000
to 2005.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's senior over-
collateralization (OC) ratio since March 2014. The Class B notes
have paid down by approximately 8.76%, or $1.19 million, since
that time. Based on Moody's calculations, the Class B over-
collateralization ratio is 135.59%, versus 132.17% in March 2014.
The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since March 2014. Based on
Moody's calculations, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 911, compared to 1357 in March 2014.

The deal has also incurred administrative expenses which are
significantly less than what is allowed in the transaction
documents and that was previously assumed in Moody's analysis. In
consideration of these lower historical levels, and the limited
amount of time during which the notes are expected to be at risk
from cashflow diversions to more senior administrative expense
payments, Moody's analysis gave greater weight to modeling such
expenses at levels closer to those recently reported.

Finally, the rating action also reflects corrections to Moody's
modeling of the note interest payments. In prior rating actions,
the payment sequence was modeled so that principal proceeds were
used to pay Class C interest and deferred interest before paying
the Class B principal balance, instead of only after the Class B
principal balance was paid in full. Also, the notes were modeled
to capitalize unpaid additional interest amounts even though they
are not part of the rated interest promise. These errors have now
been corrected, and the rating action reflects this change.

The trustee reported that, in December 2008, the transaction
experienced an "Event of Default" pursuant to (i) Section 5.1 (a)
of the Indenture due to a default in the payment of interest on
the Class A notes and Class B notes. Though no deferred interest
remains outstanding on the Class A or Class B notes, the Event of
Default continues.

Under Article V of the indenture, during an Event of Default, 66
2/3% in the aggregate outstanding amount of each of the Class A,
Class B and Class C notes voting separately or in the case of a
payment default, the controlling class, can direct the trustee to
proceed with the sale and liquidation of the collateral. In that
event, the severity of losses will depend on the timing and choice
of the remedy pursued. Moody's believes the likelihood of
liquidation is low because of the separate voting requirement
needed to liquidate and the high coverage of the senior most
notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially if they jump to default.

5) Sensitivity to amount of administrative expenses: The deal is
highly sensitive to the assumed amount of administrative expenses
due each payment period. In its base case Moody's modeled the
administrative expenses to be closer to those recently reported
than the permissible expense caps. Should the administrative
expenses increase to higher than expected levels, there would be a
negative impact to the Class B notes' rating.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities on all of the rated notes (by
the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches:

Class B: +3

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches:

Class B: -1


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. G Certs From Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.'s series 1998-C3, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes F and G to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for the classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimates of
the necessary credit enhancement at the respective rating levels.
The upgrades also reflect our views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral and available
liquidity support, the significant reduction in the trust balance,
and that seven ($11.8 million, 71.7%) of the remaining loans are
fully amortizing.

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
movement on classes F and G, S&P's analysis also considered the
classes' interest shortfall history as well as the fact that three
loans ($4.6 million, 27.9%) are currently on the master servicer's
watchlist, primarily because they have a low reported debt service
coverage (DSC) or occupancy.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Sept. 16, 2014, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool balance was $16.4 million, which is 2.6% of the
pool balance at issuance. The pool currently includes 11 loans,
down from 139 loans at issuance. No loans were reported with the
special servicer, two ($2.5 million, 15.2%) are defeased, and
three are on the master servicer's watchlist, including the
largest loan in the pool (discussed below).

S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted average DSC of 1.58x
and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 29.6% using a Standard & Poor's
weighted average capitalization rate of 7.86%. The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude the two defeased loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $29.9 million in
principal losses, or 4.7% of the original pool trust balance.

The Republic Beverage Building loan ($3.5 million, 21.2%) is the
largest loan both in the pool and on the master servicer's
watchlist because it had a low reported DSC. According to the
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the property is currently
100% owner occupied and the reported DSC was 0.88x for year-end
2013. The loan is secured by a 384,895-sq.-ft.
industrial/distribution center in Grand Prairie, Texas.

RATINGS LIST

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C3

                                 Rating           Rating
Class         Identifier         To               From
F             589929SR0          AA+ (sf)         BB (sf)
G             589929SS8          A+ (sf)          B (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C18: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating of Cl. E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has finalized the provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2014-C18, to be issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Trust 2014-C18:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-B, X-C, X-D, D, E and F have been privately placed
pursuant to Rule 144A.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on
interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of
receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS
considers the IO certificates' position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PST certificates.
Class PST certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 65 fixed-rate loans secured by 100
commercial properties.  The second-largest loan in the pool, 300
North LaSalle, representing 9.7% of the pool, was shadow-rated AAA
by DBRS.  The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the
provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of loan
default within the term and its liquidity at maturity.  When the
cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Stabilized
Net Cash Flow and their respective actual constants, two loans,
representing 2.6% of the pool, had a DBRS Term Debt Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.  Additionally, to
assess refinance risk given the current low interest rate
environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon
amounts, resulting in 58.6% of the pool having DBRS Refinance
DSCRs below 1.00x.

Eleven loans, representing 11.1% of the pool, are leased to single
tenants, which have higher loss severities in the Event of
Default.  Seven of the 11 single-tenant loans, representing 25.3%
of the single-tenant concentration, are occupied by The Walgreen
Company, an investment-grade-rated tenant on leases expiring well
beyond loan maturity, providing for minimal term risk and, in
certain instances, reduced refinance risk as well.  Additionally,
seven loans, representing 21.2% of the pool (including two in the
top ten), are structured as IO for the full loan term.  An
additional 32 loans, representing 58.3% of the pool, have partial
IO periods ranging from 12 to 60 months.  The transaction's
scheduled amortization by maturity at -9.8% is below other recent
conduit transactions.

The DBRS sample included 28 of the 66 loans in the pool,
representing 74.1% of the pool by loan balance.  Of the sampled
loans, one loan was given Excellent property quality and one loan
was given Above Average property quality while no loans were given
Below Average property quality.  DBRS considers the pool to be
relatively diverse based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to a pool of 25 equal-sized loans.


NATIONS EQUIPMENT: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2014-1 (Series 2014-1 or
the notes) to be issued by Nations Equipment Finance Funding II,
LLC. The transaction is a securitization of equipment loans and
leases sponsored by Nations Equipment Finance, LLC (NEF), which
will also act as the servicer. The issuer, Nations Equipment
Finance Funding II, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NEF
Holdings, LLC., (the transferor) an affiliate of the servicer. The
equipment loans and leases were originated by Nations Fund I, LLC.
(the originator), a subsidiary of the transferor and are backed by
collateral including trailers, trucks and various types of
construction and manufacturing equipment.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Nations Equipment Finance Funding II, LLC - Equipment
Contract Backed Notes, Series 2014-1

  Fixed-rate Class A Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

  Fixed-rate Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  Fixed-rate Class C Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Series 2014-1 is the second securitization sponsored by NEF, which
was founded and is led by a team of former GE Capital executives.
Holdings is owned by this group and investment funds affiliated
with a private equity firm.

The provisional ratings that assigned to the notes are primarily
based on:

(1) the assessed quality of the collateral, which consists
primarily of leases and loans secured by various equipment
including trailers, trucks and various types of construction and
manufacturing equipment;

(2) the historical performance of similar collateral originated by
the sponsor;

(3) the level of available credit enhancement provided by
subordination, reserve account, excess spread and
overcollateralization;

(4) the sequential pay structure;

(5) the origination and underwriting practices as well as the
servicing experience of NEF;

(6) the ability US Bank National Association (rated Aa3) and
Portfolio Financial Servicing Co as backup servicers for contracts
in the U.S. and Canada respectively; and

(7) the legal integrity of the transaction structure.

Credit support to the notes includes (i) initial
overcollateralization of 11%, which is expected to grow with time
as the notes pay down, (ii) annual excess spread of approximately
4.0%, (iii) a non-declining reserve account funded at 1.5% of the
initial collateral balance, and (iv) subordination in the case of
the Class A and Class B notes (12.0% and 5.5% respectively).

The equipment loans and leases backing the notes transaction were
extended primarily to middle market obligors and are secured by
various types of equipment including charter buses (9.6%), gas
compressors (6.4%), drill rig/top drives (5.7%), and trailers
(5.6%).

The pool consists of 128 contracts with 66 unique obligors and an
initial balance of $194,525,122. The average contract balance is
$1,519,728. The weighted average original and remaining terms to
maturity are 53 and 45 months, respectively. The largest obligor
is 6.4% of the initial pool balance and the top five obligors
comprise 26.1% of the initial pool balance. Nearly all of the
contracts in this deal are fixed interest rate and monthly pay.

Approximately 7.3% of the NEF 2014-1 collateral pool at closing
has exposure to equipment/obligors located in Canada. Additional
loans to obligors in Canada will be added to the collateral pool
at a later date through a pre-funding account subject to the
successful execution of a cross-currency swap. Post addition,
approximately 15% of the pool will have exposure to obligors in
Canada. In evaluating the transaction, Moody's has assumed that
the additional loans will eventually be added to the pool and all
collateral pool-related statistics in this press release assume
the same.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans "
published in December 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings on the notes if levels of credit
protection are greater than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. As the primary drivers of performance, positive changes
in the US macro economy and the performance of various sectors
where the lessees operate could also affect the ratings. Other
reasons for better performance than Moody's expectations could
include changes in servicing practices to maximize collections on
the loans or refinancing opportunities that result in a prepayment
of the loan.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if levels of
credit protection are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss. Moody's updated expectations of loss
may be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the contracts
or a greater than expected deterioration in the value of the
equipment that secure the obligor's promise of payment. As the
primary drivers of performance, negative changes in the US macro
economy could also affect Moody's ratings. Other reasons for worse
performance than Moody's expectations could include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transactional governance and fraud.


REALT 2014-1: DBRS Rates Class G Certificates '(P)Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2014-1 issued by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust, Series 2014-1.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X at AAA (sf)

The Class X is notional.  DBRS ratings on interest-only
certificates address the likelihood of receiving interest based on
the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers the interest-only
certificates' position within the transaction payment waterfall
when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral for the transaction consists of 34 fixed-rate loans
secured by 46 properties.  One loan, Sheraton Cavalier Hotel
Calgary, representing 5.7% of the pool, was shadow rated
investment grade.  All 34 loans in the transaction amortize for
the entire term, with 49.9% of the pool by loan balance having
approximately 25 years to 30 years of remaining amortization, and
the remainder having less than 25 years of remaining amortization.
For 22 loans (67.3% of the pool by loan balance) that offer
recourse to the respective sponsor, DBRS reduced the corresponding
probability of default.  DBRS did not identify any loans as having
a DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times
(x), indicating a lower likelihood of mid-term default.  However,
48.1% of the pool, based on both the A-note and whole loan balloon
balances, have DBRS Refinance DSCRs below 1.00x.  The DBRS
weighted-average Term DSCR and Debt Yield, excluding the shadow-
rated loan, based on the A-note balances, are 1.36x and 8.42%,
respectively, while based on the whole loan balances, are 1.33x
and 8.24%, respectively.  The DBRS weighted-average Exit Debt
Yield, excluding the shadow-rated loan, based on the A-note
balances and the whole loan balances are 10.05% and 9.97%,
respectively.

DBRS sampled 26 loans, representing 90.3% of the pool by loan
balance, and site inspections were performed on 36 properties,
representing 82.9% of the pool by loan allocated balance.  Of the
sampled loans, three loans were given an Above Average property
quality rating.


RESOURCE REAL 2006-1: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2-F-X and A-2-FL notes from Resource Real Estate Funding
CDO 2006-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on five other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying collateral's credit
characteristics using S&P's global CDOs of pooled structured
finance assets criteria, its rating methodology and assumptions
for U.S. and Canadian commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), and S&P's CMBS global property evaluation methodology
criteria.  The upgrades reflect the transaction's amortization.
As of the Sept. 19, 2014, trustee report, the class A-1 notes had
an outstanding balance of $12.2 million, down from $129.4 million
at issuance.

According to the Sept. 19, 2014, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $211.0 million, while the transaction's
liabilities totaled $195.5 million, down from $345.0 million in
liabilities at issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool
includes these:

   -- Eight whole loans and senior participation loans ($125.6
      million, 59.5% of the pool);

   -- Four mezzanine loan interests ($40.1 million, 19.0%);

   -- Two CRE CDO securities from one CRE CDO transaction ($17.3
      million, 8.2%);

   -- One subordinate B note interest ($16.2 million, 7.7%); and

   -- Four CMBS tranches from four different transactions ($11.8
      million, 5.6%).

The trustee report noted two impaired assets totaling $10.4
million (4.9%). The impaired assets are:

   -- FRI Portfolio mezzanine loan interest ($5.0 million; 2.4%)
      for which S&P did not estimate any recovery; and

   -- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s class
      k commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-
      TFL1 ($5.4 million, 2.5%).

Using loan performance information provided by the collateral
manager, along with S&P's criteria for U.S. and Canadian CMBS and
our CMBS global property evaluation methodology, S&P applied
asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the performing
loans ($177.0 million, 83.9%).

S&P also considered in its analysis qualitative factors such as
the loans' near-term maturities, refinancing prospects, and
modifications.

According to the Sept. 19, 2014, trustee report; the deal passed
all of its overcollateralization and interest coverage tests.

RATINGS LIST

Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                         Rating
Class      Identifier    To          From
A-1        76122VAA2     AA (sf)     BBB (sf)
A-2-FL     76122VAB0     AA- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
A-2-F-X    76122VAL8     AA- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
C          76122VAD6     BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)
D          76122VAE4     BB (sf)     BB (sf)
E          76122VAF1     B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
F          76122VAG9     B (sf)      B (sf)
G          76122VAH7     B- (sf)     B- (sf)


SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $18MM Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Sapphire Valley CDO I, Ltd.:

  $73,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2022, Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf); previously on January 6, 2014 Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2022,
  Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on January 6, 2014 Affirmed
  A2 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2022,
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on January 6, 2014 Affirmed
  Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $418,500,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2022 (current outstanding
  balance of $298,157,578.55), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
  January 6, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2022
  (current outstanding balance of $12,956,700.45), Affirmed
  Ba2 (sf); previously on January 6, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Sapphire Valley CDO I, Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation ("CLO") backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans and CLO tranches. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since January 2014. The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately 16% or $57.9 million
since the deal ended its reinvestment period in January 2014.
Based on the trustee's 5 September 2014 report, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
129.08%, 122.48%, 116.52% and 112.96%, respectively, versus
January 2014 levels of 124.42%, 118.71%, 113.64% and 110.59%,
respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Concentration Risk: The portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities. Moody's views CLOs as highly
correlated, and the specific CLO securities that the issuer has
invested in have longer average lives and are of relatively better
average credit quality than the loans in the portfolio. Therefore,
as the deal further seasons and amortizes, the CLO securities,
currently representing 24% of the total collateral, may comprise
an even larger portion of the portfolio.

7) Counterparty risk: The issuer has significant investments in
CLO tranches, a portion of which is referenced under a total
return swap with Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). The rating of the
notes may be exposed to uncertainties over the credit quality of
BANA and any future deterioration in BANA's creditworthiness could
negatively impact the ratings on the notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1739)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +4

Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2609)

Class A: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -3

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $479.4 million, defaulted
par of $4.3 million, a weighted average default probability of
14.94% (implying a WARF of 2174), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 40.94%, a diversity score of 54 and a weighted
average spread of 2.80%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


SATURN CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Saturn CLO, Ltd.:

$27,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 18, 2014
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$25,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$20,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2014
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$135,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (current outstanding balance of $114,442,502.88), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 18, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$208,000,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (current outstanding balance of $171,945,835.19), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 18, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$24,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 18, 2014 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf);

$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2014 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf).

Saturn CLO Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 14.13% or $18.8 million and
the Class A-1-J notes have been paid down by approximately 15.8%
or $32.3 million. Based on the trustee's September 2014 report,
the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B,
Class C, and Class D notes are reported at 124.15%, 115.59%,
109.55%, and 104.12%, respectively, versus March 2014 levels of
121.03%, 113.72%, 108.48%, and 103.70%, respectively.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio and in the weighted average recovery
rate. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted average rating
factor is currently 2297 compared to 2499 in March 2014 and the
weighted average recovery rate is 52.15 compared to 51.04 in March
2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can

lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in
credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1838)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2756)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -3

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $419.5 million, defaulted
par of approximately $57,400, a weighted average default
probability of 13.43% (implying a WARF of 2297), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 52.15%, a diversity score of
59 and a weighted average spread of 2.92%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


SATURN VENTURES 2004: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-3 Notes to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Saturn Ventures 2004 -- Fund America Investors III, Limited:

$60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes (current balance
of $23,539,600), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 12,
2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$22,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes (current balance
of $10,203,850), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on November 12,
2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

Saturn Ventures 2004 - Fund America Investors III, Limited, issued
in April 2004, is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) backed by a portfolio primarily comprised of
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) originated between
2002 and 2004.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes. Since October 2013, the Class A-1 notes have paid
off in full and the Class A-2 notes have been paid down by
approximately 15.4%, or $4.3 million, using principal proceeds
from the sales of underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. The interest payments, principal prepayments
and sales proceeds from certain defaulted assets have been
materially exceeding expectations. Accordingly, Moody's have
assumed the deal will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and from potential recoveries on defaulted
securities, some of which have experienced significant price
increases in the last two years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. Although the commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, consistent
growth will be unlikely until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The residential real estate property market
is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming limited recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries exceeding Moody's expectation in the
future would positively impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's typically applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in
Moody's CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in a CDOEdge cash flow
model to calculate expected losses on the rated notes. Moody's
supplemented its analysis on this deal by estimating that the
expected losses of the notes could be reduced by excess interest
proceeds applied to pay down the senior notes, as well as by
potential recoveries realized from defaulted assets (based on a
range of assumed market values). Moody's determined the current
ratings in part based on these adjusted expected losses.

The deal's ratings are not expected to be sensitive to the typical
range of changes (plus or minus two rating notches on Caa-rated
assets) in the rating quality of the collateral that Moody's
tests, and no sensitivity analysis was performed.


SEAWALL 2006-4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of the following
class of notes issued by Seawall 2006-4, Ltd.:

  Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2013 Affirmed
  C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the rating of the note because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Seawall 2006-4 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing 100% commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations
were securitized in 2005 (89.8% of the notional balance of the
reference obligations) and 2006 (10.2%). As of this review, 79.5%
of the reference obligations are publicly rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 8,188, compared to 8,456 at last review. The current ratings on
the Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: B1-B3 (5.1%,
compared to 4.4% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (94.9%, compared
to 95.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.4 years, compared to 3.8 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 0.0%, compared to 0.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as at last review.

Methodologies Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
assessments. Notching the reference obligations down by -1 notches
would result in an an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero notches downward (e.g. one notch downward implies
Baa3 to Ba1). Notching the reference obligations upward by +1
notch would result in an average modeled rating movement of zero
notches upward (e.g. one notch upward implies Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


STRIPS III 2003-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
note issued by STRIPs III Ltd./STRIPs III Corp. Master Trust,
Series 2003-1:

  Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2013 Affirmed
  Caa3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also downgraded the rating on the
following note:

  Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2013
  Affirmed Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has downgraded the rating of one class as it is expected
to take a significant loss as a result of lower expected future
cash flow from the underlying interest only certificates. Moody's
has affirmed the rating on one class because its key transaction
metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic)
transactions.

STRIPs 2003-1 is a static transaction backed by a portfolio of
seven interest only (IO) certificates from seven CMBS transactions
issued from 1999 through 2002. As of the September 24, 2014
trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $5.1 million from $465.2 million at issuance, with
the cash flow from the IO certificates directed to amortize the
rated notes in a senior-sequential manner after scheduled interest
payments are made to the outstanding notes.

Within the resecuritization pool, the identified weighted average
life is 2.6 years assuming a 0%/0% constant default and prepayment
rate (CDR/CPR).

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key parameter
may be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameters. Cash flows to the underlying IO certificates are
particularly sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions for
the underlying CMBS transactions.

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SPARKS REGIONAL 2002: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
of Sparks Regional Medical Center Lease, Certificates of
Participation, Series 2002 as follows:

  Term certificates due June 15, 2017, Affirmed B1; previously on
  Dec 20, 2013 Affirmed B1

  Term certificates due June 15, 2022, Affirmed B2; previously on
  Dec 20, 2013 Affirmed B2

Ratings Rationale

The ratings were affirmed based on the support of the long term
triple net lease guaranteed by CHS/Community Health Services
(Moody's long term Corporate Family rating B1, stable outlook).

The rating of the certificates due June 15, 2017 is affirmed at B1
based on the current rating of CHS/Community Health Services (CHS;
LT Corporate Family rating B1; stable outlook), which acquired
HMA, which had previously substantially all of the assets of
Sparks Regional Medical Center (Sparks), the original lessee of
the facilities supporting the transaction.

The rating of the certificates due June 15, 2022 is affirmed at B2
based on the term risk associated with CHS and the balloon risk
associated with a non-Moody's rated residual value insurer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a
higher dark loan to value. Factors that may cause a downgrade of
the ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate
tenant or the residual insurance provider.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Commercial Real
Estate Finance: Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease
Financings" published in November 2011.

No model was used in this review.

Deal Performance

As of October 2014, the transaction's aggregate certificate
balance is $19.7 million compared to $37.2 million at
securitization. The transaction is secured by a lease on 19
medical facilities totaling 335,000 square feet. The facilities
are located in Arkansas and Oklahoma. The lease expires on June
30, 2017, with an option to extend for an additional five-year
term.

The scheduled lease payments are sufficient to completely pay off
the Certificates due in 2017. There will be an outstanding
principal balance of $10,175,000 (due in June 2022) when the lease
expires in June 2017. If the lease is not extended in accordance
with its terms while the Certificates are outstanding, the
Certificates are required to be redeemed with the proceeds of a
residual value insurance policy, which is provided by R.V.I.
America Insurance Company (RVI).


TOWER CLO V: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $24MM Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Stone Tower CLO V Ltd.:

$36,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

$29,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
A3(sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

$2,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3
(sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$60,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $37,006,616), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on July 16, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$75,000,000 Class A-2a I Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $43,041,793), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on July 16, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$411,900,000 Class A-2a NV Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $236,385,529), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 16, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$100,000 Class A-2a V Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $57,389), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
July 16, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$54,500,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$43,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$24,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Ba2
(sf); previously on July 16, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Stone Tower CLO V Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
October 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since July 2014. The Class A-1 and A-2
notes have been paid down by approximately 20% or $80.0 million
since then. Based on the trustee's September 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class
C and Class D notes are reported at 129.9%, 119.5%, 111.69% and
106.38%, respectively, versus July 2014 levels of 125.05%,
116.56%, 110.02% and 105.51%, respectively. Additionally the
transaction currently holds $24.6 million of cash in its principal
collections account.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1841)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a I: 0

Class A-2a V: 0

Class A-2a NV: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2761)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a I: 0

Class A-2a V: 0

Class A-2a NV: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $537.7 million, defaulted
par of $2.3 million, a weighted average default probability of
14.33% (implying a WARF of 2301), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.17%, a diversity score of 57 and a weighted
average spread of 3.14%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


VALHALLA CLO: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Valhalla CLO, Ltd.:

  $56,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Extendable Notes
  (current balance of $15,337,349), Confirmed at A3 (sf);
  previously on June 26, 2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade;

  $39,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
  Extendable Notes, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on June 26,
  2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $21,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
  Subordinate Extendable Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
  December 9, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

  $5,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
  Extendable Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on December 9,
  2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Valhalla CLO, Ltd., issued in August of 2004, is a synthetic
collateralized loan obligation referencing a portfolio of
primarily senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in August 2011.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect both the ongoing deleveraging in the
deal as well as growing concerns related to the deal's increased
exposure (as a proportion of the performing collateral pool's
outstanding par amount) to securities that mature after the CLO's
legal maturity date on August 1, 2016 ("long-dated assets").
Notwithstanding the reported availability of par
overcollateralization for the rated notes, Moody's believes that
the increased exposure to long-dated assets, and the upcoming
maturity of the CLO, makes it likely that repayment of the notes
at their maturity will be highly dependent on the issuer's
successful monetization of the long-dated assets at close to their
par amounts. Moody's notes that the issuer will likely take on
price risk in relation to any such sales of collateral. Moody's
additionally notes that the deal's exposure to long-dated assets
includes investments in a material amount of thinly- or untraded
loans whose lack of liquidity may pose additional risks relating
to the issuer's ultimate ability or inclination to pursue a
liquidation of such assets, especially if the sales can be
transacted only at heavily discounted price levels.

Based on Moody's calculations, long-dated assets (including
illiquid assets that are currently not long-dated but for purposes
of this analysis were assumed to be long-dated) currently make up
approximately 79% of the underlying portfolio par, compared to 74%
in June 2014. In addition, Moody's notes that the deal's increased
exposure to long-dated assets relates in part to amend and extend
activities that result in loan maturity extensions. Based on
Moody's calculations, the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are currently 624.1% and 174.6%,
respectively. Excluding the long-dated assets, Moody's calculates
that the pro-forma Class A and Class B overcollateralization
ratios are currently 128.6% and 35.9%, respectively, including
$9.4 million of assumed recoveries on $44.5 million of currently
defaulted and assumed to be defaulted securities.

Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
ratings on the issuer's Class A-2 and Class B Notes announced on
June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the
ratings on review for upgrade in consideration of pending
information needed to assess the impact of the increased exposure
to long-dated assets.

Additionally, the rating of the Class A-2 Notes also reflects the
additional risk posed to the noteholders due to the insurance
financial strength rating of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.
(f.k.a. Financial Security Assurance Inc.), which acts as
Guarantor under the Investment Agreement in the transaction.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Reference pool credit risk: A shift towards a reference
portfolio of better credit quality, or better credit performance
of assets collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a
negative shift in credit quality or performance of the reference
assets can have adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging of the reference pool from
unscheduled principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
Deleveraging may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the
loan market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

5) Recovery of defaulted reference assets: Fluctuations in the
market value of defaulted reference assets reported by the trustee
and those that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would
positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated reference assets: The presence of reference assets
that mature after the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal
to liquidation risk on those reference assets. This risk is borne
first by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an asset
upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the lower of an
assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the asset's
current market value. The deal's increased exposure owing to
amendments to loan agreements extending maturities continues. In
light of the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which
increases its sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the
rating analysis, Moody's ran scenarios using a range of
liquidation value assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset
exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's
maturity will drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.

7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of reference assets whose default probabilities Moody's has
assessed through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
necessary information to update its credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected by any
default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

8) Lack of reference portfolio granularity: The performance of the
reference portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit
conditions of a few large obligors Moody's rates, especially if
they jump to default.

9) Counterparty risk: A deterioration in the credit quality of the
Guarantor under the Investment Agreement or its failure to
mitigate such deterioration could negatively affect the rating of
the notes.

10) Operational risk: The deal contains a large proportion of
reference assets that mature after the CLO's legal maturity date.
Repayment of the notes at their maturity will be highly dependent
on the issuer's successful monetization of the long-dated assets
which will be contingent upon issuer's ability and willingness to
sell these assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2619)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3928)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a par balance
of $95.7 million, defaulted par of $44.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 14.57% (implying a WARF of 3274), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.55%, a diversity
score of 11 and a weighted average spread of 3.75%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the transaction. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with credit estimates that have not been updated within the last
15 months, which represent approximately 13.5% of the collateral
pool.


* Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Oct. 7, 2014, has upgraded the
ratings of 39 tranches from 19 transactions issued by various
issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE11

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-TC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-EC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-PC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
INABS 2005-B

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust,
INABS 2005-C

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 15, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 1, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF2

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF3

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 3, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-1
Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-2
Trust

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-3
Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-2
Trust

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the collateral. The upgrades are a result of improving performance
of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to
high prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 5.9% in September 2014 from
7.2% in September 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House
prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.



                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
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liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

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by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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