TCR_Public/140928.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

           Sunday, September 28, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 270

                            Headlines

AGATE BAY 2014-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Cl. B-4 Certs
ACAS CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
ACIS CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on 2 Notes
AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to BB+
AMERICA STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms Class XC Notes' Caa3 Rating

BABSON CLO 20096-II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches to B+
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B-
BANC OF AMERICA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class O to C
BEAR STEARNS 1999-WF2: Moody's Lowers Class X Rating to Caa2

BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes
BLCP HOTEL 2014-CLRN: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2014-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
BNPP IP 2014-II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
CARFINANCE CAPITAL: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to B1

CARLYLE GLOBAL: Moody's Rates $5.5-Mil. Class Notes (P)B3
CASTLE 2003-1: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
CATAMARAN CLO 2014-2: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class E Notes
CENT CLO 16: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D-R Notes
CENT CLO 22: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes

CIFC FUNDING 2007-I: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $17MM Notes
COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Raises Rating on Cl. J Debt From 'B'
COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating of Class F Notes
COMM 2014-LC17: DBRS Assigns '(P)BB' Rating to Class E Certs
COMM 2014-PAT: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Class E Debt

CSMC 2007-C1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on $25MM Class A Cert.
CWHEQ REVOLVING 2007-G: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to Ca
EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Lifts $48-Mil. Class Notes Rating to B1
EATON VANCE VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
ECP CLO 2014-6: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $10.5MM Cl. E Notes

GSMS 2004-GG2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs. Classes
GSMS 2006-RR3: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 3 Classes to C
HALCYON 2005-2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on 2 Notes Classes
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2012-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
JP MORGAN 2013-HLT: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X-Fl Cert

KATONAH X CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
KEYCORP STUDENT 2004-A: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Cl. II-D Notes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class B Notes
MASTR ALTERNATIVE 2003-4: S&P Cuts Rating on Class B-3 Notes to CC
MID-STATE CAPITAL: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Ba2

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Classes to C
OFSI FUND VII: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class F Notes
OMI TRUST 2002-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D(sf)'
PACIFICA CDO VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Cl. Certs

PREFERRED TERM XIII: Moody's Raises Rating on 3 Tranches to Caa1
PRETSL COMBINATION: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Note Classes
RAMPART CLO 2007: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $15.3MM Notes
SAPPHIRE VALLEY I: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes From BB+
SDART 2014-4: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on $79.4MM Cl. E Notes

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2014-3: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certificate BB
STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $16.1MM Notes to Ba2
SYMPHONY CLO VIII: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
THACHER PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
TIAA REAL ESTATE 2003-1: Fitch Hikes Cl. C-1 Notes Rating From 'B'

TIMBERSTAR TRUST I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class F Notes
VENTURE V CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on $11.5MM Cl. D Notes to B2
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Moody's Cuts Class E Certs. Rating to C
WELLS FARGO MBS: Moody's Upgrades Cl. I-A-3 Notes Rating to Ba2
WESTGATE RESORTS: DBRS Assigns '(P)BB' Rating to Cl. C Debt

WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL 2005-1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 6 Tranches
ZAIS CLO 2: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on $4.4MM Class E Notes
* Fitch Takes Actions on 15 SF CDOs Issued from 2001-2006
* Moody's Takes Action on $1.7BB RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
* Moody's Takes Action on $709MM RMBS Issued From 1998-2006

* Moody's Takes Action on $224.5MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2002-2004
* S&P Takes Action on 22 Tranches From 19 US Synthetic CDO Deals


                             *********


AGATE BAY 2014-2: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Cl. B-4 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-2 issued by Agate Bay
Mortgage Trust 2014-2 (the Trust):

-- $277.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $277.3 million Class A-X-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $69.3 million Class A-X-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $346.6 million Class A-X-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.4 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.7 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.7 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Class A-X-1, Class A-X-2, Class A-X-3, Class A-X-4, Class A-X-5, Class
A-X-6, Class A-X-7, Class A-X-8, Class A-X-9, Class A-X-10, Class
A-X-11, Class A-X-12, Class A-X-13, Class A-X-14, Class A-X-15, Class
A-X-16 and Class A-X-17 are interest-only certificates.  The class
balances represent notional amounts.

Class A-3, Class A-4, Class A-5, Class A-6, Class A-7, Class A-8,
Class A-9, Class A-10, Class A-11, Class A-12, Class A-13, Class A-14,
Class A-15, Class A-X-9, Class A-X-10, Class A-X-11, Class A-X-12,
Class A-X-13, Class A-X-14, Class A-X-15, Class A-X-16 and Class
A-X-17 are exchangeable certificates.  These classes can be exchanged
for combinations of initial exchangeable certificates as specified in
the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings in this transaction reflect the 7.40% of credit
enhancement provided by subordination.  The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf)
and BB (sf) ratings reflect 6.25%, 4.55%, 3.55% and 2.30% of credit
enhancement, respectively.  Other than the specified classes, DBRS
does not rate any other classes in this transaction.

The certificates are backed by 543 loans with a total principal
balance of $374,340,300 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1, 2014).
The mortgage loans were acquired by TH TRS Corp. (the Sponsor)
directly from originators pursuant to its direct loan acquisition
program.

The originators for the mortgage pool are Mortgage Master, Inc.
(Mortgage Master, 14.8%), George Mason Mortgage, LLC (George Mason,
14.5%), American Pacific Mortgage Corporation (American Pacific,
10.3%), NYCB Mortgage Company, LLC (NYCB Mortgage, 9.0%) and various
other originators, each comprising less than 9% of the mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced by Cenlar FSB (Cenlar).  Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (rated AA (high) and R-1 (high) with Stable trends by DBRS) will
act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator and Custodian.
Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
will serve as Trustee.  Matrix Financial Services Corporation will act
as the Servicing Administrator.  The transaction employs a
senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash flow structure that is
enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Each originator has made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans.  The enforcement mechanism for breaches
of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a third-party
reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and resolution of
disputes is generally subject to determination in an arbitration
proceeding.

DBRS views the representations and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with recent DBRS-rated prime jumbo
transactions.  However, some originators may potentially experience
financial stress that could result in their inability to fulfill
repurchase obligations and the backstop to fulfill some of the
obligations is being provided by an unrated entity (the Sponsor).  To
capture the perceived weakness, DBRS adjusted downward the originator
scores of some of the lenders in the portfolio.  Such adjustment (and
hence increases in default and loss rates) is to account for the
originators' or the Sponsor's potential inability to fulfill
repurchase obligations.


ACAS CLO 2012-1: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by American
Capital Asset Management LLC, after the notes were redeemed in full.
At the same time, S&P assigned its ratings to the replacement class
A-1-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes.  S&P also affirmed its 'BB- (sf)'
rating on the class E notes.

The redemption of the class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes and the
issuance of the replacement notes were done via a supplemental
indenture.

The issuer used all of the proceeds from the replacement classes of
notes to redeem the original classes of notes, as outlined by
provisions in the transaction documents.  The replacement notes were
all floating rate with a notional balance equal to the original
floating- and fixed-rate note balances; the class A-1-R note balance
was the combined total of the original class A-1 and A-2 notes.  The
replacement notes were issued at a lower spread over LIBOR than the
original notes.

The class E notes were not refinanced and S&P affirmed its 'BB- (sf)'
rating because the available credit enhancement is appropriate for the
current rating level.

The transaction is still in its reinvestment period, so none of the
notes have delevered.

S&P's full cash flow analysis resulted in higher cushions for all the
notes after the refinancing.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date before refinancing
Class      Amount    Interest          BDR      SDR    Cushion
         (mil. $)    rate (%)          (%)      (%)        (%)
A-1        208.50    LIBOR + 1.52    67.68    62.75       4.93
A-2         10.00    2.42            67.68    62.75       4.93
B           48.00    LIBOR + 2.80    61.46    54.89       6.57
C           19.50    LIBOR + 3.60    56.62    48.85       7.76
D           17.00    LIBOR + 4.85    50.74    43.05       7.69
E           16.50    LIBOR + 6.00    40.96    34.01       6.95

Current date after refinancing
A-1-R      218.50    LIBOR + 1.25    68.46    62.75       5.71
B-R         48.00    LIBOR + 2.32    62.81    54.89       7.93
C-R         19.50    LIBOR + 3.25    58.11    48.85       9.26
D-R         17.00    LIBOR + 4.25    53.13    43.05      10.08
E           16.50    LIBOR + 6.00    43.47    34.01       9.45

Effective date
A-1        208.50    LIBOR + 1.52    69.41    63.50       5.94
A-2         10.00    2.42            69.41    63.50       5.94
B           48.00    LIBOR + 2.80    64.01    55.30       8.74
C           19.50    LIBOR + 3.60    58.85    49.10       9.72
D           17.00    LIBOR + 4.85    53.58    43.00      10.63
E           16.50    LIBOR + 6.00    44.57    33.60      11.02

BDR--Break-even scenario.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive changes
to the transaction, other than including provisions focused on
complying with the Volcker Rule.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

                        Rating
Original class     To           From
A-1                NR           AAA (sf)
A-2                NR           AAA (sf)
B                  NR           AA (sf)
C                  NR           A (sf)
D                  NR           BBB (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Replacement class       Rating
A-1-R                   AAA (sf)
B-R                     AA (sf)
C-R                     A (sf)
D-R                     BBB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
E                       BB- (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:               ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
Co-issuer:            ACAS CLO 2012-1 LLC
Collateral manager:   American Capital Asset Management LLC
Refinancing arranger: Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Trustee:              Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO

CLO--Collateralized loan obligation.


ACIS CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on 2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings to
ACIS CLO 2014-5 Ltd./ACIS CLO 2014-5 LLC's $457.75 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated
senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 18, 2014.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings
that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not including excess spread), and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2336%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS LIST

ACIS CLO 2014-5 Ltd./ACIS CLO 2014-5 LLC

Class                Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)            310.75
B                    AA (sf)              68.00
C                    A (sf)               32.00
D-1                  BBB (sf)             13.00
D-2                  BBB (sf)             13.00
E-1                  BB (sf)              10.50
E-2                  BB (sf)              10.50
Subordinated notes   NR                   52.75

NR--Not rated.


AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, and B notes from Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd. and removed them
from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Aug. 29, 2014.  At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on the class
C and D notes.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2014 and the
class A-1 notes have since been paid down $97.0 million, reducing
their outstanding balance to 65.7% of the original balance.  S&P
raised its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B notes to reflect these
paydowns and the additional support provided for these classes.

S&P's lowered rating on the class C notes was affected by applying its
largest-obligor default test, which addresses event and model risks
that might be present in rated transactions.  The class C notes failed
the largest-obligor default test at the 'BBB' rating level.

The downgraded class D notes reflect that the paydowns have been
outpaced by the decreased collateral available to support these notes
since S&P's in June 2012 rating actions.  As of the Aug. 8, 2014,
trustee report, the sum of the collateral and eligible investments
available to the notes was $308.6 million, decreasing by $110.4
million since the June 8, 2012, trustee report.  Over the same time
period, the class A-1 notes have been paid down $97.0 million,
decreasing the class D overcollateralization ratio to 102.15% from
103.34% as a result.

Though the class D notes also failed the largest-obligor default test
at the 'CCC' rating level, the final rating takes into account the
cash flow results that suggested it could support a higher rating.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.

                                  Cash flow   Cash flow
             Previous             implied     cushion   Final
Class        rating               rating      (i)       rating
A-1          AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    7.84%     AAA (sf)
A-2          AA- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)    11.32%    AA+ (sf)
B            A (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)     7.51%     A+ (sf)
C            BBB (sf)             BBB+ (sf)   1.50%     BB+ (sf)
D            B+ (sf)              B+ (sf)     0.50%     B- (sf)

(i)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow implied
rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current
collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted
average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario              Within industry (%)   Between industries (%)
Below base case       15.0                  5.0
Base case             20.0                  7.5
Above base case       25.0                  10.0

                    Recovery    Corr.       Corr.
        Cash flow   decrease    increase    decrease
        implied     implied     implied     implied     Final
Class   rating      rating      rating      rating      rating
A-1     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B       A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)     AA (sf)     A+ (sf)
C       BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)   BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
D       B+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   B (sf)      B+ (sf)     B- (sf)

Corr.--Correlation.

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity, S&P
biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool with the
highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                      Spread         Recovery
         Cash flow    compression    compression
         implied      implied        implied       Final
Class    rating       rating         rating        rating
A-1      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B        A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)        BBB (sf)      A+ (sf)
C        BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)      B (sf)        BB+ (sf)
D        B+ (sf)      B- (sf)        CC (sf)       B- (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd

                     Rating     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1     00936CAA0    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2     00936CAC6    AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B       00936CAE2    A+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
C       00936CAG7    BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D       00936BAA2    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)


AMERICA STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms Class XC Notes' Caa3 Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of Banc
of America Structured Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-X1 as follows:

Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.5% of the
current balance compared to 12.6% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings of IO classes are based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to improved credit quality
of its reference classes. An IO class may be downgraded based on a
higher WARF due to declined credit quality of its reference classes,
paydowns of higher quality reference classes or nonpayment of
interest. Classes that have paid off through loan paydowns or
amortization are not included in the WARF calculation. Classes that
have experienced losses are grossed up for losses and included in the
WARF calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July
2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type and
sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and
other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $6 million from
$419 million at securitization. The certificates are collateralized by
four mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to 45% of the pool.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13 million (for an average loss severity
of 35%).

Moody's received full year 2013 and partial year 2014 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
75% compared to 76% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 31% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.97X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 96% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Comfort Inn-Palm Springs, CA Loan ($3 million --
45% of the pool), which is secured by a 129-room limited-service hotel
located in Palm Springs, California. The collateral is subject to a
ground lease that expires in November 2024. The loan was in special
servicing at last review, but has since been modified and returned to
the master servicer. The modification extended the loan's maturity to
October 1, 2017, reduced the loan's coupon rate and forgave
approximately $228,000 of principal. In exchange for the modification
terms the borrower paid down the principal by almost $1 million.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 1.19X, respectively,
compared to 111% and 1.17X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Pennsylvania Place Apartments Loan ($3
million -- 42% of the pool), which is secured by a 152-unit
multifamily property located in Forth Worth, Texas. The property was
98% leased as of December 2013, as compared to 94% as of December
2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.90X, respectively,
compared to 60% and 1.72X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Madison Park Apartments Loan ($0.5
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 32-unit multi-family
property located in Plainfield, New Jersey. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 49% since securitization. The property
was fully leased as of December 2012. The current loan exposure is
approximately $15,600 per unit. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 17%
and greater than 4.00X, respectively, compared to 21% and greater than
4.00X at the last review.


BABSON CLO 20096-II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2006-II:

$18,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due October 16, 2020, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 11, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$32,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due October 16, 2020,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 11, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due October 16, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 11, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due October 16, 2020,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 11, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$200,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Notes Due October 16, 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $120,782,725), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 11, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$22,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due October 16, 2020, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 11, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$218,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due October 16, 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $140,210,063), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 11, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Babson CLO Ltd. 2006-II, issued in October 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October
2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A-1A and
Class A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 35.7% or $144.8
million since that time. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report,
the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class B, Class C, Class
D and Class E notes are reported at 131.81%, 119.16%, 112.42% and
109.33%, respectively, versus January 2014 levels of 121.28%, 113.17%,
108.63% and 106.49%, respectively. The credit quality of the portfolio
has been stable since January 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better credit
quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing the
transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to positive
CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1949)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2923)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $397.4 million, defaulted par of $5.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 15.36% (implying a
WARF of 2436), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
51.10%, a diversity score of 56 and a weighted average spread of
2.92%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In
some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered based
on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case,
historical and market performance and the collateral manager's
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four classes
and affirmed its ratings on four other classes from Banc of America
Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4, a U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction containing fixed-rate, highly seasoned
Alternative-A (Alt-A) collateral.  These classes are backed by pools
of loans with amortization terms generally greater than 20 years,
which are secured primarily by first-liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its rating on class 3-A-1 to 'B+ (sf)' because the
pool-level constant prepayment rate (CPR) decreased, extending S&P's
projected payment horizon for this class and resulting in a projected
loss allocation to this class at the prior rating level.

The lowered ratings on classes 4-A-3, 4-A-4, and 4-A-5 reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit enhancement for these classes will be
insufficient to cover S&P's projected losses at the prior rating
levels.  S&P projected increased losses due to an increase in
delinquencies in the pool backing these classes.

All of these ratings were lowered to non-investment-grade ('BB+' or
lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher).

AFFIRMATIONS

Of the four affirmations, three were investment-grade and one was
non-investment-grade.  The investment-grade rating affirmations on
classes 1-A-1, 2-A-1, and 4-A-2 reflect the classes' relatively senior
positions in payment priority.  They also reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit enhancement is sufficient to cover our projected
losses at those rating levels.

Regarding the 'CC (sf)' rating affirmation on class 30-B-1, S&P
believes that its projected credit enhancement will remain
insufficient to cover its base-case projected loss to this class.
According to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, this affirmation reflects our belief
that this class remains virtually certain to default.

LOSS SEVERITY ASSUMPTIONS

As the pools backing the eight classes contain loans with amortization
terms generally greater than 20 years, S&P applied the 50% base-case
loss severity assumption.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from its
view of how the loans will behave under various economic conditions.
Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook assumptions for
variables that we believe could affect residential mortgage
performance are as follows:

   -- A 6.3% unemployment rate for 2014, decreasing to 5.8% for
      2015;

   -- Home prices will increase 6% in 2014, using the 20-city
      Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller Home Price Index;

   -- Real GDP growth will be 2.1% in 2014 and 3.0% in 2015;

   -- The 30-year mortgage rate will average 4.3% for 2014 and
      increase to 5.0% in 2015; and

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in both 2014 and 2015.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall housing
fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals still hinge on
additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of modified loans, the
propensity of servicers to advance on delinquent loans, and
liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS collateral
quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were to become
stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside forecast, S&P
believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken. S&P's downside
scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment rises to 7.0% in 2014 and then 7.2% in
      2015;

   -- Downward pressure causes a 1.1% GDP growth in 2014, rising
      slightly to 1.2% in 2015;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate falls slightly to 4.3% in
      2014, but limited access to credit and pressure on home
      prices largely prevents consumers from capitalizing on such
      lower rates.

RATINGS LOWERED

Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4
                      Rating
Class   CUSIP      To        From
3-A-1   05948KPN3  B+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
4-A-3   05948KPS2  B+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
4-A-4   05948KPT0  B+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
4-A-5   05948KPU7  BB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4
Class   CUSIP        Rating
1-A-1   05948KPH6    A+ (sf)
2-A-1   05948KPM5    A+ (sf)
4-A-2   05948KPR4    BBB+ (sf)
30-B-1  05948KQB8    CC (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-3: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B-
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four classes and affirmed 20 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust (BACM) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-3.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are the result of higher than expected recoveries on
loans liquidated in addition to the improved performance of the
several larger loans in the pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 10% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 12.5%, including $168.4 million (4.8%
of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 24 loans (18.8%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes
eight specially serviced assets (2%).

As of the August 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 22.9% to $2.71 billion from
$3.52 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, one loan (0.3%
of the pool) is defeased.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes J through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Pacifica Tower loan
(6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 326,384 square foot (sf)
office tower that is part of the Plaza at La Jolla office development,
a six-building property that features 825,000 sf of office space
spread over 17 acres located in the Golden Triangle/University Town
Center (UTC) submarket of San Diego, CA. The largest tenants are DLA
Piper LLP (14%) with lease expiration in June 2020, Wells Fargo Bank
(12%), lease expiration in
Nov. 2018, and CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (10%), lease expiration August
2016.  Wells Fargo Bank (12%) recently renewed their lease in December
2013 for five years.  The property is very highly leveraged ($509
psf).  The most recent servicer reported occupancy as of December 2013
is 97.6% with average rental rates at $35.52 sf.  Per REIS as of the
second quarter of 2014 (2Q'14), the La Jolla submarket vacancy is
11.8% with average asking rent $36.31 sf.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Renaissance
Mayflower Hotel loan (6.8%), which is secured by a 657-key,
full-service luxury hotel located in the DuPont Circle area of
downtown Washington, D.C.  The original five-year interest-only loan
is a full-service luxury hotel featuring 657 guest rooms and 74
suites, an on-site floral boutique, multiple dining options, Thomas
Pink retail store, and a Grand Ballroom built in 1925, renovated in
2004, and located in the DuPont Circle area of downtown Washington,
D.C.  The property is a member of Historic Hotels of America and has
over 35,000 sf of meeting/banquet space.  The loan was modified in
March 2014 and terms included a reduction of the outstanding original
principal balance and a maturity date extension to Sept. 1, 2016 with
a 1 one-year extension option.  Per the July 2014 STR report, the
property is 73.8% occupied with average daily rate (ADR) $215.32 and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) $158.94 compared to 72.7%,
$225.51, $163.89 for its competitive set.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Rockwood Ross
Multifamily Portfolio loan (6.5%), which was originally secured by
seven class B/C multifamily properties totaling 2,508 units located in
Maryland and Northern Virginia and constructed between 1947 and 1988.
One property has been released leaving six properties totaling 1,948
units.  The portfolio is currently 96.41% occupied.  The loan was
previously modified in 2009 which included new equity for renovations
and the funding of a capital improvement reserve.  The modification
included a three-year extension, with a new maturity date of Feb. 1,
2015, and remains interest only.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 through A-1A remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown.  Rating Outlooks
on the A-M classes and A-J class are stable due to the lowered
expected pool losses.  In addition, Fitch applied additional cash flow
stresses to the entire pool, under these additional cash flow
stresses, the rating upgrades were warranted. Further upgrades to the
A-M are unlikely as there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls,
should any of the larger loans become specially serviced and incur
fees as the pool pays down.  According to Fitch's global criteria for
rating caps, Fitch will not assign or maintain 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf'
ratings for notes that it believes have a high level of vulnerability
to interest shortfalls or deferrals, even if permitted under the terms
of the documents.

Fitch upgrades the following classes and assigns or revises Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

   -- $116.6 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $100 million class A-MF to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $135 million class A-MFL to 'Asf' from 'BBB-sf', Outlook to
      Stable from Negative;

   -- $241.7 million class A-J to 'B-sf' from 'CCCsf', assigned
      Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes and assigns or revises REs as indicated:

   -- $35.2 million class B at 'CCCsf', RE 70%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $95.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $61.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $50 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $598.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $48.3 million class C at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $26.4 million class D at 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $26.4 million class E at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $35.2 million class F at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $30.8 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $48.3 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $35.2 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $7.4 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-2FL certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class S certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class XW certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class O to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 12 classes and
downgraded the ratings of five classes of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-2 as follows:

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I Classes A-5 through J were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I Classes K through O were downgraded due to an
increase in Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses.

The ratings on the IO Class X-C was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.7% of the
current balance compared to 3.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.0% of the original pooled
balance compared to 2.5% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating
U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 18, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations
and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 10, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 43% to $930 million
from $1.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 65 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 40% of the
pool. Thirteen loans, constituting 30% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by US government securities.

Eleven loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15 million (for an average loss severity
of 25%). One loan, constituting 3% of the pool, is currently in
special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Atria East Loan
($29.2 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 207,252
square foot (SF) Class B office building in Garden City, NY. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2014 due to payment
delinquency, and is currently due for the March 2014 payment.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 3% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $17.4 million (a 29% expected loss) from the
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 89% compared to 87% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 1.71X and 1.22X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the NYU Housing -- 80 Lafayette Street Loan ($110
million -- 11.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 264-unit student
housing property located in the Tribeca submarket of New York City.
The property is 100% master leased to New York University through
August 2017. Performance has increased since securitization due to
annual rent increases. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and
0.96X, respectively, compared to 95% and 0.91X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Asian Garden Mall Loan ($42.4 million
-- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 123,000 SF retail property
located in Westminster, California. The property was built in 1986. As
of March 2014, the property was 93% leased, the same as at Moody's
prior review. Performance is stable and the loan is benefitting from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 1.08X,
respectively, compared to 97% and 1.06X at last review.

The third largest loan is the TV Guide Hollywood Center Office
Building Loan ($39.7 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by
a 182,967 SF, 12-story office building in Los Angeles, CA. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.89X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.85X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 1999-WF2: Moody's Lowers Class X Rating to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one class of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-WF2 as follows:

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded due to a decline
in the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its referenced
classes as a result of principal paydowns of higher quality referenced
classes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings of IO classes are based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to improved credit quality
of its reference classes. An IO class may be downgraded based on a
higher WARF due to declined credit quality of its reference classes,
paydowns of higher quality reference classes or non-payment of
interest. Classes that have paid off through loan paydowns or
amortization are not included in the WARF calculation. Classes that
have experienced losses are grossed up for losses and included in the
WARF calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating
U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of five compared to eight at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations
and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $34.0 million
from $1.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 32% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 78% of the
pool. Six loans, constituting 13% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities. There are no loans that have
investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Five loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $18.7 million (for an average loss severity
of 26%). There are no specially serviced or troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 and partial year 2014 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
25% compared to 33% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 4.84X,
respectively, compared to 1.74X and 4.59X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 57.4% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is a portfolio of four cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by movie theaters ($10.8 million --
31.7% of the pool), totaling 258,700 square feet (SF) and located in
metropolitan St. Louis, Missouri. The properties are all fully leased
to a single-tenant through January 2019. The loans are fully
amortizing and the loan maturities are co-terminus with the lease
expirations. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 28% and 4.21X,
respectively, compared to 34% and 3.48X at prior review.

The second largest loan is the AMC Theatres Loan ($6.5 million --
19.2%), which is secured by a 90,000 SF movie theater located in
Westminster, Colorado. The property is leased to a single tenant
through April 2018. The loan is fully amortizing and matures in July
2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 25% and 4.26X, respectively,
compared to 32% and 3.43X at prior review.

The third largest loan is the Crossroads Office Center ($2.2 million
-- 6.6%), which is secured by a 46,115 SF suburban office building
located in Mountain View, California. As of July 2014, the property
was 92% leased. Two tenants have indicated that they will be vacating
their premises when their leases expire later in 2014, causing
occupancy to drop to 57% by year-end 2014. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in December 2018. Moody's value is based on a
stabilized approach. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 3.16X,
respectively, compared to 32% and 3.60X at prior review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes and
downgraded the ratings on five classes in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-PWR15 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JFX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2014
Assigned Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2014 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on four P&I classes were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that are
higher than Moody's had previously expected. The rating on the IO
Class was downgraded due to a decline in the credit performance (or
the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.7% of the
current balance compared to 10.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.3% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 12.7% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 51 compared to a Herf of 41 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the September 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $1.77 billion
from $2.81 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 160 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 36% of the
pool. One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

Forty-two loans, constituting 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $356 million (for an average loss severity
of 63%). Realized losses increased since last review primarily due to
the recent payoff of the World Market Center II Loan and the resulting
losses, leading to approximately $211 million in additional losses.
Four loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Aiken Mall Loan
(for $20 million -- 1% of the pool), which is secured by an
approximately 288,000 square foot (SF) portion of an approximately
400,000 SF anchored mall located 25 miles from Augusta, GA. The
anchors are currently Sears, Belk, JCPenney and Dillard's. Dillard's
is not part of the collateral. According to the special servicer,
Sears has indicated they will vacate at lease expiration in October
2014, Belk has used their five year extension option for their October
2014 lease expiration and JCPenney is currently negotiating terms for
their lease expiration in March 2015. As of June 2014, in-line
occupancy at the property was 36%, down from 50% in December 2013.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $31 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (64% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans, constituting 10% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $31 million (a 17% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 98% of the pool
and partial year 2014 operating results for 48% of the pool. Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 102%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 9% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.01X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 1325 G Street Loan ($100 million -- 6% of the
pool), which is secured by an approximately 306,500 SF office property
located near the White House in Washington, DC. The tenant base is
concentrated in government sponsored entities. The property was 62%
leased as of June 2014, as compared to 60% as of January 2014 and 82%
as of March 2013. Moody's analysis reflects a stabilized value for
this asset. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.75X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Cherry Hill Town Center Loan ($88
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
511,000 SF retail property located in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, a
suburb of Philadelphia. The property was 94% leased as of June 2014 as
compared to 100% as of September 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 107% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.87X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Renaissance Orlando at Sea World Loan
($76 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 10-story and
778-room Renaissance brand full service hotel in Orlando, FL. The
property is adjacent to Sea World. The property is on the watchlist
for a drop in DSCR due in part to lower EGI and in part to an increase
in debt service following a switch from partial interest-only payments
to amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.43X at the last review.


BLCP HOTEL 2014-CLRN: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings to
BLCP Hotel Trust 2014-CLRN's $570 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2014-CLRN.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage
loan totaling $570.0 million, with three one-year extension options,
secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 47 extended-stay hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 22, 2014.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings
that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BLCP Hotel Trust 2014-CLRN

Class      Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A          AAA (sf)              189,300,000
X-CP       B- (sf)           484,500,000(ii)
X-EXT      B- (sf)           570,000,000(ii)
B          AA- (sf)               69,000,000
C          A- (sf)                51,300,000
D          BBB- (sf)              73,900,000
E          BB- (sf)              113,000,000
F          B- (sf)                73,500,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities
     Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
     X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
     class A, B, C, D, E, and F certificates.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2014-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
BlueMountain CLO 2014-1 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2014-1 LLC's $475.625
million fixed- and floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of June 24, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of portfolio
collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager typically
covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within the guidelines
specified in the transaction documents to reach the target level of
portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO transaction documents
specify a date by which the targeted level of portfolio collateral
must be reached.  The "effective date" for a CLO transaction is
usually the earlier of the date on which the transaction acquires the
target level of portfolio collateral or the date defined in the
transaction documents.  Most transaction documents contain provisions
directing the trustee to request the rating agencies that have issued
ratings upon closing to affirm the ratings issued on the closing date
after reviewing the effective date portfolio (typically referred to as
an "effective date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that the
portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to us by the
trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the transaction's
structure, provides sufficient credit support to maintain the ratings
that we assigned on the transaction's closing date.  The effective
date reports provide a summary of certain information that we used in
our analysis and the results of our review based on the information
presented to us," S&P said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager to
acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This window of
time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period." Because some CLO
transactions may acquire most of their assets from the new issue
leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give collateral managers
the flexibility to acquire a more diverse portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of portfolio
collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the closing date and
prior to its effective date review are generally based on the
application of S&P's criteria to a combination of purchased
collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and the indicative
portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the collateral manager, and may
also reflect its assumptions about the transaction's investment
guidelines.  This is because not all assets in the portfolio have been
purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of the
transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether the
initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement based on
the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis relies on the
use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default rate at each
rating level based on the effective date portfolio, full cash flow
modeling to determine the appropriate percentile break-even default
rate at each rating level, the application of our supplemental tests,
and the analytical judgment of a rating committee," S&P noted.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis of
the information provided by the transaction's trustee and collateral
manager in support of their request for effective date rating
affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an effective
date report each time we issue an effective date rating affirmation on
a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit quality
of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support the notes,
and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit
rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to
include a description of the representations, warranties, and
enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how
they differ from the representations, warranties, and enforcement
mechanisms in issuances of similar securities.  The Rule applies to
in-scope securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on
or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included
in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bluemountain CLO 2014-1 LTD./Bluemountain CLO 2014-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                      Amount
                                                     (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                    321.25
B-1                        AA (sf)                      30.00
B-2                        AA (sf)                      20.00
C                          A (sf)                       41.25
D                          BBB (sf)                     26.88
E                          BB (sf)                      21.25
F                          B (sf)                       15.00


BNPP IP 2014-II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings to
BNPP IP CLO 2014-II Ltd./BNPP IP CLO 2014-II LLC's $322.75 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated
senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 24, 2014.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings
that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash
      flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the assigned
      preliminary ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
      including LIBOR ranging from 0.2365%-11.4093%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment interest diversion test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50.0% of available excess interest proceeds into principal
      proceeds during the reinvestment period that are available
      before paying subordinated, deferred, and incentive
      management fees, uncapped administrative expenses and fees
      and subordinated note payments.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit
rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to
include a description of the representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how
they differ from the representations, warranties and enforcement
mechanisms in issuances of similar securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this credit
rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/2732.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BNPP IP CLO 2014-II Ltd./BNPP IP CLO 2014-II LLC

Class                   Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)            222.25
B                       AA (sf)              40.75
C (deferrable)          A (sf)               25.00
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)             18.25
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)              16.50
Subordinated notes      NR                   37.90

NR--Not rated.


CARFINANCE CAPITAL: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded nine tranches issued from
CarFinance 2013-1 and 2013-2 securitizations, originated and serviced
by CarFinance Capital LLC.

The complete rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-1

Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2014 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2014
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2014
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-2

Class A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions were prompted by the build-up of credit enhancement due to
the sequential pay structure and non-declining reserve account. The
lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectation for the 2013-1
transaction was slightly lowered to 11.00% from 12% due to the stable
performance of the underlying collateral pool. The CNL expectation for
the 2013-2 transaction remains unchanged from the original loss
expectation of 11%. Additionally, the upgrade of the senior tranches
above A3 (sf) is due to the declining operational risk as the pool
seasons .

Below are key performance metrics (as of the August 2014 distribution
date) and credit assumptions for each affected transaction. Credit
assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime CNL (expected loss)
which is expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance;
Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and Moody's Aaa (sf) level
which are expressed as a percentage of the current pool balance. The
Aaa (sf) level is the level of credit enhancement that would be
consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset pool.
Performance metrics include pool factor which is the ratio of the
current collateral balance to the original collateral balance at
closing; total credit enhancement, which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, and a reserve fund; and per
annum excess spread.

Issuer -- CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 11.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -12.34%

Aaa (sf) level -- 44.0%

Pool factor -- 59.15%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Class A 75.11%, Class B 34.53%, Class
C 25.24%, Class D 17.63%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 9.8%

Issuer -- CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-2

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 11.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation -12.15%

Aaa (sf) level -- 44.0%

Pool factor -- 71.37%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Class A 56.04%, Class B 28.72%, Class
C 20.31%, Class D 15.41%, Class E 9.8%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 9.2%

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to an
upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss may be
better than its original expectations because of lower frequency of
default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in the value of the
vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of payment. The US job
market and the market for used vehicle are primary drivers of
performance. Other reasons for better performance than Moody's
expected include changes in servicing practices to maximize
collections on the loans or refinancing opportunities that result in a
prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect investors
against current expectations of loss could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may be worse than its
original expectations because of higher frequency of default by the
underlying obligors of the loans or a deterioration in the value of
the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of payment. The US job
market and the market for used vehicle are primary drivers of
performance. Other reasons for worse performance than Moody's expected
include poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack
of transactional governance and fraud.


CARLYLE GLOBAL: Moody's Rates $5.5-Mil. Class Notes (P)B3
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO
2014-4, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Carlyle 2014-4").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$350,375,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$58,210,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$29,245,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$34,535,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$32,865,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$5,570,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes,
Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Carlyle 2014-4 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is expected to be at least 70% ramped as of the closing
date.

Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the
Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $557,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of the
Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability relative
to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes (shown in terms
of the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2825 to 3249)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2825 to 3673)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has been
assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score assigned for
the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the special report
titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Global Cash Flow
CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around the
various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing to
uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality, historical
performance, the level of disclosure, transaction complexity, the
modeling and the transaction governance that underlie the ratings. The
V Score applies to the entire transaction, rather than individual
tranches.


CASTLE 2003-1: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, and D notes from Castle 2003-1 Trust, which is an
aircraft asset-backed securities transaction collateralized primarily
by aircraft lease revenue and sale proceeds.

The withdrawals follow the notes' complete principal paydown on July 15, 2014.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Castle 2003-1 Trust
                        Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA (sf)
B-1                 NR                  A (sf)
B-2                 NR                  A (sf)
D                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


CATAMARAN CLO 2014-2: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Catamaran
CLO 2014-2 Ltd./Catamaran CLO 2014-2 LLC's $425.00 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
      primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, hedge termination
      payments, subordinated, deferred senior, and incentive
      management fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

RATINGS LIST

Catamaran CLO 2014-2 Ltd./Catamaran CLO 2014-2 LLC
Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)              283.50
A-2                   AA (sf)                53.75
B                     A (sf)                 35.50
C                     BBB (sf)               23.25
D                     BB (sf)                19.25
E                     B (sf)                  9.75
Subordinated notes    NR                     39.75

NR -- Not rated.


CENT CLO 16: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the class
A-1a, A-1b, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Cent CLO 16 L.P., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Columbia
Management Investment Advisers LLC, after the notes were redeemed in
full on Sept. 19, 2014.  At the same time, S&P assigned its ratings on
the replacement class A-1a-R, A-1b-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture. All of
the proceeds from the replacement notes were used to redeem the
original notes as outlined by provisions in the transaction documents.

The supplemental indenture includes provisions focused around the
Volcker Rule that made nonloan collateral ineligible.  The amendment
also extended the weighted average life test by one year.

S&P's full cash flow analysis resulted in positive cushions for the
refinanced notes.

Current date after refinancing

Class      Amount   Interest          BDR      SDR     Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)     (%)
A-1a-R     245.50   LIBOR plus 1.25   73.02    60.06   12.96
A-1b-R     10.00    2.52              73.02    60.06   12.96
A-2-R      45.50    LIBOR plus 2.25   70.82    52.53   18.29
B-R        31.00    LIBOR plus 3.20   59.56    46.47   13.09
C-R        19.00    LIBOR plus 4.25   54.63    40.90   13.73
D-R        17.00    LIBOR plus 5.99   48.70    34.27   14.43

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive changes
to the transaction.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Cent CLO 16 L.P.

                       Rating
Original class     To           From
A-1a               NR           AAA (sf)
A-1b               NR           AAA (sf)
A-2                NR           AA (sf)
B                  NR           A (sf)
C                  NR           BBB (sf)
D                  NR           BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cent CLO 16 L.P.

Replacement class    Rating
A-1a-R               AAA (sf)
A-1b-R               AAA (sf)
A-2-R                AA (sf)
B-R                  A (sf)
C-R                  BBB (sf)
D-R                  BB (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:               Cent CLO 16 L.P.
Co-issuer:            Cent CLO 16 LLC
Collateral manager:   Columbia Management Investment Advisers LLC
Refinancing arranger: Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Trustee:              The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. N.A.
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


CENT CLO 22: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary ratings to
Cent CLO 22 Ltd./Cent CLO 21 Corp.'s $471.20 million fixed and
floating-rate notes.

The notes issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 18, 2014.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings
that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread).

   -- The transaction's cash flow structure, which can withstand
      the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's CDO
      Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using the
      assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans (i.e., those rated 'BB+' or lower).

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- During the reinvestment period, the transaction's interest
      reinvestment overcollateralization test.  A failure of this
      test will lead to the reclassification of up to 50% of the
      excess interest proceeds (that are available before paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      hedge termination payments, collateral manager subordinated
      and incentive fees, distributions to any contributors, and
      subordinated note payments) as either, at the collateral
      manager's option, principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets, or proceeds to pay principal on the notes
      according to the note payment sequence.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cent CLO 22 Ltd./ Cent CLO 22 Corp.

Class                Prelim rating   Prelim amount (mil. $)

A-1                  AAA (sf)        319.80
A-2a                 AA (sf)         34.00
A-2b                 AA (sf)         25.00
B (deferrable)       A (sf)          34.40
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)        25.40
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)         21.30
E (deferrable)       B (sf)          11.30
Subordinated notes   NR              42.45

NR--Not rated.


CIFC FUNDING 2007-I: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $17MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by CIFC Funding 2007-I, Ltd.:

$24,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on November 27, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on November 27, 2013 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$17,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1
(sf); previously on November 27, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$100,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $66,409,019.58), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on November 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$75,000,000 Class A-1LAr Variable Funding Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $43,508,455.86), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on November 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$77,800,000 Class A-1LAt Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $45,132,771.54), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on November 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$38,200,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on November 27, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
$17,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $16,399,907.40), Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
on November 27, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

CIFC Funding 2007-I, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
in November 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since April 2014. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 29.4% or $80.8 million since
then. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Senior Class A, Class B-1L
and Class B-2L notes are reported at 137.77%, 123.55%, 115.45% and
108.58%, respectively, versus April 2014 levels of 126.65%, 116.84%,
111.00% and 105.89%, respectively.

The deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit quality of
the portfolio since the last review. Based on Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2700 compared to 2908
at the time of the last review.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

(1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

(2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

(3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing
the transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to
positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit
quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
for CLO performance.

(4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

(5) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number of
securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed through
credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the necessary
information to update its credit estimates in a timely fashion, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2160)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LAr: 0

Class A-1LAt: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +1

Class B-1L: +3

Class B-2L: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3240)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LAr: 0

Class A-1LAt: 0

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -3

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $299.1 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 18.70% (implying a WARF of
2700), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.06%, a
diversity score of 71 and a weighted average spread of 3.36%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Raises Rating on Cl. J Debt From 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has upgraded four classes of COMM 2004-LNB2 as follows:

-- Class F to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class G to AAA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class H to BBB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class J to BBB (sf) from B (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining classes
in the transaction. The trends on Classes C, D, E, X-1, F, G, H and J
are Stable.  There is no trend on Class K.

The ratings upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to the
bonds as a result of loan repayment and amortization, in addition to
substantial defeasance collateral.  Two loans, representing 80.67% of
the current pool, are fully defeased. Since issuance, there has been
collateral reduction of 90.4%, with five loans remaining in the pool
out of the original 90 loans.  Approximately 19.0% of total collateral
reduction has occurred over the past 12 months, as 47 loans have been
paid in full over the past year.

As of the August 2014 remittance, there is one loan, Alta Mesa
(Prospectus ID#54), in special servicing, due to a maturity default in
January 2014.  According to the special servicer, the borrower has
expressed interest in refinancing the loan; however, the loan
performance has declined after some tenants vacated the property at
the end of 2013.  An updated appraisal was completed in May 2014,
which suggested a value in excess of the current loan amount; however,
the special servicer is exploring all possible options, including
foreclosure.  DBRS will continue to monitor the loan and will follow
up with the special servicer regarding its resolution strategy.


COMM 2012-CCRE4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating of Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2012-CCRE4 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2012-CCRE4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool.  The pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1.7% to $1.09 billion from $1.11 billion at issuance.
Currently there are three specially-serviced loans that account for
0.7% of the pool.

The specially-serviced loans are cross-collateralized (and
cross-defaulted) secured by retail and multifamily properties in
Chicago, IL.  All three loans transferred to special servicing in May
2014; however, the initial default originated from the Wells Street
Portfolio loan(0.2% of the pool), which consists of an 8,100 square
foot (sf) retail building and 6-unit multifamily property.  At
issuance, the retail space was leased to one tenant (Community Bar),
which had not yet taken occupancy; the tenant was expected to move
into the space in September 2012 and $500,000 was held back at
closing, to be released when the tenant was open for business for 6
months.  The tenant never took occupancy and the building remains 100%
vacant; the escrow funds were never released.  Negotiations between
the borrower and special servicer are ongoing.

The largest loan in the pool is The Prince Building (11.4% of the
pool), which is secured by a 354,603 sf, 12-story multi-use building
located in the SoHo neighborhood of Manhattan, New York, NY.  Major
tenants include Scholastic Inc. (16.3% NRA, expiration 4/2018) and
ZocDoc (15.1% NRA, expiration 7/2017).  Performance is stable with
year-end (YE) 2013 occupancy and DSCR at 94% and 2.25x, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable.  Due to the recent
issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

   -- $40.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $148.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $499.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $869;983;027* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104;156;000* class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $111.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $62.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $38.9 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $45.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.4 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.

A comparison of the transaction's Representations, Warranties, and
Enforcement (RW&E) mechanisms to those of typical RW&Es for the asset
class is available in the following report:

   -- 'COMM 2012-CCRE4: Appendix' (Dec. 21, 2012).


COMM 2014-LC17: DBRS Assigns '(P)BB' Rating to Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC17 to be
issued by COMM 2014-LC17 Mortgage Trust.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-B, X-C, X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G, D, E, F and G will be privately
placed pursuant to Rule 144A.  The Class X balances are notional. DBRS
ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of
receiving interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS
considers the IO certificates' position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-M, Class B and Class
C certificates may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates.  Class PEZ
certificates may be exchanged for up to the full certificate balance
of the Class A-M, Class B and Class C certificates.

The collateral consists of 71 fixed-rate loans secured by 207
commercial properties, for a total transaction balance of
$1,235,960,696.  The DBRS sample included 28 loans, representing 70.0%
of the pool.  The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with
a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 27 equal-sized
loans, despite the largest loan representing 9.7% of the pool.
Increased pool diversity helps to insulate the higher-rated classes
from event risk.  Properties located in urban markets represent only
12.5% of the pool, which is below transactions seen in the recent past
that typically have urban concentrations of 15.0% to 20.0%, and have
increased liquidity.  Term default risk is moderate, as indicated by a
strong DBRS Term DSCR of 1.57x.  In addition, 25 loans, representing
44.1% of the pool, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x, including
five of the top ten loans.

The deal consists of 26 properties, totaling 10.9% of the pool, leased
to single tenants, which have been found to have higher losses in the
event of default.  DBRS modeled single-tenant properties with a higher
expected loss compared with multi-tenant properties.  Additionally,
none of the single-tenant properties in the pool are considered to be
overly specialized in such a manner that would make it difficult to
re-lease the space to another user.  The transaction has a moderate
concentration of loans exhibiting elevated refinance risk, with 31
loans, representing 42.0% of the pool, having a DBRS Refi DSCR below
1.00x and 17 loans, representing 26.6% of the pool, having a DBRS Refi
DSCR below 0.90x.  These DSCRs are based on a weighted-average stress
refinance constant of 9.8%, which implies an interest rate of 9.2%,
amortizing on a 30-year schedule.  This represents a significant
stress of 4.6% over the weighted-average contractual interest rate of
the loans in the pool.


COMM 2014-PAT: DBRS Assigns (P)BB Rating to Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
COMM 2014-PAT Mortgage Trust.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The collateral for the transaction consists of the fee interest in a
36-story office tower in Midtown Manhattan.  The subject property is
located at 65 East 55th Street and spans the entire block between East
55th and East 56th, with public entrances on both sides.  It is
considered Class A with excellent views of Manhattan on the upper
floors.  The building consists of 579,694 square feet (sf) of office
and storage space, and 7,232 sf of ground floor retail space that is
100.0% occupied by the restaurant Aquavit.  As of July 2014, the
property was 92.4% leased by 12 tenants, the largest of which is the
law firm Paul Hastings LLP (Paul Hastings), which occupies 274,271 sf
(46.7% of the net rentable area (NRA)).  Both Paul Hastings and the
second-largest tenant, Davidson Kempner Capital LLC (Davidson
Kempner), will be leaving the subject property after their respective
lease expiries in June 2016 and February 2016.  Combined, these
tenants encompass 54.7% of the NRA and 50.9% of the DBRS underwritten
base rent.  The loan, combined with both a senior and junior mezzanine
loan totaling $135.2 million, served as acquisition financing for the
loan sponsor, Blackstone Real Estate Partners VII, L.P. (Blackstone),
which acquired the subject for $750.0 million.  Including closing
costs and $5.1 million of upfront reserves, there will be $209.5
million of cash equity behind the $425.0 million mortgage loan.

The loan sponsor, Blackstone, is considered strong, as the firm is an
experienced commercial real estate operator with a considerable
presence in the Manhattan market.  The cash equity of $209.5 million,
results in a loan-to-basis ratio of only 49.3%.  To address the
significant rollover occurring over the next two years, the loan is
structured with a full cash flow sweep, which commenced at loan
closing, as well as a $53.2 million payment guarantee from Blackstone
to cover leasing costs and other building improvements associated with
re-tenanting the Paul Hastings and Davidson Kempner space.  DBRS
anticipates that there will be approximately $17.1 million swept into
the leasing reserve in addition to the Blackstone guarantee.  DBRS
estimates that re-leasing the collateral to its current 89.1% economic
occupancy rate will cost $18.6 million.  While this amount does not
completely cover DBRS's estimate of full leasing costs, the loan
fundamentals are considered quite strong in light of the borrower's
cash equity investment to date and the sponsor's guarantee.


CSMC 2007-C1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on $25MM Class A Cert.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following rating to class A-MFX of Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC), series 2007-C1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

   -- $25,000,000 class A-MFX 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The creation of the A-MFX class is the result of the partial exchange
and termination of the swap agreement for class A-MFL.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Additional information on rating sensitivity is available in the
release 'Fitch Affirms CSMC 2007-C1; Revises Outlooks for Classes A-3
& A-1-A to Stable' (Jan 21, 2014), available at


CWHEQ REVOLVING 2007-G: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Tranches to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three tranches
from CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, 2007-G, backed primarily
by HELOCs.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, 2007-G

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades are a result of the recent performance of the
HELOC loan backed pool and reflects Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pool. The tranches were upgraded primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures and
non-amortizing subordinate bonds. Performance has remained generally
stable from Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 from 7.2% in August
2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5%
for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.


EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Lifts $48-Mil. Class Notes Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Eastland CLO, Ltd.:

$78,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due May 1, 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on April 9, 2014
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

$81,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due May 1, 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
April 9, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$68,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due May 1, 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
April 9, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$48,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due May 1, 2022 (current outstanding balance of
$37,636,187), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on April 9, 2014
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$100,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due May 1, 2022 (current outstanding balance of $85,003,900), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on April 9, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$825,600,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due May 1, 2022 (current outstanding balance of $670,900,000),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 9, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$206,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due May 1, 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 9, 2014
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Eastland CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with exposure to CLO tranches. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes since April 2014. The Class A-1 and A-2a notes have been
paid down by approximately 5.4% or $43.3 million since April 2014.
Moody's expects deleveraging to continue as the deal is currently not
allowed to reinvest due to failure of restricted trading covenants.

Additionally, the deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio since April 2014. Based on the trustee's
August 2014 report, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2373 compared to 2554 in April 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

(1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

(2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

(3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing
the transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to
positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit
quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
for CLO performance.

(4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

(5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

(6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a number of
securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed through
credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the necessary
information to update its credit estimates in a timely fashion, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2057)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3085)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: -1

Class A-3: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $1.25 billion, defaulted par of $81.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 17.89% (implying a
WARF of 2571), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.63%, a diversity score of 47 and a weighted average spread of
3.06%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In
some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered based
on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case,
historical and market performance and the collateral manager's
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.


EATON VANCE VIII: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Eaton Vance CDO VIII, Ltd.:

$48,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due August 15, 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 12, 2013
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$23,250,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
August 15, 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 12, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

$33,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due August 15, 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 12, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$583,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due August
15, 2022 (current outstanding balance of $379,173,861.09), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on June 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf).

Eaton Vance CDO VIII, Ltd., issued in July 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in August 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class A notes have
been paid down by approximately 19% or $89.8 million since March 2014.
Based on the trustee's September 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C
and Class D notes are reported at 139.9%, 124.2%, 117.8% and 109.6%,
respectively, versus March 2014 levels of 132.3%, 120.0%, 114.8% and
108.1%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better credit
quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing the
transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to positive
CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1947)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2921)

Class A: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $527.4 million, defaulted par of $4.1
million, a weighted average default probability of 17.26% (implying a
WARF of 2434), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.97%, a diversity score of 73 and a weighted average spread of
3.07%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In
some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered based
on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case,
historical and market performance and the collateral manager's
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.


ECP CLO 2014-6: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $10.5MM Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by ECP CLO 2014-6, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "ECP CLO
2014-6").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$516,700,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$29,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$103,700,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$47,600,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

$44,200,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$36,700,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$4,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$10,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2
Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as
the "Rated Notes".

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses posed
to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and
the characteristics of the underlying assets.

ECP CLO 2014-6 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The Issuer's portfolio is 100% ramped as of the closing date.

Silvermine Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the
Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets and equity securities,
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $850,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2500

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of the
Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability relative
to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes (shown in terms
of the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2500 to 2875)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D-1 Notes: 0

Class D-2 Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2500 to 3250)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has been
assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score assigned for
the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the special report
titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Global Cash Flow
CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around the
various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing to
uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality, historical
performance, the level of disclosure, transaction complexity, the
modeling and the transaction governance that underlie the ratings. The
V Score applies to the entire transaction, rather than individual
tranches.


GSMS 2004-GG2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes,
upgraded two classes and downgraded one class in GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-GG2 as follows:

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I classes E and F were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 92% since Moody's last review.The
ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was downgraded due to a decline
in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of its referenced classes based on the paydown of more highly
rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 45.5% of the
current balance, compared to 5.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.7% of the original pooled
balance compared to 5.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July
2000.

Moody's analysis also incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 60% of the pool is in
special servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 30% of
the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that it expects will generate
a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a review of
broker's opinions of value (if available), other information from the
special servicer, available market data and Moody's internal data. The
loss given default for each loan also takes into consideration
repayment of servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and
closing costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior
classes.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of four, compared to 23 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7 in formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan
model derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV
ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage,
loan structure, property type and sponsorship. Moody's also further
adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated
with loan level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $116 million
from $2.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
2% to 29% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 10% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $69 million (for an average loss severity
of 47.8%). Four loans, constituting 60% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
University Mall (for $34 million 29% of the pool), which is secured by
a 560,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail property located in rural
Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing in 2008 after the
mall's two largest tenants filed bankruptcy. The property became REO
in 2010. At year-end 2013, the property was 83% leased compared to 67%
at last review.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $51 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (73% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2013 and partial year 2014 operating
results for 50% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
90% compared to 93% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects
a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.22X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The conduit pool consists of two loans representing 30% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Renaissance Plaza Loan ($33 million
-- 28% of the pool), which is secured by a 175,000 SF anchored retail
center located in Durham, North Carolina. The property is adjacent to
The Streets at Southpoint, a GGP regional mall. Current occupancy is
100%, same as prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and
1.17X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at the last review.

The second loan is the Kleppe Business Park Loan ($2 million -- 1.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 80,000 SF industrial property just
outside Reno, Nevada. The loan transferred into special servicing in
2010 and was subsequently modified in 2012 with a rate reduction and
term extension. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.88X,
respectively, same as at the last review.


GSMS 2006-RR3: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 3 Classes to C
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the following
certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR3 ("GSMS
2006-RR3"):

Cl. A1-P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A1-S, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of three classes of certificates
because the disposition of higher credit quality assets has not fully
offset a material increase in high credit risk assets in the remaining
collateral pool as evidenced by the WARF. The rating actions are the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic) transactions.

GSMS 2006-RR3 is a static Re-Remic transaction backed by a portfolio
of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). All of the CMBS assets were securitized between 2004 and
2006. The aggregate certificate balance of the transaction has
decreased to $134.0 million compared to $727.8 million at issuance as
a result of the disposition of certain assets and writedowns to the
underlying CMBS collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the expected
loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating factor
(WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically
models these as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants
for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF (excluding
defaulted securities) of 7711, compared to 6731 at last review. The
current ratings on the Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of
the non-Moody's rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0%, compared to
2.7% at last review; A1-A3 and 7.2%, compared to 0.0% at last review;
Baa1-Baa3 and 2.3%, compared to 4.2% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 0.0%,
compared to 11.1% at last review; B1-B3 and 18.7%, compared to 20.9%
at last review; Caa1-Ca/C and 71.8%, compared to 61.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.8 years, compared to 3.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 3.9% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty, because
it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject to
change. The servicing decisions of the master and special servicer and
surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to the collateral
interests and oversight of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the key
parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption could
be offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly sensitive to
changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, increasing the recovery rates by 10% would
result in no modeled rating movement on the rated certificates.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values continue to improve modestly, along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, sustained growth will not be possible
until investment increases steadily for a significant period,
non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a
euro area recession abate.


HALCYON 2005-2: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on 2 Notes Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the following
classes of notes issued by Halcyon 2005-2, Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of the note because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Halcyon 2005-2 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a portfolio
of credit default swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations were securitized in
2005 (80.0% of the notional balance of the reference obligations), and
2006 (20.0%). As of this review, 73.3% of the reference obligations
are publicly rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the expected
loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating factor
(WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically
models these as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants
for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
1,202, compared to 952 at last. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 (23.3%,
compared to 16.7% at last review); A1-A3 (20.0%, compared to 23.3% at
last review); Baa1-Baa3 (30.0%, compared to 36.7% at last review );
Ba1-Ba3 (6.7%, compared to 10.0% at last review); B1-B3 (10.0%,
compared to 6.7% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (10.0%, compared to
6.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.0 years, compared to 1.6 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 10.5%, compared to 36.3% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.3%, compared to 18.4% at last review.

Methodologies Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it is
sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject to
change. The servicing decisions of the master and special servicer and
surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to the collateral
interests and oversight of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the key
parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset by a
change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions. The
rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the ratings of
the reference obligations and credit assessments. Notching the
reference obligations down by -1 notches would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch
downward (e.g. one notch downward implies Baa3 to Ba1). Notching the
reference obligations upward by +1 notch would result in an average
modeled rating movement of zero notches upward (e.g. one notch upward
implies Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values continue to improve modestly, along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, sustained growth will not be possible
until investment increases steadily for a significant period,
non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a
euro area recession abate.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2012-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Highbridge Principal Strategies LLC, after the notes were redeemed in
full on Sept. 22, 2014.  At the same time, S&P assigned its ratings on
the replacement class A-1R, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes and affirmed
its rating on the class E notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture. All of
the proceeds from the replacement notes were used to redeem the
original notes as outlined by provisions in the transaction documents.

The supplemental indenture includes provisions focused around the
Volcker Rule that made non-loan collateral ineligible.  The amendment
also increased the maximum covenant-lite loan limitation to 60% from
30%.

S&P's full cash flow analysis resulted in positive cushions for the
refinanced notes (see tables 1 and 2).

Table 1

Current date after refinancing
Class      Amount   Interest          BDR      SDR     Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)     (%)
A-1R      200.00    LIBOR plus 1.40   69.25    61.14   8.11
A-2R      27.50     LIBOR plus 2.25   69.40    53.18   16.22
B-R       23.00     LIBOR plus 3.25   57.82    46.76   11.05
C-R       13.50     LIBOR plus 4.25   52.92    40.69   12.23
D-R       12.25     LIBOR plus 5.75   44.67    33.63   11.04
E         7.00      LIBOR plus 6.75   36.20    27.60   8.60

Table 2

Effective date
Class      Amount   Interest          BDR      SDR     Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)     (%)
A-1       200.00    LIBOR plus 1.51   68.69    66.46   2.23
A-2       27.50     LIBOR plus 2.70   69.07    58.35   10.72
B         23.00     LIBOR plus 4.15   57.62    52.20   5.42
C         13.50     LIBOR plus 5.00   52.89    45.92   6.97
D         12.25     LIBOR plus 5.75   45.95    38.59   7.36
E         7.00      LIBOR plus 6.75   44.02    32.28   11.74

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive changes
to the transaction.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd.

                       Rating
Original class     To           From
A-1                NR           AAA (sf)
A-2                NR           AA (sf)
B                  NR           A (sf)
C                  NR           BBB (sf)
D                  NR           BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating
A-1R                 AAA (sf)
A-2R                 AA (sf)
B-R                  A (sf)
C-R                  BBB (sf)
D-R                  BB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED
Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd.

Class                Rating
E                    B (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:               Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd.
Co-issuer:            Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 LLC
Collateral manager:   Highbridge Principal Strategies LLC
Refinancing arranger: Credit Suisse
Trustee:              The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. N.A.
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


JP MORGAN 2013-HLT: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X-Fl Cert
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on 13 classes of JP
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-HLT. Moody's rating action is
as follows:

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-1FX, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-2FX, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X-FL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the three interest only (IO) classes
were affirmed based on the stable ratings of the referenced classes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance in the pool or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in loan
concentration, an increase in expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July
2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type and
sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and
other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 5, 2014 Distribution Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged from that of
securitization at $3.5 billion. The transaction is secured by a first
lien mortgage loan on a cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
portfolio of 23 hotels totaling 18,359 guestrooms located across 13
states, Washington DC and Puerto Rico. The loan is interest only
during the term and its final maturity date is in December 2018. The
sponsor of the loan is Hilton Worldwide Inc. There is no additional
debt.

The mortgage is comprised of two components: 1) $875 million floating
rate component with an initial maturity date in December 2015 plus
three successive one-year extension terms, and 2) $2.625 billion fixed
rate component with a five-year term. Any losses will be shared across
the two components on a pro rata basis in reverse sequential order.
Principal reduction through prepayment and/or collateral releases will
be distributed first to the Floating Rate Certificates on a pro rata
basis. After the balance of Floating Rate Certificates has been
reduced to zero, then principal reduction is applied to the Fixed Rate
Certificates in a senior sequential order.

The portfolio's year-end 2013 net cash flow (NCF) was $413.7 million.
Moody's stabilized Net Cash Flow is $418.9 million, and Moody's
stabilized value is $4.07 billion, the same as securitization. Moody's
trust LTV ratio is 85% and Moody's stressed DSCR for the trust is
1.28X, the same as securitization. The trust has not incurred as
losses or interest shortfalls as of the current Distribution Date.


KATONAH X CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Katonah X CLO, Ltd.:

$40,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on April 3, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf); previously on April 3, 2013 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$22,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf); previously on April 3, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 3, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$94,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $41,628,091.10), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on April 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$23,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on April 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-2a Revolving Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
(current outstanding balance of $27,714,081.31), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on April 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$187,500,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $103,927,804.95), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on April 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Katonah X CLO Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2013. The Class A-1
and A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 45.51% or $34.8
million and 34.8% or $70.3 million, respectively, since December 2013.
Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the OC ratios for the Class
A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at 132.8%,
121.6%, 113.1% and 106.4%, respectively, versus December 2013 levels
of 126.7%, 118.1%, 111.3% and 105.8%, respectively. Moody's notes that
the August 2014 trustee-reported OC ratios do not take into account
$35.7 million of principal proceeds that were distributed to the A-1
and A-2 notes on the August 2014 payment date.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the stated maturity of the notes. Based on the trustee's
August 2014 report, securities that mature after the stated maturity
of the notes currently make up approximately 7.44% of the portfolio
compared to 5.33% in December 2013. These investments could expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes
mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better credit
quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing the
transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to positive
CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal
value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to
which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the
asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1921)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2881)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
recovery rate, weighted average spread and the weighted average coupon
are based on its published methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $322.14 million, defaulted par of $8.7 million, a weighted
average default probability of 15.10% (implying a WARF of 2401), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.06%, a diversity
score of 51, a weighted average spread of 2.8% and a weighted average
coupon of 7.6%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In
some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered based
on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case,
historical and market performance and the collateral manager's
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.


KEYCORP STUDENT 2004-A: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Cl. II-D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms all ratings on the outstanding student loan
notes issued by KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2004-A Group II.  The
Rating Outlook for the class A and B notes is revised to Stable from
Negative due to improved parity and accelerated paydown of the class A
notes.  The Rating Outlook for the class C notes remains Negative.
The Recovery Estimate for the class D notes remains 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS:

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$223.66 million private student loans as of June 2014.  The loans were
originated primarily by KeyBank, NA.  The projected remaining defaults
are expected to range between 15%-17% as a percentage of current
principal balance.  A recovery rate of 15% was applied which was
determined to be appropriate based on data provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement (CE): CE is provided by excess spread and
overcollateralization, and the senior notes benefit from subordination
provided by the junior notes.  As of the June 2014 distribution, the
class A, B, C, and D parity ratios are 230.13%, 163.09%, 111.23%, and
95.98% respectively.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve account
sized at approximately $8.9 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by KeyBank, N.A.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ from
the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than the
base case.  This will result in a decline in CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain note
ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions, depending on
the extent of the decline in coverage.  Fitch will continue to monitor
the performance of the trust.

Fitch affirms these:

KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2004-A (Group II):

   -- Class II-A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- Class II-B at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to Stable from
      Negative;

   -- Class II-C at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative;

   -- Class II-D at 'CCsf'; RE0%.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of the following
class of notes issued by Magnolia Finance II Series 2005-6 ("Magnolia
Finance II"):

Cl. B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the rating of the notes because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Magnolia Finance II is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations were
securitized in 2003 (1.0% of the notional balance of the reference
obligations), 2004 (15.1%), and 2005 (83.9%). As of this review,
100.0% of the reference obligations are publicly rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the expected
loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating factor
(WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery
rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically
models these as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants
for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 178,
compared to 143 at last. The current ratings on the Moody's-rated
reference obligations and the assessments of the non-Moody's rated
reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 (82.1%, compared to 81.7% at
last review); A1-A3 (10.6%, compared to 10.1% at last review);
Baa1-Baa3 (1.3%, compared to 3.4% at last review );Ba1-Ba3 (3.7%,
compared to 3.4% at last review); B1-B3 (1.3%, compared to 0.8% at
last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (1.0%, compared to 0.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.5 years, compared to 3.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 47.4%, compared to 63.2% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.6%, compared to 16.0% at last review.

Methodologies Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it is
sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in
turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject to
change. The servicing decisions of the master and special servicer and
surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to the collateral
interests and oversight of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the key
parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset by a
change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions. The
rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the ratings of
the reference obligations and credit assessments. Notching the
reference obligations down by -1 notches would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of one to two notches
downward (e.g. one notch downward implies Baa3 to Ba1). Notching the
reference obligations upward by +1 notch would result in an average
modeled rating movement of one notches upward (e.g. one notch upward
implies Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values continue to improve modestly, along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property type
performance. Limited new construction and moderate job growth have
aided this improvement. However, sustained growth will not be possible
until investment increases steadily for a significant period,
non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a
euro area recession abate.


MASTR ALTERNATIVE 2003-4: S&P Cuts Rating on Class B-3 Notes to CC
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two classes
and affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from MASTR Alternative
Loan Trust 2003-4, a U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction containing fixed rate, highly seasoned
Alternative-A (Alt-A) collateral.  This transaction has five pools of
loans, three of which have 30-year amortization terms, and two of
which have shorter amortization terms (20-years or less) and lower
balances.  All of the loans in this transaction are secured primarily
by first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

DOWNGRADES

The lowered ratings on classes B-1 ('CCC (sf)') and B-3 ('CC (sf)')
reflect S&P's belief that our projected credit enhancement for these
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses at the
prior rating levels.  S&P's projected losses reflect the impact of
interest rate loan modifications, which have decreased the amount of
available interest cash flow in the transaction.  To the extent
principal cash flows are diverted to make interest payments, S&P
expects there will be insufficient cash flow to satisfy these classes'
principal obligations.

The ratings on both of these classes were non-investment-grade (rated
'BB+ (sf)' or lower) before the rating actions.  According to
"Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC','CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings,"
published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' rating on class B-1 indicates
that S&P believes this class is vulnerable to default, and the 'CC
(sf)' rating on class B-3 reflects S&P's belief that this class is
virtually certain to default.

AFFIRMATIONS

Of the 12 affirmed ratings, 11 are 'AA+ (sf)' and one is 'CCC (sf)'.
The 'AA+ (sf)' rating affirmations reflect the classes' relatively
senior positions in payment priority.  They also reflect S&P's opinion
that our projected credit enhancement is sufficient to cover our
projected losses at those rating levels.

Regarding the 'CCC (sf)' rating affirmation on class B-2, S&P believes
that its projected credit enhancement will remain insufficient to
cover its base-case projected loss to this class and that it remains
vulnerable to default.

LOSS SEVERITY ASSUMPTIONS

S&P applied a 50% base-case loss severity assumption in this review
for all five loan pools, as set forth in table 3 of "Methodology And
Assumptions: U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For
Pre-2009 Originations," published Dec. 23, 2013.

In an earlier surveillance review of this transaction, S&P applied a
20% base-case loss severity assumption to the two pools that contain
short amortizing Alt-A loans with lower balances.  However, as
discussed in the Sept. 9, 2014 "Criteria FAQ" report, the 20%
base-case loss severity assumption does not apply to these pools due
to their lower balances.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from its
view of how the loans will behave under various economic conditions.
Standard & Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook assumptions for
variables that it believes could affect residential mortgage
performance are as follows:

   -- A 6.3% unemployment rate for 2014, decreasing to 5.8% for
      2015;

   -- Home prices will increase 6% in 2014, using the 20-city
      Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller Home Price Index;

   -- Real GDP growth will be 2.1% in 2014 and 3.0% in 2015;

   -- The 30-year mortgage rate will average 4.3% for 2014 and
      increase to 5.0% in 2015; and

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.9% in both 2014 and 2015.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall housing
fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals still hinge on
additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of modified loans, the
propensity of servicers to advance on delinquent loans, and
liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS collateral
quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were to become
stressed in line with Standard & Poor's downside forecast, S&P
believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken. S&P's downside
scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment rises to 7.0% in 2014 and then 7.2% in
      2015;

   -- Downward pressure causes a 1.1% GDP growth in 2014, rising
      slightly to 1.2% in 2015;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate falls slightly to 4.3% in
      2014, but limited access to credit and pressure on home
      prices largely prevents consumers from capitalizing on such
      lower rates.

RATINGS LOWERED

MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

                       Rating
Class   CUSIP       To        From
B-1     576434EW0   CCC (sf)  BB (sf)
B-3     576434EY6   CC (sf)   CCC (sf)


RATINGS AFFIRMED

MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

Class   CUSIP        Rating
1-A-1   576434EJ9    AA+ (sf)
2-A-1   576434EK6    AA+ (sf)
3-A-1   576434EL4    AA+ (sf)
4-A-1   576434EM2    AA+ (sf)
5-A-1   576434EQ3    AA+ (sf)
15-A-X  576434ER1    AA+ (sf)
15-PO   576434ES9    AA+ (sf)
30-PO   576434EU4    AA+ (sf)
B-2     576434EX8    CCC (sf)
4-A-2   576434EN0    AA+ (sf)
4-A-3   576434EP5    AA+ (sf)
30-A-X  576434ET7    AA+ (sf)


MID-STATE CAPITAL: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
issued by Mid-State Capital Corporation 2004-1 Trust. The collateral
backing this transaction consists primarily of stick-built single
family homes.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Mid-State Capital Corporation 2004-1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflects Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pool. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up in credit
enhancement from non-declining over-collateralization. Performance has
remained generally stable from Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 from 7.2% in August
2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5%
for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector.

Housing prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers or
other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ8: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Classes to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on seven classes and
downgraded the ratings of six classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HQ8
as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations of the four investment grade P&I classes A-1A, A-4,
AJ and A-M are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade P&I classes H and J are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed.

The downgrades of P&I classes B through G are due to higher than
anticipated realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is affirmed based on the credit
quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.0% of the
current balance compared to 7.2% at last review. Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 11.2% of the original pooled balance
compared to 10.0% at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 47 compared to 52 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $1.98 billion
from $2.73 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 215 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1%
to 8% of the pool. Sixteen loans, representing 4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Fifty-three loans, representing approximately 26% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, of which 35 loans generated an aggregate realized loss
totaling $126.9 million (average loss severity of 47%). There are 18
loans, representing 10% of the pool, currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Marketplace at Northglenn
Loan ($58.1 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
439,000 square foot (SF) retail power center in Northglenn, a suburb
of Denver, Colorado. The loan transferred to special servicing in
August 2011 for imminent default. Foreclosure occurred in March 2012
and the asset became real estate owned (REO) effective July 2012. As
of December 2013, the property was 80% leased compared to 72% at last
review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Roseville Portfolio
Roll-Up Loan ($39.6 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by
two mixed-use properties totaling 147,677 SF, located in Roseville,
California. The portfolio originally was secured by three properties.
The third property, Fairway Commons, was sold and released in December
2012. The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2008 due
to payment default. The asset became REO effective April 2012. As of
July 2014, the portfolio was 66% leased compared to 40% at last
review.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multi-family, office, retail, industrial and self-storage properties.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $104.2 million loss (53% expected
loss) for 16 of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans, representing 2% of the pool. Moody's has estimated a
$6.5 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2013 and partial year 2014
operating results for 96% and 73% of the performing loans. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 100% compared to 102% at last full review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.1% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.07X, respectively, compared to
1.27X and 1.03X, respectively, at last full review. Moody's actual
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Portfolio Loan
($159.0 million -- 8.0% of the pool), which represents an 87%
participation interest in a $182.8 million loan. The property is also
encumbered with a $39.0 million B-note held outside the trust. At
securitization, the portfolio consisted of five Ritz-Carlton Hotels,
totaling 1,218 rooms, located in New York (2), Boston (1) and
Washington D.C. (2). The two NYC hotels have ground leases through
2069 and 2075. In 2007 the Boston property was released, reducing the
portfolio to 945 rooms. The master servicer reported in 2013 that the
St. Regis Hotel in Washington D.C. was substituted for the Ritz
Battery Park asset, which was released. The portfolio now consists of
829 rooms. Based on the year end 2013 financials, the portfolio's
occupancy rate and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 74% and
$395, respectively, compared to 73% and $362 the previous year. Based
on a stabilized value, Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and
0.93X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.91X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan ($108.5
million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by ten crossed suburban
office properties totaling 599,520 SF and located in Columbia and
Annapolis Junction, Maryland. As of December 2013, the portfolio was
85% leased compared to 84% at last review. The largest tenants are
Booz Allen (approximately 22% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration in December 2015); Northrop Gruman (17% of the NRA; lease
expiration in July 2019) and L-3 Communication (8% of the NRA; lease
expiration in August 2015). Performance has remained stable; however
51% of the NRA will roll between 2015 and 2016. The loan is
interest-only for its entire ten-year term and matures in January
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.90X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.88X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Flournoy Portfolio Loan ($89.8 million
-- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by four multifamily properties
with a total of 1,397 units located in Texas (2), Tennessee, and
Kansas. As of March 2014, the portfolio was 93% leased, essentially
the same at the prior review. Performance has improved due to higher
base revenues. The loan is benefiting from amortization and is
scheduled to mature in January 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
90% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 100% and 0.95X at last
review.


OFSI FUND VII: S&P Assigns B Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OFSI Fund
VII Ltd./OFSI Fund VII LLC's $373.4 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by a revolving pool
consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

Since S&P assigned its preliminary ratings to the transaction on July
30, 2014, the issuer added a class of combination notes comprising the
class A and B notes and updated the amounts for all of the classes
accordingly.  The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.234%-12.753%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OFSI Fund VII Ltd./OFSI Fund VII LLC

Class                     Rating                   Amount
                                                 (mil. $)
X                         AAA (sf)                   2.00
A                         AAA (sf)                 238.80
B                         AA (sf)                   59.00
C (deferrable)            A (sf)                    28.80
D (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                  20.60
E (deferrable)            BB (sf)                   17.00
F (deferrable)            B (sf)                     7.20
Combination notes(i)      AA (sf)                  297.80
Subordinated notes        NR                        41.20

(i) Combination notes consist of components representing up to
     $238,800,000 of the class A notes and up to $59,000,000 of
     the class B notes.
NR -- Not rated.


OMI TRUST 2002-A: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class A-1
certificates from OMI Trust 2002-A, an asset-backed securities
transaction backed by fixed-rate manufactured housing loans originated
by Oakwood Acceptance Corp., to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.  S&P
subsequently withdrew the rating.

The downgrade and withdrawal reflect the nonpayment of full principal
to investors by Sept. 15, 2014, the certificates' stated final
maturity date.  S&P's rating reflects the probability of the default
of full principal and interest by the certificates' stated final
maturity or legal final maturity date.

Because cumulative net losses were higher than initially expected, the
transaction did not generate enough collections each month to pay the
complete scheduled principal amount due to all of the outstanding
class A certificates per the transaction documents.  As such, all of
the class A certificates have currently accumulated approximately
$18.7 million in principal shortfalls.  According to the transaction
documents, the payment waterfall specifies that, before the normal
sequential principal payment distribution, any unpaid principal
shortfalls will be paid pro rata among all of the still-outstanding
class A certificates. Accordingly, the class A-1 certificates have
been receiving their pro rata share of the available monthly
collections.

As of the Sept. 15, 2014, distribution date, the class A-1
certificates were not paid in full, with approximately $712,620
remaining.


PACIFICA CDO VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1a, A-1c, B, C-1, and C-2 notes from Pacifica CDO VI Ltd., a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Alcentra Ltd.  S&P removed its ratings on the class A-1a and A-1c
notes from CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive
implications on June 18, 2014.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1b, A-2, and D notes.

Since S&P's July 2012 rating actions, the class A-1 notes have paid
down by $42 million to 86% of their initial issuance amounts. The
class A overcollateralization (O/C) ratio increased to 127.91% as of
the August 2014 trustee report, from 124.01% as of the June 2012
trustee report, which S&P referenced in its last rating actions.  The
balance of 'CCC' rated collateral has also decreased to $9 million
from $13 million during the same time.  S&P affirmed its 'AAA' rating
on the class A-1b note and raised its ratings on the class A-1a, A-1c,
B, C-1, and C-2 notes to reflect the increase in credit support
available to these notes.  The transaction is reinvesting principal
proceeds received from prepayments, credit-risk obligations, or
credit-improved obligations according to the indenture.

S&P affirmed its 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class A-2 notes to reflect
the availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
level.

There is some concentration risk as the top two obligors each account
for over $9 million, causing the class D notes to fail the top obligor
test.  In addition, the weighted average spread and the LIBOR floor
levels of the portfolio have both decreased since S&P's 2012 review.
Although the class D notes are exposed to concentration risk and the
cash flows fail at 'BB' by a small margin, S&P affirmed its rating due
to the improvements in credit quality and the senior liability
paydowns noted above.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.

                              Cash flow
         Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class    rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1a     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)         7.07%   AAA (sf)
A-1b     AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        16.79%   AAA (sf)
A-1c     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)         7.07%   AAA (sf)
A-2      AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)        12.74%   AA+ (sf)
B        A+ (sf)              AA- (sf)         1.57%   A+ (sf)
C-1      BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)        0.76%   BBB- (sf)
C-2      BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)        0.76%   BBB- (sf)
D        BB (sf)              BB- (sf)         1.99%   BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current
collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted
average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1a   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1b   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1c   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
C-1    BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
C-2    BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
D      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB (sf)     BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity, S&P
biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool with the
highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1a   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1b   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1c   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
C-1    BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
C-2    BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
D      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC (sf)      BB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.
       Rating
Class  To          From
A-1a   AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1c   AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS RAISED

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.
       Rating
Class  To          From
B      AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)
C-1    BBB (sf)    BBB- (sf)
C-2    BBB (sf)    BBB- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.
Class  Rating
A-1b   AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)
D      BB (sf)


PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Cl. Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on six classes in PNC Mortgage Acceptance
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-C2 as follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the P&I class H was upgraded primarily due to an
increased credit support since Moody's last review, resulting from
paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down by 37% since Moody's
last review.

The ratings on the P&I classes J through N were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on the
IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the credit performance (or
the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 23.0% of the
current balance compared to 22.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.6% of the original pooled
balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating
U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 7 compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

Where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating recommendation.
The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan
level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the September 12, 2014 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $63.5 million from $1.08
billion at securitization. The Certificates are collateralized by 11
mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 22% of the pool,
with the top ten loans constituting 99% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24.5 million (for an average loss severity
of 21%). Three loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Taconic
Corporate Park Loan ($12.2 million -19.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 210,000 square foot (SF) office property located Yorktown
Heights, New York. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 as the result of imminent default. The loan became real
estate owned (REO) in May 2011. The property is under a contract for
sale.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by multifamily
properties located in Akron, Ohio. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$10.2 million loss for the specially serviced loans (49% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 23% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate $3.0 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 74% compared to 63% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.64X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 2.04X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 44% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Northside Marketplace Loan ($13.8 million
-- 21.8% of the pool) which is secured by an 189,299 SF retail
property located in Nashville, Tennessee. The loan was in special
servicing due to imminent default and passing its ARD of September 1,
2010. The loan was modified and returned to the master servicer in
December 2012. Terms of the modification include a maturity date
extension until January 2017, an interest rate reduction from 8.3% to
4.5%. The largest tenants are Dick's Sporting Goods, Best Buy and Old
Navy. As of May 2014 the property was 92% leased compared to 75% at
last review. Performance has improved since last review; however,
performance is poor and due to potential refinancing risk the loan was
identified as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 142%
and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 163% and 0.67X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Waterford at Spencer Oaks
Apartments Loan ($7.4 million -- 11.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 208 unit multifamily property located in Denton, Texas. The
property was 98% leased as of March 2014 compared to 95% as of
December 2011. The property's performance has been stable. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 62% and 1.65X, respectively compared to 70% and
1.47X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1450 Marina Way South Office Building
Loan ($6.8 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 93,887
SF office property located in Richmond, California. The loan returned
from the special servicer in February 2013 after being modified to a
interest-only loan. The property was 100% leased by Chevron Corp.,
which downsized its space to the current 53% level, causing a 47%
vacancy. The Chevron lease expires in January 2018. The loan matures
in February 2015. The loan is on the servicer's watchlist. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.91X, respectively.


PREFERRED TERM XIII: Moody's Raises Rating on 3 Tranches to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XIII, Ltd.:

$27,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due March 24, 2034,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

$7,750,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes due March 24,
2034, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$21,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-4 Senior Notes due March 24,
2034, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$98,350,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due March 24,
2034, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$21,450,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due March
24, 2034, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$44,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes due March
24, 2034, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also confirms the rating on the following notes:

$276,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due March 24, 2034
(current outstanding balance of $150,722,718.10), Confirmed at Aa2
(sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Preferred Term Securities XIII, Ltd., issued in March 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the updates to Moody's
TruPS CDO methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS
CDOs" published in June 2014, the deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes,
the repayment of deferred interest on the Class B notes, an increase
in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios, the redemption of
two underlying assets, and the resumption of interest payments on
previously deferring assets.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS CDO
methodology. These updates include: (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by Moody's
CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5) giving full
par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain criteria; and (6)
raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by $23.5 million in
June 2014, using principal proceeds from the redemption of two
underlying assets with a total balance of $19.5 million and the
diversion of excess interest proceeds. The Class B notes' deferred
interest has been paid off in June as well using excess interest
proceeds. The Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to
228.2%, based on Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's June
2014 report, the senior principal coverage test was at 147.3% (limit
128.0%), versus 132.3% in December 2013. The Class A-1 notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the use
of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $67.0 million from $146.8 million in December
2013. In June 2014 two previously deferring banks with a total par of
$18.5 million have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1, Class
A-2, Class A-3, Class A-4, Class B-1, Class B-2 and Class B-3 notes
announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the
ratings on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $344.0 million,
defaulted and deferring par of $67.0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 8.99% (implying a WARF of 899), and a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%. In addition to the
quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors
are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's considers the
structural protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of
default, recent deal performance under current market conditions, the
legal environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings, as
described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than Moody's
current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments that
are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a positive
impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes with the
highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The timing
and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive impact on
the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the ratings on the
notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit estimates.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to additional
estimation uncertainty.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then
used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash flow
model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on www.moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed
free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly.
To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the
credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC
Q2-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 583)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class A-4: +1

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class B-3: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1395)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -1

Class A-4: -1

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -1

Class B-3: -1


PRETSL COMBINATION: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating on the following
notes issued by PreTSL Combination Certificates:

$1,500,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XXIV-1 (current balance
of $1,029,943.05), Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XXIV, Ltd.:

$577,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due March 22, 2037
(current balance of $430,741,397.27), Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
October 17, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$152,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due March 22, 2037
(current balance of $150,798,744.39), Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously
on October 17, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

$85,800,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2037 (current balance of $89,178,707.83, including deferred interest),
Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on April 29, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

$20,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due March
22, 2037 (current balance of $23,409,989.59, including deferred
interest), Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on April 29, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

$65,650,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2037 (current balance of $69,960,086.90, including deferred interest),
Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 29, 2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

$54,250,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due March
22, 2037 (current balance of $65,083,894.60, including deferred
interest), Affirmed C (sf); previously on April 29, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXIV, Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS). PreTSL Combination
Certificates, issued in December 2006, is a TruPS CDO Repack comprised
by the Class A-1 Senior Notes and the Subordinate Income Notes issued
by Preferred Term Securities XXIV, Ltd. and by zero coupon strips
issued by Federal Home Mortgage Association.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the updated TruPS CDO methodology and
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and combination certificates. As
such, the expected losses on the notes and the combination
certificates are still commensurate with their current rating level.

Class A-1 has paid down by approximately $28,563,095.47 or 6% since
October 2013. As a result, Class A overcollateralizaton test has
increased to 115.85% from 106.62% in October 2013. The combination
certificates have paid down by approximately $37,937.40 or 4% since
October 2013. Additionally, the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has remained stable. The weighted average rating factor, as
calculated by Moody's was 811 as compared to 819 in October 2013.

The deal has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs"
published in June 2014. These updates include: (1) removing the 25%
macro default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six
probability-weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile
for bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it had
concluded its review of its rating on the combination certificates
announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the
rating on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $722.67 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $259.30 million, a weighted average default
probability of 8.99% (implying a WARF of 811), and a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative
factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of
rating committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings, as
described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than Moody's
current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments that
are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a positive
impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes with the
highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The timing
and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive impact on
the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the ratings on the
notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or

credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional estimation uncertainty.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's CDOROM
v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios defined
the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then used the loss
distribution as an input in its CDOEdg  cash flow model. CDOROM v.
2.13.1 is available on www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions --
Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's
evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool
relies on FDIC Q2-2014 financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance
team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 536)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class B-1: +3

Class B-2: +3

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Combination Certificates: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1187)

Class A-1: -2

Class A-2: -1

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Combination Certificates: 0


RAMPART CLO 2007: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $15.3MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Rampart CLO 2007 Ltd.:

$26,100,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$25,100,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$384,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 13, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$15,300,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Ba1 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$16,350,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Ba3 (sf); previously on August 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Rampart CLO 2007 Ltd., issued in October 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
October 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of time
remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October
2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the manager
to effect significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that the
deal will benefit from lower WARF of 2425 compared to the covenant
level of 2805. Furthermore, the transaction's reported collateral
quality and OC ratios have been stable.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

(1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

(2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

(3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing
the transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to
positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit
quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
for CLO performance.

(4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

(5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1940)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2910)

Class A: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $490.5 million, defaulted par of $0.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.11% (implying a
WARF of 2425), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.70%, a diversity score of 51 and a weighted average spread of
3.11%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


SAPPHIRE VALLEY I: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes From BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class A,
B, C, D, and E notes from Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd.  At the same
time, S&P removed the ratings on the class A, B, C, and D notes from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on Aug.
29, 2014.  Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction that closed in Dec. 2006 and is primarily
composed of broadly syndicated loans and collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) tranches.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in Jan. 2014, and it has
since paid down almost $58.00 million to the class A notes.  In
addition to the $62.45 million in paydowns the class A notes received
in 2009 due to failing overcollateralization (O/C) tests, the $58.00
million has paid down the class A notes to 71.24% of their original
balance.  The Aug. 5, 2014, trustee report, which S&P referenced in
its rating action, indicated the following O/C increases from the
April 3, 2013, trustee report used in S&P's
May 29, 2013 rating actions:

   -- The class A/B O/C increased to 128.71% from 123.84% in April
      2013.

   -- The class C O/C increased to 122.13% from 118.33% in April
      2013.

   -- The class D O/C increased to 116.19% from 113.28% in April
      2013.

   -- The class E O/C increased to 112.64% from 110.24% in April
      2013.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions as it deems
necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    7.35%        AAA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    2.06%        AA+ (sf)
C      A- (sf)/Watch Pos    A+ (sf)     5.98%        A+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   6.12%        BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)    0.61%        BBB (sf)

(i)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow implied
rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral
pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average
recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E      BBB (sf)   BBB- (sf)  BBB- (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity, S&P
biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool with the
highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     B (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
E      BBB (sf)     BBB- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)     BBB (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd.


                   Rating
Class         To           From

A             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A+ (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING RAISED

Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
E             BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)


SDART 2014-4: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on $79.4MM Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the notes
to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-4 (SDART
2014-4). This is the fourth SDART transaction of the year for
Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SCUSA).

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-4

$238,700,000, 0.25000%, Class A-1 Asset Backed Notes, Definitive
Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

$220,000,000, 0.67%, Class A-2-A Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$233,000,000, LIBOR + 0.32%, Class A-2-B Asset Backed Notes,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$162,000,000, 1.08%, Class A-3 Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$166,800,000, 1.82%, Class B Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa1 (sf)

$206,400,000, 2.60%, Class C Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

$123,100,000, 3.10%, Class D Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

$79,414,000, 4.12%, Class E Asset Backed Notes, Definitive Rating
Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the underlying
auto loans and their expected performance, the strength of the
structure, the availability of excess spread over the life of the
transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2014-4 pool is
17.0% and the Aaa level is 49.0%. The loss expectation was based on an
analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as well as
performance of past securitizations, and current expectations for
future economic conditions.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the ratings
up. Losses could decline from Moody's original expectations as a
result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the
value of the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment.
Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US job market and
the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for better-than-expected
performance include changes to servicing practices that enhance
collections or refinancing opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect investors
against current expectations of loss could drive the ratings down.
Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations as a result of a
higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US job market and the market
for used vehicles. Other reasons for worse-than-expected performance
include poor servicing, error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance and fraud.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2014-3: Fitch Rates Class B-4 Certificate BB
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns ratings to Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2014-3 (SEMT 2014-3) as:

   -- $307,975,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,380,000 class A-2 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61,595,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $307,975,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,380,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $61,595,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $153,987,500 class A-7 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $153,987,500 class A-8 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $292,576,000 class A-9 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $15,399,000 class A-10 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $307,975,000 class A-11 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $146,288,000 class A-12 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,699,500 class A-13 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,380,000 class A-14 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $307,975,000 class A-IO notional certificate 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;

   -- $307,975,000 class A-IO1 notional exchangeable certificate
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,380,000 class A-IO2 notional exchangeable certificate
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $307,975,000 class A-IO3 notional exchangeable certificate
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $246,380,000 class A-IO4 notional exchangeable certificate
      'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $7,250,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,779,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $4,449,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $1,648,000 non-offered class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable.

The $3,460,674 non-offered class B-5 certificate is not expected to be
rated by Fitch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Majority are Qualified Mortgages: Of the total pool, 450 loans on
primary or secondary residences have application dates of Jan. 10,
2014 or later and are, therefore, subject to the Ability-to-Repay
(ATR)/Qualified Mortgage (QM) Rule.  Of these, two loans were
originated as non-QM, resulting in a negligible increase to the pool's
'AAAsf' loss severity (LS).  The remaining loans were classified as
safe harbor QM (SHQM), for which no adjustment was made, or were not
subject to the ATR/QM Rule.

Geographically Diverse Pool: Roughly 10% of the pool is located in the
San Francisco metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and almost 9% is in
the Seattle, WA MSA.  One loan comprising 0.14% of the pool is located
in Napa, California, which may have been impacted by the Aug. 24, 2014
earthquake.  As part of the securitization diligence, Redwood Trust
ordered a drive-by inspection to confirm that the property was still
intact and no material external damage was present.  Fitch did not
make any adjustment in its analysis for this loan.

Valuation Review Exception: Under Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Master Criteria"
dated July 1, 2014, the agency expects a secondary valuation product
to be used in the third party due diligence review of value for each
loan.  However, the transaction includes 36 loans for which secondary
valuation products were not used. Therefore, Fitch considers these
loans to be 'D' with respect to valuation as insufficient
documentation was available to confirm the value.

Fitch did not deem adjustments to the original property values of
these loans as necessary due to the strong loan attributes and
borrower credit profiles.  Fitch believes the low weighted average
(WA) combined loan-to-value (CLTV) of these loans of 63.1% mitigates
the risk of possible overvaluation.

High-Quality Mortgage Collateral: The collateral pool consists of
30-year, fixed-rate, fully documented loans to borrowers with strong
credit profiles, low leverage and substantial liquid reserves.
Third-party, loan-level due diligence was conducted on 89.8% of the
pool, the results of which, in Fitch's opinion, indicate strong
underwriting controls.

Market Value Decline Sensitivity: Fitch's sustainable home price (SHP)
model suggests home prices for the pool are overvalued by roughly
21.2%, which results in an 'Asf' sustainable market value decline
(sMVD) stress above the recent national housing recession's
peak-to-trough experience.  A sensitivity analysis was factored into
Fitch's analysis to better align its sMVD stress to recent
observations, which resulted in applying a base sMVD of 17.2%.

Aggregator Quality: Based on Fitch's review of Redwood Residential
Acquisition Corporation (Redwood) as an aggregator, Redwood's loan
acquisition platform and underwriting overlays it applies to loans
acquired are robust, as evidenced by the very limited findings from
the due diligence review.  Fitch factored these qualitative strengths
into its loss expectations, despite the large number of unproven
originators participating in Sequoia transactions.  Fitch believes
that Redwood's sound acquisition strategy is also reflected in the
very strong performance of the post-crisis Sequoia pools.

Cash Flow Structure: The transaction features a traditional
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure.  Furthermore, the
trust provides for expenses, including indemnification amounts and
costs of arbitration, to be paid by the net weighted average coupon
(WAC) of the loans, which does not impact the contractual interest due
on the certificates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate how
the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) than
assumed at both the MSA and national levels.  The implied rating
sensitivities are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes
and do not consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings would
react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The analysis assumes
MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the base case projected
17.2% for this pool.  The analysis indicates there is some potential
rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.


STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $16.1MM Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Stratford CLO Ltd.:

$104,300,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

$41,300,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

$37,100,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July
22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$16,100,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July
22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$417,200,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $379,695,299), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$21,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$14,676,786), Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Stratford CLO Ltd., issued in October 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans and CLO tranches. The transaction's reinvestment period will end
in November 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of time
remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November
2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the manager
to effect significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that the
deal will benefit from lower weighted average rating factor (WARF)
compared to the previously assumed levels. Based on its calculations,
Moody's modeled a WARF of 2822 compared to 3262 during the last rating
review. Furthermore, the transaction's reported OC ratios have been
stable over the past year.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better credit
quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing the
transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to positive
CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal
value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to
which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the
asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of the
notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated notes
(by the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower expected
loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2257)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3386)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $621.42 million, defaulted par of $37.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.61% (implying a
WARF of 2822), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.77%, a diversity score of 53 and a weighted average spread of
3.15%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In
some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered based
on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case,
historical and market performance and the collateral manager's
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.


SYMPHONY CLO VIII: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
original class A, B, C, D, and E notes from Symphony CLO VIII L.P., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Symphony Asset
Management LLC, after the notes were redeemed in full.  At the same
time, S&P assigned ratings to the replacement class A-R, B-R, C-R,
D-R, and E-R notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture that
included provisions to limit non-loan collateral investments, subject
to certain conditions outlined in the transaction documents.  There
was no change to the reinvestment period's duration, which ends in
January 2015.

All of the proceeds from the replacement notes were used to redeem the
original notes as outlined in the transaction documents.  The class
E-R notes were issued at a higher spread over LIBOR then the original
class E notes, while the remaining replacement notes were issued at a
lower spread over LIBOR than the original notes.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS
Current date before refinancing
Class      Amount       Interest      BDR      SDR    Cushion
         (mil. $)       rate (%)      (%)      (%)        (%)
A          240.00   LIBOR + 1.55    66.63    64.43       2.20
B           43.75   LIBOR + 2.50    63.23    56.30       6.94
C           29.25   LIBOR + 3.15    51.54    50.07       1.47
D           18.75   LIBOR + 4.60    43.47    44.00      (0.53)
E           17.25   LIBOR + 5.75    33.10    36.87      (3.77)

Current date after refinancing
A-R        240.00   LIBOR + 1.10    68.49    64.43       4.06
B-R         43.75   LIBOR + 1.75    65.13    56.30       8.83
C-R         29.25   LIBOR + 3.05    53.53    50.07       3.46
D-R         18.75   LIBOR + 4.05    45.82    44.00       1.82
E-R         17.25   LIBOR + 6.00    35.63    36.87      (1.24)

Effective date
A          240.00   LIBOR + 1.55    69.47    64.62       4.85
B           43.75   LIBOR + 2.50    66.42    56.19      10.23
C           29.25   LIBOR + 3.15    55.85    49.90       5.95
D           18.75   LIBOR + 4.60    49.12    43.54       5.58
E           17.25   LIBOR + 5.75    42.15    36.21       5.94

BDR--Break-even scenario. SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive changes
to the transaction.

The results of the cash flow analysis point to a lower rating on the
class E-R notes than the rating action suggests.  However, the
transaction has seen improvement in all overcollateralization ratios
since the effective date from the overall portfolio's--comprising the
aggregate collateral and principal cash held in the underlying
portfolio--increased par value.  S&P believes that as the transaction
exits its reinvestment period in January 2015 it will start paying
down the rated notes, which could potentially continue to increase the
overcollateralization levels. Furthermore, the transaction has low
levels of exposure to securities whose obligors are rated in the 'CCC'
category, which diminishes the potential for near-term credit risk.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit
rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to
include a description of the representations, warranties, and
enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how
they differ from the representations, warranties, and enforcement
mechanisms in issuances of similar securities.  The Rule applies to
in-scope securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on
or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included
in this credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1111390.pdf

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Symphony CLO VIII L.P.

                        Rating
Original class     To           From
A                  NR           AAA (sf)
B                  NR           AA (sf)
C                  NR           A (sf)
D                  NR           BBB (sf)
E                  NR           BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Symphony CLO VIII L.P.

Replacement class       Rating
A-R                     AAA (sf)
B-R                     AA (sf)
C-R                     A (sf)
D-R                     BBB (sf)
E-R                     BB (sf)


THACHER PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Thacher Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$357,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$58,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$26,950,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$23,100,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$11,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$28,450,000 Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class E-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$4,000,000 Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1
Notes, the Class D-2 Notes, the Class E-1 Notes and the Class E-2
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Birchwood Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured loans, high
yield bonds and senior secured bonds. The Issuer's portfolio is
expected to be at least 80% ramped as of the closing date and the
Issuer's documents are also expected to require that the portfolio
will be 100% ramped within four to five months thereafter.

GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of the
Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability relative
to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes (shown in terms
of the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E-1 Notes: -1

Class E-2 Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D-1 Notes: -2

Class D-2 Notes: -2

Class E-1 Notes: -1

Class E-2 Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has been
assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score assigned for
the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the special report
titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Global Cash Flow
CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around the
various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing to
uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality, historical
performance, the level of disclosure, transaction complexity, the
modeling and the transaction governance that underlie the ratings. The
V Score applies to the entire transaction, rather than individual
tranches.


TIAA REAL ESTATE 2003-1: Fitch Hikes Cl. C-1 Notes Rating From 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed two classes of TIAA Real
Estate CDO 2003-1, Ltd. (TIAA 2003-1) as a result of increased credit
enhancement to the notes from principal paydowns.

Key Rating Drivers

Since the last rating action in October 2013, the class C notes have
received $16.1 million in pay downs. Over this period, approximately
18.8% of the collateral has been downgraded and 11.4% has been
upgraded. Currently, 60.6% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 26.1% has a rating in the 'CCC' category
and below, compared to 56.7% and 23.3%, respectively, at the last
rating action. Since issuance the transaction has experienced
approximately $256 million in paydowns.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using the
Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default levels for
the underlying portfolio. The default levels were then compared to the
breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under
the various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as
described in the same report. Fitch also analyzed the structure's
sensitivity to the assets that are distressed, experiencing interest
shortfalls, and those with near-term maturities. The class C notes are
passing above their current rating category and have been upgraded to
reflect the likelihood of continued delevering over the next year.

For the class D and E notes, Fitch analyzed the class' sensitivity to
the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and below). Given the high
probability of default of these assets and expected limited recovery
prospects upon default, the class D notes have been affirmed at
'CCCsf', indicating that default is possible. Similarly, the class E
notes have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable as the notes are undercollateralized.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In addition to the sensitivities discussed above, further negative
migration and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM as well as
increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit quality could
lead to downgrades. The senior notes are expected to continue to
amortize as 15.7% of the collateral are senior positions in their
respective underlying transactions. The Stable Outlook on the class C
notes reflects Fitch's view that the transaction will continue to
delever.

TIAA 2003-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Nov. 6, 2003. The current portfolio consists of 12 bonds
from 11 obligors, of which 69.8% are commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS), 18.8% are real estate investment trust (REIT) debt
securities, and 11.4% are structured finance CDOs.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $4,271,854 class C-1 notes to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;

-- $3,737,873 class C-2 notes to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;

In addition, Fitch affirms the following:

-- $13,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf';
-- $14,187,899 class E notes at 'Csf'.

The class A-1MM, B-1, and B-2 notes have all paid in full. The
Preferred Equity is not rated.


TIMBERSTAR TRUST I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the class A
and B notes and affirmed its ratings on the class C, D, E, and F notes
from TimberStar Trust I's $800 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-1 following the application of
S&P's imputed promises criteria.  At the same time, S&P removed its
ratings on all classes from CreditWatch, where it placed them with
negative implications on June 20, 2014.

TimberStar Trust I's series 2006-1 is an asset-backed securities
transaction backed by 800,000 acres of timberlands in Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Texas.  The timber is mostly Southern Yellow Pine and
is sold as pulpwood, chip and saw, saw timber, biomass, and pole
products.  A lesser amount of hardwood timber also grows on the
property.  The transaction receives cash flow from the sale of
harvested timber, the sale of higher-and-better-use land, land lease
payments, and easement payments derived from extracting Haynesville
Shale natural gas from the land.  Hancock Natural Resources Group
manages all of the standing timber the issuer owns.

TimberStar Trust I's series 2006-1 pays each class of notes 5%
contingent additional interest following a failure to pay the notes in
full on the expected repayment date (Oct. 2016) or upon acceleration
following an event of default.  The transaction will pay the
contingent additional interest following the full principal payments
on the lowest-rated class.  When S&P first rated the notes, it
considered the contingent additional interest to be outside the scope
of the ratable promise based on the applicable criteria.  Now, based
on the imputed promises criteria, S&P's ratings will incorporate the
contingent additional interest distribution amounts as part of the
credit-based and measurable promise, provided the failure to pay those
amounts will lead to an event of default.  S&P determined that these
payments do not constitute "supplemental payments" or the like that
can be excluded from the ratable promise.

The downgrades reflect not only the application of the imputed
promises criteria, but also the transaction's performance since S&P's
March 29, 2013, rating actions, when it affirmed its ratings on six
classes.  S&P's affirmations on the class C, D, E, and F notes reflect
the availability of adequate credit support at the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether they remain consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them, and will take further rating actions as it deem
necessary.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

TimberStar Trust I
$800 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2006-1

            Rating                Rating
Class       To                    From
A           AA- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           A+ (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg
C           A (sf)                A (sf)/Watch Neg
D           BBB (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
E           BBB- (sf)             BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
F           BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg


VENTURE V CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on $11.5MM Cl. D Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Venture V CDO Limited:

$20,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$13,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to A1
(sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$11,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$295,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balance $20,890,065), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
February 28, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$27,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$25,000,000 Class J Blended Securities Due 2018 (current rated
balance $8,877,191), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 28,
2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Venture V CDO Limited, issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May
2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios since the last rating action in February
2014. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 72.8%
or $55.9 million since then. Based on the trustee's August 2014
report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class
B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported at 174.61%, 137.42%,
120.52% and 109.09%, versus February 2014 levels of 142.79%, 122.16%,
111.55%, and 103.87%, respectively. Moody's notes that Trustee's
August 2014 OC ratios do not reflect the payment distribution made to
Class A-1 notes on its August payment date.

The deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit quality of
the portfolio since February 2014. Based on the August 2014 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2883 compared
to 2980 in February 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and circumstances
that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b) the
large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively or
negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and b)
differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by
different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better credit
quality, or better credit performance of assets collateralizing the
transaction than Moody's current expectations, can lead to positive
CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences for CLO
performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO could
accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's
current expectations will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes,
beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value of
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the deal's
OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a manager
decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create additional
uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower
of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than
assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal
value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to
which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) or the
asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of
the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds to
lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2522)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class J: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3784)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class J: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $101.2 million, defaulted par of $14.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.24% (implying a
WARF of 3153), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.18%, a diversity score of 39 and a weighted average spread of
3.62%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO liability
reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate for
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in
the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Moody's Cuts Class E Certs. Rating to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded three classes in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C22 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the three investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the six below investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The ratings on P&I Classes C, D and E were downgraded due to realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.9% of the
current balance compared to 13.4% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.1% of the original
pooled balance compared to 14.9% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or overall
improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a decline in the overall performance of the pool, loan
concentration, increased expected losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64, which
it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit model
results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf) level are based on a
paydown analysis using the individual loan-level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's may consider other concentrations and correlations in its
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels of Aa2
(sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit enhancement on the remaining
conduit classes are either interpolated between these two data points
or determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two data
points. For fusion deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments with the
conduit model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar structured
credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating volatility,
including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under adverse
circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The pool has a
Herf of 31 compared to 39 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the September 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7% to $1.9 billion from
$2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are collateralized by
124 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 8% of the
pool, with the top ten loans representing 43% of the pool. The pool
contains three loans, representing 5% of the pool, that have
investment grade structured credit assessments. Seven loans,
representing 6% of the pool have defeased and are secured by US
Government securities.

Twenty-one loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess
which loans have material issues that could impact performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $124 million (69% loss severity on
average). Nine loans, representing 22% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Westin Casuarina
Hotel & Spa Loan ($137 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured
by an 826-room luxury hotel spa and casino located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2010
due to poor financial performance. A receiver was appointed in October
2011 and the trust is pursuing foreclosure. The servicer has
recognized an $72 million appraisal reduction for this loan, while
Moody's estimates a $121 million loss.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $207 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six
poorly-performing loans representing 5.5% of the pool and has
estimated an aggregate $18.6 million loss (18% expected loss based on
a 50% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for 97%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95% compared to
99% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.02X at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and
a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Metro
Pointe at South Coast Loan ($48 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a leasehold interest on a 386,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located in Costa Mesa, California. Tenant mix at the property
consists mainly of discounted upscale retailers. The property was 100%
leased as of June 2014 compared to 99% at last review. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa1 (sca.pd) and
2.43X, respectively, compared to aa1 (sca.pd) and 2.39X at the last
review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Shoppes at East Chase Loan ($26 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 364,000 SF retail center located in Montgomery, Alabama.
The property was 96% leased as of June 2014 compared to 98% at last
review. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1
(sca.pd) and 2.19X, respectively, compared to a2 (sca.pd) and 1.84X at
the last review.

The third loan with a structured credit assessment is the 1201
Broadway Loan ($10 million -- 0.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
132,000 SF office building located in New York, New York. The property
was 98% leased as of June 2014 compared to 99% at last review. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aa1 (sca.pd) and
2.84X, respectively, compared to aa1 (sca.pd) and 2.40X at the last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Hyatt Center Loan ($154 million --
8.3% of the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest in a
first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.5 million SF Class A
office building located in Chicago, Illinois. The property is also
encumbered with a revolving mezzanine loan. The property was 93%
leased as of June 2014 compared to 90% leased at last review. The loan
originally had a 60-month interest-only period, and is now amortizing
on a 360-month schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.03X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Extra Space Loan ($95 million -- 5.1%
of the pool), which is secured by 19 cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans backed by 19 properties in eight states. The
properties have a weighted average occupancy of 92%, with occupancy
ranging from 71% to 96%. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and
1.26X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.14X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 300 Four Falls Corporate Center Loan
($66 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 293,000 SF
Class A office building located in West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.
The property was 91% leased as of May 2014 compared to 85% as of last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 107% and 0.91X at the last review.


WELLS FARGO MBS: Moody's Upgrades Cl. I-A-3 Notes Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust. The tranches
are backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings upgraded are primarily a result of the recent performance
of the underlying pools and are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to higher
prepayments/faster liquidations. The upgrade actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 down from 7.2% in
August 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.0%
to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance
of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures.
Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


WESTGATE RESORTS: DBRS Assigns '(P)BB' Rating to Cl. C Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by Westgate Resorts 2014-1 LLC:

-- Timeshare Collateralized Notes, Series 2014-1, Class A rated
   A(sf)

-- Timeshare Collateralized Notes, Series 2014-1, Class B rated
   BBB(sf)

-- Timeshare Collateralized Notes, Series 2014-1, Class C rated
   BB(sf)


WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL 2005-1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 6 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on nine
classes from Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO)
transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's liability
structure and the underlying credit characteristics of the collateral
using S&P's global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets criteria,
its rating methodology and assumptions for U.S. and Canadian
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and S&P's CMBS global
property evaluation methodology criteria.

While the transaction has experienced amortization since issuance, it
was partially offset by the reduced recovery rates on the remaining
underlying collateral based on S&P's estimates.  As of the Aug. 15,
2014, note valuation report, classes A-1 and A-R have outstanding
balances of $192.1 million and $41.0 million, respectively, down from
$376.8 million and $100.0 million at issuance.

According to the Aug. 15, 2014, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $377.3 million, while its liabilities totaled
$406.4 million, down from $650 million in liabilities at issuance. The
transaction's current asset pool consists of 25 whole loans and senior
participation loans ($377.3 million, 100%).

The trustee report noted two defaulted loans totaling $29.3 million
(7.7%). The defaulted loans are:

   -- 814 Commerce Drive whole loan ($21.7 million, 5.7%) and
   -- Milan Business Center whole loan ($7.6 million, 2.0%).

Standard & Poor's estimated a 37.6% weighted average assets specific
recovery rate for the defaulted loans.  S&P based the recovery rates
on the information from the collateral manager and special servicer.
S&P's analysis also considered qualitative factors, such as the
near-term maturities of the loans over the next couple of years,
refinancing prospects, and loan modifications.

Using loan performance information provided by the collateral manager,
S&P applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the
performing loans ($348.1 million, 92.3%) using its criteria for U.S.
and Canadian CMBS and S&P's CMBS global property evaluation
methodology.

According to the Aug. 15, 2014, trustee report, the deal passed all of
its overcollateralization and interest coverage tests.

RATINGS LIST

Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.

                       Rating       Rating
Class    Identifier    To           From
A-1      982512AA3     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
A-R      982512AJ4     B- (sf)      B- (sf)
B        982512AB1     CCC (sf)     CCC (sf)
C        982512AC9     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)
D        982512AD7     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)
E        982512AE5     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)
F        982512AF2     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)
G        982512AG0     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)
H        982512AH8     CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)


ZAIS CLO 2: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on $4.4MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to nine
classes of debt to be issued by ZAIS CLO 2, Limited:

$106,400,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-1 Loans due 2026 (the "Class A-1 Loans"),
Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Up to $50,000,000 Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class A-1C Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$36,600,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$20,900,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

$12,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$4,400,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1 Loans, the Class A-1B Notes, the
Class A-1C Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Debt." At closing, the Class A-1 Loans
will have a principal balance of U.S.$50,000,000 and the Class A-1C
Notes will have a principal balance of U.S.$0. At any time, the Class
A-1 Loans may be converted in whole or in part to Class A-1C Notes.
Once converted, the Class A-1C Notes cannot be re-converted into Class
A-1 Loans. The aggregate balance of the Class A-1C Notes and the Class
A-1 Loans may never exceed $50,000,000.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

ZAIS CLO 2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans. The underlying portfolio
is expected to be at least 70% ramped as of the closing date.

ZAIS Leveraged Loan Manager 2, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the
Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved assets,
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes and loans in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on the
Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $325,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2620

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of the
Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Debt. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability relative
to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt (shown in terms
of the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2620 to 3013)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1 Loans: 0

Class A-1B Notes: 0

Class A-1C Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2620 to 3406)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1 Loans: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-1C Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has been
assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score assigned for
the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the special report
titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Global Cash Flow
CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around the
various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing to
uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality, historical
performance, the level of disclosure, transaction complexity, the
modeling and the transaction governance that underlie the ratings. The
V Score applies to the entire transaction, rather than individual
tranches.


* Fitch Takes Actions on 15 SF CDOs Issued from 2001-2006
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded 13, downgraded two and affirmed 43 classes
of notes from 15 structured finance collateralized debt obligations
(SF CDOs) with exposure to various structured finance assets.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Thirty-five classes rated 'Csf' have credit enhancement (CE) levels
that are exceeded by the expected losses (EL) from the distressed
collateral (rated 'CCsf' and lower) of each portfolio. For these
classes, the probability of default was evaluated without factoring
potential losses from the performing assets.  In the absence of
mitigating factors, default for these notes at or prior to maturity
appears inevitable.

Four classes rated 'CCsf' have CE levels that are greater than EL.
Default still remains probable as these classes are not expected to
withstand losses projected at the 'CCCsf' rating stress under Fitch's
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) analysis.

Three classes, affirmed at 'Dsf', are non-deferrable classes which
continue to experience interest payment shortfalls.

The upgrades are attributed to significant deleveraging of each
transaction's capital structure which has resulted in increased credit
enhancement available to the notes.  According to the SF PCM analysis,
these tranches are now able to withstand losses at a higher rating
stress compared to Fitch's previous review.

In addition, the class B notes of Sunrise CDO I, Ltd./Inc. and the
class A-2L and A-2 notes of Birch Real Estate CDO I, Ltd are now
supported by cash in the principal collection account.

Although the credit enhancement available to the class A-1 notes of
Lakeside CDO II Ltd. is indicative of a 'BBsf' rating, Fitch believes
that volatile interest collections introduces the risk of an interest
shortfall that is commensurate with a 'Bsf' rating.

The 'CCCsf' rating for the class B notes of Coast Investment Grade
2002-1 is constrained by a structural feature.  In the principal
waterfall, payments towards the class B cumulative deferred interest,
at $1.3 million as of the August 2014 report, are subordinated to
payments towards class B, C, and D principal, as a result of the
failing class C/D overcollateralization test (46.4% vs. the trigger of
102.9%).  While Fitch expects a near-term payoff of the class B
principal, the class' cumulative deferred interest will be paid down
slowly, from the interest proceeds only.  After repayment of the class
B principal, principal proceeds will be directed to pay interest and
principal of class C and D until the coverage test returns to
compliance.  Consequently, the rating for the class B notes is
constrained by the risk of default with regards to the cumulative
deferred interest for the notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative migration, defaults beyond those projected, and lower than
expected recoveries could lead to downgrades for classes analyzed
under the SF PCM.  Classes already rated 'Csf' have limited
sensitivity to further negative migration given their highly
distressed rating levels.  However, there is potential for
non-deferrable classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they
experience any interest payment shortfalls.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the reports
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global Rating
Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  None of the transactions have
been analyzed under a cash flow model framework, as the effect of
structural features and excess spread available to amortize the notes
were determined to be minimal.


* Moody's Takes Action on $1.7BB RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 44 tranches and
downgraded the ratings of five tranches from 24 transactions issued by
various issuers, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-HE2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Funding Corporation Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2006-OPT3

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB7

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB8

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-D

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-B

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2014 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-D

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-A

Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2014 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Affirmed B3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-B

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-D

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related pools
and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high prepayments/faster
liquidations. The downgrades are a result of structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for the bonds than previously
anticipated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 from 7.2% in August
2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5%
for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver of
US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise
in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead
to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to
remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $709MM RMBS Issued From 1998-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two tranches
and upgraded the ratings of 23 tranches from 11 subprime RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE7

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FRE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-NC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-NC2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-7

A, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at A2,
Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The ratings
upgraded are a result of improving performance of the related pools
and/or improving credit enhancement on the bonds due to continued
availability of spread and failure of performance triggers. The
ratings downgraded reflect the updated loss projections.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 from 7.2% in August
2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5%
for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver of
US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise
in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead
to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to
remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $224.5MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued 2002-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 25 tranches
from seven transactions backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-21A

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-15A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-31A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-36XS

Cl. A5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B2,
Outlook Stable on May 21, 2014)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-37A

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A7, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 8-A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 8-A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
ratings downgraded are due to the weaker performance of the underlying
collateral and the erosion of enhancement available for those bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in August 2014 from 7.2% in August
2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5%
for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver of
US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise
in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead
to negative rating actions.


* S&P Takes Action on 22 Tranches From 19 US Synthetic CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, on Sept. 18, 2014, took the
following rating actions on 22 tranches from 19 U.S. synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions:

   -- S&P raised its ratings on 11 tranches from eight investment-
      grade corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions and
      removed them from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with
      positive implications.

   -- S&P also raised its ratings on eight tranches from eight
      synthetic CDO transactions that are weak-linked to three
      investment-grade corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions
      and removed them from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them
      with positive implications.

   -- S&P placed its rating on one tranche from one investment-
      grade corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction on
      CreditWatch with positive implications.

   -- S&P also placed its ratings on two tranches from two
      synthetic CDO transactions that are weak-linked to one
      investment-grade corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction
      on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating and CreditWatch actions follow S&P's monthly review of
synthetic CDO transactions and reflect the transactions' seasoning,
the rating stability of the obligors in the underlying reference
portfolios over the past few months, and the increased synthetic rated
overcollateralization (SROC) ratios, which are above 100% at the
next-highest rating level.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Camber Master Trust Series 9
Series 9
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 9            B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Camber Master Trust Series 10
Series 10
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 10           B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust
Series 4
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Tranche             B+ (sf)             B (sf)/Watch Pos

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A3-$FMS             BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3-$LMS             BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3A-$FMS            BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3B-$LMS            BBB+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Infinity SPC Ltd.
Series 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Newport Waves CDO
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-$FMS             A- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

NOAJ CDO Ltd.
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 1            BBB (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Pivot Master Trust
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 1            B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Pivot Master Trust
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 2            B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A Series18          BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
EUR15 million, JPY3 billion, US$81 million REVE SPC segregated
portfolio of Dryden
XVII notes
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 40           BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rutland Rated Investments
Series DRYDEN06-3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A6-$LS              BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2007-5
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Notes               BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Camber Master Trust Series 7
Series 7
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 7            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Camber Master Trust Series 8
Series 8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Series 8            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

REVE SPC
Series 26
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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                  *** End of Transmission ***