TCR_Public/140914.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 14, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 256

                            Headlines

ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $11.7MM Class D Notes
ACACIA CRE CDO 1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Note Classes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-3: Moody's Rates Cl. E Notes 'Ba2'
ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' on Class C Notes
ARES XI CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on $15.9MM Class E Notes to Ba2

ARES XXXI: Fitch Rates Class D Notes 'BBsf'
ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
BIRCHWOOD PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
BLACKROCK SENIOR IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
C-BASS CBO VIII: Moody's Ups $4.9MM Cl. D-2 Notes Rating to Caa3

CALLIDUS DEBT VI: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Class C Notes
CAPLEASE CDO 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. E Notes
CEDARWOODS CRE II: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to Ca
CHL MORTGAGE 2004-14: Moody's Hikes Cl. 3-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
CIFC FUNDING 2014-IV: Moody's Rates $12MM Class F Notes B2

CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Rates Class A-JFX Certs 'CCCsf'
CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B Certs
CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certs
COLUMBUSNOVA CLO IV: Moody's Ups Rating on $14MM D Notes to Ba1
COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Cert. Classes

COMM 2005-FL10: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class M Debt
COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class K Certificate
COSO GEOTHERMAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on $629MM Certs Due 2026 to 'C'
CREDIT AND REPACKAGED: Moody's Hikes $5MM Notes Rating to Caa2
DRYDEN 34 SENIOR: Moody's Rates $20.7MM Class F Notes B2(sf)

EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $11.8MM Class D Notes
FIRST FRANKLIN 2003-AR3: Moody's Hikes M-2 Notes Rating to Caa3
FRASER SULLIVAN II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Fitch Cuts & Withdraws Rating on Cl. A Notes
HALCYON LOAN 2014-1: Moody's Rates $11MM Class F Notes (P)B2

HARBOURVIEW CLO 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1
ICG US CLO 2014-2: Moody's Rates $8.5MM Class F Notes B3
JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class J Certs
KINGSLAND II: Moody's Hikes Rating on $6MM Class D Notes to Ba2
LB-UBS MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. F Notes Rating to C

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on A-J Certs
MADISON AVENUE 2002-A: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 Notes Rating to Ba1
MASTR ASSET 2006-HE2: Moody's Reinstates Ca Rating on A-2 Notes
MESA WEST 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Note Classes to Caa3

ML-CFC 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $2.2MM Class H Debt
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Cl. E Notes Rating to C
MMCAPS FUNDING XIX: Moody's Ups $26MM Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to B1
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLC1: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 5 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on 2 Tranches

MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
MOUNTAIN VIEW 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $13.5MM Notes
NELDER GROVE: Moody's Rates $25MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
OCTAGON LOAN: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba3'
OMI TRUST 2002-B: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Tranches to B2

OZLM VIII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $12MM Class E Notes
PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to C
PREFERRED TERM XV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Note Classes to Caa3
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts $34MM Certs Rating to Ba3
SARANAC CLO III: Moody's Rates $24.5MM Class E Notes Ba3(sf)

SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Certs Rating to Ba1
SDART 2014-4: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2014-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
SLM PRIVATE 2004-A: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class C Securities
STRUCTURED ASSET 2003-BC5: Moody's Hikes M4 Notes Rating to Caa2

TORO ABS II: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws Rating on 7 Tranches
U.S. CAPITAL V: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-3 Notes to Caa1
VENTURE CLO XVIII: Moody's Rates $29MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C14: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Certs Rating to Ba3
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches
WELLS FARGO 2008-AR1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to B2
WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs

* Moody's Takes Action on $199MM RMBS by Accredited and AEGIS
* Moody's Takes Action on $139.9MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2005
* Moody's Takes Actions on $100MM of RMBS Issued 1997-12006
* Moody's Hikes Rating on $1.5BB Subprime RMBS Issue 2004-2007
* Moody's Raises Ratings on $1.8MM of Subprime RMBS

* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $484MM of Subprime RMBS


                             *********

ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $11.7MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  $9,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf);

  $18,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Upgraded to
  A3 (sf);

  $12,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $245,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021
  (current outstanding balance of $70,919,997), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

  $26,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf);

  $11,750,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
  Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 11, 2014 Affirmed Ba3
  (sf).

ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class A-1a notes
have been paid down by approximately 52.0% or $76.8 million since
that time. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C
and Class D notes are reported at 151.0%, 128.9%, 117.2% and
107.9%, respectively, versus February 2014 levels of 130.3%,
118.5%, 111.6% and 105.8%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes.Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the
rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2155)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3233)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $154.4 million, defaulted
par of $7.0 million, a weighted average default probability of
15.21% (implying a WARF of 2694), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 46.30%, a diversity score of 33 and a weighted
average spread of 3.11%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.

Regulatory Disclosures

For further specification of Moody's key rating assumptions and
sensitivity analysis, see the sections Methodology Assumptions and
Sensitivity to Assumptions of the disclosure form.

Moody's did not receive or take into account a third-party
assessment on the due diligence performed regarding the underlying
assets or financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's describes its loss and cash flow analysis in the section
"Ratings Rationale" of this press release.

As the section on loss and cash flow analysis describes, Moody's
quantitative analysis entails an evaluation of scenarios that
stress factors contributing to sensitivity of ratings and take
into account the likelihood of severe collateral losses or
impaired cash flows. Moody's weights the impact on the rated
instruments based on its assumptions of the likelihood of the
events in such scenarios occurring.

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt,
this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in
relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of
the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program
for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing
ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings
issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain
regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the
support provider and in relation to each particular rating action
for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support
provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this
announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation
to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a
definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final
issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure
and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the
definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct
credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this rating action,
and whose ratings may change as a result of this rating action,
the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the
guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the
following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary
Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated
entity.

Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to
the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook
or rating review.


ACACIA CRE CDO 1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Acacia CRE CDO 1, Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Acacia CRE CDO 1 is a cash CRE CDO transaction, whose reinvestment
period ended in April 2008. The transaction is backed by a
portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(77.7% of the pool balance); ii) CRE CDO securities (19.1%); and
iii) asset backed securities (ABS) (3.2%). As of the July 31, 2014
trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $283.9 million from
$300 million at issuance, as a result of the principal paydown
directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes. The
paydown was the result of the combination of regular amortization
and the failing of certain par value tests.

Also, as of the July 31, 2013 trustee report, the par balance of
the collateral, including defaulted securities, is $58.0 million,
which represents an under-collateralization to the transaction of
1:4.9 (assets/liabilities) compared to 1:3.4 at last review.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6134,
compared to 6329 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.4% compared to 10.8% at
last review; A1-A3 and 1.4% compare to 1.1% at last review; Baa1-
Baa3 and 1.7% compared to 1.3% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 5.2%
compared to 3.6% at last review; B1-B3 and 26.0% compared to 18.2%
at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 63.3% compared to 65.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.9 years, compared to 4.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.7%, compared to 6.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 33.4%, compared to 100.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced
are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-3: Moody's Rates Cl. E Notes 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-3
(AMCAR 2014-3). This is the third public subprime transaction of
the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit).

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-3

Class A-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2-A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of
AmeriCredit as servicer.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2014-
3 pool is 8.50% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating is 36.00%. The loss expectation was based on an
analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage performance as well as
performance of past securitizations, and current expectations for
future economic conditions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other
reasons for better-than-expected performance include changes to
servicing practices that enhance collections or refinancing
opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance depends greatly on the
U.S. job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 10 classes issued by ARCap 2004-1
Resecuritization, Inc. (ARCap 2004-1). The affirmations are a
result of amortization of the capital structure.

Key Rating Drivers

Since the last rating action in September 2013, the credit quality
of the portfolio has improved with approximately 15.7% of the
underlying collateral downgraded and 10.7% of the collateral
upgraded. Currently, 96% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade, improved from 99% below investment
grade at last review. Collateral with a Fitch derived rating in
the 'CCC' category and below has improved to 62.1% from 66.6% at
the last rating action. Over this time, the class A notes have
received $5.95 million in principal payments, for a total of $37.6
million in principal paydowns since issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio. Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the credit enhancements for
the class A through D notes is consistent with the rating
indicated below.

For the class E through K notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below). Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class E and F notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating
that default is probable. Similarly, the class G through K notes
have been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is
inevitable.

The Stable Outlook on the class A notes reflects Fitch's view that
the notes will continue to delever. The Negative Outlook on the
class B notes reflects the increasing obligor concentration, as
the remaining collateral consists of 37 assets from 10 issuers,
and the potential for adverse selection as the portfolio continues
to amortize.

Rating Sensitivities

In addition to those sensitivities discussed above, further
negative migration and defaults beyond those projected by
Structured Finance PCM as well as increasing concentration in
assets of a weaker credit quality could lead to downgrades.

ARCAP 2004-1 is backed by 37 tranches from 10 commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) transactions and is considered a CMBS B-
piece resecuritization (also referred to as first loss commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO]/ReREMIC) as
it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS transactions. The
transaction closed April 19, 2004.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $19,529,967 class A notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,600,000 class B notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $26,500,000 class C notes at 'CCCsf'
-- $8,500,000 class D notes at 'CCCsf'
-- $30,700,000 class E notes at 'CCsf';
-- $13,600,000 class F notes at 'CCsf;
-- $36,000,000 class G notes at 'Csf';
-- $13,000,000 class H notes at 'Csf';
-- $31,500,000 class J notes at 'Csf';
-- $20,500,000 class K notes at 'Csf'.


ARES XI CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on $15.9MM Class E Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Ares XI CLO, Ltd.:

$15,000,000 Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $14,599,100), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$60,400,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

$48,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

$48,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

$32,400,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

$15,900,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$50,000,000 Class A-1a Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $48,509,700), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$473,900,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $459,775,000), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ares XI CLO, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in October
2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF and
higher spread levels compared to the covenant levels. Moody's
modeled a WARF of 2411 and a spread of 2.99% compared to the
covenant levels of 3071 and 2.93%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1929)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2893)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, weighted average
recovery rate and weighted average spread, are based on its
published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported
numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as
having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $774.1
million, defaulted par of $5.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.65% (implying a WARF of 2411), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.37%, a diversity score of
57 and a weighted average spread of 2.99%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Include this language when deal
has exposure to SF assets: Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the
CLO transaction. In each case, historical and market performance
and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral
are also factors.


ARES XXXI: Fitch Rates Class D Notes 'BBsf'
-------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings to ARES XXXI CLO
Ltd./LLC:

-- $759,900,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $136,900,000 class A-2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,700,000 class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,250,000 class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,500,000 class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.

Transaction Summary

ARES XXXI CLO Ltd. and ARES XXXI CLO LLC (together, ARES XXXI, or
the issuer) comprise an arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) that will be managed by Ares CLO Management XXXI,
L.P., a wholly owned subsidiary of Ares Management LLC. Net
proceeds from the issuance of the secured and subordinated notes
will be used to purchase a portfolio of approximately $1.25
billion of primarily senior-secured leveraged loans. The CLO will
have a four-year reinvestment period and a two-year noncall
period.

Key Rating Drivers

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) available
to the notes, in addition to excess spread, is sufficient to
protect against portfolio default and recovery rate projections in
the respective rating stress scenarios. The level of CE for each
class of notes is above the average CE for notes in the same
respective rating categories in recent CLO issuances.

'B' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the indicative
portfolio is approximately 'B', which is comparable to recent
CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote highly
speculative credit quality; however, in Fitch's opinion, each
class of rated notes is projected to perform with sufficient
robustness against default rates commensurate with its applicable
rating stress.

Strong Recovery Expectations: The indicative portfolio consists of
96% first-lien senior-secured loans. Approximately 87.8% of the
indicative portfolio has either strong recovery prospects or a
Fitch-assigned Recovery Rating of 'RR2' or higher, resulting in a
base case recovery assumption of 75.5%. In determining the notes'
ratings, Fitch stressed the indicative portfolio by assuming a
higher portfolio concentration of assets with lower recovery
prospects and further reduced recovery assumptions for higher
rating stress assumptions. For example, the analysis of the class
A-1 notes assumed a 36.5% recovery rate in Fitch's 'AAAsf'
scenario.

Consistent Portfolio Parameters: The concentration limitations and
collateral quality test levels are within the range of limits set
in the majority of recent CLOs. Fitch addressed the impact of the
most prominent risk-presenting concentration allowances in the
Fitch stressed portfolio analysis.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch evaluated the structure's sensitivity to the potential
variability of key model assumptions, including decreases in
recovery rates and increases in default rates or correlation.
Fitch expects the class A-1 and class A-2 notes to remain
investment grade, while classes B, C, and D are generally expected
to remain within two rating categories, even under the most
extreme sensitivity scenarios. Results under these sensitivity
scenarios ranged between 'AA-sf' and 'AAAsf' for the class A-1
notes, between 'BBB+sf' and 'AAAsf' for the class A-2 notes,
between 'BBsf' and 'AA+sf' for the class B notes, between 'B-sf'
and 'AA+sf' for the class C notes, and between a level below
'CCCsf' and A+sf' for the class D notes. The results of these
scenarios remain consistent with the assigned ratings.


ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Arroyo CDO I Limited:

$38,800,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current
outstanding balance of $262,022.22), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on March 19, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class C-1 Notes Due 2036, (current outstanding
balance of $10,673,600.00) Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
March 19, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

$16,000,000 Class C-2 8.46% Notes Due 2036 (current outstanding
balance of $18,883,900), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March
19, 2014 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Arroyo CDO I Limited, issued in August 2001, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of corporate, ABS,
CMBS and RMBS assets originated in 1998 to 2002.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class B notes have
paid down by approximately 94%, or $3.9 million, since that time
and Moody's expects the Class B notes to be fully paid off on the
next payment date. Based on the Moody's calculations, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratio of the Class C notes is currently
140.84%, versus 128.19% in March 2014.

Notwithstanding the improvement in the OC ratio, a portion of
Class C current interest is being paid using principal proceeds
due to insufficient interest proceeds. As of the last payment date
in August 2014, a total of $26,733 of principal proceeds was used
to cover the Class C interest shortfall.

The rating actions also reflect growing concerns about the
potential occurrence of an Event of Default and uncertainty over
subsequent actions by the controlling class including acceleration
of the notes or liquidation of the collateral should this occur.
On previous payment dates, a portion of the Class C current
interest was paid with principal proceeds and once the Class C
notes become the senior most notes, a failure to pay their current
interest can trigger an Event of Default. As Section 5.01 of the
Indenture provides, during an Event of Default, a majority of the
controlling class can vote to accelerate the payments on the notes
by declaring the principal of all the notes immediately due and
payable. In addition, the holders of at least 67% of each class of
outstanding notes voting separately can direct the trustee to
proceed with the sale and liquidation of the collateral. The
severity of any losses on the notes will depend on the timing and
choice of remedies.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. Although the commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, consistent
growth will be unlikely until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The residential real estate property market
is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities on all of the rated notes (by
the difference in the number of notches versus the current model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches:

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches:

Class B: 0

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -1


BIRCHWOOD PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to nine classes of
notes issued by Birchwood Park CLO, Ltd.:

  $375,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $54,600,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
  (sf)

  $21,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $22,400,000 Class C-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  A2 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class C-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  A2 (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Baa3 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Baa3 (sf)

  $35,900,000 Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class E-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Ba3 (sf)

  $2,500,000 Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class E-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Ba3(sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the
Class D-2 Notes, the Class E-1 Notes and the Class E-2 Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Birchwood Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The Issuer's portfolio is
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date and the
transaction documentation requires that the portfolio be 100%
ramped within three months thereafter.

GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E-1 Notes: -1

Class E-2 Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C-1 Notes: -3

Class C-2 Notes: -3

Class D-1 Notes: -2

Class D-2 Notes: -2

Class E-1 Notes: -1

Class E-2 Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


BLACKROCK SENIOR IV: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by BlackRock Senior Income Series IV:

$14,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$25,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019, Upgraded
to Ba1(sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

$385,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2019 (current outstanding
balance of $176,193,000), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March
13, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

BlackRock Senior Income Series IV, issued in January 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A Notes
have been paid down by $145.7 million, or 45.3% since that time.
Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratios for the Class A/B and Class C/D are
reported at 146.0% and 110.8%, respectively, versus January 2014
levels of 125.4% and 106.3%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 12.4% or $34.5 million of the portfolio, compared
to 3.9% or $18.6 million of the portfolio in February 2013. These
investments could expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable
exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2123)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3185)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $278.3 million, a weighted
average default probability of 16.7% (implying a WARF of 2654), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.2%, a diversity
score of 49 and a weighted average spread of 3.2%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


C-BASS CBO VIII: Moody's Ups $4.9MM Cl. D-2 Notes Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd.:

$20,700,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance $
11,222,497), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 31, 2014
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);

$12,000,000 Class D-1 Fifth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance $
6,890,335), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 31, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf);

$4,950,000 Class D-2 Fifth Priority Secured Fixed Rate Deferrable
Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance $
3,316,200.84), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 31, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf).

C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd., issued in November 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS assets
originated in 2003.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since last rating action in March 2014.
Since then the Class B notes have paid off in full and the Class C
notes have paid down by approximately 46%, or $9.5 million. Based
on Moody's calculation, the over-collateralization ratio of the
Class C and Class D notes in August 2014 are 194.1% and 101.7%,
respectively, versus 133.1% and 93.5%, respectively, in March
2014.

In addition, on the August 2, 2014 payment date, there was
sufficient interest proceeds to pay all deferred interest due on
the Class C notes, as well as a significant portion of Class D-1
and Class D-2 notes' current interest. The balances of deferred
interest on the Class D-1 and Class D-2 notes continue to grow,
though at a slower pace than in previous payment periods.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. Although the commercial real estate
property markets are gaining momentum, consistent growth will be
unlikely until the volume of transactions increases, distressed
properties are cleared from the pipeline and job creation
rebounds. The residential real estate property market is subject
to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of residential
mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and refinancing; the
unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches:

Class C: 1

Class D-1: 1

Class D-2: 1

Caa ratings notched down by two notches:

Class C: -4

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1


CALLIDUS DEBT VI: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI,
Ltd.:

$25,000,000 Class A-1D Delayed Draw Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2021 (current balance of $23,819,109.56), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$279,000,000 Class A-1T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current balance of $265,821,262.68), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

$17,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf);

$20,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf);

$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2021, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on June 30, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf).

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI, Ltd., issued in September
2007, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The reinvestment period will
end in October 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period that limit the manager's ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that
the deal will benefit from a higher diversity level compared to
the covenant level. Moody's modeled a diversity score of 62 versus
a covenant of 55. Moody's also notes that the transaction's
reported over-collateralization (OC) ratios have been stable.

Nevertheless, because the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
the end of the reinvestment period, and the post-reinvestment
period reinvesting criteria provides some flexibility in
reinvesting in portfolio collateral with a wide range of
maturities, Moody's modeled an extension of the actual weighted
average life in its analysis. Additionally, because the post-
reinvestment period reinvesting criteria do not require that a
reinvestment asset have a Moody's rating equal to or better than
the rating of the security sold or prepaid, Moody's modeled the
base case portfolio credit quality using the deal's covenant
weighted average rating factor (WARF).

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or participate in
amend-to-extend offerings. Life extension can increase the default
risk horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
collateral.

8) Other collateral quality metrics: Reinvestment is allowed and
the manager has the ability to negatively affect the collateral
quality metrics' existing buffers against the covenant levels,
which could negatively affect the transaction. Moody's analyzed
the impact, assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values
for the weighted average rating factor. However, as part of its
base case, Moody's also factored diversity levels higher than
covenant levels owing to the large difference between reported and
covenant levels.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2250)

Class A-1D: 0

Class A-1T: 0

Class A-2: 3

Class B: 4

Class C: 2

Class D: 1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3376)

Class A-1D: -1

Class A-1T: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $381 million, defaulted par
of $1.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 22.52%
(implying a WARF of 2813), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.58%, a diversity score of 62 and a weighted average
spread of 2.98%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CAPLEASE CDO 2005-1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by CapLease CDO 2005-1, Ltd. Collateralized Debt
Obligations:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO &
Re-REMIC) transactions.

CapLease CDO 2005-1 is a cash transaction whose reinvestment
period ended in October 2009. The transaction is backed by a
portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities ("CMBS")
(23.9% of the collateral pool balance); and ii) credit tenant
leases ("CTL") (76.1%). As of the trustee's July 23, 2014 report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, is $137.6 million, compared to $153.6 million at last
review.

The pool contains one asset totaling $200,000 (0.1% of the
collateral pool balance) that is listed as a defaulted security as
of the trustee's July 23, 2014 report. The asset is a CMBS
security. While there have been limited realized losses on the
underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate losses
to occur on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2082,
compared to 2038 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (11.1%, compared to 10.8% at last
review); A1-A3 (6.2%, compared to 6.7% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(36.5%, compared to 37.1% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (24.6%,
compared to 19.4% at last review); B1-B3 (5.8%, compared to 3.5%
at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (15.8%, compared to 22.5% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 6.2 years, compared to 6.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 34.3%, compared to 38.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.4%, compared to 6.4% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Notching down 100% of the collateral pool (excluding
assets rated or credit assessed at Ca or C) by one notch would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
one to three notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Notching up 100% of the
collateral pool by one notch would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the rated notes of one to four notches upward
(e.g., one notches upward implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to
Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CEDARWOODS CRE II: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Cedarwoods CRE CDO II, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Moody's has also upgradeded the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Moody's has also downgraded the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class of notes due to
greater than expected recoveries on certain defaulted assets along
with improvements in the credit quality of the remaining
collateral pool. Moody's has downgraded the ratings of notes due
to increased under-collateralization; and has affirmed the ratings
of notes due to key transaction metrics being commensurate with
existing ratings. The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO & Re-REMIC) transactions.

Cedarwoods CRE CDO II, Ltd. is a cash transaction whose
reinvestment period ended in February 2012. The transaction is
wholly backed by a portfolio of whole loans and senior
participations on multifamily properties. As of the trustee's July
21, 2014 report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, is $495.3 million, compared to $539.9
million at last review.

The pool contains fifteen assets totaling $83.6 million (17.5% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's July 21, 2014 report. Ten of these
assets (46.3% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS and three assets
are CRE CDO (53.7%). While there have been limited realized losses
on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate
losses to occur on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4572,
compared to 5428 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (2.3%, compared to 0.4% at last
review); A1-A3 (11.3%, compared to 6.9% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(11.4%, compared to 12.0% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (10.3%, the
same as at last review); B1-B3 (14.4%, compared to 12.3% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C and 50.2%, compared to 58.1% at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years, compared to 3.2 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 5.5%, compared to 10.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.1%, compared to 11.4% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool to 0% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero notches (e.g., one notch down
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by 10% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero
to two notches upward (e.g., one notch upward implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CHL MORTGAGE 2004-14: Moody's Hikes Cl. 3-A-1 Debt Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 27, 2014 release, downgraded
the ratings of three tranches issued by GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust
2003-AR1 and upgraded the rating of Cl 3-A-1 from CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust 2004-14. The tranches are backed by Prime Jumbo
RMBS loans.

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-14

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR1

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 15, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are primarily a result of the recent performance of
the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pools. The downgrade actions are a result of deteriorating
performance of the related pools and/or slower pay-down of the
bonds due to lower prepayments/slower liquidations. The upgrade
action is a result of improving performance of the related pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.


CIFC FUNDING 2014-IV: Moody's Rates $12MM Class F Notes B2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to ten classes of
notes to be issued by CIFC Funding 2014-IV, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"CIFC Funding 2014-IV").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$4,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due October
2026 (the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$353,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
October 2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Aaa (sf)

$25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due October
2026 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$75,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
October 2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

$6,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due October
2026 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$21,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due October 2026 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned A2 (sf)

$8,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due October 2026 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned A2 (sf)

$34,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due October 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$29,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due October 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

$12,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due October 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
B2 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the
Class C-2 Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the
Class F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CIFC Funding 2014-IV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 83%
ramped as of the closing date.

CIFC Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes and subordinated fee notes. The transaction incorporates
interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert
interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of
seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 62

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3192)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C-1 Notes: -3

Class C-2 Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Rates Class A-JFX Certs 'CCCsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, in an Aug. 28, 2014 ratings release, assigned the
following rating to class A-JFX of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2007-C6:

-- $150,000,000 class A-JFX 'CCCsf'; RE 50%.

Key Rating Drivers

The creation of the A-JFX class is the result of the full
termination of the swap agreement for class A-JFL.


CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, in a Sept. 4, 2014 ratings release, downgraded two
and affirmed 24 classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C6.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect an increase in the expected losses and lack
of progress disposing of assets in specially servicing. At Fitch's
last rating action there were 41 loans in special servicing. Since
this time, one loan has been resolved and five additional loans
have transferred to the special servicer. Fitch modeled losses of
19% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 16.6%, including $66.4 million (1.4% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date.

Fitch has designated 107 loans (39.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes the 44 specially serviced assets (15%). 13 loans
within the top 15 have Fitch loan to values (LTVs) in excess of
100%, including two loans in special servicing.

As of the August 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance was $3.8 billion, down from $4.8 billion at
issuance. There is one defeased loan (0.04%). Cumulative interest
shortfalls in the amount of $47.5 million are currently affecting
classes C through S.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is Moreno Valley Mall
(2.1% of the pool). The collateral consists of 472,844 square feet
(sf) of a 1.1 million sf regional mall in Moreno Valley, CA, just
east of Riverside, CA. The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Macys,
and Sears, which are not part of the collateral. The loan was
originally transferred to special servicing as part of the GGP
bankruptcy and was modified. The loan re-defaulted and became REO
through a deed in lieu of foreclosure in February 2011. Recent
leasing efforts have resulted in increased occupancy at the mall.
In-line occupancy at the property, including temporary tenants, is
90.5% as of March 2014 and 62.6% without temporary tenants
compared to 88.8%, including temporary tenants, in October 2013.

The second largest contributor to losses is the Hyde Park
Apartment Portfolio (2.9%). The loan is secured by 951 units
within 43 buildings. The latest reported debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was 0.84x, as of March 30, 2014, with occupancy of
90.3%. The borrower completed $26 million of renovations in 2011,
updating kitchens, baths, walls, ceilings and floor coverings, as
well as improving common areas. Additionally, the borrower
finished addressing several deferred maintenance issues in late
2013 that caused units to be off line. The servicer expects
performance to improve in 2014.

The third largest contributor to losses is 100 Technology Center
Drive (1%). The loan is collateralized by a 197,000 sf fully
vacant office building located in Stoughton, MA. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in May 2013 due to imminent
default and subsequently became REO in September 2013. The
servicer is currently marketing the building for lease.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A1-A through A-4 are expected to remain
Stable due to sufficient credit enhancement. Assets have been in
special servicing for an average of 34 months and the final
disposition dates remain uncertain. Continued deterioration of the
specially serviced assets may lead to further downgrades, but if
progress is made on the REO assets, the outlook for the A-M
classes could be revised to stable.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes:

-- $425.6 million class A-M to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   Negative;

-- $50 million class A-MFL to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   Negative.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $43.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $126.3 million class A-3B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,573 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $435.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $248.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $150 million class A-JFL at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- Class A-JFX at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $23.8 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $71.3 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $35.7 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.7 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $35.7 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $47.6 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%.
-- $53.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $65.4 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $53.5 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $11.9 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $11.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $17.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $11.9 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.9 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.9 million class Q at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The swap agreement on the class A-JFL notes was recently
terminated. The rating on the class A-JFL will be withdrawn upon
receipt of the September 2014 trustee report. Please see Fitch's
press release titled 'Fitch Rates Class A-JFX of CGCMT 2007-C6'
dated Aug. 28, 2014 for further details.

Fitch does not rate class S. Class A-1 and A-2 notes are paid in
full. The rating on class X was previously withdrawn.


CITIGROUP 2007-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. X Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of seven
classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.6% of
the current balance compared to 14.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.9% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 13.4% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 47 compared to 50 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the August 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $3.81
billion from $4.76 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 283 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
32% of the pool. One loan, constituting 0.04% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Sixty-one loans, constituting 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $66.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 31%). Forty-four loans, constituting 16% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Moreno Valley Mall Loan ($81 million -- 2% of the
pool), which is secured by a former GGP mall located in Moreno
Valley, California. The property is currently real estate owned
(REO) and the servicer indicated their current strategy is to
stabilize the asset.

The remaining forty-three specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $345
million loss for the specially serviced loans (57% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 54 poorly
performing loans, constituting 26% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $164 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
49% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 94% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110% compared to
111% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.00X,
respectively, essentially the same as at the last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the DDR Southeast Pool Loan ($441 million -- 11.6%
of the pool), which represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a
first mortgage loan secured by 52 anchored retail properties
located in California (1 property), Florida (29), Georgia (8),
Indiana (1), Maryland (2), Massachusetts (1), New Jersey (1),
North Carolina (6), Ohio (2) and Virginia (1). Seventy-five
percent of the properties are grocery anchored. The portfolio was
89% leased as of February 2014 compared to 88% at last review.
This loan is interest only for its entire 10 year term. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.74X, respectively, compared
to 123% and 0.75X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Greensboro Corporate Center Loan
($126.7 million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
439,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Tyson's Corner
outside of McLean, Virginia. The property was 94% leased as of
December 2013 compared to 91% at the last review. Moody's analysis
factors in rollover of large tenants with upcoming lease
expirations by using market vacancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 136% and 0.72X, respectively, compared to 137% and 0.71X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Wells Fargo Capitol Center ($120.3
million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 560,000 SF
Class A office tower located in the central business district of
Raleigh, North Carolina. The property was 94% leased as of June
2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 149% and 0.71X,
respectively, compared to 150% and 0.70X at last review.


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO IV: Moody's Ups Rating on $14MM D Notes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ColumbusNova CLO IV Ltd. 2007-II:

$27,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$26,250,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$300,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
balance of $292,374,240.77), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
November 13, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

$14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021, Affirmed
Ba1 (sf); previously on July 25, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

ColumbusNova CLO IV Ltd. 2007-II, issued in November 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will
end in October 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower weighted
average rating factor (WARF), higher weighted average spread
(WAS), and higher diversity score levels compared to the levels
previously assumed. Moody's also notes that the
overcollateralization (OC) ratios have been stable. The OC ratios
for the Class A/B, Class C and Class D notes are reported at
125.04%, 116.61% and 112.36%, respectively in July 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2224)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3336)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -3

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $429.1 million, defaulted
par of $3.1 million, a weighted average default probability of
19.96% (implying a WARF of 2780), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 48.98%, a diversity score of 80 and a weighted
average spread of 3.47%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


COMM 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed eight classes of COMM 2005-C6 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I Classes A-J, B, C and D were upgraded due to a
significant increase in defeasance, to 15% of the current pool
balance from 3% at the last review; increased credit support
resulting from amortization and loan payoffs as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. Loans constituting 53% of the pool that
have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature within
the next 12 months.

The ratings on P&I Classes A-5A, A-5B, and A-1A were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on P&I Classes E, F, G and H were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The rating on the IO Class, Class X-C, was affirmed based on
the credit of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.7% of the
current balance compared to 5.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 6.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $1.51
billion from $2.27 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 108 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
51% of the pool. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Twenty loans,
constituting 15% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Fourteen loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $95.0 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). Four loans, constituting 1.3% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$10.7 million loss for specially serviced loans (54% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $17.8 million (an 22% expected loss based on
a 52% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year or partial year 2013 operating results
for 98% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 86%,
the same as last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.71X and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 1.71X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 9701 Apollo
Drive Loan ($3.6 million -- 0.2% of the pool), which is secured by
a 94,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Largo (Prince
George's County), Maryland. The loan is fully amortizing and has
paid down 51% since securitization. The loan matures in May 2020.
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa
(sca.pd) and 2.78X, respectively, compared to aaa (sca.pd) and
3.02X at the last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 33% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Lakewood Center Loan ($218.0 million --
14.4% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 2.1 million SF super regional mall located in Lakewood (Los
Angeles County), California. The loan is also encumbered by
additional debt in the form of a $32 million B-Note, held outside
of the Trust. The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney and
Target. As of March 2014, the property was 97% leased compared to
94% as of July 2013. The mall is managed by The Macerich Company.
Property performance has improved since last review, with anchor
sales on par or better than the national average. The loan is
interest only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 74% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.15X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Kaiser Center Loan ($147 million
-- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 914,000 SF Class A
office building located in Oakland, California. As of June 2014,
the property was 88% leased, the same at last review. The largest
tenants are BART (40% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration July 2021) and the Regents of the University of
California (UCLA) (14% of the NRA; lease expiration April 2021).
The property's cash flow has increased considerably since 2011,
largely due to rent steps and increases in other income. The loan
is interest-only throughout the entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 105%
and 0.96X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Private Mini Storage Portfolio Loan
($135.5 million -- 9.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 38 self storage facilities totaling 23,410 units
located in six states. The loan is also encumbered by additional
debt in the form of a $33 million mezzanine loan. As of March
2014, the weighted average occupancy was 81% compared to 82% as of
June 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 88% and 1.13X at last review.


COMM 2005-FL10: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Class M Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of COMM Mortgage Trust
2005-FL10.

Key Rating Drivers

As of the August 2014 remittance, the pool has paid down by 98%
since issuance, with only one asset remaining.

The affirmations of the distressed ratings are due to
exceptionally high credit risk associated with the remaining
asset, Berkshire Mall. The mall comprises 589,146 square feet (sf)
of a 715,146-sf regional mall located in Lanesboro, MA, about 40
miles east of Albany, NY. The collateral consists of 192,793 sf of
in-line space and 396,353 sf of anchor/major tenant space. The
non-collateral anchor space (Target) totals approximately 126,000
sf.

The mall continues to face significant challenges related to trade
area fundamentals, tenant retention and capital expenditure needs
which will ultimately affect investor interest and the long-term
viability of the asset. The immediate trade area for the subject
property is considered rural and tertiary in nature and is
confronting declining population trends with incomes below state
and national levels. Additionally, weak retail sales are affecting
progress on long-term tenant renewals, causing uncertainty for
prospective investors. Management has extended the terms of
several anchor tenants on a short-term basis; however, tenants
have been reluctant to provide commitment to the location. In
particular, major anchor tenants, representing 31.1% of the mall,
have lease expirations by the end of 2016. The asset will
eventually require additional capital expenditures and cosmetic
renovation to remain competitive in the market.

As of June 2014, the mall was 73% occupied, a decline from 78% in
the year prior. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2014 due to the imminent expiration of the forbearance
agreement. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure was executed in June of
2014 and the asset remains real estate owned. The mall is being
managed and leased by CBL & Associates Properties, which
specializes in new development and repositioning of distressed
properties. As of June 2014, approximately $3.6 million remains in
reserves.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings of the remaining distressed classes (those rated below
'Bsf') are subject to further downgrade with the loss of any major
tenant coupled with a prolonged hold period prior to disposition.
Fitch anticipates significant losses based on current valuations
of the asset and uncertainty related to anchor tenant renewal and
future stabilization of the asset.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $6.4 million class J at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $19.8 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 10%;
-- $6.5 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.3 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The following classes, originally rated by Fitch, have paid in
full: A-1, A-J1, A-J2, X-1, MOAX-1, MOAX-2, MOAX-3, B, C, D, E, F,
MOA-1, MOA-2, N-PC, O-PC, P-PC, Q-PC, N-DEL and O-DEL.

Fitch does not rate the class A-J3, G, H and MOA-3 certificates.

In addition, Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only classes X-2-DB, X-2-NOM, X-2-SG, X-3-DB, X-3-NOM and
X-3-SG.


COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class K Certificate
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
downgraded the rating of one class and affirmed the ratings of
nine classes of COMM 2007-FL14 Commercial Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2007-FL14 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-3-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-5-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 13, 2014
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades of Class B and Class C are due to increased credit
support resulting from the pay off of the Glenborough Portfolio
loan. The pool has paid down by 61% since Moody's last review. The
downgrade of interest-only (IO) Class X-2 is due to the weighted
average rating factor or WARF if its referenced classes. The
affirmations of seven principal and interest (P&I) certificate
classes are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value
(LTV) ratio remaining within an acceptable range. The ratings of
IO Class X-3-SG and and IO Class X-5-SG are consistent with the
expected credit performance of their referenced loans, and thus
are affirmed.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 Payment Date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 96% to $90.8
million from $2.5 billion at securitization due to the payoff of
ten loans and the partial loan pay downs of the two remaining
loans in the trust.

The Certificates are collateralized by two mortgage loans ranging
in size from 31% to 69% of the pooled balance. One loan, the Rose
Orchard Technology Park loan (31%) has been modified. The other
loan, the New Jersey Office Portfolio loan, was transferred to
special servicing in January 2011 and is REO.

The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan ($62.2 million -- 69%) is
secured by six office buildings and one exhibition center totaling
1.2 million square feet. The properties are located in Franklin
Township, New Jersey. As of the July 2014 rent roll the portfolio
was 48% leased, the same as last review and compared to 45% at
securitization. The loan is REO via a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure
that closed in April 2012. The properties have been listed for
sale and the marketing of the properties is ongoing. The whole
loan in the amount of $81.4 million includes subordinate mortgage
debt held outside the trust in the amount of $19.1 million. The
properties are challenged by high market vacancy. Moody's
structured credit assessment is caa3 (sca.pd), the same as last
review.

The Rose Orchard Technology Park loan ($28.6 million -- 31%) is
secured by a 310,896 square foot office/R&D park located in San
Jose, California. The property was 30% leased as of July 2014.
Occupancy declined from 37% at last review due to the move-out of
one tenant upon expiration of its lease. Currently one tenant,
ARM, Inc., remains in occupancy. Occupancy sharply decreased in
December 2010 when a major tenant that leased 43% of the property
vacated. The loan was modified in early 2013 when the $20.7
million B-Note held outside the trust was exchanged for equity and
the borrower deposited $3.1 million in new cash to cover leasing,
CapEx costs and debt service shortfalls. The loan has a final
maturity date of January 9, 2015. Moody's structured credit
assessment is caa3 (sca.pd), the same as last review.


COSO GEOTHERMAL: Fitch Cuts Rating on $629MM Certs Due 2026 to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the rating on Coso Geothermal Power
Holdings LLC's (Coso) $629 million ($455 million outstanding) pass
through certificates due 2026 from 'CC' to 'C'.

The rating downgrade to 'C' is based on Fitch's expectation that
the project will fail to meet a pari passu reimbursement
obligation under a drawn letter of credit (LC) due in November
2014. Failure to meet the LC obligation would trigger a technical
default of the pass-through trust certificates, and a payment
default shortly thereafter appears imminent.

Key Rating Drivers

Impending Technical Default
On July 31, 2014, CoBank issued a notice declining the request
from Coso to extend the LC facility commitment termination date
under the credit agreement. This notice indicates that the PPA
performance security and debt service reserve LCs under the LC
facility are scheduled to expire Nov. 30, 2014. If Coso is not
able to replace the LC facility with another provider, the PPA LC
and debt service reserve LC will be drawn into cash, creating a
reimbursement obligation that Fitch expects Coso will be unable to
meet from its operating cash flow and will result in a technical
default under the LC facility that may result in cross default to
the lease and lease indenture.

Geothermal Resource Depletion - Supply Risk: Weaker
Underperformance of the geothermal resource has lowered net
operating capacity at the project's three interlinked geothermal
power plants. With the decline in the geothermal resource, energy
revenues have fallen to levels that are not sufficient to meet
debt obligations.

Expected Payment Shortfalls - Debt Structure: Midrange
Fitch's projections indicate that cash available for debt service
will result in shortfalls for future payment obligations on the
fully amortizing certificates. These obligations are supported by
approximately $27.6 million of remaining funds in the LC-funded
senior rent reserve.

Limited Price Risk - Revenue Risk: Midrange

Southern California Edison (SCE, rated 'A-' with a Stable Outlook)
is committed to purchase Coso's entire energy output under long-
term, mostly fixed-price power purchase agreement (PPA) through
2030. Variable pricing on energy sales is limited to one-fifth of
total revenues between July 2014 and March 2019.

Lack of Dedicated Operating Reserves - Operation Risk: Weaker
The project has no dedicated operations and maintenance or major
maintenance reserve, leaving little cushion to protect against
increased operational costs.

Peer Comparison

Coso's geothermal assets have suffered worse resource depletion
than those within the CE Generation LLC ('BB-'/Outlook Negative)
portfolio and OrCal Geothermal Inc. ('BB'/Outlook Stable), leading
to more pressured financial performance.

Rating Sensitivities

Negative: A technical default on the pari passu LC repayment
obligation would accelerate payment of the certificates resulting
in default.

Transaction Summary

Coso is pursuing a replacement for the PPA security LC, but if it
is unable to secure one by Oct. 30, 2014, appropriate notices to
relevant parties (including the offtaker) will be issued. If the
PPA security LC is drawn, it would trigger the reimbursement
obligation to be immediately due to CoBank. Since Fitch does not
expect Coso will have any excess cash flow to meet this
obligation, there would likely be a default on this obligation.
This would be a technical default under the lease indenture and
would lead to acceleration of payment of the certificates. The
lack of sufficient operating cash flow to meet accelerated
payments due on the certificates would lead to a payment default,
likely around mid-November 2014.

Note that the cross default provision only exists for the
reimbursement obligation of the PPA LC. Failure to pay
reimbursement obligations under the debt service reserve LC does
not cross default to the lease.

Even if Coso is able to replace its PPA security LC, a payment
default on the certificates still appears probable. In developing
a base case for long-term expected performance, Fitch utilized
recent performance as an assumption for Coso's net capacity and
applied minimal additional stress. Fitch expects Coso to operate
below breakeven levels for the remainder of the debt tenor, with a
DSCR average of 0.77x. Based on this profile, and the availability
of liquidity in the reserve, default could occur between 2015 and
2017.

Coso makes its rent payments semi-annually with a large payment in
January and smaller payment in July of each year.  As of August
2014, Coso has twice tapped its senior reserve to meet payment
shortfalls; in January 2013 and January 2014.  The remaining rent
reserve balance is $27.6 million, and future draws on the reserve
are expected for forthcoming January payments.  Reserve funds will
eventually be exhausted, leading to default on the certificates.

CGP is a special-purpose company formed to lease and operate the
Coso project, which consists of three interlinked geothermal power
plants located in Inyo County, CA. Coso provides royalty payments
to the U.S. Navy and the Bureau of Land Management for use of the
geothermal resource.  Under a series of power purchase agreements,
Coso's entire output will be sold to SCE through January 2030.
Cash flows from both Coso and Beowawe, an affiliated geothermal
project in Nevada, are available to service CGP's rent payments
under the CGP lease.  Rent payments are the sole source of cash
available to pay debt service on the pass-through trust
certificates.  Each tranche of the certificates represents an
undivided interest in a related pass-through trust, which holds
the lessor notes issued by the owner lessors. The notes are the
sole collateral and source of repayment of the certificates.


CREDIT AND REPACKAGED: Moody's Hikes $5MM Notes Rating to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced the following rating action on
Credit and Repackaged Securities Limited Series 2006-15 and Credit
and Repackaged Securities Limited Series 2006-16:

Issuer: Credit and Repackaged Securities Limited Series 2006-15

  $20,000,000 Tranche Notes Due December 20, 2016 Notes, Upgraded
  to B1 (sf); previously on January 16, 2014 Upgraded to
  Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit and Repackaged Securities Limited Series 2006-16

  $5,000,000 Tranche Notes Due December 20, 2016 Notes, Upgraded
  to Caa2 (sf); previously on January 16, 2014 Upgraded to
  Caa3 (sf)

These transactions are corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligations (CSOs) referencing a portfolio of corporate senior
unsecured bonds, originally rated in 2006.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are due to the shortened time to maturity of the CSOs,
the level of credit enhancement remaining in the transactions, and
the improving credit quality of the reference portfolio. The
average gap between Market Implied Ratings (MIRs) and fundamental
ratings has also improved.

Since the last rating review in January 2014, the credit quality
of the portfolio has improved. The portfolio's ten-year weighted
average rating factor (WARF) has declined to 814 from 1022,
excluding settled credit events. Moody's rates the majority of the
reference credits in the portfolio as investment grade, with 3.16%
rated Caa (sf) or lower compared to 6.25% in January 2014. In
addition, the number of reference credits with a negative outlook
has decreased by eight to six while the number of reference
credits whose ratings are on review for downgrade has increased by
one. The number of reference credits with a positive outlook or
are on review for upgrade remains unchanged.

The average gap between MIRs and Moody's senior unsecured ratings
has improved, turning positive to a gap of 0.003 notches for over-
concentrated sectors versus -0.05 notches in January 2014.
Currently, the over-concentrated sector is Banking and FIRE,
comprising 24% of the portfolio.

There has been one new credit event since the last rating action
in January 2014 on Texas Competitive Electric Holdings Company
LLC. Five credit events in total, equivalent to 5% of the
portfolio's notional value at closing, have taken place. Since
inception, the subordination of the rated tranches has declined by
approximately 2.5% due to credit events on Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., Washington Mutual Inc., CIT Group Inc., The PMI
Group Inc., and Texas Competitive Electric Holdings Company LLC.

The CSOs have a remaining life of 2.3 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt
Obligations" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

These transactions are subject to a high level of uncertainty,
primarily because of 1) unexpected volatility in the credit and
macroeconomic environment; 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of documentation by different transactional parties
because of embedded ambiguities; and 3) unexpected changes in the
portfolio composition as a result of the actions of the
transaction parties.

For CSOs, the performance of the credit default swaps can be
affected either positively or negatively by 1) variations over
time in default rates for instruments with a given rating; 2)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics; and 3) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Given the tranched nature of CSO liabilities, rating
transitions in the reference pool can have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the CSO liabilities that could
lead to a high degree of rating volatility, which is likely to be
higher for the more junior or thinner liabilities.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also conducted sensitivity analyses, discussed below. Results are
in the form of the difference in the number of notches from the
base case, in which a higher number of notches corresponds to
lower expected losses, and vice-versa.

* Moody's ran a scenario in which it reduced the maturity of the
   CSOs by six months, keeping all other things equal. The
   results of this run were one notch higher than in the base
   case.

* Moody's conducted a stress analysis in which it defaulted all
   entities rated Caa or lower. The result were one notch lower
   than in the base case.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's models explicitly,
rating committees also consider qualitative factors in the rating
process. These qualitative factors include a transaction's
structural protections, recent deal performance in the current
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features and the portfolio manager's track record. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


DRYDEN 34 SENIOR: Moody's Rates $20.7MM Class F Notes B2(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by Dryden 34 Senior Loan Fund:

$409,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$84,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$32,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
A2 (sf)

$39,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

$31,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Ba3 (sf)

$20,750,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F
Notes (collectively, the "Rated Notes") address the expected
losses posed to the noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Dryden 34 is a managed cash-flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first-lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, and up to 5% of the portfolio may
consist of loans that are neither senior secured loans nor second
lien loans. The underlying portfolio is expected to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Prudential Investment Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on
behalf of the Issuer, and it may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four
year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
collateral principal collections constituting unscheduled
principal payments or the sale proceeds of credit risk obligations
or credit improved obligations in additional collateral debt
obligations, subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $650,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2600

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -2

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -4

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $11.8MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Eagle Creek CLO Ltd.:

  $12,700,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 28,
  2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $45,900,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2018 (current outstanding balance of $29,567,986), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on March 28, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $23,200,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2018, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 28, 2014
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $11,800,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2018 (current outstanding balance of $10,460,103.17),
  Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 28, 2014 Affirmed Ba3
  (sf)

Eagle Creek CLO Ltd., issued in February 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
February 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios (OC) since the last rating action in
March 2014. Since then, the Class A-1 notes have been paid down in
full and the Class A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately
35.6% or $16.3 million. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report,
the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes
are reported at 276.2%, 154.8%, 124.8% and 107.6%, respectively,
versus February 2014 levels of 164.8%, 127.9%, 114.0% and 104.5%,
respectively.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio since the last rating action. Based on
the trustee's July 2014 report, the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) is currently 1830 compared to 1914 in February 2014.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on Moody's calculation,
securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 32.5% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class D notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class D notes
owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1596)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2394)

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $81.7 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 9.98% (implying a
WARF of 1995), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.95%, a diversity score of 16 and a weighted average spread of
2.58%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


FIRST FRANKLIN 2003-AR3: Moody's Hikes M-2 Notes Rating to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
from two subprime RMBS transactions backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., 2003-AR3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The principal
methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


FRASER SULLIVAN II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Fraser Sullivan CLO II, Ltd.:

  $32,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18,
  2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $33,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on December 18,
  2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  $17,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on December
  18, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $242,400,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Term Notes
  Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $63,817,146),Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on December 18, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $50,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Revolving
  Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $13,163,603),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 18, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
  (sf)

  $51,600,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 18, 2013
  Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $33,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 18, 2013
  Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
in December 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since December 2013. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 50.4% or $78.2 million since
December 2013. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E notes are reported at 165.34%, 138.01%,
117.91% and 109.68%, respectively, versus December 2013 levels of
143.35%, 126.47%, 112.78% and 106.82%, respectively

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can

lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in
credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2231)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3346)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $261 million, defaulted par
of $5.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 18.53%
(implying a WARF of 2788), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.40%, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted average
spread of 3.54%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Fitch Cuts & Withdraws Rating on Cl. A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six bonds to 'Dsf' from 'Csf',
affirmed six bonds at 'Dsf', and subsequently withdrew the ratings
on 15 classes of notes from two commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDOs).  Additionally, Fitch
marked four classes as paid in full.

On May 15, 2014, an Event of Default occurred for N-Star Real
Estate CDO III Ltd. (N-Star III) as a result of a missed timely
interest payment. On May 28, 2014, the holders of the controlling
class directed for the sale and liquidation of the collateral.
Subsequently, proceeds were distributed on Aug. 13, 2014. Proceeds
were sufficient to pay the class A-1 through B notes in full and
77% of the outstanding balance of the class C-1 notes. The class
A-1 and A-2 notes previously experienced an event of default due
to missed timely interest payments. Principal losses, based on the
original balance of the transaction, were 12%. N-Star III is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that closed on March 10,
2005.

On the June 23, 2014 payment date the class A notes from GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation, series 2006-CC1 (GSMS 2006-CC1)
experienced a principal loss. The class B through G notes had
previously experienced principal writedowns. GSMS 2006-CC1 is a
CMBS Mezzanine Resecuritization issued in April 2006.

Fitch has taken the following actions:

GSMS 2006-CC1:

-- $273,188,580 class A notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;
-- $0 class B notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $0 class C notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $0 class D notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $0 class E notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $0 class F notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $0 class G notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn.

N-Star RE CDO III:

-- $0 class A-1 notes withdrawn;
-- $0 class A-2A notes withdrawn;
-- $0 class A-2B notes withdrawn;
-- $0 class B notes marked 'PIF';
-- $0 class C-1A notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;
-- $0 class C-1B notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;
-- $0 class C-2A notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;
-- $0 class C-2B notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and
   withdrawn;
-- $0 class D notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf' and withdrawn.


HALCYON LOAN 2014-1: Moody's Rates $11MM Class F Notes (P)B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of notes to be issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors
Funding 2014-3 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Halcyon 2014-3").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$4,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$330,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$76,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$39,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$34,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$26,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$11,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F
Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Halcyon 2014-3 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be
approximately 60% ramped as of the closing date.

Halcyon Loan Advisors 2014-3 LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


HARBOURVIEW CLO 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Harbourview CLO 2006-1:

$23,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on October 30, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on October 30, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf); previously on October 30, 2013 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

$14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba1
(sf); previously on October 30, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$337,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $223,372,839.07), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on October 30, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Harbourview CLO 2006-1, issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since October 2013. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 32% or $105.7 million. Based
on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC)
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are
reported at 132.66%, 120.44%, 113.73%, and 108.45%, respectively,
versus October 2013 levels of 123.66%, 115.46%, 110.76%, and
106.95%, respectively. Other metrics remain stable since the last
rating action.

The rating actions on the Class B and C notes also reflect a
correction to Moody's modeling of the weighted average spread.
Moody's understated the weighted average spread amount in its
October 2013 rating action. This error has now been corrected, and
the ratings action reflect this change.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2022)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3032)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $326.8 million, defaulted
par of $1.8 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.14% (implying a WARF of 2527), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.43%, a diversity score of 51 and a weighted
average spread of 3.43%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ICG US CLO 2014-2: Moody's Rates $8.5MM Class F Notes B3
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of notes issued by ICG US CLO 2014-2, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$3,000,000 Class X Senior Term Notes due October 2026 (the "Class
X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$247,000,000 Class A Senior Term Notes due October 2026 (the
"Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$51,000,000 Class B Senior Term Notes due October 2026 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$24,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due October
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$19,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due October
2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$5,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes due October
2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Term Notes due October 2026
(the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$8,500,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Term Notes due October 2026
(the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes, the Class E
Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets

ICG US CLO 2014-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as
of the closing date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2832

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.1 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2832 to 3257)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2832 to 3682)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D-1 Notes: -2

Class D-2 Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's have assessed the "Experience of, Arrangements Among and
Oversight of Transaction Parties," a sub-component of Governance
in the V Score analysis, as Medium for this transaction, instead
of Low/Medium for the benchmark CLO. The score of Medium reflects
the fact that this transaction will be the Manager's second U.S.
CLO transaction and that the Manager is a newly-established and
relatively untested manager, although its senior team includes
individuals that have experience in managing CLO transactions.
This higher score for "Experience of, Arrangements Among and
Oversight of the Transaction Parties" does not, however, cause
this transaction's overall composite V Score of Medium/High to
differ from that of the CLO sector benchmark.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2000-C9 as follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the P&I class was affirmed because it is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.5% of the
current balance compared to 0.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.5% of the
original pooled balance compared to 4.6% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology underlying the rating action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.6% to $3.3
million from $814 million at securitization. The pool has paid
down 73% since last review. The certificates are collateralized by
two mortgage loans.

One loan, constituting 82% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $37 million (an average loss
severity of 38%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 83% compared to 81%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.97X and 1.47X,
respectively, compared to 1.01X and 1.46X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Kmart Baltimore Loan ($2.7 million -- 82%
of the pool), which is secured by a single story retail building
in Baltimore, Maryland. The anchor tenant, Kmart, leases 79% of
property through November 2014. Current occupancy is 92%, the same
as at prior review. The borrower was not able to refinance on its
December 2009 anticipated Repayment Date (ARD). Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.24X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the RiteAid Dayton Loan ($0.6 million -
- 18% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant, RiteAid.
The loan is fully-amortizing and the lease term scheduled to
expire in 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 40% and 2.72X,
respectively, compared to 46% and 2.35X at the last review.


KINGSLAND II: Moody's Hikes Rating on $6MM Class D Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Kingsland II, Ltd.:

$29,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$27,525,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

$6,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$50,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
Notes due 2021 (current balance of $41,114,030.64), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Current Rating A3, Not
on Watch; July 2, 2014)

$205,150,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current balance of $168,690,867.69), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Current Rating A3, Not
on Watch; July 2, 2014)

$62,000,000 Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current balance of $50,981,397.98), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$8,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Kingsland II, Ltd., issued in April 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since October 2013. The Class A-1a, A-1b,
and A-1c notes in aggregate have been paid down by approximately
13.6% or $41.1 million since then. Based on the trustee's August
2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class
A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are reported at 135.29%,
122.04%, 111.72%, and 109.69%, respectively, versus October 2013
levels of 131.37%, 120.06%, 111.04%, and 109.26%, respectively. In
addition, the deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio since the end of the reinvestment period.

However, Moody's notes that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the notes do. Based on
Moody's calculation, securities that mature after the notes do
currently make up approximately 5.28% of the portfolio or $16.4
million. These investments could expose the junior notes to market
risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure to extending maturities continues. In light of
the deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which increases
its sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating
analysis, Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1838)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2756)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $356.7 million, defaulted
par of $10.3 million, a weighted average default probability of
14.11% (implying a WARF of 2297), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 47.31%, a diversity score of 46 and a weighted
average spread of 2.51%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


LB-UBS MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. F Notes Rating to C
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of two classes,
downgraded two classes and affirmed ten classes of LB-UBS Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
C2 as follows:.

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I Classes A-J and B were upgraded due to a
significant increase in defeasance, to 33% of the current pool
balance from 7% at the last review; as well as Moody's expectation
of additional increases in credit support resulting from the
payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance. Loans constituting 14% of the pool that have debt
yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature within the next 12
months.

The ratings on P&I Classes A-4, A-AB and A-5 were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on P&I Classes C, D, E, G, H, J and
K were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss. The rating on the P&I Class F was downgraded due to
timing of anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-CL, was downgraded due to a
decline in the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.8% of
the current balance, the same at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 48% to $1.0 billion
from $1.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 50% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Fourteen loans,
constituting 33% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Sixteen loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $47.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 18%). Five loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$11.6 million loss for specially serviced loans (44% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans, constituting 20% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $117.1 million (an 58% expected loss based on
a 50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 91% of the
pool and partial year 2014 operating results for 86% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100% compared to 101% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.01X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Hartz Fee
Portfolio Loan ($13.5 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is
secured by the leased fee interest in land improved with three
commercial properties in Secaucus, New Jersey, six miles west of
Midtown Manhattan. The improvement include two limited service
hotels and a single-tenant retail building. The ground lease
includes rent steps. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.32X, respectively, the same at
the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool. The largest
loan is The Woodbury Office Portfolio I & II Loan ($211 million --
21.1% of the pool), which consists of two-cross collateralized
senior loans originally secured by 32 primarily office properties
in suburban Long Island, New York. The Woodbury I loan group
includes ten properties, which were 74% leased as of April 2014.
The Woodbury II loan group includes 19 properties, which were 75%
leased as of April 2014. Three properties from the Woodbury II
loan group were released with proceeds paying down the A-Note
balance. RXR Realty, the loan sponsor, gained control of the
portfolio in 2010 through a foreclosure of the mezzanine position.
The loans were modified in October 2011 into an A/B Note structure
whereby the two A-Notes continue to pay interest at the original
contract rate and interest is accrued for the two B-Notes. The
Woodbury I and II loans were cross-collateralized as part of the
loan modification. The total B-Note balance is currently $79.4
million. Moody's current A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and
0.92X, respectively, compared to 113% and 0.86X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Civica Office Commons Loan ($113.5
million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by an 8-story
Class A office complex located in downtown Bellevue, Washington,
10 miles East of Seattle. The property was 92% leased as of June
2014 compared to 98% at last review. The largest tenants are Wells
Fargo, Waggener Edstrom Worldwide and Microsoft Corporation. The
loan sponsor is Brickman, a real estate investment group based in
New York City. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and
0.82X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.83X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the senior portion of the Park
80 West Loan ($100.0 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a 490,000 square foot Class A office property located
in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, a suburb of New York City. The loan
was modified on March 26, 2012 with an A/B Note structure. The
modification split the former $100 million interest-only loan into
a $72 million A-Note and a $28 million B-Note. The A-Note
continues to pay interest at the original contract rate, while
interest on the B-Note is accrued and deferred until the
occurrence of a capital event. As of March 2014, the property was
71% leased compared to 67% as of March 2013. Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan. Moody's A-Note LTV and
stressed DSCR are over 150% and 0.63X, respectively, compared to
143% and 0.68X at last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 22 classes
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. HAF-5, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-6, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. HAF-7, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-8, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. HAF-9, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. HAF-10, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-1A through B were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on Classes C through M were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating
on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit performance (or
the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the referenced
classes.

The affirmations of six non-pooled or rake classes are due to
sufficient credit support for the current ratings. The rake
classes are currently supported by the B-notes associated with the
70 Hudson Street Loan and the Fountains of Miramar Loan.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.3% of
the current balance compared to 9.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.5% of
the original pooled balance, the same as last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24.0% to $1.51
billion from $1.98 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 116 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
61% of the pool. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. At the last review
the 70 Hudson Street loan ($69.4 million - 4.6% of the pool) also
had a structured credit assessment. It was removed this review
because of concerns of potential leasing volalitity due to
exposure to a single tenant with a relatively short remaining
lease term. Five loans, constituting 1% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, constituting 48% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $51.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). Additionally, there was a $4.4 million loss to
the HAF-11 rake class as a result of the liquidation of the AMLI
of North Dallas Loan B-note. Fourteen loans, constituting 8% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Oxford Court Business Center Loan
($18.3 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 153,000
square foot (SF) office complex consisting of ten buildings in
Middletown Township, Pennsylvania, approximately 25 miles
northeast of Philadelphia. The property became real estate owned
(REO) in March 2014. The property was 68% leased as of July 2014.
The property was 100% leased in January 2010 but performance
declined after ten tenants vacated, totaling 20,260 SF (13% NRA)
during 2010. The current strategy is to continue with management
and leasing of the project in order to stabilize the asset.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $72.6 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (64% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans, constituting 13% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $36.0 million (an 18% expected loss based on
a 50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 84% of the
pool and full year 2013 operating results for 80% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97% compared to 105% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average positive adjustment of 25% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.30X and 0.98X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Fountains of
Miramar Loan ($12.3 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 139,000 SF anchored retail center located in Miramar,
Florida. The property is also encumbered by a $11.7 million B-
note, which is part of the collateral for the multi-loan HAF rake
bonds. The property is 100% leased as of August 2014, which is the
same as at last review. Performance has remained stable with a
slight increase in 2013 performance due to an increase in rental
income and expense reimbursements. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.72X,
respectively, compared to a3 (sca.pd) and 1.60X at the last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 39% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One Federal Street Loan ($262 million -- 17%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1 million SF Class A office
tower located in the Financial District of Boston, Massachusetts.
The property is also encumbered by a $111.5 million mezzanine
loan, which is interest only and coterminous with the A-note's
maturity. The property was 86% leased as of June 2014 compared to
65% at last review. The loan is on the watchlist due to low DSCR.
Moody's analysis incorporates a positive benefit for the burn off
of rental abatements of several newly signed leases. The loan is
interest-only throughout the term and matures in June 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.92X, respectively,
compared to 101% and 0.91X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the One New York Plaza Loan ($177.5
million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 2.4 million SF
Class A office property located in Lower Manhattan. The property's
largest tenant is Morgan Stanley (47% NRA; lease expiration
December 2029). The property was 93% leased as of March 2014
compared to 84% at last review. The loan is on the watchlist due
to low DSCR. The loan's sponsor is Brookfield Office Properties.
Moody's analysis incorporates stabilized rental income. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
69% and 1.34X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 215 Fremont Street Loan ($141.4
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 373,000 SF Class
A office building located in the Financial District of San
Francisco, California. Charles Schwab Corporation leases the
entire building as its headquarters (Moody's senior unsecured
rating of A2, stable outlook) through June 2024. The loan is
interest-only for the entire term and matures in May 2016, eight
years prior to the lease expiration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 126% and 0.73X, respectively, the same as last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on A-J Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2007-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement of the
remaining classes relative to Fitch's expected losses. Fitch
modeled losses of 4.8% of the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 14.7%, including $426.5 million
(12% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Fitch has designated 28 loans (30.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes three specially serviced assets (17.5%).

As of the August 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 43.6% to $2.01 billion from
$3.55 billion at issuance. Office properties account for 63.9% of
the pool balance, with five loans (38.5%) secured by Washington DC
metro office buildings. There is one defeased loan (1.0%).
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class A-J and classes
K through T.

The largest specially serviced loan is secured by the Willis Tower
(16.8% of the pool), the second largest loan in the pool. The 110
story, 3.7 million square foot (SF) landmark office tower
(formerly known as the Sears Tower) transferred to special
servicing in May 2014 after a borrower request for a loan
modification due to significant anticipated capital costs
associated with new leasing activity. The July 2014 rent roll
reported occupancy at 82.4%, an increase from December 2012 at
75%. Net operating income (NOI) has been steady with year-end (YE)
2013 NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reporting at 1.70x for
the senior notes, and 1.49x including the subordinate debt.
However, due to the significant costs in tenant improvements and
capital expenditures, property net cash flow (NCF) has been low,
at 1.14x as of YE 2013 for the senior notes, and 0.99x including
the junior piece. The borrower's request is being reviewed by the
servicer to determine the best workout strategy going forward.
According to the servicer, debt service payments are expected to
remain current for the foreseeable future. Fitch did not apply
modeled losses to the subject loan.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Watergate 600
loan (6.6% of the pool) which is secured by a 12-story, 289,286 SF
office building in Washington, DC. Occupancy has remained flat
over the past year, reporting at 99% as of August 2014. The two
major property tenants include Atlantic Media (65% net rentable
area [NRA]) whose lease is through 2023, and Blank Rome LLP (29%
NRA) whose lease expires in December 2018. The subject loan
matures in April 2017. The YE December 2013 NOI DSCR was reported
at 1.27x. The loan remains current as of the August 2014 payment
date. Although Fitch calculated losses based on in-place cash flow
and a stressed cap rate, losses may be mitigated given the strong
location and stable performance of the asset.

The next largest contributor to expected losses are three loans
secured by office buildings located in Louisville, KY (1.7%),
McLeansville, NC (1.6%), and Meridian, ID (1.6%). All three
properties are 100% leased to Citicorp North America. / Citigroup
Inc. (rated 'A' by Fitch) through December 2019. The subject loans
all mature in April 2017. The YE 2013 NOI DSCR was reported at
1.17x for the three loans since issuance. The loans remain current
as of the August 2014 payment date. Fitch had further stressed the
cap rates on the subject properties in its analysis due to the
properties' single tenancy and tertiary office markets. Fitch had
calculated losses based on in-place cash flow and stressed cap
rates; however, losses may be mitigated due to the credit tenancy
and lease expirations over 1.5 years past the loan maturities.

The next largest contributor to losses is the Delamar Hotel
(1.8%), which is secured by an 82-room full service boutique hotel
located in Greenwich, CT adjacent to the Greenwich Harbor boat
docks. The property performance has seen positive trends since
trending downwards in 2009 due to the sluggish economy. For YE
December 2013, occupancy reported at 67%, ADR was $309, and RevPAR
was $207.26, respectively, compared to 57.6%, $304.98, and $175.85
for YE 2010. The partial interest-only loan has been amortizing
since March 2012. The YE December 2013 NOI DSCR reported at 1.16x,
compared to 1.0x at YE 2012. The loan remains current as of the
August 2014 payment date.

Rating Sensitivity

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 and A-1A are Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown. The Negative
Outlook on class A-M reflects above-average loan concentration
concerns, with the top two loans representing 37% of the pool and
the top 15 loans representing 71.5%. Should actual losses exceed
Fitch expectations the class may be subject to future downward
rating actions. The rating on class A-M will be capped at 'Asf'
for any future rating actions due to previous interest shortfalls.
According to Fitch's global criteria for rating caps, Fitch will
not assign or maintain 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' ratings for notes that it
believes have a high level of vulnerability to interest shortfalls
or deferrals, even if permitted under the terms of the documents
(for more information please see the full report titled 'Criteria
for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global Structured Finance
Transactions', dated May 28, 2014, at www.fitchratings.com).

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $1 billion class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $319.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $355.4 million class A-M at 'Asf', Outlook Negative;
-- $284.3 million class A-J at 'Dsf', RE 70%;
-- $0 class B at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2 and A-AB certificates have paid in full. Fitch
does not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CP,
X-W and X-CL certificates.


MADISON AVENUE 2002-A: Moody's Cuts Cl. B-1 Notes Rating to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
tranches from four transactions backed by Manufactured Housing
RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: BankAmerica MH Contract 1998-1

B-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GreenPoint Credit Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-2

Cl. II A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Madison Avenue Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Signal Securitization Corp. MH 1998-2

Class A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures and non-
amortizing subordinate bonds. Performance has remained generally
stable from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

Housing prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MASTR ASSET 2006-HE2: Moody's Reinstates Ca Rating on A-2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has reinstated the rating of Class A-2
from MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE2.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-2, Reinstated to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Withdrawn (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects recent performance of the underlying
pool and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool. In
addition, Moody's is reinstating the rating on Class A-2 following
the trustee's reinstatement of the principal balance of this
tranche. In a report issued in January 2012, the trustee indicated
that the principal balance of the Class A-2 tranche was paid down
to zero. As a result, Moody's withdrew the rating on Class A-2 in
accordance with Moody's withdrawal policy. Having learned that the
trustee later corrected its January 2012 report and reinstated the
principal balance of Class A-2, Moody's has reinstated the rating
on this tranche.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MESA WEST 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Note Classes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1
("Mesa West CDO 2007-1"):

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of ten classes of notes due to
material unexpected pre-payments of high credit risk assets since
last review while credit metrics have remained stable to
improving. Currently, there are no defaulted securities in the
asset pool. Moody's has affirmed the rating of one class of notes
because the key transaction metrics are commensurate with the
existing rating. The rating actions are the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1 is a static cash transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial real estate whole loans and A-
notes (100% of the pool balance). As of the July 10, 2014 trustee
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, has decreased to $330.2 million from $600.0
million at issuance. Paydown is directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes.

There is no asset that is considered defaulted security as of the
July 10, 2014 trustee report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5026,
compared to 5471 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-Ca/C and 100.0%, the same as at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years, compared to 3.6 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral and extensions on
direct loan interests.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 56.8%, compared to 55.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 37.4%, compared to 30.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates by 10% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to ten notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings
movement of Ba1 to Baa3). Decreasing the recovery rates by 10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to eight notches downward (e.g., one notch down
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ML-CFC 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on $2.2MM Class H Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2006-1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are primarily due to the overall stable pool
performance since Fitch's last rating action. Fitch modeled losses
of 9.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original
pool balance total 9.5%, including $86.2 million (4% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 24 loans (21.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, 13 of which
are specially serviced assets (8.9%).

As of the August 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42.5% to $1.23 billion from
$2.14 billion at issuance. Four loans (10.2% of the pool) are
defeased, including two (9.4%) of the top ten loans (by unpaid
principal balance). Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
classes F through Q with the exception of class J.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (2.3% of the
pool) secured by two office properties located in suburban
Atlanta, GA totaling 323,526 sf. The portfolio has been
underperforming since year end (YE) 2009 due to the loss of
several large tenants. The servicer-reported YE 2013 portfolio
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 0.61x with a 74% occupancy
rate, compared to a DSCR of 1.29x and 91.5% occupancy rate at
issuance. The loan remains current on debt service.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (1.4%)
secured by a resort-oriented strip/neighborhood shopping center
located in the Kahana region of Lahaina on the island of Maui,
Hawaii that comprises 58,774 sf. The property's performance
continues to deteriorate due to declining occupancy. Based on
March 2014 rent roll, the property was 60.5% occupied, compared to
63% at YE2013, 67% at YE2012, 70% at YE2012 and 96% at issuance.
The loan began amortizing in February 2011, which also affected
cash flow due to increased debt service payments. Servicer
reported YE 2013 DSCR was 0.64x, compared to 0.74x at YE2012,
0.89x at YE2011 and 1.24x at issuance. The loan remains current on
debt service.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a loan (1.4%)
secured by a 275,754 sf multi-tenant business park located in the
Tampa, Florida. The loan transferred to special servicing in
February 2013 due to imminent default as the borrower was no
longer willing to fund the cash flow shortfalls. The loan is now
over 90-days delinquent. The special servicer has filed for
foreclosure. The loan has a cash management agreement in place. As
of May 2014, the property was 53% occupied, compared to 93.3% at
issuance.

Rating Sensitivities

The 'AAA' rated classes are expected to remain stable due to
increased loan defeasance and continued paydown. Future downgrades
to the 'BBB-' rated class are possible should pool performance
deteriorate and losses on the specially serviced assets exceed
expectations. In addition, the distressed classes (rated below
'B') may be subject to further rating actions as losses are
realized.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $471.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $214.2 million class AM at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82.1 million class AJ at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $100 million class AN-FL at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $50.9 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE70%;
-- $21.4 million class C at 'CCCsf';RE0%;
-- $29.5 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
-- $16.1 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE0%;
-- $24.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE0%;
-- $16.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE0%;
-- $2.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-3FL, A-3B, and A-SB certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Cl. E Notes Rating to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded the rating of one class of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2006-3 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. AJ, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Class A-4, A-1A, AM and AJ were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on classes B, C, D and F were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating class E was downgraded due to an increase in realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The ratings on the IO classes, XC and XP, were affirmed based on
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of
the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.5% of the
current balance, compared to 8.0% at Moody's last review. Realized
losses from liquidated loans increased to 5.7% of the original
pooled balance from 3.7% at last review. Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 11.2% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 9.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30, compared to 34 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the August 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $1.78
billion from $2.43 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 171 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
38% of the pool. As of the August 2014 remittance statement, five
loans, constituting 3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured
by US government securities. Since then, one loan, consituting 6%
of the pool, has defeased as well which is expected to be
reflected in the September remittance statement.

Fifty-eight loans, constituting 42% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $138 million (for an average loss
severity of 53%). Ten loans, constituting 5.7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$43.5 million loss for specially serviced loans (43% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $29 million (a 18% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B through F
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $3.3
million. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses, loan
modifications that include either an interest rate reduction or a
non-accruing note component, and non-recoverability determinations
by the servicer that involve either a clawback of previously made
advances or a decision to stop making future advances.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 90%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 102%, compared to 103% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes defeased,
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.23X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.23X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 25% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Atrium Hotel Portfolio Loan ($239 million -- 13% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of six hotels across six different
states with a total of 1,473 rooms. Five of the six properties
carry the Embassy Suites flag. The hotels are located in secondary
or tertiary markets, and property locations include Tampa,
Florida; Monterey, California; and Topeka, Kansas. The loan
entered special servicing in May 2013 for imminent default but
remained current and returned to the master servicer in November
2013 with no modification. Portfolio occupancy was 73% at year-end
2013 compared to 74% in 2012. Property financial performance has
shown gains over the past two years, however, performance remains
well below that at securitization. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.84X, respectively,

The second largest loan is the Wilton Portfolio Pool 1 Loan
($112.5 million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 45 properties in the greater Richmond, Virginia area.
The portfolio consists of six anchored retail, 15 unanchored
retail, 18 industrial, and six office properties. The majority of
the assets are in the northwest suburban county of Henrico. The
portfolio occupancy levels which have held steady near 85% for
several years. Performance improved in 2013 due to an increase in
rental revenues. As of the August remittance statement, this loan
was on the watchlist due to low DSCR, however, the loan defeased
on August 22, 2014.

The third largest loan is the Westin Arlington Gateway Loan ($87.7
million -- 4.9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 366-key
full-service hotel in the Ballston section of Arlington, Virgina,
a suburb of Washington, DC. The loan is currently on the watchlist
for low DSCR. Revenue per available room (RevPAR) has declined
nearly 3% annually for year-end 2012 and 2013. For the trailing
twelve month period ending March 2014, RevPAR was $138.19 compared
to $149.32 for the prior 12-month period. Additionally, property
NOI decreased 11% from 2011 to 2012 and 8% from 2012 to 2013. Due
to the decline in performance, Moody's view this as a troubled
loan.


MMCAPS FUNDING XIX: Moody's Ups $26MM Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by MMCapS Funding XIX, Ltd.:

   $220,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038
   (current balance of $184,982,457.62), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
   previously on June 26, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
   Possible Upgrade

   $26,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2038,
   Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf)
   Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

MMCapS Funding XIX, Ltd., issued on July 12, 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by
Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
2.5% or $4.8 million since January 2014, using the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. Moody's gave full par credit in its
analysis to two deferring assets that meet certain criteria,
totaling $17 million in par. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, the over-collateralization ratio of the Class A notes was
124.74% (limit 151.80%), the Class B notes was 108.48% (limit
133.30%), the Class C notes was 80.90% (limit 106.20%) and the
Class D notes was 74.16% (limit 102.70%), versus 120.86%, 105.25%,
78.78% and 72.29% respectively in January 2014. The Class A-1
notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool due to the failure of the Class A Principal
Coverage Test.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $91.5 million from $116.5 million in January
2014. Since January 2014, two previously deferring banks with a
total par of $8 million have resumed making interest payments on
their TruPS.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1
and A-2 notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's
had placed the ratings on review for upgrade as a result of the
aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $276.5
million, defaulted/deferring par of $91.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 7.41% (implying a WARF of 756), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition
to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The transaction experienced an Event of Default (EoD) on July 2009
due to a missed interest payment with respect to the Class B
notes. To this date, the controlling class has not directed the
Trustee to implement any of the possible post EOD remedies
specified in Section V of the indenture, which include liquidation
or acceleration. The possible remedies were factored in Moody's
analysis.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed
by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation
of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 506)

Class A-1: +2

Class A-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1092)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-XLC1: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 5 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings on the
following notes issued by Morgan Stanley 2007-XLC1, Ltd.:

Cl. F, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes of
Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6 as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Class X-A, X-B, and X-C, were
affirmed based on the credit performance (or the weighted average
rating factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.0% of the
current balance compared to 2.3% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25, the same as at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.10 billion
from $1.12 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 54% of
the pool. There are no loans with structured credit assessments.

Ten loans are currently on the master servicer's watchlist,
representing 17% of the pool. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

No loans have liquidated from the pool. Additionally, no loans are
in special servicing and Moody's did not identify any troubled
loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for
99% of the pool and partial year 2014 operating results for 42% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97% compared to
99% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.68X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.65X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is 1880 Broadway/15 Central Park West Retail Loan
($125.0 million -- 11.4% of the pool), which is secured by 84,240
square foot (SF), four-level (two below grade), multi-tenant
retail condominium unit located on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan in New York City. The property has approximately 232
feet of frontage along the east side of Broadway, and is 100%
occupied by four tenants, the same as at Moody's last review. The
loan is interest only for its entire term. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 94% and 0.92X, respectively, the same as at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Chelsea Terminal Building Loan
($75.0 million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.05
million SF mixed-use facility located in Chelsea, New York City,
consisting of 25 interconnected 7 to 9-story commercial buildings
originally constructed as warehouses and distribution centers. The
master servicer added the loan to the watchlist due to material
damage suffered as a result of Hurricane Sandy. Per an update from
the servicer, the borrower has completed a substantial portion of
the insurance loss repairs, and the loan is pending removal from
the watchlist upon lender's review. The loan is interest only for
its entire term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.17X,
respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Hyatt Regency Austin Loan ($74.9
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 448-room full-
service hotel located on Lady Bird Lake in Austin, Texas. The
property was constructed in 1982 and most recently renovated in
2008. The property has operated as a Hyatt branded hotel since it
was built and is subject to a management agreement with the Hyatt
Corporation that expires on January 1, 2027. The loan had an
initial 12-month interest-only period, and is currently amortizing
on a 30-year schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and
1.21X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.23X at Moody's last
review.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.:

$24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due April 25,
2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Mezzanine Deferrable Notes Due
April 25, 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on March 12, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$301,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes Due April 25,
2019 (current outstanding balance of $159,590,447.96), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 12, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Mezzanine Deferrable Notes Due
April 25, 2019, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 12, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

$11,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Junior Deferrable Notes Due
April 25, 2019 (current outstanding balance of $10,098,829.49),
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on March 12, 2013 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
in April 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A notes
have been paid down by approximately 28% or $83.9 million since
January 2014. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D
and Class E notes are reported at 127.90%, 116.48%, 108.41% and
103.58%, respectively, versus January 2014 levels of 119.04%,
111.54%, 105.97% and 102.53%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 16% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class E notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class E notes
owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable
exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2178)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3266)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $229.4 million, defaulted
par of $5.9 million, a weighted average default probability of
17.53% (implying a WARF of 2722), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 52.76%, a diversity score of 44 and a weighted
average spread of 3.29%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MOUNTAIN VIEW 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $13.5MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd.:

$18,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf);

$8,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due April 2019, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

$11,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf);

$12,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Deferrable Notes Due April 2019,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 15, 2012 Upgraded to A2
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$305,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019
(current outstanding of $211,277,168), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$40,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
April 2019 (current outstanding of $27,708,481), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$19,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2019, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf);

$13,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2019, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 15, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf).

Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A notes
have collectively paid down by approximately 21% or $63.4 million
since January 2014. Based on the trustee's August 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E notes are reported at 127.9%, 117.7%, 110.2%
and 105.6%, respectively, versus January 2014 levels of 122.3%,
114.5%, 108.6% and 104.9%, respectively.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the portfolio. Based on Moody's calculation, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2310.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the weighted average spread of the
portfolio has decreased. According to the trustee's August 2014
report, the weighted average spread is currently 3.06% compared to
3.24% in January 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1848)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2772)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -1

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $334.6 million, defaulted
par of $7.8 million, a weighted average default probability of
11.71% (implying a WARF of 2310), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.56%, a diversity score of 38 and a weighted
average spread of 2.65%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


NELDER GROVE: Moody's Rates $25MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Nelder Grove CLO, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$218,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$40,000,000 Class A-F Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-F Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$5,000,000 Class A-X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$41,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

$15,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$9,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, Class A-F Notes, the Class A-X Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class
D-2 Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Nelder Grove CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The Issuer's documents require the portfolio
to be at least 98% ramped as of the closing date.

Tall Tree Investment Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $398,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 50.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2900 to 3335)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-F Notes: 0

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2900 to 3770)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-F Notes: -1

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D-1 Notes: -2

Class D-2 Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


OCTAGON LOAN: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to nine
classes of notes to be issued by Octagon Loan Funding, Ltd. (the
"Issuer" or "Octagon Loan Funding").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$202,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$36,700,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$13,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$30,700,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

$14,800,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$20,700,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$95,000,000 Combination Notes (representing components of
$36,700,000 Class B-1 Notes, U.S.$30,700,000 Class C Notes and
$27,600,000 subordinated notes) due 2026 (the "Combination
Notes"), Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Combination Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Moody's rating of the Combination Notes addresses only the
ultimate payment of principal to the holders of the Combination
Notes. For the avoidance of doubt, Moody's rating of the
Combination Notes does not address any other payments or
additional amounts that a holder of the Combination Notes may
receive pursuant to the underlying documents.

Octagon Loan Funding is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be at least 58%
ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2648

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.57%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2648 to 3045)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Combination Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2648 to 3442)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Combination Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


OMI TRUST 2002-B: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Tranches to B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
issued from OMI Trust 2002-B and backed by Manufactured Housing
RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-B

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement. Performance has remained generally stable
from Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

Housing prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


OZLM VIII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $12MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to notes issued by OZLM VIII, Ltd. (the "Issuer"
or "OZLM VIII"):

$348,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$30,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1b Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$66,750,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2a Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2b Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$33,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$33,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

$30,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$12,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A-1a Notes, Class A-1b Notes, the
Class A-2a Notes, the Class A-2b Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes
(collectively, the "Rated Notes") address the expected losses
posed to the holders of the Rated Notes. The ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

OZLM VIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The underlying collateral pool is expected to be
approximately 95% ramped as of the closing date.

Och-Ziff Loan Management LP ("Och-Ziff" or the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations or credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $600,000,000

Diversity of 55

WARF of 2550

Weighted Average Spread of 3.85%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 43%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2550 to 2933)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: 0

Class A-1b Notes: 0

Class A-2a Notes: -2

Class A-2b Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2550 to 3315)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: -1

Class A-1b Notes: -1

Class A-2a Notes: -3

Class A-2b Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Score applies to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


PETRA CRE 2007-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Moody's has also downgraded the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of two classes of notes due to
the implied losses as a result of increased under-
collateralization in the transaction since last review. As of the
August 25, 2014 trustee report, none of the assets in the pool are
generating interest proceeds, and the deal is under-collateralized
by a ratio of 1:11.7 (assets/liabilities). Moody's has affirmed
the ratings on the transaction because its key transaction metrics
are commensurate with existing ratings. The affirmation is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. is a cash transaction whose
reinvestment period ended in June 2013. The transaction is
currently backed solely by one defaulted whole loan (73.1%) and
two defaulted mezzanine interests (26.9%). As of the August 25,
2014 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $356.7
million from $1.0 billion at issuance with the pay-down currently
directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes.

Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on the defaulted
assets once realized and has accounted for this in its analysis.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency assumed a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000,
compared to 9,639 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-C (100.0%), the same as that at last
review. All of the assets are defaulted.

Moody's assumed a WAL of 1.0 year, compared to 4.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about liquidation timing
of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's assumed a fixed WARR of 29.2%, compared to 36.7% at last
review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of all of the
collateral pool by 10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of 0 to 1 notch downward (e.g., one
notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing
the recovery rate of all of the collateral pool by 10% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
0 to 5 notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


PREFERRED TERM XV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Note Classes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd.:

$63,400,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due September
26, 2034, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$15,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes due
September 26, 2034, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$114,500,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due
September 26, 2034 (current balance of $121,242,440.55, including
deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$22,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due
September 26, 2034 (current balance of $23,295,490.73, including
deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$36,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes due
September 26, 2034 (current balance of $38,382,616.76, including
deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also confirmed the rating on the following notes:

$323,100,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due September
26, 2034 (current balance of $246,750,661.10), Confirmed at Aa3
(sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Preferred Term Securities XV, Ltd., issued in September 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts $34MM Certs Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the following certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust
Series CZN-1:

$34,500,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.375% Trust Certificates; Downgraded to
Ba3; previously on December 19, 2013 Ba2 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
ratings of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction. The rating action is a result of the change of
the rating of 7.05% Debentures due October 1, 2046 issued by
Frontier Communications Corporation which was downgraded on
September 3, 2014.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the rating on the
certificate.


SARANAC CLO III: Moody's Rates $24.5MM Class E Notes Ba3(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following definitive
ratings to notes issued by Saranac CLO III Limited:

$164,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$74,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-2A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$11,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-2B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$31,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B Notes"), DefinitiDefinitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

$31,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$23,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$24,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2A Notes, the
Class A-2B Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes (collectively, the "Rated Notes")
address the expected losses posed to the holders of the Rated
Notes. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Saranac III is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments and up
to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of senior unsecured loans, ,
second lien loans and first-lien last-out obligations. The
underlying collateral pool is fully ramped as of the closing date.

Saranac Advisory Limited (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue two tranches
of notes, including income notes. The transaction incorporates
interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert
interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of
seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $387,000,000

Diversity of 65

WARF of 2600

Weighted Average Spread of 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon of 4.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 45%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2A Notes: 0

Class A-2B Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2A Notes: 0

Class A-2B Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Certs Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
classes and affirmed the ratings on two classes in Schooner Trust,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CF2 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the eight P&I classes were upgraded primarily due
to an increase in credit support since Moody's last review,
resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 83% since
Moody's last review. The loans remaining in the pool all mature
within the next six months.

The rating on Class C was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the weighted
average rating factor, or WARF, of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance compared to 1.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.0% of the
original pooled balance compared to 0.7% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $38.3
million from $363.3 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 3% to 60% of the pool. One loan, constituting 60% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by Canadian Government
securities.

The remaining four loans are on the master servicer's watchlist
for upcoming loan maturities. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing. Moody's has not assumed a high
default probability for any loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for
67% of the conduit loans. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is
68% compared to 59% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
15% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.37%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 1.54X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.77X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The three conduit loans represent 40% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Hespeler Road Retail Loan ($10.4 million --
27% of the pool), which is secured by a 136,063 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Cambridge, Ontario. The loan has
amoritized 23% since securitization and is full recourse to the
sponsor. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.22X,
respectively, unchanged since last review.

The second largest loan is the 6333 Unsworth Road Loan ($3.7
million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by a 111,081 SF
industrial facility located in Chilliwack, British Columbia. The
facility was 97% occupied as of November 2013, unchanged from the
prior year. The loan has amortized 22% and is full recourse to the
sponsor. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 55% and 1.76X,
respectively, compared to 53% and 1.84X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Village Centre Loan ($1.1 million
-- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 21,788 SF retail center
located in Bedford, Nova Scotia. The center was 98% occupied as of
May 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 23% and 3.94X,
respectively, compared to 25% and 3.67X at the last review.

Moody's is anticipating the above three loans to pay-off in full
at scheduled maturity.


SDART 2014-4: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-
4 (SDART 2014-4). This is the fourth SDART transaction of the year
for Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SCUSA).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-4

Class A-1 Notes, Assigned (P)P-1 (sf)

Class A-2-A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of SCUSA as
servicer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2014-4 pool
is 17.0% and the Aaa level is 49.0%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of SCUSA's portfolio vintage performance as
well as performance of past securitizations, and current
expectations for future economic conditions.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other
reasons for better-than-expected performance include changes to
servicing practices that enhance collections or refinancing
opportunities that result in prepayments

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other
reasons for worse-than-expected performance include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, inadequate
transaction governance and fraud.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2014-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2014-3 (SEMT
2014-3) as follows:

-- $308,335,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $277,502,000 class A-2 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $30,833,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $308,335,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $277,502,000 class A-5 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $30,833,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $154,167,500 class A-7 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $154,167,500 class A-8 exchangeable certificate 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $308,335,000 class A-IO notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $308,335,000 class A-IO1 notional exchangeable certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $277,502,000 class A-IO2 notional exchangeable certificate
    'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $7,259,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $4,784,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $4,454,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $1,650,000 non-offered class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

The $3,464,699 non-offered class B-5 certificate is not expected
to be rated by Fitch.

Key Rating Drivers

Majority Comprise Qualified Mortgages: Of the total pool, 448
loans on primary or secondary residences have application dates of
Jan. 10, 2014 or later and are, therefore, subject to the Ability-
to-Repay (ATR)/Qualified Mortgage (QM) Rule. Of these, two loans
were originated as non-QM, resulting in a negligible increase to
the pool's 'AAAsf' loss severity (LS). The remaining loans were
classified as safe harbor QM (SHQM), for which no adjustment was
made, or were not subject to the ATR/QM Rule.

Geographically Diverse Pool: Roughly 10% of the pool is located in
the San Francisco metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and almost
9% is in the Seattle, WA MSA. One loan comprising 0.14% of the
pool is located in Napa, California, which may have been impacted
by the Aug. 24, 2014 earthquake. As part of the securitization
diligence, Redwood Trust ordered a drive-by inspection to confirm
that the property was still intact and no material external damage
was present. For this reason, Fitch did not make any adjustment in
its analysis for this loan.

High-Quality Mortgage Collateral: The collateral pool consists of
30-year, fixed-rate, fully documented loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage and substantial liquid
reserves. Third-party, loan-level due diligence was conducted on
89.8% of the pool, the results of which, in Fitch's opinion,
indicate strong underwriting controls.

Market Value Decline Sensitivity: Fitch's sustainable home price
(SHP) model suggests home prices for the pool are overvalued by
roughly 21.2%, which results in a 'Asf' sustainable market value
decline (sMVD) stress above the recent national housing
recession's peak-to-trough experience. A sensitivity analysis was
factored into Fitch's analysis to better align its sMVD stress to
recent observations, which resulted in applying a base sMVD of
17.2%.

Valuation Review Exception: Under Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Master
Criteria," dated July 2014, the agency expects a secondary
valuation product to be used in the third-party due diligence
review of value for each loan. However, the transaction includes
36 loans for which secondary valuation products were not used.
Based on its criteria, the loans subject to this review exception
are viewed by Fitch to be consistent with that of a "D" grade with
respect to valuation, as insufficient documentation was available
to confirm the value.

Fitch did not deem adjustments to the original property values of
these loans as necessary due to the strong loan attributes and
borrower credit profiles. Fitch believes the low weighted average
(WA) combined loan-to-value (CLTV) of these loans of 63.1%
mitigates the risk of possible overvaluation.

Aggregator Quality: Based on Fitch's review of Redwood Residential
Acquisition Corporation (Redwood) as an aggregator, Redwood's loan
acquisition platform and underwriting overlays it applies to loans
acquired are robust, as evidenced by the very limited findings
from the due diligence review. Fitch factored these qualitative
strengths in its loss expectations, despite the large number of
unproven originators participating in Sequoia transactions. Fitch
believes that Redwood's sound acquisition strategy is also
reflected in the very strong performance of the post-crisis
Sequoia pools.

Cash Flow Structure: The transaction features a traditional
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure. Furthermore, the
trust provides for expenses, including indemnification amounts and
costs of arbitration, to be paid by the net weighted average
coupon (WAC) of the loans, which does not impact the contractual
interest due on the certificates.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the base case
projected 17.2% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


SLM PRIVATE 2004-A: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class C Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all the outstanding student loan notes
issued by SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2004-A (2004-A) at
their current rating levels. The Rating Outlook has been revised
to Stable from Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

Adequate Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by
approximately $472.0 million of private student loans originated
by Navient Corp. under the Signature Education Loan Program,
LAWLOANS program, MBALoans program, and MEDLOANS program. The
projected remaining defaults are expected to range between 10.0% -
12.0%. A recovery rate of 10.0% was applied which was determined
to be appropriate based on data provided by the issuer.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE): Transaction credit enhancement
is provided by a combination of combination of
overcollateralization (the excess of the trust's asset balance
over the bond balance), excess spread, and subordination for the
Class A and B notes. As of the May 2014, senior, subordinate, and
junior subordinate parity ratios are 118.43%, 112.00% and 101.66%
respectively.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a
reserve account sized at approximately $3.1 million.

Satisfactory Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is
provided by Navient Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated
satisfactory servicing capabilities.

Rating Sensitivities

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance; actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels
than the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and
remaining loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make
certain note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating
actions, depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch
will continue to monitor the performance of the trust.

Fitch has affirmed the following:

SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2004-A:

-- Class A-2 at 'AAsf';
-- Class A-3 at 'AAsf';
-- Class B at 'Asf';
-- Class C at 'BBsf'.

The Rating Outlooks have been revised to Stable from Negative.


STRUCTURED ASSET 2003-BC5: Moody's Hikes M4 Notes Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Cl. M-2 from
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC4 and the ratings
of three tranches from Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust
2003-BC5. These subprime RMBS transactions are backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC5

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2008
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


TORO ABS II: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws Rating on 7 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following actions on seven classes of
TORO ABS CDO II, LTD./LLC. (TORO II):

-- $527,170,903 Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $55,899,748 Class A-2 notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $23,957,035 Class B notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $6,987,469 Class C notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $10,502,286 Class D notes affirmed at 'Csf' and withdrawn;
-- $13,152,617 Class E notes affirmed at 'Csf' and withdrawn;
-- $6,464,239 Class F notes affirmed at 'Csf' and withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's rating action follows the sale of the remaining debt
securities in the transaction's portfolio in June 2014.
Previously, in August 2013 the non-deferrable class A-1, A-2, B
and C notes defaulted on their accrued interest payments. Although
the notes will remain outstanding until the deal's legal maturity
or liquidation in accordance with the Indenture, the ratings are
withdrawn as they are no longer considered analytically
meaningful.

Toro II is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that closed on
April 27, 2006. The initial portfolio was selected by Merrill
Lynch Investment Managers (MLIM) and is currently managed by
Vertical Capital LLC.


U.S. CAPITAL V: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-3 Notes to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by U.S. Capital Funding V, Ltd.:

$30,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2040,
Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 B3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$42,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2040,
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

$193,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2040
(current balance of $89,847,095), Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on
May 14, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding V, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDO methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect deleveraging
of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios and resumption of interest payments of
previously deferring assets since May 2014.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDO methodology, which include (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by
Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
3.6% or $3.4 million since May 2014 using principal proceeds from
the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. Due to the methodology update mentioned
above, Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to one
deferring asset that meets certain criteria, totaling $5 million
in par. In addition, four previously deferring asset with a total
par of $17.4 million have resumed interest payment on their TruPS
securities. As a result, the Class A-1 notes' par coverage has
improved to 179.8% from 149.3% since May 2014, by Moody's
calculations. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratios of the Class A, Class B and Class C notes
were 92.4%, 66.6% and 61.1%, respectively, compared to April 2014
levels of 84.7%, 61.0% and 56.0%, respectively. The Class A-1
notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-2
and Class A-3 notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time,
Moody's had placed the ratings on review for possible upgrade as a
result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $161.6 million, defaulted/deferring par of $99.6
million, a weighted average default probability of 7.75% (implying
a WARF of 691), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 10.0%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's
explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on www.moodys.com
under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of
a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 412)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1053)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class A-3: -2

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0


VENTURE CLO XVIII: Moody's Rates $29MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to six
classes of debt issued by Venture XVIII CLO, Limited:

  Up to $371,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  due October 2026, with an initial principal balance of
  $271,000,000 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $100,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Loans due October 2026 (the
  "Class A Loans"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $69,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  October 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  $51,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due October 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

  $33,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due October 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3
  (sf)

  $29,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due October 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class A Loans, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Debt." At closing, the Class A
Notes will have a principal balance of U.S.$271,000,000 and the
Class A Loans will have a principal balance of U.S.$100,000,000.
At any time, the Class A Loans may be converted in whole or in
part to Class A Notes. Once converted, the Class A Notes cannot be
re-converted into Class A Loans. The aggregate balance of the
Class A Notes and the Class A Loans may never exceed $371,000,000.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Debt address the expected losses
posed to debtholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Venture XVIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued debt will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and senior unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

MJX Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. After the end of the reinvestment period, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes and subordinated fee notes. The transaction incorporates
interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert
interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes and loans in
order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Debt. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Debt
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class B Notes: 0

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class A Loans: 0

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C14: Moody's Hikes Cl. K Certs Rating to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four
classes, upgraded the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
rating on one class of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C14 as
follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I classes L through O were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on P&I classes H through K were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 92% since
Moody's last review.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 36.3% of
the current balance compared to 7.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 3.7% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to a upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology underlying the rating action:

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating this transaction since 68% of the pool is in special
servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 32% of the
pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that it expects will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior classes and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $41 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
31% of the pool, with the top three loans constituting 68% of the
pool.

Three loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $10.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%). Three loans, constituting 68% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Hot Springs Mall Loan ($12.8 million - 31% of the
pool), which is secured by 319,000 square foot (SF) regional
shopping mall located in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The mall is
anchored by JCPenney, Sears and Dillards (which is not part of the
collateral). The mall was 89% leased as of July 2014. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June of 2014 due to imminent
maturity default. The borrower indicated they plan to submit a
workout proposal and would cooperate with the lender regarding a
foreclosure if an agreement is not reached.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Rockdale Square
Shopping Center Loan ($9.5 million -- 23% of the pool), which is
secured by an anchored retail center located approximately 27
miles east of Atlanta in Conyers, Georgia. The loan transferred to
special servicing in April 2014 due to imminent maturity default.
The property was previously anchored by a grocery tenant who
vacated in 2012 and its lease expired in May 2014. The special
servicer indicated a foreclosure sale was scheduled for August
2014.

The third special serviced loan is the Park 80 East Loan ($5.8
million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a 83,000 SF
office property located in Saddle Brook, New Jersey. The loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2014 due to imminent
maturity default. The property was 82% leased as of May 2014. The
special servicer indicated they will pursue foreclosure with
consensual receivership or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $14.8 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (53% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 62% compared to 80%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.80X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.29X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Great American Plaza Building A-1 Loan ($3.4
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 26,000 SF
office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The property was
100% leased as of December 2013. The largest tenant, representing
79% of the net rentable area (NRA), has a scheduled lease
expiration in 2016. The loan passed its anticipated repayment date
in May 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.61X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Manakin Trade Center Loan ($2.9
million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by a flex office
property located in Richmond, Virginia. The property was 90%
leased as of February 2014. The loan is currently on the watchlist
due to potential roll over risk. One tenant leasing, 30% of the
NRA, is month to month while another tenant leasing 50% of the NRA
has a scheduled lease expiration in 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 83% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to 79% and 1.23X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the Broad Trace Apartments Loan ($2.1
million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 48-unit
multifamily property located 15 miles east of Columbia in Sumter,
South Carolina. The property was 100% leased as of March 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.22X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.11X at the last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 13 classes
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-C29 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I classes A-1A, A-4, A-M and A-J were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.4% of
the current balance compared to 12.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.0% of
the original pooled balance compared to 11.5% at the last review.

Factors That Would Lead To A Upgrade Or Downgrade Of The Ratings
Downgrade:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 27 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 23% to $2.6 billion
from $3.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 118 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
48% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 1% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $78 million (average loss severity of
45%). Thirteen loans, constituting 9% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
New Market Pool ($36 million - 1.4% of the pool), which is secured
by five Class B flex industrial buildings and one office building
totaling approximately 470,000 square feet (SF) in Marietta,
Georgia. The loan transferred to special servicing in December
2010 and is now REO. As of June 2014, the portfolio was 48% leased
compared to 52% at last review.

The remaining 12 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $136 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly
performing loans, constituting 15% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $90 million (23% expected loss based on a 58%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 97% of the
pool and full or partial year 2014 operating results for 75% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106% compared to
105% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 1.50X and 0.98X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 27% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Duke Realty Industrial Pool Loan ($319 million
-- 12% of the pool), which is secured by 27 cross-collateralized,
cross-defaulted industrial properties located in Indianapolis,
Indiana; Atlanta, Georgia; and Savannah, Georgia. The portfolio
was 93% leased as of March 2014 compared to 94% at prior review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 112% and 0.87X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the BRE Retail Pool Loan ($234 million
-- 9% of the pool), which is secured by 16 cross-collateralized,
cross-defaulted retail properties located across 12 states. As of
March 2014, the portfolio was 96% leased compared to 94% at last
review. Performance has remained relatively stable since
securitization but there has been an increase in expenses,
particularly real estate taxes. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
77% and 1.27X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.28X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Westfield Fox Valley Loan ($150
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.4 million SF
regional mall located in Aurora, Illinois. The mall is anchored by
Sears, Macy's and JC Penney, which are not part of the collateral.
As of March 2014, the property was 81% leased compared to 84% at
prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.00X at the last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, in an Aug. 14, 2014 release, downgraded two
classes, upgraded four classes, and affirmed 9 classes of Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-C17.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are due to an increase in credit enhancement as a
result of paydown and defeasance. Additionally, the pool has
experienced stable to improved cash flow performance and lower
overall loss expectations. The downgrades are due to the increased
certainty of losses to the already distressed classes.

Fitch modeled losses of 3.1% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.5%, including $41.7
million (1.5% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. Fitch has designated 32 loans (21.8%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes nine specially serviced assets (4.7%).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 35.4% to $1.76 billion from
$2.72 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 45 loans
(27.5% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes K through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 175,209 square
foot (sf) office property located in Phoenix, AZ (1.1% of the
pool). The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2010
for imminent default and became real estate owned (REO) in
September 2010. The special servicer reports that an existing
tenant at the property is vacating in 2015, which will have an
impact on the value of the property. The latest reported occupancy
is 48%, which has remained unchanged since April 2013.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 169,334 sf
grocery anchored retail center located in Las Vegas, NV (1.5%).
The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2010 for
imminent default and became REO in January 2011. The special
servicer reports that the property has been sold and should be
reflected in the August 2014 remittance report.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Westland
Mall loan (1%), which is secured by a 338,476 sf regional mall
located in Burlington, IA. The loan was previously in special
servicing between June 2013 and June 2014 due to imminent default.
The loan was modified in March of 2014 and included a bifurcation
into an A/B note structure, a 36-month maturity extension, and a
reduced interest rate of 4.75% from 5.85% with the difference
accruing. The servicer-reported occupancy was 91.7% as of YE 2013.

Rating Sensitivity

The Positive Outlook on class C is based on continued increasing
credit enhancement; a future upgrade is likely should credit
enhancement improve and loss expectations remain stable. The
Stable Outlooks reflect the stable to improving performance of the
remaining pool. Fitch will continue to monitor the changing
collateral as 93.8% of the pool is maturing the next eight months.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns Recovery
Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $10.2 million class K to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $13.6 million class L to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated:

-- $74.9 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $23.8 million class C to 'AAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Positive;
-- $47.7 million class D to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $27.2 million class E to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $219.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $187.2 million class A-J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $27.2 million class F at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $30.6 million class G at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $6.8 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $6.8 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns REs as indicated:

-- $37.4 million class H at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $6.8 million class J at 'CCCsf', RE 50%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-PB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and X-C
certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2008-AR1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1 Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Cl. A-1 from
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2008-AR1 Trust. The tranche
is backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2008-AR1 Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade action is a result of improving performance of the
related pool and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to higher
prepayments/faster liquidations. The action reflects Moody's
updated loss expectations on the pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 down from
7.3% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.0% to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 12 classes
in Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-LC5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Classes X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the expected credit performance of their referenced classes
and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, the same as at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the August 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 2.2% to
$1.25 billion from $1.27 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool. There is one structured
credit assessment representing 8% of the pool.

Four loans, representing 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

No loans have been liquidated and there are no loans in special
servicing at this time.

Moody's was provided with full year 2013 and partial year or full
year 2014 operating results for 99% and 34% of the pool,
respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97% compared
to 102% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.08X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Trump Tower
Condominium Loan ($100.0 million - 8.0% of the pool), which is
secured by the commercial condominium component of the Trump
Tower. The tower is located at 725 Fifth Avenue in New York City.
The collateral is a Class A multi-tenant office and retail
building containing approximately 244,500 square feet (SF) and
consists of the lower level, ground floor and floors 2 - 26. The
retail represents approximately 24% of the collateral and is
located on the Garden Level (Lower Level), Grade and 2nd through
4th floors. The office space comprises the remaining 76% of the
collateral and is located on the 5th and 14th through 26th floors.
Due to the public atrium there are no 6th through 13th floors
within the building. The largest tenant in the retail space is
Gucci (20% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration
February 2026) which operates its American flagship store. The
remaining floors 29-68 comprise the residential component and are
not contributed as loan collateral. The loan is interest only for
the full 10-year term. As of April 2014 occupancy was 100%, the
same as at last review. Moody's current structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.75X,
respectively, the same as last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Westside Pavilion Loan ($150.5 million --
12.0% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 755,500 SF regional mall (collateral is 535,500 SF) located in
Los Angeles, California. The property is situated approximately 10
miles west of downtown Los Angeles. The property was constructed
in 1985 and most recently renovated in 2007, the scope of which
included the addition of a 12-screen movie theater. The mall
anchors include Macy's (non-owned) Macy's Home and Nordstrom. The
collateral also includes an Urban Home, Westside Tavern
restaurant, and Landmark Theatres. As of December 2013, the
property was approximately 97% leased compared to 96% at last
review. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 108% and 0.93X at last review.

The second conduit loan is the Starwood Capital Hotel Portfolio
($108.4 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted portfolio of 16 limited-service
hotels and four full-service hotels totaling 1,735 keys. Eighteen
properties are located in Texas with one property each in Altus,
Oklahoma and Texarkana, Arkansas. All of the hotels currently
operate under individual franchise agreements, with no franchise
agreements rolling during the loan term. Hotel flags include
Holiday Inn Express (6), Hampton Inn & Suites (4), Courtyard
Marriott (3), Comfort Inn & Suites (1), Holiday Inn (1), Fairfield
Inn and Suites by Marriott (1), Candlewood Suites (1) and Country
Inn & Suites (1). Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 84%
and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.50X, at last
review.

The third conduit loan is the 100 Church Street Loan ($79.9
million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 21-story, 1.1
million SF Class B+ office building in the City Hall office
submarket of Lower Manhattan. The loan represents a 34.8% pari-
passu piece in a $229.7 million loan. The property was originally
built in 1958 and renovated in 2012. Since securitization the City
of New York expanded into an additional 132,000 SF, helping to
boost occupancy to 94% as of March 2014, up from 84% at
securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and
0.96X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.93X at last review.


* Moody's Takes Action on $199MM RMBS by Accredited and AEGIS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from five RMBS transactions issued by Accredited and
Aegis in 2005. These subprime RMBS transactions are backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-1

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-3

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $139.9MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2005
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in a Sept. 2, 2014 release, upgraded
the ratings of four tranches from three transactions and
downgraded the ratings of 19 tranches from five transactions
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-J6

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-6

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A4A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A4B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2003-A3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2004-AP1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS18 Trust

A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

A-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS13 Trust

Cl. NB, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. CB, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2002-AR17 Trust

Cl I-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

These actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
collateral performance and credit enhancement available to these
bonds. The ratings downgraded are a result of deteriorating
performance and/or structural features resulting in higher
expected losses than previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Actions on $100MM of RMBS Issued 1997-12006
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
tranches and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from five
RMBS transactions. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable rate "scratch and
dent" residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C. 1997-R1

WAC, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: BlackRock Capital Finance L.L.C. 1997-R3

A-WAC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-RP1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ocwen Residential MBS Corporation Series 1998-R1

A-WAC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structure, non-
amortizing subordinate bonds, and availability of excess spread.
Performance has remained generally stable from Moody's last
review. The ratings downgraded are due to the weaker collateral
performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Rating on $1.5BB Subprime RMBS Issue 2004-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in a Sept. 8, 2014 ratings release,
upgraded the ratings of 43 tranches from 20 subprime RMBS
transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

Cl. M4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R11

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R8

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 3, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-R1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-PW1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-3

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: First NLC Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: First NLC Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-H1

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: OwnIt Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 24, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2006-BC1

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2014
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools. The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance
of the related pools and/or improving credit enhancement on the
bonds due to continued availability of spread and failure of
performance triggers.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Raises Ratings on $1.8MM of Subprime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in a Sept. 2, 2014 release, upgraded
the ratings of 55 tranches from 28 subprime RMBS transactions
issued in 2005 and 2006. These subprime RMBS transactions are
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-5

Cl. IA4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. IIA, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE1

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE3

Cl. M4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE5

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE3

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

Cl. AV2-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2014
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-10

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE4

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-HE6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-WMC2

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-FLD1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-ACC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-CW1

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-FRE1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 27, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-FRE2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE1, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 8, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE1

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 21, 2014
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2014
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $484MM of Subprime RMBS
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 34 tranches
from 19 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RS9 Trust

Cl. A-I-6A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 8,
2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-I-7, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ2 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS1 Trust

A-I-6A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba2 (sf)

A-I-6B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 30,
2012 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)*

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust

Cl. M-II-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS2 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS4 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS6 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2014
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS8 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust

A-I-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS11 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS4 Trust

Cl. A-III, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2003-KS7 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS5 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS6 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in Juy 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.




                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


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