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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 24, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 235

                            Headlines

ACCESS FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-6 Notes to Caa2
AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D Notes
AMORTIZING RESIDENTIAL 2002-BC4: Moody's Ups Rating on 3 Tranches
APIDOS CDO V: Moody's Confirms B1 Rating on $12MM Class D Notes
BABSON CLO 2014-II: Moody's Rates $8MM Class F Notes '(P)B2'

BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Notes
CALLIDUS DEBT V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $13MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
CARFINANCE CAPITAL 2014-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D Notes
CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Secs. to C
CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Csf

CITIGROUP 2008-C7: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
COUNTRYWIDE COMMERCIAL 2007-MF1: Moody's Rates 4 Certificates 'C'
CREDIT SUISSE 2000-C1: Fitch Raises Rating on Class H Notes to Bsf
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 2 Notes
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C3: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to C

CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs
DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-LC3: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on E Notes
FRASER SULLIVAN: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2002-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. L Secs. Rating to Ba3
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. L Certs

GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC17: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 11 Certs
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Certs
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Certs to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to 'B1'

KINDER MORGAN 2002-6: Moody's Reviews Ba2 Rating on Cl. A Certs
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Cert. Rating to Caa3
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
MASTR ASSET 2006-AM3: Moody's Ups Class A-3 Secs. Rating to Caa3
MERRILL LYNCH 2003-CA: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. J Certs to Ba1

MONROE CAPITAL 2014-1: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
MORGAN STANLEY 2002-IQ3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
MOUNTAIN VIEW III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

PREFERRED TERM XXII: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
RAIT PREFERRED II: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 3 Note Classes
STRUCTURED ASSET 2007-EQ1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-2 Debt Rating to Ca
TICP CLO II: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $4.8MM Class E Notes
TRALEE CLO III: Moody's Rates $19.75MM Class E Notes 'Ba2'

TRAPEZA CDO VII: Moody's Confirms 'Ca' Rating on 2 Note Classes
TROPIC CDO II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to Ba2
UNITED AIRLINES 2014-2: S&P Assigns BB+ Rating on Class B Certs

* Moody's Lowers Rating on $783MM RMBS Issued in 2006
* Moody's Takes Action on $334.7MM Option ARM RMBS Issued in 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $220.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2007
* Moody's Raises Ratings on $182MM of RMBS Issued 1995-1999
* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $176MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004

* Moody's Takes Action on $141MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $108MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $94MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2004-2007


                             *********

ACCESS FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. A-6 Notes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches backed by
Manufactured Housing RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.
In addition, Moody's has upgraded the rating of two tranches
issued by Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1.
The resecuritization is backed by several bonds issued by Green
Tree Financial Corporation Manufactured Housing deals from 1995 to
1997.

Issuer: Access Financial MH Contract Trust 1996-1

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Manufactured Housing Trust 2003-MH1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2003
Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitization Corp. Series 2001-4

Class A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-1

Cl. I M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac MH Contract 1997-1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1

I-A1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

I-IO, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2012 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1998-D

A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

A-1 ARM, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2001-B

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-A

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2002-C

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Senior/Subordinate
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-A

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrade rating actions are primarily due to the
build-up in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures
and non-amortizing subordinate bonds. Performance has remained
generally stable from Moody's last review.

The actions on the resecuritization reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools backing Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-
Backed Trust 1998-1 and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying Manufactured Housing RMBS bonds.

The principal methodology used in the ratings referenced above,
except Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1, was
"US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013. The
principal methodology used in rating Lehman Manufactured Housing
Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in June 2014 from 7.5% in
June 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-3: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-3's $200 million
asset-backed notes series 2014-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.83%, 47.36%, 39.38%,
      and 35.94% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.35x, and 1.25x S&P's 25.75%-
      26.75% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated
      notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under its
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that S&P believes is
      appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would
      remain within one rating category of its 'AA (sf)' and 'A
      (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the class C and D notes
      would remain within two rating categories of S&P's
      'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These potential rating
      movements are consistent with S&P's credit stability
      criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA', and a two-rating category
      downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,
      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-3

Class   Rating    Type           Interest        Amount
                                 rate          (mil. $)
A       AA (sf)   Senior         Fixed           117.90
B       A (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed            37.70
C       BBB (sf)  Subordinate    Fixed            30.20
D       BB (sf)   Subordinate    Fixed            14.20


AMORTIZING RESIDENTIAL 2002-BC4: Moody's Ups Rating on 3 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches from Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series
2002-BC4.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC4

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pool. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pool. The principal methodology used in this rating
was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


APIDOS CDO V: Moody's Confirms B1 Rating on $12MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Apidos CDO V:

$19,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on February 26, 2014
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on February 26, 2014
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$130,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current outstanding rated balance 117,164,788.69), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on February 26, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$17,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 26, 2014 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

$150,000,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021 (current outstanding rated balance $133,511,690.08), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on February 26, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on February 26, 2014
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also confirmed the rating on the following note:

$12,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on July 18, 2014 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Apidos CDO V, issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans with some exposure to CLO securities. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in April 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of a lower assumed
WARF level compared to the level in February 2014. In light of the
reinvestment restrictions during the amortization period, and
therefore the limited ability of the manager to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will maintain a positive buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that
the deal will benefit from lower WARF level compared to the level
during the last rating review. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2433
compared to 2762 in February 2014.

These rating actions also reflect the deleveraging of the senior
notes since February 2014. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down
by approximately 9.9% or $12.9 million and the Class A-1S notes
have paid down by 11.0% or 16.5 million since then.

Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
rating on the issuer's Class D Notes announced on July 18, 2014.
At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the rating on review
for downgrade due to a change in the methodology Moody's uses to
estimate recovery rates for structured finance securities
including CLO notes in a CDO or CLO transaction. Moody's latest SF
CDO methodology continues to differentiate recovery rates of CLO
tranches by their current rating and tranche size, but the updated
recovery rates are lower than previously assumed.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Exposure to structured finance assets: The deal has a
significant investment in securities from CLO issuers. The
performance and characteristic of these investments can be notably
different from corporate debt, and may introduce additional risk.
Currently, 4.9% of the deal's portfolio is composed of CLO notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1946)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-1-S: 0
Class A-1-J: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +3
Class C: +1
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2919)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-1-S: 0
Class A-1-J: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $353.95 million, defaulted
par of $4.85 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.25% (implying a WARF of 2433), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.03%, a diversity score of 71 and a weighted
average spread of 3.01%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


BABSON CLO 2014-II: Moody's Rates $8MM Class F Notes '(P)B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Babson CLO
Ltd. 2014-II.

  $256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $21,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $19,250,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

  $8,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Class A Notes, the Class B-1
Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes,
the Class E Notes, and the Class F Notes (collectively, the "Rated
Notes") address the expected losses posed to the holders of the
Rated Notes. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Babson CLO 2014-II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio
must be invested in senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The underlying collateral pool is
expected to be approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

Babson Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $400,000,000
Diversity of 60
WARF of 2765
Weighted Average Spread of 3.70%
Weighted Average Coupon of 7.0%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 47.5%
Weighted Average Life of 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2765 to 3180)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0
Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0
Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2765 to 3595)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1
Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P's affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-only certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current ratings.  The
affirmations also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity support available to the
classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class X-1 and X-2
interest-only (IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating
IO securities.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's weighted average debt service coverage (DSC) of
1.15x and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 94.20% using a Standard &
Poor's weighted average capitalization rate of 7.78%.  The DSC and
LTV calculations exclude the two assets described below with the
special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III).

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the July 11, 2014, trustee remittance report, two assets
($9.7 million, 0.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer
and have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) totalling
$5.6 million.  The master servicer deemed the 280 Dobbs Ferry Rd
asset ($6.7 million, 0.4%) nonrecoverable.

Details of the specially serviced assets are as follows:

   -- The 280 Dobbs Ferry Rd asset ($6.7 million, 0.4%) is the
      largest with the special servicer and has $8.0 million in
      total reported exposure.  The asset, secured by a 30,242-
      sq.-ft. office property in White Plains, N.Y., was
      transferred to C-III on April 25, 2011, because of imminent
      monetary default and became real estate owned (REO) on
      March 12, 2013.  A $4.2 million ARA is in effect against the
      asset and S&P expects a significant loss upon its
      resolution.

   -- The One Elm Street loan ($3.0 million, 0.2%) has $3.5
      million in total reported exposure and is secured by a
      10,800-sq.-ft. mixed-use property in Westfield, N.J.  The
      loan was transferred to C-III on Jan. 8, 2013, because of
      payment default and there is a $1.4 million ARA is in effect
      against it.  The loan, which is 90-plus days delinquent, was
      sold at foreclosure and S&P expects a moderate loss upon its
      eventual resolution.

With respect tothe specially serviced assets noted above, a
moderate loss is 26%-59% and a significant loss is 60% or greater.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the July 11, 2014, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.66 billion, which is 66.2% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 142 loans and one REO
asset (down from 179 loans at issuance), two of which are with the
special servicer and 42 ($646.7 million, 39.0%) are on the master
servicers' combined watchlist.  The master servicers, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A. and Prudential Asset Resources, reported financial
information for 100.0% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 98.7% was year-end 2013 or partial-year 2013 or 2014 data
and the remainder was partial- or year-end 2012 data.

To date, the transaction has experienced $196.2 million in
principal losses, or 7.8% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 8.2% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the two specially serviced
assets' eventual resolution or liquidation.  Thirty-four loans
($534.8 million, 32.3%) have a reported Standard and Poor's DSC of
less than 1.00x and 18 loans have a reported Standard & Poor's DSC
between 1.00x and 1.10x.

SUMMARY OF THE TOP 10 LOANS

The top 10 nondefeased loans have a $707.8 million (42.7%)
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance.  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a Standard & Poor's weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.13x and 98.1%, respectively, for the top 10 loans.
Three ($326.1 million, 19.7%) of the top 10 nondefeased loans are
on the master servicers' combined watchlist, which S&P discussed.

The DRA/Colonial Office Portfolio loan ($207.3 million, 12.5%) is
the largest in the transaction and has a $207.3 million trust
balance and a $621.9 million outstanding whole-loan balance.  The
whole loan is divided into three pari passu pieces, a $207.3
million A-1 note held in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1, a
$207.3 million A-2 note held in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-PWR17, and a $207.3 million A-3 note held in
this transaction.  The whole loan is secured by a portfolio of 16
office properties totalling 4.4 million sq. ft. across Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina and is on the master
servicers' combined watchlist because of a low reported combined
DSC -- 0.98x as of year-end 2013.  The loan was previously
transferred to C-III on Aug. 21, 2012, modified on Dec. 14, 2012,
and returned to the master servicer on May 29, 2013.  The
modification terms included extending the loan's maturity date to
July 2016 from July 2014.

The Marriott Houston Westchase loan ($75.5 million, 4.6%) is the
fourth-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
master servicers' watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 600-room
full-service hotel in Houston and appears on the master servicers'
watchlist because of low reported DSC, which was 1.19x for year-
end 2013.  Reported occupancy and revenue per available room were
73.5%, and $92.53, respectively, for year-end 2013.

The Marketplace at Four Corners loan ($43.4 million, 2.6%) is the
sixth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 478,000-sq.-ft.
anchored retail property in Bainbridge, Ohio.  The loan appears on
the master servicers' watchlist because of low reported DSC, which
was 0.94x for year-end 2013.  Reported occupancy was 95.1% as of
Dec. 31, 2013.  The loan was previously with C-III because of
payment default and was modified in Feb. 2011 and returned to the
master servicer in June 2011.  The modification terms included
repaying the $2.9 million deferred interest with excess property
cash flow beginning April 2012.

RATINGS LIST

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-PWR18
                                 Rating
Class         Identifier         To               From
A-3           07401DAC5          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-AB          07401DAD3          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-4           07401DBC4          AA (sf)          AA (sf)
A-1A          07401DAE1          AA (sf)          AA (sf)
A-M           07401DAF8          BBB (sf)         BBB (sf)
AM-A          07401DAG6          BBB (sf)         BBB (sf)
AJ            07401DAH4          B- (sf)          B- (sf)
AJ-A          07401DAJ0          B- (sf)          B- (sf)
X-1           07401DAK7          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
X-2           07401DBD2          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
B             07401DAL5          CCC (sf)         CCC (sf)
C             07401DAM3          CCC (sf)         CCC (sf)
D             07401DAN1          CCC (sf)         CCC (sf)


CALLIDUS DEBT V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $13MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V, Ltd.:

  $21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
  on March 3, 2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  $20,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
  March 3, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  $13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
  on March 3, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class Q-1 Securities Due November 20, 2020 (current
  outstanding rated balance $1,928,112), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on March 3, 2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $30,000,000 Class A-1A Revolving Senior Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due November 20, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
  $19,835,054), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 3, 2014
  Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $270,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  November 20, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
  $178,515,482), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 3, 2014
  Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  November 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 3,
  2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V, Ltd., issued in December 2006,
is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in November 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class A-1A and A-1B
notes have been paid down by approximately 25% or $66.5 million
since March 2014. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B ,
Class C and Class D notes are reported at 135.18%, 123.46%,
113.79% and 108.43%, respectively, versus January 2014 levels of
124.46%, 116.87%, 110.26% and 106.47%, respectively.

The deal has benefited from an improvement in the credit quality
of the portfolio since March 2014. Based on the trustee's July
2014 report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2169
compared to 2375 in January 2014.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 7.1% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. However, actual long-dated asset
exposures and prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's
maturity will drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1748)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class Q-1: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2621)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class Q-1: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $299.2 million, no defaulted
par, a weighted average default probability of 13.41% (implying a
WARF of 2184), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
51.24%, a diversity score of 43 and a weighted average spread of
2.69%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CARFINANCE CAPITAL 2014-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2014-2's $230.50 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2014-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 32.3%, 27.6%, 24.6%,
      22.1%, and 19.2% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provides coverage
      of more than 2.50x, 2.25x, 1.85x, 1.60x, and 1.40x S&P's
      11.0%-12.0% expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated
      notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that S&P believes is
      appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, its ratings on the class A
      notes would remain within one rating category of its 'A
      (sf)' rating during the first year; and its ratings on the
      class B, C, D, and E notes would remain within two rating
      categories of its 'A- (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', 'BB (sf)', and
      'BB- (sf)' ratings, respectively, during the first year.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of
      credit deterioration as a two-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under the
      moderate stress conditions.

   -- S&P's view of the collateral characteristics of the subprime
      automobile loans securitized in this transaction including
      35% of direct loans in the pool.

   -- The transaction's cumulative net loss trigger.

   -- S&P's view of the transaction's payment and legal
      structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2014-2

Class     Rating        Type           Interest         Amount
                                       rate           (mil. $)
A         A (sf)        Senior         Fixed            191.88
B         A- (sf)       Subordinate    Fixed             15.21
C         BBB (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed              9.36
D         BB (sf)       Subordinate    Fixed              7.61
E         BB- (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed              6.44


CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Secs. to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of ten classes
and downgraded the rating of one class of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C4 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-1A through C were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on Classes D, E and G were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on Class F was downgraded due increased realized losses
since Moody's last review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.8% of the
current balance compared to 6.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.3% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 50 compared to 39 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to $1.6 billion
from $2.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 143 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 27%
of the pool. Nine loans, constituting 15% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Twenty-three loans, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $118 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). Six loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$34.4 million loss for specially serviced loans (51% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $33.7 million (a 33% expected loss based on a
59% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 96% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96% compared to 94%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Olen Pointe Brea Office Park Loan ($120.8
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of
office buildings located in Brea, California totaling 637,000
square feet (SF). The properties were 93% leased as of December
2013 compared to 95% at last review. Performance has been stable,
although it has declined recently due to tenant roll-over at lower
base rents. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.87X,
respectively, compared to 111% and 0.86X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Reckson II Office Portfolio Loan
($72.0 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by seven
office properties totaling approximately 915,600 SF (6 fee simple
/ 1 leasehold) in Long Island, Westchester and Bergen County, New
Jersey. As of December 2013, the portfolio's weighted average
occupancy was 89% compared to 95% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.10X, respectively, compared to
79% and 1.20X at last review.

The third largest loan is the GT Portfolio Loan ($36.2 million --
2.2% of the pool), which is secured by eight cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted industrial facilities located in the Oklahoma
City and Tulsa areas. Three of the eight loans are on the
watchlist. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 0.96X at the last review.


CITIGROUP 2006-C4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 16 classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C4 as increased loss
expectations were offset by paydown and defeasance.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 6.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 10%, including $117.5
million (5.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 31 loans (29.4%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes six specially serviced assets (4.2%).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 28.6% to $1.61 billion from
$2.26 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(15% of the pool) are defeased, including the largest loan in the
pool.  Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes E
through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Bossier Corners asset (1.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 147,900 sf retail center located in Bossier City, LA.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in August 2011
due to imminent default.  Foreclosure occurred and the asset
became REO in June, 2013.  The property is approximately 75%
occupied.  The special servicer is preparing the property to be
marketed for sale later this year.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Bristol
Pointe Apartment Homes loan (1.6%), which is secured by a 508 unit
apartment complex located in Norcross, GA.  The loan has been
modified twice and was returned to the master servicer in 2011
after being bifurcated into a $15.2 million A-Note and an $11
million B-note.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Du Bois
Mall (1.6%), which is secured by a 439,451-sf retail mall located
in DuBois, PA, approximately 90 miles northeast of Pittsburgh.
Occupancy levels have historically been steady, around the low 90%
range, since issuance.  As of YE 2013, occupancy was 85%.  NOI
declined by 17% compared to YE 2012 due to lower rental rates and
increased expenses.  Additionally, approximately 30% of the space
rolls in the next year.

Rating Sensitivities

Rating Outlooks on the senior classes remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement due to continued paydown.  Rating
Outlooks on class B is Negative due to potential erosion in credit
enhancement from disposition of loans in special servicing as well
as several highly levered large loans in the pool.  If losses on
the specially serviced loans exceed Fitch's expectations or should
performance deteriorate on the larger performing loans downgrades
to these classes are possible.

Fitch downgrades the following class as indicated:

   -- $22.6 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $800.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $253.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $226.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $164.1 million class A-J at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $50.9 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $25.5 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 35%.
   -- $31.1 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28.3 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $12.7 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


CITIGROUP 2008-C7: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 15 classes
of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2008-C7 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. A-MA, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-JA, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I Classes A-1A through A-MA were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I Classes A-J through H
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss. The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was affirmed
based on the credit performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.7% of the
current balance compared to 9.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 13.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $1.22
billion from $1.85 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 72 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 48% of
the pool. There are no loans defeased or investment-grade
structured credit assessments.

Four loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $126.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). Eleven loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Lincoln Square Loan ($60.0 million -- 4.9% of the
pool), which represents a 27.3% pari-passu interest in a $220.0
million first mortgage. The collateral is also encumbered by a
$65.0 million B-Note. The loan is secured by a 406,000 square foot
(SF), Class A office building located in Washington, DC. As of
December 2013, the property was 97% leased; however, the second
largest tenant, the U.S. Government, which leased 12% of the NRA,
vacated at lease expiration in December 2013. The loan was
transferred to special servicing due to potential cash flow issues
resulting from rent abatements regarding the law firm Latham &
Watkins, which leases 58% of the NRA through January 2016.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Bush Terminal
(Note 10) Loan ($48.8 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is
secured by 16 flex/industrial properties totaling 5.98 million SF
located in Brooklyn, New York. The pooled loan represents a 16.7%
pari passu interest in an $300.0 million interest-only first
mortgage. At securitization, the sponsor had planned to capitalize
on the property's significant near-term tenant rollover by
renovating and converting some of the industrial buildings to
office space. The original income projections were never achieved
due to the sponsor's difficulty in releasing the renovated space.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2011 due
to payment default. In April 2012, the loan was modified into A/B
structure. The pooled $50.0 million portion was divided into a
$31.7 million A-2 note and an $18.3 million B-2 note. The $250.0
million pari passu loan, which is in a separate transaction, was
split into a $158.3 million A-1 note and a $91.7 million B-1 note.
The borrower contributed $15.4 million as additional equity, which
was applied to the accrued interest on the A-notes, an additional
$10.0 million toward a capital expenditure and tenant improvement
reserve account and a $5.0 million letter of credit. The interest
rate on the loan was reduced to 4.68% from 6.28% for the A notes;
payments were interest-only through April 2013. In August 2013,
the loan was re-modified. The subsequent modification closed on
August 19, 2013 and funded on August 20, 2013. The terms of the
new modification include an increase in supplemental borrower new
equity from $25.0 million to $75.0 million; an increase in the
return on equity from 10% to 12%; and an extension of the A-Note
interest-only pay rate of 4.68% an additional 24 months (until
August 6, 2015). The Capital Event Waterfall was modified to
reflect a payout of 80% to the Borrower and 20% to the Lender on
the B-Note. The B-Note was paid down by $7.5 million. A guarantee
of $7.5 million is to remain in place until the loan is paid in
full.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Alexandria Mall
Loan ($46.5 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
844,176 SF anchored mall located in Alexandria, Louisiana. The
collateral, 559,438 SF, is also encumbered by a $12.0 million B-
Note. The loan transferred to special servicing in October 2012
due to imminent monetary default. Anchors at the mall include J.C.
Penney, Dillards, Sears and Burlington Coat Factory, with J.C.
Penney only part of the collateral. As of March 2014, total and
inline occupancy was 81% and 56%, respectively. The servicer is
currently waiting to hear from the borrower regarding a
modification term sheet.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $68.2 million loss for specially
serviced loans (33% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 7% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $14.0 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year full or partial year 2013 operating
results for 94% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 102% compared to 103% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.28X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One Liberty Plaza Loan ($241.2 million --
19.7% of the pool), which represents at 29.4% pari-passu interest
in an $820.0 million first mortgage. The collateral consists of a
2.19 million SF office building located in lower Manhattan. As of
December 2013, the property was 99% leased, the same as at last
review. Major tenants include the law firm Cleary Gottlieb,
Goldman Sachs, FINRA, Zurich American Insurance and Bank of Nova
Scotia. There are lease rollover concerns regarding Goldman Sachs
and Bank of Nova Scotia. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108%
and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.85X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Huntsville Office Portfolio
II ($39.8 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by three
cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans located in
Huntsville, Alabama. The properties are located in the county of
Madison, Alabama, located in the far northern region of Alabama.
As of June 2014, the properties had a combined occupancy of 94%
compared to 95% at last review. Approximately 51% of the NRA will
expire in the next 12 months. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 85% and 1.27X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Cooper Beach Townhomes II - Columbia
Loan ($36.2 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
278-unit student housing complex located in Columbia, South
Carolina. The property benefits from its proximity to the
University of South Carolina, which has limited on-campus housing.
The loan is currently on the watchlist due to a low DSCR. As of
March 2014, the property was 98% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 126% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 128% and 0.74X
at the last review.


COUNTRYWIDE COMMERCIAL 2007-MF1: Moody's Rates 4 Certificates 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on seven classes in Countrywide Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
MF1 as follows:

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2014 Reinstated to C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on class A was upgraded due to an increase in credit
support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization and improved
loan performance. The ratings on the remaining classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.7% of the
current balance compared to 8.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 10.3% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29 compared with 32 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 57% to $277.7
million from $639.8 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 94 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 46%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 5% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

Twenty-two loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $40 million (for an average loss
severity of 52%). Four loans, constituting 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Carrington Park Apartments Homes ($22.6 million 8% of
the pool), which is secured by 330-unit multi-family property
located Jonesboro, Georgia. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in November 2011 due to monetary default. The loan went
to auction in March 2014 and was unsuccessful because the reserve
price was not met. The property was 91% occupied as of December
2013.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by multi-
family and mixed-use property types. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $15.8 million loss for all specially serviced loans (61%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 10 poorly
performing loans, constituting 8.3% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $4.5 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full or partial-year 2013 operating
results for 87% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 90% compared to 95% at last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and
CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.5% to
the most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 1.01X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 20.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is The Reserve at North River ($22 million --
7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 240 unit multi-family
property located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The property was 94%
leased as of March 2014,compared to 95% as of December 2013.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 0.87X, respectively,
compared to 114% and 0.8X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Colonial Grand at Natchez Trace
Loan ($20.6 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
328 unit multi-family property located in Ridgeland, Mississippi.
The property was 98% leased as of March 2014, unchanged since
December 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 0.97X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Alliance Edgewater Loan ($13.3
million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 228 unit
multi-family property located in Lake Jackson, Texas. The property
was 98% leased as of March 2014, compared to 94% as of December
2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.37X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.22X at the last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2000-C1: Fitch Raises Rating on Class H Notes to Bsf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed four distressed
classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement from payoffs
and principal amortization and defeasance.  There are 25 loans
totaling $17.7 million remaining in the pool, four of which are
defeased (7.7%) and none of which are delinquent or in special
servicing.  Fitch has designated five of the remaining loans
(13.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes H through M.

The remaining pool is highly concentrated, with cooperative
housing as the largest property type representing 59% of the pool.
The other property types are office (28%, the largest loan in the
pool), multifamily (12%, the third largest loan in the pool), and
industrial (less than 1% of the pool).  There are 22 fully
amortizing loans (54% of the pool).  Maturity dates of the
remaining loans are as follows: 2014, 13.4%; 2015, 36.6%%; 2019,
9.5%; 2020, 12.3% and 2024, 28.3%.

Fitch modeled losses of 4.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4.6%, including $50
million (4.5% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.4% since issuance.

The largest loan in the pool is the 520 US Highway 22 loan (28.3%)
which is secured by a 60,320 square foot (sf) office property
located in Bridgewater, NJ.  Per the most recent rent roll, the
property is 100% occupied with an average in-place rent of $24.48
per sf.  The rent roll at the property is diverse and no rollover
is projected until 2017 and 2018.  The debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the property as of year-end 2013 was 1.21x, down
slightly from the 1.26x reported as of year-end 2012.  The fully
amortizing loan matures in 2024.

The second largest loan in the pool is The Ponds Cooperative Homes
loan (27.4%) which is secured by a 144-unit cooperative
multifamily building located in Okemos, MI, in the Lansing MSA.
The loan was previously in special servicing due to maturity
default at its original maturity in 2010.  The loan was modified
at which time the term was increased by 59 months to January 2015
and the rate was reduced from 8.9% to 6.5%.

The third largest loan in the pool is also the largest contributor
to expected losses.  The Timber Ridge Apartments loan (12.1% of
the pool) is secured by a multifamily property consisting of 136
units located in Arlington, TX.  Current financials were not
available on the property.  At Fitch's last rating action, the
master servicer reported the decline in performance was as a
result of decreased rents, lower occupancy, and competition in the
area.  The most current financial information is from May 2013, at
which time the property was 92% occupied with average rents at
$444 per unit.  The DSCR as of the same period was 0.71x.  The
property's submarket shows slightly improving metrics.  According
to REIS, as of the second quarter 2014, the Fort Worth Central
Arlington multifamily submarket has a vacancy rate of 4.5%, down
from 5.2% a year prior, with average asking rent of $654 per unit,
up from $620 per unit a year prior.

Rating Sensitivities

Rating Outlooks on class G remains Stable.  Class H is assigned a
Rating Outlook Stable.  Further upgrades are limited by the
concentrated nature of the pool.

Fitch upgrades the following classes and assigns Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

   -- $918,267 class G to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $12.5 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $4.3 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 85%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the class N certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class A-X certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CP3: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the remaining classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2002-CP3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on limited recovery projections on the
remaining loans.  Five loans totaling $26.7 million remain in the
pool.  Two of the five (91.1% of the pool) are specially serviced
and real estate owned (REO).  Given significant expected losses on
the two specially serviced REO properties, recovery estimates on
class L are limited and classes M and N are expected to be reduced
to zero due to anticipated losses.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes L through O.

The three performing loans (8.9%) are collateralized by
multifamily properties, two of which are located in El Dorado, AR
and one of which is located in Edmond, OK.  All three balloon
loans mature in 2017.

Fitch modeled losses of 89.3% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.4%, including $6.9
million (0.8% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool has paid
down 97% to $26.7 million from $895.7 million at issuance.

The largest loan in the pool and the largest contributor to
expected losses is a 288,825 square foot (sf) retail center, known
as River Street Square (48.4% of the pool) located in Elyria, OH
in the Cleveland MSA.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in April 2012 due to monetary default after the borrower was
unable to refinance the loan.  The property's anchor tenant,
Walmart, vacated the property prior to its lease expiration in
August 2012.  The special servicer reports that the property's
current occupancy is 27%, down from 36% a year ago.  The property
became REO in November 2013 and is anticipated to be marketed for
sale in an upcoming auction.

The second largest loan in the pool and the next largest
contributor to expected losses is a 91,917 sf office building
located in Troy, MI (42.7% of the pool).  The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2010 and became REO in October 2011.
The special servicer has appointed a property manager to manage
and lease the property.  The special servicer reports that the
property's occupancy is currently at 72%, which has improved from
22.6% as of Sept. 2012.  The special servicer marketed the
property for sale in July 2014 and anticipates a sale of the
property to close later this year.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating on class L may see a further downgrade if the
performance of the remaining three performing properties
deteriorates or if recoveries on the specially serviced loans are
not sufficient to repay expenses and advances.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $2.2 million class L at 'CCCsf'', RE 0%.
   -- $11.2 million class M at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $4.5 million class N at 'Csf', RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-SP, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and K have
been paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class O certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class A-
X certificates.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C3: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class,
affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the ratings
on three classes of CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mtge
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C3 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014
Affirmed B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 30, 2014
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on Class B was upgraded due to an increase in credit
support since Moody's last review, resulting from paydowns and
amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of additional
increases in credit support resulting from defeasance. The pool
has paid down by 84% since Moody's last review. In addition,
defeased loans constituting 14% of the pooled loan balance are
scheduled to mature in August 2014.

The rating on Class C was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl index (Herf) are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes F and G were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss from specially serviced
loans, troubled loans and certificate undercollateralization.

The ratings on Classes D and E were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans, troubled loans
and certificate undercollateralization that are higher than
Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of its reference classes resulting from principal paydowns
of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 52.4% of
the current pooled certificate balance compared to 7.8% at Moody's
last review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is
now 8.8% of the original pooled balance compared to 8.5% at the
last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized
and expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls, an increase in certificate
undercollateralization or suspension of interest or principal
distribution.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach since
79% of the pool is in special servicing and performing conduit
loans only represent 6% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances, closing costs and
undercollateralization due to Workout Delayed Reimbursement
Amounts (WODRAs). Translating the probability of default and loss
given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies
the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to the most
junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the
most senior classes.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $104 million
from $1.64 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pooled loan balance (excluding defeasance), with
the top ten loans constituting 74% of the pooled loan balance. One
loan, constituting 14% of the pooled loan balance, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

The certificates are undercollateralized by $19.7 million.
Previous to July 2014, five properties had been in special
servicing for up to six years, amassing $18.4 million in advances
on a collective $37.0 million loan balance. In July 2014, Workout
Delayed Reimbursement Amounts (WODRAs) occurred on these five
properties, increasing the certificate undercollateralization from
$1.3 million to $19.7 million. Moody's is currently treating this
certificate undercollateralization as a delayed loss of principal
to the trust (100% expected loss).

Two loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $89 million (for an average loss
severity of 50%). Sixteen loans, constituting 80% of the pooled
loan balance, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is The Tower at Northwoods Loan ($17
million -- 20% of the pooled loan balance), which is secured by a
184,616 square foot (SF) office property located in Danvers,
Massachusetts, 15 miles north of Boston. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in February 2009 and the lender took title
via foreclosure in May 2013. The loan has been deemed non-
recoverable. Occupancy for this property was 92% at year-end 2013.
This property has a WODRA associated with over $10 million that
were previously servicer advances.

The remaining 15 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $34 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average),
not including the expected loss associated with the WODRAs.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 89% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95% compared to 93%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.12X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The four conduit loans represent 7% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Groves at Wimauma Apartments Loan ($3 million
-- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 108-unit multifamily
apartment property located in Wimauma, FL. The property was 100%
leased as of October 31, 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
78% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.16X at the last
review.


CSFB COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
of CSFB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the four investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the five below investment grade
P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class (Class A-X) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.4% of the
current balance compared to 13.0% at Moody's last review. Realized
losses have increased to 8.3% of the original pooled balance
compared to 4.1% at last review and Moody's base expected loss
plus realized losses is now 14.0% of the original pooled balance
compared to 14.6% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 44 compared to 45 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $2.3 billion
from $3.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 237 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 39%
of the pool. Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Seventy-one loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fifty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $283 million (for an average loss
severity of 59%). Nineteen loans, constituting 12% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Best Western President Loan ($77.7 million -- 3.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a 334-key hotel in Manhattan, New
York. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2013 due
to imminent payment default, however, the loan has remained
current on its payments. The special servicer has indicated that
the borrower has requested a possible loan modification, as well
as approval to convert the hotel to a more upscale brand. The
Lender is currently evaluating the requests.

The second largest exposure in special servicing is the West
Covina Portfolio ($75.6 million -- 3.2% of the pool) which is
comprised of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans.
The West Covina Village Community Shopping Center Loan is secured
by a 229,000 square foot (SF) anchored retail center and the Wells
Fargo Bank Tower Loan is secured by a 215,000 SF suburban office
building, both located in West Covina, California. The loans
initially transferred to special servicing in June 2009 due to
delinquent payments and a modification closed in May 2013. The
modification for both loans included (a) a one-year extension of
the maturity date; (b) capitalization of lender expenses; (c)
interest-only payment for the remainder of the term and (d)
implementation of a hard lockbox. The loans were returned to the
master servicer in 2013 but were subsequently transferred back to
the special servicer in June 2014 due to the Wells Fargo Bank
Tower being 60 days delinquent.

The remaining 16 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $111.9 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (41% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 27 poorly
performing loans, constituting 6.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $25.1 million from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 93% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 102% compared to
109% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.23X and 0.95X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the 720 Fifth Avenue Loan
($165.0 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
121,100 SF mixed-use (retail and office) property located in the
Fifth Avenue retail submarket of Manhattan. The property was 90%
leased as of October 2013 compared to 92% at last review. The
largest tenant is Abercrombie & Fitch (54% of net rentable area
(NRA), with various lease expiration dates from 2019 through
2022). The loan is interest-only throughout the term and matures
November 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.74X,
respectively, compared to 125% and 0.74X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the HGSI Headquarters Loan
($141.9 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
635,000 SF office property located in Rockville, Maryland. The
property is 100% leased to Human Genome Sciences, Inc. through May
2026 and serves as its corporate headquarters. Property
performance is consistent with Moody's original projections.
Moody's stressed the cash flow with a lit/dark analysis given the
single tenant occupancy of the property. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 105% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.94X
at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 280 Park Avenue Loan ($138.6
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which represents a participation
interest in a $433 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 1.2 million SF office property in Midtown Manhattan
near Grand Central Terminal. The loan is on the watchlist for poor
performance, as occupancy has remained well below market levels
for several years. As of June 2014 the property was 57% leased
compared to 60% in September 2013. Two tenants, together
representing approximately 12% of property NRA, vacated at their
lease expirations in January 2014, however, approximately 92,000
SF of this space was leased to new tenants at higher rents. The
borrower reports strong leasing activity for the property
following a major renovation which included an overhaul of the
lobby. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.11X,
respectively.


DEUTSCHE BANK 2011-LC3: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities
(DBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2011-
LC3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral since issuance.  Expected losses are in-line
with issuance.  The transaction continues to be highly
concentrated with the top five and 10 largest loans accounting for
50% and 70%, respectively.  Additionally, the transaction has a
large hotel concentration of 19% with the second and fourth
largest loans being secured by hotels.

There have been no delinquent or specially serviced loans in the
pool since issuance.  One loan (0.5% of the pool) is defeased.
Fitch has designated two Fitch Loans of Concern (15.5%).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 4.4% to $1.58 billion from
$1.65 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class G.

The largest Fitch loan of concern, Quadrus Office Park loan (8.3%
of the pool), is secured by an eight-building office campus
consisting of 216,605 sf, located on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park,
CA.  The property is located two miles from the Stanford
University Campus.  Major tenants include The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation (10%), lease expiration June 2021; Samsung
SemiConductor (7%), expiration May 2016; and Mayfield Fund, LLC
(5%), expiration July 2023.  There is approximately 18% tenant
rollover in 2015 and 24% in 2016.  As of March 2014, the property
is 73.7% occupied with above- market-average rent of $87.13 per
sf.  Per REIS, as of 2Q'14, the San Francisco Metro office market
vacancy is 12.6% with asking rent $45.38 per sf.  The South San
Mateo office submarket vacancy is 16% with asking rent $45.95 per
sf.  The loan remains current; however, Fitch continues to monitor
the below-market occupancy at the property.

The next largest Fitch Loan of Concern (7.2%) is secured by a
portfolio of eight full-service hotels located across eight states
consisting of 2,342 rooms.  The portfolio includes six Marriott
hotels, one Doubletree, and one Hilton.  As of Dec. 2013 the
portfolio was 62.5% occupied with revenue per available room
(RevPAR) of $141, respectively, compared to 60% and $89 for the
prior year.  The portfolio is on the master servicer's watchlist
due to borrower notification that the Hilton Boston Woburn
sustained damage due to Hurricane Irene.  Per the master servicer,
the restoration is approximately 90% complete.  The year end (YE)
2013 debt service coverage ratio improved to 5.42x from 4.97x at
YE 2012 and remains above that at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Rating Outlooks on classes A-1 through P-M5 remain Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown and overall
stable pool performance.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $34 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $671.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $97.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $112.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $127.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $75.2 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $54.2 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $73.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $131.7 million class PM-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class PM-X at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.9 million class PM-2 at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $28.9 million class PM-3 at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $26.5 million class PM-4 at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $20.9 million class PM-5 at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-B or the class G
certificates.


FRASER SULLIVAN: Moody's Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Fraser Sullivan CLO I, Ltd.:

$22,800,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

$10,200,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

$10,200,000 Class E-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

$4,800,000 Class E-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

$15,000,000 Composite Obligations (current outstanding balance
$6,540,990.09), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$50,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Revolving
Notes (current outstanding balance $7,311,709.52), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$298,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Term Notes
(current outstanding balance $43,577,789.06), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$32,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$31,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO I, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in March 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in March
2014. Since then, the Class A notes have been paid down by
approximately 42% or $37 million. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, the the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class
A/B, Class C, Class D, Class E Notes are reported at 223.42%,
162.61%, 126.08% and 114.39% respectively versus trustee reported
levels in February 2014 of 183.80%, 146.05%, 119.85% and 110.81%.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the

CLO could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes.Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the
rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2230)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class E-1: +1

Class E-2: +1

Composite Obligations: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3346)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class E-1: -1

Class E-2: -1

Composite Obligations: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $179 million, defaulted par
of $6 million, a weighted average default probability of 17.66%
(implying a WARF of 2788), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.85%, a diversity score of 26 and a weighted average
spread of 3.60%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2002-C1: Moody's Hikes Cl. L Secs. Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has upgraded the rating of one
class and affirmed two classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Series 2002-C1 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on Class L was upgraded primarily due to an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
deal has paid down 43% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Class M was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.1% of the
original pooled balance compared to 4.2% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 in formulating a rating recommendation. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type and sponsorship.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $5 million
from $710 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 23% to
49% of the pool. No loans have investment-grade structured credit
assessments and there are no defeased loans.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist and no loans
in special servicing.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $29 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%).

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 64%. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 8.6% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

The largest loan is the Safeway Gaithersburg Loan ($2 million --
49% of the pool), which is secured by a 9-acre ground lease in
Gaithersburg, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, DC. The land is
improved and is leased to Safeway, which operates a grocery store
on the property. The Safeway lease expires in September 2029. The
loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80%
and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.21X at prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreen Oklahoma City Loan ($1
million -- 28% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 15,000
square foot retail property in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The
property is 100% leased to Walgreen Co. through December 2020.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.16X, respectively,
compared to 54% and 1.99X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens Lafayette Loan ($1 million
-- 23% of the pool). The loan is secured by a retail property in
Lafayette, Louisiana. The property is 100% leased to Walgreen Co.
through December 2020. The loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 47% and, 2.32X, respectively, compared to
51% and 2.12X at the last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2003-C3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. L Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on two classes on two classes GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-C3 as follows:

Cl. J, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Class J and Class K were upgraded based primarily
on an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 94% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on Class L was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.7% of the
current balance compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 4.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions " published in September
2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 12 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 10, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $21 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to
47% of the pool.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or in
special servicing. Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $44 million (for an
average loss severity of 30%).

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 75%, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.01X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.46X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 87% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Shaw's Lewiston Loan ($9.8 million -- 47% of
the pool), which is secured by a 64,500 square foot (SF) Shaws
grocery store in Lewiston, Maine approximately 35 miles from
Portland, Maine. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.13X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Waterford Place II Apartments Loan
($5.5 million -- 26% of the pool), which is secured by a 120 unit
garden-style multifamily property located in Greenville, North
Carolina close to Vidant Medical Center, the Brody School of
Medicine, and East Carolina University. The property was 93%
leased as of March 2014, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.14X, respectively, the same as
last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens San Antonio Loan ($2.9
million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a 14,500 SF
single-tenant Walgreens property in San Antonio, Texas. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to
79% and 1.13X at the last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C1 as follows:

Cl. K, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on Classes K and L were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on Classes N and O were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on
Class M was downgraded due to higher realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans. The IO Class XC was
downgraded due to a decline in the WARF of its referenced classes
due to the paydown of highly rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 47.2% of
the current balance compared to 18.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 3.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's used the excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.7 in this
analysis. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 78% of the pool is in
special servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 22%
of the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that it expects will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Deal Performance

As of the July 8, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 97% to $33.4 million
from $1.22 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 27% of the pool.

Currently one loan, representing 22% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $37.2 million loss (32% loss severity on
average). Currently five loans, representing 78% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Four Hills Village Shopping Center Loan ($8.9 million -- 26.9% of
the pool). The loan is secured by a 171, 500 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2013 as the result of
imminent default. The property is currently real estate owned
(REO). The loan has been deemed non-recoverable. As of March 2014,
the property was 58% leased and is currently under contract to be
sold.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Gateway Plaza
Shopping Center Loan A note ($8.4 million -- 25.2% of the pool),
which is secured by a 143,520 SF unanchored retail center located
in Overland Park, Kansas. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in August 2011 due to imminent monetary default. The
borrower has indicated that falling rents and declining occupancy
destabilized the property. A loan modification closed in July
2013, bifurcating the loan into the A note portion and a $2.9
million B note. The loan matured on August 1, 2014. The special
servicer is pursuing legal remedies.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Greystone Centre
Loan ($3.5 million -- 10.5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
54,000 SF two story mixed use office/retail property located in
Birmingham, Alabama. The loan transferred to special servicing in
November 2011 as the result of imminent default. The property is
currently 61% leased.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a mixed use
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $14.2 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (55% expected loss on average).

There is only one performing conduit loan remaining in the pool
representing 22% of the pool balance. The 495 South Street Loan
($7.4 million) is secured by a 79,000 SF office building which was
built in 2001 and is located in Columbus, Ohio. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2013 due to imminent
maturity default and returned to the master servicer in March
2014. The loan was modified in November 2013, with the maturity
date extended to June 2016 and the interest rate changed from
5.990% to 3.000%. The interest rate changes over time. As of
November 2013, the property was 82% leased, with some tenants on
month-to-month leases or on leases that roll within the next two
years. The loan is on the watchlist due to low DSCR. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to
132% and 0.79X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC17: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 11 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 19 classes
in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corporation,
Series 2006-CIBC17 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 5, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A-SB, A-3, A-4 and A-1A were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 17.1% of
the current balance compared to 17.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 17.0% of
the original pooled balance compared to 17.6% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 28 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 11% to $2.3 billion
from $2.5 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 134 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
50% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 0.5% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Thirty-one loans, constituting 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $43 million (for an average loss
severity of 56.6%). Twenty loans, constituting 24% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Bank of America Plaza loan ($263 million - 11.6% of
the pool), which is secured by a 1.25 million square foot (SF)
office property located in Atlanta, Georgia. The loan transferred
to special servicing in 2011 for imminent default. The property is
currently 50% leased and is real estate-owned (REO).

The remaining 19 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $287 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans, constituting 13% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $72 million (24% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 97% of the
pool and full or partial year 2014 operating results for 66% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 100% compared to
103% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.4% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.03X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Blackstone Retail Portfolio Loan ($221 million
-- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by 14 retail properties
located across ten states. The properties range in size from
62,000sf to 330,000 SF. As of March 2014, the properties were 92%
leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.13X, the same
as last review.

The second largest loan is the CNL Center I & II Loan ($138
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent
office properties located in Orlando. Top tenants includ CNL Bank,
CNL Hotels and Akerman LLP. As of March 2014, the property was 89%
leased compared to 87% at year-end 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 116% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 120% and 0.73X
at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Residence Inn Times Square Loan
($127 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by an
extended stay hotel with 357 guest rooms located in the Garment
District, with close proximity to Bryant Park, Times Square, Grand
Central and Penn Station. Performance has improved significantly
since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and
1.08X, respectively, compared to 121.5% and 0.96X at the last
review.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 17 classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2006-LDP7 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-1A through Class A-J were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on Classes B through J were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.4% of
the current balance compared to 9.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.4% of
the original pooled balance compared to 10.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 37 compared to 38 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $3.1 billion
from $3.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 213 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 44%
of the pool. Eleven loans, constituting 3% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Forty-six loans, constituting 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $135.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%). Twenty-five loans, constituting 17% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Westfield Centro Portfolio Loan ($240.0 million --
7.7% of the pool), which is secured by five regional malls located
in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri and Ohio. The
properties range in size from 327,000 to 589,000 square feet (SF).
The Midway and West Park properties continue to underperform the
rest of the portfolio due to previous tenant bankruptcies and
subsequent occupancy declines. As of September 2013, the portfolio
was 84% leased compared to 83% at last review. The loan is
interest-only for its entire term. The loan recently transferred
as special servicing in May 2014 due to imminent default due to
cash flow issues. The special servicer is still evaluating a
strategy for the asset and will continue discussions with borrower
while dual tracking legal remedies including receivership and/or
foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Shoreview
Corporate Center Loan ($51.5 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 553,000 SF office building located in the St. Paul
submarket in Shoreview, Minnesota. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2009 for imminent default and has
been real estate owned (REO) since March 2012.

The remaining 23 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $220.2 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (41.5% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 21 poorly
performing loans, constituting 10% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $84.1 million (27.6% expected loss based on a
56.1% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 89% of the
pool and partial year 2014 operating results for 31% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99% compared to 105% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.01X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 17% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One & Two Prudential Plaza Loan ($205.0
million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured by two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted Class A office buildings
located in the East Loop sub-market of Chicago, Illinois. The loan
represents a 50% pari-passu interest in a $336.0 million first
mortgage. Effective June 6, 2013 the loan was split into an A/B
Note structure. The Restated Promissory Notes A-1 and A-2 are
$168.0 million each and Promissory Notes B-1 and B-2 are $37.0
million each. The loan modification included a 300 bp interest
rate reduction on the A-Note for 36 months and deferred interest
on the B-Note. The borrower contributed $60.0 million in
additional equity to fund a combined tenant improvements, leasing
commissions and capital expenditure reserve. The loan remains
locked out to prepayment until July 1, 2015. The property is
currently 60% leased compared to 69% at last review as Integrys
Business Support (205,000 SF) vacated at the conclusion of its
lease term in May 2014. The borrower continues to focus on leasing
up the property and the lender holds significant leasing reserves
as part of the modification. Moody's A Note LTV and stressed DSCR
are 122% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.68X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Bella Terra Retail Loan ($180.6
million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured a 664,000 SF retail
property located in Huntington Beach, California. In 2005 the mall
underwent a significant renovation into an open-air retail center
from an enclosed mall. The total property is now comprised of
approximately 840,000 SF. The property was 97% leased as of YE
2013 compared to 96% at last review. At securitization the
property was encumbered with an additional $17.0 million of
mezzanine financing, which was paid off in June 2011. The loan's
initial interest-only period expired in September 2011 and the
note is now amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and
0.73X, respectively, compared to 111% and 0.80X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue Loan
($165.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
284,000 SF single tenant office building in Washington, DC. The
space is 100% leased to Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
through 2023. WilmerHale is listed as one of the AMLaw top 100 law
firms in the country and has been ranked in the Top 20 since 2010.
The loan is interest only for its entire term and matures in June
2016. Moody's stressed the cash flow with a lit/dark analysis
given the single tenant occupancy of the property. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 102%
and 0.90X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Certs to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eleven classes
and downgraded three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-LDP10 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MS, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JS, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-S, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 15, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-1A through A-MS were affirmed because the
credit enhancement levels are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

The ratings on seven below-investment P&I classes were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on Classes B and B-S were downgraded due to realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans
that were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.9% of
the current balance compared to 15.4% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.0% of the original
pooled balance compared to 14.1% at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 42 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $3.1 billion
from $5.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 146 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 48% of the pool. Two loans, representing 1% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

There are 30 loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of our ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Forty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $402.9 million (35% loss severity on
average). There are presently 11 loans, representing 16% of the
pool, currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan exposure is Skyline Portfolio debt ($203.4 million -
- 6.6% of the pool), which represents a 30% pari passu interest in
a $678 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by eight
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties
totaling 2.6 million square feet (SF) which are located outside of
Washington, DC in Falls Church, Virginia. At securitization, over
55% of the net rentable area (NRA) was leased by the General
Services Administration (GSA). As a result of the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, the Department of
Defense (GSA tenant) and its subcontractors have vacated
approximately 800,000 SF of space since 2011. The portfolio was
45% as of April 2014.

A Skyline loan modification closed effective October 30, 2013 and
the loan was returned to the master servicer as of February 28,
2014. The modification bifurcated the original $678 million first
mortgage into a $350 million A-Note and a $328M B-Note. The loan
maturity was extended by five years to February 1, 2022 with a
one-year extension option. The A-Note interest rate was unchanged,
while the B-Note interest rate was reduced to 0%. In exchange for
the modification, the borrower remitted over $35 million from
operating cash flow to repay over $32 million of outstanding
interest payments, fund a $2 million Working Capital Reserve and
repay almost $1 million of interest on advances. About $19 million
of outstanding interest was capitalized and added to the B-Note
balance. The borrower also funded $5.75M to cover modification
costs, expenses and a $4.5M modification fee. The borrower's
parent company, Vornado Realty, L.P (VNO), entered into an
unsecured credit agreement with the borrower in an amount of
$150,000,000 (VNO Loan) that is available to fund operating
deficits, interest shortfalls, and capital requirements including
TIs, LCs and approved capital expenditures. The VNO Loan will
accrue interest at 10%. The loan is locked out from prepayment
until January, 1, 2019, but individual property sales are
permitted prior to the lockout period with all net proceeds going
toward A-Note repayment. The VNO Loan is senior to the B-Note in
the event of a sale or refinance. After the A-Note and VNO Loan
are repaid any remaining funds are split evenly between the B-Note
and until VNO earns a 20% internal rate of return (IRR). After VNO
reaches the 20% IRR threshold, 85% of the remaining cash flow goes
to the B- Note, while the remaining 15% goes a borrower related
management company. The borrower would receive any remaining funds
once the B-Note is repaid.

The second largest specially serviced exposure is the Solana Loan
($140 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which represents a 39% pari
passu interest in a $360 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 1.9 million SF mixed use complex mixed-use complex
consisting of 11 office buildings, a health club, supporting
retail, a 198-room Marriott hotel, and 5,901 parking spaces (3,332
space garage) located in Westlake, Texas. The loan has been in
special servicing since March 2009 and is under contract for sale
in August 2014.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $130 million appraisal
reduction for six of the 11 specially serviced loans. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $260.1 million loss (53% average loss
severity) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loans representing 11% of the pool and has estimated a
$69.6 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 54% of the
pool and 42% of partial year 2014 operating results. Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 116% compared to 118% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.25%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.32X and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and 0.89X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cas flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Coconut Point Loan ($230 million -- 7.5% of the pool),
which is secured by an 835,000 SF retail center located near Fort
Meyers in Estero, Florida. The collateral consists of three retail
components: a cinema-anchored village, a community center
primarily consisting of big box retail, and a lakefront component
comprising of casual restaurants. The collateral was 94% leased as
of June 2014, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 126% and 0.73X, respectively, compared to 128% and 0.72X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the 599 Lexington Avenue Loan ($225
million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.0 million SF
office building located in Midtown Manhattan in New York City. The
loan represents a 30% pari-passu interest in a $750 million loan.
The property was 99% leased as of December 2013, which is the same
as at last review. The largest tenant is Shearman & Sterling LLP,
which leases 45% of the NRA through 2022. Property performance has
been stable since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
128% and 0.72X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Lafayette Property Trust Portfolio
Loan ($203 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured by nine
cross defaulted and cross collateralized office properties
containing 840,000 SF located in Alexandria, Virginia. The
portfolio is 80% leased compared to 82% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.80X, respectively, the same
as at last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP12: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP12 Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-LDP12 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance (WARF) of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.5% of the
current balance compared to 9.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.8% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 35 compared to 37 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $1.52
billion from $2.50 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 126 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
41% of the pool. One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Twenty-four loans, constituting 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool for a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $152 million (for an
average loss severity of 28%). Ten loans, constituting 9% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Liberty Plaza loan ($43 million -- 3% of the
pool), which is secured by a 371,505 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Philadelphia, PA. The anchor tenant, Wal-Mart,
has provided notice that it will vacate the property at lease
expiration in March of 2015.

The remaining nine specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $62 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (48% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 24 poorly
performing loans, constituting 22% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $52 million (a 16% expected loss based on a
44% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 94% of the
pool and partial year 2014 operating results for 55% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101% compared to 111% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 0.96X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Plaza El Segundo Loan ($162 million -- 11% of
the pool), which is secured by a 382,000 SF power/lifestyle
community center located in El Segundo, California. Major tenants
include Whole Foods, Best Buy, and Dick's Sporting Goods. The
property was 100% leased as of December 2013 compared to 99% at
last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.82X,
respectively, compared to 126% and 0.75X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 111 Massachusetts Avenue Loan ($88
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 255,000 SF
office property located in Washington, DC. The property was 95%
leased as of December 2013, the same as at last review. Most of
the space is leased to GSA tenants with lease expirations in 2015
and 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.88X,
respectively, compared to 107% and 0.86X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Summit Mall Loan ($65 million --
4%), which is secured by a 529,000 SF portion of a 765,000 SF
regional mall located in Fairlawn, OH. The total mall was 97%
leased and the collateral was 96% leased as of March 31, 2014. The
mall is anchored by two Dillard's (non-collateral) and a Macy's.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.54X, respectively,
compared to 70% and 1.50X at the last review.


KINDER MORGAN 2002-6: Moody's Reviews Ba2 Rating on Cl. A Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed on review
for possible upgrade the rating of the following certificates
issued by Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
Debenture Backed Series 2002-6:

  $10,574,190 Class A Certificates due March 1, 2098; Ba2 Placed
  Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on July 18, 2012
  Downgraded to Ba2

Ratings Rationale

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction. The rating action is the result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the 7.45% Senior
Debentures issued by Kinder Morgan, Inc which were placed on
review for possible upgrade by Moody's on August 11, 2014.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Moody's says that the underlying securities are subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which is manifest in uncertain
credit conditions across the general economy. Because these
conditions could negatively affect the ratings on the underlying
securities, they could also negatively impact the rating on the
certificate.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Cert. Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one class
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-C7 as follows:

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating of the IO Class X-CL was downgraded due to a decline in
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of its referenced class due to the paydowns of highly rated
classes. The IO class is the only outstanding Moody's-rated class
in this transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of
its referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a
lower weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.7% to $4.6
million from $1.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans representing 47% and 53% of
the pool. The larger loan has defeased and is secured by US
Government securities. There is only one remaining conduit loan in
the pool.

No loans are on the master servicer's watchlist or in special
servicing. Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $10.5 million (24% loss severity
on average).

The single conduit loan is the Cabarrus Family Medicine Medical
Office Loan ($2 million -- 46.5% of the pool), which is secured by
a 24,0000 SF medical office building located outside of Charlotte.
The current occupancy is 83% compared to 100% at year-end 2012.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and 1.70X, respectively,
compared to 60% and 1.72X at prior review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2008-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of eight
classes and downgraded six classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-
C1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-AB, A-2 and A-2FL, were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on Classes F through K were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The ratings on Classes A-M through E were downgraded due to
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16.1% of
the current balance compared to 10.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 18.8% of
the original pooled balance compared to 14.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 12% to $886.6
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 60 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 66% of
the pool. There is one loan, constituting 10% of the pool, that
has an investment-grade structured credit assessment. Two loans,
constituting of less than 1.0% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities.

Fifteen loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $46.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 71%). Seven loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Computer Sciences Building ($68.7 million -- 7.7% of
the pool), which is secured by a 325,000 square foot (SF) Class A
office building located in Lanham, Maryland. The loan transferred
to special servicing in January 2014 due to imminent monetary
default as Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC), previously leasing
275,000 SF, vacated at its lease expiration in December 2013. The
loan became real estate owned (REO) in June 2014. Currently the
property is 100% vacant. Moody's value is based on a stabilized
value, using market rents and a stressed vacancy.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sutton Plaza
Loan ($26.6 million - 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
retail property located in Mount Olive Township, New Jersey. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2011 as the
result of monetary default. The property was formerly anchored by
A&P which vacated after the company filed for bankruptcy. This
loan was modified with an A/B note split with a $5.6 million B-
note, an increase in IO periods and a decrease in interest rate
from 5.9% to 3.0%. Following the modification, the borrower did
not comply with post-closing requirements and although the
property was modified to extend payments to the lender, the
borrower failed to do again. The property became REO in June 2014.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Memphis Retail
Portfolio Loan ($24.6 million -- 2.8% of the pool). The loan was
originally secured by five retail properties located around
Collierville, Tennessee, approximately 25 miles east of Memphis.
The loan transferred to special servicing in April 2011 as the
result of monetary default. In April 2013, two properties sold for
a total of $2.4 million. The strategy for the three remaining
properties is to lease up and stabilize them prior to marketing
them for sale. Chicksaw Gardens has an environmental concern but
the Tennessee Department of Environmental and Conservation (TDEC)
has agreed to remediate and absorb the cost, providing a comfort
letter to the servicer. Remediation has yet to start.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $90.3 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $14.4 million (a 26% expected loss based on a
54% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 98% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101% compared to
104% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.03X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with the structured credit assessment is the Chevy Chase
Center Loan ($91.7 million -- 10.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 397,744 SF mixed-use property located in Chevy Chase,
Maryland. Office space represents 56% of the net rentable area
(NRA) with retail space representing the remainder of the
property. The largest tenant is The Mills Limited Partnership,
which leases 51% of the NRA through April 2019. As of April 2014,
the property was 95% leased, compared to 94% at last review. The
loan fully amortizes on a 240-month schedule and matures in
November 2026. Moody's current structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are baa2 (sca.pd) and 1.55X, respectively, compared
to baa3 (sca.pd) and 1.52X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 33% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Westfield Southlake Loan ($140.0
million -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.4 million SF regional mall located in
Merrillville, Indiana. The mall is anchored by Sears (not part of
the collateral), J.C. Penney, Macy's (not part of the collateral)
and Carson (not part of the collateral). As of March 2014, the
property was 96% leased, compared to 98% at last review. The loan
is interest-only for its entire ten-year term maturing in January
2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.12X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Regions Harbert Plaza Loan
($86.5 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 613,764
SF office property built in 1989 and located in downtown
Birmingham, Alabama. The largest tenants include Regions Bank,
which leases 35% of the NRA through December 2017, and Balch &
Bingham LLP, which leases 23% of the NRA through October 2022. As
of May 2014, the property was 94% leased compared to 98% at last
review. Performance continues to remain stable. The loan had a 24-
month interest only period but is currently amortizing on a 360-
month schedule maturing in March 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 91% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.14X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Westin Charlotte Loan ($69.9
million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is a pari-passu interest in a
$171.8 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 26-
story, 700-room full service hotel located in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Property performance has improved since last review. The
loan had a 12-month interest only period but is now amortizing on
a 360-month schedule maturing in January 2018. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 136%
and 0.85X at last review.


MASTR ASSET 2006-AM3: Moody's Ups Class A-3 Secs. Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
from MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM3.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM3

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects recent performance of the underlying
pool and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pool. The
upgrade action is a result of improving performance of the related
underlying pool.  The principal methodology used in this rating
was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-CA: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. J Certs to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed four classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-Canada
10 as follows:

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on five P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff
of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance. The pool has paid down by 19% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.5% of the
current balance compared to 2.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.2% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $25 million
from $460 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
56% of the pool. The pool contains no loans with investment grade
structured credit assessments and no defeased loans.

Two loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

No loans have liquidated from the pool, and there are no loans in
special servicing.

Moody's received full year full or partial year 2013 operating
results for 80% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 44% compared to 45% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
16.6% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 2.79X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 2.64X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 88% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Junction Loan ($14 million -- 56% of the
pool), which is secured by a 194,000 square foot collateral
portion of a larger 370,000 square foot power center located in
Mission, British Columbia. As of January 2014, the property was
93% leased compared to 98% the prior year. The loan sponsor is
RioCAN, the large Canadian real estate investment trust (REIT).
The loan balance has amortized down from approximately $24 million
at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 33% and
3.07X, respectively, compared to 36% and 2.81X at prior review.

The second largest loan is the CLA-721523 Loan ($5 million -- 22%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a 324,000 square foot
industrial property in Calgary, Alberta. The property was 98%
leased as of year-end 2013 reporting. The loan sponsor is H&R
REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42% and 2.37X,
respectively, compared to 45% and 2.21X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the CLA-758806 Loan ($2 million -- 10%
of the pool), which is secured by a 73,000 square foot industrial
property in Mississauga, Ontario. The single tenant recently
exercised a 7-year lease renewal option and now is contracted to
occupy the space until February 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 34% and, 2.92X, respectively, compared to 38% and 2.60X
at the last review.


MONROE CAPITAL 2014-1: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of notes to be issued by Monroe Capital CLO 2014-1
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  $137,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $40,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $42,250,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class
  B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $7,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class B-2
  Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $34,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $27,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2
Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes and Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Monroe Capital 2014-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized by small and medium enterprise and broadly
syndicated loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments. Up to 5% may
consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. At closing, the
portfolio is expected to be approximately 53% ramped and 100%
ramped within 4 months thereafter.

Monroe Capital Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, no collateral purchases are
allowed.

The transaction incorporates coverage tests, both par and
interest, which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Target Par Amount of $350,000,000
Diversity Score of 42
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3300
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 5.30%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis which was an important
component in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3300 to 3795)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: 0

Class B-2 Notes: 0

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3300 to 4290)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com. A significant portion of the underlying assets for
this transaction will be SME corporate loans, which receive
Moody's credit estimates, rather than publicly rated corporate
loans. This distinction is a factor in the determination of this
transaction's V Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are
the basis for the CLO V Score Report.

The scores for the quality of historical data for U.S. SME loans
and for disclosure of collateral pool characteristics and
collateral performance reflect higher volatility. This results
from lack of a centralized default database for SME loans, as well
as obligor-level information for SME loans being more limited and
less frequently provided to Moody's than that for publicly rated
companies.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


MORGAN STANLEY 2002-IQ3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirmed the ratings on five classes in Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2002-IQ3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-IQ3 as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily
on an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 6% since prior review.

The ratings on the three below investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO Class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

The rating on the IO Class X-Y, was affirmed due to the credit
quality of its referenced loan. The Class refers to the
residential cooperative loan in the pool.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.1% of the
current balance compared to 9.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.9% of the
original pooled balance compared to 5.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by approximately 95% to $44.3
million from $909.6 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
57% of the pool. The pool includes one loan, representing 1.7% of
the pool, which is secured by a residential co-op located in
Jackson Heights, New York and has aaa (sca.pd) structured credit
assessment.

Fifteen loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $41.0 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%). One loan, constituting 18% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The Magnolia Ridge Apartments Loan
($8.1 million) is secured by a 228 unit apartment complex in
Metairie, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in November 2012 due to maturity default. The borrower has been
unable to refinance the mortgage. The process of foreclosure was
initiated on February 18, 2014. The servicer has recognized a $2.1
million appraisal reduction for this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans constituting 4% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $3.1 million loss (a 30.5% expected loss ) from the
specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 84% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 38% compared to 40%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.33X and 3.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.31X and 3.35X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Marketplace at Washington Square
Loan ($4.2 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
94,000 square foot (SF) grocery-anchored retail center located in
North Canton, Ohio. Giant Eagle anchors the collateral and leases
77% of the net rentable area through February 2020. The property
was 95% leased as of December 2013, the same as of December 2012.
The loan is fully amortizing and matures in July 2021. The loan
has amortized 46% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 61% and 1.78X, respectively, compared to 56% and 1.92X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Monroeville Giant Eagle Loan ($3.4
million -- 7.6%), which is secured by an 89,000 SF Giant Eagle
grocery store located in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. Giant Eagle
leases the entire space under a triple net lease that expires in
February 2019. The loan is conterminous with Giant Eagle's initial
lease term, but the lease has two five-year extension options.
This loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 60% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 2.88X,
respectively, compared to 38% and 2.72X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Homewood Plaza Loan ($2.0 million
-- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 53,000 SF office
property located Homewood, Alabama. This loan is fully amortizing
and has amortized 41% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.78X, respectively, compared to 40% and
2.70X at last review .


MORGAN STANLEY 2004-TOP15: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
classes, affirmed six classes and downgraded one class of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-TOP15 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2014
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes C through F were upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff
of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance. The pool has paid down by 76% since Moody's last
review. In addition, loans constituting 23% of the pool that have
debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature within the
next 24 months.

The rating on Class B was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), is within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes G through L were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to a
decline in weighted average rating factor or WARF of its
referenced classes based on paydowns of highly rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.2% of the
current balance compared to 3.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 8 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $84.8
million from $889.8 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
64% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 6% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities. There are no
loans that have investment-grade structured credit assessments.

Nine loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $10.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%). Four loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Franklin Business Center ($9.2 million -- 10.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a 198,255 square foot (SF)
industrial/office building located in Sacramento, California. The
loan transferred to special servicing in November 2013 due to
imminent monetary default as the loan was unable to refinance by
January 2014. As of June 2014, the property was 37% leased
compared to 38% at year-end 2013. The property has suffered from
low occupancy for several years. Per the servicer, dual tracking
foreclosure and a possible principal paydown.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sunset Park
($7.0 million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by a four
building (45,367 SF) strip center located in Rocklin, California.
The loan transferred to special servicing in September 2012 due to
delinquent payments, with the trust taking title in August 2013.
As of May 2014, the property was 52% leased, down from 62% at
year-end 2013. Per the servicer, the loan is recommended for an
August sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the West Orange
Professional Center ($4.2 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is
secured by two office buildings located in Ocoee, Florida. The
loan transferred to special servicing in April 2014 due to
maturity default. As of December 2013, the property was 61% leased
compared to 78% at year-end 2012. There is some near-term rollover
risk, with 21% of the net rentable area (NRA) rolling within the
next two years. Moody's is keeping the loan in the conduit model.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.6 million loss for specially
serviced loans (30% expected loss on average). Moody's has not
identified any troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 58% compared to 61%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.54X and 2.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.85X and 2.00X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the International Plaza I Office Building Loan
($10.5 million -- 12.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
125,293 SF office building located in Herndon, Virginia. As of
March 2014, the property was 100% leased by Orange Business
Service. Moody's value is based on a Lit/Dark blend incorporating
future rent steps. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and
1.30X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.32X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Gateway Courtyard Loan ($4.8
million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 32,162 SF
strip center located in Fairfield, California. As of March 2014,
the property was 38% leased as Cost Plus, 56% of the NRA, vacated
at its lease expiration in January 2014. The borrower had
requested an extension on the maturity date, which is August 2014,
having two leasing prospects for the anchor space. Per the
servicer, this loan is expected to payoff in August. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to 69%
and 1.42X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Meadowood Apartments Loan ($4.4
million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 84-unit
multifamily complex located in Redding, California. As of June
2014, the property was 95% leased, the same at year-end 2013.
Performance has remained stable, benefiting from amortization and
a high debt yield. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 55% and
1.67X, respectively, compared to 56% and 1.65X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and affirmed 15 classes
of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSC 2007-IQ16) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are a result of higher expected losses primarily
associated with deteriorating values of real estate owned (REO)
assets in special servicing.  The affirmations reflect sufficient
credit enhancement of the remaining classes relative to Fitch's
expected losses.  Fitch modeled losses of 14.3% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 15.7%,
including $102.8 million (4% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 59 loans (22.7%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 23 specially serviced
assets (15.4%).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 18.4% to $2.12 billion from
$2.6 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, two loans
(0.3% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes D through S.

In total, there are currently 23 assets (15.4%) in special
servicing, which consists of 14 REO (11.8%), two loans (0.5%) in
foreclosure, and seven loans (3%) that are over 90 days delinquent
on debt service payments.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 744-key, full-
service hotel (4.1%) located in Daytona Beach, Florida.  The hotel
has waterfront access and is in close proximity to the airport and
the Daytona Raceway.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
October 2010 for imminent default and subsequently became REO in
August 2013.  As of June 2014, the hotel achieved TTM occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR of 70.1%, $128.87, and $90.32, respectively,
surpassing its competitive set averages of 61.1%, $118.95, and
$72.69.  Results over the same period in 2013 for TTM occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR were 68.5%, $131.18, and $89.89, respectively.
The most recent appraisal value has declined from previous
appraisal valuations, in part due to higher estimates of capital
expenditures which include a 75% increase in costs for soft goods
and guestroom lighting, 68% increase for meeting space renovation,
and 84% higher estimate for exterior maintenance and upgrades.  A
substantial infusion in capital would be required to maintain
brand standards and to compete with newer hotels coming online in
the market.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 754,882 sf
regional mall (1.8% of the pool), located in Ashtabula, OH.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2010 for
monetary default and subsequently became REO in December 2012.
The mall has only two remaining anchors from the original five at
issuance.  The remaining anchors are JC Penney and K-Mart.  The
mall was approximately 66% occupied as of July 2014.  The asset is
listed for sale via auction at the end of the month.  Fitch
anticipates significant losses based on recent valuations.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a 379,685 sf
Wal-Mart anchored retail property (3.5%) located in Milford, CT.
As of June 2014, occupancy for the center declined to 93% as a
result of Sleepy's vacating at lease expiration.  With the decline
in occupancy, NOI declined 10% from YE 2012 to YE 2013 and cash
flow has been insufficient to service the debt with debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) as of December 2013 at 0.96x.  The former
Arby's at the center has been converted to a Sonic Drive-In as of
November 2013.  The property has no leases expiring through 2016
and the loan remains current as of July 2014.  According to Reis,
the Orange/Milford submarket of New Haven reported a vacancy rate
of 7.3% and asking rents of $17.85 psf compared to average in-
place rents of $14.69 psf.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Rating Outlooks on the 'AAA' rated classes remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown of the
classes.  The Negative Outlooks on the A-M classes reflect the
high concentration of REO assets the lack of progress liquidating
the REO assets which will lead to additional expenses.  The
distressed classes (those rated below 'B-sf') are subject to
further downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades and revises Outlooks on the following classes as
indicated:

   -- $194.7 million class A-M to 'BBBsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $20 million class A-MFL to 'BBBsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $44.9 million class A-MA to 'BBBsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- $26 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $16.2 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises REs as indicated:

   -- $131 million class A-J at 'CCCsf', RE 65%;
   -- $30 million class A-JFL at 'CCCsf', RE 65%;
   -- $33.7 million class A-JA at 'CCCsf', RE 65%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

   -- $167.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $1.3 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.5 million class B at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $38.9 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $13 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $35.7 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $26 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $26 million class J at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $20.5 million class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class O, P, Q and S certificates.  Classes
A-1, A-2 and A-3 have paid in full.  Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


MOUNTAIN VIEW III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mountain View CLO III, Ltd.:

$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on February 25, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$31,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on February 25, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$24,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on February 25, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$299,700,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021
(current outstanding balance of $291,874,429.31), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on February 25, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$75,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 25, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

$14,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
2021, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on February 25, 2014 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf).

Mountain View CLO III, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since February 2014. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 2% or $5.2 million since
February 2014. Based on Moody's calculations, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A, Class B, and Class
C notes are 132.11%, 123.68% and 114.61%, versus February 2014
levels of 131.91%, 123.61% and 114.65%, respectively. Moody's also
notes that during the last payment date in July 2014, $67.8
million of cash proceeds were held in the principal proceeds
account for possible reinvestment. If no assets meeting the
reinvestment criteria are found within the due period, these
proceeds will also be used to pay down the notes on the next
payment date.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality and weighted average rating factor (WARR) of the portfolio
since February 2014. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor and WARR are currently 2302 and 49.70%
compared to 2399 and 47.29% in February 2014.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively. In particular, Moody's tested for
a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria has loose restrictions on the weighted average life of
the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1841)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +2
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2762)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -2
Class D: -2
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $480.6 million, defaulted
par of $8.7 million, a weighted average default probability of
12.09% (implying a WARF of 2302), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.70%, a diversity score of 45 and a weighted
average spread of 2.8%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


PREFERRED TERM XXII: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd.:

$201,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2036
(current outstanding balance $ 195,157,307.5), Upgraded to A3
(sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade

$65,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
2036(current balance of $ 62,860,381.53), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$50,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
2036 (current balance of $ 48,354,139.63), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$30,300,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes Due
2036 (current balance of $ 29,302,608.6), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$77,250,000.00 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due 2036
(current balance of $ 83,782,156.58, including interest
shortfall), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 28, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

$71,650,000.00 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
2036 (current balance of $ 88,016,847.54, including interest
shortfall), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 28, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

Moody's also confirmed the ratings of the following notes:

Issuer: Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd.

$762,500,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2036
(current outstanding balance $ 515,548,297.06), Confirmed at A1
(sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Issuer: PreTSL Combination

PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1 Due 2036 (current Moody's
Ratable Balance of $ 345,990.21), Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Preferred Term Securities XXII, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1, a combination note security,
was issued in June 2006. It is composed of $250,000 of Class A-1
notes, $200,000 of income notes issued by Preferred Term
Securities XXII, Ltd, a TruPS CDO and $185,000 face treasury
strips due November 15, 2029 stripped from bonds issued by Fannie
Mae (CUSIP 31359YDZ7)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the senior notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios and resumption of interest payments
of previously deferring assets since the rating action on December
2013.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment;
(5) giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet
certain criteria and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for
insurance TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
2.8% or $14.8 million since December 2013, using principal
proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and the
diversion of excess interest proceeds. Due to the methodology
update mentioned above, Moody's gave full par credit in its
analysis to four deferring assets that meet certain criteria,
totaling $42 million in par. As a result, the Class A-1 notes' par
coverage has thus improved to 192.14% from 172.46% since December
2013, by Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's June 23,
2014 report, the over-collateralization ratio of the senior notes
was 135.90% (limit 128.0%), versus 130.60% on December 23, 2013,
and that of the Class B notes, 113.47% (limit 115%), versus
107.71% in December 23, 2013. The Class A-1, A-2, and B notes will
continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest due to
B, C and D coverage test failure and the Class A-1 will benefit
from principal proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool.

Class B is current on its interest payments and has paid off all
its interest deferral amount. Moody's anticipates that the Class B
overcollateralization will also cure in the near future, and Class
C will resume receiving interest payments and start reducing its
interest deferral amount.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $255.5 million from $344.5 million in
December 2013. Since then, four previously deferring banks with a
total par of $42 million have resumed making interest payments on
their TruPS and two assets, with a total par of $20.5 million,
have redeemed with a value of $10.33 million. In addition Moody's
gives full par credit to four deferring assets that meet certain
criteria with a total par of $23.5 million

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1,
A-2, Class B-1, B-2, B-3 Notes and PreTSL Combination Series P
XXII-1 announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had
placed the ratings on review for upgrade as a result of the
aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool as having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $990.6 million, defaulted/deferring par of $255.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 12.01%
(implying a WARF of 1119), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. For bank TruPS, Moody's has a stable outlook on
the US banking sector. For insurance TruPS, Moody's maintains its
stable outlook on the US insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 741)

Class A-1: +2

Class A-2: +4

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class B-3: +2

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1788)

Class A-1: -2

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: -3

Class B-2: -3

Class B-3: -3

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

PreTSL Combination Series P XXII-1: -1


RAIT PREFERRED II: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on 3 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1R and A-1T floating-rate notes from RAIT Preferred Funding II
Ltd., a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations (CRE-CDO) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on nine other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the collateral's underlying credit
characteristics using S&P's criteria for rating global CDOs of
pooled structured finance assets, its rating methodology and
assumptions for U.S. and Canadian commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), and S&P's CMBS global property evaluation
methodology criteria.  The upgrades also reflect the amortization
of the transaction: Classes A-1R and A-1T have $150.9 million and
$156.6 million respective outstanding balances, down from $200.0
million and $207.5 million at issuance.

According to the July 25, 2014, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $712.9 million, while the transaction's
liabilities totaled $728.0 million, down from $828.0 million in
liabilities at issuance.  The transaction's current asset pool
includes the following:

   -- 53 whole loans or senior participation loans ($635.1
      million, 89.1% of the pool);

   -- Eight subordinated mezzanine loans ($32.1 million, 4.5%);

   -- Six preferred equity loans ($27.2 million, 3.8%); and

   -- One subordinated B-note ($18.5 million, 2.6%).

The trustee report noted three defaulted loans totaling $19.9
million (2.8%).  The defaulted loans are as follows:

   -- The One Congress Street subordinated B-note ($18.5 million,
      2.6%);

   -- The Safrin Portfolio mezzanine loan ($962,894, 0.1%); and

   -- The Holland Gardens Apartment mezzanine loan ($429,844
      million, 0.1%).

S&P estimated no recovery for the defaulted loans, based on
information provided in the trustee report.  Using loan
performance information provided by the collateral manager, S&P
applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the
performing loans ($693.0 million, 97.2%) using its criteria for
U.S. and Canadian CMBS and our CMBS global property evaluation
methodology.

S&P's analysis also considered qualitative factors such as the
near-term maturities of the loans ("near-term" meaning within the
next couple of years), refinancing prospects, and loan
modifications.

According to the July 25, 2014, trustee report, the deal passes
all of its overcollateralization and interest coverage tests.

RATINGS LIST

RAIT Preferred Funding II Ltd.
Floating rate notes due 2045

                     Rating      Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1T    751021AA4    BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)
A-1R    751021AC0    BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)
A-2     751021AE6    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
B       751021AG1    CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)
C       751021AJ5    CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)
D       751021AL0    CCC+ (sf)   CCC+ (sf)
E       751021AN6    CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
F       751021AQ9    CCC (sf)    CCC (sf)
G       751021AS5    CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)
H       751021AU0    CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)
J       751021AW6    CCC- (sf)   CCC- (sf)


STRUCTURED ASSET 2007-EQ1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-2 Debt Rating to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Cl. A-2
from Structured Asset Securities Corp. Trust 2007-EQ1, which is
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp. Trust 2007-EQ1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade action of Cl. A-2 from Structured Asset Securities
Corp. Trust 2007-EQ1 is primarily a result of the change in
principal priority for the group 2 senior bonds from sequential-
pay to pro-rata pay upon the recent depletion of the mezzanine
classes. Today's actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on the pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


TICP CLO II: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $4.8MM Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by TICP CLO II, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$255,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$65,300,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$43,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$18,100,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$25,400,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$26,400,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

$28,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

$4,800,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2A Notes,
the Class A-2B Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the
Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating of the Rated Notes addresses the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The rating reflects the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

TICP CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The underlying collateral pool is
approximately 85% ramped as of the closing date.

TICP CLO II Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest any
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved assets,
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one tranche
of subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and
par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and
principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2600

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the rating assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: 0

Class A-2A Notes: -2

Class A-2B Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2A Notes: -4

Class A-2B Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

The score for the "Experience of, Arrangements Among and Oversight
of the Transaction Parties," a sub-category of the V Score, is one
notch higher than that of the benchmark CLO, which is Low/Medium.
The score of Medium reflects the fact that this transaction will
be the Manager's second CLO. This higher score for "Experience of,
Arrangements Among and Oversight of the Transaction Parties" does
not, however, cause this transaction's overall composite V Score
of Medium/High to differ from that of the CLO sector benchmark.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


TRALEE CLO III: Moody's Rates $19.75MM Class E Notes 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Tralee CLO III, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$150,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$128,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$64,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$29,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$14,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Definitive Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$19,750,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Tralee III is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
senior unsecured loans. The Issuer's documents require the
portfolio to be at least 55% ramped as of the closing date.

Par-Four Investment Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000
Diversity Score: 63
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2675
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2675 to 3076)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -1
Class C Notes: -2
Class D-1 Notes: -1
Class D-2 Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2675 to 3478)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -3
Class D-1 Notes: -2
Class D-2 Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


TRAPEZA CDO VII: Moody's Confirms 'Ca' Rating on 2 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza CDO VII, Ltd.:

  $194,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $91,431,079), Confirmed
  at Aa2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under
  Review for Possible Upgrade

  $32,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on June
  26, 2014 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  $56,600,000 Class B-1 Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $61,863,419 including
  interest shortfall), Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June
  26, 2014 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  $37,500,000 Class B-2 Third Priority Secured Fixed/Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $41,947,613 including
  interest shortfall), Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on June
  26, 2014 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Trapeza CDO VII, Ltd., issued in October 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating confirmations on the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B-1
and Class B-2 notes are primarily a result of the transaction's
stable performance. As such, the expected losses on the Class A-1,
Class A-2, Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes are still commensurate
with their current rating levels.

Moody's assumed defaulted amount decreased slightly to $65.9
million (25.7% of the curret portfolio) from $80.9 million. As a
result, the Class A-1 notes' par coverage, by Moody's
calculations, has increased to 207.9% from 176.2% since August
2013. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratio of the Class A notes was 148.3% (limit
138.1%), versus 135.2% in August 2013, and that of the Class B
notes, 80.7% (limit 101.6%), versus 79.3% in August 2013.

The transaction was analyzed using the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to Rating
TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. These updates include (1)
removing the 25% macro default probability stress for bank and
insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the default timing profiles from
one to six probability-weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a
redemption profile for bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss
distribution generated by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not
permit reinvestment; and (5) giving full par credit to deferring
bank TruPS that meet certain criteria.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1,
Class A-2, Class B-1 and Class B-2 notes announced on June 26,
2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the ratings on review for
upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
giving par credit to deferring securities that meet certain
criteria) of $190.1 million, defaulted/deferring par of $65.9
million, a weighted average default probability of 11.7% (implying
a WARF of 858), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 538)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1304)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0


TROPIC CDO II: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Tropic CDO II, Ltd.:

$35,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due April 2034,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 B2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Moody's also confirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$145,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due April 2034
(current balance of $61,159,659), Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously
on June 26, 2014 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$50,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due April 2034,
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Tropic CDO II, Ltd., issued in October 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and REIT trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrade on the Class A-3L notes is primarily a result
of updates to Moody's TruPS CDO methodology, as described in
"Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. It
also reflects deleveraging of the Class A-1L notes, an increase in
the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets since August
2013.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDO methodology, including (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by
Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment; and
(5) giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet
certain criteria.

In addition, the Class A-1L notes have paid down by approximately
31.7% or $28.3 million since August 2013, using principal proceeds
from the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds . Due to the methodology update mentioned
above, Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to one
deferring asset that meets certain criteria, totaling $10.0
million in par. As a result, by Moody's calculations, the par
coverage of the Class A-1L notes has improved to 285.4% from
212.0% since August 2013, and that of the Class A-3L notes has
improved to 117.7% from 108.7%. The Class A-1L notes will continue
to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and the use of
proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted
declined to $94.5 million (after giving par credit to deferring
securities that meet certain criteria) from $109.6 million in
August 2013. Since August 2013, two previously deferring banks
with a total par of $5.1 million have resumed making interest
payments on their TruPS; and six assets with a total par of $32.7
million have redeemed at par.

However, the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
deteriorated. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) increased to 1479 since August 2013.

Moody's also received a notice that the trustee filed a petition
dated December 9, 2013, requesting judicial determination of the
correct interpretation of the payment provisions of the indenture.
Pursuant to the petition, the trustee seeks, among other things,
judicial confirmation that on payment dates on which the senior
overcollateralization test is failing, (i) the Indenture requires
the application of Available Adjusted Collateral Interest
Collections and Available Adjusted Collateral Principal
Collections to the payment of principal as an O/C Redemption, in
the amount required to be paid in order to satisfy the Senior
Overcollateralization Test in full, and (ii) the calculation
method prescribed in Annex A to the Indenture does not limit the
amount of Available Adjusted Collateral Interest Collections and
Available Adjusted Collateral Principal Collections that may be
used by the Trustee on any Payment Date to satisfy the Senior
Overcollateralization Test. The undistributed principal collection
of $7,204,675.16 is held in escrow by the trustee pending the
resolution of the consolidated proceeding. Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of possible outcomes of
the court's decision.

Moody's also confirmed the ratings on the Class A-1L and Class A-
2L notes since the expected losses on those notes are still
commensurate with their current rating levels.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-
1L, Class A-2L and Class A-3L notes announced on June 26, 2014. At
that time, Moody's had placed the ratings on review for upgrade as
a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
giving par credit to deferring securities that meet certain
criteria) of $172.1 million, defaulted/deferring par of $94.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 14.57%
(implying a WARF of 1479), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For REIT TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their
credit quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 943)

Class A-1L: +2

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +2

Class A-4L: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B-1L: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2223)

Class A-1L: -1

Class A-2L: -2

Class A-3L: -3

Class A-4L: 0

Class A-4: 0

Class B-1L: 0


UNITED AIRLINES 2014-2: S&P Assigns BB+ Rating on Class B Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'A- (sf)' rating
to United Airlines Inc.'s series 2014-2 class A pass-through
certificates (with an expected maturity of Sept. 3, 2026).  At the
same time, S&P assigned its 'BB+ (sf)' rating to the company's
series 2014-2 class B pass-through certificates (with an expected
maturity of Sept. 3, 2022).

The final legal maturities will be 18 months after the expected
maturities.  United Airlines is issuing the certificates under a
Rule 415 shelf registration.

The ratings are based on the credit quality of United Airlines'
parent, United Continental Holdings Inc., the substantial
collateral coverage by good-quality aircraft, and the legal and
structural protections available to the pass-through certificates.
The company will use proceeds of the offerings to finance 2014 and
2015 deliveries of 12 Embraer ERJ-175LR aircraft (large regional
jets), 11 Boeing B737-900ER (extended range) aircraft, and four
Boeing B787-9 aircraft.  The secured notes relating to each
aircraft are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted--a provision
we believe increases the likelihood that United Airlines would
cure any defaults and agree to perform its future obligations,
including its payment obligations, under the indentures in
bankruptcy.

The pass-through certificates are a form of enhanced equipment
trust certificates (EETCs), and they benefit from the legal
protections afforded under Section 1110 of the U.S. bankruptcy
code and the liquidity facilities BNP Paribas (New York Branch)
provides.  The liquidity facilities would cover up to three
semiannual interest payments, a period during which the
certificate holders could repossess and remarket the collateral if
United Airlines does not enter into an agreement under Section
1110, or they could be used to maintain continuity of interest
payments on the certificates as the certificate holders negotiate
with United Airlines on revised terms.

The ratings apply to a unit consisting of certificates
representing the trust property and escrow receipts representing
interests in deposits that are the proceeds of the offerings.  The
proceeds will be deposited with BNP Paribas, acting through its
New York branch, pending delivery of the new aircraft.  The
amounts deposited under the escrow agreements are not property of
United Airlines, and they are not entitled to protection under
Section 1110 of the bankruptcy code.  S&P believes that its
corporate credit rating on BNP Paribas is sufficiently high so
that, based on its counterparty criteria, this does not represent
a constraint on S&P's ratings on the certificates.  Neither the
certificates nor the escrow receipts may be assigned or
transferred separately.

S&P believes that United Airlines views these aircraft as
important and would, given the cross-collateralization and cross-
default provisions, likely cure any defaults and agree to perform
its future obligations, including its payment obligations under
the indenture, in any future bankruptcy.  In contrast to most
EETCs that airlines issued before 2009, the cross-default would
take effect immediately in a bankruptcy if United Airlines
rejected any of the aircraft notes.  This should prevent the
company from selectively affirming some aircraft notes and
rejecting others ("cherry picking"), which often harms the
certificate holders' interests in a bankruptcy.

This transaction is similar to United Airlines' series 2014-1
pass-through certificates, which were issued in March 2014 and to
which S&P assigned 'A-' and 'BB+' ratings, except that all of the
B787 aircraft in the series 2014-2 transaction are of the B787-9
model, rather than a mix of B787-8 and B787-9 models.  The
collateral pool consists of B737-900ER (40% by value), B787-9
(36%), and ERJ-175LR (24%), each of which we view as good quality
models.  The B737-900ER is the largest model in Boeing's range of
current technology narrowbody planes.

Entering service in 2007 as a longer-range version of the
relatively unsuccessful B737-900, the B737-900ER model has
gradually gained orders, though it has fewer orders and operators
than Airbus' competing model, the A321-200.  The B737-900ER has
not yet been as successful as its operating economics and
capabilities would suggest.  This may be partly because it entered
into service only in 2007, which is fairly recent and was shortly
before the financial crisis and recession in 2008-2009.  However,
it is a good replacement for B757-200s in domestic U.S. service, a
factor borne out by Delta Air Lines Inc.'s 2011 order for 100
aircraft.

Boeing is introducing a B737-900ER with its new engine option (the
"MAX" series), but S&P do not believe that this will cause the
current B737-900ER values to fall significantly during the next
three years.  Companies are still ordering the current version to
replace many of their B757-200s.  Following the merger of United
Airlines and Continental Airlines, the combined company operates
two families of narrowbody planes, the B737 and A320 aircraft.
However, the combined company appears to favor the B737-900ER over
the competing A321-200, based on recent orders and management's
stated preference.

The B787-9 is a larger version of Boeing's new-technology, long-
range, midsize, widebody 787-8 aircraft.  This model also has
slightly longer range than the B787-8, and S&P believes that it
will prove to be the most popular of the B787 models.  Therefore,
in S&P's collateral analysis, it assumed slightly more favorable
resale liquidity for the B787-9. The B787 family (which also
includes the planned larger B787-10 version, with the first
expected delivery in 2018) has been a huge success in terms of
orders.  There are more than 1,000 deliveries and orders
outstanding--one of the fastest starts for any aircraft model.
The airline user base is globally diversified and includes a mix
of types of airlines and aircraft leasing companies.  The B787-8
is intended mainly as a replacement for the B767-300ER, a small
widebody, whereas the 787-9 is intended to fill the gap between
the B787-8 and B777-200ER.

Embraer's ERJ-175LR aircraft is the longer range version of the
medium range ERJ-175 regional jet, with a seating capacity of
approximately 76 in dual class service.  The ERJ-175 is a member
of Embraer's E-jet family, which also includes the slightly
smaller ERJ-170 and larger ERJ-190/195 models.  There have been
375 orders for the ERJ-175 from 19 customers, primarily from
regional airlines in North America, with 187 delivered thus far.

"We are applying a depreciation rate of 6.5% annually of the
preceding year's value for the B787-9, which is equal to the
lowest depreciation rate we currently use for a widebody plane
(for the B777-300ER).  We chose the 6.5% depreciation rate
considering several factors: their resale liquidity should be good
for a widebody plane, though not as good as for the most popular
narrowbody planes (which usually have a greater number of airline
operators globally); and with their advanced technology, these
aircraft should face little technological risk for many years to
come.  For the B737-900ER, we also used a depreciation rate of
6.5%, the same rate we have used before.  For the ERJ-175LR, we
used a depreciation rate of 8%, reflecting our view that this
aircraft has weaker resale liquidity because of the much smaller
number of airline operators globally and it will be superseded by
a new-engine version later in the decade," S&P noted.

The pass-through certificates' initial loan-to-value (LTV) is
55.1% for class A and 71% for class B, using the appraised base
values and depreciation assumptions in the offering memorandum.
When S&P evaluates an enhanced equipment trust certificate, it
compares the values provided by appraisers that the airline hired
with its own sources.  In this case, S&P is focusing on the lower
of the mean or median of the three base values the appraisers
provided that the prospectus uses for the B737-900ER and ERJ-175LR
aircraft, and the lowest of the three base values for the B787-9
model.  S&P applies more conservative (faster) depreciation rates
than those used in the prospectus (3% of initial value each year),
and S&P's LTVs start out modestly higher (55.9% for the class A
certificates and 72.1% for the class B certificates) and gradually
diverge further from those shown in the prospectus, reaching a
maximum of 59.6% for the class A certificates and about 75% for
the class B certificates.  S&P's analysis also considered that a
full draw of the liquidity facility, plus interest on those draws,
represents a claim senior to the certificates.  This amount is
typical of recent EETCs, and it is equal to about 5% of the
collateral value.  S&P factored that added priority claim in its
analysis.  S&P also notes that the transaction is structured so
that United Airlines could later issue subordinated classes of
certificates without a liquidity facility.  In the past, airlines
have structured follow-on certificates of this kind in such a way
as to not affect the rating on outstanding senior certificates.

United Airlines' parent, United Continental, is the second largest
U.S. airline.  S&P's corporate credit rating on United Continental
reflects the company's substantial market position and expected
synergies from the 2010 merger of UAL Corp., United Airlines'
former parent, and Continental Airlines, as well as the company's
heavy debt and lease burden.  S&P characterizes United
Continental's business risk profile as "weak" and its financial
risk profile as "aggressive," based S&P's our criteria.

The rating outlook on United Continental is stable.  S&P could
raise its rating on the company if strong earnings and faster-
than-expected achievement of merger synergies allow it to generate
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt consistently in the
mid-teens percent area.  On the other hand, S&P could lower the
rating if the company's financial results deteriorate such that
FFO to debt falls into the mid-single-digit percent area.  This
could result from adverse industry conditions, possibly due to a
major recession or much-worse-than-anticipated merger integration
problems.

RATINGS LIST

United Airlines Inc.
Corporate credit rating               B/Stable/--

United Continental Holdings Inc.
Corporate credit rating               B/Stable/--

New Ratings

United Airlines Inc.
Equipment trust certificates
  Series 2014-2 class A pass-thru certs      A- (sf)
  Series 2014-2 class B pass-thru certs      BB+ (sf)


* Moody's Lowers Rating on $783MM RMBS Issued in 2006
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 24 RMBS
tranches issued by Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage
Loan Trust, Series 2006-PR1 and four tranches issued by CSMC
Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-9.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-9

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2006-PR1

Cl. 2-A-F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-F-1, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12,
2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)

Cl. 3-A-F-2, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12,
2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)

Cl. 3-A-I, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-F-1, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12,
2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)

Cl. 4-A-F-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-I-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-I-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-S-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-S-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-F-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-F-2, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12,
2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on July 2, 2014)

Cl. 5-A-F-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-F-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-I-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-I-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-I-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-I-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-S-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-S-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-S-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-S-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 5-PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The rating downgrades are due to the weak performance of the
underlying collateral.

The deals are backed by fixed-rate residential mortgage loans
originated in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's economy has been in
recession for the past eight years and the unemployment rate in
the region has remained elevated at 13.1%. Due to the continued
poor economic environment, delinquencies on the underlying pools
have remained high. Historically, a large percentage of delinquent
borrowers in Puerto Rico were able to cure out of the
delinquencies. However, the prolonged recession has increased the
risk of default. Moody's also expects delinquencies (and future
defaults) to continue to rise as the unemployment rate in Puerto
Rico remains above pre-recession norms.

In addition to the increased frequency of defaults, Moody's
actions are also based on concerns relating to expectations of
severity of loss given default. Historically, Puerto Rico has
enjoyed modest house price appreciation -- however, the severity
of the recession in Puerto Rico, has continued to adversely impact
house prices on the island, as a result loss severities on the
deals remain high. Also, the average foreclosure timeline in
Puerto Rico is 24 months which can further exacerbate severities
through increased foreclosure costs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $334.7MM Option ARM RMBS Issued in 2005
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 7, 2014 ratings release,
upgraded the ratings of nine tranches from three transactions
backed by Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4

Cl. 2-A1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26,
2013 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-X, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26,
2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Insured Rating
Withdrawn Nov 08, 2012)

Cl. 2-A-1C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

These actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance and credit enhancement available to these bonds.

The rating action also reflects updates and corrections to the
cash-flow models used by Moody's in rating these transactions. The
modeling changes pertain to the calculation of senior percentage
post subordination depletion, loss allocation and interest
payments to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $220.6MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 14, 2014 ratings release,
upgraded the ratings of eight tranches, downgraded the ratings of
two tranches, and reinstated the rating of one tranche issued by
five RMBS transactions. The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable rate
"scratch and dent" residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: CS Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
CF2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-SP4 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Reinstated to C (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-SP1 Trust

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-SP2 Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structure, non-
amortizing subordinate bonds, and availability of excess spread.
Performance has remained generally stable from Moody's last
review. The ratings downgraded are due to the weaker performance
of Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD2.

Moody's has reinstated the rating of Class M-4 issued by RAAC
Series 2006-SP4 Trust following the trustee's partial
reinstatement of the principal balance of this tranche due to the
recovery from the ResCap RMBS Settlement. This tranche was written
down to zero due to realized losses as of October 2010. As a
result, Moody's withdrew the rating on Class M-4 in accordance
with Moody's withdrawal policy. In May 2014, the trustee partially
re-instated the principal balance of Class M-4, reverting back
some of the prior realized losses.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Raises Ratings on $182MM of RMBS Issued 1995-1999
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 22 tranches
backed by Manufactured Housing RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corp 1999-A

A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

A-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-06

B-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-09

B-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-02

A-6, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 15, 2011 Confirmed at
Baa1 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-03

A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-01

A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

A-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-02

A-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1999-A

A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

A-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 18, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1997-4

A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1998-2

A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrade rating actions are primarily due to the
build-up in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures
and non-amortizing subordinate bonds. Performance has remained
generally stable from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in June 2014 from 7.5% in
June 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Ratings on $176MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 7, 2014 ratings release,
upgraded the ratings of 10 tranches from nine subprime RMBS
transactions, which are all backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Sec Corp Home Equity Loan Tr 2004-HE8

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2002-3

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC8

Cl. M1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $141MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of nine
tranches from five subprime RMBS transactions and downgraded the
ratings of two tranches from one other subprime RMBS transaction.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Ser 2003-6

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2003-W1

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 23, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-5

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2003-BC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
ratings upgrades are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or improving credit enhancement on the bonds due
to continued availability of spread and failure of performance
triggers.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $108MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 8, 2014 ratings release,
downgraded the ratings of 18 tranches and upgraded the rating of
one tranche in three transactions issued by miscellaneous issuers.
The tranches are backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-8

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. III-A-18, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-19, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-20, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IX-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. IX-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. IX-A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. IX-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR13

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2005-QA5 Trust

Cl. A-I, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The rating upgrade is due to stable pool performance. The rating
downgrades are due to the weak performance of the underlying
collateral.

The rating actions also reflect updates and corrections to the
cash-flow models used by Moody's in rating these transactions. The
modeling changes for all of the transactions pertain to the
calculation of senior percentage post subordination depletion,
loss allocation and interest payments to the bonds. Additionally,
the changes for IndyMac 2005-AR13 pertain to loss allocation
following subordinate depletion. In accordance with the pooling
and servicing agreement, losses are applied to classes 2-A-2, 3-A-
2, 4-A-2, and 5-A-2 ahead of classes 2-A-1, 3-A-1, 4-A-1, and 5-A-
1, respectively. In previous rating actions, losses were allocated
pro rata between these tranches as described in the prospectus
supplement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $94MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2004-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, in an Aug. 7, 2014 ratings release,
downgraded the ratings of six tranches from three transactions
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-
FA1

Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2012
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

These actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings downgraded are a result of deteriorating
collateral performance and credit enhancement available to these
bonds.

The action on the MALT 2007-1 transaction reflects a change in
modeling based on the securities administrator's changed approach
to allocating losses between certain classes. The securities
administrator previously stated that losses would be allocated
pro-rata between the classes 2-A-14 and 2-A-4 and classes 3-A-2
and 3-A-1 after the subordinate bonds were depleted, in accordance
with the pooling and servicing agreement. However since
subordination depletion occurred, the securities administrator has
allocated losses first to the classes 2-A-14 and 3-A-2 ahead of
classes 2-A-4 and 3-A-1 respectively, as stated in the prospectus
supplement. Today's action reflects how the securities
administrator is currently allocating losses.

The rating of interest-only tranche class A-X issued from MALT
2005-6 was also corrected, in accordance with Moody's methodology
for rating Interest-Only (IO) securities. In our February 2012
rating action, this tranche was incorrectly capped to the highest
tranche rating of the entire transaction instead of the underlying
referenced pool. This has been corrected and Moody's has adjusted
the rating accordingly.

The rating action also reflects updates and corrections to the
cash-flow models used by Moody's in rating these transactions. The
modeling changes pertain to the calculation of senior percentage
post subordination depletion, loss allocation and interest
payments to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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