TCR_Public/140817.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 17, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 227

                            Headlines

ADAMS MILL: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $11.75MM Class F Notes
ALESCO PREFERRED V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ca
APIDOS CINCO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
ARES XXI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
BATTALION CLO V: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

BBCMS TRUST 2014-BXO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on E Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class B Notes
CAVALRY CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Fitch Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Certs
CITIGROUP 2014-GC23: Fitch Rates $9.2-Mil. Class F Certs 'B-sf'

COBALT 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 14 Note Classes
COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Expects to Rate Class E Notes 'BBsf'
FALCON AUTO 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Sec. Classes to C
FMAC LOAN: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'C'

GRAMERCY REAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. C Notes to Caa1
GRANT GROVE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba1'
GRESHAM STREET 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. D Notes Rating to Caa3
HIGHLAND LOAN V: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 7 Cert. Classes

JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Moody's Rates Cl. A-JFX Certs 'Caa1'
JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class F Notes
LANDMARK IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes to Ba2
MADISON PARK XIV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $7MM Class Notes
MARQUETTE US/EUROPEAN CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Ba2

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ12: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Cl. C Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
N-STAR REL VIII: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Note Classes
NEWCASTLE CDO VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. VIII Notes Rating to Caa2
OCTAGON INVESTMENT X: Moody's Hikes Rating on $17.4MM Cl. E Notes

OCTAGON INVESTMENT XX: Moody's Rates $44.6MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
PREFERRED TERM XXVII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Caa3
PUTNAM STRUCTURED 2002-1: S&P Corrects Ratings on 3 Sec. Classes
SIERRA TIMESHARE 2011-3: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class C Notes
SOLOSO CDO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1LB Notes to Ba1

TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa2
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-WHALE7: Moody's Cuts X-1B Certs Rating to B3
WELLS FARGO 2006-AR6: Moody's Lowers Cl. IV-A-1 Debt Rating to B3
WG HORIZONS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $12MM Class D Notes

* Fitch Takes Actions on 943 Classes in 144 US Scratch & Dent RMBS
* Moody's Raises Ratings in $300MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $132.7MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2007


                             *********


ADAMS MILL: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $11.75MM Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
eleven classes of notes issued by Adams Mill CLO Ltd.

  $230,625,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $105,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $46,625,000 Class B-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $17,125,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

  $7,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

  $30,375,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $2,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $22,750,000 Class E-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class E-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $6,000,000 Class E-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $11,750,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the
Class D-1 Notes, the Class D-2 Notes, the Class E-1 Notes, the
Class E-2 Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Adams Mill is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans with a first priority perfected
security interest and eligible investments, and up to 10.0% of the
portfolio may consist of senior secured loans with a second
priority perfected security interest, second-lien loans, and
unsecured loans. We expect the portfolio to be approximately 50%
ramped as of the closing date.

Shenkman Capital Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $535,000,000
Diversity Score: 55
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2485
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2485 to 2858)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: 0Class B-1 Notes: -2
Class B-2 Notes: -2
Class C-1 Notes: -2
Class C-2 Notes: -2
Class D-1 Notes: -1
Class D-2 Notes: -1
Class E-1 Notes: 0
Class E-2 Notes: 0
Class F Notes: -1
Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2485 to 3231)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B-1 Notes: -3
Class B-2 Notes: -3
Class C-1 Notes: -3
Class C-2 Notes: -3
Class D-1 Notes: -2
Class D-2 Notes: -2
Class E-1 Notes: -1
Class E-2 Notes: -1
Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


ALESCO PREFERRED V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding V, Ltd.:

$42,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 23, 2034, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously
on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$10,615,266.29 including deferred interest balance); Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$42,350,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$45,515,935.36 including deferred interest balance), Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

$37,700,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Fixed/Floating
Rate Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$40,838,472.05 including deferred interest balance), Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

$4,450,000 Class C-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Fixed/Floating
Rate Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$5,540,961.66 including deferred interest balance), Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

$6,300,000 Class D Deferrable Subordinate Secured Floating Rate
Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$7,101,569.51 including deferred interest balance), Upgraded to Ca
(sf); previously on July 23, 2011 Downgraded to C (sf)

$5,000,000 Series I Combination Notes due December 23, 2034
(current rated balance of $3,621,862.45), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on October 11, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$4,150,000 Series II Combination Notes due December 23, 2034
(current rated balance of $1,765,594.44), Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

$189,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due December 23, 2034 (current outstanding balance of
$101,946,307.96), Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on October 11,
2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding V, Ltd., issued in September 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios, resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets, and the
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in December 2013.

The transaction has benefited from updates to Moody's TruPS CDOs
methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by
Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
3.6% (or $3.8 million) since December 2013, using principal
proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and the
diversion of excess interest proceeds due to Class D
overcollateralization test failure. In the same period, the rated
balance of the Series I and Series II combination notes has
decreased by 1.3% and 6.7%, respectively. Due to the methodology
update mentioned above, Moody's also gave full par credit in its
analysis to one deferring asset that met certain criteria,
totaling $5 million in par. As a result, the Class A-1 notes' par
coverage has improved to 220.1% from 195.6% since December 2013,
by Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's June 2014 report,
the overcollateralization ratios of the Class A and Class D notes
were 152.89% (limit 125.00%) and 87.08% (limit 102.6%),
respectively, versus 141.78% and 81.38% in December 2013. The
Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 853. The
total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $34.3 million from $52.4 million in December
2013. This was, in part, due to two previously deferring banks
with a total par of $13 million resuming interest payments on
their TruPS. Additionally one asset had a partial redemption of
$0.4 million.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's Series II
combination notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time,
Moody's had placed the rating on review for upgrade as a result of
the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool as having performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $224.4 million, defaulted and deferring par of $34.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 8.53% (implying
a WARF of 853), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 575)

Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +1
Class C-1: +1
Class C-2: +1
Class C-3: +1
Class D: 0
Series I combination notes: +1
Series II combination notes: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1221)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1
Class B: -2
Class C-1: -1
Class C-2: -1
Class C-3: -1
Class D: 0
Series I combination notes: 0
Series II combination notes: -1


APIDOS CINCO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2b, A-3, and B notes from Apidos Cinco CDO, a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Apidos
Capital Management LLC.  S&P also removed the class B rating from
CreditWatch, where it placed it with positive implications on
June 18, 2014.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-2a, C, and D notes from the same transaction.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2014, and S&P
expects the transaction to begin paying down the notes on the next
payment period in Aug. 2014.  The class A-1 and A-2 notes are pari
passu. But within the class A-2 notes, class A-2a receives
principal payments ahead of class A-2b and, as a result, can be
paid down earlier and support a higher rating.

S&P's last rating action on this transaction was in March 2012
when it raised all the ratings.  Since then, the transaction's
credit quality has improved.  Compared to the Feb. 2012 portfolio
(that S&P used for its March 2012 rating actions), the July 2014
portfolio has a higher percentage of assets rated 'BB- (sf)' and
above.  And per the monthly trustee reports, the weighted average
life of the portfolio has also declined to 3.56 years from 4.18
years during this period.

The improved credit quality and decrease in weighted average life
are the prime reasons for the decline in the scenario default
rates, which also led to the upgrades.

The transaction's performance continues to be stable with defaults
at a low level.  According to the July 2014 monthly trustee
report, the defaults were $0.584 million, down from $0.739 million
in February 2012.  All coverage tests are passing.

The affirmations reflect the availability of adequate credit
support at the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash-flow analysis to
estimate future performance based on the portfolio and transaction
as reflected in the trustee report.  In line with S&P's criteria,
its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the
expected default timing, pattern, and recoveries under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest, ultimate principal, or both to each of the rated
tranches.  In S&P's view, the results of the cash flow analysis
demonstrated that all of the rated outstanding classes have
adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with this rating action.

S&P's analysis included the impact of various default patterns
considering the gradually reducing weighted average life of the
portfolio.  Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated a lower
rating on the class C and D notes using its standard default
patterns, S&P affirmed both class ratings based on the results of
shortened default patterns considering the weighted average life
reduction.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Apidos Cinco CDO
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)    2.26%        AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    12.24%       AAA (sf)
A-2b   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)    2.26%        AAA (sf)
A-3    AA (sf)              AA+ (sf)    5.56%        AA+ (sf)
B      A (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)     3.43%        A+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)             BBB- (sf)   1.50%        BBB (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)             BB- (sf)    1.22%        BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current
collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.  S&P generated other scenarios by
adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the
current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation
assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2b   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-3    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA- (sf)    A+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
D      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2a   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2b   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3    AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)       A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)      A (sf)        BBB- (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       BBB (sf)
D      BB- (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Apidos Cinco CDO

             Rating       Rating
Class        To           From
A-1          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-2b         AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-3          AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
B            A+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Apidos Cinco CDO

Class        Rating
A-2a         AAA (sf)
C            BBB (sf)
D            BB+ (sf)


ARES XXI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from Ares XXI CLO Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation transaction managed by Ares CLO Management XXI
L.P., and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with positive implications on June 18, 2014.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its rating on the class D notes.

The transaction is currently amortizing since its reinvestment
period ended in Feb. 2014.  The upgrades reflect the class A-1
notes' $71.17 million paydown to about 78.63% of their original
balance, which also increased the class A, B, C, and D
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.

The affirmation reflects the sufficient credit support available
to the notes at their current rating level, which was constrained
by applying S&P's largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test S&P introduced as part of its corporate collateralized
debt obligation criteria update to address event and model risks
that might be present.

While the cash flows for the class A-2 notes show passing runs at
the 'AAA' level, S&P only raised its rating on them to 'AA+ (sf)'
because the July 2014 trustee report showed that the transaction
has roughly 5.40% long-dated assets that mature later than the
transaction's legal final maturity in Dec. 2018.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Ares XXI CLO Ltd.

                             Cash flow   Cash flow
        Previous             implied     cushion    Final
Class   rating               rating      (i)        rating
A-1     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    11.89%     AAA (sf)
A-2     AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    0.43%      AA+ (sf)
B       A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA- (sf)    3.23%      AA- (sf)
C       BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   5.14%      BBB+ (sf)
D       B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)    0.39%      B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

                                   Notional balance (mil. $)
Class                            January 2012        July 2014
A-1                              333.00              261.83
A-2                              25.00               25.00
B                                25.00               25.00
C                                18.00               18.00
D                                15.00               15.00

Coverage tests (%)
A O/C                            120.06              124.52
B O/C                            112.22              114.54
C O/C                            107.19              108.29
D O/C                            103.32              103.58
WAS (%)                            3.35                3.00

O/C-Overcollateralization.
WAS-Weighted average spread.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios.

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                      Spread        Recovery
         Cash flow    Compression   Compression
         implied      implied       implied       Final
Class    rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B        AA- (sf)     AA- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
C        BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D        BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC (sf)      B+ (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Ares XXI CLO Ltd.

                     Rating      Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1     18972AAA1    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2     18972AAB9    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B       18972AAC7    AA- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
C       18972AAD5    BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D       18972AAE3    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)


BATTALION CLO V: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Battalion CLO V Ltd./Battalion CLO V LLC's $376.75 million fixed-
and floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date
as of July 11, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Battalion CLO V Ltd./Battalion CLO V LLC

                     Rating     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1     07131UAA8    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2A    07131UAC4    AA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-2B    07131UAJ9    AA (sf)    AA (sf)
B       07131UAE0    A (sf)     A (sf)
C       07131UAG5    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)
D       07131VAA6    BB (sf)    BB (sf)
E       07131VAC2    B (sf)     B (sf)


BBCMS TRUST 2014-BXO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to BBCMS Trust 2014-BXO's $355 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate
commercial mortgage loan totaling $355 million, with three one-
year extension options, secured by a cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted first-priority lien mortgage on the borrowers' fee
simple interests in nine office properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 12,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BBCMS Trust 2014-BXO

Class        Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A            AAA (sf)              146,400,000
B            AA- (sf)               55,700,000
C            A- (sf)                28,870,000
D            BBB- (sf)              35,420,000
E            BB- (sf)               48,120,000
F            B- (sf)                40,490,000
X            NR                           (ii)

(i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
     buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR7: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed sixteen classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2005-PWR7.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on generally stable loss expectations
from Fitch's previous rating action.  Although credit enhancement
is increasing with continued loan amortization, payoffs and
defeasance, expected losses on certain loans are increasing.

Fitch modeled losses of 8.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.2%, including $28.7
million (2.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 17 loans (22%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern including the two specially serviced loans (4.5%).  Loan
maturities are concentrated in 2014, 2015, and 2016 comprising of
23.3%, 65.5%, and 7.6% of the pool balance, respectively.  Of the
loans maturing in 2015, all mature in the first quarter: 42.2% in
January, 38.7% in February, and 19.1% in March.

As of the July 2014 remittance, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been paid down by 35.3% to $727.3 million from $1.1
billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls totaling $3.5 million
are currently affecting classes F through Q.  Per the servicer
reporting, twenty one loans (28.7% of the pool) are defeased,
including 4 loans (16.7%) in the top 15.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Shops at Boca
Park loan (6.9%), which is secured by 140,415 square feet (sf) of
retail space and a 139,000 sf ground lease anchor pad within a
lifestyle center located northwest of Las Vegas.  The property is
shadow anchored by Target and Vons.  The loan which had previously
been in special servicing and was modified in November 2012
(modification included extending the term 48 periods and reduced
the interest rate from 5.25% to 4.75%) transferred back to the
master servicer in June 2013.  The collateral is part of a larger
lifestyle center that features a diverse set of upscale and mid-
tier retailers in the suburban submarket of Summerlin.  The center
reported occupancy of 97% and a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.23x as of year-end 2013.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Quintard Mall loan (4.3%), which is secured by
375,486 sf of a 621,752 sf regional mall located in Oxford, AL,
approximately 60 miles east of Birmingham.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in May 2013 based on a monetary default after
the loan became 60 days delinquent.  The sponsor initially
requested a modification which was rejected, but continues to
negotiate with the special servicer in order to resolve the
current default and avoid foreclosure proceedings.  The property
is anchored by JC Penney, Dillards, and Sears and is the only
regional mall in the market with the closest competitor located
more than 30 miles to the east.  Servicer reported occupancy as of
June 2013 was 88%.  In-line occupancy was reported at 78%;
however, this includes 19% temporary tenants.  Excluding the
temporary tenants, in-line occupancy is 63%.  The loan is
categorized as 90+ days delinquent.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the 1550
Magnolia Avenue Industrial loan (1.1%), which is secured by a
198,800 sf complex located in Corona, CA.  The largest tenant,
MonkeySports, which occupies 81.5% of the NRA, has a lease
expiration during the first quarter of 2015.  Although the subject
is fully occupied and performance has been consistent, Fitch is
concerned with the future performance due to weak market
fundamentals and uncertainty with the status of the lease renewal.
The loan remains current and with the master servicer.

The remaining specially serviced loan in the pool (0.2%), is
secured by a 38,836 sf industrial building located in Harlingen,
TX.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in March
2014 for payment default.  The property foreclosure process was
completed on July 1, 2014 and a third party manager was appointed.
The special servicer continues to evaluate potential workout
strategies.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class A-J was changed to Positive to reflect
Fitch's expectation of continued increases in credit enhancement
due to the potential payoff of loans in early 2015 at maturity.
An additional sensitivity analysis was performed assuming higher
losses on the Quintard Mall.  An upgrade to A-J is possible if
expected losses on the Quintard Mall remain stable and the
maturing loans' payoff is imminent.  The a Negative Rating Outlook
on class C reflects the potential for downgrades if pool
performance deteriorates, maturing loans default at maturity
and/or the Quintard Mall's value declines.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Ratings Outlooks
as indicated:

   -- $3.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $527.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $85.7 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Negative;
   -- $33.7 million class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative;
   -- $8.4 million class C at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $15.5 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 30%;
   -- $11.2 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $11.2 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $9.8 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $12.7 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%.
   -- $4.2 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $3.6 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate the class Q certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


CAVALRY CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Cavalry CLO IV Ltd./Cavalry CLO IV LLC's $369.000
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligations transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 11,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2386%-12.8177%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, which are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
      fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cavalry CLO IV Ltd./Cavalry CLO IV LLC

Class                  Rating                    Amount
                                               (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                 254.000
B-1                    AA (sf)                   28.000
B-2                    AA (sf)                   20.000
C-1 (deferrable)       A (sf)                    18.000
C-2 (deferrable)       A (sf)                    10.000
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                  21.000
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                   18.000
Subordinated notes     NR                        38.375

NR-Not rated.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2006-C5: Fitch Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 18 classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2006-C5 (CGCMT 2006-C5).

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of class A-M reflects an overall increase in
expected losses for the pool, the lack of progress in resolving
the specially serviced assets, and the risk of potential future
interest shortfalls increasing to the class.  Fitch modeled losses
of 12.9% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original
pool balance total 13.9%, including $88 million (4.1% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 58 loans (32.5%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 19 specially serviced assets (12.5%) and the largest loan
in the pool (7.6%) which recently transferred to special servicing
after the July 2014 remittance report.  Of the real-estate owned
(REO) assets in special servicing, Fitch modeled loss severities
in excess of 40%, ranging from 43% to two assets with greater than
100% loss severity.

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 28% to $1.61 billion from
$2.24 billion at issuance.  Eight loans (2.9% of the pool) have
defeased.  Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $14.4 million
are currently affecting classes C through P.

The largest contributor to modeled losses, which remains the same
since the last rating action, is the IRET Portfolio (7.6% of the
pool).  The loan is secured by a portfolio of nine suburban office
properties totaling 936,720 square feet (sf) located in the Omaha,
NE MSA (four properties); the greater Minneapolis, MN MSA (two),
the St. Louis, MO MSA (two), and Leawood, KS (one).  The loan
recently transferred to special servicing in July 2014 for
imminent default.  The borrower requested the transfer of the loan
to special servicing as it is unwilling to fund debt service
shortfalls and come out of pocket for capital, leasing, and other
costs.  The borrower believes the portfolio is overleveraged and
indicated it would not be able to support enough take-out
financing when the loan matures in October 2016.  As of the July
2014 remittance report, the loan remains current; however, the
borrower is projecting negative cash flow in 2014 and 2015.

Portfolio occupancy was above 90% during 2010 and early 2011 and
was 95.7% at issuance; however, performance declined drastically
between 2010 and 2012 due to a significant drop in occupancy,
which was largely attributable to three large tenants either
vacating or downsizing at their lease expiration.  Assurant and
Unigraphics Solutions both vacated their entire occupied spaces at
two of the underlying properties in 2010 and 2011 and Hewlett
Packard downsized its occupied square footage at another one of
the underlying properties.

As of the April 2014 rent roll, portfolio occupancy improved to
90.3% due to recent positive leasing momentum at the underlying
properties compared to 82.8% and 81.8% for the trailing 12 months
(TTM) ending April 2013 and TTM ending April 2012, respectively.
The underlying properties have experienced both positive and
negative leasing momentum given the various different markets with
tenants expanding, tenants vacating at lease expiration, and new
leases signed.  Rollover risk remains significant over the next
few years prior to loan maturity, with 7% rolling in 2014, 13% in
2015, and 16% in 2016, according to the April 2014 rent roll.

For TTM ending April 2014, the portfolio generated a net operating
income (NOI) of $8.76 million, a 19% improvement from $7.37
million from TTM April 2013 due to recent leasing, but remained
14% below Fitch's underwritten cash flow at issuance.  The debt
service coverage ratio, on a net cash flow basis, was 1.09x for
TTM April 2014, 0.88x for TTM April 2013, 0.92x for TTM April
2012, and 1.44x at issuance.

According to REIS, the underlying property submarkets reported
vacancies ranging between 10.3% and 25.5% (weighted average market
vacancy of approximately 15%).  The weighted average portfolio
rent is approximately $19 per square foot (psf) compared to REIS-
reported submarket asking rents ranging between $15 and $24 psf
(weighted average asking rent of approximately $20 psf).  Fitch
will continue to monitor the portfolio's performance and the
workout of this loan in special servicing.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses, which remains
the same since the last rating action, is the One and Two
Securities Centre asset (4.1%).  The asset consists of two office
buildings totaling 521,957 sf located in the Buckhead submarket of
Atlanta, GA.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2010 for imminent default when several tenants vacated
upon lease expiration.  The asset became REO in November 2011.

As of the June 2014 rent roll, One Securities Centre was 92.2%
leased and Two Securities Centre was 57.3% leased with a combined
occupancy of 75.7%, representing a significant decline from 95%
reported at issuance.  According to REIS, the Buckhead office
submarket reported a vacancy rate of 22.2% and average asking
rents of $28.30 psf.  Average in-place rents at the property were
below market at approximately $21.60 psf according to the June
2014 rent roll.  The NOI for the TTM period ending June 2014
declined nearly 72% when compared to issuance.  According to the
servicer, the occupancy for Two Securities Centre is projected to
reach 75% in the next four months due to three newly signed leases
totaling approximately 15% of that building's square footage.
After the leasing is in place, the property is expected to be
marketed for sale.

The third largest contributors to modeled losses are the
specially-serviced Courtyard Atlanta Roswell and Courtyard
Columbia Northwest assets (combined 0.9%).  The loans were both
transferred to special servicing in November 2009 for payment
default.  The assets became REO in 2011.  Both assets lost their
Courtyard hotel flags in July 2012.  Fitch modeled loss severities
in excess of 100% for these assets.

The Courtyard Columbia Northwest, which now has a new affiliation
with Baymont Inn & Suites, is a 149-room hotel property located in
Columbia, SC.  The NOI reported for the TTM period ending May 2014
was negative.  According to the May 2014 STR report, the property
performed below its competitive set in terms of occupancy and
revenue per available room (RevPAR).  For the TTM ending May 2014,
the property's occupancy and RevPAR were 41.5% and $28.64,
respectively, compared to 53.6% and $31.89 for the competitive
set.  The asset was listed for sale in the September and November
2013 auctions, but no bids were accepted.  A post-closing offer
was received from a bidder, but was denied by the controlling
class representative.  The special servicer is preparing other
recommendations for asset disposal.

The Courtyard Atlanta Roswell, which is now operating
independently as Hotel 400, is a 154-room hotel property located
in Roswell, GA.  Performance has deteriorated significantly since
issuance.  The NOI reported for the TTM ending May 2014 was
negative.  According to the June 2014 STR report, the property
performed significantly below its competitive set in terms of
occupancy, average daily rate (ADR), and RevPAR.  For the TTM
ending June 2014, the property's occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR were
15.8%, $66.69, and $10.56, respectively, compared to 66.6%,
$81.74, and $54.42, for the competitive set.  The hotel also has
an unsubordinated ground lease and the most recent appraisal
valued the collateral at zero.  The special servicer is working to
complete an orderly turnover of the asset to the ground lessor.

Rating Sensitivities

The Rating Outlooks on the super senior 'AAA' classes remain
Stable due to sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown.
The Negative Rating Outlook on class A-M reflects the high
concentration of specially serviced assets and the uncertainty and
timing surrounding their workouts and final dispositions.
Additionally, the Negative Outlook reflects the ongoing risks of
increasing interest shortfalls should additional loans transfer to
special servicing, as well as the possibility for further
performance deterioration of the top 15 loans.  Distressed classes
(those rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to downgrades as losses
are realized or if realized losses are greater than Fitch's
expectations.  No upgrades to any of the classes are anticipated.

Fitch has downgraded the following class as indicated:

   -- $212.4 million class A-M to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes as
indicated:

   -- $52.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $46.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $774.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $188.1 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $172.6 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 80%;
   -- $42.5 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $21.2 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $26.5 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $29.2 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $26.5 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $18.2 million class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
XP and XC certificates. Classes A-1, A-2, AMP-1, AMP-2, and AMP-3
have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class P.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC23: Fitch Rates $9.2-Mil. Class F Certs 'B-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC23
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $49,642,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85,798,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $300,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $345,240,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,766,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $957,932,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $129,367,000* class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95,486,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,084,000b class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $224,853,000b class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,283,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,641,000*a class X-C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64,683,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,641,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,241,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(*) Notional amount and interest-only.
(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) The class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be
    exchanged for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ
    certificates may be exchanged for the class A-S, class B and
    class C certificates.

Fitch did not rate the $55,443,996*a class X-D, and the
$46,202,996a class G certificates.

The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.
The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 83 loans secured by 99 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.23 billion as of the cutoff date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.; Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Company; GS Commercial Real Estate LP; MC-Five Mile
Commercial Mortgage Finance LLC; Redwood Commercial Mortgage
Corporation; and Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 79.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87%, and asset summary reviews
of 88.8% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Leverage from Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) at 1.25x and
99.4%, respectively, are better than the 2013 and 2014 year-to-
date (YTD) averages of 1.29x and 101.6% and 1.19x and 105.6%.

Large High Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The largest loan
in the pool, 28-40 West 23rd (11.4%), has a Fitch credit opinion
of 'A-sf' on a stand-alone basis. In the context of the pool, the
loan's credit opinion is 'AAAsf'. The loan is collateralized by a
571,205 square foot (sf) mixed-use office and retail building
located in Manhattan.

Limited Additional Debt: No loans have subordinate debt in place.
The pool has one pari passu loan, Selig Portfolio (7.9%), with the
controlling $100 million note securitized in the GSMS 2014-GC22
transaction.

Below-Average Amortization: Three of the top five loans are full-
term interest-only. As such, the pool has a significantly above-
average proportion of interest-only loans (24.4% of the pool
balance versus the 2013 average of 17.1%) and above-average
concentration of partial interest loans (43.7% versus the 2013
average of 34%). The pool is scheduled to amortize 11% prior to
maturity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.8% below
the most recent net operating income (NOI) (for properties for
which historical NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during the most recent reporting period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severity on defaulted loans, and could
result in potential rating actions on the certificates. Fitch
evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CGCMT 2014-
GC23 certificates and found that the transaction displays slightly
above-average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could
result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further
30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf'
certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. The new issue report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities on pages 74 - 75.

The master servicer will be Midland Loan Services, Inc., rated
'CMS1' by Fitch. The special servicer will be Rialto Capital
Advisors, LLC, rated 'CSS2-' by Fitch.


COBALT 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on 14 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Cobalt CMBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2006-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are the result of stable overall pool performance
since Fitch's last rating action.  Fitch modeled losses of 11.6%
for the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 19.1%, including $330 million (13% of the original
pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 22
loans (25.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes six
specially serviced assets (8.7%).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance (including rakes) has been reduced by 47.7% to
$1.34 billion from $2.56 billion at issuance.  Three loans (1.8%)
are defeased.  Interest shortfalls totaling $17.3 million are
currently affecting class AJ, and classes G through P.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (4.6% of the
pool) secured by a 537,400 SF class A office property located in
downtown Cincinnati, OH.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in December 2012 due to the loss of Chiquita Brands
International, the former largest tenant, which represented a
significant portion of the net rentable area and vacated at its
lease expiration.  The bankruptcy subsequently filed by a majority
of the TIC ownership structure was dismissed by the court.  A
receiver (CBRE) has been appointed.  The trust is currently
engaged in legal proceedings with the ground lessor for a ground
lease default allegation.  The property is currently 66% occupied.
A cash management agreement is in place.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is an interest
only (IO) loan (2.7%) secured by a 296,308 SF Class A office
building located in Bloomington, MN.  The loan was modified and
restructured into an A/B note split effective November 2012.  The
servicer reported year-end (YE) 2013 DSCR was 0.78x compared to
0.97x at YE 2012 DSCR.  The decline in performance as of YE 2013
was primarily due to a decrease in effective gross income and a
significant increase in real estate taxes (91% from YE2012).  The
continued decline in performance since the modification has
resulted in higher Fitch modeled losses.  Per March 2014 rent
roll, the property was 65% occupied, unchanged since YE2012.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is an IO loan (3%)
secured by a 336-unit multifamily property located in Glendale,
AZ.  As Arizona State University's (ASU) West Campus is located
within close proximity of the subject, a significant portion of
the residents at the property are students of ASU.  The servicer
reported 1st quarter 2014 DSCR was 1.14x, compared to 1.03x at
YE2013 and 0.98x at YE2012.  As of March 31, 2014, the property
was 93% occupied.

Rating Sensitivities

The 'AAA' rated classes are expected to remain stable and no near-
term rating actions are anticipated.  The 'BB' rated class may be
subject to future downgrades should pool performance deteriorate
and losses exceed expectations.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $680.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $227.3 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $253.1 million class A-M at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
   -- $176.7 million class A-J at 'Dsf'; RE 10%;
   -- $0 class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The classes A-1, A-2, A-AB, A-3, AMP-E1 and AMP-E2 have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificates.


COMM 2013-CCRE10: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 15 classes
of COMM 2013-CCRE10 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO class and the PEZ class were affirmed based
on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor
or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29.

Deal Performance

As of the July 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.0 billion
from $1.01 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 48% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 15% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. The pool contains
no defeased loans and no loans on the watchlist. No loans have
liquidated from the pool.

There is one specially serviced loan in the pool. The Strata
Estate Suites Loan ($22 million -- 2% of the pool) is secured by
two multifamily properties in Williston, North Dakota and Watford,
North Dakota, in the heart of the Bakken shale gas exploration
area. Moody's analysis incorporates an elevated loss severity for
this loan.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 66% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%, unchanged from
securitization. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.2% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.04X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the One
Wilshire Loan ($100 million -- 10% of the pool), which represents
a participation interest in a $180 million mortgage loan. The loan
is secured by a 663,000 square foot, 30-story, Class A office
tower and collocation center in downtown Los Angeles, California.
The property was 91% leased as of December 2013. The loan is
interest-only for the term. The loan sponsor is a joint venture
which includes GI Partners and CalPERS. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are baa2 (sca.pd) and 1.46X,
respectively, unchanged from at securitization.

The second loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Raytheon & DirecTV Buildings Loan ($48 million -- 5% of the pool).
The loan is secured by three office buildings in El Segundo,
California, adjacent to Los Angeles International Airport. The
properties are 100% leased to Raytheon Company and DirecTV. The
DirecTV space serves as that company's corporate headquarters. The
loan sponsor is a joint venture which includes GI Partners,
TechCore, and CalPERS. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are baa2 (sca.pd) and 1.62X, respectively, unchanged
from at securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the RHP Portfolio IV Loan ($55
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by five manufactured
housing communities located in Florida, Utah, New York, and
Kansas. The properties were 84% leased as of March 2014 compared
to 83% at securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115%
and 0.86X, respectively, unchanged from securitization.

The second largest loan is the RHP Portfolio V Loan ($53 million
-- 5% of the pool), which is secured by seven manufactured housing
communities located in Florida, Utah, New York, and Kansas. The
properties were 76% leased as of March 2014 compared to 79% at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.87X,
respectively, unchanged from securitization.

The third largest loan is the Brighton Towne Square Loan ($44
million -- 4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 328,000
square mixed use property, consisting of a power center and office
space, located in Brighton, Michigan. The retail anchors include
MJR Theatres and Home Depot. The loan metrics benefit from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 111% and 0.95X at the last review.


COMM 2014-CCRE19: Fitch Expects to Rate Class E Notes 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2014-CCRE19 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

   -- $69,931,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $168,679,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15,824,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $94,344,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $190,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $283,135,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $911,443,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $89,530,000b class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55,773,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $198,140,000b class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $52,837,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $108,610,000a,c class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $64,579,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,483,000c class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.

(b) Class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
    certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for
    class A-M, B, and C certificates.

(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Aug. 4, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$36,693,000 interest-only class X-C, the $52,837,569 interest-only
class X-D, the $13,210,000 class F, the $13,209,000 class G or the
$39,628,569 class H certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in
the trust, primary assets of which are 69 loans secured by 85
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.17 billion, as of the cutoff date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate
Lending, L.P., German American Capital Corporation, Ladder Capital
Finance LLC, and Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 76.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.8%, and asset summary reviews
on 91.2% of the pool.

Key Rating Drivers

High Fitch Leverage: This transaction has higher leverage than
other recent Fitch-rated fixed-rate deals.  The pool's Fitch debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) of 1.16x and
107.7%, respectively, are worse than the first-half 2014 averages
of 1.19x and 105.6%.

Pool Concentration: The pool is diverse by loan size and sponsor
as compared to average transactions from 2013 and first-half 2014,
as evidenced by a loan concentration index (LCI) of 277 and
sponsor concentration index (SCI) of 298.  Also, the 10 largest
loan exposures represent 42.4% of the total pool balance, which is
lower than the average 2013 and first-half 2014 top-10
concentration of 54.5% and 52.5%, respectively.

High Hotel Concentration: Hotel properties make up 20.8% of the
pool, which is greater than the 2013 and first-half 2014 averages
of 14.7% and 13.3%, respectively.  Hotels have the highest
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

Above-Average Property Quality: Fitch assigned property quality
grades of 'A-' or better to 10.6% of the pool by balance (13.8% of
properties inspected by Fitch), including two of the five largest
loans in the pool.  Furthermore, property quality grades of 'B+'
or better were assigned to 35.4% of the balance of properties
inspected by Fitch.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 20.1% below
the most recent net operating income (NOI; for properties for
which a recent NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans, and could result in potential
rating actions on the certificates.  Fitch evaluated the
sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM 2014-CCRE19
certificates and found that the transaction displays slightly
above average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could
result.  In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a
further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf'
certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result.  The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities on pages 83 - 84.

The master servicer will be Midland Loan Services, a Division of
PNC Bank, National Association, rated 'CMS1' by Fitch.  The
special servicer will be Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC
Bank, National Association, rated 'CSS1'.


FALCON AUTO 2003-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Sec. Classes to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action the ratings on four
securities from Falcon Franchise Loan Trust 2000-1, Falcon Auto
Dealership LLC, Series 2001-1, and Falcon Auto Dealership LLC,
Series 2003-1

Issuer: Falcon Franchise Loan Trust 2000-1

Class E, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2001-1

Class C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2003-1

Class A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades result from high levels of credit enhancement
available to protect noteholders from potential future collateral
writedowns. As the deals amortize, the sequential payment
waterfalls allows for subordination as a percentage of the pool
balances to increase over time. The rating actions also reflect
the underlying concentrations and default risks in the transaction
as well as Moody's view on future performance of the collateral
properties.

As of the July 2014 payment date, the Class E notes of Falcon
Franchise Loan Trust 2000-1 had 52% total credit enhancement from
subordination and overcollaterization. The collateral pool is
highly concentrated, with only six obligors as of the July 2014
payment date, and with the largest two obligors comprising 57% of
the pool.

For Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2001-1, as of the July 2014
payment date, the Class C notes had 92% total credit enhancement
from subordination. The collateral pool is highly concentrated,
with 74% exposure to two obligors as of the July 2014 payment
date.

The downgrade of the Class A-2 Notes of Falcon Auto Dealership
LLC, Series 2003-1 are due to the high degree of
undercollateralization. As of the July 2014 payment date, Class A-
2 had no credit enhancement, and the deal was undercollateralized
by approximately $40 million, with $5.4 million of collateral
principal available for the first-pay Class A-2 bond that had a
balance of $14 million.

The downgrade of the Class IO note from the 2003-1 transaction is
in accordance with "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities," published in February 2012. The
interest-only security from Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series
2003-1 references the collateral pool. The methodology states that
for IO securities referencing a single pool, the new IO rating
will be the minimum of "Ba3", the highest rated bond in the deal,
and the rating corresponding to the pool's expected loss.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations"
published in January 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

An increase or decrease in delinquencies or losses that differs
from recent performance, or further large changes in credit
enhancement available to the notes.


FMAC LOAN: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on notes
issued by FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 1998-D and FMAC Loan
Receivables Trust 2000-A.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 1998-D

Class A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 2000-A

Class A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to high expected losses on the notes, and
the new ratings reflect the undercollaterlization levels for each
bond as reported by the trustee.

As of the July 2014 payment date, the outstanding collateral
balance in the FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 1998-D transaction is
$2.8 million, while the first-pay Class A-3 balance is $32.0
million. Also as of the July 2014 payment date, the outstanding
collateral balance in the FMAC Loan Receivables Trust 2000-A
transaction is $3.8 million, while the first-pay Class A-3 balance
is $34.6 million.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations"
published in January 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Moody's does not anticipate a situation that could lead to an
upgrade of the ratings, due to the degree to which the notes are
undercollateralized.


GRAMERCY REAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. C Notes to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013
Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

Cl. H, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings on the transaction because of
rapid redemption of the underlying collateral due to greater
recoveries from defaulted assets and the failure of certain par
value triggers resulting in material amortization of senior class
of notes. This, combined with a stable WARF more than offsets the
decreases in WARR. Moody's has downgraded the ratings on the
transaction because of future expected increases in under-
collateralization resulting from the sale of defaulted assets.
Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 is a cash CRE CDO transaction,
whose reinvestment period ended in July 2011. The transaction is
backed by a portfolio of: i) whole loans and senior participations
(52.2% of the pool balance); ii) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (29.0%); iii) B-notes (14.3%); and iv) CRE CDO
securities (4.5%). As of the June 30, 2014 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $532.5 million from $1.0 billion at
issuance, with junior notes cancellation to the Class C, Class D,
Class E, Class F, and Class G notes and the principal paydown
directed to the senior most outstanding class of notes. The
paydown was the result of the combination of regular amortization,
resolution and sales of defaulted collateral, and the failing of
certain par value tests. In general, holding all key parameters
static, the junior note cancellations can result in higher
expected losses and longer weighted average lives on the senior
notes, while producing slightly lower expected losses on the
mezzanine and junior notes. However, this does not cause, in and
of itself, a downgrade or upgrade of any outstanding classes of
notes in this transaction.

Currently, the transaction has under-collateralization of $59.0
million primarily due to implied losses on the collateral as the
result of dispositions of defaulted assets. As of the June 30,
2014 trustee report, there are seven assets with $129.2 million of
par balance (29.2% of the pool balance) classified as defaulted
assets, which include three whole loans/senior participations
(19.0%) and four CMBS securities (10.1%). Moody's does expect
significant losses to occur from these defaulted collateral once
they are realized, further increasing the level of under-
collateralization in the transaction.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5273,
compared to 5584 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 3.4% compared to 2.3% at last
review; A1-A3 and 2.0% compare to 1.6% at last review; Baa1-Baa3
and 5.8% compared to 4.2% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 2.1%
compared to 3.4% at last review; B1-B3 and 17.8% compared to 19.6%
at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 68.9% the same as at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.4 years, compared to 2.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 21.0%, compared to 36.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 18.7%, compared to 15.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Holding all other key parameters static, reducing the recovery
rate by 10% would result in modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to four notches downward (e.g. one notch down
implies a rating movement from Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the
recovery rate by 10% would result in modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero to three notches upward (e.g. one notch up
implies a rating movement from Ba1 to Baa3).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GRANT GROVE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Grant Grove CLO, Ltd.:

  $15,750,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due Jan. 25,
  2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2013
  Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $14,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due Jan. 25,
  2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on October 21, 2013
  Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $50,000,000 Class A-1 Delayed Drawdown Floating Rate Notes Due
  January 25 2021 (current outstanding balance of
  $19,362,829.16), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 21,
  2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $170,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due January 25 2021
  (current outstanding balance of $66,027,247.42), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on October 21, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due January 25, 2021,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 21, 2013 Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf)

  $9,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due Jan. 25,
  2021 (current outstanding balance of $7,413,396.25), Affirmed
  Ba3 (sf); previously on October 21, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action date in
October 2013. The Class A-1 and A-2 notes have been paid down by
approximately 22% or $49.3 million since October 2013. Based on
the latest trustee report in July 2014, the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
133.11%, 117.98%, 106.98% and 102.03%, respectively, versus
October 2013 levels of 126.13%, 115.29%, 106.97%, and 103.10%,
respectively. Moody's notes that the trustee reported OC ratios
for July 2014 do not include the recent payment of $19.4 million
to the Class A-1 and A-2 notes. They also incorporate par haircuts
for assets that mature after the maturity of the CLO notes (long-
dated assets).

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, the portfolio
includes a number of long-dated assets, which currently make up
approximately 3.08% of the portfolio based on Moody's calculation.
These investments could expose the junior notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light of the
deal's exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its
sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis,
Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1990)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +1
Class D: +3
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2986)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -3
Class D: 0
Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $142.9 million, defaulted
par of $4.3 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.32% (implying a WARF of 2488), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 52.38%, a diversity score of 56 and a weighted
average spread of 3.06%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GRESHAM STREET 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. D Notes Rating to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Gresham Street CDO Funding 2003-1, Ltd.:

  $5,300,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate Term Notes Due
  2033 (current outstanding balance of $2,485,476), Upgraded to
  Caa1(sf); previously on August 21, 2009 Downgraded to
  Caa3(sf).

Gresham Street CDO Funding 2003-1, Ltd., issued in August 2003, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of RMBS, CMBS and ABS originated from 1998 to 2003.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
Class C and Class D notes, an increase in the Class D over-
collateralization ratio, and the repayment of the deferred
interest of the Class D notes. The Class C notes were paid in full
on the August 2013 Payment Date. Additionally, the deferred
interest of Class D notes has been fully repaid, and the Class D
notes have been paid down by approximately 57.5%, or $3.4 million
since August 2013. Currently, the Class D notes are the senior-
most outstanding notes. Based on Moody's calculation, the over-
collateralization ratio of the Class D notes is 114.3%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. The residential real
estate property market is subject to uncertainty about housing
prices; the pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modifications and refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest
rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
obligors, especially if they jump to default. Because of the
deal's lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its analysis with
a individual scenario analysis.

5) Event of Default risk: The deal has been partially relying on
principal proceeds to make interest payments on the Class D notes,
which are currently the senior-most outstanding notes (the
controlling class of notes). Any shortfall in proceeds to pay the
interest due on Class D notes creates an additional uncertainty
which could result in an event of default.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two notches (1273):

Class D: 0

Caa ratings notched down by two notches (1967):

Class D: -1


HIGHLAND LOAN V: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D(sf)'
from 'CC(sf)' on the class C-1, C-2, and D notes from Highland
Loan Funding V Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction.
At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class
B notes.

S&P withdrew its rating on the class B notes after the notes were
paid down in full and lowered its ratings on the class C-1, C-2,
and D notes because the transaction did not pay the total
principal due on these notes on the Aug. 1, 2014, legal final
maturity date.

RATINGS LIST

Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.

                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To       From
B       43037QAD1    NR       CCC- (sf)
C-1     43037QAE9    D (sf)   CC (sf)
C-2     43037QAF6    D (sf)   CC (sf)
D       43037RAA5    D (sf)   CC (sf)

NR--Not rated.


JP MORGAN 2007-C1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 7 Cert. Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 17 classes
and downgraded one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-3 through A-M were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on Classes B through M were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on IO Class X-2 was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes. The rating on IO Class X-1
was downgraded due to a decline in the weighted average rating
factor or WARF of its referenced classes due to the paydown of
highly rated classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.4% of
the current balance compared to 14.2% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.8% of
the original pooled balance compared to 15.2% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $929 million
from $1.18 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 51 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 69% of the pool. There no defeased loans or loans with
structured credit assessments in the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $46.5 million (51% loss severity on
average). Six loans, representing 18% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Westin
Portfolio Loan ($117 million -- 12.5% of the pool), which is
secured by two Westin Hotels -- the Westin La Paloma, a 487-key
full-service hotel in Tucson, Arizona and the Westin Hilton Head,
a 412-key full-service ocean-front hotel in Hilton Head, South
Carolina. The loan represents an approximately 50% pari-passu
interest in a $233 million loan. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2008 due to imminent default. The
borrower filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in November 2010. A
bankruptcy court in Arizona modified the loan in May 2012 with the
loan term extended and loan made principal-only for 21 years of
$500,000 monthly payments split pro rata between the two pari
passu notes. Various fees, interest, and other expenses were
capitalized into the loan balance as a part of the loan
modification. The loan was later deemed non-recoverable by the
master servicer in August 2012 and the servicer began recovering
advances from the trust.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $57.6 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (34% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly-
performing loans representing 14% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $25.5 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for
98% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106%
compared to 109% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and
CTL loans and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the
most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.20X and 1.00X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 29% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the American Cancer Society Loan
($131.6 million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
996,000 square foot (SF) office building located in Atlanta,
Georgia. The largest tenant is the American Cancer Society, which
leases approximately 28% of the net rentable area (NRA) through
June 2022. As of March 2014, the property was 85% leased compared
to 83% at last review. The loan matures in September 2017. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.79X, respectively, compared
to 140% and 0.75X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Gurnee Mills Loan ($75 million --
8% of the pool), which is a pari passu interest in a $321.0
million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.8 million SF regional mall located in Gurnee,
Illinois. The mall's major tenants include Sears, Bass Pro Shops
Outdoor World and Kohl's. The property was 95% leased as of
December 2013 compared to 94% as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.78X, respectively, compared to 124%
and 0.76X at the last review.

The third largest loan is The Outlet Shoppes at El Paso Loan
($64.9 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by 378,800
SF of a class A outlet retail center. The property was nearly 100%
leased as of May 2014 and its top tenants include Old Navy, Nike,
and Gap. The loan matures in December 2017. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 87% and
1.21X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Moody's Rates Cl. A-JFX Certs 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating to one class of
CMBS securities of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-LDP10.

  Cl. A-JFX, $100,000,000, Assigned Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

There has been a termination of the Class A-JFL Swap Agreement,
along with an exchange of the Class A-JFL Certificate balance to
the successor Class A-JFX Certificate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


JP MORGAN 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C8, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2012-C8 (JPMCC 2012-C8).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to stable pool performance.  There have
been no delinquent or specially serviced loans since issuance.
Fitch reviewed the most recently available quarterly financial
performance of the pool as well as updated rent rolls for the top
15 loans, which represent 69.5% of the transaction.  Fitch has
designated two (7.0%) Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC).

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 3.7% to $1.1 billion.

The largest loan in the pool (11.4%) is secured by an 1.0 million
square foot (sf) interest in a 1.2 million sf regional mall
located in Springfield, MO.  Anchors include: JC Penney,
Dillard's, Dillard's Mens & Home, Macy's and Sears (non-
collateral).  As of year-end (YE) 2013, the servicer-reported
collateral occupancy and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
96.0% and 3.42x, respectively.

The second largest loan in the pool (9.8%) is secured by a 280,299
sf office building located in Seattle, WA.  The property is leased
to multiple tenants under three primary General Services
Administration (GSA) leases, which expire between 2019 and 2022.
As of YE 2013, occupancy and DSCR were a reported 94.1 % and 1.55x
respectively.

The larger of the two FLOCs (6.4%) is secured by a portfolio of
industrial properties.  The loan was the second largest loan in
the pool at issuance and is currently the fourth largest loan.
The loan was originally backed by seven industrial properties
located in two states (Connecticut and Massachusetts); one
property, which had been fully leased to Kraft and had been vacant
at issuance was released in September 2013.  The remaining
portfolio is 98% leased with 38.5% scheduled to expire in 2015.
Per the master servicer, lease renewal discussions regarding the
largest lease (20.9%) will begin towards the end of this year.  As
of YE 2013 DSCR was reported at 1.90x; NOI for the remaining
properties has increased 7.3% since issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

   -- $34.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $189.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $426.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $103.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $898 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $102.3 million class A-S** at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56.8 million class B** at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $44 million class C** at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $203 million class EC** at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.
   -- $35.5 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.6 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

  * Notional amount and interest only.
** Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
    for class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
    exchanged for Class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the $36,938,989 class NR certificates or the
$238,681,989 interest only class X-B.


LANDMARK IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Landmark IX CDO Ltd.:

$16,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes, Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on March 1, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on March 1, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf);

$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 1, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf);

$18,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 1, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$274,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes
(current outstanding balance $108,857,424), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 1, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$68,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 1, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Landmark IX CDO Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
April 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 60.3% or $165.6 million since
the deal entered the amortization phase, including $91.9 million
in cumulative paydowns since January 2014. Based on the trustee's
July 2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at
137.1%, 119.6%, 111.9% and 105.2%, respectively, versus January
2014 levels of 131.21%, 116.91%, 110.37% and 104.68%,
respectively. Moody's notes that the July 2014 trustee reported OC
ratios do not include the $45.1 million paydown to the Class A-1
notes on July 15, 2014 payment date.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.]
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2150)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +1
Class D: +3
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3226)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $277.0 million, defaulted
par of $8.2 million, a weighted average default probability of
17.7% (implying a WARF of 2688), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 51.0%, a diversity score of 62 and a weighted
average spread of 3.5%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MADISON PARK XIV: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on $7MM Class Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to nine classes of
notes issued by Madison Park Funding XIV, Ltd.

$5,000,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes due 2017 (the "Class X
Notes"); Assigned Aaa (sf)

$410,000,000 Class A-1 Exchangeable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-1 Notes"); Assigned Aaa (sf)

$210,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class
A-2 Notes"); Assigned Aaa (sf))

$135,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class B
Notes"); Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$45,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class C-1 Notes"); Assigned A2 (sf)

$7,500,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class C-2 Notes"); Assigned A2 (sf)

$60,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class D Notes"); Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$53,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class E Notes"); Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$7,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class F Notes"); Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Madison Park XIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The Issuer's portfolio is
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date and the Issuer's
documents require that the portfolio be 100% ramped within four
months thereafter.

Credit Suisse Asset Management (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,000,000,000

Diversity Score: 62

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2830

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.7%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2830 to 3255)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0
Class A-1 Notes: 0
Class A-2 Notes: 0
Class B Notes: -2
Class C-1 Notes: -2
Class C-2 Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: 0
Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2830 to 3679)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0
Class A-1 Notes: -1
Class A-2 Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -3
Class C-1 Notes: -4
Class C-2 Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -1
Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Score provides a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. The V Score applies to the entire
transaction, rather than individual tranches.


MARQUETTE US/EUROPEAN CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Marquette US/European CLO, P.L.C.:

US$10,000,000 Class C-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

EUR7,937,000 Class C-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

US$9,500,000 Class D-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

EUR7,540,000 Class D-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class E-1 Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes Due
2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

EUR2,381,000 Class E-2 Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$103,905,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar
Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $4,017,503),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$11,545,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes
Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

EUR86,151,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes
Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of EUR 11,622,998), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$2,550,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Dollar Notes
Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

EUR7,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Euro Notes Due
2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Marquette US/European CLO, P.L.C., issued in July 2006, is a
multi-currency collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans denominated in US
dollars and Euros. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
July 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2014. The Class A-1A notes
have been paid down by approximately 84.4% or USD 21.7 million and
the Class A-2 notes were paid down by 58.3% or EUR16.2 million
since March 2014. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class B, Class C, Class
D and Class E notes are reported at 182.1%, 140.4%, 115.3% and
109.1%, respectively, versus February 2014 levels of 167.9%,
135.8%, 114.9% and 109.6%, respectively. Moody's notes that the
July 2014 trustee reported OC ratios do not include the USD 12.8
million paydown to the Class A-1A notes and the EUR 9.6 million
payment to the Class A-2 notes on the July 2014 payment date.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
necessary information to update its credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected by any
default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated
credit estimates. Moody's ran scenarios to assess the collateral
pool's concentration risk because loans to obligors it assesses
with credit estimates constitute more than 3% of the collateral
pool.

7) Currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-
USD-denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates will
have a direct impact on the amount of interest and principal
proceeds available to the transaction, which could affect the
expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2354)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class E-1: +2

Class E-2: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3532)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class E-1: 0

Class E-2: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of USD 45.5million and EUR 40.1
million, defaulted par of EUR 3.8 million, a weighted average
default probability of 18.6% (implying a WARF of 2943), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.8%, a diversity score of
23 and a weighted average spread of 3.5%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates. For
each credit estimates whose related exposure constitutes more than
3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a two-notch equivalent
assumed downgrade to approximately 12.4% of the pool.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-IQ12: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Cl. C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust (MSCI) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2006-IQ12.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement relative to
Fitch expected losses. Fitch modeled losses of 5.6% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
12.9%, including $249.2 million (9.1% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 47 loans
(21.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes 12 specially
serviced assets (9.1%).

Rating Sensitivities

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-1A and A-4 remain Stable due to
sufficient credit enhancement and continued paydown. The Outlooks
on classes A-M and A-MFX remain Negative due to high Fitch loan to
value (LTV) for several of the top 15 loans, and concerns
surrounding the timing and ultimate resolutions of the specially
serviced loans. These classes could be subjected to downward
rating migration should realized losses exceed Fitch's expectation
on the specially serviced assets, or should loans not refinance at
maturity as expected.

As of the July 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 33.6% to $1.81 billion from
$2.73 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(0.5% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes C, E, and H through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Gateway Office
Building loan (3.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 251,430
square foot (SF) office building in Rockville, MD. Cash flow had
recently declined due to rent reductions on the properties largest
tenant, EMMES Corporation (EMMES), which had extended its lease
from May 2013 to May 2033. EMMES had expanded its space to
approximately 97,000 SF (38% NRA) from 89,000 SF (31% NRA), but
base rent was reduced by approximately 18% with 2.75% annual rent
steps. The year to date (YTD) March 2014 financials net operating
income (NOI) reported a 15% decline from year end (YE) 2013, and a
20% decline from YE 2012. The YTD March 2014 NOI debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.12x, compared to 1.30x and 1.40x for
YE 2013 and YE 2012, respectively. The March 2014 rent roll
reported occupancy at 88.5%, with leases for approximately 15% of
the property's NRA scheduled to roll by YE 2015. The loan remains
current as of the July 2014 distribution date.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Harbour Centre loan (2.8%), which is secured by a 213,501
SF office property in Aventura, FL. The loan was previously
modified after transferring to special servicing in April 2010 for
shortage in the leasing fund reserves. The modification included
an extension of the interest only period to January 2013, and
deferred interest payments applied to the monthly reserve
collection. The loan transferred again to special servicing in
June 2013 due to a default on the deferred interest payments, and
the borrower had subsequently filed for bankruptcy in September
2013. A cash collateral order was put into place and debt service
payments are current as of the July 2014 distribution. The
servicer reports it is pursuing all rights and remedies, including
loan modification discussions with the borrower. The June 2014
rent roll reported occupancy at 89.7%, with YE 2013 NOI DSCR
reporting at 1.34x.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a
66,000 SF medical office building in Landsdowne, VA (0.7%). The
property had experienced cash flow issues due to large tenant
vacancies in 2013. The loan had transferred to special servicing
in February 2013 due to monetary default, and became REO in
January 2014. The property is currently 41% occupied. The servicer
is working to lease up and stabilize the property.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $378.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Stable;
-- $864.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $173 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $100 million class A-MFX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $242.3 million class A-J at 'CCsf'; RE 85%;
-- $17.1 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $37.5 million class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-NM, A-3 and A-AB certificates have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class O, P, Q and S certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the class A-MFL
certificate and the interest-only class X-1, X-2 and X-W
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Morgan Stanley Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust 2014-1 as follows:

   -- $229,291,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $206,362,000 class A-2 depositable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $22,929,000 class A-3 depositable certificates 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $8,336,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,181,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $4,874,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $2,564,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

The $4,232,741 class B-5 certificates will not be rated.

Key Rating Drivers

High Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists of 291
seven year hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) totaling
approximately $256.5 million made to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, low leverage, and substantial liquid reserves.  All of
the loans were originated by FRB, which Fitch considers to be an
above-average originator of prime jumbo product.  Third-party,
loan-level due diligence was conducted on 100% of the pool with
minimal findings indicating strong underwriting controls.

Payment Shock Exposure: The pool consists entirely of ARM loans
while more than half also have interest-only (IO) features
originated prior to January 2014.  Loan products that result in
periodic changes in a borrower's payment such as ARMs and IOs
expose borrowers to payment reset risk.  Future rises in interest
rates and payment re-amortization after the expiration of interest
only periods can increase monthly payments considerably.  To
account for this risk, Fitch applied a probability of default (PD)
penalty of approximately 1.60x to the ARM loans without IO terms
and 1.76x to those with IO features.

High Geographic Concentration: The pool's primary concentration
risk is California where 65.30% of the properties are located.
Additionally, 46.00% of the pool is secured by properties in the
San Francisco metropolitan statistical area (MSA), reflective of
FRB's strong footprint in the area.  The top five MSAs, which are
in California, New York, and Massachusetts, comprise approximately
83.9% of the pool.  The significant geographic concentrations
resulted in an increase in the lifetime default expectations for
the pool of around 1.87x.

Documentation Adjustment: For borrowers who have accounts with FRB
with reserves that meet a certain threshold, FRB's asset
verification process consists of capturing a screenshot of the
borrower's account, which is categorized as 'Stated, Partially
Verified' on the American Securitization Forum's (ASF) loan tape
provided by the sponsor.  However, because FRB has a complete
record of these borrowers' assets and reserves, Fitch considered
the assets for these loans to be fully verified in its analysis.
This adjustment impacted 150 loans (51.5% of the pool) and
resulted in a decrease in the pool's 'AAAsf' expected loss by
roughly 50bps.

Seasoned Property Value Exception: Under Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Master
Criteria' dated July 1, 2014, the agency expects property
valuations to be no more than 12 months old at the time of
securitization.  However, the transaction includes 22 loans for
which the valuations are between 13 - 16 months old and 13 loans
with valuations aged 16 - 18 months.  Fitch did not deem
adjustments to these loans' original property values necessary
because all of them are secured by properties in areas that have
experienced home prices increases over the past 18 months.  Given
the strong loan attributes and borrower profiles, in Fitch's view
it is unlikely that these properties experienced price
depreciation or deterioration in their condition.

Small Loan Count: While total loan count in this pool is 291, the
weighted average number of loans (WAN) is 218.  Transactions with
a small number of loans carry the risk that portfolio performance
may be adversely impacted by a few assets that underperform
relative to the statistically derived assumptions underlying their
ratings.  Therefore, Fitch applied a penalty of approximately
1.18x to the pool's lifetime default expectations to account for
this risk.

Rating Sensitivities

After Fitch determines credit ratings through a rating stress
scenario analysis, additional sensitivity analyses are considered.
The analyses provide a defined stress sensitivity to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper MVDs than that assumed at
issuance as well as a defined sensitivity that demonstrates the
stress assumptions required to reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to CCCsf'.

In its analysis, Fitch considered additional sMVD stress
assumptions to those generated by the SHP model.  These
supplementary scenarios reflected base case sMVDs that aligned
Fitch's 'Asf' sMVD stress assumptions with peak-to-trough MVDs
experienced in the U.S. during the recent financial crisis (2007 -
2009).  This is consistent with Fitch's view as described in its
U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria which associates the recent
national housing recession and related performance observations
with an 'Asf' stress.  The result of this sensitivity analysis was
included in the consideration of the loss expectations for this
transaction.  The sensitivity analysis resulted in a base sMVD of
19.4%, compared with the model projected 22.2%.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 19.4% for this pool.  The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.  For example,
additional MVDs of 5%, 24% and 48% would potentially reduce the
'AAAsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.


N-STAR REL VIII: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by N-Star REL CDO VIII, Ltd.

Cl. A-1, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. A-R, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmations are the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
CLO) transactions.

N-Star VIII is a cash transaction whose reinvestment period ended
in February 2012. The transaction is backed by a portfolio of: i)
whole loans (57.7% of the collateral pool); ii) b-notes (1.1%);
mezzanine interests (23.1%); iii) preferred equity (11.2%); iv)
CDO bonds, primarily in the form of CRE CDO CLO securities (6.8%);
and v) CMBS securities (0.1%). As of the trustee's June 16, 2014
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, is $812.0 million, compared to $836.3 million at
last review.

The pool contains one asset, totaling $6.2 million (0.7% of the
collateral pool balance) that is listed as a defaulted security as
of the trustee's June 16, 2014 report. The defaulted asset (100.0%
of the defaulted balance) is a commercial real estate mezzanine
interest. While there have been limited implied losses on the
underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate losses
to occur on the defaulted assets.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8869,
compared to 8971 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 0.1% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.1% compared to 0.2% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(0.0%, the same as at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (0.9%, compared to
0.8% at last review); B1-B3 (0.5%, compared to 1.0% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (98.5%, compared to 98.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.8 years, compared to 4.0 at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 31.7%, compared to 28.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, compared to 100.0% at last review.
The decrease in MAC is due to the reduction in the number of
obligors in a high credit risk pool.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by 5.0% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to four notches downward
(e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).
Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by
5.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of zero to eight notches upward (e.g., one notches up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


NEWCASTLE CDO VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. VIII Notes Rating to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Newcastle CDO VIII 1, Limited and
Newcastle CDO VIII 2, Limited:

Cl. II, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. III, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. V, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. VIII, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014
Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IX-FL, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014
Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IX-FX, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014
Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Affirmed
C (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

Cl. XII, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2014 Affirmed C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of seven classes of notes due to
the combination of the recent disposition of a material portion of
the collateral pool at an average sales price premium and the full
payoff of high credit risk assets. Moody's has affirmed the rating
of one class of notes because the key transaction metrics are
commensurate with the existing rating. The rating actions are the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Newcastle CDO VIII 1, Limited and Newcastle CDO VIII 2, Limited is
a cash transaction whose reinvestment period ended in November
2011. The collateral pool contains: i) mezzanine interests (50.7%
of the collateral pool balance); ii) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (14.4%); iii) commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligations (CRE CDOs) (15.9%); iv) asset
backed securities (ABS) (14.2%), primarily in the form of subprime
RMBS; and v) real estate bank loans (4.8%). As of the July 18,
2014 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $309.4 million, down
from $983.9 million at issuance and $472.8 million at last review,
due to the combination of full or partial junior notes
cancellations of the Classes IV, VI, VII, X and XI notes,
disposition of certain assets, and regular amortization of the
collateral pool. Paydowns are directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes.

Per Moody's special comment, "Junior CDO Note Cancellations Should
Concern Senior Noteholders in Structured Transactions," dated June
14, 2010, there is a concern that the cancellation of junior notes
can lead to a diversion of cash flow away from the senior notes.
During the current review, holding all key parameters static, the
cancellations of the Class IV, VI, VII, X and XI Notes in the
subject transaction did not result in higher expected losses and
longer weighted average lives (WAL) on the senior notes, while
having the opposite effect on mezzanine and junior notes to cause,
in and of itself, a downgrade or upgrade of any classes of notes.
Please also note that the pool has one asset referred to as
NEWCASTLE 2006-8A 12 with a par balance of $11.5 million. Being a
liability of the trust as well, it has a similar effect to the
transaction as that of junior note cancellation. Moody's accounted
for this in its analysis which did not result in higher expected
losses and longer WAL.

There is one asset with a par balance of $5.0 million (1.6% of the
collateral pool balance) that is considered defaulted security as
of the July 18, 2014 trustee report. This asset is an RMBS
subprime security. Moody's does expect significant losses to occur
once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5798,
compared to 4866 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0% compared to 0.2% at last
review, A1-A3 and 3.6% compared to 4.0% at last review, Baa1-Baa3
and 4.6% compared to 17.6% at last review, Ba1-Ba3 and 19.9%
compared to 14.3% at last review, B1-B3 and 10.2% compared to
13.2% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 61.7% compared to 50.8% at
last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years, compared to 3.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral and extensions on
direct loan interests.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 10.4%, compared to 7.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 12.0%, compared to 6.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates by 10% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
0 to +6 notches (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings movement of
Ba1 to Baa3). Decreasing the recovery rates to 0% would result in
an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of 0 to -5
notches (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3
to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT X: Moody's Hikes Rating on $17.4MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners X, Ltd.:

$38,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 18 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 15,
2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$24,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 18, 2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on October 15,
2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$19,125,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 18, 2020, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on October 15,
2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$17,450,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
October 18, 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on October 15,
2013 Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$281,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 18, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $150,818,457),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on October 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

$22,500,000 and EUR 17,662,297 Class A-1R Redenominatable Senior
Secured Floating Rate notes Due October 18, 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $23,774,448), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on October 15, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners X, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Class A notes
have been paid down by approximately 46.2% or $150.2 million since
that time. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D
and Class E notes are reported at 128.6%, 118.1%, 111.0% and
105.3%, respectively, versus January 2014 levels of 122.1%,
114.3%, 108.9% and 104.4%, respectively. The overcollateralization
ratios reported in the trustee report do not include the July 2014
payment distribution when $64.5 million of principal proceeds were
used to pay down the Class A-1 and Class A-1R notes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2039)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: +2
Class D: +4
Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3059)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-1R: 0
Class B: -1
Class C: -2
Class D: -1
Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $291.4 million, defaulted
par of $1.7 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.17% (implying a WARF of 2549), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 46.57%, a diversity score of 62 and a weighted
average spread of 3.44%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDO's". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XX: Moody's Rates $44.6MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners XX, Ltd.:

  $480,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  August 2026 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Aaa (sf)

  $79,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  August 2026 (the "Class B Notes"),Definitive Rating Assigned
  Aa2 (sf)

  $37,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  August 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  A2 (sf)

  $48,100,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  August 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Baa3 (sf)

  $44,650,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  August 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Octagon XX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The Issuer's documents require the portfolio
to be at least 70% ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $750,000,000
Diversity Score: 55
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2650
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.62%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.00%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2650 to 3048)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -2
Class C Notes: -2
Class D Notes: -1
Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2650 to 3445)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1
Class B Notes: -4
Class C Notes: -4
Class D Notes: -2
Class E Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


PREFERRED TERM XXVII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Notes to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXVII, Ltd.:

$171,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due Dec. 22,
2037 (current balance of $137,478,892.69), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$40,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due Dec. 22,
2037 (current balance of $38,484,048.69), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$40,500,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due Dec. 22,
2037 (current balance of $38,965,099.58), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$24,000,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due Dec. 22,
2037 (current balance of $25,543,467.26, including deferred
interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 6, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

$18,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
December 22, 2037 (current balance of $22, 277,400.34, including
deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 6,
2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVII, Ltd. issued in September 2007, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect an
increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and
the resumption of interest payments of previously deferring assets
since February 2014.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the
default timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted
scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank and
insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by
Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

Due to the methodology update mentioned above, Moody's gave full
par credit in its analysis to two deferring assets that meet
certain criteria, totaling $14 million in par. As a result, the
Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to 189.58% by
Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's June 2014 report, the
over-collateralization ratio of the senior notes was 140.17%
(limit 128.00%), versus 132.98%, that of the Class B notes,
114.75% (limit 115.00%), versus 108.87% and that of the Class C
notes, 93.87% (limit 106.20%), versus 89.53% based on February
2014 trustee report.

In addition, the total par amount that Moody's treated as having
defaulted or deferring declined to $52.8 million. Since February
2014, two previously deferring banks with a total par of $15
million have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS.
Moody's also notes that the Class B notes have resumed payment of
current interest and paid down the previously outstanding deferred
interest.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1,
A-2 and B notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's
had placed the ratings on review for possible upgrade as a result
of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $260.6 million, defaulted par of $52.8 million, a
weighted average default probability of 11.13% (implying a WARF of
1025), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.
In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM),
an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive
credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of
the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial
data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 686)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1514)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -2


PUTNAM STRUCTURED 2002-1: S&P Corrects Ratings on 3 Sec. Classes
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Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
class A-1LT-a, A-1LT-b, A-1LT-c notes from Putnam Structured
Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd. by placing them on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

Due to an administrative error, S&P did not place these ratings on
CreditWatch negative on July 2, 2014, when it placed its ratings
on the other A-1LT tranches on CreditWatch negative.  The rating
action corrects this.

RATINGS CORRECTED

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.

                      Rating
Class        To                    From
A-1LT-a      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)
A-1LT-b      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)
A-1LT-c      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg    BB- (sf)

RATINGS UNAFFECTED

Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 Ltd.

Class        Rating
A-1LT-d      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-f      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-g      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-h      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-i      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-j      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2          CCC+ (sf)


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2011-3: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
class A and B notes from Sierra Timeshare 2012-2 Receivables
Funding LLC (Sierra 2012-2) and the class A, B, and C notes from
Sierra Timeshare 2011-3 Receivables Funding LLC (Sierra 2011-3).

Both securitizations are backed by timeshare loans originated by
Wyndham Vacation Resorts Inc. (WVRI) and Wyndham Resort
Development Corp. (WRDC).  Wyndham Consumer Finance Inc. (Wyndham)
is the servicer of the timeshare loans that collateralized these
transactions.

As of April 2014, based on the aggregate loan balance, Sierra
2012-2's collateral consisted of approximately 65.96% in WVRI
loans and 34.04% in WRDC loans; Sierra 2011-3's collateral
consisted of approximately 72.71% in WVRI loans and 27.29% in WRDC
loans.  The Sierra 2012-2 aggregate loan balance was about $109.65
million, a pool factor of 32.90%; Sierra 2011-3 was about $99.31
million, a pool factor of 31.12%.

Sierra 2012-2's class A and B notes' total outstanding balance was
$98.69 million, approximately 32.90% of the original balance.
Sierra 2011-3's class A, B, and C notes' total outstanding balance
was $93.36 million, approximately 31.12% of the original balance.

The affirmations reflect the notes' ability to withstand S&P's
stress tests at their current ratings.  The ratings reflect the
credit enhancement available in the form of overcollateralization,
the reserve accounts, and the available excess spreads.  The
ratings are also based on Wyndham's demonstrated servicing ability
and experience in the timeshare market.

According to the servicer's July 2014 distribution report, the
transactions met their reserve account and overcollateralization
requirements.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the
notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to
support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Sierra Timeshare 2012-2 Receivables Funding LLC
Class                Rating
A                    A+ (sf)
B                    BBB (sf)

Sierra Timeshare 2011-3 Receivables Funding LLC
Class                Rating
A                    A (sf)
B                    BBB (sf)
C                    BB (sf)


SOLOSO CDO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-1LB Notes to Ba1
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Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Soloso CDO 2007-1 Ltd.:

$263,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes due October 2037
(current balance of $221,257,678.35), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
previously on October 9, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$83,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes due October 2037,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 B2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Soloso CDO 2007-1 Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the A-1LA notes, an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization ratios and resumption of interest payments
of previously deferring assets.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the 25% macro default
probability stress for bank TruPS; (2) expanding the default
timing profiles from one to six probability-weighted scenarios;
(3) incorporating a redemption profile for bank TruPS; (4) using a
loss distribution generated by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that
do not permit reinvestment; and (5) giving full par credit to
deferring bank TruPS that meet certain criteria.

In addition, the Class A-1LA notes have paid down by approximately
3.3% or $7.6 million since October 2013, using the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. Due to the methodology update mentioned
above, Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to two
deferring assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $12 million
in par. As a result, the Class A-1LA notes' par coverage has
improved to 160.67% from 138.84% since October 2013, by Moody's
calculations. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratio of the senior Class A-1 notes was 116.17%
(limit 131.02%), the Class A-2 notes was 94.54% (limit 117.05%),
and the Class A-3 notes was 79.02% (limit 104.81%) versus 107.50%,
87.89% and 73.60% at the last rating action respectively. The
Class A-1LA notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's Class A-1LB
Notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed
the rating on review for possible upgrade as a result of the
aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $355.5 million, defaulted/deferring par of $149.43
million, a weighted average default probability of 6.37% (implying
a WARF of 566), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed
by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation
of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 397)

Class A-1LA: +1

Class A-1LB: +1

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 791)

Class A-1LA: -1

Class A-1LB: -1

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Class A-3L: 0


TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza CDO III, LLC:

  $25,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 26,
  2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  $31,250,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $35,831,390.98, including
  deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on June
  26, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  $31,250,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $35,831,390.98,
  including deferred interest), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously
  on June 26, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

  $71,500,000 Class A1B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $49,807,024.60),
  Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on February 12, 2014 Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf)

Trapeza CDO III, LLC issued in June, 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities (TruPS)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A1B notes, an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios and resumption of interest payments of
previously deferring assets since February 2014. The actions also
reflect updates to Moody's TruPS CDO methodology, as described in
"Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014.

The Class A1B notes have paid down by approximately 8.7% or $4.7
million since February 2014 with the diversion of excess interest
proceeds. The Class A1B notes' par coverage has thus improved to
261.25% from 221.71% since February 2014, by Moody's calculations.
Based on the trustee's 15 July 2014 report, the class A/B over-
collateralization ratio was 165.08% (limit 141.25%), versus
142.68% on 15 January 2014 and the Class C/D over-
collateralization ratio was 81.47% (limit 102.25%), versus 77.02%
on 15 January 2014. The Class A1B notes will continue to benefit
from the diversion of excess interest and the use of future
proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The transaction also benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS
CDOs" published on June 2014. These updates include: (1) removing
the 25% macro default probability stress for bank TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated by Moody's
CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment; and (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria. In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced
that it had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's
Class B Notes, Class C-1 Notes and Class C-2 Notes announced on
June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the
ratings on review for possible upgrade as a result of the
aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $130.1
million, defaulted par of $60.4 million, a weighted average
default probability of 6.3% (implying a WARF of 595), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition to
the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed
by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation
of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 418)

Class A1B: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 833)

Class A1B: -1

Class B: -1

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-WHALE7: Moody's Cuts X-1B Certs Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating on one IO class of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-WHALE7. Moody's rating action is
as follows:

Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The interest only (IO) class references all the outstanding pooled
principal classes in the trust. The IO class was downgraded as a
result of a higher WARF due to paydowns of higher quality
reference classes. Two loans, the Westin Aruba Loan and the
Colonial Mall Loan paid off since last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of
its referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a
lower weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes, or non-payment of interest. Classes
that have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 17, 2014 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased to $132 million from $274
million at the prior review. Two loans, the Westin Aruba Loan and
the Colonial Mall Loan paid off since last review.

The only loan remaining in the pool, the Jameson Inn Portfolio
Loan, is secured by a pool of 102 limited service hotels (five
properties have been released to- date). The portfolio totals
6,493 guestrooms and are located in 12 states across southeastern
and midwestern US. The new sponsor, Colony Capital LLC, and the
special servicer agreed to forbear until December 2014. A one year
supplemental forbearance term can be achieved if certain
conditions are met.

The portfolio's NCF dipped in year-end 2013 but has rebounded to
$14.7 million in the trailing twelve month period ending March
2014.

The Class L has experienced 100% losses and Class K experienced
approximately $20 million in losses as of the current Payment
Date. Moody's does not rate the outstanding principal classes.


WELLS FARGO 2006-AR6: Moody's Lowers Cl. IV-A-1 Debt Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class IV-A-
1 issued by Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust.
The tranche is backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans.

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR6 Trust

  Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
  Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The action is primarily a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pool. The downgrade action is a result of deteriorating
performance of the related pool and/or slower pay-down of the bond
due to lower prepayments/slower liquidations.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 down from
7.3% in July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.0% to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


WG HORIZONS: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $12MM Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by WG Horizons CLO I:

  $24,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf);

  $21,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due May 24,
  2019, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013
  Upgraded to A2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $296,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019
  (current outstanding balance $138,084,950.47), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

  $16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
  Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to
  Baa3 (sf);

  $12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
  Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on March 13, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3
  (sf).

WG Horizons CLO I, issued in May 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2013. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 53% or $157.5 million.
Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the OC ratios for the
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are reported at
140.54%, 124.42%, 114.42%, and 107.92%, respectively, versus
August 2013 levels of 120.50%, 113.07%, 107.99%, and 104.48%,
respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 8.5% of the portfolio or $19.9 million. These
investments could expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation when the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC
ratio of the Class D notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the
Class D notes owing to potential market risk stemming from the
exposure to these long-dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. Actual long-dated asset exposures
and prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity
will drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated
assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes.Below is a summary of the impact of different
default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the
rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2117)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +3
Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3175)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -1
Class B: -1
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $226.7 million, defaulted
par of $7.9 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.56% (implying a WARF of 2646), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.56%, a diversity score of 51 and a weighted
average spread of 3.23%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs." In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


* Fitch Takes Actions on 943 Classes in 144 US Scratch & Dent RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings took various rating actions on 943 classes in 144
U.S. Scratch and Dent RMBS transactions on Aug. 6, 2014.  The
transactions reviewed are generally composed of residential
mortgage loans that were originated with exceptions to the
originator's underwriting guidelines or had experienced payment
problems prior to issuance. The reviewed transactions were issued
between 1996 and 2008.

Summary of the rating actions:

   -- 911 classes affirmed;
   -- 20 classes upgraded;
   -- 12 classes downgraded.

Fitch affirmed and subsequently withdrew the ratings on all
classes that were rated 'Dsf', with a recovery estimate of 0% and
had no principal balance remaining.

KEY RATING DRIVERS:

Downgrades made up just over 1% of all rating actions.  Of the
classes that were downgraded only two held investment grade
ratings prior to the review.  The remaining downgrades were
distressed ratings transitioning downwards as default becomes more
likely.  All of the downgrades were one rating category revisions.

Upgrades made up 2% of all rating actions.  Classes that were
upgraded to investment grade had on average 80% credit enhancement
and are all expected to pay off in less than four years.  The
rating committee limited upgrade revisions for a number of
classes, primarily due to a long remaining life.

Collateral performance changed little since the last review.
Serious delinquency fell by less than 1% on average and prepayment
trends were mostly flat across all vintages

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

When projecting default and loss severity, Fitch relies on its
non-prime loan-level loss model.  For transactions without loan-
level data available, Fitch assumed default and loss severity
assumptions consistent with subprime vintage averages as
determined by the loss model, adjusted for pool-specific product
composition and performance.

Fitch analyzes each bond in a number of different scenarios to
determine the likelihood of full principal recovery and timely
interest.  The scenario analysis incorporates various combinations
of the following stressed assumptions: mortgage loss, loss timing,
interest rates, prepayments, servicer advancing, and loan
modifications.

The analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'.  The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario.  Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are
increasingly more stressful and less-likely outcomes.  Although
many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary
driver of the loss scenarios is the home price forecast
assumption.  In the 'Bsf' scenario, Fitch assumes home prices
decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level.  The home
price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating
category up to a 35% decline in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home price movements.  Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices
nationally to decline further before reaching a sustainable level.
While Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent
actual home price and mortgage performance trends differ from
those currently projected by Fitch.


* Moody's Raises Ratings in $300MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of ten tranches
from five transactions issued by miscellaneous issuers. The
tranches are backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A3

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 27, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MortgageIT Securities Corp., Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series
2005-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The rating upgrades are due to stable pool performance and build
up of credit enhancement from excess spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $132.7MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
and downgraded the ratings of three tranches issued by three RMBS
transactions. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable rate "scratch and
dent" residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-RP2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-MX1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-A

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structure, non-
amortizing subordinate bonds, and availability of excess spread.
Performance has remained generally stable from Moody's last
review. The ratings downgraded are due to the weaker performance
of C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
MX1.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in July 2014 from 7.3% in
July 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.




                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

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