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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 3, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 214

                             Headlines

ALESCO PREFERRED XII: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
ALESCO PREFERRED XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Notes to Ca
AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
ATLAS SENIOR IV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'

CALLIDUS DEBT V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
CGBAM 2013-BREH: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
COLUMBUSNOVA CLO 2006-I: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating to Ba1
CSMC TRUST 2014-IVR3: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
GALAXY VII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'

GS MORTGAGE 2014-GSFL: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
HILT 2014-ORL: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
JP MORGAN 2014-C22: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB-sf'
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C17: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Cl. F Certs
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: S&P Retains 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes

NEUBERGER BERMAN XII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-R Notes
NORTHEAST HOUSING: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on 2007-B Bonds
OFSI FUND VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
PREFERRED TERM XIX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B1
PREFERRED TERM XXVI: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Note Classes to B3

PREFERRED TERM XXVIII: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Notes to Caa2
REALT 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. L Certificates
ROSEDALE CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B-
TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes
TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2L Notes to Ca

WELLS FARGO 2005-AR3: Moody's Hikes Rating on I-A-2 Secs. to Caa1
WEST CLO 2014-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes

* Moody's Takes Action on $161MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003 to 2006
* Moody's Takes Action on $255MM RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
* S&P Lowers Rating on 116 Classes From 73 U.S. RMBS Deals to D


                             *********

ALESCO PREFERRED XII: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Notes to 'Ca'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ALESCO Preferred Funding XII, Ltd:

$10,000,000 Class X First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2016 (current outstanding balance of $3,749,999.95),
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$370,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037 (current outstanding balance of
$278,232,728.54), Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$87,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$70,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating R
ate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 26,
2014 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$60,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, (current outstanding balance
of $64,392,465, including interest shortfall), Upgraded to Ca
(sf); previously on September 23, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

$10,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, (current outstanding
balance of $11,906,410, including interest shortfall), Upgraded to
Ca (sf); previously on September 23, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding XII, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets,

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment;
(5) giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet
certain criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for
insurance TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
5.4% or $15.8 million since December 2013, using principal
proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and the
diversion of excess interest proceeds. The Class A-1 notes' par
coverage has thus improved to 168.40% from 146.63% since December
2013, by Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's July 2014
report, the over-collateralization ratio of the senior Class A
notes is 127.50% (limit 124.0%), the Class B notes 106.87% (limit
106.69%) and the Class C is 90.88% (limit 103.83) versus 117.50%,
98.62% and 84.42% in December 2013 respectively. The Class A-1
notes will continue to benefit from proceeds from redemptions of
any assets in the collateral pool. The Class C notes will benefit
from the diversion of excess interest to pay down the deferred
interest balance, as long as the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization tests continue to pass.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $48.8 million from $98.8 million in December
2013. Since December 2013, four previously deferring banks with a
total par of $35.5 million have resumed making interest payments
on their TruPS; two assets with a total par of $11.1 million have
redeemed at par.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating(s) on the issuer's Class X,
Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes and Class B Notes announced on
June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the rating(s) on
review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology
updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par and (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $474.9 million, defaulted/deferring par of $48.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 8.95% (implying
a WARF of 895), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 606)

Class X: +1

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1390)

Class X: -1

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0


ALESCO PREFERRED XIV: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Notes to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd.:

$80,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due September 23, 2037, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
on June 26, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

$103,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current balance of
$108,860,558), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on August 27, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

$50,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Floating Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current
balance of $54,555,585),Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June
24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

$32,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current
balance of $39,437,296), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June
24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

$21,000,000 Class C-3 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current
balance of $29,102,790), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June
24, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Moody's also confirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$12,000,000 Class X First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due December 23, 2016 (current balance of $5,000,000),
Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$430,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due September 23, 2037 (current balance of $329,616,639
), Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd, issued on December 21, 2006, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios, and the improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since August
2013.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
4.7% or $16.4 million since August 2013, using principal proceeds
from the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. Due to the methodology update mentioned
above, Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to four
deferring assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $23 million
in par. As a result, the Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus
improved to 163.14% from 155.83% since August 2013, by Moody's
calculations. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from
the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool. Class B notes will benefit from the diversion of
excess interest since Class A overcollateralization ratio is
expected to be cured soon.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. The total par amount that Moody's
treated as having defaulted declined to $74 million (after giving
par credit to deferring securities that meet certain criteria)
from $82 million in August 2013. Since August 2013, two assets
with a total par of $8.8 million have redeemed at par.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating(s) on the issuer's Class X
Notes, Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes announced on June 26,
2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the rating(s) on review for
upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $537.7 million , defaulted/deferring par of $74
million , a weighted average default probability of 12.82%
(implying a WARF of 967), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 597)

Class X: +2

Class A-1: +2

Class A-2: +3

Class B: +3

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class C-3: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1528)

Class X: -2

Class A-1: -2

Class A-2: -3

Class B: -3

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class C-3: 0


AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-3's
$200 million asset-backed notes series 2014-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 28,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 56.70%, 48.91%, 40.13%,
      and 36.38% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.35x, and 1.25x S&P's 25.75%-
      26.75% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that
      S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would
      remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary 'AA
      (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the class C
      and D notes would remain within two rating categories of its
      preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA', and a two-rating category
      downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,
      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-3

Class   Rating    Type           Interest        Amount
                                 rate       (mil. $)(i)
A       AA (sf)   Senior         Fixed           117.90
B       A (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed            37.70
C       BBB (sf)  Subordinate    Fixed            30.20
D       BB (sf)   Subordinate    Fixed            14.20

(i) The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
     pricing date.


ATLAS SENIOR IV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its rating on Atlas
Senior Loan Fund IV Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV LLC's $471.10
million fixed- and floating-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of March 31, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P said.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors.  We will take rating actions as we
deem necessary," S&P added.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1L                       AAA (sf)                     311.80
A-2L                       AA (sf)                       44.70
A-3L (deferrable)          A (sf)                        44.70
B-1L (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                      32.90
B-2L (deferrable)          BB- (sf)                      23.50
B-3L (deferrable)          B (sf)                        13.50


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A and A-2 notes and affirmed the ratings on the class B and C
notes from BlueMountain CLO II Ltd., a U.S. cash-flow
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by BlueMountain
Capital Management L.P.  At the same time, S&P removed these
ratings from CreditWatch where it had placed them with positive
implications on April 9, 2014.  In addition, S&P lowered its
ratings on the class D and E notes.

The upgrades reflect the increased credit support following the
$66.72 million paydowns to the class A and A-2 notes.  The
affirmations on the class B and C notes reflect the availability
of adequate credit support at the current rating levels.

Following the most recent payment date (June 6, 2014), the class A
and A-2 notes balances are 73.34% of their original balances, down
from 95.96% as reflected in the report issued November 2012, which
S&P referenced for its Jan. 2013 rating actions.  The paydowns
increased the credit support by improving the
overcollateralization (O/C). As per the May 2014 monthly report,
the trustee reported the following O/C ratios:

   -- The senior (class B) O/C ratio was 127.77%, up from 123.07%
      in November 2012.

   -- The mezzanine (class D) O/C ratio was 111.41%, up from
      109.36% in November 2012.

According to the May 2014 trustee report, the transaction has no
defaulted obligations compared to $8.07 million in defaulted
obligations at the time of the Jan. 10, 2013, rating actions.  The
amount of 'CCC' category-rated collateral held in the
transaction's asset portfolio has also dropped since the Jan. 2013
rating actions.  According to the May 2014 trustee report, the
transaction held $14.97 million in assets rated in the 'CCC'
range, down from the $18.00 million noted in the Nov. 2012 trustee
report.

Although the credit support to the senior tranches has improved,
the May 2014 monthly trustee report indicates that 35.02% of the
underlying collateral is scheduled to mature after the stated
maturity of the notes.  The presence of these long-dated
securities in the portfolio introduces a market value risk.

"We lowered our ratings on the class D and E notes to reflect the
significant increase in the exposure to long-dated assets.  Our
cash flow analysis demonstrated that, under our current criteria
assumptions, the class D and E notes are commensurate with a lower
rating than currently assigned.  We believe the notes are not at
imminent risk for default because the size of this bucket could
change over time, due to potential prepayments on the underlying
collateral, trading by the manager or other factors.  Therefore,
we lowered our ratings on the class D notes to 'BB- (sf)' and
class E notes to 'B- (sf)' even though the cash flow analysis
indicated 'B+' and 'CC' respectively," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

BlueMountain CLO II Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.74%        AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.74%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    6.42%        AA (sf)
C      A- (sf)/Watch Pos    A- (sf)     1.08%        A- (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)            B+ (sf)     8.39%        BB- (sf)
E      B+ (sf)              CC (sf)     N/A          B- (sf)

N/A-Not applicable.

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
    default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
    implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C      A- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     A- (sf)
D      B+ (sf)    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)
E      CC (sf)    CC (sf)    CC (sf)     CC (sf)     B- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA (sf)
C      A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      A- (sf)
D      B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       CC (sf)       BB- (sf)
E      CC (sf)      CC (sf)       CC (sf)       B- (sf)

RATINGS LIST

BlueMountain CLO II Ltd.

          Rating      Rating
Class     To          From
A         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B         AA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C         A- (sf)     A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D         BB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
E         B- (sf)     B+ (sf)


CALLIDUS DEBT V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all
classes from Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management.  S&P also removed its
ratings on classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, B, and C from CreditWatch,
where it placed them with positive implications on April 9, 2014.

Since S&P affirmed these ratings in March 2013, the transaction's
reinvestment period ended in November 2013 and it began paying
down the class A-1A and A-1B notes, which are pari passu.  The
current note balances are about 66% of the original balances.

The upgrades mainly reflect these paydowns and the subsequent
increase in the overcollateralization (O/C) available to support
the notes.  According to the June 10, 2014, monthly trustee
report, the O/C ratios were as follows:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 135.18%, up from a reported
      125.52% in the January 2013 report, which S&P used for its
      March 2013 rating actions.

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 123.47%, up from 117.82% in
      January 2013.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 113.80%, up from 111.14% in
      January 2013.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 108.44%, up from 107.30% in
      January 2013.

The portfolio's credit quality has improved since March 2013--for
example, per the June 2014 monthly trustee report, the amount of
'CCC' rated obligations was $4.3 million par, down from $19.1
million par in Jan. 2013, which further increased the cushion
available to support the ratings at their previous levels.  In
addition, there have been no defaults in the portfolio.

The transaction's exposure to long-dated securities--those
scheduled to mature after the transaction's stated maturity--
increased to 7.1% according to the June 2014 monthly trustee
report, up from 0.2% in January 2013.  When computed based on the
performing loans (i.e. excluding principal cash), this percentage
increases to 7.9%.  S&P's analysis included a sensitivity test
that evaluated the impact of market-value risk on this exposure.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis to
estimate future performance based on the portfolio and transaction
as reflected in the June 2014 monthly trustee report.  In line
with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected default timing, pattern, and
recoveries under various interest rate and macroeconomic
scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's
ability to pay timely interest, ultimate principal, or both to
each rated tranche.  In our view, the results of the cash flow
analysis demonstrated that all of the rated outstanding classes
have adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with this rating action," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)  rating
A-1A   AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    23.62%      AAA (sf)
A-1B   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    23.62%      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    9.84%       AAA (sf)
B      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)    9.47%       AA+ (sf)
C      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)     2.19%       A- (sf)
D      BB (sf)              BB+ (sf)    7.48%       BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated scenarios in
which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current
collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's
weighted average recovery rate.  S&P generated other scenarios by
adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the
current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation
assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1A   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A (sf)      A+ (sf)     A- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1A   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1B   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)     A- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V Ltd.

             Rating       Rating
Class        To           From
A-1A         AAA          AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1B         AAA          AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2          AAA          AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA+          A (sf)/Watch Pos
C            A- (sf)      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D            BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)


CGBAM 2013-BREH: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-BREH issued by CGBAM
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-BREH as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-ACP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-BCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.  The rating confirmations reflect the
continued stable performance of the transaction.  This transaction
consists of a $600 million single mortgage loan secured by the fee
and leasehold interests in 65 select-service, extended-stay and
full-service hotels.  In addition to the mortgage loan, there is
$175 million of subordinate mezzanine debt outside of the trust
consisting of a $100 million senior mezzanine loan and a $75
million junior mezzanine loan.  The loan is interest only with an
initial term of three years, plus two one-year extensions.
However, in both May and June 2014, the loan saw a collateral
reduction of .01% due to the delivery of unscheduled principle
curtailments, resulting in a current trust balance of $593.4
million.

According to the May 2014 Smith Travel Research reports, the Top
15 properties, representing 48% of the allocated loan amount,
reported average occupancy rates, average daily rates and average
revenue per available room rates of 80.7%, $150 and $119.94,
respectively, compared with their competitive set's averages of
76.2%, $135.5 and $107.4, respectively.  As of the July 2014
operating statement analysis report, the entire loan reported a
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 4.28 times (x) compared with
the DBRS underwritten term DSCR of 2.05x.  The DBRS underwritten
term DSCR was calculated using a stressed interest rate.

The vast majority of the properties were built between 1996 and
2005, and are typically well located in primarily infill suburban
locations with high barriers to entry across 18 different states.
Based on the property qualities and locations, DBRS considers the
loan per key to be moderate at $79,105.  Properties representing
the most significant contribution to the overall net cash flow are
located in strong coastal markets such as Oregon, California and
Washington.  All hotels carry nine different national flags but
are ultimately operated by two parent companies: Marriott and
Hilton.  None of these franchise agreements expire prior to 2025,
as all franchise agreements were renewed prior to loan closing.
Franchisor-mandated property improvement plans are estimated to
cost approximately $64 million within the time parameters of 2013
to 2017.  The loan has been structured with an up-front reserve
and ongoing monthly reserves.  According to the July 2014 loan
level reserve report, the balance of this reserve is currently
$25.3 million.  This reserve is in addition to the traditional
furniture, fixtures and equipment reserve.

Blackstone Real Estate Partners VII, L.P., (Blackstone) the
sponsor, is the largest owner of hotels in the United States and
is considered a very strong operator, with $20.6 billion market
capitalization behind it.  Blackstone has contributed over $195
million of cash equity behind total financing (preferred equity,
mortgage and mezzanine debt).  Overall, the transaction benefits
significantly from new cash investment behind the mortgage loan.


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO 2006-I: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I:

  $24,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due July 18, 2018, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on August 23, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  $18,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 18,
  2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 23, 2012
  Upgraded to A1 (sf);

  $15,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 18,
  2018, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 23, 2012
  Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  $12,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 18,
  2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 23, 2012
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $300,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due July 18, 2018 (current
  outstanding balance of $136,181,334), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on August 4, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I, issued in August 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in October 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since October 2013. The Class A notes
have been paid down by approximately 48.1% or $126.0 million since
that time. Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B and Class D notes
are reported at 133.21% and 114.08%, respectively, versus October
2013 levels of 123.38% and 110.45%, respectively. Moody's notes
that the overcollateralization ratios reported in the trustee
report don't include the July 2014 payment distribution when $39.6
million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the Class A
notes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2064)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3096)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -3

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $225.1 million, defaulted
par of $1.4 million, a weighted average default probability of
14.41% (implying a WARF of 2580), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 52.16%, a diversity score of 52 and a weighted
average spread of 3.12%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CSMC TRUST 2014-IVR3: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class B-4 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-IVR3 issued by
CSMC Trust 2014-IVR3 (the Trust):

-- $278.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $284.5 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $284.5 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.0 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $284.5 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.0 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $334.5 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $278.3 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $284.5 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $284.5 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $5.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.4 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $5.3 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Class A-X-1, Class A-X-2, Class A-X-3, Class A-X-4, Class A-X-5
and Class A-X-6 are interest-only certificates.  The class
balances represent notional amounts.

Class A-3, Class A-4, Class A-5, Class A-6, Class A-8, Class A-X-3
and Class A-X-6 are exchangeable certificates.  These classes can
be exchanged for combinations of initial exchangeable certificates
as specified in the offering documents.

Class A-1 and Class A-4 are super senior certificates.  These
classes benefit from additional protection from senior support
certificates (Class A-2 and Class A-5) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings in this transaction reflect the 8.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordination.  The AA (sf), A
(sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect 6.55%, 4.75%, 3.00% and
1.55% of credit enhancement, respectively.  Other than the
specified classes above, DBRS does not publicly rate any other
classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 526 prime residential mortgage
loans with a total principal balance of $363,625,272 as of the
Cut-Off Date (July 1, 2014).  The mortgage loans were acquired by
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. (DLJMC).  The originators for the
mortgage pool are Quicken Loans Inc. (33.2%), Fifth Third Mortgage
Company (13.1%), First Republic Bank (FRB, 10.7%), Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. (6.1%), Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc. (5.1%)
and various other originators, each comprising less than 5% of the
mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(69.0%), Fifth Third Bank (13.1%), FRB (10.7%), PHH Mortgage
Corporation (4.8%) and New Penn Financial, LLC doing business as
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (2.4%).  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will
act as the Master Servicer and Securities Administrator.
Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society,
FSB will serve as trustee.  The transaction employs a senior-
subordinate shifting-interest cash flow structure that is enhanced
from a pre-crisis structure.

Each originator has made certain representations and warranties
concerning the mortgage loans.  The enforcement mechanism for
breaches of representations includes automatic breach reviews by a
third-party reviewer for any seriously delinquent loans, and
resolution of disputes are ultimately subject to determination in
an arbitration proceeding.  The loans (except for FRB-originated
loans) also benefit from representations and warranties
backstopped by the seller, DLJMC, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Credit Suisse (USA), Inc., in the event of an originator's
bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, and if the originator fails
to cure, repurchase or substitute such breach or loans.  However,
such a backstop is subject to certain sunset provisions that give
consideration to prior loan performance.

DBRS views the representation and warranties features for this
transaction to be consistent with recent DBRS-rated CSMC prime
jumbo transactions.  However, the relatively weak financial
strength of certain originators, coupled with the sunset
provisions on the backstop by DLJMC, still demand additional
penalties and credit enhancement protections.  The full
description of the representations and warranties standard, the
mitigating factors and the DBRS analysis are detailed in the
related presale report.


GALAXY VII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D, and E notes from Galaxy VII CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by PineBridge Investments
LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings from
CreditWatch, where it had placed them with positive implications
on April 9, 2014, and S&P affirmed its rating on the class B
notes.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2
notes.

The upgrades on the class C, D, and E notes mainly reflect an
increase in credit support following complete paydowns to the
class A-1 and A-2 notes.  On the most recent payment date
(July 14, 2014), the class A-1 and A-2 notes paid off in full;
therefore, S&P withdrew its ratings on them.  Also, the
transaction has commenced paying down the class B notes.  The
transaction continues to maintain few defaults in the collateral
pool:  The July 2014 monthly trustee report indicated only about
0.1% of the pool in default.

The ratings on the class D and E notes are driven by S&P's largest
obligor default test, a supplemental stress test that addresses
the potential concentration of exposure to obligors in the
transaction's portfolio by assessing the effect of several of the
largest obligors defaulting simultaneously.  The class D and E
notes can only pass the largest obligor default test at the 'AA'
and 'BB' rating categories respectively.

S&P's affirmation on the class B notes reflects the adequate
credit support available to the notes at the 'AAA' level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Galaxy VII CLO Ltd.

         Previous    Cash flow        Cash flow
Class    rating      implied rating   cushion (%)(i)   Final
rating
B        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)         31.70            AAA (sf)
C        AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)         31.59            AAA (sf)
D        BBB+ (sf)   AAA (sf)         12.24            AA+ (sf)
E        BB (sf)     AA+ (sf)         0.66             BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions, based on the
correlation scenarios.

RATINGS LIST

Galaxy VII CLO Ltd.

                     Rating     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1     363184AA0    NR         AAA (sf)
A-2     363184AB8    NR         AAA (sf)
B       363184AC6    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
C       363184AE2    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D       363184AF9    AA+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E       36319HAA0    BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Pos

NR-Not rated.


GS MORTGAGE 2014-GSFL: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-GSFL's $542.8 million
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-GSFL.

The certificate issuance is backed by eight commercial mortgage
loans with a $542.8 million aggregate principal balance, secured
by the fee and/or leasehold interests in 59 properties across 17
U.S. states.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 29,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the underlying
collateral's economics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the
collateral pool's relative diversity, and our overall qualitative
assessment of the transaction.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-GSFL

Class            Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A                AAA (sf)              276,138,000
X-CP             BB- (sf)          542,769,616(ii)
B                AA- (sf)               67,847,000
C                A- (sf)                48,147,000
D                BBB- (sf)              64,480,000
E                BB- (sf)               86,157,616

(i) The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
     buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.

(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP
     certificates will equal the sum of the class A through E
     certificates' principal amounts.


HILT 2014-ORL: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to HILT
2014-ORL Mortgage Trust's $345.0 million commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates series 2014-ORL.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one floating-rate mortgage loan
totaling $345.0 million secured by a first lien on the borrower's
fee interest in one full-service convention hotel in Orlando, Fla.

The ratings are based on information as of the closing date,
July 29, 2014.  The special servicer as of the closing date is
Talmage LLC.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

HILT 2014-ORL Mortgage Trust

Class       Rating(i)                  Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)                  116,508,000
X-FP        AAA (sf)                2,639,250(ii)
X-CP        AAA (sf)               10,557,000(ii)
X-EXT       AAA (sf)               13,196,250(ii)
B           AA- (sf)                   43,885,000
C           A- (sf)                    32,623,000
D           BBB- (sf)                  43,108,000
E           BB- (sf)                   67,963,000
F           B (sf)                     40,913,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities
     Act of 1933.

(ii) The notional amount of the class X-FP, X-CP, and X-EXT
     certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to a
     portion of the class A certificates.


JP MORGAN 2014-C22: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's JPMBB 2014-C22 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

   -- $47,120,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $29,158,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $162,500,000 class A-3A1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $87,500,000c class A-3A2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $355,389,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $102,553,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $78,422,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $862,642,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,816,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $58,816,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $47,614,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $184,852,000b class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $61,617,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,008,000c class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $28,008,000ac class X-C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.
(b) Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
    for a related amount of class EC certificates, and class EC
    certificates may be exchanged for class A-S, class B, and
    class C certificates.
(c) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of July 24, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$12,604,000 class F, the $14,003,000 class G, the $26,607,000
interest-only class X-D, the $35,010,270 interest-only class X-E,
and the $35,010,270 class NR.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$15,099,000 class UHP, which will only receive distributions from,
and will only incur losses with respect to, the non-pooled
component of the U-Haul Self-Storage Portfolio mortgage loan.
Such class will share in losses and shortfalls on the related
componentized mortgage loan.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 76 loans secured by 120 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.20 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association;
Barclays Bank PLC; Starwood Mortgage Funding II LLC; General
Electric Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 74.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis on 82%, and asset summary reviews
on 82% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.11x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 110.8%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 8.6%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 9% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch DSCR
and LTV are 1.11x and 110.8%, respectively, which is worse than
the first-half 2014 and 2013 averages of 1.19x and 105.6% and
1.29x and 101.6%, respectively.

Lower Loan Concentration: Loan concentration is lower than that of
other recent transactions.  The largest loan represents 8% of the
pool, and the top 10 loans represent 47.3%.  The average top 10
concentrations for first-half 2014 and 2013 conduit transactions
were 52.5% and 54.5%, respectively.

Limited Amortization: 12.9% of the pool is full-term interest-
only, 59.2% of the pool is partial term interest-only, and 3.4% of
the pool is fully amortizing.  The remainder of the pool
(31 loans, 24.5%) consists of amortizing balloon loans with loan
terms of five to 10 years.  Based on the scheduled balance at
maturity, the pool will have paid down 14.9%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.8% below
the most recent NOI (for properties that a recent NOI was
provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during this
period).  Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans, and could result in potential rating actions on the
certificates.  Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to JPMBB 2014-C22 certificates and found that the
transaction displays average sensitivity to further declines in
NCF.  In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB+sf' could result.  In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result.

The master servicer will be Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, rated 'CMS1-' by Fitch.  The special servicer will be
LNR Partners, LLC., rated 'CSS1-' by Fitch.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C17: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Cl. F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2014-C17, to be issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Trust 2014-C17.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class PST at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Classes X-B, X-C, D, E and F will be privately placed pursuant to
Rule 144A.

The Classes X-A, X-B and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings
on interest-only certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers
the interest-only certificates' position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PST certificates.
Class PST certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-S, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 67 fixed-rate loans secured by 72
commercial and multifamily properties.  The transaction has a
balance of $1,036,844,774.  The pool consists of relatively high-
leverage financing, with a weighted-average DBRS Refi debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.00 times, based on a weighted-average
stressed refinance constant of 9.8%.  The DBRS sample included 30
loans, representing 75.0% of the pool.  Of the sampled loans, four
loans were given Above Average property quality and 17 loans were
given Below Average property quality.  DBRS considers the pool to
be relatively diverse based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to a pool of 29 equal-sized loans.  One loan in
the top ten, representing 3.6% of the pool, was shadow-rated
investment grade.

Ten hotel properties secure 21.3% of the allocated loan balance of
the pool, a relatively high concentration, only one of which is in
the top ten.  Hotel properties have higher cash flow volatility
than traditional property types, as their income, which is derived
from daily contracts rather than multi-year leases, and their
expenses, which are often mostly fixed, are quite high as a
percentage of revenue.  These two factors cause revenue to fall
swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to fall even faster,
because of the high operating leverage.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL IV: S&P Retains 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-3L and B-1L notes from Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC.  S&P also affirmed its ratings
on the class A-1L, A-1LB, A-2L, and B-2L notes.  In addition, S&P
removed the ratings on classes A-3L and B-2L from CreditWatch,
where they were placed with positive implications on April 9,
2014.

Since S&P's June 2013 rating actions, the three classes of A-1L
notes have been paid down by $85 million.  Class A-1LA was paid
down in full, and S&P withdrew its rating on it earlier this year.
The class A overcollateralization (O/C) ratio increased to 165% as
of the June 2014 trustee report from 128% as of the May 2013
trustee report, which S&P referenced for the last rating actions.
S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1L, A-1LB, and
A-2L notes and raised its ratings on the class A-3L and B-1L notes
to reflect the increased credit support available to these notes.
Although the class B-1L notes now pass S&P's cash flow stresses at
a higher rating category, it only raised its rating to 'A+ (sf)'
because the notes are constrained by the top obligor test.

The class B-2L O/C ratio has increased to 112% from 107% since
S&P's June 2013 rating actions.  The transaction is exposed to
concentration risk since only 52 unique obligors remain in the
portfolio.  In addition, there are over $9 million in long-dated
assets as of the June 2014 trustee report.  Although S&P's top
obligor test constrains the class B-2L rating, its cash flow runs
for this class pass at a higher rating with sufficient cushion.
S&P affirmed its rating on the class B-2L notes to reflect the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios.

RATINGS LIST

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1L    62388TAB4    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-1LB   62388TAD0    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2L    62388TAE8    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-3L    62388TAF5    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L    62388TAG3    A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
B-2L    62388UAA3    BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


NEUBERGER BERMAN XII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
class X, A, B, C, D, and E notes from Neuberger Berman CLO XII
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by
Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC, after the notes were redeemed
in full.  At the same time, S&P assigned its ratings on the
replacement class X-R, A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture.
All of the proceeds from the replacement notes were used to redeem
the original notes as outlined by provisions in the transaction
documents.  The class X note was redeemed after the July 25, 2014,
payment and replaced by the issuance of the $1 million class X-R
note.  The class A note was redeemed by the issuance of the class
A-1-R and A-2-R notes, both pro rata with one another.  The spread
of the class A-1-R note is 1.25%, and the spread of the class A-2-
R note is 1.15%, which will step up to 1.90% after two years.  The
other replacement notes were issued at a lower spread over LIBOR
than the originals.

The supplemental indenture also includes provisions focused around
the Volcker Rule, which makes nonloan collateral ineligible.

S&P's full cash flow analysis resulted in positive cushions at the
effective date rating for the refinanced notes.

Table 1

Current Date After Refinancing
Class      Amount  Interest             BDR      SDR   Cushion
         (mil. $)  rate(%)              (%)      (%)       (%)
X-R         1.00   LIBOR plus 1.25      94.08    59.71   34.37
A-1-R      69.00   LIBOR plus 1.25      62.99    59.71    3.28
A-2-R     183.00   LIBOR plus 1.15(i)   62.99    59.71    3.28
B-R        42.75   LIBOR plus 2.10      60.81    51.85    8.97
C-R        27.10   LIBOR plus 3.10      50.43    45.96    4.47
D-R        15.50   LIBOR plus 4.00      46.15    40.24    5.90
E-R        18.50   LIBOR plus 6.25      35.24    33.60    1.64

(i)Class A-2-R spread will step up to 1.90% after two years.
  BDR--Break-even default rate.
  SDR--Scenario default rate.

Table 2

Effective Date
Class       Amount  Interest          BDR      SDR   Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)       (%)
X            2.00   LIBOR plus 1.25   94.59    64.38   30.21
A          252.50   LIBOR plus 1.52   64.89    64.38    0.51
B           42.75   LIBOR plus 2.75   62.88    56.42    6.46
C           27.10   LIBOR plus 3.65   53.59    50.29    3.30
D           15.50   LIBOR plus 5.50   49.67    44.17    5.50
E           18.50   LIBOR plus 7.00   40.11    37.10    3.01

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive
changes to the transaction.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Neuberger Berman CLO XII Ltd.

                       Rating
Class              To           From
X                  NR           AAA (sf)
A                  NR           AAA (sf)
B                  NR           AA (sf)
C                  NR           A (sf)
D                  NR           BBB (sf)
E                  NR           BB (sf)

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XII Ltd.

Class              Rating
X-R                AAA (sf)
A-1-R              AAA (sf)
A-2-R              AAA (sf)
B-R                AA (sf)
C-R                A (sf)
D-R                BBB (sf)
E-R                BB (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:               Neuberger Berman CLO XII Ltd.
Co-issuer:            Neuberger Berman CLO XII LLC
Collateral manager:   Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC
Refinancing arranger: BNP Paribas
Trustee:              U.S. Bank N.A.
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


NORTHEAST HOUSING: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on 2007-B Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has affirmed the Ba1 rating on
Northeast Housing LLC's (PA) $277 million outstanding Taxable
Military Housing Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2007-A Class I,
and has affirmed the B1 rating on $69 million outstanding Series
2007-B Class II bonds.

Series 2007-A-1 (Class I) $252,890,000 outstanding, affirmed at
Ba1;

Series 2007-A-2 (Class I) $24,430,000 outstanding, affirmed at
Ba1; and

Series 2007-B (Class II) $69,340,000 outstanding, affirmed at B1.

The outlook on the Class I and Class II bonds is stable.

Rating Rationale

The rating affirmations are based on the project's Basic Allowance
for Housing (BAH) increase for 2014, which will help to offset the
decrease in financial performance between 2012 and 2013. In
addition, the project's debt service reserve fund is funded by a
surety bond provided by Ambac Assurance Corporation (unrated by
Moody's).

Credit Strengths

-- The project received weighted average increase in the Basic
    Allowance for Housing (BAH) of 5.1% for 2014

-- Financial performance is satisfactory despite a decrease in
    debt service coverage between 2013 and 2012 (Moody's adjusted
    debt service coverage was 1.35x and 1.08x, for the Class I
    and Class II bonds respectively, for 2013)

-- Sustained weighted average occupancy of 93% in 2013

Credit Challenges

-- Soft real estate markets surrounding Newport, Rhode Island
    and Saratoga Springs, New York are resulting in lower average
    occupancy.

-- Project is accessing tenant waterfall to improve occupancy by
    renting to non-active military personnel and civilians,
    exposing it to greater market risk, including competition
    from surrounding real estate

-- The debt service reserve fund is funded by a surety bond from
    Ambac Assurance Corporation (unrated by Moody's)

Outlook

The stable outlook is based on the project's financial position
and performance which is sufficient to meet debt service.

What Could Change the Rating Up

-- Improvement of financial performance and achievement of high
    occupancy levels for several more reporting periods

-- Cash funding of debt service reserve fund, replacement of the
    surety provider or an upgrade of the current surety bond
    provider while maintaining strong financial performance

What Could Change the Rating Down

-- Stressed occupancy levels or decline in the BAH that results
    in a significant decline in debt service coverage

-- Unexpected spike in operating expenses which materially
    reduces revenue available to pay debt service

-- Downsizing or closure of any of the seven naval installations
    that support the housing units


OFSI FUND VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on OFSI
Fund VI Ltd./OFSI Fund VI LLC's $359 million floating-rate notes
following the transaction's effective date as of June 18, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OFSI Fund VI Ltd./OFSI Fund VI LLC

Class                    Rating             Amount
                                          (mil. $)
A-1                      AAA (sf)           232.00
A-2                      AA (sf)             51.00
B                        A (sf)              30.00
C                        BBB (sf)            20.50
D                        BB (sf)             14.00
E                        B (sf)              11.50
Combination securities   AA (sf)            283.00


PREFERRED TERM XIX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XIX, Ltd. and
PreTSL Combination Trust 1:

Issuer: Preferred Term Securities XIX, Ltd:

$385,300,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due December
22, 2035 (current balance of $284,601,556), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on October 31, 2013 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$98,100,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due December 22,
2035 (current balance of $95,890,802), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on October 31, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

$87,600,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes due December
22, 2035 (current balance of $86,717,646), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on October 31, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: PreTsl Combination Trust I:

$15,200,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XIX-1 due December
22, 2035 (current Moody's Ratable Balance of $8,494,876), Upgraded
to Aaa (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

Preferred Term Securities XIX, Ltd. issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank,
insurance and TruPS CDO Tranches.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios, resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets, and the
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
5.9% or $17.7 million since October 2013, using principal proceeds
from the redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. The Class A-1 notes' par coverage has
thus improved to 170.6% from 157.3% since October 2013, by Moody's
calculations. Based on the trustee's June 2014 report, the OC
ratio of the senior notes (Class A-1 and A-2 notes) was 128.6%
(limit 128.0%), versus 119.4% in October 2013, that of the Class B
notes, 104.8% (limit 115.0%), versus 97.5% in October 2013, that
of the Class C notes, 87.9% (limit 105.4%), versus 82.5% in
October 2013, and that of the Class D notes, 82.7% (limit 100.3%),
versus 77.9% in October 2013. The Senior OC test was cured in June
2014. As a result, Class B notes started to receive payments of
current interest and repayments of deferred interest. The Class A-
1 notes will continue to benefit from the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool. After the
deferred interest on Class B notes are fully paid, the Class A-1
notes will also benefit from diversion of excess interest as long
as the Class B OC test continue to fail.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. The weighted average rating factor
(WARF) based on Moody's calculation has improved to 1032. The
total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $95.4 million from $137.7 million in October
2013. Two previously deferring banks with a total par of $16
million have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS; two
assets with a total par of $12.2 million have redeemed at par.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the Combination
Certificates, Series P XIX-1 issued by PreTSL Combination Trust 1
announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the
rating on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $482.3
million, defaulted/deferring par of $95.4 million, a weighted
average default probability of 13.32% (implying a WARF of 1032),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In
addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are
subject to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 623)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +3

Class B: +3

Class C: 0

Combination Certificates, Series P XIX-1 : 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1426)

Class A-1: -2

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -3

Class C: 0

Combination Certificates, Series P XIX-1 : 0


PREFERRED TERM XXVI: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Note Classes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXVI, Ltd.:

$140,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due September
22, 2037 (current outstanding balance of $137,798,230), Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2
(sf)

$59,900,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
September 22, 2037 (current outstanding balance of $61,480,730),
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

$37,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
September 22, 2037 (current outstanding balance of $44,755,024),
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

Issuer: Preferred Term Securities XXVI, Ltd.

  $530,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due September
  22, 2037 (current outstanding balance of $340,878,362),
  Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on February 28, 2014 Upgraded to
  A1 (sf)

Moody's also confirmed the rating on the following notes:

Issuer: PreTSL Combination Series P XXVI Trust:

  PreTSL $500,000 Combination Series P XXVI-1 Certificates Due
   September 22, 2037 (current Moody's Ratable Balance of
   $363,034), Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014
   Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Preferred Term Securities XXVI, Ltd., issued in June 21, 2007, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect
deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios and resumption of
interest payments of previously deferring assets since February
2014.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM for deals that do not permit reinvestment; (5)
giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet certain
criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for insurance
TruPS.

In addition, the Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately
2.0% or $6.8 million since February 2014 from the diversion of
excess interest proceeds. The Class A-1 notes' par coverage has
thus improved to 183.58% from 173.32% since February 2014, by
Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's June 2014 report, the
over-collateralization ratio of the Class A, B, C, and D notes are
128.0%, 104.8%, 86.2% and 78.4%, respectively, compared to
December 2014 levels of 124.1%, 101.7%, 84.0% and 76.5%,
respectively. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $232.5 million from $ 259.0 million in
February 2014. Since February 2014, one previously deferring bank
with a total par of $10.0 million has resumed making interest
payments on their TruPS.

Moody's Credit Policy has identified an analytical error in the
GetRating function embedded in CDOEdge version 3.4.0.0
(Application build 3089). This error affects the modeling of
Series P XXVI-1 combination notes relying on the related rating
methodology "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes." However, the error has no effect on this TruPS CDO
because the rating of the combination notes in this deal has been
analyzed using the corrected GetRating function Excel Add-In
(getrating2014.xll) available on QTools.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par and after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria of $625.8 million, defaulted/deferring par of $232.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 11.94%
(implying a WARF of 1112), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10.0%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have

significant positive impact on the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc,
an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive
credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of
the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial
data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's
relies on the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the
credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms' annual
statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 756)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B-1: +3

Class B-2: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Series P XXVI-1: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1703)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -2

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Series P XXVI-1: 0


PREFERRED TERM XXVIII: Moody's Ups Rating on 2 Notes to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXVIII, Ltd.:

n$191,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $153,202,206.65), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on May 15, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$45,700,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $43,748,885.25), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on May 15, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$44,400,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $42,504,387.41), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$36,000,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current outstanding balance of $36,357,688.93), Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

$8,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
March 22, 2038 (current outstanding balance of $8,572,818.75),
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVIII, Ltd. issued in November, 2007,
is a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank
and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect an
increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios,
resumption of interest payments of previously deferring assets and
the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in May 2014.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment;
(5) giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet
certain criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for
insurance TruPS.

Due to the methodology update mentioned above, Moody's gave full
par credit in its analysis to four deferring assets that meet
certain criteria, totaling $23 million in par. As a result, the
Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to 195.56% from
178.26% since May 2014, by Moody's calculations. Based on the
trustee's June 2014 report, the over-collateralization ratio of
the senior notes was 140.44% (limit 128.00%), versus 136.52%, that
of the Class B notes, 115.51% (limit 115.00%), versus 111.80% and
that of the Class C notes, 97.26% (limit 106.20%), versus 93.72%
based on March 2014 trustee report.

In addition, the Class C-1 and the Class C-2 notes resumed the
payment of current interest since the rating action in May 2014
and have also received a partial payment to pay down their
outstanding deferred interest on the June 2014 payment date. They
will continue to receive their interest payments as long as the
Class B overcollateralization test is passing.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 1085 in May
2014. The total par amount that Moody's treated as having
defaulted or deferring declined to $42.5 million from $69 million
in May 2014. Since March 2014 trustee report, one previously
deferring bank with a total par of $3.5 million has resumed making
interest payments on its' TruPS.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's Class B
Notes announced on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed
the rating on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $298.5 million, defaulted par of $42.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 14.24% (implying a WARF of
1085), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.
In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 700)

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1651)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -2


REALT 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. L Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on sixteen
classes in Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1 (REALT 2007-1) as
follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A-1 through K were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The rating on the P&I class L was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO classes XC-1 and XC-2 were affirmed based on
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.2% of the
current balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 20 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the July 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $347 million
from $514 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 64% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 22% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Two loans
(including the defeased portion of the Conundrum Portfolio loan) ,
constituting 1.3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
Canadian government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

The pool has not experienced any realized losses to date and
currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 3.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.4 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 77% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 83%, compared to
78% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.42X and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to 1.48X and 1.44X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Atrium
Pooled Interest Loan ($38.5 million -- 11.1% of the pool), which
is secured by a 1.05 million square foot (SF) mixed-use complex
located in Toronto, Ontario. The loan is a pari passu interest in
a $116.0 million first mortgage loan. There is also a $74 million
B-Note secured by the property that is not part of this
transaction. The collateral was 97% leased as of January 2014
compared to 98% as of January 2013. H&R REIT acquired the subject
property in June 2011. Moody's current structured credit
assessment is are a2(sca.pd) and 1.81X, respectively, compared to
a2(sca.pd) and 1.76X at last review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is
Langley Power Centre Loan ($36.7 million -- 10.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 228,000 SF anchored retail center located in
Langley, British Columbia. The property was 100% leased as of
January 2014 compared to 99% at last review. The loan is 100%
recourse to RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust. Moody's current
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa2(sca.pd)
and 1.21X, respectively, compared to baa2(sca.pd) and 1.14X at
last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the non-defeased portion of the Conundrum
Portfolio loan ($32 million -- 9.3% of the pool). The portfolio
was originally secured by a 15 property portfolio containing 9
industrial, 5 unanchored retail and 1 office property, all located
in Ontario. The Lender has consented to a partial defeasance of 25
Lesmill Road, Toronto, Ontario, and the defeasance collateral in
the amount of $3.6 million was received on September 5, 2008.
Following the defeasance, the subject portfolio loan now consists
of 14 properties. As of April 2014, the 14 properties had a
combined occupancy of 91.5%. The loan has been on the watchlist
since April 2014 due to declined DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 114% and 0.9X, respectively, compared to 96% and 1.1X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Dundee Mississauga Office Loan ($28
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by two office/flex
properties, one office and one industrial property, all located in
Mississauga, Ontario. The portfolio was 95% leased as of April
2014, which is the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.17X, respectively, compared to 87% and
1.12X, at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sundance Pooled Interest Loan ($24
million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a 175,000 SF
office building located in Calgary, Alberta. The loan is a pari
passu interest in a $48 million first mortgage loan. As of March
2014, the property was fully leased to a single tenant, Worley
Parsons Ltd, through September & October 2016. There are also two
land leases in place, one with a Petro Canada gas station and the
other with Cattlebaron restaurant. Due to the tenant concentration
risk, Moody's valuation incorporated a lit/dark analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 107.5% and 0.88X, respectively, compared
to 96% and 0.98X at last review.


ROSEDALE CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B-
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D-1, D-2 and E notes from Rosedale CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Princeton
Advisory Group Inc.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class A-1A, A-1D, A-1J, A-1R and A-1S notes from the same
transaction.  In addition, S&P removed its ratings on class B, C,
D-1, D-2 and E notes from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on April 9, 2014.

The transaction is currently amortizing since its reinvestment
period ended in July 2011.  The upgrades reflect the continued
paydowns of the class A-1 notes.  The class A-1 balances are about
22.6% of their original balances, which is down from 58.7% during
the last rating action in Feb. 2013.  These paydowns also led to
increases in the A/B, C, D, and E overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
to the notes at the current rating levels.

The affirmation on the class E notes was driven by the application
of the largest obligor test.  While the largest obligor test
pointed to a 'CCC+ (sf)' rating, S&P took into account the passing
cash flow runs at higher rating levels and improved credit support
since S&P last review when assigning the 'B- (sf)' rating.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

RATINGS LIST

Rosedale CLO Ltd.
                     Rating      Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1R    77732WAB8    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1D    77732WAC6    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1A    77732WAD4    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1S    77732WAJ1    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1J    77732WAK8    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B       77732WAE2    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C       77732WAF9    AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-1     77732WAG7    BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D-2     77732WAH5    BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E       77732VAA2    B- (sf)     CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos


TRAPEZA EDGE: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd.:

$22,500,00 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
November 10, 2035, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jun 26,
2014 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$6,000,000 Class 1 Combination Notes due November 10, 2035
(current rated balance of $2,852,639.97), Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);
previously on Jun 26, 2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

Trapeza Edge CDO, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and insurance trust
preferred securities.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's confirmed the ratings on the Class B-2 and Class 1
Combination notes, which had previously been on review for
upgrade, after analyzing the impact of its recent update to the
TruPS CDO methodology. As such, the expected losses on the Class
B-2 and Class 1 Combination notes are still commensurate with
their current rating levels.

The transaction was analyzed using the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating TruPS
CDOs" published in June 2014. These updates include: (1) removing
the current 25% macro default probability stress for bank and
insurance TruPS; (2) expanding the default timing profiles from
one to six probability-weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a
redemption profile for bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss
distribution generated by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not
permit reinvestment; (5) giving full par credit to deferring bank
TruPS that meet certain criteria; and (6) raising the assumed
recovery rate for insurance TruPS.

As a result of the methodology update mentioned above, Moody's
gave full par credit in its analysis to two deferring assets that
meet certain criteria, totaling $9.5 million in par. As a result,
the Class A and Class B overcollateralization ratios based on
Moody's calculations have improved to 152.05% and 119.08%,
respectively, from 146.84% and 104.87%, respectively in May 2014.
Based on the trustee's June 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratios of the Class A and Class B notes were
147.606% (limit 124.00%) and 105.420% (limit 104.49%), remaining
stable since May 2014.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class B-2
Notes and Class 1 Combination Notes announced on June 26, 2014. At
that time, Moody's had placed the ratings on review for upgrade as
a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $277.4
million, defaulted/deferring par of $18.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 13.79% (implying a WARF of 1310),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In
addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge cash
flow model. CDOROM v. 2.13.1 is available on www.moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a
signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc, an
econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 851)

Class B-2: +2

Class 1 Combination Notes: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1835)

Class B-2: -2

Class 1 Combination Notes: -1


TROPIC CDO V: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2L Notes to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Tropic CDO V Ltd.:

$220,000,000 Class A-1L1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
(current balance of $184,979,532.68), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$220,000,000 Class A-1L2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036
(current balance of $191,346,890.37), Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
previously on June 26, 2014 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$94,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due July 2036,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on June 26, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$51,000,000 Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due July
2036 (current balance of $53,713,450.67, including deferred
interest), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on October 20, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Tropic CDO V Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of bank, insurance, and REIT
trust preferred securities (TruPS) and TruPS CDO tranches.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of updates to Moody's
TruPS CDOs methodology, as described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating TruPS CDOs" published in June 2014. They also reflect an
increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios due to
the resumption of interest payments of previously deferring
assets.

The transaction has benefited from the updates to Moody's TruPS
CDOs methodology, including (1) removing the current 25% macro
default probability stress for bank and insurance TruPS; (2)
expanding the default timing profiles from one to six probability-
weighted scenarios; (3) incorporating a redemption profile for
bank and insurance TruPS; (4) using a loss distribution generated
by Moody's CDOROM(TM) for deals that do not permit reinvestment;
(5) giving full par credit to deferring bank TruPS that meet
certain criteria; and (6) raising the assumed recovery rate for
insurance TruPS.

In addition, the deal has also benefited from improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. The total par amount
that Moody's treated as having defaulted or deferring declined to
$206 million from $247.5 million in January 2014. Since January
2014, three previously deferring banks with a total par of $26.5
million have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
Class A-1L1 and Class A-1L2 notes' par coverage has thus improved
to 139.2% from 126.1% since January 2014, by Moody's calculations.
Based on the trustee's July 2014 report, the Senior Over-
collateralization ratio was 112.0% (limit 127.0%), versus 106.0%
in January 2014, and that of the Class A-2L notes, 100.7% (limit
116.0%), versus 95.3% in January 2014. The Class A-1L1 and Class
A-1L2 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool due to the senior overcollateralization ratio
failure.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1L
Notes on June 26, 2014. At that time, Moody's had placed the
ratings on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par (after
treating deferring securities as performing if they meet certain
criteria) of $524 million, defaulted/deferring par of $206
million, a weighted average default probability of 11.42%
(implying a WARF of 1045), and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors
Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in June 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) v.2.13.1 to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs.
The simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDOROM(TM) v. 2.13.1 is available on
www.moodys.com under Products and Solutions -- Analytical models,
upon receipt of a signed free license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc,
an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports. REIT TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's REIT
group assesses their credit quality using the REIT firms' annual
financials.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 652)

Class A-1L1: +2

Class A-1L2: +2

Class A-1LB: +2

Class A-2L: +2

Class A-3L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Class B-1L: 0

Class B-2L: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1612)

Class A-1L1: -1

Class A-1L2: -1

Class A-1LB: -2

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class A-3F: 0

Class B-1L: 0

Class B-2L: 0


WELLS FARGO 2005-AR3: Moody's Hikes Rating on I-A-2 Secs. to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of nine
tranches issued by two issuers. The tranches are backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans issued from 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5F

Cl. 2A-19, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-8, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2013
Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating upgrades are due to improving collateral
performance and/or buildup of credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in June 2014 down from
7.5% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.0% to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


WEST CLO 2014-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of notes issued by West CLO 2014-1 Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"West CLO 2014-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$292,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
July 2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$49,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due July
2026 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$20,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due July 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

$29,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due July 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$20,250,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due July 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

West CLO 2014-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The Issuer's documents require the portfolio
to be at least 90% ramped as of the closing date.

Allianz Global Investors U.S. LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014. Please

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


* Moody's Takes Action on $161MM Alt-A RMBS Issued 2003 to 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on July 28, 2014, upgraded the ratings
of three tranches and downgraded the ratings of 25 tranches from
seven transactions backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

  Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2013
  Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
  Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-WIO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
  Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-2

  Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2012
  Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2012
  Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6

  Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. 5-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Confirmed at B1 (sf)

  Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2012
  Upgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. CB-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-9

  Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
  Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A3

  Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
  Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
  Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC4

  Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
  Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-1 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2005-1

  Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013
  Confirmed at B2 (sf)

  Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013
  Confirmed at B3 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
collateral performance and credit enhancement available to bonds.
The ratings downgraded are due to weaker collateral performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in June 2014 from 7.5% in
June 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $255MM RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on July 28, 2014, upgraded the ratings
of 25 tranches from 14 transactions and downgraded the rating of
one tranche from one transaction backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-
HE2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
TC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE1

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2013
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
HS1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-
RM1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2002-BC9

Cl. M1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-BC2

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE16

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-WCW1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-8

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The downgrade is a result of
deteriorating performance and/or structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.1% in June 2014 from 7.5% in
June 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Lowers Rating on 116 Classes From 73 U.S. RMBS Deals to D
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, in a July 25, 2014 ratings
release, lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on 116 classes of
mortgage pass-through certificates from 73 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2002
and 2009.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the principal write-
downs' effect during recent remittance periods, before which S&P
rated each of the affected classes either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.

The 116 defaulted classes consist of the following:

   -- 51 classes from Alternative-A transactions (43.97%);
   -- 32 from prime jumbo transactions (27.59%);
   -- 24 from subprime transactions (20.69%);
   -- Three from RMBS negative amortization transactions;
   -- One from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transaction;
   -- One from an outside-the-guidelines transaction;
   -- One from a closed-end, second-lien transaction;
   -- One from a document-deficient transaction;
   -- One from a risk transfers transaction; and
   -- One from a second-lien high loan-to-value transaction.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provides credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and it will
adjust its ratings as it considers appropriate according to its
criteria.


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
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then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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