TCR_Public/140629.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 29, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 179

                            Headlines

A VOCE CLO: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BB'
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Moody's Rates Cl. E Notes 'Ba1'
BAKER STREET 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
BALLYROCK CLO 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From BB+

BAMLL 2012-CLRN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2A Certs
BANK OF AMERICA 2005-6: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. P Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP14: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. N Certs to Caa1
BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP18: Moody's Hikes Cl. F Certs' Rating to Ba2

BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Securities to C
BENEFIT STREET IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
BLADE ENGINE: S&P Puts Class B Notes' BB+ Rating on Watch Neg.
BRIDGEPORT CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
BUSINESS LOAN 2006-1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class A Notes

C-BASS CBO VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $27MM Cl. D Notes to B2
CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
CENT CLO 21: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2014-HD: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
CHASE COMMERCIAL 1998-1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on X Certs

CITIGROUP 2006-Fl2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'CCsf'
COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 7 Securities
COMM 2013-THL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
COMM 2014-CCRE18: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. E Certificates 'BB-sf'
COMM 2014-KYO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes

COVENANT CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Action on $71MM of Alt-A RMBS
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 2008-RS1: Moody's Cuts 3-A-1 Certs Rating to Ca
DRYDEN XI: Moody's Hikes Rating on $23.6MM Class D Notes to Ba2
EMPORIA PREFERRED III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes

EQTY 2014-INNS: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
ESP FUNDING I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $38.2MM CDO Notes to 'B3'
FMC REAL 2005-1: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class C Debt
GALAXY XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
GEM LIGO III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class C Notes

GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Hikes Rating on $25MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
HICKORY TRUST: S&P Lowers Rating on Credit-Linked Notes to D(sf)
HILDENE CLO II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
ING IM CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. C Certs to B2

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
JP MORGAN 2011-C4: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2014-INN: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
KODIAK CDO I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'D'
KVK CLO 2014-2: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class E Notes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-3: Moody's Hikes Cl. S Certs' Rating to B1
LEHMAN BROTHERS 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class K Certs
LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
MAYPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to D

MISSOURI HIGHER: S&P Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Raises Rating on $4MM Cl. E Notes to Caa2
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-WF1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to B3
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB-'

MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
MT. WILSON II: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
NEUBERGER BERMAN XVII: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
NOVASTAR MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Ups Cl. A-2C Debt Rating to Caa1
OCEAN TRAILS I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes

OZLM VII: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating on $20.8MM Class E Notes
RACE POINT III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From BB
RALI 2005-QA1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M-1 Secs. to 'B2'
REGATTA IV: Moody's Assigns '(P)B3' Rating on $10MM Class F Notes
REPACS TRUST: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on 2 Securities

SCHOONER TRUST 2007-7: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. L Certs
SDART 2013-5: Principal Payment Error No Impact on Fitch Ratings
SENECA PARK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on $40.5MM Class E Notes
STONE TOWER CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
SYMPHONY CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

TIAA STRUCTURED: Moody's Confirms 'Caa3' Rating on 2 Note Classes
TRAPEZA CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to B3
TRAPEZA CDO X: Moody's Raises Rating on $31MM Class Notes to Caa3
TRIMARAN CLO VI: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
TRINITAS CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes

WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C27: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-C Certs to B1
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C28: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO Certs to B1
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class A-J Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C33: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 10 Certs
WG HORIZONS I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes

ZAIS CLO 1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
ZAIS INVESTMENT X: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes

* Fitch Cuts Rating on 177 Bonds in 106 RMBS Deals to 'Dsf'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 2001-2005 SF CDOs
* Moody's Takes Action on $760 Million of Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $520 Million of Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $402MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-2008

* Moody's Takes Action on $145MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $109MM RMBS Issued From 2003 to 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $73MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005 to 2006
* Moody's Lowers Rating on $43.5MM RMBS Issued 2002 to 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $33MM RMBS Issued 1996 to 2007

* S&P Lowers Rating on 254 Classes From 180 RMBS Transactions to D


                             *********


A VOCE CLO: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
eight classes of notes to be issued by A Voce CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$194,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$192,400,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$64,100,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$5,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$28,800,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$33,700,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$34,200,000 Class D Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$5,100,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2A Notes,
the Class A-2B Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the
Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

A Voce is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior
unsecured loans and first-lien last-out loans. The underlying
portfolio is expected to be approximately 80% ramped as of the
closing date.

Invesco Senior Secured Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain conditions,
the Manager may reinvest in additional collateral obligations the
principal proceeds that are received in respect of the sale of
credit risk assets and unscheduled principal payments.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: 0

Class A-2A Notes: -2

Class A-2B Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2A Notes: -4

Class A-2B Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -2


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Fitch to Rate Class E Certs 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables
Trust (AMCAR) 2014-2:

-- $197,000,000 class A-1 'F1+sf';
-- $391,110,000 class A-2-A/A-2-B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $264,240,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $91,830,000 class B 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113,980,000 class C 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $112,090,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,750,000 class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Stable Credit Quality: The 2014-2 pool displays relatively
consistent credit quality versus 2013 pools, with a 566 weighted
average (WA) Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) score, and a 241 WA internal
credit score. Extended term contracts continue to account for the
majority of the pool at 89.24%. New vehicles total 47.43% of the
pool, consistent with prior AMCAR transactions.

Consistent Credit Enhancement: The cash flow distribution is a
sequential-pay structure. Initial hard credit enhancement (CE) is
consistent with the prior nine transactions. The reserve is 2%
(non-declining), and initial overcollateralization (OC) is 5.25%,
growing to a target of 14.25% of the outstanding pool balance
(less the required reserve amount for the distributing period). Of
note, excess spread has decreased to one of the lowest levels seen
to date, at 8.59% per annum.

Stable Portfolio/Securitization Performance: Losses on GM
Financial's managed portfolio and securitizations declined to some
of its lowest levels, given the gradual economic recovery and
stronger used vehicle values.

Stable Corporate Health: Fitch rates GM and GM Financial Company
Inc. 'BB+' with a Positive Rating Outlook. GM has recorded
positive corporate financial results since 2010. Fitch assessed
the potential impact of GM/ GM-affiliated brand vehicle recalls in
relation to this transaction; Fitch expects this to have limited
to no impact on the 2014-2 pool.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: AFSI demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer, as
evidenced by historical portfolio delinquency and loss experience
and securitization performance. Fitch deems AFSI capable of
adequately servicing this series.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of GM Financial would not impair
the timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case and could result in potential rating actions on
the notes. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned
to each class of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-2
to increased losses over the life of the transaction. Fitch's
analysis found that each class of notes displays some sensitivity
to increased defaults and losses, with some classes showing
potential downgrades of up to two rating categories under Fitch's
moderate (1.5x base case loss) scenario. Some classes of notes
could experience downgrades of more than three rating categories
under Fitch's severe (2.5x base case loss) scenario.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-2: Moody's Rates Cl. E Notes 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-2
(AMCAR 2014-2). This is the second public subprime transaction of
the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-2

Class A-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2-A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of
AmeriCredit as servicer.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2014-
2 pool is 8.50% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating is 36.00%. The loss expectation was based on an
analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage performance as well as
performance of past securitizations, and current expectations for
future economic conditions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly
on the US job market and the market for used vehicles. Other
reasons for better-than-expected performance include changes to
servicing practices that enhance collections or refinancing
opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance depends greatly on the
U.S. job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


BAKER STREET 2005-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Baker Street Funding 2005-1 CLO:

  $20,000,000 Class B Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on July 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  $18,000,000 Class C Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
  previously on July 21, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

  $16,000,000 Class D Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance
  $14,729,583.72), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 21,
  2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

  $9,400,000 Class E Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
  previously on July 21, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $234,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Notes Due 2018 (current
  outstanding balance $148,221,555.13), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on July 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

  $35,000,000 Class A-2 Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding
  balance $22,169,890.74), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
  July 21, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Baker Street Funding 2005-1 CLO, issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2011.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios since August 2013. The Class A notes
have been paid down by approximately 33.4% or $85.31 million since
August 2013. Based on the trustee's May 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E notes are reported at 124.5%, 115.2%, 108.5% and 104.7%,
respectively, versus August 2013 levels of 120.1%, 112.7%, 107.3%
and 104.2%, respectively. Moody's notes the May 2014 trustee
reported OC ratios do not include $31.5 million paid to the Class
A notes on June 16, 2014. In addition, the credit quality of the
collateral portfolio has remained stable over the past twelve
months, although diversification has deteriorated.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2032)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3047)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014. The key model inputs
Moody's used in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, the weighted average recovery rate and
weighted average spread, are based on its published methodology
and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $241.9 million, defaulted
par of $14.4 million, a weighted average default probability of
13.5% (implying a WARF of 2540), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.64%, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted
average spread of 2.81%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


BALLYROCK CLO 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D, and E notes from Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Ballyrock
Investment Advisors LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with positive implications on Feb. 21, 2014.
Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A and B notes.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2013 and
all principal proceeds were used to pay down the notes.  The class
A notes have been reduced by approximately $172.98 million to
7.34% of their original balance since S&P's September 2013 rating
action.

The transaction currently holds no defaulted obligations and the
trustee reported no assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category in the April 2014 monthly report, compared with more than
$15.08 million in assets in August 2013.

Paydowns to the senior notes and overall improvements in the
transaction have increased the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to all the rated notes.  The trustee provided the
following O/C ratios in the April 7, 2014 monthly report:

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 194.80%, up from 151.50% in August
      2013.

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 156.50% up from 134.00% in August
      2013.

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 128.20% up from 118.70% in August
      2013.

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 117.80% up from 112.40% in August
      2013.

The rating on the class E notes is driven by the top obligor test.
The affirmations reflect sufficient credit support available at
the 'AAA (sf)' rating level for the class A and B notes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd.

                            Cash flow
        Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class   rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        30.06%   AAA (sf)
B       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        30.06%   AAA (sf)
C       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        21.43%   AAA (sf)
D       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  AA+ (sf)         8.28%   AA+ (sf)
E       BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)          2.73%   BBB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0
                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating      rating

A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
D      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
E      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A- (sf)      A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
D      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
E      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer: Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd.
Co-issuer: Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Inc.
Collateral manager: Ballyrock Investment Advisors LLC
Trustee: U.S. Bank N.A.
Transaction type: Cash flow CLO
CLO-Collateralized loan obligation.

RATINGS LIST

Ballyrock CLO 2006-2 Ltd.

                     Rating      Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A       05874GAA4    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B       05874GAD8    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C       05874GAE6    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D       05874GAF3    AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E       05874EAA9    BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos


BAMLL 2012-CLRN: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2A Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on eight classes of
BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-CLRN, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-CLRN.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. X-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-2A, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on the two interest only
(IO) classes were affirmed based on the stable rating of the
referenced classes.

Factors That Would Lead To An Upgrade Or Downgrade Of The Rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in defeasance in the pool or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in loan
concentration, an increase in expected losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of models used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 15, 2014 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance remains unchanged from securitization at $335
million. The transaction is secured by a floating rate mortgage
loan on a portfolio of extended-stay hotels totaling 47 properties
(including one leasehold property) located across 18 states. The
loan is interest only during the term and its initial maturity
date is in August 2014 plus three on-year extension options. The
sponsors of the loan are Clarion Lion Properties Fund Holdings,
LP, Lion value Fund Holdings, LLC and Henley Holding Company.
There is additional debt in the form of a mezzanine loan.

The portfolio is comprised 32 Residence Inns by Marriott and 15
Homewood Suites by Hilton. Hotels located in California account
for approximately 40% of the pool balance based on allocated loan
amount. No properties reported a Seismic Probable Maximum Loss
(PML) higher than 11%. All of the properties in the pool were
built between 1984 and 2000.

The portfolio's Net Cash Flow (NCF) for calendar year 2013 was
$60.8 million, up from $54.4 million achieved in calendar year
2012. Moody's Net Cash Flow is $49.5 million, and Moody's value is
$450 million. Moody's trust LTV ratio is 74%, down slightly from
75% at securitization. Moody's stressed DSCR for the trust is at
1.60X, up from 1.54X at securitization. The trust has not
experienced any losses or interest shortfalls since
securitization.


BANK OF AMERICA 2005-6: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirmed the ratings on 13 classes of Bank of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-6 as follows as follows:

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I classes A-SB, A-4, A-M and class D though class
G were affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index
(Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I classes A-J, B and C were upgraded primarily
due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last review,
resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's
expectation of additional increases in credit support resulting
from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are well
positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 3% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 70% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 18 months.

The ratings on P&I class H through class M were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, class XW, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.0% of the
current balance, which is the same as at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 6.2% at the last review.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26, compared to 29 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 23% to $2.12
billion from $2.74 billion at securitization. The deal contains
$178 million of non-pooled rake bonds tied to the KinderCare
Portfolio Loan, which brings the deal's total balance to $2.3
billion. The certificates are collateralized by 130 mortgage loans
ranging in size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top
ten loans constituting 48% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
19% of the pool, have structured credit assessments. Six loans,
constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $61 million (for an
average loss severity of 45%). Six loans, constituting 5% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the One Old County Road Loan ($46 million -- 2.1%
of the pool), which is secured by a 320,000 square foot (SF)
office property in Long Island, New York. The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2010 due to Imminent Default. The
property was 91% leased as of April 2014, similar to last review.
The special servicer is proceeding with foreclosure.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by office and
industrial properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $49 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (48% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $11 million (a 26% expected loss based on a
54% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 88%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91%, the same as at last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased, specially serviced and troubled.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
12% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.18X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 277
Park Avenue Loan ($260 million -- 12.2%), which represents a pari-
passu interest in a $500 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 1.8 million SF 50-story Class A office tower located
in Midtown Manhattan. The property is also encumbered by $200
million of mezzanine debt. The property was 97% leased as of
October 1, 2013, which is the same as at Moody's last review. JP
Morgan Chase Bank leases 75% of the net rentable area (NRA)
through March 2021. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.51X, respectively.

The second loan with a structured credit assessment is the
KinderCare Portfolio Loan ($133 million -- 6.3% of the pool),
which represents a participation interest in the senior component
of $576 million mortgage loan. The property's $178 million
subordinate B-note is collateral for six non-pooled raked classes
in this deal. There is also a $50 million of mezzanine loan. The
loan was originally secured by a portfolio of 713 properties
located throughout 37 states. The portfolio is master-leased to
Knowledge Universe Education LLC (f.k.a. Knowledge Learning
Corporation; Moody's corporate family rating B3, stable outlook).
Moody's current structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
a3 (sca.pd) and 2.04X, respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14.2% of the
pool. The largest loan is the Burnett Plaza Loan ($103 million --
4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 40-story Class A office
property located in downtown Fort Worth, Texas. The property was
83% leased as March 2014 compared to 88% at Moody's last review.
The property's third largest tenant is vacating at its May 31,
2014 lease expiration. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
111% and 0.92X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.97X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the InTown Suites Loan ($101 million --
4.8% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 40 InTown
Suites extended-stay hotels located in 33 cities across 16 states.
The properties were constructed between 1996 and 2001. An increase
in the portfolio's average weekly rate led to an increase in
performance. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and
2.22X, respectively, compared to 57% and 1.88X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Omni Hotel -- San Diego Loan ($98
million -- 4.6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 511-room
full-service hotel located in downtown San Diego, California. The
hotel is adjacent to the San Diego Padres' baseball stadium and is
located near the San Diego convention center. The property's
revenue per available room decreased slightly to $151 in 2013 from
$152 in 2012, which led to a minor decline in property
performance. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and
1.27X, respectively compared to 88% and 1.29X at last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. P Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
upgraded the ratings of six classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-PWR6 as follows:

Cl. A-6, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades to classes B through G were primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff
of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance. The pool has paid down by 22% since Moody's last
review. Approximately 60% of the pool's loans with debt yields
exceeding 10.0%, are scheduled to mature within the next six
months.

The affirmations to the P&I classes A-6, A-J, H through L were
based on the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The affirmation to the ratings on P&I classes M through P are due
to the ratings being consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The affirmation to the rating on the IO class X-1 was based on the
credit performance of it's referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.5% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 24 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the June 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to $573.7
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 47% of
the pool. Thirteen loans, representing 24% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities. Defeasance
at last review represented 16% of the pool. The pool contains one
loan with a structured credit assessment, representing 2% of the
pool.

Twenty loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
resulting in an aggregate $11.2 million loss (52% loss severity on
average). Three loans, representing 1.4% of the pool, are in
special servicing. These loans are secured by office, industrial
and retail properties. Moody's estimates an $800,000 loss for two
of the specially serviced loans (27% loss severity).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly-
performing loans representing 2.5% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $2.1 million loss (30% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 91%, respectively, of the
performing pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 76%, the same as at last review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.54X, respectively, compared to
1.55X and 1.46X, respectively, at last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Berry Plastics
Portfolio Loan ($14.1 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of four industrial buildings containing a
total of 862,860 square feet (SF). The properties are located in
New York (3) and Arizona. The properties are 100% net leased to
Berry Plastics through November 2023. The loan is fully
amortizing. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR
are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.98X, respectively, compared to a2 (sca.pd)
and 1.85X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Highland Village Loan
($75.4 million -- 13.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
331,400 SF retail center located in Houston, Texas. The property
was 94% leased as of January 2014 compared to 100% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 55% and 1.78X, respectively,
compared to 65% and 1.50X at last review.

The second largest loan is Eton Collection Loan ($47.9 million --
8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 286,600 SF retail center
located in Woodmere, Ohio. The property was 92% leased as of
December 2013, compared to 94% at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.85X, respectively, compared to 100%
and 0.98X at last review.

The third largest loan is BAMC Building Loan ($25.8 million --
4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 199,230 SF office
building located in San Antonio, Texas. The property is 100%
leased to GSA tenants through 2021. Performance is stable and the
loan is benefiting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 74% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.32X at
last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-TOP14: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. N Certs to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-TOP14 as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. O, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the nine P&I classes were upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as overall improved pool
performance. The pool has paid down by 55% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.6% of the
current balance compared to 1.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.5% of the
original pooled balance compared to 0.6% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 13 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the June 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $41.2
million from $894.5 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 18 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
85% of the pool.

Five loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.8 million. Currently there are no
loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 78% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 59% compared to
71% at Moody's last review. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.49X and 2.26X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.81X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 47% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Johnston Road Plaza ($8.9 million -- 21.6% of the
pool), which is secured by a 79,500 square foot (SF) Food Lion
grocery store anchored shopping center located in Charlotte, North
Carolina. The property was 96% leased as of April 2014 compared to
95% in December 2013. The loan is benefitting from amortization
and matures in April 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83%
and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.13X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Laguna Promenade Loan ($6.7 million
-- 16.2% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property in
Elk Grove, California. The property was 98% leased as of May 2014
compared to 100% in June 2013 and is shadow anchored by Nugget
Market. The largest collateral tenant is Rite Aid which leases
approximately 37% of the net rentable area through January 2024.
The loan is benefitting from amortization and matures in February
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.42X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the The Shops @ Thoroughbred Square VI
Loan ($3.85 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
35,000 SF unanchored retail property in Franklin, Tennessee. The
property was 100% leased as of December 2013 compared to 83% in
December 2012. As a result of the increased occupancy, property
performance improved in 2013. The loan has amortized over 35%
since securitization and fully amortizes over its term. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.44X, respectively.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP18: Moody's Hikes Cl. F Certs' Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and upgraded the ratings on six classes in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-TOP18 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
A2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on classes A-4 and A-4FL were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes A-J, B, C, D, E and F were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 9% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 88% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10% are scheduled to mature
within the next 24 months.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 3.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $683 million
from $1.12 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
39% of the pool. Ten loans, constituting 19% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Thirty-one loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24 million (for an average loss
severity of 12%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans, constituting 2.5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.7 million (a 15.5% expected loss based on
a 50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 20% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 80%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 76.8%, compared to 76.4%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.70X and 1.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.72X and 1.43X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 95-97 Horatio Street Loan ($85 million --
12.4% of the pool), which is secured by a multifamily property
located in the West Village neighborhood of Manhattan. The
property was 96% leased as of May 2014, compared to 89% at last
review. Performance has increased due to an increases in base
rents and increases in other income. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 81% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.03X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Waikele Center Loan ($63 million --
9% of the pool), which is secured by a community shopping center
located outside of Honolulu. The center is anchored by Lowe's and
Kmart and was 93% leased as of September 2013, compared to 95% in
March 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82.7% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 82.8% and 1.11X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 110-114 Horatio Street Loan ($31
million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a multifamily
property located in the West Village neighborhood of Manhattan.
Occupancy at yearend 2013 was 93%, compared to 97% at prior
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 82.5% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 85.7% and 1.07X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Securities to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on two
classes and affirmed the ratings on 13 classes in Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2006-TOP22 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A-1A through D were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes E through J and M were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the P&I classes L and K were downgraded due to
higher anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans than Moody's had previously estimated and realized losses.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% of the
current balance compared to 3.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.8% of the
original pooled balance compared to 3.2% at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 46 compared to 52 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the June 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $1.14
billion from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 179 mortgage loans. Seven loans, constituting 3%
of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit assessments.
Eight loans, constituting 5% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by US government securities.

Fifty-one loans, constituting 20% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $20.0 million (for an average loss
severity of 39%). Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The loans are secured by a mix of
property type. Moody's estimates an aggregate $11.4 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans, constituting 7% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $16.1 million (a 20% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full year 2013 operating results for 83% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 79% compared to 81% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes defeased,
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.71X and 1.4X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 1.35X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the Oak
Ridge Estates Loan ($11.0 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is
secured by a manufactured housing community in Monroe, Michigan.
The property was 94% leased as of December 2013 compared to 95% at
last review. Performance has been stable. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a3 (sca.pd) and 1.57X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The remaining six loans with a structured credit assessment ($21.4
million --1.9% of the pool) are secured by six multifamily co-op
buildings located in the New York City area. Performance has
remained stable. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and >4.0X, respectively, the same as at last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Chesterbrook/Glenhardie Portfolio ($120.0
million -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by 17 office
properties located in suburban Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As of
December 2013 the properties were 80% leased compared to 75% at
last review. The portfolio has experienced a decline in
performance due to lower revenues. The loan no longer has a
structured credit assessment. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
93% and 1.13X.

The second largest conduit loan is the Olympic Plaza Loan ($34.9
million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 244,448 square
foot (SF) Class B office building located in Los Angeles,
California. The property was 95% leased as of February 2014
compared to 90% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
78% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 86% and 1.13X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 60 Thompson Street Loan
($27.5 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 98-key
hotel located in New York City's Soho neighborhood. Performance
has declined due to lower revenues. As of December 2013 RevPar and
occupancy were $332.12 and 86%, respectively, compared to $347.95
and 93% a year before. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and
1.22X, respectively, compared to 88% and 1.42X at last review.


BENEFIT STREET IV: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Benefit
Street Partners CLO IV Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO IV LLC's
$460.75 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by a revolving pool
consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to pay timely interest and
      ultimate principal on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2228%-12.8177%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which, during the reinvestment period, will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of excess interest proceeds
      that are available before curing an effective date rating
      agency confirmation failure or paying subordinated,
      deferred, and incentive management fees; uncapped
      administrative expenses; hedge payments; and subordinated
      note payments as principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets or to pay down the notes according to the
      note payment sequence, at the collateral manager's option.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Benefit Street Partners CLO IV Ltd./Benefit Street Partners CLO IV
LLC

Class                Rating           Amount (mil. $)
A-1A                 AAA (sf)                  275.00
A-1B                 AAA (sf)                   30.00
A-2A                 AA (sf)                    40.00
A-2B                 AA (sf)                    25.00
B (deferrable)       A (sf)                     41.00
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                   27.00
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)                    22.75
Subordinated notes   NR                         51.52

NR-Not rated.


BLADE ENGINE: S&P Puts Class B Notes' BB+ Rating on Watch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, and B notes from Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.'s
series 2006-1 on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
transaction is collateralized primarily by the lease revenue and
sales proceeds from a commercial aircraft engine portfolio.

S&P placed these ratings on CreditWatch because 10 of the
remaining 46 engines in the portfolio have not been leased out for
more than six months.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after completing a
comprehensive review of the transaction.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.
Series 2006-1

              Rating                   Rating
Class         To                       From
A-1           A- (sf)/Watch Neg        A- (sf)
A-2           A- (sf)/Watch Neg        A- (sf)
B             BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg       BB+ (sf)


BRIDGEPORT CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, and B notes from Bridgeport CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Deerfield Capital Management LLC/CIFC Asset Management LLC.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the C and D notes from
the same transaction.  In addition, S&P removed the ratings on the
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from CreditWatch, where it placed them
with positive implications on Feb. 21, 2014.

Bridgeport CLO Ltd. ended its reinvestment period in July 2013.
The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A-1 notes due to
the delevering of the transaction.  Since S&P's December 2012
review, the class A-1 notes have paid down about $118 million
total, and they are currently at 65.64% of their original balance.
As a result, the credit enhancement available to support the notes
has improved since our December 2012 rating actions.

According to the April 14, 2014, trustee report, all the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios improved since S&P's December
2012 review as a result of the paydowns and increased credit
enhancement:

   -- The class A-2 O/C ratio is 124.63%, up from 120.69% in the
      November 2012 trustee report, which S&P used for its
      December 2012 rating actions;

   -- The class B O/C ratio is 116.82%, up from 114.35% in
      November 2012;

   -- The class C O/C ratio is 109.05%, up from 107.90% in
      November 2012; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio is 105.06%, up from 104.53% in
      November 2012.

According to the April 14, 2014, trustee report, the transaction
held $0.735 million in defaulted assets.  This number is lower
than the $5.03 million noted in the November 9, 2012, trustee
report, which S&P used for its review in December 2012.

The upgrades are primarily due to the increase in the credit
support.  The affirmations on class C and D notes reflect the
availability of adequate credit support at the current rating
level.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Bridgeport CLO Ltd.
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)      2.16%     AAA (sf)
A-2    AA (sf) /Watch Pos   AA+ (sf)      7.55%     AA+ (sf)
B      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA- (sf)      0.64%     A+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BBB- (sf)     2.35%     BBB- (sf)
D      BB (sf)              BB+ (sf)      0.01%     BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      AA- (sf)   A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB (sf)      BB (sf)     BB (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B      AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)     BB (sf)       BBB- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf       B- (sf)       BB (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Bridgeport CLO Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1           AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B             A+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Bridgeport CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
D             BB (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Bridgeport CLO Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Bridgeport CLO Corp.
Collateral manager: Deerfield Capital Management LLC/CIFC Asset
Management LLC
Trustee:            Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


BUSINESS LOAN 2006-1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on the class A notes from Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust
2006-1, an asset-backed securities transaction collateralized
primarily by a pool of unguaranteed Small Business Association
Section 7(a) loans.  The majority of the loans are secured by
first-lien, multipurpose commercial real estate.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class A notes to reflect its view
that the tranche is able to withstand its stress tests for the
current rating level and the constraints from applying S&P's
largest obligor default test.

Subordination and excess spread provide credit support to the
class A notes; this transaction has no reserve account.  Since
S&P's previous rating action in June 2011, the transaction has
paid down to approximately 24.7% of its original outstanding
balance.  According to the servicer report for the May 2014
payment date, the pool's securitized loan balance was $16.06
million, the class A note balance was $16.57 million, and the
loans more than 60-days delinquent represented about 8.9% of the
pool.

The rating on the class A notes is constrained at the 'CCC-' level
by the largest obligor default test, a supplemental test S&P
adopted in its 2014 U.S. small business loan securitization
criteria update.  There were 112 loans left in the pool; the
largest five obligors composed 12.4% of the pool and the largest
10 obligors composed 22.0% of the pool.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the rating
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support it and S&P will take further
rating action as it deems necessary.


C-BASS CBO VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $27MM Cl. D Notes to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by C-Bass CBO VII, Ltd.:

U.S. $27,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance of
$10,430,444.40), Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2014
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

C-Bass CBO VII, Ltd., issued in July 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and ABS
originated in 2003.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action taken is due primarily to the full pay down of
the Class C Notes, deleveraging of the Class D Notes, and an
increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios since
December 2013. The Class D Notes have paid down by approximately
28.44%, or $4.14 million, since December 2013. Based on the
trustee's May 2014 report, the over-collateralization ratio of the
Class D Notes is 198.99%, versus 178.84% in December 2013. Moody's
notes that the May 2014 reported ratio does not reflect the latest
payments made to Class C Notes and Class D Notes on May 2014.

Notwithstanding benefits of deleveraging, Moody's notes that the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since
December 2013. According to the trustee, the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) has increased by 872 points to 4933 as of the
May 2014 report compared to 4061 reported in December 2013.

The deal also benefits from the updates to Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps Moody's apply to deals
experiencing event of default. In taking the foregoing actions,
Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
rating on the issuer's Class D notes announced on March 6, 2014.
At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the rating on review
for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially if they jump to default.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash
flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's B rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class D: +1

Moody's B rated assets notched down by 2 rating notches:

Class D: -1


CD 2006-CD3: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of twelve
classes of CD 2006-CD3 Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-CD3 as follows:

Cl. A-1S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XS, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the four investment-grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the seven below investment-grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.2% of the
current balance, compared to 8.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.3% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 33, compared to 35 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to $2.5 billion
from $3.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 144 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 46%
of the pool. Four loans, constituting 1% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Forty-five loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $263.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%). Thirteen loans, constituting 8% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the 660 South Figueroa Tower Loan ($60.1 million -- 2.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 279,000 square foot (SF)
office property located in Los Angeles, California. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in November 2009 and became REO
in January 2013. As of December 2013, the property was 45% leased.
A July 2013 appraisal valued the property at $68.6 million.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, retail, hotel and multifamily property types. Moody's
estimates an aggregate $53.4 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (27% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for thirteen poorly
performing loans, constituting 7% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $30.6 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for
94% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 107%,
compared to 103% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.4% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.32X and 1.06X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the ShopKo Portfolio Loan ($232.3 million -- 9.4%
of the pool) which represents a 47.5% pari-passu interest in a
$489.1 million first mortgage loan secured by 112 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted ShopKo retail stores. Ranging
between 13,000 SF to 535,000 SF, the stores are located in 12
states and total 10.9 million SF. The stores are all operated
under 15-year triple net leases. One of the properties, which is
located in Green Bay, Wisconsin, serves as Shop Ko's headquarters.

The second largest loan is the InterContinental Boston Hotel Loan
($175.0 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 424-
room, luxury hotel located in Boston's Financial District. The
hotel was constructed in 2006 and benefits from a strong brand
affiliation with the Intercontinental Hotel Group (IHG), which
signed a 99-year triple net lease and guaranteed rental payments
for the first 25 years. The loan is interest-only throughout its
15-year term. Additionally, there is mezzanine debt of $45
million. The sponsor is the Extell Development Company. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 147% and 0.75X, the same as at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Fair Lakes Office Portfolio Loan
($142.5 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which represents a 55% pari-
passu interest in a $259.0 million first mortgage loan secured by
a 1.25 million SF office park located in Fairfax, Virginia.
Located 15 miles west of Washington D.C., the complex consists of
nine buildings ranging in size from 75,000 SF to 275,000 SF. As of
March 2014, the complex was 79% leased, compared to 89% at Moody's
prior review. The largest tenants are SRA International (21% of
the GLA; lease expiration in December 2015) and General Dynamics
(14% of the GLA; lease expiration in February 2019.) Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 142% and 0.71X, respectively, compared to
138% and 0.72X at last review.


CENT CLO 21: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Cent CLO 21 Ltd./Cent CLO 21 Corp.'s $567.00 million
fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 13,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2200%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest reinvestment
      overcollateralization test, a failure of which will lead to
      the reclassification of up to 50% of the excess interest
      proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, subordinated hedge
      termination payments, collateral manager subordinated and
      incentive fees, and subordinated note payments during the
      reinvestment period only and at the collateral manager's
      option, as principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets or to pay principal on the notes according
      to the note payment sequence.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS LIST

Cent CLO 21 Ltd./Cent CLO 21 Corp.

Class                Rating     Amount (mil. $)
A-1A                 AAA (sf)            137.00
A-1B                 AAA (sf)            250.00
A-2A                 AA (sf)              62.00
A-2B                 AA (sf)              10.00
B                    A (sf)               39.00
C                    BBB (sf)             33.00
D                    BB (sf)              24.00
E                    B (sf)               12.00
Subordinated notes   NR                   54.48

NR-Not rated.


CGBAM COMMERCIAL 2014-HD: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CGBAM
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-HD's $257.5 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-HD.

The certificate issuance is one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $257.5 million, with three one-year
extension options, secured by a cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted first-priority lien mortgage on the borrowers' fee
simple and leasehold interests, as applicable, in the 866-room
Hudson and the 194-room Delano hotels.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CGBAM Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-HD

Class       Rating(i)                Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)                 95,423,000
X-CP        A- (sf)             163,781,000(ii)
B           AA- (sf)                 39,211,000
C           A- (sf)                  29,147,000
D           BBB- (sf)                38,517,000
E           BB- (sf)                 55,202,000
X-NCP       A- (sf)        163,781,000(ii)(iii)

  (i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
      institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the
      Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.
(iii) Non-offered certificates.  The notional amount of the class
      X-CP and X-NCP certificates will be reduced by the aggregate
      amount of principal distributions and realized losses
      allocated to the class A, B, and C certificates.
NR - Not rated.
N/A - Not applicable.


CHASE COMMERCIAL 1998-1: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on X Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed four classes in Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-
1 as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. I, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on P&I Class G was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 10% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on P&I Class F was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I Classes H and I were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.4% of
the current balance compared to 13.3% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the
original pooled balance compared to 2.2% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000 and "Commercial Real Estate Finance:
Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Financings"
published in November 2011.

Description of Models Used

Moody's used the excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.7 in this
analysis. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in
its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.12-2, to generate a portfolio
loss distribution for the CTL component which is used to assess
the credit quality of this component.

Deal Performance

As of the May 19, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $32 million
from $818 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 25% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased
loans, loans with structured credit assessments or specially
serviced loans.

Two loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.5 million (77% loss severity on
average). There are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full-year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 67% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 55% compared to
58% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 2.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 2.78X,
respectively, compared to 1.18X and 2.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the Royal Palm Apartments Loan ($2.7
million -- 8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 288-unit
apartment complex in Orlando, Florida. The property was 94% leased
as of March 2014, slightly higher than 93% at last review. The
loan is fully amortizing and does not mature until July 2022. The
loan has amortized 42% since securitization and the loan balance
represents $9,527 per unit. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 28%
and 3.70X, respectively, compared to 35% and 2.90X at the last
review.

The other two conduit loans are cross-collateralized and cross
defaulted. The collateral consists of two retail properties
containing 78,000 squared feet (SF) that are located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Both loans are fully amortizing and mature in March 2018.
The loans' aggregate balance is $1.6 million or 4.9% of the pool.
Both loans are on the servicer's watchlist due to occupancy
concerns. Vista Plaza is 84% leased as of March 2014, but has a
physical occupancy of only 20%. The grocer anchor space is leased
through June 2017, but the space has been dark since the end of
2008. The other retail property is only 52% leased as of March
2014, the same as at last review. Blockbuster had leased the
remaining 48% of the collateral, but Blockbuster's lease expired
in August 2012. Although both collateral properties struggle with
low occupancy, the loans have benefitted from 69% of amortization
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
1.18X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.15X at last review.

The CTL component consists of seven loans, totaling 87% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to three tenants. The largest
exposure is Brinker International, Inc. ($18.4 million -- 57.3% of
the pool; senior unsecured rating: Ba2 -- stable outlook). The
bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool
is 2,505 compared to 2,544 at the last review. WARF is a measure
of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability.


CITIGROUP 2006-Fl2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'CCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one distressed pooled class of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2006-FL2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade is the result of more certainty of losses on the
Radisson Ambassador Plaza Hotel & Casino as the borrower has not
made any progress towards a payoff and the forbearance agreement
terminated in July 2013.  Performance has also continued to
decline and the borrower indicated they can no longer make debt
service payments.  An updated appraisal with a lower value
indicates lower recoveries.

Since Fitch's last rating action, the pool has paid down by
approximately $13.7 million due primarily to the payoff of the
Doubletree Hospitality & Centre Plaza Office.

The transaction is collateralized by one loan, the specially-
serviced Radisson Ambassador Plaza Hotel & Casino loan, a 233-
room, full-service hotel and approximately 15,000 square foot (sf)
casino located in the Condado section of San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The loan transferred to special servicing in June 2011 for
imminent maturity default.  The borrower had exercised its third
and final extension option, which expired on July 9, 2011. In
January 2012, a forbearance agreement was executed, which
terminated in July 2013 with no payoff from the borrower.  For the
year ending 2013 the NOI has decreased, resulting in a negative
cash flow with an occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR of 66.6%, $124, and
$83 respectively.  Fitch continues to model significant losses to
the senior pooled loan based on a Fitch adjustment to the most
recent appraisal.  The nonpooled RAM-1 and RAM-2 classes
associated with the loan continue to be modeled with no recoveries
in the base case.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating on class J is revised to Negative as downgrades are
possible if a prolonged workout for the Radisson Ambassador Plaza
Hotel & Casino results in an increased expected loss.  Additional
downgrades to the distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades the following class as indicated:

   -- $22.4 million class K to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 50%

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:
   -- $3.7 million class J at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;
   -- $23.9 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $2 million class RAM-1 at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $2.4 million class RAM-2 at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The following classes originally rated by Fitch have paid in full:
A-1, A-2, X-1, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, CAN-1, CAN-2, CAN-3, CAC-1,
CAC-2, CAC-3, CNP-1, CNP-2, CNP-3, DSG-1, HFL, HGI-1, HGI-2, HMP-
1, HMP-2, HMP-3, MVP, WBD-1, and WBD-2.  In addition, Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only classes X-2
and X-3.

Fitch did not rate the non-pooled classes DHC-1, DHC-2, DHC-3,
DSG-2, PHH-1, PHH-2, SRL, and WPP.


COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 7 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 20 classes
and upgraded the ratings on four classes in COMM 2007-C9 Mortgage
Trust as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AM, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AM-FL, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AJ-FL, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to B2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XP, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. XS, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on classes A-1A, A-4, A-AB, AM, and AM-FL were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on classes D through Q were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
their referenced classes.

The ratings on classes A-J, AJ-FL, B and C were upgraded based on
increased credit support resulting from paydowns and amortization
as well as overall improved performance of the deal.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.9% of the
current balance compared to 8.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 8.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 23 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the June 10, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to $2.4 billion
from $2.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 83 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 61% of
the pool.

Nineteen loans, constituting 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $45.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 21%). Three loans, constituting 1.8% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $25
million loss for the specially serviced loans (56% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans, constituting 10% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $36.6 million (a 15% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 94% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 71% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 109%, compared
to 111% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.5% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 0.92X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 60 Wall Street Loan ($285 million -- 11.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a Class A office building which
serves as the North American headquarters for Deutsche Bank.
Deutsche Bank leases 100% of the property until June 2020. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 112% and 0.79X, respectively, same as
the last review.

The second largest loan is the DDR Portfolio Loan ($221 million --
9% of the pool), which is secured by 52 anchored retail properties
located across ten states. Approximately 75% of the properties are
grocery-anchored. The weighted-average occupancy as of year-end
2013 was 88%, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 122% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 118% and 0.78X
at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Waterview Loan ($210 million -- 8.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 24-story Class A office
building located in Rosslyn Virginia. It is one of two towers
which comprise the Waterview Complex. The largest tenant at 99%,
The Corporate Executive Board, is a global provider of member-
based advisory services, talent measurement and management
solutions. Occupancy was 99% at yearend 2013, unchanged from
Moody's prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and
0.97X, respectively, compared to 94% and 0.98X at the last review.


COMM 2013-THL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of COMM 2013-THL Mortgage
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2013-
THL.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this
press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on stable performance of the underlying
collateral pool since issuance.  As of first quarter 2014, the 152
hotel portfolio's trailing 12 month (TTM) occupancy and revenue
per available room (RevPAR) was 69.7% and $71.71, respectively,
compared with first quarter 2013 of 68.9% and $69.19,
respectively.  The issuer's underwritten RevPAR was $71.98.
Sixty-one properties experienced a decline in TTM occupancy, while
53 properties had a decline in TTM RevPAR.

The portfolio exhibits significant geographic diversity across
secondary markets in 32 states.  The largest state exposure is
California with 23 hotels.  The servicer reported four hotels have
changed flags and 13 have changed management companies since
issuance.  The portfolio is comprised of nine different franchises
that are split up among 21 different flags.  The majority of the
portfolio is limited service or extended stay properties, with the
three largest flags consisting of Fairfield Inn, Residence Inn and
Courtyard.

The transaction is sponsored by Whitehall Street Global Real
Estate Limited Partnership 2005 and Whitehall Street Global
Employee Fund 2005 (Whitehall).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  No rating
actions are expected unless there are material changes to the
portfolio occupancy and cash flow.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

   -- $77.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $280.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-CP at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-only class X-EXT at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $108.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $79 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $78.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;
   -- $122.5 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $29 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.


COMM 2014-CCRE18: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. E Certificates 'BB-sf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2014-CCRE18 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $47,076,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $139,682,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,600,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,350,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $195,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $241,730,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $758,464,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,026,000b class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58,535,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165,641,000b class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,080,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $158,169,000a,c class X-B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,554,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26,153,000c class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.
(b) Class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
     PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged
     for class A-M, B, and C certificates.
(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of June 16, 2014. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$79,707,247 interest-only class X-C certificates the $23,664,000c
class F or $29,890,247class G certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in
the trust, primary assets of which are 49 loans secured by 60
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $996 million, as of the cutoff date. The loans were
contributed to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate Lending,
L.P., German American Capital Corporation, Ladder Capital Finance
LLC, and Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 71.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 82.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 82.6% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentrated Pool: The 10 largest loans represent 57.5% of the
total pool balance, which is higher than the average 2013 top 10
concentration of 54.5%.

High Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.14x and 110.5%,
respectively, are worse than the 1st quarter 2014 averages of
1.18x and 104.7%, respectively.

Diverse Property Type Mix: The pool has a good mix of property
types, with retail as the largest property type at 23.7%, followed
by multifamily at 18.3%, mixed-use at 18.2%, office at 12.6% and
hotel at 12.2%. There are 13 retail properties. None of the retail
properties are malls. The retail properties consist of a mix of
anchored and unanchored shopping centers.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 11.7%
of the initial pool balance prior to maturity. Three loans
(16.4%), including the largest loan, are full-term interest only,
and 20 loans (47.3%) are partial interest only. Fitch rated
transactions in the 1st quarter of 2014 had an average full-term
interest only percentage of 15.8% and a partial interest only
percentage of 37.6%. This transaction has a lower than average
amount of full-term interest only but a higher amount of partial
interest only.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.5% below
the most recent NOI (for properties that a recent NOI was
provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing during this
period). Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF
could result in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted
loans, and could result in potential rating actions on the
certificates. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to COMM 2014-CCRE18 certificates and found that the
transaction displays slightly above average sensitivity to further
declines in NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20%
from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates
to 'A-sf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result. The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities on pages 75 - 76.

The master servicer will be KeyBank National Association, rated
'CMS1' by Fitch. The special servicer will be Rialto Capital
Advisors, LLC, rated 'CSS2-'.


COMM 2014-KYO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to COMM 2014-KYO Mortgage Trust's $1.4 billion commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-KYO.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate
commercial mortgage loan totaling $1.4 billion, with three one-
year extension options, secured by the fee and/or leasehold
interests in five full-service hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 17,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

COMM 2014-KYO Mortgage Trust

Class       Rating           Amount
                           (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)        550.944
X-CP        AAA (sf)     325.770(i)
X-EXT       AAA (sf)     325.770(i)
B           AA- (sf)        191.558
C           A- (sf)         142.397
D           BBB (sf)         89.846
E           BBB- (sf)        98.322
F           BB- (sf)        286.394
G           B+ (sf)          40.539

(i) Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP and
     X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to a
     portion of the class A certificates.


COVENANT CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Covenant Credit Partners CLO I Ltd./Covenant Credit
Partners CLO I LLC 's $466.00 million floating-rate notes.  The
note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 13,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Peaks CLO 1 Ltd./Peaks CLO 1 LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  3.50
A                      AAA (sf)                305.00
B                      AA (sf)                  65.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   40.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 26.00
E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                 26.50
Subordinated notes     NR                       61.50

NR-Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Action on $71MM of Alt-A RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of three
tranches and upgraded the rating of one tranche in three
transactions issued by Credit Suisse First Boston. The tranches
are backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-3

Cl. 8-M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8

Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-6

Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The rating downgrades are due to the weak performance of the
underlying collateral. The upgrade is due to stable pool
performance.

The rating actions also reflect updates and corrections to the
cash-flow models used by Moody's in rating these transactions. The
modeling changes pertain to the calculation of the senior
percentage post subordination depletion, the loss allocation to
the bonds, and the interest payment to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 2008-RS1: Moody's Cuts 3-A-1 Certs Rating to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
in the resecuritization transaction Deutsche Mortgage Securities,
Inc. REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2008-RS1. The Class II-2A-1
backing the resecuritized tranches was issued by Bear Stearns Alt-
A Trust 2006-4 and is backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2006.

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. REMIC Trust
        Certificates, Series 2008-RS1

  Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating downgrade is due to erosion of the credit enhancement
available to the bond. The actions also reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying RMBS bonds.

The methodologies used in this rating were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in April 2014 from 7.5%
in April 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


DRYDEN XI: Moody's Hikes Rating on $23.6MM Class D Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006:

$47,200,000 Class B Third Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on August 23, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

$24,800,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on August 23, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$12,700,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Upgraded to Baa2
(sf); previously on August 23, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$23,600,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Deferrable
Fixed Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance
of $20,143,416), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 23,
2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$325,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
$192,931,972.83), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 23, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$225,000,000 Class A-2A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020 (current outstanding balance of
$123,409,209.87), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 23, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$25,000,000 Class A-2B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
August 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$25,300,000 Class A-3 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due April 12, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
August 23, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006, issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action date in
August 2013. The Class A-1 and A-2A notes have been paid down by
approximately 21.5% or $69.8 million and 23.9% or $53.7 million,
respectively, since the last rating action date. Based on the
trustee's May 2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios
for the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are reported
at 138.81%, 122.98%, 112.76% and 107.94%, respectively, versus
August 2013 levels of 129.16%, 117.81%, 110.13% and 106.40%,
respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1978)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +2

Class C-1: +2

Class C-2: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2968)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $503.4 million, defaulted
par of $7.3 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.26% (implying a WARF of 2473), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.37%, a diversity score of 68 and a weighted
average spread of 3.03%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDO's". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


EMPORIA PREFERRED III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes from Emporia Preferred Funding III
Ltd., a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes from this transaction.  S&P removed the
class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes from CreditWatch, where it had
placed them with positive implications on Feb. 21, 2014.

The transaction is currently in its amortization phase and has
commenced the paydown of the notes.  The upgrades largely reflect
aggregated paydowns of $125.85 million to the class A-1, A-2, and
A-3 notes since our March 2012 rating actions.  Because of this,
the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios increased for each class of
notes since February 2012:

   -- The A/B O/C increased to 141.72%, up from 131.46%,
   -- The class C O/C ratio is 120.97%, up from 116.95%,
   -- The class D O/C ratio is 111.87%, up from 110.19%, and
   -- The class E O/C ratio is 104.78%, up from 104.74%.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    4.39%        AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.39%        AAA (sf)
A-3    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.39%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    4.02%        AA+ (sf)
C      A- (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)      0.06%        A- (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)            BB+ (sf)    9.38%        BBB- (sf)
E      B+ (sf)              B (sf)      1.20%        B+ (sf)

(i)The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario           Within industry (%)     Between industries (%)
Below base case                   15.0                        5.0
Base case                         20.0                        7.5
Above base case                   25.0                       10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)     BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     A+ (sf)     A- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)   BBB- (sf)
E      B (sf)     CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)      B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)       BBB- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     A- (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     B (sf)        BB (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E      B (sf)       CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)     B+ (sf)

RATING ACTIONS

Emporia Preferred Funding III Ltd.

             Rating     Rating
Class        To         From

A-1          AAA(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
A-2          AAA(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
A-3          AAA(sf)    AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
B            AA+(sf)    AA(sf)/Watch Pos
C            A-(sf)     A-(sf)/Watch Pos
D            BBB-(sf)   BBB-(sf)
E            B+(sf)     B+(sf)


EQTY 2014-INNS: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to EQTY 2014-INNS Mortgage Trust's $865 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-INNS.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate
commercial mortgage loan totaling $865.0 million, with three one-
year extension options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 104 limited-service and extended-stay hotels and two full-
service hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 2,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has
a beginning and ending loan-to-value ratio of 95.4%, based on
Standard & Poor's value.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

EQTY 2014-INNS Mortgage Trust

Class        Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A            AAA (sf)              271,878,000
X-CP         B- (sf)           425,701,000(ii)
X-EXT        B- (sf)           425,701,000(ii)
B            AA- (sf)              101,421,000
C            A- (sf)                66,000,000
D            BBB- (sf)             120,769,000
E            BB- (sf)              167,658,000
F            B- (sf)               137,274,000

(i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
     institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities
     Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
     X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
     class D, E, and F certificates.


ESP FUNDING I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $38.2MM CDO Notes to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by ESP Funding I, Ltd.:

  $225,000,000 Advance Swap between IXIS Financial Products and
  ESP Funding I, Ltd. (undrawn notional amount of
  $38,236,270.70), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 6,
  2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

ESP Funding I, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs and RMBS,
originated from 2003 to 2007.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since January 2014. The Advance Swap
notional amount has been reduced by approximately 39%, or $24.2
million, since January 2014. Based on Moody's calculation, the
over-collateralization ratio of the Advance Swap is 462.58%,
versus 315.38%% in January 2014.

The deal also benefits from the updates to Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps Moody's apply to deals
experiencing event of default. In taking the foregoing actions,
Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
rating on the issuer's Advance Swap announced on March 6, 2014. At
that time, Moody's said that it had placed the ratingon review for
upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

Moody's notes that in February 2008, the transaction experienced
an "Event of Default" when the Class A overcollateralization ratio
declined below 100%, the minimum required under Section 5.1h of
the indenture. The controlling class of investors has directed the
trustee to declare the Advance Swap and notes immediately due and
payable, and the Event of Default continues.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4) Under Article V of the indenture, during an Event of Default
following failure of the over-collateralization test, if
liquidation proceeds will not equal the aggregate par of the
portfolio sold, the holders of a super majority of the controlling
class can direct the trustee to proceed with the sale and
liquidation of the collateral. In that event, the severity of
losses will depend on the timing and choice of remedy pursued.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes unrated
synthetic obligations whose credit quality Moody's has reviewed
through an unpublished credit assessment.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analysis to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities on the rated notes (by the
difference in the number of notches versus the current base model
output, for which a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches :

Advance Swap: +2

Caa ratings notched down by two notches:

Advance Swap: -1


FMC REAL 2005-1: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class C Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rated classes of FMC Real Estate
CDO 2005-1 Ltd. (FMC 2005-1).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to the relatively stable performance and
the credit quality of the remaining collateral. Despite the
deleveraging of class C, the ratings and Negative Outlooks reflect
concern over the CDO's ability to continue to make timely interest
payments. Fitch's base case loss expectation, which incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market values
and cash flow declines, is 46%.

Since Fitch's last rating action, class C received $33.4 million
in paydown. Although Fitch expects class C to ultimately recover
its full principal and interest payments even in high stress
scenarios, interest proceeds may become insufficient to cover the
timely interest due on a monthly basis because of the high default
rate of the underlying collateral. Currently, only two loans
(27.5% of the pool) are paying interest on a current basis; both
of these assets are underperforming and located in weak markets.

FMC 2005-1 is a commercial real estate (CRE) CDO managed by SCFFI
GP LLC, an affiliate of Five Mile Capital. The portfolio is
concentrated, with only nine exposures remaining. Since Fitch's
last rating action, three assets (with a par balance of $67.9
million) paid off or were disposed of with $35 million in realized
losses. Defaulted assets now represent 72.5% of the pool compared
to 79% during the last rating action. In addition, 66.6% of the
remaining collateral is real estate owned (REO).

Under Fitch's methodology, 100% of the portfolio is modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress. Modeled recoveries are approximately 53.7%.

The largest contributor to Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
junior equity position in an REO asset (10.8%) that is a 1.3
million-square foot (sf) regional mall located in Bloomingdale,
IL. Fitch modeled a full loss on the CDO position given its
estimated value below that of the senior equity position.

The next largest contributor to Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a first mortgage (17.4%) on a two-building office property
comprising 230,650 sf, located in the Detroit suburb of Troy, MI.
The property's occupancy has remained below 70% and the submarket
suffers from a high vacancy rate.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's base case loss
expectation is an REO asset (7.8%) consisting of a 162-acre
residential development site located in Madera County, CA.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates. The
transaction was not cash flow modeled based on the limited
available interest received from the assets, the majority of which
are defaulted. Fitch used a deterministic approach to evaluate the
impact of further interest payment defaults of the collateral.

The 'CCC' ratings for classes E and F are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class's credit enhancement.

RATING SENSITIVITY

All classes are subject to further downgrades should additional
losses be realized. Negative outlooks reflect the high
concentration of defaulted assets and the potential for missed
interest payments.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $6.7 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $34.1 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $13.2 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $22 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 30%

The class A-1, A-2 and B notes have paid in full. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings of classes G and H following the surrender
and cancellation of those certificates.


GALAXY XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Galaxy XVII CLO Ltd./Galaxy XVII CLO LLC's $414.90
million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 13,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.23%-12.75%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of some of the
      excess interest proceeds that are available before paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and hedge payments,
      subordinated and incentive management fees, and subordinated
      note payments into principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Galaxy XVII CLO Ltd./Galaxy XVII CLO LLC

Class               Rating           Amount
                                   (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)         279.90
B                   AA (sf)           58.05
C-1 (deferrable)    A (sf)            27.00
C-2 (deferrable)    A (sf)             7.20
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)          22.95
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)           19.80
Subordinated notes  NR                50.45

NR-Not rated.


GEM LIGO III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes from GEM LIGOs III Ltd., a
collateralized debt obligation transaction collateralized
primarily by emerging market corporate bonds and emerging market
sovereign bonds.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class C and D notes.

The upgrades mainly reflect the $290.4 million paydowns to the
class A-1 notes since S&P's May 2011 affirmations, reducing the
notes to about 24% of its original balance.  The paydowns also
increased credit support for the subordinate notes.  The trustee
reported the following principal coverage overcollateralization
(O/C) ratios in its April 2014 report:

   -- The A O/C ratio was 140.35%, up from 119.73% in March 2011.
   -- The B O/C ratio was 123.08%, up from 113.13% in March 2011.
   -- The C O/C ratio was 111.70%, up from 108.19% in March 2011.
   -- The D O/C ratio was 106.81%, up from 105.88% in March 2011.

In addition, the transaction did not hold any defaulted assets in
the collateral pool according to the April 2014 trustee report,
down from $19.5 million (3.2% of the pool) in March 2011.

Although all of the principal coverage ratios have increased as a
result of the paydowns, the obligor concentration in the pool has
increased.  According to the April 2014 trustee report, the
largest single corporate obligor accounted for 8% of the
collateral pool, breaching the 5% concentration limit.  The
largest sovereign issuer accounted for 11.4% of the collateral
pool, breaching the 7% concentration limit.

The ratings on the class A-3 and B notes are driven by S&P's
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test S&P
introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria update.

"We affirmed our 'B+ (sf)' and 'B (sf)' ratings on the class C and
D notes, respectively, although the largest-obligor default
testlimits the ratings to 'CCC+ (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)'.  In our
analysis, we considered the increased O/C and improved credit
quality with no defaults in the portfolio.  Consequently, we
believe that the class C and D notes' credit support is
commensurate with their current rating levels," S&P said.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

GEM LIGOs III Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To          From
A-1     36860NAA0    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-2     36860NAE2    AAA (sf)    A+ (sf)
A-3     36860NAG7    A+ (sf)     A- (sf)
B       36860NAJ1    BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
C       36860NAL6    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
D       36860NAN2    B (sf)      B (sf)


GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Hikes Rating on $25MM Cl. D Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities IV,
Limited:

$14,000,000 Class A-1cJ Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

$32,200,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

$43,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$48,100,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

$25,400,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Up To $100,000,000 Clas A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating
Rate Notes Due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$240,600,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

$125,000,000 Class A-1cS Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

GoldenTree Loan Opportunities IV, Limited, issued in July 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in August 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
August 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's modeled a WARF of 2850 compared to a covenant of 3350 and
a diversity score of 56 compared to a covenant of 45.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2280)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1cS: 0

Class A-1cJ: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3420)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1cS: 0

Class A-1cJ: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $702.3 million, defaulted
par of $5.6 million, a weighted average default probability of
20.25% (implying a WARF of 2850), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.55%, a diversity score of 56 and a weighted
average spread of 3.54%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In addition, Moody's may assess
alternative recovery prospects for CLO securities. Although these
alternative recovery assumptions are generally derived from those
presented in Moody's methodology for rating Structured Finance
CDOs, they may vary based on the specifics of the analysis of the
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


HICKORY TRUST: S&P Lowers Rating on Credit-Linked Notes to D(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on Hickory Trust's credit-linked notes, an
investment-grade corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction.

The lowered rating follows recent credit events in the underlying
reference portfolio that caused the notes to incur principal
losses.


HILDENE CLO II: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
Notes issued by Hildene CLO II Ltd.

Moody's rating actions are as follows:

  $252,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $24,250,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
  Aa2 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $24,250,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $19,750,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $6,500,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class
F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Hildene CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of senior secured
bonds, senior secured notes, high yield bonds, second lien loans
and senior, unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70%
ramped as of the closing date.

Hildene Leveraged Credit, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2925

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2925 to 3364)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2925 to 3803)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2


ING IM CLO 2013-3: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on ING IM
CLO 2013-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-3 LLC's $475.2 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Feb. 26, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ING IM CLO 2013-3 Ltd./ING IM CLO 2013-3 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     320.00
A-2                        AA (sf)                       45.60
B                          A (sf)                        47.20
C                          BBB (sf)                      25.60
D                          BB (sf)                       22.80
E                          B (sf)                        14.00


JP MORGAN 2002-CIBC4: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. C Certs to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of one class
and affirmed the ratings of three classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-CIBC4 as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on P&I Class C was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 26% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes D and E were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 12.1% of
the current balance, compared to 12.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.8% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 13.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $31.6
million from $798.9 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by fourteen mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 25% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 86% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Three loans, constituting 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $98.2 million. Two loans, constituting
12% of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Northwest Commons Shopping Center
($1.9 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 50,964
SF retail center located in Macon, GA. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2012 after the borrower was unable to
payoff the loan at maturity. The property is currently 31% leased
as of September 2013, same as at Moody's prior review.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.2 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (83% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full or partial year 2013 operating results for
70% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 63%,
compared to 64% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.09X and 1.96X,
respectively, compared to 1.19X and 1.88X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 50% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Plainfield Commons Loan ($7.8 million -- 24.6%
of the pool), which is secured by a 173,602 SF retail property
located in Plainfield, IN. Performance has been stable, and the
loan is fully amortizing with a maturity date of March 2022.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.12X, respectively,
compared to 47% and 2.18X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arrowood Villas Loan ($4.4 million
-- 14.0% of the pool), which is secured by 120-unit multifamily
property located in Charlotte, NC. The loan is on the watchlist
due to a low DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and
1.03X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.06X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 555 Post Street Loan ($3.6 million -
- 11.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 59,258 SF office
property located in downtown San Francisco. The loan is on the
watchlist for low DSCR, however the property remains 100%
occupied. The loan is fully amortizing with a maturity date of
January 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.13X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 6 Cert. Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twenty
classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-LDP9 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. A-3SFL, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3SFX, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-MS, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JS, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. B-S, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. C-S, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F-S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on P&I classes A-1A through A-MS were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I classes A-J through F-S were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the one IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.0% of
the current balance, compared to 14.5% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30, compared to 36 at Moody's prior review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to $3.6 billion
from $4.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 200 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
48% of the pool. One loan, constituting 5% of the pool, has a
Moody's structured credit assessment. Five loans, constituting 2%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Fifty-six loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Forty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $243 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%). Twenty-one loans, constituting 27% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Belnord loan ($375.0 million - 10.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a 215-unit multifamily building located in the
Upper West Side of Manhattan. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2011 due to imminent default, but remains
current. The loan was modified in March 2013, and is subject to a
two-year forbearance period thru March 2015. The residential
component reported occupancy 94% as of January 2014, same as the
last review. An October 2012 appraisal, valued the property at
$283 million.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 131 South
Dearborn Loan ($236 million-6.6% of the pool), which represents a
50% pari passu interest in a $472 million senior mortgage. The
loan is secured by the 37-story "Citadel Center", a 1.5 million
square foot (SF) office tower in the Central Loop submarket of
Chicago, Illinois. The property is also encumbered by $50 million
of mezzanine debt. The property transferred to special servicing
in May 2014. The property was 98% occupied as of December 2013,
compared to 94% occupied as of June 2012. The second largest
tenant, which had occupied 20% of the net rentable area (NRA), is
executing an early termination option to move out in 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Bank of America
Plaza Loan ($100.0 million-2.8% of the pool), which represents a
27.5% pari passu interest in a $363 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a 1.25 million SF Class A office building
located in Atlanta, Georgia. The property transferred to special
servicing in February 2011 due to monetary default and became REO
in February 2012. The servicer is pursuing a comprehensive
stabilization strategy for the asset. The occupancy was 51% as of
November 2013, compared to 63% as of October 2011.

The remaining 18 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $292 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (30% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 39 poorly
performing loans, constituting 28% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $197 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2012 operating results for
96% of the pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results
for 71% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 103%,
compared to 110% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and
CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.4% to
the most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 0.98X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with Moody's structured credit assessment is the
Merchandise Mart Loan ($175.0 million-4.9% of the pool), which
represents a 50% pari passu interest in a $350 million first
mortgage loan. The property is also encumbered by a $300 million
mezzanine loan. The loan is secured by a 3.45 million SF office
and design showroom building located in downtown Chicago,
Illinois. The sponsor is Vornado Realty, L.P. Google's Motorola
Mobility leased 608,000 SF with a lease commencement in September
2013, and moved its headquarters from Libertyville to the property
in Feb 2014. The property was 96.4% leased as of December 2013,
compared to 95.2% at last review. Moody's current structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are baa2 (sca.pd) and 1.71X,
respectively, compared to baa3 (sca.pd) and 1.45X at last review.

The top three non-specially serviced loans represent 16% of the
pool balance. The largest non-specially serviced loan is the
Galleria Towers Loan ($232.0 million-6.4% of the pool), which is
secured by three Class A office buildings, totaling 1.43 million
SF, located in Dallas, Texas. The collateral is also encumbered by
a $29 million mezzanine loan. The loan is currently on the master
servicer's watchlist for low DSCR. The property was 77% leased as
of March 2014 compared to 81% leased as of December 2012.
Approximately 30% of the NRA will expire in 2014 and 2015. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 141% and 0.67X, respectively, compared
to 148% and 0.64X at last review.

The second largest non-specially serviced loan is the Americold
Portfolio Loan ($194 million-5.4% of the pool), which is secured
by four cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted cold storage
properties located in Missouri, Texas, Mississippi, and Kansas.
The loan has been on the watchlist since April 2008 due to low
occupancy, resulting in total revenues significantly lower than
the securitization amount. The Mississippi property ceased
physical operations in 2010 due to minimal occupancy. As of
December 2012, the consolidated occupancy for the other three
properties was 73%. Moody's has a high LTV and low stressed DSCR,
similar to last review.

The third largest non-specially serviced loan is the Colony IV
Portfolio Loan ($144 million-4.0% of the pool). The loan is
secured by 25 properties, comprised of office, industrial, and
flex space and has been on the watchlist since April 2013, due to
Low DSCR as a result of low occupancy. As of December 2013, the
consolidated occupancy was 65%, compared to 70% as of December
2012. Moody's has a high LTV and low stressed DSCR, in excess of
last review.


JP MORGAN 2011-C4: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
including the class X-A interest-only (IO) certificates, from J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C4, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal- and interest-
paying classes follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions
and reflect the stable performance of the pool.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics and performance of
the remaining loans in the pool, and the transaction structure.

The affirmations of the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimated necessary credit
enhancement requirement for the current outstanding ratings.  The
affirmations also reflect S&P's view of the collateral credit
characteristics and performance, as well as the transaction-level
changes.

The affirmation of S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X-A IO
certificates reflects its current criteria for rating IO
securities.

Credit Enhancement Levels (%) As Of The May 16, 2014, Trustee
Remittance Report


Class                                   Credit enhancement
                                        level (%)
A-1                                     19.37
A-2                                     19.37
A-3                                     19.37
A-3FL                                   19.37
A-4                                     19.37
A-SB                                    19.37
B                                       15.82
C                                       10.54
D                                       8.83
E                                       5.27
F                                       4.22
G                                       2.77
H                                       1.45
X-A                                     N/A

N/A-Not applicable.

RATINGS LIST

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C4

                                 Rating           Rating
Class         Identifier         To               From
A-1           46636DAA4          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-2           46636DAC0          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-3           46636DAE6          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-3FL         46636DAG1          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-4           46636DAJ5          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-SB          46636DAL0          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
X-A           46636DAN6          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
B             46636DAS5          AA (sf)          AA (sf)
C             46636DAU0          A (sf)           A (sf)
D             46636DAW6          A- (sf)          A- (sf)
E             46636DAY2          BBB (sf)         BBB (sf)
F             46636DBA3          BB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)
G             46636DBC9          BB- (sf)         BB- (sf)
H             46636DBE5          B (sf)           B (sf)


JP MORGAN 2014-INN: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2014-INN's $635 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2014-INN.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate
commercial mortgage loan totaling $635.0 million, with three one-
year extension options, secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 36 extended-stay, nine limited-service, and two full-service
hotels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 16,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historic and projected performance, the sponsors' and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-INN

Class        Rating(i)              Amount ($)
A            AAA (sf)              213,240,000
X-CP         B (sf)            508,000,000(ii)
X-EXT        B (sf)            635,000,000(ii)
B            AA- (sf)               77,760,000
C            A- (sf)                57,700,000
D            BBB- (sf)              83,300,000
E            BB- (sf)              127,200,000
F            B (sf)                 75,800,000

  (i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
      institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the
      Securities Act of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
      X-EXT certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount
      of principal distributions and realized losses allocated to
      the class A, B, C, D, E, and F certificates.


KODIAK CDO I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-2 notes from Kodiak CDO I Ltd., a collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction collateralized mostly by trust preferred
securities (TruPs) and issued by mortgage REITs.  In addition, S&P
lowered its rating on the class A-1 notes from N-Star Real Estate
CDO V Ltd., a CDO transaction backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS).

S&P lowered its ratings on these nondeferrable classes of notes to
'D (sf)' because the transactions failed to make timely interest
payments by their May 2014 payment dates.

RATINGS LOWERED

Kodiak CDO I Ltd.

          Rating      Rating
Class     To          From
A-2       D (sf)      CC (sf)

N-Star Real Estate CDO V Ltd.

          Rating      Rating
Class     To          From
A-1       D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)


KVK CLO 2014-2: S&P Assigns Preliminary BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to KVK CLO 2014-2 Ltd./KVK CLO 2014-2 LLC's $559.50
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 2,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread) and cash flow structure, which can
      withstand the default rate projected by Standard & Poor's
      CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's using
      the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.243%-12.818%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the preliminary rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of up to 50.00% of
      the excess interest proceeds that are available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees, deferred
      subordinated portfolio management fees, portfolio manager
      incentive fees, and payments to the subordinated notes to
      principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

   -- The identified portfolio's weighted average spread is below
      the minimum weighted average spread covenanted to in the
      transaction documents.  If the collateral manager cannot
      acquire portfolio collateral with characteristics in line
      with the transaction's covenants during the ramp-up period,
      the break-even default rates (BDRs) may decrease and the
      cushion outlined in the preliminary ratings table--the
      difference between the BDRs and the scenario default rates -
      could be diminished.  If this difference becomes negative,
      S&P may not affirm the ratings on the effective date.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

KVK CLO 2014-2 Ltd./KVK CLO 2014-2 LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  4.00
A                      AAA (sf)                378.00
B                      AA (sf)                  67.50
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   50.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 32.00
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  28.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       60.00

NR-Not rated.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2000-3: Moody's Hikes Cl. S Certs' Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirmed the rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2003-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-C3 as follows :

Cl. P, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. Q, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. S, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization as well as increased defeasance. The deal has paid
down 36% since Moody's last review. Defeasance represents 8% of
the current balance compared to 0% at last review.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-CL, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance compared to 12.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.0% of the
original pooled balance compared to 1.1% at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $17.8
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans. Two loans, representing 8% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.

One loan, constituting 29% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $13.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 and full or partial year 2013
operating results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 64% compared to 65% at Moody's last review. Moody's
conduit component excludes defeased, specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 18% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.22X and 1.73X,
respectively, compared to 1.23X and 1.68X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 58% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Rancho La Costa Loan ($5.1 million -- 28.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 27,384 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Carlsbad, California. The property was 100%
leased as of March 2014. The largest tenant, CVS, leases 54% of
NRA through June 2022. Property performance has been stable and
the loan matures in November 2018. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to a deferred maintenance issue. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.79X, respectively, compared to 60% and
1.73X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Walgreens-Henderson Loan
($3.5 million -- 19.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,120
SF single tenant retail property located in Henderson, Nevada. The
property is fully leased to Walgreen Co. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa1, stable outlook) through March 2061. Property
performance has been stable and the loan matures in February 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 95% and 1.05X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Rite Aid -- Medina Loan
($1.7 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 11,180
SF single tenant retail property located in Medina, Ohio. The
property is fully leased to Rite Aid Corporation (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa1, stable outlook) through July 2021 which is
coterminus with the loan maturity. The loan fully amortizes during
the loan term and has amortized 41% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and 1.61X, respectively, compared to
64% and 1.57X at last review.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 1998-C1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class K Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed two classes of
Lehman Brothers (LB) Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-C1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class J reflects the stable performance of the
remaining pool, continued expected paydown (67% of the pool is
fully amortizing), defeased collateral, and increased credit
enhancement. Upgrades were limited to 'BBsf' given the pool's high
concentration with only 20 loans remaining; the top three loans
represent 39.5% of the pool.

As of the May 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.2% to $48.8 million from
$1.73 billion at issuance. Fitch modeled losses of 6.9% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
3.3%, including $53.3 million (3.1% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated six loans (32.8%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially serviced
asset (7.4%), five loans are defeased (12.1%). Interest shortfalls
are currently affecting the distressed classes K through M.

The largest loan in the pool is a multifamily property located in
Largo, FL (17.8%). The property caters to residents 55 and over.
The most recent DSCR and occupancy as of YE 2013 was reported at
1.89x and 95%. The second largest loan is an industrial park in
Blauvelt, NY (9.4%); Fitch considers this a Loan of Concern as the
property has not reported financials and occupancy since 2011.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan (7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 194-bed senior
housing facility in Long Beach, NY. The loan transferred to
special servicing in August 2009 due to monetary default.
According to the servicer, negotiations between the borrower and a
new third party operator to manage the property are ongoing. The
Servicer could not confirm that necessary post Superstorm Sandy
repair work was completed by the Borrower. Further, occupancy
remains low at 35% as of February 2014. The servicer's legal
counsel is continuing to proceed with legal remedies.

RATING SENSITIVITY

The Rating Outlook on class J remains Stable due to the overall
low leverage and continued amortization of the remaining loans in
the pool. Further upgrades to class J may be limited due to the
highly concentrated nature of the pool and secondary market
location of the collateral.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

-- $37.3 million class J to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $11.5 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 35%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G and H certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class M certificate. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class IO
certificate.


LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC,
a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Neuberger Berman Inc.  At the same time, S&P removed its ratings
on four classes from CreditWatch, where it had placed them with
positive implications on Feb. 21, 2014.

The upgrades reflect post-reinvestment period principal
amortization paydowns to the class A notes.  Since February 2012,
when S&P affirmed its ratings on five classes, the class A notes
have paid down $136.0 million, reducing the notes to 38.2% of
their original balance and increasing credit support for the
subordinate notes.

As of the April 2014 trustee report, the transaction had
$9.8 million (5.1%) of assets from obligors in the 'CCC' rating
category, down from $18.7 million (6.1%) in January 2012.
Defaulted assets have increased to $3.5 million (1.8%) from
$0.8 million (0.3%) as of January 2012.  The class B, C, and D
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased by 16.7%, 7.4%,
and 1.3%, respectively, since January 2012; and the class E O/C
ratio has decreased by 0.9%.

Although the class E note rating was limited by the largest-
obligor default test to 'CCC+', S&P raised its rating to 'B- (sf)'
after considering the results of our cash flow analysis.

The transaction holds USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated collateral
and issues EUR-denominated classes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, as well as on recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.
The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with this
rating action.

S&P will continue to review our ratings on the notes and assess
whether they remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS

LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating     cushion(i)  rating
A      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   22.45%      AAA (sf)
B      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)    5.97%      AAA (sf)
C      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)    2.99%      AA- (sf)
D      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)   10.06%      BB+ (sf)
E      CCC- (sf)            B+ (sf)     3.13%      B- (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
    default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
    implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC

                  Rating
Class         To          From
A             AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA- (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING RAISED

LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 PLC

                  Rating
Class         To          From
E             B- (sf)     CCC- (sf)


MAYPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mayport CLO Ltd.:

  $19,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2020,
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on February 10, 2014 Upgraded
  to A2 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2020
  (current outstanding balance of $19,262,292.40), Upgraded to
  Ba2 (sf); previously on February 10, 2014 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $250,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2020
  (current outstanding balance of $32,034,467.66), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on February 10, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $60,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
  February 2020 (current outstanding balance of $7,688,272.24),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 10, 2014 Affirmed
  Aaa (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 2020,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 10, 2014 Affirmed
  Aaa (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class A-3L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
  February 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 10,
  2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Mayport CLO Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
February 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since February 2014. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 68.2% or $85.2 million since
February 2014. Based on the trustee's May 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Senior Class A, Class A,
Class B-1L and Class B-2L notes are reported at 166.7%, 135.8%,
118.6% and 105.4%, respectively, versus February 2014 levels of
148.4%, 127.3%, 114.6%, and 104.3%, respectively. Moody's notes
the reported May overcollateralization ratios do not reflect the
May 22, 2014 payment of $43.9 million to the Class A-1 notes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2100)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3149)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par balance of $138.9 million, defaulted par of $1.0 million, a
weighted average default probability of 15.17% (implying a WARF of
2624), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.17%, a
diversity score of 33 and a weighted average spread of 3.02%.
Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to D
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust's series 2005-MKB2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F and G certificates to 'D
(sf)' because of accumulated interest shortfalls oustanding for 15
months that S&P believes will not be repaid.  As of the May 12,
2014, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced monthly
interest shortfalls totaling $119,991, primarily related to a
$98,167 interest rate reduction for the Simon--DeSoto Square Mall
subordinate hope note loan, $8,810 in appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts on one loan ($6.4 million, 1.0%) of
the two specially serviced assets ($15.9 million, 2.6%), $8,000 in
special servicing fees, $3,440 in other interest shortfalls, and
$1,574 in workout fees.  The interest shortfalls affected all the
classes subordinate to and including class F.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the other 10 classes because it
expects that the available credit enhancement for these classes
will be within its estimate of the necessary credit enhancement
required for the current ratings.  The affirmations also reflect
the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movements for classes B through E, S&P's analysis
also considered the amount of liquidity available to the trust,
potential for additional interest shortfalls from the two
specially serviced loans and potential corrected mortgage fees
related to the the Simon--DeSoto Square Mall and the magnitude of
the performing loans maturing in 2014 and 2015.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XC interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities.

Credit Enhancement Levels

As of the May 12, 2014, trustee remittance report

Class                                Credit enhancement
                                     level (%)
A-3                                     29.65
A-SB                                    29.65
A-4                                     29.65
A-1A                                    29.65
A-J                                     19.69
B                                       14.35
C                                       12.73
D                                       9.26
E                                       7.17
F                                       4.16
G                                       2.30
XC                                      N/A

N/A-Not applicable.

RATINGS LIST

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-MKB2

                                 Rating           Rating

Class         Identifier         To               From
A-3           59022HFW7          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-SB          59022HFX5          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-4           59022HFY3          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-1A          59022HFZ0          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
AJ            59022HGA4          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
B             59022HGB2          AA- (sf)         AA- (sf)
C             59022HGC0          A (sf)           A (sf)
D             59022HGD8          BBB (sf)         BBB (sf)
E             59022HGE6          B- (sf)          B- (sf)
F             59022HGQ9          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
G             59022HGR7          D (sf)           CCC- (sf)
XC            59022HHA3          AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)


MISSOURI HIGHER: S&P Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB(sf)' ratings
on four series of bonds issued by the Missouri Higher Education
Loan Authority (MOHELA) under its 12th General Student Loan
Program Bond Resolution (1995 trust).

The 12th General Student Loan Program Bond Resolution governs a
trust that is a student loan asset-backed securities (ABS) master
trust currently backed by all private student loans originated
under MOHELA's private student loan program.  At the time of the
trust's last issuance in 2006, the trust was backed by both
private student loans (approximately 57%) and student loans
originated under the U.S. government's Federal Family Education
Loan Program (FFELP) (approximately 43%).  In June 2013, the trust
sold all of its FFELP collateral and used the sale proceeds to pay
down certain trust liabilities.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view of improvement in the trust's
costs of funds partially offsetting the modest increase in the
risk profile for this trust.  The increased risk resulted from the
aforementioned shift in the collateral composition, as private
student loans do not benefit from the U.S. government's guarantee
that FFELP loans receive.  S&P believes the potential improvement
in the trust's cost of funds in high interest rate scenarios
resulted from the paydown of all of its tax-exempt auction-rate
securities (ARS).  The ratings-dependent multiplier generally
found in tax-exempt ARS can lead to compression of excess spread
in high interest rate environments.

The ratings also reflect S&P's views regarding future collateral
performance as well as current credit enhancement available to
support the bonds, including hard enhancement as measured by
overcollateralization, the reserve account, and excess spread.
S&P's analysis incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios and
secondary credit factors such as credit stability, payment
priority, and sector- and issuer-specific analysis.

KEY STRUCTURAL HIGHLIGHTS

The trust was initially structured with a bond insurance policy
from Ambac Assurance Corp (Ambac).  Because S&P do not rate Ambac,
it do not consider the bond insurance policy it provides to the
bonds.  The remaining bonds in the trust have maturities in
February and August of 2025 and June of 2046.  The transaction
documents provide for certain optional and mandatory redemptions,
as well as releases to the issuer, subject to Ambac's consent, if
parity remains above 103%.

All of the bonds in the trust are ARS.  Since the auction markets
failed in February 2008, these bonds have been paying interest
rates that are based on their respective maximum auction rate
definitions.  Since the recent pay down of the tax-exempt ARS, all
of the bonds remaining in the trust are taxable ARS.  Tax-exempt
ARS are generally more onerous in terms of cost of funds than
taxable ARS; they typically pay interest based on a floating
interest index multiplied by a ratings-dependent multiplier while
taxable ARS typically pay interest based on a floating interest
index plus a ratings-dependent margin.  As a result, the shift in
the liabilities to 100% taxable eliminates the exposure to a
ratings-dependent multiplier that would be particularly onerous in
a high interest environment.  In addition, the maximum auction-
rate definition for the series 2006J bonds also includes a net
loan rate component to be paid under certain circumstances.

The bonds are all secured equally and ratably under the trust's
indenture.  Interest payments are due periodically based on the
auction term established pursuant to each bond's supplemental
indenture.  Principal payments are generally not required until
the bonds' maturity.  However, the trust, at the issuer's
discretion, may redeem bonds with available cash flow after
interest payments.

HISTORICAL POOL PERFORMANCE

Since S&P's last review of this trust in the first quarter of
2012, the percentage of the private loans in repayment has
increased to 80.0% as of March 2014 from 73.3% as of December 2011
(excludes loans reported in default from the portfolio total).  At
the same time, the percentage of the private loans in nonpaying
status has declined (See Table 1).  The combination of these
trends results in a higher percentage of the trust generating cash
flow available to pay down the bonds.

Table 1
Trends Payment Status(i)
                                  March
                     2011     2012     2013     2014
Repayment           70.4%    73.9%    76.9%    80.0%
30-plus day          4.8%     4.7%     4.5%     4.2%
Deferment           13.4%    14.1%    13.6%    13.4%
Forbearance          5.0%     4.5%     4.1%     3.0%

(i) All metrics are calculated on the total private portfolio
     excluding loans reported in default.

Since S&P's last review, cumulative defaults on the private loans
as a percentage of the original pool balance (private student
loans outstanding at the time of the last issuance in 2006 plus
recycled loans since that time) have increased to 9.29% as of
March 2014 from 7.18% as of December 2011.  However, the pace of
defaults on the private loans has slowed as measured by current
period defaults as a percentage of the original balance
(See Table 2).  The slow down in the pace of defaults is
consistent with S&P's general expectation of student loan
collateral as it becomes more seasoned.

Table 2
Trends Defaults(i)
                                March
                     2011     2012     2013     2014
Cumulative          5.87%    7.36%    8.43%    9.29%
Periodic(ii)        0.60%    0.37%    0.27%    0.21%

(i) Based on the original pool balance of $251.6 million, which
     includes the balance of the private loans as of June 2006
     plus recycling purchases from July 2006 to June 2008.
(ii) Rolling four-quarter average.

Overcollateralization, as measured by the parity percentage (the
sum of the values of all accrued assets divided by the aggregate
principal amount of and accrued interest on all outstanding bonds,
and program and administrative expenses) has grown since the
trust's most recent issuance.  The recent spike in parity growth
in 2013 was largely due to the repurchase of ARS bonds at
discounts with the proceeds from the sale of the trust's FFELP
collateral.  In addition, the issuer has completed periodic
redemptions of additional bonds with cash flow received from loan
payments available in the trust's general collection fund.  Since
our last review, parity has increased to 108.5% as of March 2014
from 104.3% as of December 2011.

CASH FLOW MODELING SUMMARY

Based on S&P's views of the collateral pool's current and
projected performance, it established our base-case lifetime
default assumption at 12.5%-13.0% of the original pool balance.
Based on cumulative defaults as of June 2013 (the cut-off date for
our break-even cash flow analysis) of 8.7% of the original pool
balance and assumed recoveries on defaulted loans of 10%, S&P
expects remaining net losses on the pool balance as of June 2013
to be 5.6%-6.3%.

S&P rans a variety of midstream cash flows for this trust under
various rating stress assumptions.  S&P applied defaults on the
collateral pool in the stressed rating scenarios to test the
trust's ability to meet full and timely interest and ultimate
principal payments on the bonds.  The following are some of the
major assumptions S&P modeled:

   -- A marginally front-loaded six-year default curve;

   -- Recovery rate on defaulted loans of 10% realized over five
      years;

   -- Two prepayment scenarios: a flat prepayment speed of 3%
      constant prepayment rate (CPR, an annualized prepayment
      speed stated as a percent of the current loan balance) for
      life; and a ramped prepayment speed starting at 3% CPR and
      ramping up over five years to a maximum rate of 7% CPR.
      After five years, the rate is held constant;

   -- Stressed interest rate vectors for the various indices;

   -- Auctions failed for the life of each transaction.  S&P
      determined the coupons for ARS based on the applicable
      "maximum rate" definition in the transaction documents; and

   -- Semi-annual pro rata redemptions of the bonds with available
      cash flow generated by the trust.

S&P's cash flow runs indicated that the trust's current collateral
profile and available credit enhancement were sufficient to
withstand stressed rating scenarios consistent with the current
rating before a payment default would occur.  A key factor in the
results of the break-even analysis is the liabilities' maturity
profile.  The majority (approximately 90%) of the liabilities have
legal finals in 2025.  Accordingly, the trust must generate
sufficient cash flow in our stressed scenarios to pay the majority
of the liabilities over the next 11 years, which constrains the
level of break-even defaults S&P was able to assume that still met
full and timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
bonds.  Based on S&P's cash flow runs, the transaction is able to
absorb remaining cumulative net losses of 9.1%-11.0% of the pool
balance as of June 2013 before a payment default would occur in
S&P's stress scenarios.

After considering the aforementioned break-evens and remaining
expected net losses, S&P affirmed its 'BB (sf)' ratings on the
bonds to reflect the trust's current collateral profile and its
view that the available credit enhancement is sufficient to
support the bonds at the current rating level based on S&P's
stressed break-even cash flow results.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the student loan
receivables backing this trust relative to our revised cumulative
default expectations and available credit enhancement.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority
US$45 mil student loan revenue bonds series 1995-C
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          606072DG8   BB (sf)

Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority
US$40 mil student loan revenue bonds series 1995-D
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          606072DH6   BB (sf)

Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority
US$55 mil adj rate student loan revenue bonds series 1996-H
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          606072DJ2   BB (sf)

Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority
US$126 mil student loan revenue bonds series 2006-J
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2006-J     606072JG2   BB (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Raises Rating on $4MM Cl. E Notes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Morgan Stanley Investment Management
Croton, Ltd.:

$16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
January 15, 2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September
12, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$14,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
January 15, 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September
12, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

$4,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
January 15, 2018, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on September
12, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$175,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balances of $22,098,465), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balances of $6,313,847), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on September 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$14,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on September 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$4,000,000 Class B Senior Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Morgan Stanley Investment Management Croton, Ltd., issued in
December 2005, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in September
2013. The Class A-1 and A-2 notes have been paid down by
approximately 54% or $32.7 million since September 2013. Based on
the trustee's 5 May 2014 report, the Senior Overcollateralization
and Mezzanine Overcollateralization ratios are reported at 188.9%
and 114.0%, respectively, versus August 2013 levels of 154.1% and
111.2%, respectively.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the stated maturity of the notes. Based on the
trustee's May 2014 report, securities that mature after the stated
maturity of the notes currently make up approximately 20.31% of
the portfolio. These investments could expose the notes to market
risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light of the
deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its
sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis,
Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (Insert WARF level)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B Floating: 0

Class B Fixed: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3506)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B Floating: 0

Class B Fixed: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: 0

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $86.7 million, defaulted par
of $5.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 17.47%
(implying a WARF of 2960), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 53.96%, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted average
spread of 3.10%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies
recovery rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-WF1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and downgraded one class of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-WF1 as
follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 34% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.0% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $23.3
million from $968.5 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
23% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 85% of the
pool. One loan, constituting 1% of the pool, has defeased and is
secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 28%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 100%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 27%, compared to 36% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.85X and 4.90X,
respectively, compared to 1.80X and 3.77X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 48% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Ward Office / Retail Portfolio ($5.3 million
-- 23% of the pool), which is secured by five properties located
in Bel Air, Maryland (3 suburban office, 2 unanchored retail). The
properties were 90% leased overall as of March 2014, compared to
92% as of December 2011. This loan fully amortizes during its loan
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 25% and 4.15X,
respectively, compared to 30% and 3.54X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Vista Oaks Apartment Loan ($3.9
million -- 17%), which is secured by a 108-unit multifamily
property located in Martinez, California. The property was 95%
leased as of March 2014 compared to 98% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 37% and 2.74X, respectively, compared to
41% and 2.50X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Fiesta Shopping Center Loan ($2.1
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 93,000 square
foot (SF) grocery anchored retail center located in Dallas, Texas.
The property was 94% leased as of March 2014. The center is
anchored by a Fiesta Mart grocery store (52% of the net rentable
area (NRA); lease expiration May 2015). The loan fully amortizes
during its loan term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 24% and
4.41X, respectively, compared to 28% and 3.83X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C11: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 14 classes
in Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C11
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed due to the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.3% of the
current balance. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 3.3% of the original pooled balance.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $850 million
from $856 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 67% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 56% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101% compared to
102% at securitization. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.59X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.05X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the University
Towers Cooperative Loan ($20 million -- 2% of the pool), which is
secured by three 15-story coop apartment buildings located in
Brooklyn and constructed in 1957. Occupancy as of August 2013 was
95%. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
aaa (sca.pd) and 5.15X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Westfield Countryside Loan ($100 million --
33% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately 465,000
square foot (SF) component of an approximately 1.26 million SF
super-regional mall located in Clearwater, Florida, 20 miles west
of the Tampa CBD. The mall is anchored by Dillard's, Macy's,
Sears, and JC Penney, all of which are non-collateral. Collateral
was 92% leased as of July 2013. The loan is pari-passu with MSBAM
2013-C12. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and 0.97X,
respectively, the same as at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Mall at Tuttle Crossing Loan ($95
million -- 11% of the pool), which a pari-passu interest in a $125
million loan. The loan is secured by an approximately 385,000 SF
component of an approximately 1.13 million SF super-regional mall
located in Dublin, OH, 11 miles from the Columbus, Ohio CBD. The
mall is currently anchored by JC Penney, Sears and two Macy's
stores that are all non-collateral. Collateral was 95% occupied as
of April, 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.34X,
respectively, the same as at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Matrix Corporate Center Loan ($84
million -- 10% of the pool), which is secured by an approximately
1.05 million SF Class A office complex located in Danbury,
Connecticut. The property was 69% leased as of March 2014 as
compared to 73% at securitization. The property was originally the
headquarters for Union Carbide, but has since been repositioned
for multiple tenants. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 98% and 1.08X at securitization.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust, series 2014-C16 commercial
mortgage trust pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

  -- $52,700,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $132,100,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $72,300,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $43,900,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $250,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $335,852,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $956,533,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $69,681,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $91,853,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $209,044,000b class PST 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47,510,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $139,363,000a,c class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $72,848,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28,506,000c class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

a Notional amount and interest only.
b Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PST
  certificates, and class PST certificates may be exchanged for
  class A-S, B and C certificates.
c Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 27, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$12,669,000 class F, the $14,253,000 class G, the $42,759,846
class H, or the $98,187,846 interest-only class X-C.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 76 loans secured by 110 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.267 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC; Bank
of America, National Association; and CIBC Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 72.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 73%, and asset summary reviews
on 83.5% of the pool.

KEY RATINGS DRIVERS

High Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.25x and 105.4%,
respectively, are higher than the first-quarter 2014 averages of
1.18x and 104.7%, respectively.

Large Hotel Concentration: At 24%, the transaction has among the
highest hotel concentrations for Fitch-rated transactions in 2013
and 2014.  Four of the top 10 loans (14.3% of the pool) are
secured by hotel properties.

High Concentration of Full and Partial Interest-Only Loans: Nine
loans (24.7%) are subject to full-term interest-only payments, and
31 loans (40.6%) are subject to partial interest-only payments.
These figures are higher than those for Fitch-rated transactions
in 1Q'14, which had average full term and partial interest-only
loans of 15.8% and 37.6%, respectively.

Collateral Quality: 42.2% of the pool, including five of the
largest 10 loans, received property quality grades of 'B+' or
better. Higher property quality grades result in a lower
probability of loss in Fitch's multiborrower conduit model.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.1% below
the most recent reported net operating income (NOI) (for
properties that NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).

Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severity on defaulted loans and could
result in potential rating actions on the certificates.  Fitch
evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSBAM 2014-
C16 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in which
NCF declined a further 10% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the
junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA-sf' could result.  In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further
30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf'
certificates to 'BBB-sf' could result.  The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, and C notes from Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd., a U.S. cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC, and removed two of them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Feb. 21, 2014.  Also, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D and
E notes.

The transaction exited its reinvestment period in April 2013.
Since S&P's May 2012 rating actions, the class A notes have been
paid down by $117 million to 61% of its initial issuance amount.
The senior class A/B overcollateralization (O/C) ratio increased
to 121% as of the April 2014 trustee report, from 116% as of the
April 2012 trustee report.  S&P raised its ratings on the class A,
B, and C notes to reflect the increase in credit support available
to these notes.  Although the class C notes now pass S&P's cash
flow stresses at a higher rating category, it only raised its
rating to 'A+ (sf)' because the notes are constrained by the top
obligor test.

Since S&P's last rating actions, the class D notes' O/C ratio
improved slightly, while the class E notes' O/C ratio decreased
slightly.  In addition, the transaction is exposed to $29 million
in long-dated assets.  Although S&P's top obligor test also
constrains the ratings on the class D and E notes, its cash flow
runs for these two classes pass at higher ratings with sufficient
cushion.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes to
reflect the sufficient credit support available at the current
rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    13.40%       AAA (sf)
B      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    1.33%        AA+ (sf)
C      A- (sf)              AA+ (sf)    4.20%        A+ (sf)
D      BBB- (sf)            BBB+ (sf)   1.28%        BBB- (sf)
E      B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)    2.81%        B- (sf)

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    B- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)      BB- (sf)      BBB- (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.

              Rating
Class     To          From
A         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B         AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         A+ (sf)     A- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.

Class         Rating
D             BBB- (sf)
E             B- (sf)


MT. WILSON II: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2 and C notes from Mt. Wilson CLO II Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Western Asset Management Co.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, B, and D notes from the same transaction.  S&P also
removed its rating on the class A-2, B, and C notes from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Feb. 21, 2014.

The transaction ended its reinvestment period in July 2013.  Since
S&P's December 2012 rating actions, the class A-1 note has paid
down $102 million to 56% of its initial issuance amount.  The
senior class A/B overcollateralization (O/C) ratio increased to
132% as of the April 2014 trustee report, from 124% as of the
November 2012 trustee report.  S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating
on the class A-1 notes and raised our ratings on the class A-2 and
C notes to reflect the increased credit support available to these
notes.

Although the senior class A/B O/C ratio increased, the transaction
has notable exposure to assets rated 'CCC' and below and assets
that mature after the transaction's legal maturity date.  Cash
flow runs for the class B notes show sensitivity to market value
assumptions given to the long-dated assets.  Although S&P's top
obligor test constrains the rating on the class D note, its cash
flow runs for this note passes with cushion at its current rating.
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B and D notes to reflect the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Mt. Wilson CLO II Ltd.

                             Cash flow
       Previous              implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating                rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1    AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)    24.94%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)    4.12%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)    8.33%        AA (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)     0.64%        A (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)    2.43%        BB+ (sf)

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied      Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating       rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     A+ (sf)      A (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A- (sf)       BBB- (sf)     A (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Mt. Wilson CLO II Ltd.

              Rating
Class     To          From
A-2       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C         A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Mt. Wilson CLO II Ltd.

              Rating
Class     To          From
B         AA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Mt. Wilson CLO II Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)


NEUBERGER BERMAN XVII: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Neuberger Berman CLO XVII Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO
XVII LLC's $512.750 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 13,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2228%-12.8430%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, that are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses and
      fees; subordinated hedge termination payments; collateral
      manager incentive fees; and subordinated note payments, to
      principal proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XVII Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XVII LLC

Class                    Rating          Amount (mil. $)
X                        AAA (sf)                  4.000
A                        AAA (sf)                338.250
B                        AA (sf)                  74.250
C (deferrable)           A (sf)                   41.250
D (deferrable)           BBB- (sf)                28.875
E (deferrable)           BB- (sf)                 26.125
Subordinated notes       NR                       57.000

NR-Not rated.


NOVASTAR MORTGAGE 2006-1: Moody's Ups Cl. A-2C Debt Rating to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
from Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-1, backed by
Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades of the class A-1A and class A-2C are primarily
due to the improving performance of the related pools and reflect
Moody's updated loss expectations for the pools.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of a prior error.
In previous rating actions, Moody's considered incorrect coupon
rates for the collateral, thereby overstating the amount of excess
spread. The error has now been corrected, and the
rating actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


OCEAN TRAILS I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from Ocean Trails CLO I, a collateralized
loan obligation transaction that closed in November 2006.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the combination notes 1 and
class D notes.  S&P also removed its ratings on all of these
classes of notes from CreditWatch with positive implications,
where it placed them on Feb. 21, 2014.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October 2013 and
the deal is currently in its amortization phase.  Since S&P's
March 2012 rating actions, the class A-1 notes have paid down
$55.40 million and now are at 77.84% of their original balance.
The upgrades reflect the paydowns to the class A-1 notes, which
have helped create additional support for the subordinate notes
and has increased the class A, B, C, and D overcollateralization
ratios since S&P's March 2012 rating actions.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit support available
to the combination 1 and class D notes at the current rating
levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

Ocean Trails CLO I

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion (i)  rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.87%        AAA (sf)
A-2    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    6.51%        AA+ (sf)
B      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  A+ (sf)     5.62%        A+ (sf)
C      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   1.13%        BBB+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    B+ (sf)     6.85%        B+ (sf)
Combo  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   3.70%        BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.


Class                         Feb 2012      May 2014
Notional balance (mil. $)
A-1                            256.99        201.60
A-2                             21.00         21.00
B                               16.50         16.50
C                               13.25         13.25
D                               13.25         13.25

Coverage tests, WAS (%)
A O/C                          119.13        124.16
B O/C                          112.46        115.59
C O/C                          107.61        109.52
D O/C                          103.71        104.06
WAS                              3.53          3.24

WAS-Weighted average spread.
O/C-Overcollateralization test.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
Combo  BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf))

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B      A+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    BBB- (sf)     BB- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       CCC (sf)      B+ (sf)
Combo  BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)      BB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Ocean Trails CLO I

               Rating      Rating
Class          To          From
A-1            AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2            AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B              A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C              BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D              B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
ComboNote1     BB+p (sf)   BB+p (sf)/Watch Pos

P - Principal only.


OZLM VII: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating on $20.8MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by OZLM VII,
Ltd.:

$310,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$190,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$66,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2a Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$40,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2b Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$21,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$50,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$33,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

$20,750,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-
1b, the Class A-2a Notes, the Class A-2b Notes, the Class B-1
Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes
and the Class E Notes (collectively, the "Rated Notes") address
the expected losses posed to the holders of the Rated Notes. The
provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

OZLM VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The underlying collateral pool is expected to be
approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

Och-Ziff Loan Management LP ("Och-Ziff" or the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four and a quarter
year reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted
using principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations or credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $800,000,000

Diversity of 55

WARF of 2750

Weighted Average Spread of 4.0%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 47%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: 0

Class A-1b Notes: 0

Class A-2a Notes: -1

Class A-2b Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1a Notes: -1

Class A-1b Notes: -1

Class A-2a Notes: -3

Class A-2b Notes: -3

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. Moody's assigned
this V Score in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash-flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009, available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


RACE POINT III: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes From BB
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from Race Point III CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Sankaty Advisors LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings
from CreditWatch, where it had placed them with positive
implications on Feb. 21, 2014.

The upgrades reflect post-reinvestment period principal
amortization paydowns to the class A notes.  Since June 2012, when
S&P raised its ratings on five classes, the class A notes have
paid down $212.0 million, reducing the notes to 53.0% of their
original balance and increasing credit support for the subordinate
notes.

As of the April 2014 trustee report, the transaction had $20.1
million (4.9%) of assets from obligors in the 'CCC' rating
category--down from $50.8 million (8.5%) in May 2012.  S&P also
has observed that defaulted assets have increased to $10.2 million
(or 2.5%)--up from $4.0 million (or 1.1%) as of May 2012.  The
transaction's class B, D, and E overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
have improved since May 2012 by approximately 12.1%, 3.5%, and
2.6% respectively.

The transaction holds USD, EUR, and GBP denominated collateral,
and all non-USD collateral is hedged via currency hedges with
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. as the hedge counterparty.  For S&P's
analysis, it ran an additional sensitivity test that factored cash
flow results without the benefit of the currency hedges.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, as well as on recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest and/or ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.
The results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view,
that all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with this
rating action.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether they remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS

Race Point III CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied    Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating     cushion(i)  rating
A      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   23.06%      AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)   11.19%      AAA (sf)
C      A- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)   4.35%       AA+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A (sf)     0.61%       A (sf)
E      BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)  5.81%       BBB+ (sf)

  (i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-
      even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
      cash flow implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RATING ACTIONS

Race Point III CLO Ltd.

              Rating      Rating
Class         To          From
A             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             A (sf)      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BBB+ (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Pos


RALI 2005-QA1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class M-1 Secs. to 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
issued by RALI Series 2005-QA1 Trust. The tranches are backed by
Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RALI Series 2005-QA1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2013 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The ratings upgraded are due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


REGATTA IV: Moody's Assigns '(P)B3' Rating on $10MM Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to nine
classes of notes to be issued by Regatta IV Funding Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$3,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$291,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$79,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class A-
2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$75,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the "Class B
Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$37,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$38,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$33,750,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
"Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the
Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E
Notes, the Class F Notes, and the Combination Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Up to U.S.$349,906,883 Combination Notes, which will be composed
of "Components" representing up to U.S. $291,000,000 Class A-1
Notes and up to U.S $58,906,883 Class B Notes due 2026 (the
"Combination Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf). On the closing date,
the initial aggregate principal amount of the Combination Notes
will be $345,850,000, which will be composed of components
representing $287,626,094 of Class A-1 Notes and $58,223,906 of
Class B Notes.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Moody's rating of the Combination Notes addresses only the
ultimate repayment by their Stated Maturity of principal and
interest at a rate equal to the weighted average interest rate of
the Components, which will be LIBOR plus 1.51% per annum on the
Closing Date.

Regatta IV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans, senior secured bonds, senior unsecured bonds and
letters of credit. The portfolio is expected to be at least 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

Napier Park Global Capital (US) LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may not reinvest
principal proceeds received from repayments or sales.

In addition to the Rated Notes and the Combination Notes, the
Issuer will issue subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates
interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert
interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of
seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.1 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Combination Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Combination Notes: -3


REPACS TRUST: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on 2 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced the following rating action on
REPACS Trust Series Bayshore I:

$35,000,000 Class A Debt Unit, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on
April 1, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

$750,000 Class B Debt Unit, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on
April 1, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

This transaction is a corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CSO) referencing a portfolio of structured finance
assets and six portfolios of corporate senior unsecured bonds,
originally rated in 2004.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating affirmations taken on the CSOs
are due to the resolution of the review for upgrade of MBIA
Insurance Corporation's ratings on May 21, 2014.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt
Obligations" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

These transactions are subject to a high level of uncertainty,
primarily because of 1) unexpected volatility in the credit and
macroeconomic environment; 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of documentation by different transactional parties
because of embedded ambiguities; and 3) unexpected changes in the
portfolio composition as a result of the actions of the
transaction parties.

For CSOs, the performance of the credit default swaps can be
affected either positively or negatively by 1) variations over
time in default rates for instruments with a given rating; 2)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics; and 3) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Given the tranched nature of CSO liabilities, rating
transitions in the reference pool can have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the CSO liabilities that could
lead to a high degree of rating volatility, which is likely to be
higher for the more junior or thinner liabilities.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also conducted sensitivity analyses, discussed below. Results are
in the form of the difference in the number of notches from the
base case, in which a higher number of notches corresponds to
lower expected losses, and vice-versa.

Moody's ran a scenario where no stress relating to potential
losses due from a GIC provider default was applied. The result of
this run is five notches higher than in the base case.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's models explicitly,
rating committees also consider qualitative factors in the rating
process. These qualitative factors include a transaction's
structural protections, recent deal performance in the current
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features and the portfolio manager's track record. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SCHOONER TRUST 2007-7: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. L Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-7 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.2% of the
current balance, compared to 2.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, the same as at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to $261 million
from $428 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 54% of
the pool.

Eight loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $6,223 (for an average loss severity of
1.2%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 3% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $1.3 million (a 15% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 84% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 31%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 78.3%, compared to 79.6%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to 1.60X and 1.40X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 31% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the MTS Building Loan ($37 million -- 14% of the
pool), which is secured by two adjacent office buildings located
in downtown Winnipeg. One of the two buildings serves as MTS
Allstream's corporate headquarters and they occupy 89% with a
lease expiration in 2021. The properties are 100% leased as of May
2014, same as at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.03X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Aviva Insurance Complex Loan ($28
million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by a mixed-use
complex comprised of two office buildings, ground retail and an
industrial building. The property was 93% leased as of May 2014
compared to 100% in March 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
86.2% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 87.7% and 1.11X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Milner Professional Loan ($15
million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by an office
building with ground floor retail tenants. The property was 78%
leased as of May 2014, same as prior review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 77.6% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 79.6%
and 1.22X at the last review.


SDART 2013-5: Principal Payment Error No Impact on Fitch Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SCUSA) notified Fitch Ratings that
the company became aware of an error in the payment and
distribution of principal on the outstanding class A-2-A and A-2-B
notes in the April and May payment periods, issued by Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-5 (2013-5).

SCUSA corrected these errors by making a capital contribution of
$71.25 million to 2013-5, distributed to the class A-2-B notes to
bring these notes to parity with the class A-2-A note balance.
Fitch expects no impact on the performance of the transaction with
this capital contribution, and this error and subsequent
corrective action by SCUSA will not affect any of the outstanding
ratings as listed below.

Under the priority of payments, after payment in full of the class
A-1 notes which occurred in the April 2014 payment date, the class
A-2-A and class A-2-B notes are to be paid principal ratably until
paid in full. However, due to a servicing error by SCUSA,
principal payments were instead made solely to the class A-2-A
notes on the April and May payment dates. This error resulted in
an accelerated payment of principal to the class A-2-A notes, and
delayed payment of principal to the class A-2-B notes.

Of the $71.25 million capital contribution to the class A-2-B
notes, $26.25 million was distributed for the March collection
period/April payment period, and $45.0 million for the April
collection period/May payment period. Further, interest of $7,001
was distributed to the class A-2-A and $22,675 to the class A-2-B
notes, for lost interest payments during the periods mentioned
above. The 2013-5 transaction documents were amended accordingly
to enable such capital contributions to be made by SCUSA to
2013-5.

Additionally, the capital contribution increased the targeted
overcollateralization (OC) amount to 19.98% from the initial OC
target of 15.0%, resulting in an addition of 4.98% credit
enhancement (CE) to all outstanding notes (class A, B, C, D and E
notes) providing further protection against future losses. Total
hard CE for the class A notes is currently 63.91%, up from 45.80%
at closing.

The transaction is currently at an 84.3% pool factor through seven
months, and to date is performing below Fitch's initial cumulative
net loss (CNL) proxy of 16.60%. Through the May collection period,
CNL were at 0.89% since closing in November last year.

Further, SCUSA will be implementing additional processes and will
enhance controls to ensure future payment distributions will
accurately reflect the legal documentation and transaction
structure going forward. Fitch will review these intended changes
and continue to closely monitor the performance and servicing of
the transaction.

SDART 2013-5 Outstanding Ratings:

Class A-2-A notes: 'AAAsf' Outlook Stable
Class A-2-B notes: 'AAAsf' Outlook Stable
Class A-3 notes: 'AAAsf' Outlook Stable
Class A-4 notes: 'AAAsf' Outlook Stable
Class B notes: 'AAsf' Outlook Stable
Class C notes: 'Asf' Outlook Stable
Class D notes: 'BBBsf' Outlook Stable
Class E notes: 'BBsf' Outlook Stable


SENECA PARK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on $40.5MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Seneca Park CLO, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$429,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$64,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$42,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$43,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$40,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$8,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Seneca Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is expected to be approximately
75% ramped as of the closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC, (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $700,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3162)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -4

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


STONE TOWER CDO II: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
A-1LB notes from Stone Tower CDO II Ltd.  At the same time, S&P
lowered its rating on the class A-3L and B-1L notes.  S&P also
removed its rating on the class A-1LB notes from CreditWatch,
where it had placed them with positive implications on Feb. 21,
2014.  Stone Tower CDO II Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation
of collateralized debt obligations (CDO squared) that closed in
October 2005.

The deal is currently in acceleration after an
overcollateralization (O/C)-based event of default was triggered
in August 2009.  Since S&P's February 2012 rating actions, the
remaining balance of the class A-1LA notes' $39.11 million
outstanding was paid off, and the class A-1LB notes' was partially
paid down by $32.65 million.  The class A-LB notes currently has
$12.38 million outstanding, which is 27.51% of its original
balance.  The upgrade reflects the paydowns to the class A-1LB
notes.

The downgrades reflect the unlikelihood that the classes will be
paid off in full by the maturity date.  The class A-2, A-3L, and
B-1L notes are all also currently piking, which has resulted in
lower O/C ratios for each class.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATING RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Stone Tower CDO II Ltd.

                   Rating
Class       To           From
A-1LB       BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS LOWERED

Stone Tower CDO II Ltd.

                   Rating
A-3L        D (sf)       CC (sf)
B-1L        D (sf)       CC (sf)

OTHER RATING OUTSTANDING

Stone Tower CDO II Ltd.

Class      Rating
A-2L       D (sf)


SYMPHONY CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2b, A-3, and B notes from Symphony CLO II Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Symphony Asset Management LLC.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-2a, C, and D notes, and it removed its
ratings on the class A-1, A-2b, A-3, B, C, and D notes from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
April 9, 2014.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the monthly report dated May 15, 2014.

The upgrades reflect a combined paydown to the class A-1 and A-2a
notes, as well as general improvement in the underlying
collateral's credit quality since S&P's May 2012 rating actions.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

The transaction exited its reinvestment period in November 2013.
Since then, the transaction has paid down a collective $33.41
million to the class A-1 and A-2a notes, leaving 88.71% and
85.90%, respectively, of their par balance at issuance remaining.
The combined paydown improved the transaction's class A, B, C, and
D overcollateralization ratios.

The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction's
asset portfolio significantly decreased since S&P's last rating
actions.  According to the May 2014 monthly report, the
transaction held $7.52 million in assets rated in the 'CCC' range,
down from $14.81 million noted in the April 2012 monthly report,
which S&P referenced for its May 2012 rating actions.

Additionally, the transaction's weighted average recovery rate has
improved across all rating levels since May 2012, with the 'AAA'
recovery rate increasing by 2.61%.

According to the May 2014 monthly report, the transaction holds
$2.02 million in underlying collateral obligations it considers in
default, representing approximately 0.59% of the total underlying
collateral obligations.  This was a slight increase from the $1.38
million in defaulted obligations noted in the April 2012 monthly
report.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-
looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to eachof the rated tranches," S&P said.

"Although the results of the cash flow analysis pointed to a 'BBB-
(sf)' rating on the class C notes, we believe that the
aforementioned improvements serve as a basis for an affirmation.
Because the transaction is currently in its amortization period,
we expect it to continue to pay down the rated notes, which, all
else held equal, may continue to increase the
overcollateralization levels.  In addition, because the
transaction currently holds insignificant levels of 'CCC' rated
collateral obligations, we believe the transaction is not
currently exposed to large risks that would impair the class C
notes at their current rating level," S&P added.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY METRICS COMPARISON

Class                      Notional balance (mil. $)
                           April 2012                 May 2014
A-1                        40.00                      35.48
A-2a                       205.00                     176.10
A-2b                       51.00                      51.00
A-3                        33.00                      33.00
B                          22.00                      22.00
C                          16.60                      16.60
D                          14.00                      14.00
Coverage tests and WAS (%)
A I/C                      976.7                      1,009.3
A O/C                      124.1                      126.4
B I/C                      881.5                      884.0
B O/C                      116.3                      117.7
C I/C                      788.5                      758.8
C O/C                      111.1                      111.9
D I/C                      669.2                      603.5
D O/C                      107.0                      107.4
WAS                        4.33                       3.45

WAS-Weighted average spread.
O/C-Overcollateralization test.
I/C-Interest coverage test.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Symphony CLO II Ltd.

                                    Cash flow    Cash flow
          Previous               implied     cushion     Final
Class     rating                 rating      (i)         rating
A-1       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)    0.17%       AAA (sf)
A-2a      AAA (sf)               AAA (sf)    16.73%      AAA (sf)
A-2b      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AAA (sf)    0.17%       AAA (sf)
A-3       AA- (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)    1.05%       AA+ (sf)
B         A- (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)     0.58%       A+ (sf)
C         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)   1.06%       BBB (sf)
D         BB (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)    1.04%       BB (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.  S&P also generated
other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry
correlations to assess the current portfolio's sensitivity to
different correlation assumptions assuming the correlation
scenarios outlined below.

Correlation Scenario   Within industry (%)    Between industries
(%)
Below base case        15.0                   5.0
Base case              20.0                   7.5
Above base case        25.0                   10.0

                      Recovery     Corr.      Corr.
          Cash flow   decrease    increase    decrease
          implied     implied     implied     implied    Final
Class     rating      rating      rating      rating     rating
A-1       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2a      AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2b      AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-3       AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)    AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)
B         A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
C         BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)
D         BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)   BB (sf)

Corr.-Correlation.

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                            Spread          Recovery
           Cash flow    compression    compression
           implied      implied        implied       Final
Class      rating       rating         rating        rating
A-1        AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2a       AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2b       AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3        AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)        A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B          A+ (sf)      A- (sf)        BBB (sf)      A+ (sf)
C          BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)       BB- (sf)      BBB (sf)
D          BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)        B (sf)        BB (sf)

RATINGS LIST

Symphony CLO II Ltd.
                     Rating
Class   Identifier   To         From
A-1     87155FAA4    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2a    87155FAC0    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)
A-2b    87155FAE6    AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3     87155FAL0    AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B       87155FAG1    A+ (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C       87155FAJ5    BBB (sf)   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D       87155EAA7    BB (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos


TIAA STRUCTURED: Moody's Confirms 'Caa3' Rating on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings on notes
issued by TIAA Structured Finance CDO I, Ltd.:

  $387,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
  November 2030 (Current Outstanding Principal: $64,433,791),
  Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  $30,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
  November 2030 (Current Outstanding Principal: $4,988,423),
  Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2014 Caa3 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

TIAA Structured Finance CDO I, Ltd., issued in December 2000, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
RMBS originated in 2001 through 2003.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to low over-
collateralization (OC) ratios and the poor credit quality of the
portfolio. The Class A Notes' collateralization coverage from
performing assets continues to be below par with Moody's
calculated Class A OC ratio currently at 68.60%. Portfolio credit
quality is stable, but low, with a trustee reported WARF of 6566
as of May 2014 versus 6627 as of May 2013.

The actions also reflect updates to Moody's SF CDO methodology
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published on
March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering the
resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps we apply to deals experiencing
event of default.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A-1
Notes and Class A-2 Notes announced on March 6, 2014. At that
time, Moody's said that it had placed the ratings on review for
upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates as non-investment-grade, especially if they
jump to default. Because of the deal's lack of granularity,
Moody's supplemented its analysis with a individual scenario
analysis.

5) Lack of ratings or other credit information: A significant
proportion of the portfolio is comprised by investments which do
not have credit ratings or other credit assessments from Moody's.
Although the low speculative-grade ratings currently assigned to
the issuer's notes are not strongly correlated to the likelihood
of default or the loss severity experienced upon a default by the
investments without Moody's credit ratings or other credit
assessments, Moody's ability to maintain ratings on the notes may
be adversely impacted by any increases in the exposure to such
investments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (WARF 1307):

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Caa ratings notched down by two notches (WARF 2310):

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0


TRAPEZA CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Note Classes to B3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd:

  $21,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes due November 16, 2034, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
  previously on July 31, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  $59,350,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes due November 16, 2034, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
  previously on July 31, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $39,500,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
  Notes due November 16, 2034 (current balance of $43,206,815
  including interest shortfall), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously
  on July 31, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  $56,500,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating
  Rate Notes due November 16, 2034 (current balance of $62,087,919
  including interest shortfall), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously
  on July 31, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

  $155,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes due November 16, 2034 (current balance of
  $28,168,875), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 31, 2013
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Trapeza CDO VI, Ltd., issued in April 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1A notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since July 2013.

The Class A-1A notes have paid down by approximately 30% or $11.9
million since July 2013, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Two assets, with a total par of $9.4 million,
redeemed at par in December 2013 and January 2014. The Class A-1A
notes' par coverage has thus improved to 677.2% from 486.4% since
July 2013, by Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's May
2014 report, the over-collateralization ratios of the Class A and
Class B notes are 171.3% and 90.82%, respectively, compared to
July 2013 levels of 164.9% and 88.0%, respectively. The Class A-1A
notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess
interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in
the collateral pool.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 867, from
939 in July 2013. The total par amount that Moody's treated as
having defaulted or deferring declined to $68.0 million from $73.0
million in July 2013. In October 2013, one previously deferring
bank with a total par of $5.0 million resumed making interest
payments on its TruPS.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $204.5
million, defaulted/deferring par of $68 million, a weighted
average default probability of 18.76% (implying a WARF of 867), a
Moody's Asset Correlation of 20.28%, and a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 10.0%. In addition to the
quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs," published in May 2011.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the ratings
of the notes to the volatility of these credit assessments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction's portfolio using CDOROM(TM)
v.2.12-2 to develop the default distribution from which it derives
the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter. Moody's then used the
parameter as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge. CDOROM
v.2.12-2 is available on www.moodys.com under Products and
Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains trust preferred securities
issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks and that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q4-2013
financial data.

In addition to the base case, Moody's conducted a number of
sensitivity analyses of the results to certain key factors driving
the ratings. Moody's analyzed the sensitivity of the model results
to changes in the portfolio WARF (representing an improvement or
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral pool).
Increasing the WARF by 363 points from the base case of 867 lowers
the model-implied rating on the Class A-1B notes by one notch from
the base case result; decreasing the WARF by 100 points raises the
model-implied rating on the Class A-1B notes by one notch from the
base case result.

Moody's also conducted two additional sensitivity analyses, as
described in "Sensitivity Analyses on Deferral Cures and Default
Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs," published in August 2012. In
the first analysis, Moody's gave par credit to banks that are
deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy other credit
criteria and thus are highly likely to resume interest payments;
in this case, Moody's gave par credit to $9.0 million of bank
TruPS.

In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative
default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood
of a large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on
all of the rated notes (in terms of the difference in the number
of notches versus the current model-implied output, in which a
positive difference corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Sensitivity Analysis 1: Par Credit Given to Deferring Banks

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: +1

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Sensitivity Analysis 2: Alternative Default Timing Profile

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: +1

Class A-2: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0


TRAPEZA CDO X: Moody's Raises Rating on $31MM Class Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza CDO X, Ltd.:

  $268,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Floating Rate Notes due
  July 6, 2041 (current balance of $155,432,591), Upgraded to
  Baa1 (sf); previously on April 10, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  $69,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Floating Rate Notes due
  July 6, 2041, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on April 10, 2013
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  $31,000,000 Class B Third Priority Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rates Notes due July 6, 2041 (current balance including interest
  shortfall of $32,429,916), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
  April 10, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of bank, insurance and real
estate trust preferred securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios and resumption of interest payments of
previously deferring assets since September 2013.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 3.4% or $5.4
million since September 2013, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. In addition, two previously deferring
securities with a total par of $13 million have resumed making
interest payments on their TruPS in September and December 2013.
The Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to 177.8%, by
Moody's calculations. Based on the trustee's May 31, 2014 report,
the over-collateralization ratio of the Class A, B, C, D notes
were 126.1%, 110.2%, 87.0% and 72.5%, respectively, compared to
September 2013 levels of 122.1%, 107.0%, 85.0% and 71.5%,
respectively. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from
the diversion of excess interest and the unscheduled proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $276.3
million, defaulted/deferring par of $113.7 million, a weighted
average default probability of 36.71% (implying a WARF of 1884, a
Moody's Asset Correlation of 11.10%, and a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 9.62%. In addition to the
quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. Moody's
considers the structural protections in the transaction, the risk
of an event of default, recent deal performance under current
market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs," published in May 2011.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the ratings
of the notes to the volatility of these credit assessments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction's portfolio using CDOROM(TM)
v.2.12.2 to develop the default distribution from which it derives
the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter. Moody's then used the
parameter as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.
CDOROM(TM) v. 2.12.2 is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains trust preferred securities
issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on
FDIC Q1-2014 financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance
team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance
firms' annual statutory financial reports. For REIT TruPS that do
not have public ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit
quality using the REIT firms' annual financials.

In addition to the base case, Moody's conducted a number of
sensitivity analyses of the results to certain key factors driving
the ratings. Moody's analyzed the sensitivity of the model results
to changes in the portfolio WARF (representing an improvement or
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral pool).
Increasing the WARF by 316 points from the base case of 1884
lowers the model-implied rating on the Class A-1 notes by one
notch from the base case result; decreasing the WARF by 84 points
raises the model-implied rating on the Class A-1 notes by one
notch from the base case result.

In its sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on all
of the rated notes (in terms of the difference in the number of
notches versus the current model-implied output, in which a
positive difference corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Default Timing Profile

Class A-1: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0


TRIMARAN CLO VI: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
A-3L notes from Trimaran CLO VI Ltd., a U.S. cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Trimaran Advisors LLC.  S&P also removed it from CreditWatch,
where it placed it with positive implications on April 9, 2014.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1L, A-
1LR, A-2L, B-1L, and B-2L notes.

The transaction is in its amortization phase and continues to pay
down the class A-1L and A-1LR notes, which are pari passu.  The
current balances of the class A-1L and A-1LR notes are about 26%
of their original balances, down from about 46% in November 2013
when S&P last took a rating action on the transaction.

The lower balances of the notes improved the overcollateralization
(O/C) available to support the notes.  According to the May 20,
2014, monthly trustee report:

   -- The senior class A O/C ratio (measured at the class A-2L
      notes) was 177.29%, up from 142.46% in October 2013, which
      S&P used for its November 2013 rating actions after
      factoring the paydowns on Nov. 1, 2013.

   -- The class A O/C ratio (measured at the class A-3L notes) was
      141.08%, up from 124.79% in October 2013.

   -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 127.38%, up from 117.15% in
      October 2013.

   -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 114.09%, up from 109.12% in
      October 2013.

In addition, the transaction's exposure to defaulted assets
declined since S&P's November rating action.  Per the May 2014
monthly trustee report, there are no defaults in the portfolio
(versus $2.7 million par of defaults in October 2013).

The upgrades are primarily due to increased credit support.  The
affirmations reflect the availability of adequate credit support
at their current rating level.

The ratings on the class A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes were affected
by the application of S&P's largest obligor default test, one of
two supplemental tests that S&P introduced as part of its revised
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  S&P
applied the supplemental tests to address event risk and model
risk that might be present in rated transactions.  The largest
obligor default test assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (excluding excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults based on the
ratings on the underlying assets with a flat recovery.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the May
2014 trustee report, to estimate future performance.  Our cash
flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected
default timing, pattern, and recoveries under various interest-
rate and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, we considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest and  ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with this rating action," S&P noted.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes to assess
whether they remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Trimaran CLO VI Ltd.

                             Cash flow
         Previous            implied     Cash flow   Final
Class    rating              rating      cushion(i)  rating
A-1L     AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)    33.50%      AAA (sf)
A-1LR    AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)    33.51%      AAA (sf)
A-2L     AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)    30.48%      AAA (sf)
A-3L     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    4.61%       AA+ (sf)
B-1L     BBB+ (sf)           AA+ (sf)    1.45%       BBB+ (sf)
B-2L     BB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)   5.38%       BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                   Recovery   Correlation Correlation
        Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
        implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class   rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1L    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-1LR   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2L    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-3L    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
B-1L    AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)   AA- (sf)    AA+ (sf)    BBB+(sf)
B-2L    BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                       Spread        Recovery
         Cash flow     compression   compression
         implied       implied       implied       Final
Class    rating        rating        rating        rating
A-1L     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-1LR    AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2L     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-3L     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)
B-1L     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
B-2L     BBB+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)

RATING RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Trimaran CLO VI Ltd.

                   Rating
Class        To           From
A-3L         AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Trimaran CLO VI Ltd.

Class        Rating
A-1L         AAA (sf)
A-1LR        AAA (sf
A-2L         AAA (sf
B-1L         BBB+ (sf)
B-2L         BB+ (sf)


TRINITAS CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Trinitas CLO II Ltd./Trinitas CLO II LLC's $381.625
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of June 17,
2009.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's and designated successor manager's
      experienced management teams.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of a certain amount
      of excess interest proceeds available before paying deferred
      interest on the class F notes; uncapped administrative
      expenses and fees; subordinated hedge termination payments;
      subordinated management fees; asset manager incentive fees;
      and subordinated note payments; during the reinvestment
      period, at the collateral manager's discretion, as principal
      proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets or to pay
      principal on the notes according to the principal payment
      sequence.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Trinitas CLO II Ltd./Trinitas CLO II LLC

Class                    Rating                Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                        AAA (sf)               3.625
A-1                      AAA (sf)             173.750
A-2                      AAA (sf)              75.000
B-1                      AA (sf)               44.750
B-2                      AA (sf)               19.000
C (deferrable)           A (sf)                22.000
D (deferrable)           BBB (sf)              20.250
E (deferrable)           BB (sf)               17.500
F (deferrable)           B (sf)                 5.750
Combination notes(i)     AA (sf)              218.500
Subordinated notes       NR                    34.500

  (i) Combination notes consist of an aggregate amount of up to
      $218,500,000, comprising $173,750,000 of the class A-1 notes
      and $44,750,000 of the class B-1 notes.  On the closing
      date, the issuer expects to the maximum amount of
      $218,500,000 of combination notes outstanding.  The
      individual components of the combination notes are included
      in the outstanding amount of the related components and will
      earn interest in the same manner as the related components.
      The component amounts outstanding can vary, subject to
      conditions as described in the indenture.
  SDR-Scenario default rate.
  NR- Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C27: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X-C Certs to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes and downgraded the ratings on two classes in Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2006-C27 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on four P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one P&I class was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-C) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.8% of
the current balance, compared to 12.3% at Moody's last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 37, compared to 36 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $2.1 billion
from $3.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 124 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 44%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 0.1% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

Fifteen loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $124.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 34%). Twenty-five loans, constituting 26% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Glendale Center Loan ($125.0 million -- 6.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a 382,841 square foot (SF) office
building located in Glendale, California. The property was 77%
leased as of December 2013 compared to 78% at last review. The
lender took title in August 2012 via a consensual foreclosure.

The remaining 24 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, retail, industrial, multifamily, mixed use and hotel
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $211.6 million loss for
24 of the 25 specially serviced loans (48% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 20 poorly
performing loans, constituting 14% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $50.9 million (a 17% expected loss based on a
52% probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 61% of the
pool, and full year 2013 operating results for 81% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95.2%, compared to 95.0%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 9.2% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 1.07X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 19% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One Illinois Center Loan ($143.7 million -- 7%
of the pool), which is secured by a one million SF office building
located in the East Loop office submarket of downtown Chicago,
Illinois. The property was 81% leased as of January 2014 compared
to 79% at last review. In 2011 the property's largest tenant,
Health Care Service Corp. (23% of the property's net rentable area
(NRA)), exercised its early termination option and paid an early
termination fee. Since that time, Bankers Life and Casualty signed
a long-term lease for 134,724 SF (13% of NRA). Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.81X, respectively, compared to 118%
and 0.80X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Simon Property Group Premium
Outlets Pool II Loan ($137.3 million -- 7% of the pool), which
represents a 50% pari passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by three factory outlet centers totaling 1.5
million SF. The centers are located in Williamsburg, Virginia;
Hagerstown, Maryland and Birch Run, Michigan. At year end 2013,
the portfolio was 97% leased, the same as at last review. Simon
Property Group acquired the three subject properties as part of
its August 2010 acquisition of 21 Prime Outlet Malls. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 79%
and 1.24X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 500-512 Seventh Avenue(1) Loan
($114.0 million -- 6% of the pool), which represents at 50% pari
passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
three office buildings located in the Garment District of Midtown
Manhattan, New York. The properties are 86% leased as of April
2014 compared to 91% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 84% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.10X at the
last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C28: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO Certs to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of ten classes
and downgraded the rating of one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C28 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on classes A-1A, A-4, A4-FL, A-M and AJ were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class IO) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.0% of the
current balance compared to 13.0% at Moody's last review. The
pool's realized losses have increased to 7.3% of the original
pooled balance from 2.4% at last review and Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 12.3% of the original pooled
balance compared to 13.7% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30 compared to 35 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $2.25
billion from $3.60 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 155 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
45% of the pool. One loan, constituting less than 1.0% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Forty-four loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $261 million (for an
average loss severity of 39%) on the pooled certificates. Four
loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate $30.3 million loss for
specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans, constituting 23% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $98.6 million (a 19% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 and full or partial year 2013
operating results for 98% of the pool. Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 102% compared to 113% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes defeased loans, specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 0.94X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent approximately 25% of the pool. The
largest loan is The Gas Company Tower Loan ($229.0 million --
10.2% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$458.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.3
million square foot (SF) Class A office building located in
downtown Los Angeles, California. Occupancy has continued to
decline since 2012 and as a result the loan is on the watchlist
due low occupancy and DSCR. The largest tenant, Southern
California Gas Company (33% net rentable area (NRA), lease
expiration in October 2026), significantly reduced both its space
and base rent in November 2011. Additionally, a tenant
representing 8% of NRA vacated in November 2011 and Morrison &
Forrester LLP (which leased nearly 11% of the NRA) vacated in
September 2013. As of March 2014 the property was 68% leased
compared to 76% at last review and 82% in December 2011. The loan
sponsor is now Brookfield Office Properties. The loan is interest
only for the entire term and has an actual NOI DSCR of 0.99X based
on the year to date September 2013 financials. Due to the
declining occupancy and poor performance, Moody's views this as a
troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 155% and 0.59X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the 1180 Peachtree Street Loan ($193.9
million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 669,700 SF
Class A office building located in Atlanta, Georgia. The largest
tenant is King & Spalding, which leases 66% of the NRA through
March 2021. As of March 2014 the property was 93% leased compared
to 94% in December 2012. Property performance has improved due an
increase in rental revenue from scheduled rent increases. The loan
is interest only throughout its entire term and matures in October
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 0.84X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Newport Bluffs Loan ($132.0 million
-- 5.9% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$264.0 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1,052
unit multifamily property in Newport Beach, California. The
property was 94% leased as of March 2014 and performance has
continued to improve over the past three years due to increased
rental revenue. The loan is interest only throughout its entire
term and matures in October 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 113% and 0.79X, compared to 125% and 0.72X at last review.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C29: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class A-J Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C29, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

The affirmations of the principal- and interest-paying classes
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current ratings.  The
affirmations also reflect S&P's analysis of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets, the
transaction-levelchanges, and the liquidity support available to
the classes.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class IO certificates
based on its criteria for rating interest-only securities.

Credit Enhancement Levels

As of the May 16, 2014, trustee remittance report

Class                                   Credit enhancement (%)
A-4                                     35.26
A-1A                                    35.26
A-M                                     22.28
A-J                                     10.60
B                                       9.62
C                                       8.33
D                                       7.19
IO                                      N/A

N/A-Not applicable.

RATINGS LIST

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C29

                               Rating           Rating
Class        Identifier        To               From
A-4          92978PAE9         AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-1A         92978PAF6         AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
IO           92978PAG4         AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
A-M          92978PAH2         BBB- (sf)        BBB- (sf)
A-J          92978PAJ8         B (sf)           B (sf)
B            92978PAK5         B- (sf)          B- (sf)
C            92978PAL3         CCC (sf)         CCC (sf)
D            92978PAM1         CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C33: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 10 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 21 classes
of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C33 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A-PB through A-J were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes B through P were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.4% of
the current balance compared to 13.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.2% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 12.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade structured credit assessments with the conduit
model credit enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's
incorporates negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the
structured credit assessment level) for loans with similar
structured credit assessments in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25, compared to 26 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the May 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to $2.52
billion from $3.60 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 135 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 52% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
2% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments. One loan, constituting less than 1% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Thirty-seven loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $76 million (for an average loss
severity of 7%). Sixteen loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Central / Eastern Industrial Pool ($87 million -- 4%
of the pool), which is secured by 13 industrial properties
totaling 2.1 million square feet located across several U.S.
states. The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2010 for
imminent default. The servicer reported occupancy of 77% for the
portfolio as of May 2014, unchanged from Moody's prior review.
Negotiations with the borrower are ongoing while the servicer
dual-tracks foreclosure.

The remaining 15 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $176 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (58% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 21 poorly
performing loans, constituting 16% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $102 million (a 26% expected loss based on a
53% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full year 2013 operating results for 91% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 114%, compared to 113% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3 %.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.38X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 0.91X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the High
Bluff Ridge at Del Mar Loan ($33 million -- 1% of the pool), which
is secured by an office property located approximately 20 miles
north of downtown San Diego. The property consists of three, low-
rise, Class A buildings constructed in 2005. The property was 93%
occupied as of December 2013, compared to 92% reported at Moody's
last review. The third largest tenant, occupying 11% of the
property's net rentable area (NRA) recently renewed its lease
through 2019. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are baa3 (sca.pd) and 1.42X, respectively, unchanged from the
last review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Lawndale Estates Loan ($7 million -- less than 1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 673-unit manufactured housing community in
Saginaw, Michigan. Occupancy was 80% as of December 2013. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and
2.02X, respectively, compared to a2 (sca.pd) and 2.15X at the last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 28% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 666 Fifth Avenue Loan ($258
million -- 10% of the pool),which represents a pari-passu interest
in a $1.22 billion first mortgage loan, secured by a 1.5 million
square foot office tower in Midtown Manhattan. In December 2011,
as part of a modification, the original loan was bifurcated into
$1.1 billion A-Note and a $115 million B-Note. The B-Note interest
was reduced to 0%, while the A-Note interest pay rate was
initially reduced to 3%. The current A-Note pay rate is 4.5% and
the pay rate increases annually until it returns to the original
6.353%. The property was recapitalized with $110 million of new
equity as part of the modification. The borrower contributed $30
million, while Vornado contributed $80 million. The property was
87% leased as of March 2014 compared to 82% in September 2012 and
77% in December 2011. The loan returned to the master servicer in
March 2012 and is performing under the modified terms. Moody's
considers the B Note ($37.4 million) as a troubled loan and
recognized a significant loss against it. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR for the modified A-Note are 138% and 0.63X, respectively,
unchanged from the last review.

The second largest loan is the Ashford Hospitality Pool 6 Loan
($254 million -- 10% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
portfolio of three full-service hotels located in Florida, Texas
and Washington State. Portfolio financial performance has improved
steadily into the economic recovery, with RevPar increasing to
$135.20 in 2013, up from $127.63 in 2012 and $120.37 in 2011.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 126% and 0.94X, respectively,
compared to 129% and 0.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Independence Mall Loan ($200 million
-- 8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a regional mall in
Independence, Missouri, approximately 10 miles east of downtown
Kansas City. The mall's anchors are JC Penney, Sears, and
Dillard's. Dillard's owns its own space. Total mall occupancy was
94% as of year-end 2013. Comp inline sales for the center were
$340 per square foot. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and,
0.83X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.84X at the last
review.


WG HORIZONS I: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from WG Horizons CLO I.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class D notes.  S&P also
removed its ratings on class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where it had placed them
on Feb. 21, 2014.  WG Horizons CLO I is a collateralized loan
obligation transaction that closed in May 2006.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2013, and the
deal is currently in its amortization phase.  Since S&P's June
2012 rating actions, the class A-1 notes have paid down $103.46
million and are now at 65% of their original balance.  The
upgrades reflect the paydowns to the class A-1 notes, which helped
create additional support for the subordinate notes.  The
improvements are also evident in the increased A, B, C, and D
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since our June 2012 rating
actions.

The affirmation reflects sufficient credit support available to
the notes at the current rating level.

S&P also noted that, as of the April 2014 trustee report, the
transaction has roughly 7.42% of long-dated assets that have a
maturity later than the legal final maturity of the transaction in
May 2019.  Therefore, the transaction could be exposed to market
value risk at maturity.  S&P took this into account in its review.
The cash flow results indicated a downgrade on the class D notes;
however, S&P affirmed the class at its current rating due to the
increased O/C ratios and stability in the overall credit quality
of the underlying pool.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the
notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to
support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS COMPARISON

WG Horizons CLO I

                           Cash flow
        Previous            implied     Cash flow    Final
Class   rating              rating      cushion(i)   rating

A1      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    17.40%       AAA (sf)
A2      AA (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    1.42%        AAA (sf)
B       A- (sf)/Watch Pos   AA (sf)     0.02%        AA- (sf)
C       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)   3.11%        BBB+ (sf)
D       BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)     3.54%        BB- (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

Notional balance (mil.$)

Class                       May 2012             Apr 2014

A-1                         296.00               192.54
A-2                         24.00                24.00
B                           21.00                21.00
C                           16.00                16.00
D                           12.00                12.00

Coverage tests (%)

A O/C                       119.85              130.31
B O/C                       112.47              118.79
C O/C                       107.43              111.30
D O/C                       103.93              106.27
WAS (%)                     3.55                3.28

WAS-Weighted average spread.
O/C-Overcollateralization test.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)

Below base case               15.0                     5.0
Base case                     20.0                     7.5
Above base case               25.0                    10.0


                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating

A1     AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A2     AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)    A+ (sf)    A+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)    B- (sf)    B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A1     AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A2     AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)      AA- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)     AA- (sf)
C      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)       CC (sf)       BB- (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

WG Horizons CLO I

                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA- (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
C           BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

WG Horizons CLO I

Class       Rating
D           BB- (sf)


ZAIS CLO 1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Zais
CLO 1 Ltd./Zais CLO 1 LLC's $284.20 million floating-rate notes
following the transaction's effective date as of May 5, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The effective date for a
CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, and in combination with
the transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether the current
ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit quality of
the assets, the credit enhancement available to support the notes,
and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Zais CLO 1 Ltd./Zais CLO 1 LLC

Class                  Rating                    Amount
                                               (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                  187.40
A-2                    AA (sf)                    39.10
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                     21.30
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                   15.10
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                    12.70
E (deferrable)         B (sf)                      8.60
Combination notes(i)   AA (sf)                   226.50
Subordinated notes     NR                         25.70

(i) The original principal amount of the individual components of
    the combination notes is included in, and not in addition to,
    the original principal amount of the related class A-1 and A-2
    notes.
NR-Not rated.


ZAIS INVESTMENT X: S&P Affirms 'CC' Rating on 3 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on all
rated notes from Zais Investment Grade Limited X.  S&P removed the
class A-1a, A-1b, A-2, A-3, and A-4 notes from CreditWatch, where
it had placed them with positive implications on Jan. 24, 2014.
Zais Investment Grade Ltd. X, a collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction predominantly backed by tranches from
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), is managed by Zais Group
LLC.

S&P last took rating actions on this transaction in March 2013,
when it upgraded various notes.  Since then, the class S notes
have fully redeemed, while the class A-1 notes have paid down to
50.51% of their initial balance.  As of the May 2014 trustee
report, the transaction held $37.63 million of defaulted assets,
down from $62.68 million in February 2013.

Despite the liability paydowns and improvement in credit quality,
the class C and D overcollateralization (O/C) tests continue to
fail, while the class D notes continue to defer on their interest
payments.

The transaction has a provision in its waterfall to allocate
principal proceeds to pay the deferred interest balance on the
subordinated notes before paying down the senior notes, as long as
the O/C ratios above them are passing.  On the May 2014 note
valuation report, $7.44 million of principal proceeds was used to
pay the deferred interest balance of the class B notes, while the
class A-1a and A-1b notes only received $282,362 and $222,917,
respectively, as principal paydowns.

The ratings affirmation on all the rated tranches reflects credit
support that is commensurate with the current rating levels.
Although there has been a notable increase in credit enhancement
since our rating action last year, the improvements were not
sufficient to support a higher rating at this time because of the
previously mentioned reasons and the sensitivity of the
transaction's cash flows to the amortization of the assets.

RATING ACTIONS

Zais Investment Grade Limited X

                       Rating
Class              To           From

A-1a               A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1b               A- (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3                BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
A-4                BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                  CC (sf)      CC (sf)
C                  CC (sf)      CC (sf)
D                  CC (sf)      CC (sf)


* Fitch Cuts Rating on 177 Bonds in 106 RMBS Deals to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 177 distressed bonds in 106 U.S. RMBS
transactions to 'Dsf'.  The downgrades indicate that the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down.  Of the bonds downgraded to
'Dsf', 172 classes were previously rated 'Csf' and five classes
were rated 'CCsf'.  All ratings below 'CCCsf' indicate a default
is likely.

As part of this review, the Recovery Estimates (REs) of the
defaulted bonds were not revised.  In addition, the review focused
only on the bonds which defaulted and did not include any other
bonds in the affected transactions.

Of the 177 classes affected by these downgrades, 107 are Prime, 37
are Alt-A, and 23 are Subprime.  The remaining transaction types
are other sectors.  Approximately, 54% of the bonds have an RE of
50%-100%, which indicates that the bonds will recover 50%-100% of
the current outstanding balance, while 21% have an RE of 0%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

All of the affected classes had incurred a principal write-down
and are expected to endure additional losses in the future.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover
any material amount of lost principal in the future there is a
limited possibility this may happen.  In this unlikely scenario,
Fitch would further review the affected class.

The actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch analysts.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 2001-2005 SF CDOs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six classes and affirmed 98 classes of
notes from 22 structured finance CDOs with exposure to various
structured finance assets that were securitized between 2001 and
2005.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades to the class A-1 notes of Glacier Funding CDO II and
class B notes of Pasadena CDO, Ltd are attributed to significant
deleveraging of the capital structure since the transaction's last
review.  The notes have received $35 million and $30.4 million,
respectively, over the last year.  The notes have benefited from
increased credit enhancement (CE) levels and are now able to
withstand losses consistent with a 'Asf' and 'BBsf' rating,
respectively, according to Fitch's Structured Finance Portfolio
Credit Model (SF PCM) analysis.

Similarly, the upgrades to the class I-MM from Northlake CDO I,
Ltd./Corp. and class A-2 in Solstice ABS CDO III, Ltd are the
result of the continued deleveraging of the capital structure.
The class I-MM and A-2 notes have received $10.7 and
$16.7 million, respectively, and are able to withstand losses at
the 'CCCsf' rating stress category.

Class A-2 from Pacific Bay CDO, Ltd./Inc. and class B from MKP CBO
III were upgraded to 'CCCsf' and 'Csf', respectively, as they have
repaid their previously defaulted interest and are now current on
their interest and have begun to pay down.

Class A-1 from RFC CDO II Ltd. was affirmed at 'Bsf'.  The
increase in the CE to this class as a result of principal
amortization offset the deterioration in the underlying portfolio.

For transactions in which losses projected at the 'CCCsf' rating
stress exceeded CE levels of the most senior class of notes, the
CE levels were compared to the expected losses (EL) from
distressed assets (assets rated 'CCsf' and lower).  For classes of
notes whose CE levels were higher than EL, the ratings were
affirmed at 'CCsf'.

For 83 classes of notes, the EL already exceeded the notes' CE
levels or the notes were undercollateralized.  For these classes,
in Fitch opinion, default is inevitable and they were affirmed at
'Csf'. In addition, class A-1MM of Commodore CDO II, Ltd. was
affirmed at 'Csf' due to the principal proceeds being used to pay
interest to the class, despite its CE levels exceeding the EL.

Ten classes, affirmed at 'Dsf', are non-deferrable classes that
continue experiencing interest payment shortfalls.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative migration and defaults beyond those projected could lead
to downgrades for the six transactions analyzed under the SF PCM.
The remaining 16 transactions have limited sensitivity to further
negative migration given their highly distressed rating levels.
However, there is potential for non-deferrable classes to be
downgraded to 'Dsf' should they experience any interest payment
shortfalls.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  None of the
transactions have been analyzed within a cash flow model
framework, as the effect of structural features and excess spread
available to amortize the notes were determined to be minimal.


* Moody's Takes Action on $760 Million of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 23 tranches
from 10 transactions issued by various trusts, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AQ1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AQ2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 10, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-EC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE5

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 7, 2013
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-CB4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 13, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL1

Cl. I-A1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. I-A2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. I-A3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 9, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-WF2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in April 2014 from 7.5%
in April 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $520 Million of Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 20 tranches
from 11 transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-7

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-B

Cl. M5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 9, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WCH1

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012 Confirmed
at C (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-A

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
7.5% in April 2013 to 6.3% in April 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $402MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2003-2008
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 24
tranches and upgraded the ratings of five tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers. In addition,
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of four tranches issued by
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
Series 2006-8. The resecuritization is backed by Class A-2 issued
by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-21 which is backed by
Jumbo loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-C Trust

Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2006-2 Trust

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2008-A Trust

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-6

Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 15, 2012
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-10

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-21

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-35, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-39, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2006-8

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-8

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. C-B-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-1A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-X-1B, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments/fast liquidations.

The actions on the resecuritization reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pool backing CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2005-21 and Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying
RMBS bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in November 2013 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $145MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2004
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
issued by miscellaneous issuers. The tranches are backed by Alt-A
RMBS loans issued in 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-3

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-11

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR9

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 5-M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1-A-8, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-9, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-10, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-11, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-12, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-14, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
ratings upgraded reflect the buildup of credit enhancement to the
underlying bonds through overcollateralization and excess spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in April 2014 from 7.5%
in April 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $109MM RMBS Issued From 2003 to 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches and downgraded the ratings of five tranches from six
transactions backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-14

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2013
Affirmed Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-5

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-22A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-34A

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR13
Trust

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR10

Cl. A-1-B, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are a result of improving
collateral performance and credit enhancement available to bonds.
The ratings downgraded are due to weaker collateral performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are
another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house
prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than Moody's
expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $73MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005 to 2006
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from two subprime
transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The downgrade action on Meritage
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2's class M2 bond primarily reflects
correction of a prior error. In the August 2013 rating action,
incorrect interest shortfall data was used in Moody's analysis.
The error has now been corrected, and the rating action reflects
this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in April 2014 from 7.5%
in April 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Lowers Rating on $43.5MM RMBS Issued 2002 to 2004
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of twelve
tranches issued by miscellaneous issuers. The tranches are backed
by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2002 and 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-18

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-PP, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2013
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR2

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2013 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR3

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2013
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of performance on the underlying
pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.
The rating downgrades are due to the weak performance of the
underlying collateral.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $33MM RMBS Issued 1996 to 2007
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of five tranches
on review for possible downgrade and upgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by two RMBS transactions. The collateral backing
these deals primarily consists of first lien, fixed and adjustable
rate "scratch and dent" residential mortgages.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-SP2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 24, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Mtg Sec Inc 1996-06

B-1, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

B-2, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 28, 2013 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

B-3, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 10, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

B-4, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Sep 10, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

X-1, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 14, 2012 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structure, non-
amortizing subordinate bond, overcollateralization, and
availability of excess spread. Performance has remained generally
stable from Moody's last review.

Moody's has also placed five tranches from the Bear Stearns Mtg
Sec Inc 1996-06 transaction on review for possible downgrade
because Moody's has learned that delinquency information regarding
this transaction has been omitted from monthly remittance reports
furnished by the trustee. As a result, information used by Moody's
in its prior rating action on June 28, 2013 may not have been
accurate. The servicer has indicated that it will provide the
missing delinquency information for the Bear Stearns Mtg Sec Inc
1996-06 to Moody's and to the trustee; Moody's anticipates taking
final action on these bonds after the receipt of this information.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.3% in May 2014 from 7.5% in
May 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 6.5%
to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central scenario
could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Lowers Rating on 254 Classes From 180 RMBS Transactions to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 254
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 180 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2001 and 2008 to 'D (sf)'.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the principal write-
downs' impact on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  Before the rating actions, S&P rated each of these
classes either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)'.

The 254 defaulted classes represent the following collateral:

   -- 115 from prime jumbo transactions (45.27%);
   -- 94 from Alternative-A transactions (37.00%);
   -- 20 from subprime transactions (7.87%);
   -- 10 from RMBS negative amortization transactions (3.94%);
   -- Seven from small balance commercial transactions;
   -- Four from Federal Housing Administration/Veterans Affairs
      transactions;
   -- Two from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transaction; and
   -- Two from outside-the-guidelines transactions.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and it will adjust its ratings
as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.



                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
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equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
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related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez,
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