TCR_Public/140420.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, April 20, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 108

                             Headlines

ACCESS GROUP: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B-'
AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB Rating on D Notes
APIDOS CDO III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
APIDOS QUATTRO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR10: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Notes Classes to D

BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to D
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M-3 Notes
CEDAR FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
COLONY MORTGAGE 2014-FL1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2003-CPN1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-X Certs Rating to Caa3
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to D
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 2006-CD2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Certs Rating to C
FIRST UNION 2001-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO Certs to 'C'

FIRST UNION 2001-C4: Moody's Hikes Class P Certs' Rating to 'B3'
GALLATIN CLO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. B-2L Notes' Rating to Ba1
GEMSTONE CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on $25MM Class B Notes to B3
GREYWOLF CLO III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
JFIN MM CLO 2014: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

LANDMARK IX: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
MADISON PARK V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes' Rating to B1
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-CANADA: DBRS Hikes Class K Certs Rating to 'B'
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP5: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. M Notes to BB+

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Class G Notes
MT WILSON II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $32MM Class D Notes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XI: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
OHA CREDIT IX: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
SSB RV TRUST 2001-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D

STONEGATE MORTGAGE: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable
TELOS CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
TRAPEZA CDO V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $13MM Class Notes to Caa3
TRINITAS CLO I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
WASHINGTON MILL: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on $11.25MM Notes

ZAIS INVESTMENT IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'B3'

* Moody's Takes Action on $942MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
* Moody's Hikes Rating on $208MM of RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
* Moody's Hikes Rating on $133MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2004
* Moody's Hikes Rating on $50MM of Subprime RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $30MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2005-2006

* S&P Puts 25 Tranches on Watch Neg. Following Updated Criteria
* S&P Affirms 198 Ratings on Trusts From 9 Originators


                             *********

ACCESS GROUP: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered two ratings and
affirmed 19 ratings on seven asset-backed securities (ABS) trusts
issued by Access Group Inc.  At the same time, S&P removed three
ratings from CreditWatch, where it had placed them with negative
implications on July 8, 2013, and Jan. 21, 2014.

The lowered ratings and affirmations reflect S&P's view of the
collateral performance, the remaining credit enhancement, and the
trust structures and payment priorities.  The classes currently
benefit from credit enhancement consisting of
overcollateralization, excess spread, and funds in a reserve
account.

DEFAULT EXPECTATIONS AND NET LOSS PROJECTIONS

Table 1 details our projections for the performance for these
pools of private student loans.  S&P expects future recovery rates
of 25%-35% of the dollar amount of cumulative defaults.

Table 1
         Projected lifetime     Projected remaining
         defaults (i)           Cumulative net loss (ii)
Series   (%)                    (%)
2001     15-17                  2.71-7.56
2002-A   15-17                  3.32-7.59
2003-A   14-16                  3.07-7.16
2004-A   14-16                  4.18-8.11
2005-A   15-17                  4.90-8.70
2005-B   12-13                  5.66-8.45
2007-A   16-18                  5.94-9.35

(i) Projected lifetime cumulative defaults: as a percentage of
     initial collateral balance plus any prefunding.
(ii) Projected remaining cumulative net loss: as a percentage of
     November 2013 collateral balance.

Table 2
                            90-plus days
          Forbearance (i)   delinquent (i)    As of
Series    (%)               (%)
2001      1.62              1.49              January 2014
2002-A    1.51              1.20              February 2014
2003-A    1.80              1.22              February 2014
2004-A    2.25              1.23              February 2014
2005-A    2.81              1.75              December 2013
2005-B    1.80              1.21              December 2013
2007-A    2.84              1.36              January 2014

(i) As a percentage of current collateral balance.

Table 3
          Reported         Reported
          total parity     senior parity      As of
Series    (%)               (%)
2001      102.47           111.95             January 2014
2002-A    100.58           117.45             February 2014
2003-A    100.80           141.56             February 2014
2004-A    101.97           139.65             February 2014
2005-A    102.27           123.62             December 2013
2005-B    103.00           130.13             December 2013
2007-A    103.00           126.72             January 2014

CASH FLOW MODELING ASSUMPTIONS

Based on a loan-level collateral file provided by the issuer, S&P
rans midstream cash flows.  The following are some of the major
assumptions we modeled:

   -- Four-year straight-line default curves, as well as a 10-year
      straight-line default curve in some scenarios.

   -- Recovery rates in the 25%-35% range and received over five
      years.

   -- Various prepayment speed scenarios, starting at
      approximately three constant prepayment rate (CPR; an
      annualized prepayment speed stated as a percentage of the
      current loan balance) and ramping up 1% per year to a
      maximum rate ranging from 5-8 CPR depending on the rating
      scenario.  S&P held the applicable maximum prepayment rate
      constant for the remainder of the deal's life.

   -- Forbearance: depending on the series ranged from 4% to 7% of
      the loans are in forbearance for 12 months.

   -- Stressed interest rate vectors at the respective rating
      categories.

   -- Auctions failed for the life of each transaction. (S&P
      determined the coupons for the auction rate security based
      on the applicable "maximum rate" definition in the
      transaction documents.)

Additionally, S&P rans scenarios for the 2002-A and 2004-A
transactions, in which the issuer optionally redeemed the class B
notes, and scenarios in which the issuer continued to pay the
notes sequentially.  S&P did not observe a material difference in
the results from these scenarios, because its stress scenarios in
which the class B was optionally redeemed quickly breached
performance triggers that caused the deals to revert to sequential
pay structures.  The issuer has indicated that it plans to pay the
senior and subordinate classes sequentially in the 2003-A deal;
and accordingly, S&P assumed that the deal continued to pay
sequentially between class A and class B for the purposes of S&P's
cash flow assumptions.

CASH FLOW MODELING RESULTS

Series 2001

At closing, the 2001 trust had two pools of loans that supported
two separate groups of notes.  Access Group Inc. exercised its
call right on the pool consisting of Federal Family Education Loan
Program loans guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Education.  The
issuer used proceeds from the call to pay the corresponding notes
in full in February 2012.  Currently, this trust consists
primarily of notes backed by non-cosigned private loans provided
to graduate students.

This deal is currently allocating payments pro rata to the class
IIA-1 and class IIB notes.  The class IIA-1 reported that senior
parity was approximately 112% as of January 2014.  The transaction
reprioritizes subordinate interest if the senior parity falls
below 100%; and the deal is required to pay sequentially if the
senior parity falls below 100% or if the cumulative default ratio
among the private loans exceeds 17%.

This deal called for mandatory redemptions starting in August
2011, so releases are no longer being distributed to the issuer.
This will generally enable both senior and total parity levels to
grow.  However, the senior parity and total parity levels have
actually decreased marginally.  As of January 2014, the reported
senior parity and reported total parity were approximately 111.95%
and 102.47%, respectively -- a slight decrease from 112.17% and
102.66%, respectively, as of April 2012.  This decrease indicates
that there is not enough excess spread for the parity to benefit
from the full turbo feature of this deal.  This was a contributing
factor in our class II-B CreditWatch placement.

Based on the results of stressed cash flow runs that take into
account the collateral's performance and the trust's available
credit enhancement, S&P has affirmed its 'BBB (sf)' and 'B+ (sf)'
ratings, respectively, on the senior and subordinate debt.  S&P
has also removed its rating on the subordinate notes from
CreditWatch Negative.

Series 2002-A

The series 2002-A trust directs available funds (subsequent to
senior fee and bond interest payments) to the senior
auction/variable-rate notes until the senior parity and total
parity levels reach 110.0% and 101.5%, respectively.  The issuer
may then make payments to the subordinate auction/variable-rate
bonds as long as the above-noted thresholds are maintained.  The
transaction can also release to the issuer when total parity is
above 102%.  In addition, the transaction must reprioritize
interest payments from the subordinate bonds to make principal
payments to the senior bonds if the senior parity falls below
100%; and it must allocate the principal payments sequentially if
total parity falls below 101%.

S&P originally placed the class A-2 notes on CreditWatch with
negative implications on July 8, 2013, and the class B notes on
CreditWatch with negative implications on Jan. 21, 2014.  Both
CreditWatch placements reflected a significant decrease in
available credit enhancement since our last rating action in June
2012, when S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the A-2 notes,
and in September 2012, when it lowered its rating on the class B
notes to 'B (sf)'.

"At the time of our last review, we had expected senior parity to
continue to increase as long as the issuer allocated payments
sequentially (which it had historically done).  Instead, between
August 2012 and May 2013, the issuer chose to exercise its rights,
as permitted under the documents, to redeem subordinate bonds
instead of senior bonds. As a result, reported senior parity
declined to its lowest point--116.63%--as of the quarter ended May
2013, compared with 127.84% as reported for the quarter ended May
2012.  Since then, the trust has reverted back to paying the class
A-2 sequentially, and the reported senior parity increased
incrementally to 117.45% as of February 2014.  Additionally, we
saw reported total parity decrease to 101.30% in May 2013 from
102.85% in August 2012. However, unlike the senior parity, it has
continued to decrease since then, and it stood at 100.58% reported
as of February 2014," S&P said.

"We expect the reported senior parity to continue to increase
slowly, as the issuer has indicated that it will continue to pay
the class A-2 notes sequentially.  Further, with the level of
reported total parity below the 102% threshold, it is unlikely
that the issuer will have the option to pay the class B notes.
Given the downward trend of total parity, we believe the class B
could become undercollateralized in the next three years.  We
lowered our ratings on the class A-2 notes to 'AA -(sf)' from 'AAA
(sf)' and lowered our ratings on the class B notes to 'B- (sf)'
from 'B (sf)', based on the decreased level of credit enhancement
relative to our expected cumulative net losses.  We also removed
both ratings from CreditWatch Negative," S&P said.

2003-A and 2004-A

The structures for the 2003-A and 2004-A deals, similar to the
2002-A deal, direct available funds (subsequent to senior fee and
bond interest payments) to first pay principal to the senior LIBOR
notes for the 2004-A notes and then pay the senior
auction/variable-rate notes until the senior parity and total
parity levels reach 110% and 101.5%, respectively.  The issuer
then has the option to make payments to the subordinate
auction/variable-rate bonds.  The transaction can release amounts
in excess of 102% parity to the issuer.  Interest is reprioritized
to make principal payments to the senior bonds if the senior
parity falls below 100%; and the deals are required to pay
principal sequentially if total parity falls below 101%.  Although
the Series 2003-A total parity has decreased since S&P's last
review, the performance of the collateral and paydown of notes
continues to be within the range of our current expectations for
this series, along with the Series 2004-A.  The remaining credit
enhancement in our stressed runs was commensurate with S&P's
current ratings.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings on all of
the classes in these series.

Series 2005-A, 2005-B and 2007-A

The liabilities for the 2005-A, 2005-B, and 2007-A transactions
are LIBOR-based, and the deals paid sequentially until they
reached their step-down dates (October 2011, November, 2011, and
August 2013).  Subsequent to the respective step-down dates, the
deals have paid pro rata to the class A and class B notes.  The
transactions reprioritize subordinate class interest to pay
principal to senior classes if the senior parity falls below 100%;
and the deals are required to allocate principal payments
sequentially if total parity falls below 101%. Release thresholds
decrease throughout the deal to levels in which amounts in excess
of 103% parity can be released to the issuer.

The performance of the collateral and paydown of notes continues
to be within S&P's current expectations.  The remaining credit
enhancement in S&P's stressed runs is commensurate with its
current ratings.  Therefore, S&P affirmed its ratings on all of
the classes in these series.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of the student loan
receivables backing these transactions relative to S&P's
cumulative default expectations and the available credit
enhancement.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes series 2002-A
                    Rating
Class      To               From
A-2        AA- (sf)         AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B          B- (sf)          B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Access Group Inc.
Floating-rate student loan asset-backed notes series 2001
                    Rating
Class      To               From
II-B       B+ (sf)          B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Access Group Inc.
Floating rate student loan asset-backed notes, series 2001
Class      Rating
IIA-1      BBB (sf)

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes, series 2003-A
Class      Rating
A-2        AAA (sf)
A-3        AAA (sf)
B          BB (sf)

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes, series 2004-A
Class      Rating
A-2        AAA (sf)
A-3        AAA (sf)
A-4        AAA (sf)
B-1        BB (sf)
B-2        BB (sf)

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes, series 2005-A
Class      Rating
A-2        AA (sf)
A-3        AA (sf)
B          BB (sf)

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes, series 2005-B
Class      Rating
A-2        AA+ (sf)
A-3        AA+ (sf)
B-2        BB (sf)

Access Group Inc.
Private student loan asset-backed notes, series 2007-A
Class      Rating
A-2        AA (sf)
A-3        AA (sf)
B          BB (sf)


AMERICAN CREDIT 2014-2: S&P Assigns Prelim BB Rating on D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-2's
$259.17 million asset-backed notes series 2014-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 14,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 59.2%, 48.8%, 39.9%, and
      37.0% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
      respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of more than 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.35x, and 1.25x its 27.00%-
      28.00% expected net loss range for the class A, B, C, and D
      notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that
      it believes is appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would
      remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary
      'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings, and the ratings on the class
      C and D notes would remain within two rating categories of
      its preliminary 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade
      within the first year for 'AA', and a two-rating category
      downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures,
      which include performance triggers.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2014-2

Class   Rating    Type           Interest        Amount
                                 rate       (mil. $)(i)
A       AA (sf)   Senior         Fixed           149.29
B       A (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed            50.77
C       BBB (sf)  Subordinate    Fixed            44.71
D       BB (sf)   Subordinate    Fixed            14.40

(i) The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
     pricing date.


APIDOS CDO III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from Apidos CDO III Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Apidos
Capital Management LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch, where
they were placed with positive implications on Jan. 22, 2014.  At
the same time S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1
notes.

The upgrades of the class A-2, B, C, and D notes mainly reflect
paydowns to the class A-1 notes and a subsequent increase in the
credit support available to support all of the notes.  Since S&P's
July 2013 rating actions, the transaction has paid down the class
A-1 notes by approximately $46.2 million, including principal
distributions from the March 12, 2014, payment date.  These
paydowns reduced the class A-1 notes to 29.27% of their original
balance.

In addition, the upgrades also reflect an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support all of the notes,
primarily due to the aforementioned paydowns.  The trustee
reported the following increased O/C ratios in the February 2014
monthly report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 143.20%, compared with 127.66% in
      May 2013;

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 124.81%, compared with 116.86% in
      May 2013;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 114.52%, compared with 110.32% in
      May 2013; and

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 109.37%, compared with 106.91% in
      May 2013.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1 notes to
reflect the available credit support consistent with the current
rating level.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them, and will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Apidos CDO III Ltd.

                    Rating
Class   CUSIP       To          From
A-1     03761KAA6   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2     03761KAC2   AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B       03761KAE8   AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C       03761KAG3   BBB+ (sf)   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D       03761HAA3   BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos


APIDOS QUATTRO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from Apidos Quattro CDO, a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Apidos
Capital Management LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch, where
they were placed with positive implications on Jan. 22, 2014.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A notes and a
subsequent increase in the credit support available to support all
of the notes.  Since S&P's January 2012 rating actions, the
transaction has paid down the class A notes by approximately
$102.2 million, reducing the class A notes to 60.98% of their
original balance.  Although the transaction is no longer in its
reinvestment period, it can still reinvest credit risk, credit-
improved, and prepaid collateral proceeds after the reinvestment
period as long as certain conditions are met, which S&P considered
in its analysis.

In addition, the upgrades also reflect an improvement in the
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support all of the notes,
primarily due to the aforementioned paydowns.  The trustee
reported the following increased O/C ratios in the March 2014
monthly report:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 134.14%, compared with 122.59%
      in October 2011;

   -- The class C/D O/C ratio was 115.05%, compared with 110.84%
      in October 2011; and

   -- The class E direct pay O/C ratio was 108.80%, compared with
      106.70% in October 2011.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Apidos Quattro CDO

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)        19.33%   AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)         5.96%   AAA (sf)
C      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)         2.92%   AA+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)          1.03%   A (sf)
E      BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)         6.22%   BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation
Scenario         Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                 15.0                     5.0
Base case                       20.0                     7.5
Above base case                 25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA (sf)      AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)    A- (sf)    A- (sf)      A+ (sf)     A (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
D      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)      A (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      B- (sf)       BB+ (sf)

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them, and will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Apidos Quattro CDO

                  Rating
Class        To           From
A            AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B            AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C            AA+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D            A (sf)       BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E            BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Issuer:             Apidos Quattro CDO
Co-issuer:          Apidos Quattro CDO Inc.
Collateral manager: Apidos Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:        Morgan Stanley
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO

CLO-Collateralized loan obligation.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-PWR10: S&P Cuts Rating on 3 Notes Classes to D
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10 , a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from the
same transaction, including the class X-1 interest-only (IO)
certificates.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

S&P's lowered ratings on the class A-J, B, and C certificates
reflect its belief that the credit enhancement available for the
classes is lower than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement required for the current rating levels.  S&P's
analysis also considered the anticipated credit enhancement
erosion upon the resolution of the specially serviced assets and
the deterioration in performance of the collateral, including
three of the top 10 assets that are currently with the special
servicer.  Additionally, S&P lowered its ratings on the class D,
E, and F certificates to 'D (sf)' because it expects the
accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.

S&P's affirmations of the ratings on the class A-3, A-4, A-1A, A-
AB, and A-M certificates reflect its belief that the credit
enhancement available for these classes will be within its
estimated necessary credit enhancement requirement for the current
outstanding ratings.  The affirmation of S&P's 'AAA (sf)' rating
on the class X-1 IO certificates reflects its current criteria for
rating IO securities.

RATINGS LOWERED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Rating       Rating             Credit
Class         To           From            enhancement (%)

A-J           B- (sf)      BB (sf)                11.86
B             B- (sf)      BB- (sf)               10.90
C             CCC- (sf)    B+ (sf)                 9.47
D             D (sf)       B (sf)                  8.35
E             D (sf)       B- (sf)                 7.55
F             D (sf)       CCC (sf)                6.28

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class              Rating                      Credit
                                            enhancement (%)
A-3                AAA (sf)                     34.81
A-4                AAA (sf)                     34.81
A-1A               AAA (sf)                     34.81
A-AB               AAA (sf)                     34.81
A-M                A- (sf)                      22.06
X-1                AAA (sf)                       N/A

N/A--Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR18: S&P Cuts Rating on 2 Note Classes to D
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D(sf)'
from 'CCC-(sf)' on the class E and F commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-PWR18, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The downgrades follow principal losses detailed in the April 11,
2014, trustee remittance report.  The principal losses resulted
from the liquidation of the Southlake Mall asset, which was with
the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.  According to
the report, the Southlake Mall asset liquidated at a 65.1% loss
severity, or $43.0 million in principal losses, of its beginning
trust balance of $66.1 million.  Consequently, the class E
certificates incurred $3.6 million in principal losses, or 14.2%
of the class' original principal balance.  The class F
certificates incurred $18.8 million in principal losses, or 100%
of the class' original principal balance.  The class G
certificates, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)', also
experienced a principal loss that reduced the class' outstanding
principal balance to zero.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-4: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Carlyle
Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd./Carlyle Global Market
Strategies CLO 2013-4 LLC's $377.7 million floating- and fixed-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Feb. 20, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market Strategies CLO 2013-4 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                       1.20
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     122.00
A-2                        AAA (sf)                     130.00
B-1                        AA (sf)                       24.00
B-2                        AA (sf)                       20.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        31.75
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      21.75
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       18.50
F (deferrable)             B (sf)                         8.50


CBA COMMERCIAL 2004-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M-3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2004-1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on three P&I Classes were affirmed due to sufficient
credit subordination levels in respect to Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on three below investment grade P&I Classes are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and realized loss and thus
are affirmed.

The rating of the IO Class is affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. Small balance transactions, which represent less than
1% of the Moody's rated conduit/fusion universe, have generally
experienced higher defaults and losses than traditional conduit
and fusion transactions.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 22.9% of
the current balance compared to 13.7% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.5% of the original
pooled balance compared to 13.2% at last review.

Factors That Would Lead To An Upgrade Or Downgrade Of The Ratings

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration and an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Due to limited current financial performance data of the
collateral Moody's analysis also incorporated a loss and recovery
approach in rating the P&I classes in this deal since 21% of the
pool is in special servicing and performing conduit loans only
represent 53% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. For the conduit loans
without the current financial data Moody's took into consideration
the current market condition, the values of the collateral and
overall market trends. Given dated property level financials,
Moody's also considered the past performance of the pool with
respect to defaults and losses.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 48 compared to 60 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 25, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 80% to $20.4
million from $102.0 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 33%
of the pool. The pool is characterized by both geographic and
property type concentrations. Approximately 78% of the conduit is
secured by multi-family properties; a combined 70% of the conduit
is located in California, Arizona, Connecticut, and Illinois. All
of the loans are fully amortizing.

There are no loans currently on the watchlist. Forty-five loans
have been liquidated from the pool since securitization, resulting
in an aggregate $10.1 million loss (67% loss severity on average).
Currently there are 8 loans, representing 21% of the pool, in
special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $2.6 million
loss (60% expected loss on average) for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans, representing 25% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $1.6 million loss (30% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) for the troubled loans. Currently 9% of
the pool is delinquent compared to 12% at last review.


CEDAR FUNDING III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Cedar Funding III CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding III CLO LLC's
$347.50 million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 10,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.000%-12.753%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cedar Funding III CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding III CLO LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                185.00
A-F                    AAA (sf)                 50.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                  37.50
B-F                    AA (sf)                  14.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   24.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 19.50
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  17.50
Subordinated notes     NR                       41.50

NR-Not rated.


COLONY MORTGAGE 2014-FL1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its rating to Colony
Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1 Ltd./Colony Mortgage Capital
Series 2014-FL1 LLC.'s $190.6 million floating-rate notes.  (The
aggregate principal balance of $190.6 million includes $34.5
million of unsecured subordinate income notes that we did not
rate.)

The transaction is a floating-rate note issuance backed by 11
commercial mortgage loans.  The first-mortgage loans are secured
by the fee and leasehold interests in 13 properties across 10
states.  The loans are all floating-rate based on one-month LIBOR,
with interest rate spreads ranging from 5.5% to 7.25%, averaging
6.27% over LIBOR, with LIBOR rate caps ranging from 1.0% to 3.0%,
and fully extended loan terms range from two to five years from
the origination date.  The loans feature in-place cash management
agreements with lock boxes into which tenants (if applicable) pay
rents directly; this feature provides the lender with access to
property-level cash flows before the borrower or sub-debt lenders
receive any distributions.  All of the loans afford the borrower
at least one one-year extension option, subject to certain tests,
such as a minimum property-level cash flow test and replacement of
the interest rate cap agreement.

The ratings assigned to the class A through F notes reflect:

   -- The credit support provided by the transaction structure;

   -- S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics;

   -- Loan-level liquidity provided by the servicer, with the note
      administrator as back-up liquidity provider;

   -- The collateral pool's relative diversity;

   -- The underlying borrowers' interest rate cap agreements;

   -- The legal structure of the underlying mortgage borrowers,
      including bankruptcy remoteness;

   -- The legal structure of the transaction, including the
      bankruptcy remoteness of the issuer and co-issuer; and

   -- S&P's overall qualitative assessment of the transaction.

The transaction's cash flows are derived from principal and
interest payments on the underlying mortgage loans.  In addition,
the transaction benefits from the servicer's requirement to make
loan-level advances of principal and interest (P&I), as well as
property protection advances, to the extent that such advances are
deemed recoverable.  If the servicer fails to make a P&I advance,
the note administrator is required to make such advance by noon on
the related note payment date. If the servicer fails to make a
property protection advance when due, the note administrator is
required to make such property protection advance within five
business days following such failure.  This advancing feature
makes it more likely that the transaction's deferrable interest
notes, classes C, D, E, and F, will receive timely payment of
interest.

Standard & Poor's determined that the collateral pool has, on a
weighted-average basis, a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 114.3% and
a debt service coverage (DSC) ratio of 0.93x.  S&P's DSC is based
on the maximum LIBOR rate per each loan's interest rate cap
agreement, plus the corresponding loan spread.

S&P's property evaluation results and loan-level credit
enhancement for the full pool appear in a supplemental
publication, "Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1 Ratings
Assignment--Appendix," to be published immediately following the
release of this report.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1 Ltd./
Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1 LLC

Floating-rate notes

Class             Rating                 Amount (mil. $)

A                 AAA (sf)                        78.131
B                 AA-                             19.294
C                 A-                              13.578
D                 BBB-                            15.245
E                 BB                              12.863
F                 B                               16.912
Income notes      NR                              34.539

NR-Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE 2003-CPN1: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-X Certs Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
rating of one class in Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
2003-CPN1 as follows:

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily
on an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 31% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the two below investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with expected recovery
of principal and interest from liquidated and troubled loans.

The ratings on IO class AY was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

The rating on IO Class AX was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit performance of its referenced classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 20% of the
current balance compared to 14% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.2% of the
original pooled balance compared to 10.0% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to 7 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $51 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 36% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 99% of the pool. The pool contains nine
loans, representing 3% of the pool, that are secured by
residential cooperative properties, primarily located in New York
City. One of the co-op loans, representing 0.6% of the pool, has
defeased and is collateralized by U.S. Government securities. The
co-op loans have a Aaa credit estimate, the same as last review.

Three loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $93.0 million (64% loss severity on
average). No loans are in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly-
performing loans representing 41% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $8.8 million loss (42% expected loss based on a 62%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full-year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 54%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 68% compared to
approximately 97% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.74X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.52X and 1.14X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 69% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Northgate Mall Loan ($18 million
-- 36% of the pool), which is secured by 576,000 square feet (SF)
of a regional mall in Cincinnati, Ohio. Major tenants Macy's and
Burlington Coat Factory. The mall was 85% leased as of September
2013 compared to 76% as of last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 80% and 1.43X, respectively, same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Signature Place Apartments Loan
($11.3 million -- 22% of the pool), which is secured by a 414-unit
garden apartment complex located in Marietta, Georgia. The loan
was previously in special servicing and returned to the master
servicer in September 2013 following a loan modification. The
modified loan closed on March 15, 2013 and resulted in an A/B note
split in conjunction with a $3.1 million equity investment by the
borrower. The B-Note outstanding balance is $5.0 million. The
property was 85% leased as of January 2014 compared to 84% leased
as of March 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 125% and
0.83X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the 261-267 Boston Road Loan ($5.7
million -- 11% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 97,000 SF
Class B office flex complex in Billerica, Massachusetts in north
suburban Boston. The property was 71% leased as of February 2014
compared to 67% as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 109% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.86X at
the last review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C5: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'.

S&P lowered the rating due to accumulated interest shortfalls that
it expects to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  The
accumulated interest shortfalls on class K have been outstanding
for 11 consecutive months.

According to the March 17, 2014, trustee remittance report, the
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $108,387.  They were primarily
a result of appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER)
amounts of $54,581 related to six ($44.0 million; 3.7%) of the
seven ($47.8 million; 4.1%) assets that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners LLC; special servicing fees of
$28,880; and workout fees of $24,084.  The current interest
shortfalls affected all bonds subordinate to and including class
K.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Notes to D
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  Concurrently, S&P lowered its rating on the class G
certificates from the same transaction to 'D (sf)'.  Lastly, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven classes, including its 'AAA (sf)'
rating on the class A-X interest-only (IO) certificates, from the
same transaction (see list).

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades on the class A-J, B, and C certificates reflect
Standard & Poor's expected available credit enhancement for these
classes, which S&P believes exceeds our most recent estimate of
the necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.
The upgrades also reflect S&P's views regarding available
liquidity support, the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral, and the deleveraging of the transaction.

"We lowered our rating on the class G certificates to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  As of the March 17, 2014,
trustee remittance report, the trust experienced monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $41,600, driven primarily by $27,445 in
special servicing fees, $7,241 in rate reductions from loan
modifications, $2,862 in workout fees, $1,327 in liquidation fees,
and $1,218 in reimbursement for interest on advances.  The current
monthly interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class G, which has accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for five consecutive months," S&P said.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmations also reflect S&P's views of the
available liquidity support, the transaction-level changes, and
the collateral's current and future performance.  In addition,
S&P's analysis also considered the magnitude of nondefeased
performing loans maturing in 2014 and 2015 (113 loans; $599.2
million, 69.9%).

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X IO
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

RATINGS RAISED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4
                Rating
Class        To         From     Credit enhancement (%)
A-J          AA+ (sf)   A- (sf)                   12.91
B            A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                 10.20
C            BBB+ (sf)  BBB (sf)                   8.65

RATING LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4
                Rating
Class        To         From     Credit enhancement (%)
G            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)                  0.52

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C4
Class        Rating              Credit enhancement (%)
A-5          AAA (sf)                             33.87
A-5M         AAA (sf)                             23.75
A-1-A        AAA (sf)                             23.75
D            BB+ (sf)                              5.94
E            BB- (sf)                              4.01
F            CCC+ (sf)                             2.07
A-X          AAA (sf)                               N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE 2006-CD2: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Certs Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of ten classes
and downgraded four classes in Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, CD
2006-CD2 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the six investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the four below investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The ratings on the three below investment grade P&I classes were
downgraded due to realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans that are higher than Moody's had
previously expected.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.1% of
the current balance compared to 11.5% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.5% of
the original pooled balance compared to 14.9% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 81, compared to 88 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to $2.1 billion
from $3.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 173 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 25% of the pool. Four loans, representing
2% of the pool have defeased and are secured by US Government
securities.

Thirty-six loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $236 million (58% loss severity on
average). Fourteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Rock
Pointe Corporate Center Loan ($61 million -- 3.0% of the pool),
which is secured by four office buildings totaling 566,000 square
feet (SF), in Spokane, Washington. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in July 2009 for delinquent payments. The
Borrower filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2011. Counsel
is pursuing Noteholder's rights and remedies and the State of
Washington statutory Notice of Default was served on January 6,
2014. The property was 84% occupied as of August. The servicer has
recognized a $32.5 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $197.6 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (56% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for sixteen poorly-
performing loans representing 9.8% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $39.2 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full-year 2012 operating results for 99% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 47%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96% compared to 101% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 1.02X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 9% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the SunTrust Center Loan ($77.0
million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 646,000 SF
office complex located in Orlando, Florida. The property consists
of a 30-story Class A office tower, a seven-story office building
and an eight-story atrium. Occupancy as of September 2013 was 77%
compared to 68% as of December 2012. SunTrust Bank, the largest
tenant, vacated over half the net rentable area (NRA) when its
lease expired in 2008. It now occupies 125,000 SF. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 139%
and 0.74X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Sunset Media Tower Loan ($52.5
million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 314,000 SF
Class A office building on Sunset Boulevard, located in Hollywood,
California. The property was 80% leased as of June 2013 and 85%
leased as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77%
and 1.33X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Stadium Gateway Loan ($52.0 million
-- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 273,000 SF Class A
office building located in Anaheim, California adjacent to Anaheim
Stadium. The property was 91% leased as of October 2013 compared
to 61% leased as of March 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
141% and 0.71X, respectively.


FIRST UNION 2001-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. IO Certs to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of three
classes and downgraded one class in First Union National Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-C2 as follows:

Cl. N, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the three P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to the decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 41% of the
current balance compared to 38% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the
original pooled balance compared to 2.1% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 89% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Description of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $23.8
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 11% to
32% of the pool. There are no loans with investment grade credit
assessments and no defeased loans.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of our ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $12.4 million (12% loss severity on
average). Four loans, representing 89% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 610 Weddell
Loan ($7.6 million -- 32% of the pool), which is secured by a
63,000 square-foot industrial flex property in Sunnyvale,
California. The property became real estate owned (REO) in August
2011 and is currently 100% vacant following the loss of its former
single tenant. According to the special servicer, the property is
under contract for sale, with a closing date no later than
November 2014. The servicer has not recognized an appraisal
reduction for this loan.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $9.6 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a slight default probability for the sole
performing loan in the pool, the Rite Aid Palm Desert B note Loan
($7.6 million -- 11% of the pool) and has estimated minimal loss
from this loan.


FIRST UNION 2001-C4: Moody's Hikes Class P Certs' Rating to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class in First Union National Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-C4 as follows as follows:

Cl. P, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IO-I, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 34% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the weighted
average rating factor or WARF of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 39% of the
current balance compared to 43% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 71% of the pool is in
special servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 29%
of the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that it expects will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Description of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $16 million
from $979 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 6% to
36% of the pool. No remaining loans are defeased and no remaining
loans have investment grade credit assessments.

One loan, representing 23% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $13.4 million (11% loss severity
on average). Two loans, representing 71% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Lincoln Place Loan ($5.8 million -- 36% of the pool), which is
secured by a 43,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Santa Fe, New Mexico. The property became REO in June 2012. The
property is currently 77% occupied. The servicer has recognized an
approximately $667,000 appraisal reduction for this loan.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail
property. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (50% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full-year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 100%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91%. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.43X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The two performing conduit loans represent 29% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Dixie Farm Business Park Loan
($3.8 million -- 23% of the pool), which is secured by a 124,000
SF outlet mall in Houston, Texas. Property occupancy was 93% as of
August 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 92% and 1.17X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens -- Moreno Valley, CA Loan
(approximately $933,000 -- 6% of the pool) which is secured by a
15,000 SF single tenant retail building leased to Walgreens
located in Moreno Valley, California. The loan is fully amortizing
over a 20 year term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and
3.07X, respectively, compared to 36% and 2.89X at last review.


GALLATIN CLO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Cl. B-2L Notes' Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gallatin CLO III 2007-1 Ltd.:

$33,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on March 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$24,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on March 14, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$15,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
A3 (sf); previously on March 14, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

$15,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf); previously on March 14, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$253,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $122,056,698), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on March 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

Up To $60,000,000 Class A-ILR Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
2021 (current outstanding balance of $28,946,252), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on March 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf).

Gallatin CLO III 2007-1 Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization (OC) ratios after the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in May 2013. The Class A-1L and A-1LR notes
have been paid down by approximately 52% or $162 million since May
2013. Based on the trustee's March 2014 report, the OC ratios for
the Class A-1L/A-2L, Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L notes are
reported at 141.6%, 124.9%, 116.3% and 108.8%, respectively,
versus May 2013 levels of 122.0%, 113.9%, 109.4% and 105.2%,
respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1944)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +1

Class B-1L: +3

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2916)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-1LR: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor (WARF), diversity score and the
weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published
methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.
In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $260.5 million,
no defaulted par, a weighted average default probability of 16.3%
(implying a WARF of 2430), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.5%, a diversity score of 36 and a weighted average
spread of 3.2%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GEMSTONE CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on $25MM Class B Notes to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Gemstone CDO Ltd.:

$143,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due December 2034
(current outstanding balance $824,429), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on January 18, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$40,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due December 2034
(current outstanding balance $1,153,048), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on January 18, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due December 2034,
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on January 18, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Gemstone CDO Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS and ABS
assets originated in 2003 and 2004.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since April 2013. The Class A notes have
paid down by approximately 88% or $14.1 million since April 2013.
Based on the March 2014 trustee report, the over-collateralization
ratio of the Class B Notes is 126.97% versus April 2013 level of
114.33%. Moody's notes that a large proportion of the principal
proceeds used to pay down the Class A Notes were attributable to
sales of defaulted assets. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries on these defaulted assets benefitted the Class A Notes.

The deal also benefitted from the updates to Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps Moody's apply to deals
experiencing event of default.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. Although the commercial
real estate property markets are gaining momentum, consistent
growth will be unlikely until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. The residential real estate property market
is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

4)Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a large
obligor Moody's rates Caa3, especially if it jumps to default.
Because of the deal's lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented
its analysis with a individual scenario analysis.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (910):

Class A-1: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +2

Caa ratings notched down by two rating notches (1607):

Class A-1: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0


GREYWOLF CLO III: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Greywolf CLO III Ltd./Greywolf CLO III LLC's $584.125
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 10,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through overcollateralization, excess spread, and the
      subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to pay timely interest and
      ultimate principal on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2356%-12.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Greywolf CLO III Ltd./Greywolf CLO III LLC

Class                   Rating             Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)                   385.250
A-2                     AA (sf)                     66.000
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                      54.375
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                    33.125
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)                     28.000
E (deferrable)          B (sf)                      17.375
Subordinated notes      NR                          56.700

NR-Not rated.


JFIN MM CLO 2014: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to JFIN MM
CLO 2014 Ltd./JFIN MM CLO 2014 LLC's $257.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is CLO transaction backed by a revolving pool
consisting primarily of middle-market senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of middle market speculative-grade senior secured
      term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned   ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.2281%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

JFIN MM CLO 2014 Ltd./JFIN MM CLO 2014 LLC

Class                 Rating              Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A                     AAA (sf)            170.00
B                     AA (sf)              24.00
C (deferrable)        A (sf)               22.50
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)             18.00
E (deferrable)        BB (sf)              22.50
Subordinated notes    NR                   52.00

NR-Not rated.


LANDMARK IX: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, D, and E notes from Landmark IX CDO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Sound
Harbor Partners LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch, where they
were placed with positive implications on Jan. 22, 2014.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1
notes from the same transaction.

The upgrades mainly reflect the continued pay downs to the class
A-1 notes and a subsequent increase in the overcollateralization
(O/C) available to support the notes.

S&P's last rating action on the transaction was in January 2013,
when it raised its rating on the class C notes.  Since then, the
transaction has ended its reinvestment period and is paying down
the class A-1 notes.

The current balance of the class A-1 note is $170.1 million,
approximately 62% of its original balance.  This is down from
$274.5 million (100% of the original balance) in January 2013.

The lower class A-1 note balance improved the O/C ratios.
According to the March 2014 monthly trustee report, the O/C ratios
are as follows:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 135.27%, up from a reported
      125.67% in November 2012, which S&P used for its January
      2013 rating actions;

   -- The class C O/C ratio was 118.87%, up from a reported
      114.53% in November 2012;

   -- The class D O/C ratio was 111.67%, up from a reported
      109.27% in November 2012; and

   -- The class E O/C ratio was 105.36%, up from a reported
      104.59% in November 2012.

In addition, the transaction continues to have a low level of
defaults in its portfolio: $1.97 million par according to the
March 2014 monthly trustee report, compared with $1.92 million par
in November 2012).

The affirmation reflects the availability of adequate credit
support at the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Landmark IX CDO Ltd

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied     Cash flow    Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A-1    AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)    31.38%       AAA (sf)
A-2    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)    5.31%        AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)    14.01%       AA+ (sf)
C      A (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)     6.83%        A+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)   4.59%        BBB+ (sf)
E      BB (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)    1.52%        BB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate.

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case               15.0                      5.0
Base case                     20.0                      7.5
Above base case               25.0                     10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating

A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)     AA (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)   A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)   BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
C      A+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)     A+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB+ (sf)     BB- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Landmark IX CDO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class        To           From
A-2          AAA (sf)     AA+/Watch Pos (sf)
B            AA+ (sf)     AA/Watch Pos (sf)
C            A+ (sf)      A/Watch Pos (sf)
D            BBB+ (sf)    BBB/Watch Pos (sf)
E            BB+ (sf)     BB/Watch Pos (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Landmark IX CDO Ltd.

Class        Rating
A-1          AAA (sf)


MADISON PARK V: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Madison Park Funding V, Ltd.:

$49,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

$28,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$43,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

$23,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following note:

$447,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on April 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Madison Park Funding V, Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in May 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
May 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from a higher weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) and a higher weighted average spread
(WAS) compared to the covenant levels. Moody's modeled a WARR of
50.5% compared to the covenant level of 43.5% and a WAS of 3.49%
compared to the covenant level of 3.06%.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively. In particular, Moody's tested for
a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria has loose restrictions on the weighted average life of
the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2235)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3353)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $676.86 million, defaulted
par of $6.78 million, a weighted average default probability of
19.02% (implying a WARF of 2794), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.50%, a diversity score of 75 and a weighted
average spread of 3.49%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C1-CTL: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes' Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
upgraded three classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL as follows:

  A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  Aaa(sf)

  A-PO, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  Aaa(sf)

  B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  Aaa(sf)

  C, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  A2(sf)

  D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  Ba1 (sf)

  E, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  B3(sf)

  IO, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
  B2(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings of Classes A-3, A-PO, and B were affirmed based on the
sufficiency of credit enhancement relative to expected loss. The
rating of the IO Class is affirmed based on the credit performance
(or WARF) of the referenced classes.

The ratings of Classes C, D, and E were upgraded based on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization as well as the improved credit profile of the
corporate credits supporting the transaction. The deal has paid
down 11% since Moody's last review and the current review's WARF
is 2354 compared to 2822 at last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a
higher dark loan to value. Factors that may cause a downgrade of
the ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate
tenant or the residual insurance provider.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Commercial Real
Estate Finance: Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease
Financings" published in November 2011.

Description of Models Used

Moody's used a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.12-2, to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 63% to $234.4
million from $630.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 84 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 37% of the pool. Seventy-four of the loans are CTL
loans secured by properties leased to ten corporate credits. Ten
loans, representing 27% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $37.8 million (56% loss severity on
average). Due to realized losses, Classes G, H, J and K have been
wiped out and Class F has experienced a 37% principal loss.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or in
special servicing.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($67.3
million -- 28.7% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: Caa1 --
stable outlook), Georgia Power Company ($41.6 million -- 17.7% of
the pool; senior unsecured rating: A3 -- stable outlook), and
Kroger ($21.2 million -- 9.0% of the pool; senior unsecured
rating: Baa2 -- stable outlook). Five tenants, representing 79.0%
of the pool excluding defeasance, are publicly rated by Moody's.
The bottom-dollar WARF for this pool is 2354 compared to 2822 at
the last review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a
pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
default probability.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-CANADA: DBRS Hikes Class K Certs Rating to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has upgraded the ratings of ten classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Series 2004-Canada 14 certificates as
follows:

-- Class C to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class D-1 to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D-2 to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class E-1 to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class E-2 to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class F to A (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class G to BBB (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class H to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class J to BB (sf) from B (high) (sf)
-- Class K to B (high) (sf) from B (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings of the six remaining
classes in the transaction.  DBRS does not rate the $5.1 million
first loss piece, Class M.  All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to
the bonds since issuance as a result of loan repayment and
amortization.  As of the March 2014 remittance report,
approximately 45.5% of the collateral has been reduced since
issuance.  Additionally, one loan, representing 1.1% of the
current pool balance, is defeased.

In the next year, 30 of the remaining 32 loans in the transaction,
representing 92.4% of the current pool balance, are scheduled to
mature.  Excluding defeasance collateral, these loans have a
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.74 times
(x) and a weighted-average exit debt yield of 16.4%.  Given the
strong credit metrics of these loans, DBRS believes they have a
high likelihood of refinancing.

The largest loan in the pool, 5000 Yonge Street Senior Interest
(Prospectus ID#1, 31.7% of the current pool balance), is secured
by a Class A office property built in 2004 and located in the
North York submarket of Toronto.  The two largest tenants at the
property represent 60.7% of the net rentable area (NRA) and have
long-term leases through April 2019.  Based on YE2012 reporting,
performance remains strong, with a DSCR of 1.8x, and, according to
the March 2014 rent roll, the property is 95.9% occupied.
Approximately 8.9% of the NRA is available for sublease among
three spaces, with 75% of this space becoming available for direct
lease throughout 2014.  DBRS shadow-rated this loan as an
investment-grade loan at issuance.  With this review, DBRS has
confirmed the investment-grade shadow-rating associated with this
loan.

In addition, DBRS shadow-rates 11 other loans in the pool as
investment-grade loans, including a ten-loan crossed-
collateralized and cross-defaulted portfolio secured by ten U-Haul
International, Inc. self-storage properties in Ontario.  DBRS has
confirmed that the performance of these loans remains consistent
with investment-grade characteristics.

The transaction has specific exposure to Windsor, Ontario, as
there are six loans in the deal, representing 7.8% of the current
pool balance, secured by multifamily properties throughout
Windsor.  These six loans are separated into two distinct sets of
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted groups of three loans
each that share a common sponsor. As of March 2014, one portfolio
(Prospectus ID#19, ID#25 and ID#47) reported a weighted-average
DSCR of 1.33x, a weighted-average occupancy rate of 97.0% and a
weighted-average rental rate per unit of $815.  The other
portfolio (Prospectus ID#21, ID#24 and ID#43) reported these
figures at 1.08x, 94.5% and $865, respectively.  According to
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Windsor multifamily
properties reported a total vacancy rate of 5.9%, with average
rental rates at $699 per unit.

There are no loans in special servicing, and there are four loans
on the servicer's watchlist, representing 17.8% of the current
pool balance.  These loans remain current and are largely being
monitored for low DSCRs and low occupancy rates.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the top 15 loans, the shadow-
rated loans and the loans on the servicer's watchlist, which
comprise approximately 94.5% of the current pool balance.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP5: S&P Hikes Rating on Cl. M Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P withdrew its 'BB (sf)' rating on class J from the
same transaction.

The upgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of all of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.
The upgrades further reflect S&P's expected available credit
enhancement for the affected tranches, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the rating.  They also reflect S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral as well as the deleveraging of the trust balance.
Principal repayment to date was approximately 98.5% of the
issuance balance.  To date, the transaction has experienced losses
totaling $7.2 million (0.7% of the transaction's original
certificate balance), and no loans are currently reported with the
special servicer.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement for classes L and M, our analysis also
considered the liquidity available to the trust and that the Lake
Forest Shopping Center loan ($7.6 million, 47.2%), which is the
largest loan in the pool, has a scheduled balloon maturity date in
October 2016.  The largest tenant at the collateral property,
Ralph's (38.6% of net rentable area [NRA]), has a scheduled lease
expiration date in October 2015.  The rating actions taken on
these classes consider the potential impact this balloon
maturity/lease rollover risk may have on the rated trust.  S&P
discusses this loan further, below.

S&P also withdrew its 'BB (sf)' rating on the class J commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates following the class' full
principal repayment, as reflected in the March 17, 2014, trustee
remittance report.

As of the March 17, 2014, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool had an aggregate trust balance of $16.1 million,
down from $1.04 billion at issuance.  The pool comprises six
loans, down from 143 loans at issuance.  One loan ($4.5 million,
27.8%) is defeased.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A,
provided financial information for all of the nondefeased loans in
the pool, of which 87.7% was full-year 2013 data; the remainder
was full-year 2012 data.  There are no loans currently reported
with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  In
addition, one loan ($619,022, 3.8%) was reported to be on the
master servicer's watchlist (discussed below).  S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.88x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 31.4% for the
five remaining nondefeased loans in the pool.

The Lake Forest Shopping Center loan ($7.6 million, 47.2%), the
largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 112,601-sq.-ft. retail
property in Lake Forest, Calif.  The two largest tenants at the
property are Ralph's (38.6% NRA, lease expiration in October 2015)
and CVS (13.3% NRA, lease expiration in January 2016).  Servicer-
reported DSC and occupancy were 2.13x and 94.9%, respectively, for
year-end 2012.

The A Aardvark Self-Storage loan ($619,022, 3.8%) is secured by a
113,525-sq.-ft. self-storage property in San Diego, Calif.  The
loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist because of low
reported occupancy, which was 75.4% for year-end 2013.  Servicer-
reported DSC was 2.99x for year-end 2013.

RATINGS RAISED

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
Class        To         From          Credit enhancement (%)
K            AAA (sf)   BB- (sf)                       68.63
L            A (sf)     B- (sf)                        36.34
M            BB+ (sf)   CCC (sf)                       20.21

RATING WITHDRAWN

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
Class        To         From
J            NR         BB (sf)

NR-Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: S&P Affirms CCC Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from the same
transaction, including the class X IO certificates.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the loans in the pool, the transaction structure,
and the liquidity available to the trust.

The raised ratings reflect S&P's expectation of the available
credit enhancement for these tranches, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels.  S&P also considered
the recent full repayment of nine loans within the last 12 months,
four of which were previously part of the top 10 loans in the
transaction and totaled $250.3 million.  The upgrades also reflect
S&P's views of the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

The affirmations on the 12 principal-and-interest-paying
certificates reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings.
The affirmations also reflect the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans, as well as the transaction-
level changes.  The affirmed rating on the class X IO certificate
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

RATINGS RAISED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
Class     To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4       AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)                        39.63
A-4FL     AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)                        39.63
A-1A      AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)                        39.63
A-M       A (sf)         BBB (sf)                        24.87
A-MFL     A (sf)         BBB (sf)                        24.87

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class          Rating          Credit enhancement (%)
A-3-1          AAA (sf)                         39.63
A-3-2          AAA (sf)                         39.63
A-AB           AAA (sf)                         39.63
A-J            B+ (sf)                          13.23
B              B (sf)                           12.13
C              B (sf)                            9.91
D              B- (sf)                           8.43
E              B- (sf)                           7.70
F              B- (sf)                           6.40
G              CCC (sf)                          4.93
H              CCC- (sf)                         3.26
X              AAA (sf)                           N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MT WILSON II: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on $32MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Mt Wilson CLO II, Ltd.:

   $18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to
   Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   $24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
   Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Upgraded to A2
   (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   $238,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
   outstanding balance of $166,735,192), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on June 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   $60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   $32,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Affirmed
   Ba1 (sf)

Mt Wilson CLO II, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July
2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since May 2013. The Class A-1 notes have
been paid down by approximately 30% or $71.3 million since that
time. Based on Moody's calculations, the over-collateralization
(OC) ratios for the Class A, the Class B, the Class C, and the
Class D notes are 137.48%, 127.37%, 116.00% and 103.65%,
respectively, versus May 2013 levels of 130.55%, 123.11%, 114.42%
and 104.58%, respectively.

Nevertheless, Moody's adjusted WARF has deteriorated since May
2013 owing to an increase in the percentage of securities whose
ratings are on review for downgrade or have a negative outlook.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on Moody's calculations,
securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 5.13% of the performing portfolio. These investments
could expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation
when the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Sensitivity to default timing scenarios: The junior and
mezzanine notes in this CLO rely significantly on excess interest
for additional credit enhancement. However, the availability of
such credit enhancement from excess interest is subject to
uncertainty relating to the timing and the amount of defaults, and
the transaction could be negatively affected if the timing of
defaults differs from Moody's assumptions. Moody's modeled
additional scenarios using concentrated default timing profiles to
assess the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to volatility in the
amount of excess interest available after defaults.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2415)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +3

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3623)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, the weighted
average recovery rate and weighted average spread, are based on
its published methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $308.5 million, defaulted par of $8.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 21.43% (implying a WARF of
3019), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.77%, a
diversity score of 46 and a weighted average spread of 3.64%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XI: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Northwoods Capital XI Ltd./Northwoods Capital XI LLC's $556.80
million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.2654%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50.00% of excess interest proceeds that are available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees, collateral
      manager subordinated and incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments to principal proceeds to purchase
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Northwoods Capital XI Ltd./Northwoods Capital XI LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                376.20
B-1                    AA (sf)                  39.60
B-2                    AA (sf)                  30.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   48.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 33.00
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  30.00
A subordinated notes   NR                       58.00
B subordinated notes   NR                        7.00

NR-Not rated.


OHA CREDIT IX: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on OHA
Credit Partners IX Ltd./OHA Credit Partners IX Inc.'s $464.50
million floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective
date as of Feb. 1, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P noted.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OHA Credit Partners IX Ltd./OHA Credit Partners IX Inc.

Class                      Rating                      Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                          AAA (sf)                      4.00
A-1                        AAA (sf)                    304.00
A-2                        AAA (sf)                      5.00
B-1                        AA (sf)                      31.50
B-2                        AA (sf)                      18.50
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                       45.25
D (deferrable)             BBB- (sf)                    34.00
E (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                     22.25


SSB RV TRUST 2001-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class D notes from SSB RV Trust 2001-1 and the class B notes from
CIT RV Trust 1999-A to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.  These trusts are
asset-backed securities transactions backed by recreational
vehicle loans originated by CIT Group/Sales Financing.

The lowered ratings reflect payment defaults resulting from
interest shortfalls as of the March 15, 2014, distribution date.
The interest shortfalls for both transactions stemmed from
insufficient collections to make full and timely interest payments
on their respective class D and class B notes.

Because of higher-than-expected losses, both transactions have
depleted their respective reserve accounts, and both are
undercollateralized.  As of the March 15, 2014, distribution date,
SSB RV Trust 2001-1 had a collateral balance of $12.1 million,
while the total note balance was $29.9 million.  The class D notes
had a balance of $22.7 million and remain subordinate to the
outstanding class C notes.  As of the same distribution date, CIT
RV Trust 1999-A had a collateral balance of $3.6 million, while
the total note balance was $25.6 million.  The class B notes had a
balance of $14.0 million.

While it is unclear whether interest shortfalls will persist in
future months as a result of the adverse performance trends S&P
has observed in the underlying pool of collateral, it believes a
default on ultimate principal at each class' legal final maturity
date is highly likely.

RATINGS LOWERED

SSB RV Trust 2001-1
                     Rating
                To          From
Class D         D (sf)      CC (sf)

CIT RV Trust 1999-A
                     Rating
                To          From
Class B         D           CC (sf)


STONEGATE MORTGAGE: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B' issuer
credit rating on Stonegate Mortgage Corp.  The rating outlook is
stable.

S&P's rating on Indianapolis, Ind.-based Stonegate Mortgage Corp.
(Stonegate) reflects the company's exposure to the competitive and
cyclical mortgage industry, rapid growth plans, dependence on
short-term funding facilities, and financial sponsor ownership.
The company's established origination and servicing procedures,
growing mortgage servicing book, low credit risk, and low expected
debt to equity partly offset these risks.

Stonegate originates, sells, and services conforming residential
mortgage loans.  Stonegate sells the mortgages -- originated
through the company's correspondent (74% of 2013 originations),
retail (7%), and wholesale (19%) channels -- into the secondary
market through government sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac), Ginnie Mae pools of mortgage-backed securities, and
to private investors.  When Stonegate sells the loan, the company
capitalizes and retains a mortgage servicing right (MSR) asset,
which then provides a fee-for-service revenue stream with no
direct credit risk.  The company's financing segment includes
NattyMac and the positive carry earned on mortgage loans that are
held before sale (interest rate hedges flow through gain on sale).
NattyMac provides warehouse financing to its correspondent
customers while they accumulate loans prior to sale.  Although
Stonegate currently finances NattyMac, S&P believes that NattyMac
can establish its own funding line in the future.

Stonegate was founded in 2005 and has grown rapidly over the past
few years as the broader U.S. housing market recovered, partially
aided by low interest rates.  During 2013, the company raised
approximately $239 million through a private offering in May and
an initial public offering in October.  Still, Stonegate has not
yet established a track record of managing a large mortgage
business through a full real estate cycle.  During 2013, Stonegate
originated $8.7 billion of mortgages through its multiple
channels.  As of year-end, the company was the primary servicer
for approximately $11.8 billion of unpaid principal balance,
valued at $170.3 million on the company's balance sheet.

"Stonegate's financial profile benefits from its scalable business
model and growing fee-based revenues," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Igor Koyfman.  "However, the company still relies
on origination volume."

Over the long term, Stonegate's origination volume and the broader
residential real estate market will be cyclical and depend on
interest rates and the underlying health of the U.S. economy,
which S&P believes could result in future earnings volatility.  As
a result, S&P considers the earnings quality of the business to be
weaker than a company with a business model that has less
dependence on volume.  S&P believes that, over time, Stonegate has
an opportunity to scale its fee-based servicing portfolio, which
could somewhat offset earnings volatility from the origination
segment.

S&P views Stonegate's funding risk as significant because of its
reliance on short-term wholesale funding sources for its
origination volume.  The company depends on regular access to the
capital markets, rendering it susceptible to disruptions in
funding availability during difficult economic periods.  Stonegate
has warehouse borrowing split among several lenders, which are
used to fund originations.  The maturities on its lines are
generally less than 12 months.  S&P expects the warehouse capacity
and the amount outstanding to increase as the company continues to
expand its origination volume.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Stonegate will
continue to grow its origination and servicing business, while
maintaining adequate funding capacity," said Mr. Koyfman.

An upgrade is unlikely until the company stabilizes its rate of
growth and reduces its reliance on short-term funding.  Stonegate
is aggressively expanding through multiple mortgage origination
channels and building servicing assets, which, over time, could
contribute to earnings stability and help grow its economies of
scale.  However, the process entails significant financial and
operational risks.

Although Stonegate currently doesn't have corporate debt, S&P
could lower the rating if corporate debt to equity rises above 2x
or EBITDA to interest expense falls below 2x, on a sustained
basis.


TELOS CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to TELOS CLO 2014-5 Ltd./TELOS CLO 2014-5 LLC's $376.75
million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO transaction backed by a revolving pool
consisting primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 14,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which comprises
      primarily broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral servicer's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.23%-12.58%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available before paying uncapped
      administrative expenses and fees, collateral servicer
      subordinated and incentive fees, and subordinated note
      payments into principal proceeds to purchase additional
      collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

TELOS CLO 2014-5 Ltd./TELOS CLO 2014-5 LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)                252.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                  39.00
B-2                    AA (sf)                   7.50
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   32.75
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 19.75
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  18.00
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                    7.75
Subordinated notes     NR                       35.60

NR-Not rated.


TRAPEZA CDO V: Moody's Hikes Rating on $13MM Class Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Trapeza CDO V, Ltd.:

  $120,000,000 Class A1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $41,518,174.80),
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf)

  $50,000,000 Class A1B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 9,
  2013 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  $33,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2034, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $29,336,668.05), Upgraded to
  Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

  $41,000,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed/Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $48,197,184.71),Upgraded
  to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)

  $13,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  2034 (current balance of $12,095,086.63), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
  previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Trapeza CDO V, Ltd., issued in December, 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust preferred
securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, the resumption of deferring banks making
interest payments on their trust preferred securities (TruPS) and
an increase in the transaction's over-collateralization ratios,
since July 2013.

The Class A-1A notes have paid down by approximately 29.5% or
$17.4 million since July 2013, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. The Class A-1A notes' par coverage has thus
improved to 440.1% from 292.5% since July 2013, by Moody's
calculations. Based on the trustee's March 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratio of the Class B notes was 147.72% (limit
141.75%), versus 122.56% in July 2013, and that of the Class D
notes, 85.89% (limit 102.00%), versus 75.44% in July 2013. The
Class A-1A notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool. Additionally, Moody's notes that
the Class C and Class D notes have begun to receive current
interest due to the passing of the Class B over-collateralization
test, although the remaining deferred interest balance will not be
paid until the Class C over-collateralization test is satisfied.

The total par amount that Moody's treated as having defaulted or
deferring declined to $61 million from $83 million in July 2013.
Since July 2013, three previously deferring banks with a total par
of $22 million have resumed making interest payments on their
TruPS.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of $182.7
million, defaulted/deferring par of $61 million, a weighted
average default probability of 19.2% (implying a WARF of 888), a
Moody's Asset Correlation of 18.7%, and a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative
factors Moody's explicitly models, qualitative factors are part of
rating committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of an event of default,
recent deal performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs," published in May 2011.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the ratings
of the notes to the volatility of these credit assessments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction's portfolio using CDOROM(TM)
v.2.12.2 to develop the default distribution from which it derives
the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter. Moody's then used the
parameter as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.
CDOROM(TM) v.2.12.2 is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains trust preferred securities
issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's
does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM),
an econometric model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q4-2013 financial data.

In addition to the base case, Moody's conducted a number of
sensitivity analyses of the results to certain key factors driving
the ratings. Moody's analyzed the sensitivity of the model results
to changes in the portfolio WARF (representing an improvement or
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral pool).
Increasing the WARF by 350 points from the base case of 888 lowers
the model-implied rating on the Class A-1A notes by one notch from
the base case result; decreasing the WARF by 300 points raises the
model-implied rating on the Class A-1A notes by one notch from the
base case result.

Moody's also conducted two additional sensitivity analyses, as
described in "Sensitivity Analyses on Deferral Cures and Default
Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs," published in August 2012. In
the first analysis, Moody's gave par credit to banks that are
deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy other credit
criteria and thus are highly likely to resume interest payments;
in this case, Moody's gave par credit to $11 million of bank
TruPS.

In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative
default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood
of a large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on
all of the rated notes (in terms of the difference in the number
of notches versus the current model-implied output, in which a
positive difference corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Sensitivity Analysis 1: Par Credit Given to Deferring Banks

Class A1A: 0

Class A1B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Class D: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2: Alternative Default Timing Profile

Class A1A: +1

Class A1B: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class D: 0


TRINITAS CLO I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Trinitas CLO I Ltd./Trinitas CLO I LLC's $364.25
million fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 11,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's and designated successor manager's
      experienced management teams.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the preliminary rated notes,
      which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis and
      assumptions commensurate with the assigned preliminary
      ratings under various interest-rate scenarios, including
      LIBOR ranging from 0.2356%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees;
      subordinated hedge termination payments; subordinated
      management fees; asset manager incentive fees; and
      subordinated note payments; as principal proceeds to
      purchase additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Trinitas CLO I Ltd./Trinitas CLO I LLC

Class                   Rating            Amount (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                     5.00
A-1                     AAA (sf)                   230.00
A-2                     AAA (sf)                    10.00
B-1                     AA (sf)                     51.50
B-2                     AA (sf)                     10.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                      22.75
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)                    18.75
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)                     16.25
Subordinated notes      NR                          35.75

NR-Not rated.


WASHINGTON MILL: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on $11.25MM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to nine
classes of notes to be issued by Washington Mill CLO Ltd.:

  $3,500,000 Class X Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $295,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $18,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  $48,125,000 Class B-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $18,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2026 (the
  "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  $25,625,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  $33,125,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

  $23,750,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

  $11,250,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The Class X Notes, Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B-1
Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E
Notes and Class F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as
the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Washington Mill is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments and up to
7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is expected to be approximately 50%
ramped as of the closing date.

Shenkman Capital Management, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2565

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.95%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to Downgrade or Upgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2565 to 2950)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2565 to 3335)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


ZAIS INVESTMENT IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by ZAIS Investment Grade Limited IX:

US$81,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 27, 2052 (current outstanding balance of $29,211,750),
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 13, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf)

US$90,079,566 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 27, 2052 (current outstanding balance of $61,133,756),
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 13, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3
(sf)

US$39,920,434 Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 27, 2052, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

U.S.$ 54,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 27, 2052, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 13, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

U.S.$ 58,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
April 27, 2052, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 13, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

ZAIS Investment Grade Limited IX, issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
CLOs and SF CDOs originated in 2005 to 2007.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action on June
2013. The Class A-1A and A-1B notes have paid down by
approximately 18%, or $20.4 million, since June 2013. Based on the
trustee's 03 March 2014 report, the over-collateralization ratios
of the Class A, Class A/B, Class C and Class D notes are reported
at 138.6 %, 102.4%, 88.6% and 81.1%, respectively, versus March
2013 levels of 129.6%, 95.6%, 83.7% and 77.2%, respectively. As a
result of the Class A/B overcollateralization test failures, the
Class A-1A and A-1B Notes have been receiving interest proceeds to
pay down their principal balances.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the last rating action
on June 2013. Based on the trustee's March 2014 report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 809, compared to 1047
on May 2013.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: The performance of SF CDOs backed by
CLOs (CLO Squareds) could be negatively affected by 1) uncertainty
about credit conditions in the general economy (macroeconomic
uncertainty), and 2) the large concentration of upcoming
speculative-grade debt maturities, which could make refinancing
difficult for issuers. Additionally, the performance of the CLO
assets can also be affected positively or negatively by 1) the
manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) differences in
the legal interpretation of CLO documentation by different
transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will continue and
at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's expects could have
a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Ba3 and below rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-1C: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Moody's Ba3 and below rated assets notched up by 2 rating notches:

Class A-1A: +1

Class A-1B: +1

Class A-1C: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +1


* Moody's Takes Action on $942MM Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class M2
issued by ABSC 2005-HE7 and upgraded the ratings of 21 tranches
from 12 transactions, which are all backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2005-HE7

Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

Cl. AV2-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-C

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-D

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 31, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 21, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The downgrade of
Class M-2 issued by Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home
Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE7 is driven by increased outstanding
interest shortfalls on the tranche. As of Mar 2014, the tranche
has an interest shortfall of $17,886 which is unlikely to be
recouped as structural limitations in the transaction prevent
recoupment of any interest shortfalls on the mezzanine tranches
even if funds are available in subsequent periods. The upgrade
actions are a result of improving performance of the related pools
and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high prepayments/faster
liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 7.5%
in March 2013 to 6.7% in March 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Rating on $208MM of RMBS Issued by Various Trusts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches from two transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Carrington Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 7.5%
in March 2013 to 6.7% in March 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Rating on $133MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2004
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches from six subprime RMBS transactions, which are all backed
by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE4

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2002-NC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC10

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC3

Cl. M5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 7.5%
in March 2013 to 6.7% in March 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Hikes Rating on $50MM of Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 7 tranches
from 5 transactions issued by various trusts, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-
WF2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 9, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB6

Cl. A-I, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $30MM Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the rating of one tranche backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS
loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-3

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrade rating action is a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments/fast liquidations. The rating
actions for First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1 and
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-3 also reflect
updates and corrections to the cash-flow models used by Moody's in
rating these transactions. For both deals, the changes pertain to
the calculation of the senior percentage post subordination
depletion and the loss allocation to the bonds . For First Horizon
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1, the changes also pertain to
the calculation of amounts used for cross collateralization
between the loan groups. For Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors
Trust MLCC 2006-3, the changes also pertain to the allocation of
principal and interest to the subordinate bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Puts 25 Tranches on Watch Neg. Following Updated Criteria
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 25
tranches from 10 U.S. small business loan-backed transactions on
CreditWatch negative and its ratings on 25 tranches from 11
transactions on CreditWatch positive.  The CreditWatch placements
follow S&P's updated criteria for rating U.S. small business loan-
backed securitizations, which became effective.

In addition to the application of S&P's revised criteria, its
analysis also reflects the transactions' performance since its
last rating actions, including loan seasoning and the build-up in
credit enhancement.  In S&P's analysis, it used the Small Business
Portfolio Evaluator version 3.0 and the most recent transaction
portfolios that were available.  S&P intends to resolve the
CreditWatch placements within 90 days.

The revised criteria resulted from a proposal S&P outlined in a
request for comment published on July 12, 2013.  S&P updated the
criteria to reflect performance trends we observed in the U.S.
small business sector and to further bring S&P's approach in line
with its criteria for rating corporate collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) transactions.  In addition, S&P introduced a
scoring framework we will use to consider sector-wide and
originator-specific collateral underwriting and performance
factors and to potentially adjust a small business loan's default
probabilities (derived from the U.S. Small Business Assn.'s data).
S&P also adopted tests to address portfolio obligor and geographic
concentrations, similar to the supplemental test S&P introduced in
the corporate CDO criteria.

Based on S&P's preliminary analysis, it expects that ratings on
the 20 outstanding U.S. small business loan-backed transactions
may be affected.  S&P do not expect the rating changes on most of
these transactions to be significant, except for the ratings on
some seasoned transactions backed by highly concentrated
portfolios.  S&P expects that many of the downgrades will be on
tranches senior in the capital structure.  However, as a result of
collateral seasoning and a build-up in credit enhancement,
mezzanine and subordinate tranches in the capital structure may be
upgraded.  S&P intends to complete its review of the in-scope
transactions within the next three months.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Business Loan Express Business Loan-Backed Notes Series 2004-A
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg    AA+ (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Neg     A- (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)

Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2005-1
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg     A+ (sf)
M                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)

CNL Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A1                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
A2                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)

CRF 19 LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A-3                 AAA (sf)/Watch Neg    AAA (sf)

GE Business Loan Trust 2005-1
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A-3                 AA (sf)/Watch Neg     AA (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf)

GE Business Loan Trust 2005-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg    AA+ (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)

GE Business Loan Trust 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA (sf)/Watch Neg     AA (sf)
B                   AA- (sf)/Watch Neg    AA- (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)

GE Business Loan Trust 2006-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   A (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB+ (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Neg    BBB (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB- (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
1A3                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg    BB+ (sf)
1A4                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg    BB+ (sf)

Newtek Small Business Loan Trust 2010-1
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   AA (sf)/Watch Neg     AA (sf)

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

BLC Capital Corp. (Series 2002-A)
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos    CCC+ (sf)
B                   CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos    CCC- (sf)

Business Loan Express Business Loan-Backed Notes Series 2005-A
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)

CNL Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)

CRF-18 LLC
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)
E                   B (sf)/Watch Pos      B (sf)

GE Business Loan Trust 2004-1
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial (Series 2005-1)
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
A                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
M1                  A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial (Series 2005-2)
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
1A                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
2A                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
M1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial (Series 2006-1)
                            Rating
Class               To                    From
1A                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
2A                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
3A3                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
M1                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-2
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
1A                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
2A3                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
M1                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-3
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
1A                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
2A3                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)

Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
1A2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)


* S&P Affirms 198 Ratings on Trusts From 9 Originators
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 198
classes and raised its rating on one class from asset-backed
securities (ABS) master trusts collateralized by U.S. bank credit
card receivables from nine originators/issuers.

S&P reviewed the trusts as part of its shelf review for all of the
U.S. bank credit card trusts that it rates.

"In our review, we assessed and updated our current base-case
assumptions and stresses to the key variables (yield, charge-off
rate, and payment rate) that we use when analyzing and modeling
credit card ABS.  We also incorporated other trust-specific
performance trends (delinquency, quality and consistency of pool
stratification, underwriting, and account management), a peer
analysis, and sensitivity to economic variables such as the
unemployment rate," S&P said.

"The credit card receivables' performance backing each of the
trusts has continued to improve, as it has annually since 2010.
We believe that this is a result of the improved economy, as well
as regulatory changes like the Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 and Basel III,
which has caused banks to change their underwriting standards and
resulted in pools with higher FICO scores.  But, we believe that
in the medium-term credit standards may loosen somewhat, resulting
in performance normalizing to historical levels.  For this reason,
we did not make larger changes in our base-case assumptions and
stress cases," S&P said.

Based on S&P's U.S. Credit Card Quality Index, it observed the
following overall performance trends as of February 2014:

   -- Total principal receivables were down 12.0% from February
      2012 and down 6.7% year over year;

   -- The charge-off rate was 2.5%, down 40.5% from February 2012
      and down 23.0% year over year;

   -- Thirty-plus-day delinquencies were 1.9%, down 35.8% from
      February 2012 and down 20.7% year over year;

   -- The total payment rate was 23.7%, up 8.9% from February 2012
      and up 5.6% year over year;

   -- Yield was 17.8%, down 2.1% from February 2012 and relatively
      unchanged year over year; and

   -- Excess spread was 12.6%, up 15.1% from February 2012 and up
      8.4% year over year.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
credit card receivables backing these transactions relative to the
credit enhancement available to each class.

RATING RAISED

American Express Credit Account Secured Note Trust 2012-2

                      Rating
Class            To            From
1                AA (sf)       AA- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
American Express Credit Account Master Trust
Series           Class         Rating
2004-2           A             AAA (sf)
2004-2           B             AA+ (sf)
2005-2           A             AAA (sf)
2005-2           B             AA+ (sf)
2008-2           A             AAA (sf)
2008-2           B             AA+ (sf)
2008-4           A             AAA (sf)
2008-4           B             AA+ (sf)
2008-6           A             AAA (sf)
2008-6           B             AA+ (sf)
2009-2           A             AAA (sf)
2009-2           B             AA+ (sf)
2011-1           A             AAA (sf)
2011-1           B             AA+ (sf)
2012-2           A             AAA (sf)
2012-2           B             AA+ (sf)
2012-3           A             AAA (sf)
2012-3           B             AA+ (sf)
2012-4           A             AAA (sf)
2012-4           B             AA+ (sf)
2012-5           A             AAA (sf)
2012-5           B             AA+ (sf)

American Express Credit Account Secured Note Trust
Series           Class         Rating
2004-2                         A+ (sf)
2005-2                         A+ (sf)
2008-4                         AA (sf)
2009-2           1             A- (sf)
2011-1           1             AA- (sf)
2012-4           1             AA- (sf)
2012-5           1             AA (sf)

American Express Issuance Trust II
Series           Class         Rating
2013-1           A             AAA (sf)
2013-1           B             A (sf)
2013-1           C             BBB (sf)
2013-2           A             AAA (sf)
2013-2           B             A (sf)
2013-2           C             BBB (sf)

BA Credit Card Trust
Series           Class         Rating
BASeries         A(2004-3)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2006-7)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-1)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-10)    AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-11)    AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-15)    AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-3)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-4)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2007-6)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2008-2)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2008-4)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2008-8)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         A(2014-1)     AAA (sf)
BASeries         B(2005-3)     A+ (sf)
BASeries         C(2004-2)     BBB (sf)

Barclays Dryrock Issuance Trust
Series           Class         Rating
2012-1           A             AAA (sf)
2012-2           A             AAA (sf)
2013-1           A             AAA (sf)
2014-1           A             AAA (sf)

Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust
Series           Class         Rating
Card series      A(2004-4)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2005-9)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2006-3)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2006-11)    AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2007-1)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2007-2)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2007-5)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2007-7)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2013-1)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2013-2)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2013-3)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2014-1)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2014-2)     AAA (sf)
Card series      A(2014-3)     AAA (sf)
Card series      B(2004-3)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2004-7)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2005-1)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2005-3)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2006-1)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2007-1)     A+ (sf)
Card series      B(2009-C)     A+ (sf)
Card series      C(2004-3)     BBB (sf)
Card series      C(2007-1)     BBB (sf)
Card series      C(2009-A)     BBB (sf)
Card series      D(2002-1)     BB (sf)

Chase Issuance Trust
Series           Class         Rating
CHASESERIES      A(2012-3)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2004-3)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2006-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2006-6)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-12)    AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-3)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-5)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-7)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2007-8)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2008-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2008-8)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-1)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-10)    AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-4)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-5)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-6)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-7)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-8)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2012-9)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-1)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-3)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-4)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-5)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-6)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-7)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-8)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2013-9)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2014-1)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2014-2)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      A(2014-3)     AAA (sf)
CHASESERIES      B(2007-1)     A+ (sf)
CHASESERIES      C(2004-2)     BBB (sf)
CHASESERIES      C(2007-1)     BBB (sf)

Citibank Credit Card Issuance Trust
Series           Class         Rating
Citiseries       2002-A4       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2003-A7       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2004-A8       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2005-A1       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2005-A2       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2005-A5       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2005-A9       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2006-A3       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2006-A7       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2006-A8       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2007-A3       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2007-A4       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2007-A8       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2007-A9       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2007-A11      AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2008-A1       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2008-A2       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2008-A6       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2008-A7       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2009-A4       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2012-A1       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A1       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A2       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A3       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A4       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A5       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A6       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A7       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A8       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A9       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A10      AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A11      AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2013-A12      AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2014-A2       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2014-A3       AAA (sf)
Citiseries       2005-C1       A (sf)
Citiseries       2005-C2       A (sf)

Discover Card Master Trust I
Series           Class         Rating
2007-2           B             AA+ (sf)

Discover Card Execution Note Trust
Series           Class         Rating
DiscoverSeries   A(2007-1)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A (2010-2)    AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2011-3)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2011-4)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-1)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-2)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-3)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-4)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-5)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2012-6)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-1)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-2)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-3)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-4)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-5)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2013-6)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2014-1)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   A(2014-2)     AAA (sf)
DiscoverSeries   B(2007-1)     AA+ (sf)
DiscoverSeries   B(2012-3)     AA+ (sf)

First National Master Note Trust
Series           Class         Rating
2013-2           A             AAA (sf)

1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II
Series           Class         Rating
2010-D           A             AAA (sf)
2010-D           B             A+ (sf)
2010-D           C             A- (sf)
2010-D           D             BBB- (sf)
2010-D           Senior CCA    BBp (sf)
2010-D           Int CCA       BB-p (sf)
2011-A           A             AAA (sf)
2011-A           B             AA- (sf)
2011-A           C             A- (sf)
2011-A           D             BBB- (sf)
2011-A           Senior CCA    BBp (sf)
2011-A           Int CCA       BB-p (sf)


1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust III
Series           Class         Rating
2013-I           A             AAA (sf)
2013-I           B             AA (sf)
2013-I           C             A (sf)
2013-I           D             BBB (sf)
2013-I           Senior CCA    BBp (sf)
2013-I           Int CCA       BB-p (sf)
2013-II          A             AAA (sf)
2013-II          B             AA (sf)
2013-II          C             A (sf)
2013-II          D             BBB (sf)
2013-II          Senior CCA    BBp (sf)
2013-II          Int CCA       BB-p (sf)

P - Principal only.


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


                  *** End of Transmission ***