TCR_Public/140126.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, January 26, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 25

                            Headlines

ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ADVANTA BUSINESS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D(sf)'
ALESCO PREFERRED: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'BB(sf)'
AMERICREDIT 2013-3: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Cl. E Certs
ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes

ANTHRACITE CDO II: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating of Class E Notes
APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1
ARES XXVII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
ATLAS SENIOR: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
ATRIUM X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $27.50MM Class E Notes

AUTO ABS 2012-3: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class B Notes
AVENUE CLO: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on $10MM Cl. B-2L Notes
AVENUE CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B-1F Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP12: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. N Certs to 'C'
BEAR STEARNS 2005-7: Moody's Ups Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to Caa2

BEAR STEARNS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M2 Notes to BB
BSDB 2005-AFR1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on CreditWatch Negative
CARLYLE GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CENTEX HOME: Moody's Takes Action on $228MM of Subprime RMBS
COBALT CMBS 2006-1: S&P Cuts Cl. -J Certificates Rating to 'D'

COLUMBUSNOVA CLO 2007-I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
CSMC 2009-9R: S&P Corrects Five Ratings by Raising Them
CSMC 2009-RR1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class A-3C Notes
GALAXY CLO XV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
GREENS CREEK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $80MM Class D Notes

GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Notes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert Classes to C
JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LANDMARK VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
LOUISIANA LOCAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002 Revenue Bonds to Ba3

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB+'
ML-CFC 2006-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Certificates to 'D'
MM COMMUNITY: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws Class B-1 'Dsf' Rating
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-5AR: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa3
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'D(sf)'

NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes
OZLM FUNDING IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
RBSGC STRUCTURED: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A1 Certs to 'Ca'
RFMSII HOME: Moody's Upgrades Class M-2 Cert. Rating to 'Ba3'
ROCKWALL CDO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to Ba2

SACRAMENTO COUNTY: Moody's Cuts $7.7MM Revenue Bonds Rating to B1
SATURNS TRUST 2003-1: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Watch Negative
SEAWALL SPC 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
TALMAGE STRUCTURED: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
TELOS CLO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on $52MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2004
* Moody's Ups Rating on $584MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Trusts
* S&P Puts 200 Ratings on 45 U.S. CLO Transactions on Watch Pos.

* Fitch Says US CMBS Credit Enhancement Poised for Increase
* Fitch: US Bank TruPS CDOs Combined Default & Deferrals Declined


                             *********

ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on ACAS
CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC's $378 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of July 25, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ACAS CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     246.50
B-1                        AA (sf)                       33.00
B-2                        AA (sf)                       20.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        27.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      22.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       18.50
F (deferrable)             B (sf)                        11.00


ADVANTA BUSINESS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D(sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
D(2006-D1) notes from Advanta Business Card Master Trust to
'D(sf)' from 'CC(sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' to reflect the nonpayment of
full principal to the investors of the class D(2006-D1) notes on
the Jan. 21, 2014, legal final maturity date.

As of the Jan. 21, 2014, distribution date, the transaction hasn't
repaid the invested amount of the class D(2006-D1) notes, leaving
the full initial principal amount of $15,000,000 outstanding or
unpaid on the legal final maturity date.


ALESCO PREFERRED: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'BB(sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1 and A-2 notes from Alesco Preferred Funding II Ltd., a
collateralized debt obligation transaction backed by trust-
preferred securities (TruPs) and issued by financial institutions.
At the same time, S&P removed its ratings on the notes from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P placed them on
Sept. 25, 2013.

The upgrades reflect paydowns to the class A-1 notes and the
improved credit support available to the notes since S&P last
upgraded the class A-1 and A-2 notes in May 2012, following an
update to S&P's criteria for rating CDOs backed by bank TruPs.
Since that time, the transaction has paid down the class A-1 notes
by approximately $39.8 million, leaving the notes at 44.54% of
their original balance.  The paydowns can be attributed to
interest proceeds captured due to the failure of the transaction's
coverage tests, as well as principal proceeds.

The upgrades also reflect the improved overcollateralization (O/C)
available to the notes, mainly due to the aforementioned paydowns,
since S&P's May 2012 rating action.  The trustee reported the
following O/C ratios in the December 2013 note valuation report:

   -- The class A O/C ratio was 155.48%, up from a reported ratio
      of 131.45% in March 2012; and

   -- The class B O/C ratio was 85.54%, up from a reported ratio
      of 80.68% in March 2012.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Alesco Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1           A- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           BB (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos


AMERICREDIT 2013-3: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Cl. E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Services has upgraded 16 tranches, and affirmed
39 tranches from securitizations sponsored by AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc (AmeriCredit) between 2010 and 2013.

The complete rating actions as follow:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-1

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-2

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-3

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-4

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-B

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Underlying Rating: Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-1

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-5

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-1

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C., Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-2

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E., Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-3

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-3

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The cumulative lifetime net loss expectations on 2010 transactions
remain unchanged from prior review while those on 2011 and 2012
transactions were increased marginally. However, all transactions
benefit from build-up of credit enhancement relative to remaining
losses due to the sequential pay structure and non-declining
reserve account, resulting in rating upgrades on mezzanine and
junior bonds. The junior securities receive limited benefit
because the target credit enhancement is a percentage of the
outstanding pool balance until it reaches a floor, and is a
combination of over-collateralization, which declines until it
reaches its floor of 0.50%, and a non-declining reserve account.
The combined target credit enhancement levels range from15.25% to
23.25% for the early 2010 transactions. These target levels
declined to 14.75% for late 2010 to early 2012 transactions and
further declined to 14.25% for late 2012 and 2013 transactions.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS" published in May 2013.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the January 2014
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL expected range/loss which is expressed as a percentage of the
original pool balance; Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation
and Moody's Aaa (sf) level which are expressed as a percentage of
the current pool balance. The Aaa level is the level of credit
enhancement that would be consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for
the given asset pool. Performance metrics include pool factor
which is the ratio of the current collateral balance to the
original collateral balance at closing; total credit enhancement,
which typically consists of subordination, overcollateralization,
and a reserve fund; and per annum excess spread.

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.50%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 4.10%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.0%

Pool factor - 13.26%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. C 71.65%, Cl. D 26.40%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 9.3%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 4.89%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.00%

Pool factor - 16.39%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. C 86.93%, Cl. D 28.98%, Cl. E
15.25%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 7.7%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-3

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 5.13%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.00%

Pool factor - 23.95%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. B 99.99%, Cl. C 58.03%, Cl. D
19.20%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 8.9%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-4

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 5.69%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.00%

Pool factor - 21.95%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. B 106.78%, Cl. C 65.78%, Cl. D
25.46%, Cl. E 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 9.0%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-A

Lifetime CNL expectation - 7.50%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 4.23%

Aaa (sf) level - 30.00%

Pool factor - 15.82%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A-3 33.14%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 11.1%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2010-B

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 4.16%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.00%

Pool factor - 20.95%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A-3 30.05%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 10.6%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 5.83%

Aaa (sf) level - 28.00%

Pool factor - 27.81%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. B 87.39%, Cl. C 55.02%, Cl. D
23.20%, Cl. E 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 8.7%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.50%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 5.93%

Aaa (sf) level - 30.00%

Pool factor - 27.78%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. B 87.46%, Cl. C 55.06%, Cl. D
23.21%, Cl. E 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 8.6%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-3

Lifetime CNL expectation - 6.50%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 5.09%

Aaa (sf) level - 30.00%

Pool factor - 32.83%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A-3 98.36%, Cl. B 76.28%, Cl.
C 48.86%, Cl. D 21.91%, Cl. E 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 8.6%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2011-5

Lifetime CNL expectation - 8.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 7.50%

Aaa (sf) level - 32.00%

Pool factor - 42.37%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A-3 79.54%, Cl. B 62.42%, Cl.
C 41.18%, Cl. D 20.29%, Cl. E 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 7.9%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 8.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 8.06%

Aaa (sf) level - 32.00%

Pool factor - 44.27%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A-3 76.76%, Cl. B 60.38%, Cl.
D 20.06%, Cl. E 14.75%, Cl. C. 40.05%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 8.6%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 8.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 7.73%

Aaa (sf) level - 32.00%

Pool factor - 49.18%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A 70.57%, Cl. B 55.82%, Cl. C
37.52%, Cl. D 19.53%, Cl. E. 14.75%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 9.6%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-3

Lifetime CNL expectation - 8.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 7.81%

Aaa (sf) level - 32.00%

Pool factor - 54.65%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A 64.48%, Cl. B 51.21%, Cl. C
34.74%, Cl. D 18.55%, Cl. E 14.25%

Excess Spread per annum - Approximately 9.2%

Issuer - AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2013-3

Lifetime CNL expectation - 10.00%

Lifetime Remaining CNL expectation - 10.39%

Aaa (sf) level - 38.00%

Pool factor - 88.04%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Cl. A 44.11%, Cl. B 35.87%, Cl. C
25.66%, Cl. D 15.61%, Cl. E 12.93%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 8.8%

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. The US job market and the market for used vehicle are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the loans or refinancing
opportunities that result in a prepayment of the loan.

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher
frequency of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used vehicle are primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for
worse performance than Moody's expected include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. ("Anthracite
2005-HY2"):

Cl. A, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's as affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

Anthracite 2005-HY2 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: 1) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(73.0% of collateral pool balance); 2) real estate investment
trust (REIT) debt (14.2%); and 3) rake bonds (12.8%). As of the
trustee's December 27, 2013 report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$437.0 million from $478.1 million at issuance, as a result of the
paydown directed to the senior most outstanding class of note from
the scheduled amortization of the collateral.

The pool contains twenty-two assets totaling $130.2 million (52.8%
of the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's December 27, 2013 report. Twenty-
one of these assets (97% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS and
one asset is a rake bond (3.0%). Moody's does expect significant
losses to occur on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6440,
compared to 6156 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0% compared to 1.2% at last
review; A1-A3 and 2.0% compared to 8.1% at last review; Baa1-Baa3
and 12.5 compared to 10.9% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 10.9%
compared to 9.6% at last review; B1-B3 and 10.6% compared to 9.1%
at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 64.0% compared to 61.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.0 years, compared to 2.4 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 9.7%, compared to 11.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as last review.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating
The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of the collateral
pool by 5% from 9.7% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to two notches down (e.g., one
notch down implies a ratings movement from Baa3 to Ba1).
Increasing the recovery rate of the collateral pool by 5% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to two notches up (e.g., two notches up implies a ratings
movement from Ba2 to Baa3).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ANTHRACITE CDO II: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating of Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes issued
by Anthracite CDO II Ltd./Corp. (Anthracite CDO II).

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade is a result of significant amortization of the capital
structure.  Since the last rating action in May 2013, the
transaction has received $45 million in pay downs, which has
resulted in the full repayment of the class C notes and $3.5
million in paydowns to the class D notes.  Over this same period,
approximately 8.3% of the collateral has been downgraded.
Currently, 66.3% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 55.7% has a rating in the 'CCC' category and
below, compared to 55.8% and 35.1%, respectively, at the last
rating action.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  The class D notes are passing above their current
rating category.  However, a further upgrade was not warranted
given the increased risk for interest shortfall on the notes as a
result of increased concentration and adverse selection.  The
class E notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the
rating assigned below.

For the class F and G notes, Fitch analyzed each class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class F and G notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating
that default is probable.

Rating Sensitivities

The Stable Outlook on the class D and E notes reflects Fitch's
view that the transaction will continue to delever.  In addition
to those sensitivities discussed above, further negative migration
and defaults beyond those projected by SF PCM as well as
increasing concentration in assets of a weaker credit quality
could lead to downgrades.

Anthracite CDO II is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) that closed on Dec. 10, 2002.  The collateral
is composed of 17 assets from 14 obligors of which 93.6% are
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and 6.4% commercial
real estate loans.

Fitch has taken the following actions:

-- $16,447,291 class D notes upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf';
    Outlook to Stable from Negative;

-- $10,390,280 class E notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Negative;

-- $15,334,696 class F notes affirmed at 'CCsf';

-- $12,723,005 class G affirmed at 'CCsf'.


APIDOS CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes From Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Apidos CDO I:

U.S.$13,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 27, 2013 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

U.S.$8,000,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes Due July 27, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 27, 2013 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S.$265,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $32,631,145), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on August 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

U.S. $15,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

U.S. $20,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on August 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Apidos CDO I, issued in August 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans and CLO securities. The portfolio is managed by CVC Credit
Partners, LLC. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July
2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in August
2013. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 31%
or $14.7 million since the last rating action. Based on the
trustee's December 2013 report, the over-collateralization (OC)
ratio for the Class A notes is 218.39%, up from 164.67% in July
2013, that of the Class B notes, 152.68%, up from 133.14%, that of
the Class C notes, 128.22%, up from 118.72%, and that of the Class
D notes, 116.71%, up from 111.30%.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on Moody's calculations,
securities that mature after the notes currently make up
approximately 10.51% of performing par, approximately half of
which is comprised of CLO securities. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction more than Moody's current
expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a
negative shift in credit quality or performance of the collateral
can have adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets creates
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2054)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3081)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in 2013.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, the weighted
average recovery rate and weighted average spread, are based on
its published methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $102.7 million, defaulted par of $3.5 million, a
weighted average default probability of 14.06% (implying a WARF of
2567), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.07%, a
diversity score of 30 and a weighted average spread of 3.08%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ARES XXVII: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Ares
XXVII CLO Ltd./Ares XXVII CLO LLC's $368.80 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Aug. 9,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares XXVII CLO Ltd./Ares XXVII CLO LLC

Class                      Rating                      Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     99.00
A-2                        AAA (sf)                    150.00
B                          AA (sf)                      46.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                       34.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                     22.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                      17.80


ATLAS SENIOR: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class B-2L Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Atlas
Senior Loan Fund IV Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV LLC's
$471.10 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2386%-13.8385%

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which, during the reinvestment period, will lead to the
      reclassification of up to 50% of excess interest proceeds
      available before curing an effective date rating agency
      confirmation failure or paying subordinated, deferred, and
      incentive management fees; uncapped administrative expenses;
      hedge payments; and subordinated note payments into
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets or to pay down the notes in accordance with the note
      payment sequence, at the option of the collateral manager.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund IV LLC

Class                 Rating                 Amount
                                           (mil. $)
A-1L                  AAA (sf)               311.80
A-2L                  AA (sf)                 44.70
A-3L (deferrable)     A (sf)                  44.70
B-1L (deferrable)     BBB (sf)                32.90
B-2L (deferrable)     BB- (sf)                23.50
B-3L (deferrable)     B (sf)                  13.50
Subordinated notes    NR                      46.59

NR-Not rated.


ATRIUM X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $27.50MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Atrium
X/Atrium X LLC's $596.00 million fixed- and floating-rate notes
following the transaction's effective date as of Sept. 18, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Atrium X/Atrium X LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     409.00
B-1                        AA (sf)                       48.50
B-2                        AA (sf)                       25.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        53.25
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      32.75
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       27.50


AUTO ABS 2012-3: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has confirmed the following ratings on the
Notes issued by Auto ABS 2012-3, FTA:

  * Class A Notes at AA (low) (sf);
  * Class B Notes at CCC (sf).

The confirmation follows amendment to the transaction
documentation executed on 13 January 2014.  The purpose of the
amendment is the extension of the revolving period (previously
terminated on 26 December 2013) to 26 February 2015.  The first
principal amortisation date will fall on 27 March 2015.


AVENUE CLO: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on $10MM Cl. B-2L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings on the following notes issued by Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.:

US$19,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15,
2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 8, 2013 Affirmed
to Aa3 (sf);

US$9,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2013 Affirmed to Ba1
(sf);

US$10,000,000 Class B-1F Fixed Rate Notes Due February 15, 2017,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 8, 2013 Affirmed to Ba1
(sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$34,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $6,985,081.30), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on April 8, 2013 Affirmed to Aaa (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February 15, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $8,523,443.25), Affirmed Caa2
(sf); previously on April 8, 2013 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);

Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd. issued in December 2004, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The portfolio is managed by Avenue Capital
Management II, L.P.. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
in February 2010.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since last rating action in April
2013. The Class A-1L notes have been paid down completely and
Class A-2L notes have been paid down by approximately 79% or $27.0
million. Based on the trustee's December 5, 2013 report, the Class
A, Class B-1 and Class B-2L overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 220.50%, 127.40% and 105.93%, respectively, versus
February 6, 2013 levels of 133.80%, 111.20% and 102.28%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
deteriorated since the last rating action. Based on the December
2013 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 3703 compared to 2843 in the February 2013 trustee
report.

Today's rating actions also reflect Moody's consideration of the
decreasing granularity and the low diversity score of the
portfolio, which makes the transaction highly dependent on the
performance of a small number of assets. In consideration of the
lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial
Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated default distribution
using its CDOROMTM software. Moody's also tested additional
scenarios by adjusting its assumptions for administrative fees at
the top of the waterfall and recoveries on defaulted assets, in
order to better assess how additional factors may influence the
expected loss outcomes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a number of
factors and circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or
downgrade of the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance may be negatively
impacted by a) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general
economy and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-
grade debt maturities which may create challenges for issuers to
refinance.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance may also be impacted, either
positively or negatively, by a) the manager's investment strategy
and behavior and b) divergence in legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards holding collateral of
better credit quality, or better than expected credit performance
of the underlying assets collateralizing the transaction, can lead
to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in
credit quality or performance of the underlying collateral can
have adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Faster than expected note repayment
will usually have a positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with
those having the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. The transaction has a very
large exposure to defaulted assets of $31.64 million, which
increases its sensitivity to recovery assumptions. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates non-investment-grade, especially if they
jump to default. Because of the deal's low diversity score and
lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial
Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated default distribution
using its CDOROMTM software or individual scenario analysis.

7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be negatively impacted by
any default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF
levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3285)

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +1

Class B-1F: +1

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4927)

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: 0

Class B-1F: 0

Class B-2L: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as
having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $49.65
million, defaulted par of $31.64 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.36% (implying a WARF of 4106), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.24%, a diversity
score of 11 and a weighted average spread of 3.76%.

The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in November 2013. In
addition, due to the low diversity of the collateral pool, CDOROM
was used to simulate a default distribution that was then applied
as an input in the cash flow model

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months, which
represent approximately 6.96% of the collateral pool. Total CEs
represents 10.41% of the collateral pool.


AVENUE CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class B-1F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings the class A-
3L notes from Avenue CLO Fund Ltd., a U.S. cash flow
collateralized loan obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on five classes of notes and removed one of
them from CreditWatch with positive implications, where S&P had
placed it on Nov. 14, 2013.

The transaction is currently in its amortization period since the
transaction's reinvestment period ended in February 2010.  The
upgrade reflects the full paydown of the class A-1L notes and the
$27.01 million partial paydown of the class A-2L notes since S&P's
July 2012 rating actions.  As a result, each class'
overcollateralization ratio increased.

S&P's rating on the class A-3L notes is based on its largest
obligor default test, which is intended to address the potential
concentration of exposure to obligors in the transaction's
portfolio.

The ratings on the class B-1F, B-1L, and B-2L notes, are also
based on the largest obligor default test, which indicated lower
ratings than the ones currently assigned.  However, S&P also
considered the portfolio's overall diversification and the
increase in overcollateralization.

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit support available to
the notes at their current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings currently assigned
to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.

                Rating
Class        To         From
A-3L         AA+ (sf)   A+ (sf)
B-1L         BB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Avenue CLO Fund Ltd.

Class        Rating
A-2L         AAA (sf)
B-1F         BB+ (sf)
B-2L         CCC+ (sf)
P1           AA+p (sf)


BEAR STEARNS 2003-TOP12: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. N Certs to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on four
classes, affirmed the ratings on seven classes, and downgraded the
rating on one class of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
TOP12 as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes C through F were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 76% since
Moody's last review.

The rating on the investment grade P&I class, class G was affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the six below investment grade
P&I classes, classes H through N were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.7% of the
current balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 0.9% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $92.1
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans excluding defeasance
constituting 74% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 18% of the
pool, have investment-grade credit assessments. Four loans,
constituting 16% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Three loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 3%). Two loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Wheatland Marketplace Shopping Center ($6.7 million --
7.3% of the pool), which is secured by 60,500 square foot (SF)
retail property located in Naperville, Illinois. The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2013 due to maturity
default. The Borrower has since filed for bankruptcy effective
December 3, 2013.

The second specially serviced loan is the Stonebriar Centre Shops
($4.9 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 33,700
SF retail property located in Frisco, Texas. The Loan transferred
to special servicing in July 2013 due to maturity default. The
Special Servicer originally executed a forbearance agreement with
the Borrower through December 31, 2013. The forbearance agreement
has since expired. The Borrower informed the Special Servicer that
their broker is preparing to submit an offer for the purchase of
the property. The Special Servicer is currently awaiting details
of the purchase offer before reviewing alternative options for the
resolution of this asset. As of November 2013, the property was
91.5% leased

Moody's estimates an aggregate $ 1.2 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (18 % expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 90% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 81% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 73%, compared to
69% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.99X,
respectively, compared to 1.73X and 1.69X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the 284 Mott Street
Loan ($14.5 million -- 15.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
163 unit multifamily property located in the SoHo neighborhood of
New York City. As of December 2012, the property was 99% leased,
the same as at last review. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.06X, respectively, compared to Aaa and
2.93X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Wayne Towne Center
Loan ($1.9 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
642,100 SF regional shopping center located in Wayne, New Jersey.
The shopping center is located next to the Willowbrook Mall. As of
December 2012, the property was 100% leased, the same as at last
review. The loan benefits from full amortization. Moody's current
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and >4.0X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Eagle Plaza Shopping Center Loan ($13.1
million --14.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 226,900 SF
retail property located in Voorhees, New Jersey. The largest
tenants include Acme Markets, Office Depot and Ross Dress for
Less. As of June 2013 the property was 86% leased compared to 84%
at Moody's prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and
1.71X, respectively, compared to 65% and 1.67X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Wachovia Loan ($12.5 million --
13.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 102,300 SF office
property located in Boca Raton, Florida. The largest tenant is
Wells Fargo. The loan is on the watchlist due to low DSCR and
occupancy. As of July 2013, the property was 45% leased compared
to 84% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131% and
0.80X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.59X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cokesbury Court Loan ($5.5 million
-- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 200 unit student
housing project located at the Oklahoma City University. Units
range from single bedrooms to four person suites. The loan is
benefiting from full amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 64% and 1.55X, respectively.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-7: Moody's Ups Ratings on 2 Debt Classes to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by four RMBS
transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-4

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-7

Cl. I-1A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF2

Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class M2 Notes to BB
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class M1, M2, M3, and M4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-1 , a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)'
rating on the class A commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from the same transaction.

These rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction,
which included a review of the transaction's structure, the
historical and current performance of the collateral, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

S&P's affirmation of the class A certificates reflects its belief
that the credit enhancement available for the class will be within
our estimated necessary credit enhancement requirement for the
current outstanding rating.  The affirmation also reflects S&P's
review of the transaction's structure, which historically has led
to accelerated principal repayment to the class A certificates, in
addition to the scheduled principal.  The accelerated principal
repayment (with the exception of loan prepayments) has been a
result of the underlying loans paying interest tied to prime plus
a respective margin, while the coupon certificate rates are tied
to one-month LIBOR plus a respective margin.  According to the
transaction documents, as long as the spread between prime and
one-month LIBOR is greater than 2.0%, the excess spread has been
applied to principal repayment on the A class certificates,
instead of being deposited into the excess spread reserve account.
In addition to accelerating principal repayment, the excess spread
can also mitigate the risk of interest shortfalls to the class.

S&P's lowered ratings on the class M1, M2, M3, and M4 certificates
reflect its belief that the credit enhancement available for the
classes is lower than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement required for the current rating levels.  S&P's
analysis also considered the transaction's historical loan default
rate and loss severities, as well as an analysis of the remaining
loans' potential defaults and loss severities.  Additionally, S&P
considered the high lodging property concentration in the trust
(81.5%).

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the remittance report dated Dec. 26, 2013, the collateral
pool consisted of 37 loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$43.0 million (down from 72 loans with a balance of $106.7 million
at issuance).  The loans range in size from $140,605 to
$3.4 million, with a $1.2 million average loan balance.  Lodging
properties secure 81.5% of the aggregate principal balance, with
the remaining 18.5% secured by office, retail, healthcare, and
other properties.  The collateral is located across 18 states,
with the largest concentration being the 18.6% of the principal
balance secured by collateral in Florida.  The master servicer,
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), did not provide recent
financial information for a majority of the loans or a watchlist
for the transaction, because the borrowers have not submitted
operating statements or rent rolls.  S&P considered this lack of
financial reporting in its analysis of the transaction.

To date, 13 underlying loans have incurred realized losses of
$13.2 million, resulting in a weighted average loss severity of
60.9%.  However, the certificates have experienced realized losses
of only $466,813, because of excess interest historically being
applied to principal, as noted above.  The realized losses of
$466,813 have caused a 20.3% reduction in the class B certificates
balance.  Because of this, S&P previously lowered the rating on
this class to 'D (sf)'.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED LOANS

As of the Dec. 26, 2013, trustee remittance report, there were
four loans ($7.8 million; 18.0%) with the special servicer (also
Wells Fargo).

The Holiday Inn loan ($3.4 million; 7.8%) is the largest remaining
loan in the pool, and is currently with the special servicer.  The
loan is secured by a full-service, 152-room, Holiday Inn flagged
hotel in Overland Park, Kan.  The loan was previously with the
special servicer and was returned to the master servicer in
December 2010, after a loan modification was completed.  The loan
was transferred again to the special servicer in July 2011,
because the borrower filed for bankruptcy.  The bankruptcy hearing
has since taken place, and, according to the special servicer, the
loan will remain in special servicing until all advances are
repaid as specified in the bankruptcy plan.  As of the Dec. 26,
2013, trustee remittance report, the loan is current on its
payments as per the loan modification terms.

The Radisson Inn loan ($2.1 million; 4.9%) is the second-largest
loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a full-
service, 138-room, Radisson flagged hotel in Kansas City, Mo.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in June 2013, because
the borrower was delinquent in paying property taxes.  However,
the borrower has since paid the full $50,000 in property taxes,
and the loan is current.  The special servicer expects the loan to
return to the master servicer in early 2014.

The Ramada Inn loan ($1.8 million; 4.1%) is secured by a full-
service, 119-room, Ramada flagged hotel in Nashville, Tenn.  The
loan was modified in July 2010, and has subsequently remained in
special servicing.  The borrower is making partial loan payments;
however, it is delinquent in its payment of property taxes.  The
special servicer has indicated that it is working on a resolution
with the borrower prior to pursuing foreclosure.  S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan, which S&P
considers to be a principal loss between 26% and 59%.

The Dairy Queen asset ($582,000; 1.3%) is secured by a 5,700-sq.-
ft. restaurant in St. Louis, Mo.  The loan transferred to the
special servicer in January 2012 because of payment default, and
through a foreclosure sale, became real estate-owned in September
2013.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

RATINGS LOWERED

Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Rating
Class    To          From       Credit enhancement (%)
M1       A (sf)      AA (sf)                     31.00
M2       BB (sf)     A (sf)                      22.50
M3       B (sf)      BB+ (sf)                     8.03
M4       B- (sf)     BB- (sf)                     4.32

RATING AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
A        AAA (sf)                     44.84


BSDB 2005-AFR1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
E, F, and G commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
BSDB 2005-AFR1 Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction, on CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P placed its ratings on classes E, F, and G on CreditWatch
negative because of interest shortfalls affecting these classes as
reflected in the Jan. 15, 2014, trustee remittance report.
According to the master servicer, Midland Loan Services, the
interest shortfalls were because of legal fees from an ongoing
litigation.  As of the Jan. 15, 2014, trustee remittance report,
the trust incurred $81,189 of monthly interest shortfalls and has
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding totaling $109,320,
primarily from these legal fees.  Classes E and F have accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for one month, while class G has
material accumulated interest shortfalls that were over $102
outstanding for four months.

As of the Jan. 15, 2014, trustee remittance report, the trust
consists of a fixed-rate amortizing loan totaling $240.2 million,
of which $46.4 million is secured by defeased collateral.  The
remaining trust balance is secured by 119 retail banking centers,
nine office buildings, and nine operations centers totaling
3.9 million sq. ft. in various U.S. states.  The loan matures on
Sept. 8, 2019.

Over the next few months, S&P will continue to monitor the
interest shortfalls and gather additional information on the
status and outcome of the ongoing litigation from the master
servicer.  S&P's analysis will include evaluating the timing and
materiality of the accumulated interest shortfall balances on
these classes and whether any potential settlement will include
the repayment of outstanding litigation fees incurred by the
trust.  If these fees are not repaid and the accumulated interest
shortfalls remain outstanding for an extended period of time or
exceed our de minimis shortfall threshold (one basis point of the
original certificate balance on a cumulative basis), S&P may lower
the ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.  Currently, the
cumulative interest shortfalls outstanding on class G exceed the
de minimis shortfall threshold.  Should these shortfalls not be
repaid and ultimately incur a principal loss to the trust,
according to S&P's criteria for rating debt issues based on
imputed promises, it may lower the rating on this class to
'D (sf)'.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

BSDB 2005-AFR1 Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                        Rating
Class          To                     From
E              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BB+ (sf)
F              BB (sf)/Watch Neg      BB (sf)
G              B- (sf)/Watch Neg      B- (sf)


CARLYLE GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Carlyle
Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Carlyle Global Market
Strategies CLO 2013-1 LLC's $542.40 million fixed- and floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Sept. 24, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Carlyle Global
Market Strategies CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                     380.00
A-2A                       AA (sf)                       25.00
A-2B                       AA (sf)                       29.00
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                        49.50
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      28.30
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       30.60


CENTEX HOME: Moody's Takes Action on $228MM of Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches and downgraded the ratings of eight tranches from nine
transactions issued by Centex, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Company (CHEC) Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-B

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-A

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-C

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-B

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-A

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-B

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-D

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The downgrades are a result of
deteriorating performance and/or structural features resulting in
higher expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House
prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


COBALT CMBS 2006-1: S&P Cuts Cl. -J Certificates Rating to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COBALT CMBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)'.

The downgrade follows principal losses detailed in the Jan. 17,
2014, trustee remittance report.  S&P attributes the principal
losses to seven loans, totaling $219.8 million in outstanding
balance.  The loss severities of the seven loans are as follows:

Loan name               Opening            Loss           Loss
                        balance          amount       severity
Addison
Corporate Center    $51,792,272     $23,664,999          45.7%

DHL Perimeter
Center Building     $42,898,588     $29,746,157          69.3%

Carefree Pebble     $34,444,000      $4,027,512          11.7%

Pheasant Run
Resort              $26,304,551     $26,304,551         100.0%

Valley View
Portfolio           $27,594,000     $12,267,337          44.5%

Carefree Spring
Valley              $22,715,000      $5,621,145          24.7%

Auburn
Distribution
Center              $14,084,186     $11,059,836          78.5%

Total              $219,832,597    $112,691,537          51.3%

Consequently, as detailed in the Jan. 17, 2014, trustee remittance
report, the class A-J certificates incurred $22.9 million in
principal losses, or 11.0% of the class' original principal
balance. Classes B, C, and D, which S&P previously downgraded to
'D (sf)', also experienced principal losses that reduced their
outstanding beginning principal balance to zero.


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO 2007-I: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, B, and C notes from ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2007-I, a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on class D and E notes.  In addition, S&P
removed its ratings on the class A-1, B, C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications in
November 2013.

S&P previously raised its ratings on the notes from this
transaction on Feb. 10, 2012.  The transaction has since paid down
the class A-1 notes to approximately 69.91% of their original
balance.  Since S&P's last rating action, the class A-1 notes have
paid down by $103.11 million.  The transaction's overall
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio tests have benefited from the
principal paydowns as follows:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio is 127.91%, up from 119.91%;

   -- The class C O/C is 118.95%, up from 113.49%; and

   -- The class D O/C is 111.83%, up from 108.30%;

The underlying portfolio's credit quality has remained stable over
the same period.  According to the Dec. 6, 2013 trustee report,
the transaction held $211,140 defaulted assets, down from
$860,486 reported in the January 2012 trustee report, which was
referenced for S&P's February 2012 rating actions.  In addition,
the 'CCC' rated collateral increased slightly to $9.33 million
from $8.84 million.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with their current rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Class          Rating
        To              From
A-1     AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B       AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C       AA- (sf)        A (sf)/Watch Pos
D       BBB (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
E       BB (sf)         BB (sf)/Watch Pos


CSMC 2009-9R: S&P Corrects Five Ratings by Raising Them
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on five
classes from CSMC Series 2009-9R, a residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit (re-REMIC) transaction, by raising them.

The ratings were incorrectly lowered on Dec. 2, 2013, because of
an administrative error involving the impact of the underlying
security on the affected re-REMIC classes.  S&P corrected its
ratings by raising the ratings on classes 12-A-1 and 12-A-5 to 'AA
(sf)' from 'BB (sf)', on classes 12-A-4 and 12-A-6 to 'AAA (sf)'
from 'BBB (sf)', and on class 12-A-3 to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA (sf)'.

S&P's ratings on the re-REMIC classes consider timely interest and
ultimate principal payments.  S&P reviewed the interest and
principal amounts due on the underlying security, which are then
passed through to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  S&P applied
its loss projections and assumptions to the underlying collateral
to identify the principal and interest amounts that could be
passed through from the underlying security under S&P's rating
scenario stresses.  S&P stressed its loss projections at various
rating categories to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could
withstand the stressed losses associated with the ratings while
receiving timely interest and principal payments consistent with
S&P's criteria.

In applying S&P's loss projections, it incorporated its loss
assumptions, as outlined in "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And
Cash Flow Analysis For Pre-2009 Originations," published Dec. 23,
2013, into S&P's review.

The ratings reflect our assessment that the re-REMIC classes will
likely receive timely interest and the ultimate principal payments
under the applicable stressed assumptions.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When analyzing U.S. RMBS collateral pools to determine their
relative credit quality and the potential impact on rated
securities, the degree of remaining losses stems, to a certain
extent, from S&P's outlook regarding the behavior of such loans in
conjunction with expected economic conditions.  Overall, Standard
& Poor's baseline macroeconomic outlook assumptions for variables
it believes could affect residential mortgage performance are as
follows:

   -- S&P's unemployment rate forecast is 7.4% for 2013 and 6.9%
      for 2014, compared with the actual 8.1% rate in 2012.

   -- Home prices will increase 13% in 2013, using the 20-city
      Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller Home Price Index.

   -- Real GDP growth will be 1.7% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014.

   -- The 30-year mortgage rate will average 4.0% for 2013 and
      4.6% for 2014.

   -- The inflation rate will be 1.4% in both 2013 and 2014.

Overall, S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve mildly.  However, if a downside
scenario were to occur in the U.S. in line with Standard & Poor's
forecast, it believes that the credit quality of U.S. RMBS would
weaken.  S&P's downside scenario incorporates the following key
assumptions:

   -- Home prices once again decline as a result of higher
      defaults, additional shadow inventory, and less purchase
      activity.

   -- Total unemployment is 7.5% for the rest of 2013 but rises to
      7.6% in 2014, and job growth slows to almost zero in 2013
      and 2014.

   -- Downward pressure causes 1.6% GDP growth in 2013 and 0.6%
      growth in 2014, fueled by increased unemployment levels.

   -- Thirty-year fixed mortgage rates fall back to 4.0% in 2013
      and increase to 4.1% in 2014, but capitalizing on such lower
      rates could be hampered by limited access to credit and
      pressure on home prices.

For more information on S&P's economic outlook and its effect on
its outlook for U.S. RMBS, see "U.S. Economic Forecast: Two
Economies Diverged In A Wood," published Dec. 5, 2013, and
"Positive Momentum In The Housing Market Supports A Stable Outlook
For U.S. RMBS," published May 31, 2013.

RATINGS CORRECTED

CSMC Series 2009-9R
                                   Rating
Class      CUSIP        To          From        Pre-12/2/13
12-A-1     12642HFE6    AA (sf)     BB (sf)     AA (sf)
12-A-3     12642HLN9    AAA (sf)    AA (sf)     AAA (sf)
12-A-4     12642HLP4    AAA (sf)    BBB (sf)    AAA (sf)
12-A-5     12642HLQ2    AA (sf)     BB (sf)     AA (sf)
12-A-6     12642HLR0    AAA (sf)    BBB (sf)    AAA (sf)


CSMC 2009-RR1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class A-3C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following certificates issued by CSMC Series 2009-RR1.:

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2013 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate resecuritization CRE Non-Pooled ReRemic
transactions.

CSMC Series 2009-RR1 is a non-pooled Re-Remic pass through Trust
("resecuritization") backed by one ring-fenced commercial mortgage
backed security (CMBS) certificate: one for $155.9 million, or
21.1% of the Class A-3 issued by Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2007-C1. The certificate is backed by fixed-rate mortgage
loans secured by first liens on commercial and multifamily
properties.

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the underlying on December 13,
2013. The affirmation reflected a cumulative base expected loss of
16.3% of the current balance.

Updates to key parameters, including the constant default rate
(CDR), the constant prepayment rate (CPR), the weighted average
life (WAL), and the weighted average recovery rate (WARR), did not
materially change the expected loss estimate of the resecuritized
classes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

Moody's ran ratings-specific cash flow scenarios using different
loss timing, recovery and prepayment assumptions for the pool of
mortgages collateralizing the underlying CMBS transaction, using
Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Analytics. The analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools as well as the
transaction's structural features, including the priority of
payments distribution for the different tranches, the tranche's
average life, the current tranche balance and cash flows in both
expected and stress scenarios. In each scenario, Moody's analyzed
the cash flows and any losses on the collateral, applying
different stresses at each rating level. Moody's then used the
resulting ratings-specific stressed cash flows as inputs to
determine the expected losses, and compared the expected losses to
the idealized expected loss, for each class, to gauge the
appropriateness of the existing rating. The stress assumptions
took into account the attributes of the transaction's underlying
collateral, past and current performance and Moody's current
negative performance outlook for commercial real estate, among
other factors.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

The WAL of the Class A-3 is 2.9 years, assuming a CDR of 0% and
CPR of 0%. For delinquent loans (30-plus days, REO, foreclosure,
bankrupt), Moody's assumes a fixed WARR of 40%, and for current
loans, 50%. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis using a fixed
WARR of 40% for current loans. This resulted in a zero, two, and
four downward adjustment to the ratings on Class A-3A, A-3B, and
A-3C certificates.

Because the credit quality of the resecuritization depends on that
of the underlying CMBS certificate, whose credit quality in turn
depends on the performance of the underlying commercial mortgage
pool, any change to the ratings on the underlying certificates
could lead to a review of the ratings of the certificates.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GALAXY CLO XV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Galaxy
XV CLO Ltd./Galaxy XV CLO LLC's $528.43 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Aug. 15,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P noted.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Class             Rating        Amount (Mil. $)
A                 AAA (sf)              357.65
B                 AA (sf)                62.68
C (deferrable)    A (sf)                 50.60
D (deferrable)    BBB (sf)               31.63
E (deferrable)    BB (sf)                25.88


GREENS CREEK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $80MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Greens Creek Funding Ltd.:

U.S. $25,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on December 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

U.S. $26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
December 21, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

U.S. $18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
December 21, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S. $342,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021
(current outstanding balance of $302,913,767.41), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on September 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

U.S. $8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $6,570,850.55), Affirmed
Ba2 (sf); previously on September 23, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Greens Creek Funding, Ltd. issued in May 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The portfolio is managed by Silvermine Capital
Management LLC. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
July 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF
compared to the covenant level. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2392
compared to the covenant level of 2570. Furthermore, the
transaction's reported OC ratios have been stable since January
2013.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1913)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2870)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in November 2013.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $422.0 million, defaulted
par of $3.1 million, a weighted average default probability of
15.68% (implying a WARF of 2392), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.58 %, a diversity score of 46 and a weighted
average spread of 2.86%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class L Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
L commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2003-C2, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'D(sf)' from 'CCC(sf)'.

The downgrade reflects accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for nine consecutive months, and based on S&P's analysis, it
expects interest shortfalls to continue for the near term.
According to the Jan. 8, 2014, trustee remittance report, the
current reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $154,666 and
resulted primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling
      $140,214 related to appraisal reduction amounts totaling
      $26.2 million on five ($59.1 million, 67.4%) of the seven
      specially serviced assets ($69.2 million, 78.9%): the Morris
      Business Campus real estate-owned (REO) asset
      ($25.9 million, 29.5%), the Minnesota Center REO asset
      ($25.5 million, 29.1%), the Alamerica Bank Building loan
      ($3.7 million, 4.3%), the Anclote Corner Shopping Center
      loan ($2.3 million, 2.6%), and the Lake Carolina Building
      loan ($1.7 million, 1.9%);

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $14,379; and

   -- Reimbursement of interest to servicer on outstanding
      advances of $73.

The current reported interest shortfalls have affected all classes
subordinate to and including class L.

RATING LOWERED

Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C2

                                              Reported
         Rating               Credit   interest shortfalls ($)
Class  To      From     enhancement(%)  Current    Accumulated
L      D (sf)  CCC (sf)          35.17   47,320        305,057


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Cert Classes to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and downgraded the ratings on four classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-LDP4 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A1-A through A-M were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on classes A-J and B, the below
investment grade P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the P&I classes C through E were downgraded due to
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to a
decline in the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.0% of the
current balance, compared to 12.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 9.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 45, compared to 42 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 47% to $1.40
billion from $2.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 145 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans, excluding
defeasance constituting 33% of the pool. One loan, constituting 5%
of the pool, has an investment-grade credit assessment. Eight
loans, constituting 13% of the pool, have defeased and are secured
by US government securities.

Thirty-four loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $201.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 61%). Six loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Sterling Pointe Shopping Center Loan ( $36.9 million -
- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 129,000 square foot
(SF) retail property located in Lincoln, California. The loan
transferred to specially servicing in January 2010 due to imminent
default. The loan became real estate owned (REO) in June 2012. The
loan was sold at the end of December 2013 with net proceeds of
$31.9 million.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $26.8 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (38% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans, constituting 13% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $34.1 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
45% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 70%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 91%, compared to 94% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Plastipak Portfolio Loan
($72.5 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by 14
industrial/warehouse buildings located in eight states. The
portfolio totals 4.5 million SF and is 100% leased to Plastipak
Holdings Inc. under a lease which extends 10 years beyond the
loan's maturity date. The loan is structured with a 20-year
amortization schedule and has amortized 28% since securitization.
Performance remains stable. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.99X, respectively, compared to A3 and
1.91X at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 12.7% of the
pool. The largest loan is the One World Trade Center Loan ($85.7
million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 565,000 SF
office building located in Long Beach, California. The loan is on
the watchlist due to low DSCR caused by lower revenues from
occupancy loss. The largest tenant is the US General Services
Administration (18% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease
expirations between 2014 and 2028). As of December 2013, the
property was 65% leased compared to 70% at last review. Due to
poor loan performance, Moody's views this loan as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is Highland Landmark Building ($50.0
million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 276,500 SF
office building located in a western suburb of Chicago in Downers
Grove, Illinois. As of September 2013, the property was 70% leased
compared to 43% at last review. The largest tenant is Advocate
Healthcare (38% of the NRA; lease expiration May 2027). Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.76X.

The third largest loan is 901 West Landstreet Road Portfolio Loan
($43.4 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by two
industrial properties located in Kearny, New Jersey and the other
located in Orlando, Florida. As of December 2013, both properties
were 100% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 90% and 1.08X at last review.


JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Jubilee
CLO 2013-X B.V.'s EUR345.20 million floating- rate notes following
the transaction's effective date as of Nov. 5, 2013.

Most European cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
close before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Jubilee CLO 2013-X B.V.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. EUR)
A                          AAA (sf)                     231.50
B                          AA (sf)                       42.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        27.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      21.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       23.70


LANDMARK VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from Landmark VIII CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Sound
Harbor Partners LLC, and removed them from CreditWatch, where S&P
placed them with positive implications on Nov. 14, 2013.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the A-1 and A-2 notes from
the same transaction.

The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A-1 notes.
Since S&P's January 2013 review, the class A-1 notes have paid
down about $170 million, and the notes are currently at 43.34% of
their original balance at issuance.  As a result, the credit
enhancement available to support the notes has improved since S&P
last upgraded the ratings on the notes.

The paydowns and resulting increased credit enhancement are
reflected in the transaction's overcollateralization (O/C) ratios.
According to the Nov. 29, 2013, trustee report, which S&P used for
its current review, all the O/C ratios improved since our January
2013 review:

   -- The class B O/C ratio is 149.73%, up from 128.02% in October
      2012;

   -- The class C O/C ratio is 128.80%, up from 117.48% in Oct.
      2012;

   -- The class D O/C ratio is 116.37%, up from 110.53% in October
      2012; and

   -- The class E O/C ratio is 108.32%, up from 105.71% in October
      2012.

S&P notes that the defaulted assets held are marginally higher,
according to the November 2013 trustee report, than the amount in
January 2013.  In addition, the concentration of 'CCC' rated
assets in the collateral pool was 9.35% of the total collateral
pool, up from the 6.56% in January 2013.  S&P limited the upgrades
on the class D and E notes to reflect its view of the risks
related to the increased concentration of defaulted and 'CCC'
rated assets in the pool.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes
to reflect sufficient support at the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Landmark VIII CDO Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
B             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
E             BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Landmark VIII CLO (Delaware) Corp.
Collateral manager: Sound Harbor Partners LLC
Underwriter:        Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Trustee:            The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


LOUISIANA LOCAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002 Revenue Bonds to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgrades to Ba3 from Aa1 the rating of
Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facility & Community
Development Authority Multi-Family Revenue Bonds (GNMA
Collateralized - Sharlo Apts) 2002.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The bonds are being downgraded following the review of cash flows
which demonstrate program asset-to-debt ratio (PADR)
insufficiencies beginning in June 2015.

Strengths

- High credit quality of credit enhanced mortgage

Challenges

- Performance relies on proper administration and adherence to
  mandatory provisions of the trust indenture and financing
  agreement by all parties

- Little to no additional security is available from outside the
  trust estate

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

- An increase in the performance of the bond program

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

- Deterioration of cash flow projections that show insufficiency
  or cash flow breaks in less than 1 year


MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A and B commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-through
certificates from MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC, a Canadian resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 additional classes
from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the collateral's underlying credit
characteristics using S&P's global collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) of pooled structured finance assets criteria.  The upgrades
on classes A and B also reflects the trust balance's significant
paydown and the positive rating movements on a portion of the
underlying collateral rated by Standard & Poor's (C$14.9 million,
16.0%).  Class A has amortized to C$36.2 million from
C$178.8 million at issuance.

The upgrade on the class B certificates is constrained by the
largest obligor default test, which is part of the supplemental
stress test.  As outlined in S&P's criteria, the largest obligor
default test assesses a rated CDO of pooled structured finance
liability tranche's ability to withstand the default of a minimum
number of the largest credit or obligor exposures within an asset
pool, factoring in the underlying assets' credit quality.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on the other 11 classes from the same
transaction because of the largest obligor default test's results.

According to the Dec. 23, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
transaction's liabilities totaled C$86.0 million, which is down
from C$228.6 million at issuance.  In addition, none of the
classes are experiencing interest shortfalls nor have they
experienced any principal losses.

The transaction's current asset pool includes 34 CMBS tranches
from eight distinct Canadian CMBS transactions issued in 2002,
2004, and 2005 totaling C$93.0 million.  Of the underlying
collateral, C$27.2 million (29.2%) have investment-grade ratings
or credit opinions from Standard & Poor's.  Collateral that has
experienced confidential positive rating movements by Standard &
Poor's (C$14.9 million, 16.0%) includes Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc.'s series 2004-Canada12 class E and F commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates totaling C$11.4 million
(12.2%). These classes are rated confidentially by Standard &
Poor's.

The following two transactions have the highest exposure in MACH
ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC:

   -- Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.'s series 2004-Canada12
      (classes E, F, G, H, J, K, and L; C$26.1 million, 28.1%);
      And

   -- Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.'s series 2002-Canada8
      (class D, E, F, G, J, and K; C$24.1 million, 25.9%).

The rating actions remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support these classes, and reflect S&P's analysis of
the transaction's liability structure and the underlying
collateral's credit characteristics.

RATINGS RAISED

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
Canadian commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates

         Rating
Class    To                    From
A        BBB (sf)              BB+ (sf)
B        BB+ (sf)              BB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
Canadian commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates


Class    Rating
C        B+ (sf)
D        B+ (sf)
E        B+ (sf)
F        B+ (sf)
G        CCC+ (sf)
H        CCC+ (sf)
J        CCC+ (sf)
K        CCC+ (sf)
L        CCC+ (sf)
M        CCC- (sf)
N        CCC- (sf)


ML-CFC 2006-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Certificates to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
E commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating on class E to 'D (sf)' following principal
losses totaling $10.5 million detailed in the Jan. 13, 2014,
trustee remittance report.  S&P attributes the principal losses in
the current period primarily to the O'Shea MHP Portfolio asset's
liquidation at a 88.7% loss severity of its $11.8 million original
balance at issuance.

Consequently, the Jan. 13, 2014, trustee remittance report
detailed that class E incurred $8.6 million in principal losses,
or 46.9% of the class' original principal balance. Class F, which
S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)', also experienced principal
losses that reduced its outstanding beginning principal balance to
zero.


MM COMMUNITY: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws Class B-1 'Dsf' Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ratings has marked two classes as paid-in-full and has affirmed
and subsequently withdrawn the ratings on the remaining two
classes issued by MM Community Funding IX, Ltd./Corp. (MM
Community IX), as follows:

-- Mark class A-1 notes paid-in-full;
-- Mark class A-2 notes paid-in-full;
-- $38,374,416 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- $46,049,299 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers

MM Community IX entered an Event of Default on Aug. 7, 2013 due to
a default of interest payments on the non-deferrable class B-1 and
B-2 notes. On Dec. 6, 2013, the Requisite Noteholders voted to
accelerate and liquidate the transaction.  The final liquidation
proceeds distributed on Jan. 15, 2014 were only sufficient to
repay the class A-1 and A-2 notes in full, while the class B-1 and
B-2 notes each realized a 23.3% recovery on their par balance
immediately prior to the sale.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-5AR: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
and downgraded the ratings of two tranches issued by Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR. The tranches are backed by
Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgraded comes as a result of stable performance and
faster than anticipated build up of credit enhancement through
excess spread in the deal. The rating downgraded on the group 3
senior bond comes as a result of deteriorating pool performance
and anticipated depletion of the class 3-A-3 senior support. The
group 4 senior rating downgraded comes as a result of the weak
performance of the pool's collateral.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ9: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. J Certs to 'D(sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
J commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ9, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- sf)'.

The downgrade follows principal losses detailed in the Jan. 14,
2014, trustee remittance report.  S&P attributes the principal
losses primarily to The Center Point Complex Portfolio - Roll-up
asset's liquidation at a 76.5% loss severity (totaling
$23.8 million in principal losses) of its original balance of
$31.0 million.  Consequently, as detailed in the Jan. 14, 2014,
trustee remittance report, the class J certificates incurred
$17.6 million in principal losses, or 54.8% of the class' original
principal balance. Class K, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D
(sf)', also experienced principal losses that reduced its
outstanding beginning principal balance to zero.


NOMURA ASSET 1998-D6: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. B-5 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
Nomura Asset Securities Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-D6.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade is due to increased credit enhancement, defeasance,
and continued paydown.  Fitch modeled losses of 8.9% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
2.7%, including $87.5 million (2.3% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.  No loans are specially serviced.

As of the January 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.5% to $128.6 million from
$3.72 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, 13 loans
(57.9% of the pool) are defeased, the remaining loans are retail
(73.9%) and industrial properties (5.7%) located in secondary or
tertiary markets with 24.8% exposed to CarMax.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes B-4 through B-7H.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes B-2 and B-3 remain Stable.  Although
these classes are expected to be paid in full from the defeased
collateral, the possibility for interest shortfalls to occur is
likely given the concentration within the pool.  Any shortfalls to
class B-2 is likely to be recoverable, but the rating has been
capped at 'Asf'.  According to Fitch's global criteria for rating
caps, Fitch will not assign or maintain 'AAAsf' or 'AAsf' ratings
for notes that it believes have a high level of vulnerability to
interest shortfalls or deferrals, even if permitted under the
terms of the documents.  Class B-3 has a higher possibility of
interest shortfalls, although recoverability is less certain.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

-- $37.2 million class B-3 to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $20.6 million class B-2 at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.6 million class B-5 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class B-6 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-CS1
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class B-
1, B-4, B-7 and B-7H certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class PS-1 certificates.

Headquartered in New York, New York, Nomura Securities
International, Inc., a SEC-registered broker/dealer, operates as
an arbitrage trader worldwide. It specializes in mortgaged-backed
securities sales and trading, structured finance, and equities.


OZLM FUNDING IV: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on OZLM
Funding IV Ltd./OZLM Funding IV's $547.25 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Sept. 6,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

When S&P receives a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, it performs quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with its criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  S&P's analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

OZLM Funding IV Ltd./OZLM Funding IV LLC

Class                      Rating                Amount
                                                (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)              348.50
A-2                        AA (sf)                85.00
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                 41.00
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)               31.00
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                26.75
E (deferrable)             B (sf)                 15.00


RBSGC STRUCTURED: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A1 Certs to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
backed by Alt-A RMBS loans, issued by RBSGC Structured Trust Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2008-A.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RBSGC Structured Trust Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-A

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 12, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating downgraded is primarily due to depletion of credit
support provided by Class A2.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in February 2011.

The methodology used in determining the ratings of the underlying
bonds was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in November
2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


RFMSII HOME: Moody's Upgrades Class M-2 Cert. Rating to 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of Class M-1
and Class M-2 from RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI1 and downgraded
the rating of Class A-5 from CWABS, INC, Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2003-S1. The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of closed end second lien loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: CWABS, INC., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-S1

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2010
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action is a result of the recent performance of second lien
loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on these pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the
build-up in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures
and non-amortizing subordinate bonds. The rating downgraded
reflects the exposure to tail risk due to the pro-rata pay
structure of the transaction. The rating is being capped to A3
(sf) due to tail risk. Performance has remained generally stable
from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.


ROCKWALL CDO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. A-3L Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Rockwall CDO II Ltd.:

U.S. $635,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
2024 (current outstanding balance of $569,614,896.01), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

U.S. $115,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 29, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

U.S. $76,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

U.S. $48,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2011
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S. $36,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due
2024 (current outstanding balance of $28,510,000), Affirmed B1
(sf); previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

U.S.$26,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Extendable Notes Due 2024
(current outstanding balance of $16,838,370.67), Affirmed B3 (sf);
previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

U.S. $10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2024 (current rated balance
of $8,394,680.14 as calculated by Moody's), Affirmed B1 (sf);
previously on September 29, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Rockwall CDO II Ltd. issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with significant exposure to CLO tranches. The portfolio is
managed by Highland Capital Management, L.P. The transaction's
reinvestment period will end in August 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions primarily reflect an increase in the weighted
average recovery rate of the portfolio based on Moody's
calculations since the last rating review, because of an increase
in the senior secured loan recovery rate assumptions and rating
upgrades of the underlying CLO tranches, which led to higher
recovery rate assumptions. In addition, they reflect the benefit
of the short period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in August 2014. In light of the reinvestment
restrictions during the amortization period, and therefore the
limited ability of the manager to effect significant changes to
the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a
higher likelihood that the collateral pool characteristics will
maintain a positive buffer relative to certain covenant
requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that the deal will
benefit from lower WARF, higher diversity, higher spread and lower
weighted average life since the last rating review. Furthermore,
the transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratios have been relatively stable since
January 2013.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.

6) Concentration Risk: The portfolio includes a material
concentration in CLO securities. Moody's views CLOs as highly
correlated, and the specific CLO securities that the issuer has
invested in have longer average lives and are of relatively better
average credit quality than the loans in the portfolio. As the
deal seasons and amortizes, the CLO securities, currently
representing 36% of the total collateral, may comprise an even
larger portion of the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1959)

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: +1

Class A-2L: +3

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +1

Class B-2L: +1

Combination Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2939)

Class A-1LA: 0

Class A-1LB: -3

Class A-2L: -3

Class A-3L: -1

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -3

Combination Notes: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in 2013. In addition, because CLO
securities, currently representing 36% of the performing par, may
comprise an even larger portion of the portfolio when the deal
amortizes, Moody's used CDOROM(TM) to simulate a loss distribution
that it then used as an input in the cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $904.5 million, defaulted
par of $43.1 million, a weighted average default probability of
18.49% (implying a WARF of 2449), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 44.35%, a diversity score of 47 and a weighted
average spread of 2.98%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


SACRAMENTO COUNTY: Moody's Cuts $7.7MM Revenue Bonds Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1 from Aa1 Sacramento
County Housing Authority's Multifamily Revenue BondS (The Verandas
Apartments) 2000 Issue H & Taxable Multifamily Housing Revenue
Bonds (The Verandas Apartments) 2000 Issue H-T (the "Bonds"). This
rating action affects $7,675,000 of outstanding debt and concludes
the watch list rating action on October 7, 2013.

RATING RATIONALE

The B1 rating is based on the current asset-to debt ratio of
99.57%, which is insufficient to pay bondholders in the event of
an extraordinary mandatory redemption arising from a full payment
on the credit-enhanced mortgage from Fannie Mae. Events that may
trigger an extraordinary mandatory redemption include borrower
default on the mortgage and the receipt of insurance proceeds
arising from any casualty loss or condemnation award. If such an
event of extraordinary mandatory redemption did occur, bondholders
have only the credit-enhanced mortgage and certain funds held by
the trustee as security for the bonds. Cash flow projections
demonstrate that the asset-to-debt ratio of the bond program will
be less than 100% for the life of the transaction.

The Bonds are special obligations of the Sacramento County Housing
Authority (the "Issuer"), payable from the mortgage loan revenues
from the underlying multifamily housing project, further secured
by a Fannie Mae credit enhancement agreement guaranteeing full and
timely payment on the mortgage.

Strengths

- High credit quality of credit-enhanced mortgage

Weaknesses

- Performance relies on proper administration and adherence to
  mandatory provisions of the trust indenture and financing
  agreement by all parties

- Little to no additional security is available outside the trust
  estate

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO - UP

- Improved financial position that demonstrates asset-to-debt
  ratio and revenue sufficiency in the bond program until maturity

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO - DOWN

- Further deterioration in the asset-to-debt ratio that reflects
  greater expected loss

- Insufficient revenues from mortgage to cover debt service
  payments

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was US Stand-Alone
Housing Bond Programs Secured by Credit Enhanced Mortgages
published in December 2012.


SATURNS TRUST 2003-1: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Watch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'CCC+' rating on
SATURNS Trust No. 2003-1's $60.192 million units on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

S&P's rating on the units is dependent on its rating on the
underlying security, Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp.'s 7.00% notes
due June 1, 2032 ('CCC+/Watch Neg').

The rating action follows S&P's Jan. 13, 2014, placement of its
'CCC+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the units due to changes in its rating assigned to the underlying
security.


SEAWALL SPC 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes
issued by Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. and Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2:

Issuer: Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Issuer: Seawall SPC - Series 2005-2

Cl. C-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the rating of one class as the notional
balance of underlying reference obligations has decreased
significantly since last review as a result of greater than
expected pay down on the referenced collateral. The affirmations
are due to the key transaction metrics are commensurate with
existing ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As
of the January 18, 2014 Trustee report, the aggregate issued note
balance of the transaction, was $290.0 million, the same as that
at issuance. Additionally, Class X is interest-only ("IO").

Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 is a direct pass-through of the Class
C-2 (Reference Class) from Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. As of the January
18, 2014 Trustee report, the aggregate issued note balance of the
transaction, was $11.0 million, the same as that at issuance.
Since the ratings of Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 are linked to
the rating of the Reference Class, any credit action on the
Reference Class may trigger a review of the ratings of Seawall SPC
-- Series 2005-2.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,
compared to 6 at last review. The current rating distribution on
the Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations is as follows: Aaa-Aa3
(93.8% compared to 96.6% at last review) and A1-A3 (6.2% compared
to 3.4% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years, compared to 2.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 83.2%, compared to
a mean of 84.0% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 67.8%, compared to 69.5% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012. Please see the
Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Other factors used in this rating are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities,"
published in February 2012.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
assessments Holding all other key parameters static, changing the
current ratings and credit estimates of the reference obligations
by one notch downward or by one notch upward affects the model
results by approximately 1 to 2 notches downward and 1 to 2
notches upward, respectively.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


TALMAGE STRUCTURED: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed three classes of
Talmage Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 Ltd./LLC (Talmage
2005-2) reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 51%.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade reflects the deleveraging of the transaction which is
the result of a 31% paydown since last review.  The affirmations
reflect stable performance of the remaining assets in the pool.
Since the last rating action, two assets repaid in full, while
others have amortized.

The portfolio is concentrated with only seven assets remaining and
is comprised of non-senior CMBS tranches and B-notes (54.4%) and
whole loans/A-notes (45.6%).  The current percentages of defaulted
assets and Loans of Concern are, 26.3% and 16.9%, respectively.

Talmage 2005-2 is a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) managed by Talmage, LLC.  The transaction
exited its reinvestment period on Aug. 18, 2010.  As of the
December 2013 trustee report, all overcollateralization and
interest coverage tests are passing.

Because the collateral pool is concentrated, Fitch assumed
additional cash flow stresses and that 100% of the portfolio will
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 7% from, generally, trailing 12-month second or third quarter
2013.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
related to a defaulted A-note loan (15.7%) secured by a
development site in Orlando, FL.  The loan became delinquent in
2009 and the servicer is pursuing remedies.  Fitch modeled a term
default in its base case scenario with a substantial modeled loss.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is related to a subordinate mortgage participation (10.6%) secured
by three gaming properties located in Atlantic City, NJ;
Robinsonville, MS; and Tunica, MS.  The loan is 90-plus days
delinquent.  The estimated value of the portfolio is less than the
senior debt amount.  Fitch modeled a term default and a full loss
on this overleveraged position in the base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed
cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  Cash flow
modeling was not performed as part of the analysis due to the
significant cushion between the base case expected loss of the
transaction and the credit enhancement of each class.

The ratings on classes D through F are based on a deterministic
analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for the
pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
the class' credit enhancement.

Rating Sensitivities

The Stable Outlook for class C reflects its seniority in the
capital structure.  The distressed classes are subject to
downgrade if realized losses exceed Fitch's expectations.

Fitch has upgraded the following rating:

-- $13.9 million class C upgrade to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and assigned an RE as
indicated:

-- $22.5 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.
-- $10.7 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%.
-- $10.0 million class F at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Classes S, A and B have paid in full.


TELOS CLO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by TELOS CLO 2006-1, Ltd.:

U.S. $27,200,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on December
4, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

U.S. $22,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2
(sf); previously on December 4, 2012 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

U.S. $22,000,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
previously on December 4, 2012 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

U.S. $30,000,000 Class A-1R First Priority Senior Secured
Revolving Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$13,131,449.93), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 20,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf);

U.S. $110,000,000 Class A-1T First Priority Senior Secured
Floating Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$48,148,649.73), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 20,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf);

U.S. $80,000,000 Class A-1D First Priority Senior Secured Delayed
Draw Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$35,017,199.80), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 20,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf);

U.S. $60,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 4, 2012
Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

U.S. $16,000,000 Class E Sixth Priority Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
previously on December 4, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

TELOS CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with material exposure to middle market
loans. The portfolio is managed by Telos Asset Management LLC. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the end of its reinvestment period in January 2013. Moody's notes
that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately
56.2% or $123.7 million since January 2013. Based on the latest
trustee report dated January 2, 2014, the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
146.7%, 131.8%, 119.7% and 112.2%, respectively, versus January
2013 levels of 131.2%, 122.4%, 114.7% and 109.7%, respectively.
Moody's notes that the reported overcollateralization ratios do
not take into account the January 13, 2014 payment of $11.7
million to the Class A-1 Notes.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since January 2013. Based on the trustee's January 2014 report,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2995 compared to
2826 in January 2013.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a number of
factors and circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or
downgrade of the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance may be negatively
impacted by a) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general
economy and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-
grade debt maturities which may create challenges for issuers to
refinance.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance may also be impacted, either
positively or negatively, by a) the manager's investment strategy
and behavior and b) divergence in legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards holding collateral of
better credit quality, or better than expected credit performance
of the underlying assets collateralizing the transaction, can lead
to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift in
credit quality or performance of the underlying collateral can
have adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2676)

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1T: 0

Class A-1D: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4014)

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1T: 0

Class A-1D: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in November 2013.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as
having a performing par $269.7 million, defaulted par of $18.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 22.67%
(implying a WARF of 3345), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.37%, a diversity score of 47 and a weighted average
spread of 4.31%.

The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months or
unavailable, which represent approximately 6.7% of the collateral
pool.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on $52MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2004
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-9

Cl. II-1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-C

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The performance of the pools underlying the bonds has
deteriorated over the past year with serious delinquencies
increasing substantially.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in December 2013 from
7.9% in December 2012. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Ups Rating on $584MM of Subprime RMBS by Various Trusts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 22 tranches
from twelve transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE2

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE3

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
  Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
  Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-
HE6

  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
NC1

  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2012
  Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE4

  Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
  Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE1

  Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
  Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-HE3

  Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
  Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-B

  Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-1
Trust

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-2
Trust

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Upgraded to B2 (sf)

  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Upgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. M-8, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-3
Trust

  Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed B2 (sf)

  Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
  Affirmed Ca (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2006-2
Trust

  Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010
  Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 7.8%
in September 2012 to 7.2% in September 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* S&P Puts 200 Ratings on 45 U.S. CLO Transactions on Watch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 200
tranches from 45 U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions and one collateral debt obligation (CDO) retranche
transaction on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The 200 tranches from 45 CLO transactions and one CDO retranche
transaction had an original issuance amount of $9.5 billion.

The CreditWatch positive placements stem from increased credit
support in the form of enhanced overcollateralization because of
the continued paydowns to the classes.

Of these 45 transactions, 44 have exited their reinvestment period
and started paying down the notes.  One transaction is still
reinvesting and was placed on CreditWatch with positive
implications based on improved credit performance in its
underlying asset portfolio.  S&P also placed on CreditWatch with
positive implications a transaction that is a retranche of another
CLO transaction, whose ratings have also been placed on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after it completes a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions.  S&P expects to resolve these
CreditWatch placements within 90 days.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions we rate and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as it deems appropriate.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ABCLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1a                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-1b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Airlie CLO 2006-I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Apidos CDO I
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Apidos CDO III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

Apidos Quattro CDO
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

Ares NF CLO XIV Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos      BB (sf)

Ares XII CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-III
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos       A (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)

Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A2                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B-1 Def             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
B-2 Def             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
C-1 Def             BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)
C-2 Def             BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)

Ballyrock CLO III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos       A- (sf)

Canaras Summit CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Carlyle Azure CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-3L                A- (sf)/Watch Pos       A- (sf)
B-1L                BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)

Cent CDO 10 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-II
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos      AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos       A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos      BB (sf)

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                            Rating
Class               To                     From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
A-2B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
C-1                 BBB (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB (sf)
C-2                 BBB (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)

Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Duane Street CLO III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos      B+ (sf)

Emporia Preferred Funding II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Fore CLO Ltd. 2007-1
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A-1a                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
A-1b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos      AA (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos      B+ (sf)

Galaxy X CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
D                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos      A- (sf)

Gale Force 3 CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B-1                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)
B-2                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)


Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
E-1                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)
E-2                 B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-1 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)

ING Investment Management CLO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)

ING Investment Management CLO III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-3                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
C                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Jersey Street CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Kingsland II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1a                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-1b                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-1c                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)
D                   B (sf)/Watch Pos        B (sf)

Landmark IX CDO Ltd.
                             Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

Latitude CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
C                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)

LightPoint CLO VIII Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

Liston Funding 2010-1 Ltd. (Retranche of Gale Force 3 CLO Ltd.)
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)

Loomis Sayles CLO I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A                   AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos       A- (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)
D                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos      BB- (sf)
E                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos     CCC+ (sf)

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos      BBB (sf)

Marquette US/European CLO P.L.C.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1B                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B-1                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
B-2                 AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C-1                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
C-2                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
D-1                 BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)
D-2                 BB (sf)/Watch Pos       BB (sf)
E-1                 B- (sf)/Watch Pos       B- (sf)
E-2                 B- (sf)/Watch Pos       B- (sf)

MC Funding Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
C                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos       A- (sf)
D                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos       B+ (sf)

NACM CLO I
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos      A- (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Pos      BB (sf)

Navigator CDO 2005 Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
C-1                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
C-2                 A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)

Northwoods Capital VIII Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
B                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos       AA (sf)
C                   A (sf)/Watch Pos        A (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
E                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB- (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners VIII Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   AA (sf)/Watch Pos      AA (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
E                   B+ (sf)/Watch Pos      B+ (sf)

Pacifica CDO V Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
B-1                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)
B-2                 AA- (sf)/Watch Pos      AA- (sf)
C                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
D                   BB- (sf)/Watch Pos      BB- (sf)

Prospect Park CDO Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   A (sf)/Watch Pos       A (sf)
C                   BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB- (sf)

Sierra CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                      From
A-2L                AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos      AA+ (sf)
A-3L                A+ (sf)/Watch Pos       A+ (sf)
B-1L                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BBB+ (sf)
B-2L                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos      BB+ (sf)

Veritas CLO II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class               To                     From
A-2                 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)/Watch Pos      A+ (sf)
D                   BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB+ (sf)
E                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos     BB+ (sf)


* Fitch Says US CMBS Credit Enhancement Poised for Increase
-----------------------------------------------------------
The lone improvement in U.S. CMBS underwriting last year stands to
deteriorate in 2014, which could translate to a spike in credit
enhancement on new deals, according to Fitch Ratings in a new
report.

Fitch notes that every major CMBS underwriting metric declined in
2013 except for debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).  However, with
interest rates likely to rise over the next two years, DSCR will
likely decline too.  In turn, Fitch is likely to raise CMBS credit
enhancement levels if higher interest rates push DCSRs down.

And, even if current levels of DSCR are maintained, Fitch will, as
it has steadfastly maintained over the past two years, increase
CMBS credit enhancement if other underwriting parameters continue
their deterioration.

'Debt on new CMBS deals will be increasingly comprised of first
and second mortgages and mezzanine financing in order to refinance
loans coming due over the next few years,' said Managing Director
Huxley Somerville. 'Subordinate debt in CMBS deals already rose in
the second half of last year and stands to do the same in 2014 as
the refinancing debt wall approaches.'  Particularly problematic
may be CMBS deals containing loans underwritten with expected net
operating income increases that do not come to fruition.

Another troubling trend taking place in 2013 was the increase in
interest only loans (IO), with Fitch reporting over 50% of loans
having some form of IO period. Fitch finds this counterintuitive
given the current low interest rate environment.  With the
likelihood of interest rates being higher at refinance and the
potential for lukewarm economic growth over the term of the loan,
'the logic of removing a strong mitigant to CMBS refinance risk in
a higher rate world is questionable at best,' said Somerville.

It should be noted that Fitch has already baked in higher interest
rates into its CMBS ratings.  Fitch's analysis provides benefit to
the fixed rate of interest through the term but recognizes the
potential stress at maturity when the loan may need to be
refinanced with a higher interest rate.


* Fitch: US Bank TruPS CDOs Combined Default & Deferrals Declined
-----------------------------------------------------------------
According to the latest index results published by Fitch Ratings,
the number of combined defaults and deferrals for U.S. bank TruPS
CDOs has declined to 26.5% at the end of December compared with
27.3% at the end of November.

Approximately 0.33% of this drop is attributed to the removal of
the defaulted and deferring collateral of one TruPS CDO that no
longer have outstanding ratings from Fitch, with the remainder of
the difference due to new cures.

In the last month of 2013, there was only one new default. One
issuer, representing $10 million in collateral held in two CDOs,
jumped to default without prior deferral.  Additionally, one bank
representing $5 million of collateral re-deferred on its TruPS in
one CDO.  Ten banks representing $190.9 million of collateral has
cured in December.  The month-to-month change in the cured
notional balance was less than that due to the re-deferral and
removal of the collateral that was held by a CDO that is no longer
rated by Fitch.

For the entire year, 17 new deferrals and defaults were
significantly lower than the 51 in 2012. The cures also trended
higher, with 69 new cures in 2013 compared to 50 in 2012.

Starting from this month, Fitch will be reporting the list of
banks that remain in deferral at the end of the previous month and
the size of the exposure across Fitch rated TruPS CDOs where the
deferring status of the bank can be obtained from public sources
of information.  This information is available in the related
Excel report titled 'Bank TruPS CDO Report Tables 2014.1.22'.
This report lists issuers that comprise approximately 70% of the
notional of the bank issuers deferring at the end of December.



                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


                  *** End of Transmission ***