TCR_Public/130929.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

           Sunday, September 29, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 270

                            Headlines

ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2003-IA1: Moody's Rates Cl. M-3 Secs. 'Ba3'
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2005-R10: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3 Securities
ARES NF XIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $28MM Class D Notes to Ba1
AVENUE CLO III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'

BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2012-CLRN: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings
BANC OF AMERICA 2000-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-BBA4: Moody's Cuts X-1B Certs Rating to Caa3
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 24 Classes
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certificates to D

BANC OF AMERICA 2006-1: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer
BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Three Note Tranches
BLUE HERON II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'Ca'
BOCA HOTEL 2013: Fitch Rates $77MM Class D Certs 'BB+'

C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three Note Classes
CALLIDUS DEBT V: Moody's Hikes Rating to $13MM Cl. D Notes to Ba2
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2012-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Debt
CASTLE TRUST 2003-1: Debt Amendments No Impact on Moody's Ratings
CAVALRY CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $21.5MM Class E Notes

CDC COMMERCIAL 2002-FX1: Moody's Hikes Cl. N Certs Rating to B2
CENT CDO 12: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes From 'Ba1'
CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. M Certs to D
COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Hikes Class H Debt Rating to 'BB'

COMM 2013-CCRE11: DBRS Rates Class E Certificates 'BB'
COMM 2013-CCRE11: Fitch to Rate $17.46MM Class F Certs 'B'
COMM 2013-THL: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
COSO GEOTHERMAL: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on $629MM Certs.
CPS AUTO 2013-C: Moody's Assigns Provisional Ratings to 5 Classes

CPS AUTO 2013-C: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to 'D'
CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. I Debt to B1
CVS CREDIT A-2: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Certificate
DRYDEN 30: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

DUANE STREET II: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on $11.8MM Cl. D Notes
ENHANCED RETURNS 2004-13-E: Moody's Ups Certs Rating from Ba2
FOXE BASIN 2003: Moody's Lowers Rating on $22MM Cl. C Notes to B1
GALAXY VII: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on $13.5MM Class E Notes

GE COMMERCIAL 2002-1: Moody's Takes Action on Five CMBS Classes
GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C2: Moody's Lowers Class X-1's Rating to Caa2
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. E Secs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on 3 Certs to Low-C
GREENPOINT 2001-1: Moody's Ups Rating on II-M-2 Tranche to 'Ba2'

GS MORTGAGE 2005-ROCK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. J Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs.
GSC PARTNERS VII: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
HALCYON 2005-2: Novation Confirmation No Impact on Ratings
HILLMARK FUNDING: Moody's Hikes $25MM Class C Notes Rating to Ba1

HOME EQUITY 2007-FRE1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Subprime RMBS
HOME LOAN: Moody's Takes Action on $49MM RMBS Issued 2005 to 2006
IMPAC CMB: Moody's Takes Action on $619MM 2003-2005 Alt-A Debt
JP MORGAN 2013-INN: Fitch to Rate $74MM Class E Certs 'BB'
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Ratings Unchanged Over Proposed Defeasance

JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to Csf
JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
KINGSLAND VI: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class K Certs
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Certs Rating to Ba3

LCM III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2013-1: Moody's Rates Nine Note Classes
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-LLF: Moody's Hikes Cl. G Certs Rating to Ba1
LENOX CDO: Moody's Upgrades $45MM Cl. A-1S Senior Notes to Caa3
LIMEROCK CLO I: Moody's Affirms $20MM Cl. D Notes' Ba3 Rating

LNR CDO 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
MADISON PARK XI: Moody's Rates $14MM Class F Notes 'B2'
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs
MESA WEST 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2000-PRIN: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Cl. F Notes

MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ5: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Moody's Keeps C Ratings on 2 CMBS
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer
MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

MSBAM 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $12.6MM Class H Certs.
NEUBERGER BERMAN XV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
NOB HILL: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on $11.3MM Class E Notes
NOMURA 2007-2: Cl. A-R Term Changes No Impact on Moody's Ratings
PHILADELPHIA AUTHORITY: S&P Corrects Rating on 2006 Revenue Bonds

PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C1: Moody's Raises Class G's Rating from B1
PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
PREFERRED TERM X: Moody's Ups Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Keeps Rating on 2 CMBS
RACE POINT VII: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes

RASHINBAN CLO 2006-I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
REALT COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. J Certs to B2
ROCKWALL CDO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-3L Notes to 'BB+'
SALUS CLO 2012-1: CBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
SARGAS CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on $14MM Class D Notes

SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: Moody's Hikes Cl. L Certs Rating to B2
SCHOONER TRUST 2005-3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class G Certs
SCHOONER 2006-6: DBRS Hikes Cl. F Certificates From 'BB'
SDART 2012-6: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Cl. E Securities
SIGNUM VERDE 2007-3: Fitch Hikes Rating on CLP5.30BB Notes to B-

SORIN REAL I: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A1 Notes to 'Ba2'
STONE TOWER: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B-1L Notes
UNITED COMMERCIAL 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. M Notes to BB+
VENTURE III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
VIBRANT CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes

WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 5 Cert Classes
WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class E Notes
WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms Cl. F Certs Rating to 'B2'

* Fitch: CMBS Recovery Rates Strong, Remaining Loans Challenged
* Rights Transfer to Nationstar Mortgage No Impact on 2 Issuers
* Moody's Takes Action on $273.9MM Securities Issued 1995 to 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $347MM RMBS From Four Issuers
* Moody's Takes Action on $151MM of Subprime RMBS From 10 Issuers

* Moody's Takes Action on $84MM of RMBS Issued 1999 to 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $126MM of Subprime RMBS from 10 Issuers
* Moody's Takes Action on $254MM of RMBS From 13 Tranches
* Moody's Takes Action on 49 RMBS Tranches From Various Issuers
* S&P Withdraws 51 Ratings on 9 CMBS Deals & 4 CRE-CDO Deals

* S&P Raises Ratings on 10 Synthethic CDOs to B+ and B-
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 33 Classes From 14 CDO Transactions
* S&P Puts 23 Ratings from 12 US CDO Transactions on Watch Pos.


                            *********

ACAS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to ACAS
CLO 2013-2 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-2 LLC's $375.75 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable to the supplemental
      tests (not counting excess spread) and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard
      & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard &
      Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2654%-12.8133%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test,
      a failure of which will lead to the reclassification of a
      certain amount of excess interest proceeds, that are
      available before paying uncapped administrative expenses
      and fees; subordinated hedge termination payments;
      collateral manager incentive fees; and subordinated note
      payments, to principal proceeds for additional collateral
      asset purchases during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1770.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACAS CLO 2013-2 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-2 LLC

Class                Rating                 Amount
                                          (Mil. $)
A-1A                 AAA (sf)                99.00
A-1B                 AAA (sf)               140.00
A-1C                 AAA (sf)                10.00
A-2A                 AA (sf)                 43.75
A-2B                 AA (sf)                 10.00
B (deferrable)       A (sf)                  28.00
C (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                20.00
D (deferrable)       BB (sf)                 18.00
E (deferrable)       B (sf)                   7.00
Subordinated notes   NR                      38.45

NR-Not rated.


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2003-IA1: Moody's Rates Cl. M-3 Secs. 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of fifteen
tranches and upgraded the ratings of three tranches backed by
Scratch and Dent RMBS loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-IA1

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. MV-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 19,
2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-SEA2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 3, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-GEL1

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 18, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance and/or structural features resulting in higher
expected losses for the bonds than previously anticipated. The
upgrades are a result of improving performance of the related
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.1%
in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE 2005-R10: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of four
tranches, and upgraded the ratings of three tranches from
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R10 , backed by
subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R10

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
The upgrades are due to improvement in collateral performance and/
or build-up in credit enhancement.

Previously, on May 14, 2013, Classes A-1, A-2B, A2-C, M-1 and M-2
from the deal were placed on watch direction uncertain due to a
possible incorrect modeling of principal and interest distribution
mechanism. Upon further review of the deal documents and the cash-
flow model, the separate principal and interest modeling for the
transaction has been confirmed as being correct and this is
reflected in the rating action.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.



ARES NF XIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on $28MM Class D Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Ares NF CLO XIII Ltd.:

$9,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$27,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf); previously on August 16, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$220,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $28,126,174.10), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on June 30, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$16,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on October 26, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in October 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 77% or $94.6 million
since October 2012. Based on the trustee report dated August 12,
2013, the Class A/B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 173.89%, 153.14% and 111.97%, respectively,
versus September 2012 levels of 135.77%, 127.52%, and 107.42%,
respectively. The August 12, 2013 trustee-reported OC ratios do
not reflect the August 20, 2013 payment distribution, when $21.8
million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the Class A
Notes.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the rating action in October 2012. Based on the August 2013
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2738 compared to 2379 in September 2012.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its rating on the issuer's Class C
Notes announced on July 15, 2013. At that time, Moody's said that
it had upgraded and placed certain of the issuer's ratings on
review primarily as a result of substantial deleveraging of the
senior notes and increases in OC ratios resulting from high rates
of loan collateral prepayments during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $94.0 million, defaulted par of $0.4 million,
a weighted average default probability of 19.79% (implying a WARF
of 3062), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 52.94%,
and a diversity score of 27. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Ares NF CLO XIII Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2444)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3666)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayments.


AVENUE CLO III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Avenue CLO III, Ltd.

$24,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due July 20, 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$21,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due July 20, 2018,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$22,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due July 20, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $19,636,678), Upgraded to Ba2
(sf); previously on July 15, 2013 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$357,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due July 2018 (current
outstanding balance of $98,125,221), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on August 5, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$39,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due July 20, 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization (OC) ratios
since August 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1L Notes have
been paid down by approximately 60% or $200 million since last
year. Based on the latest trustee report dated August 9, 2013, the
Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios are 157.86%, 134.34%, 118.53% and
106.37%, respectively, compared to trustee reported levels of
123.04%, 114.93%, 108.52% and 102.19%, in August 2012. In taking
the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class, A-3L
Notes, Class B-1L Notes and Class B-2L Notes announced on July 15,
2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed
certain of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC
ratios resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments
during the first half of 2013.

The credit quality of the underlying credits has deteriorated
since August 2012. In particular, the trustee reported WARF in
August 2013 is 2876 compared to trustee reported level of 2587 in
August 2012.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $204 million, defaulted par of $34 million, a
weighted average default probability of 17.89% (implying a WARF of
2835) a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.35%, a
weighted average spread of 3.34%, and a diversity score of 32. The
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Avenue CLO III, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2268)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: 0

Class B-1L: +2

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3402)

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -1

Class B-1L: -2

Class B-2L: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2012-CLRN: Rights Transfer No Impact on Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Controlling Class
Representative has elected to terminate Midland Loan Services, a
Division of PNC Bank, National Association, the existing Special
Servicer, and to appoint Strategic Asset Services LLC as the
successor Special Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer
and Replacement will become effective upon satisfaction of the
conditions precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for BAMLL Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2012-CLRN, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CLRN (the Certificates). Moody's opinion
only addresses the credit impact associated with the proposed
designation and transfer of special servicing rights. Moody's is
not expressing any opinion as to whether this change has, or could
have, other non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental
impact on the interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for BAMLL 2012-CLRN was taken on August 14,
2013, when Moody's affirmed the rating of eight classes of BAMLL
Commercial 2012-CLRN as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-2A, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.


BANC OF AMERICA 2000-1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2 CMBS Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed two classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-1 as
follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 17, 2013 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 17, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are primarily due to increased credit support
resulting from paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down
by 22% since Moody's prior review and 99% since securitization.
The upgrades also reflect Moody's assumption that many of the
loans with near-term maturities are well-positioned for refinance.

The rating of Class L is consistent with Moody's base expected
loss and thus is affirmed. The rating of the IO Class is
consistent with the expected credit performance (or the weighted
average rating factor or WARF) of its referenced classes and thus
is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance compared to 1.7% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 4.9% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the prior review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in Moody's
analysis. Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at
Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, the credit enhancement for loans with investment-grade
credit assessments is melded with the conduit model credit
enhancement into an overall model result. Negative pooling, or
adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is
incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments in the same
transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, the same as at prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the
results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $11.4
million from $771.2 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 16%
to 25% of the pool.

One loan, representing 18% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $37.9 million (31% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 59%
compared to 68% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 2.28X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 2.27X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 67% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Huntersville Square Loan ($2.9 million -- 25%
of the pool), which is secured by a 84,098 square foot (SF) retail
center located approximately 12 miles north of Charlotte in
Huntersville, North Carolina. This property is anchored by Food
Lion and some of the smaller tenants include a chiropractor, nail
salon, paint store, fabric store and hair salon. The property was
87% leased as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
57% and 1.80X, respectively, compared to 58% and 1.76X at prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Bainbridge Market Place Loan ($2.7
million -- 24% of the pool), which is secured by a 46,000 SF
retail center located in Chesapeake, Virginia. As of December
2012, the property was 100% leased, compared to 91% at last
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.35X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.34X at prior review.

The third largest loan is the Venbury Trail Apartments Loan ($2.0
million -- 18% of the pool), which is secured by a 96-unit
multifamily garden apartment complex. As of December 31, 2012, the
property was 97% leased, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.85X, respectively, compared to 56%
and 1.83X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-BBA4: Moody's Cuts X-1B Certs Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class and
downgraded one class of Banc of America Large Loan, Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-BBA4.
Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating of IO class X-4 is consistent with the credit quality
of its referenced loan, the only loan remaining in the pool, and
thus is affirmed. The downgrade of IO Class X-1B is due to a
decline in credit quality of its referenced classes due to a loan
pay off.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
pooled certificate balance decreased to $16 million from $26
million at last review due to a loan pay off. The pool is backed
by a single loan, and there is only one principal class, Class K,
outstanding. Moody's does not rate Class K.

The pool has experienced $538,125 of losses to date affecting
Class K. In addition, interest shortfalls totaling $787 affect the
same class.

The only remaining loan in the pool is the Heritage Square I & II
loan ($16 million) which is collateralized by two mid-rise office
buildings totaling approximately 350,000 square feet that are
located in Dallas, Texas. The loan's modified maturity date was in
June 2013, and is currently in special servicing due to monetary
default. Based on April 2013 rent roll, the complex was 57%
leased. Moody's current credit assessment is Caa3, the same as
last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-3: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 24 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 24 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-3 as follows:

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2012 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. SS-A, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. SS-B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. SS-C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. SS-D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

UH-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 9, 2010 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

UH-B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

UH-C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

UH-D, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

UH-E, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

UH-F, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3
(sf)

UH-G, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

UH-H, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

UH-J, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X, is consistent with the expected credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss was
3.3%. Realized losses have increased from 3.4% of the original
balance to 3.7% since the prior review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to $714 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 63 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 50% of the pool. Thirteen loans, representing 15% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains two loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 25% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $43.3 million (44% loss severity on
average). One loan, a retail property representing 2% of the pool,
is currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$3.4 million loss for the specially serviced loan (34% expected
loss).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $3.7 million loss (16% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 98%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 83% compared to 87% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 10% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.1%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.28X, respectively, compared
to 1.39X and 1.21X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the U-Haul Portfolio
Loan ($88.4 million -- 14.2% of the pool), which is secured by 78
properties operated as U-Haul storage or rental centers. The
portfolio is also encumbered by a $58.9 million B-note which is
the collateral for non-pooled Classes UH-A, UH-B, UH-C, UH-D, UH-
E, UH-F, UH-G, UH-H and UH-J. The properties total 4.0 million
square feet (SF) and are located in 24 states with concentrations
in Texas (21%), Florida (16%) and Arizona (10%). Property
performance continues to be stable. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 4.00X, respectively,
compared to Aaa and 3.90X at last full review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 17 State Street
Loan ($66.5 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
44-story, 532,000 SF office building located within the South
Ferry/Financial District sub-market of New York City. The property
is encumbered by a $31.7 million B-note which is the collateral
for non-pooled Classes SS-A, SS-B, SS-C, SS-D and a non-rated
class. The loan was transferred into special servicing in July
2010 due to the servicer's determination of imminent default. The
special servicer granted approval for the borrower to receive a
capital infusion from a new source in the form of preferred equity
to fund capital improvements. Subsequently, the loan was returned
to the master servicer on April 1, 2011. As of June 2013, the
property was 82% leased compared to 83% at last full review.
Moody's analysis reflects a downward adjustment to current NOI due
to upcoming lease maturities and above market rents. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.65X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.75X at last full review.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool. The largest
loan is the SUN Communities -- Scio Farm Loan ($36.8 million --
5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 913-pad manufactured
housing community located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. As of December
2012, the property was 97% leased compared to 96% at last full
review. The loan is stable and benefiting from amortization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.05X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the SUN Communities Portfolio 9 Loan
($33.5 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by four
manufactured housing communities totaling 1,235 pads located in
Michigan (3) and Florida (1). As of December 2012, the portfolio
was 94% leased, the same as last full review. The loan is stable
and benefiting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 81% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.18X, at
last full review.

The third largest loan is the SUN Communities Portfolio 8 Loan
($25.5 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by three
manufactured housing communities totaling 1,174 pads located in
Indiana (2) and Florida (1). As of December 2012, the portfolio
was 69% leased compared to 82% at last full review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 99%
and 0.98X at last full review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certificates to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
F commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-1, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class F certificate
following principal losses detailed in the Sept. 10, 2013, trustee
remittance report.  The principal loss on class F was attributable
to the liquidations of the $16.0 million Ashford Perimeter (A
note) and the $15.0 million Ashford Perimeter (B note) loans,
which were with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.
The loss severity for the whole loan was 57.1% ($18.0 million in
principal loss).  Consequently, class F reported a 23% loss to its
$26.1 million original principal balance, while class G lost 100%
of its remaining balance.  S&P had previously lowered its rating
on class G to 'D (sf)'.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-1: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  was informed that the Majority
Certificateholder of the Controlling Class intends to replace
Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National
Association as the Special Servicer and to appoint Torchlight Loan
Services, LLC as the successor Special Servicer (the "Proposed
Special Servicer Replacement"). The Proposed Special Servicer
Replacement will become effective upon satisfaction of the
conditions precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement. At
this time, the proposed transfer will not, in and of itself,
result in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any
class of certificates rated by Moody's for Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-1. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the proposed transfer of special servicing rights.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have
significant effect on yield and/or other payments to investors.
This action should not be taken to imply that there will be no
adverse consequence for investors since in some cases such
consequences will not impact the rating.

The last rating action for BACM 2006-1 was taken on May 23, 2013.
The methodology used in monitoring this transaction was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

On May 23, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of 16 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed at
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-SBFL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)


BATTALION CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Battalion CLO IV Ltd./Battalion CLO IV LLC's $378.00 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient
      to withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental
      tests (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard
      & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard &
      Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined in its
      corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

  -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.2654%-12.8655%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to interest
      and principal proceed diversion to reduce the balance of
      the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test,
      a failure of which will lead to the reclassification up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available prior to
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge payments, reserve deposits, portfolio
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to,
      during the reinvestment period, principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets or, after the
      reinvestment period, to paydown the secured notes as per
      the note payment sequence.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1759.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Battalion CLO IV Ltd./Battalion CLO IV LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)                241.00
A-2                    AA (sf)                  50.00
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                   35.00
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 22.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  19.00
E (deferrable)         B (sf)                   11.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       39.00

NR--Not rated.


BAYVIEW FINANCIAL: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Three Note Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2006-C. The transaction is backed by Scratch and Dent RMBS loans,

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-C

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance resulting in higher expected losses for the bonds than
previously anticipated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


BLUE HERON II: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following notes issued by Blue Heron Funding II Ltd.:

$890,000,000 Class A Blue Heron Funding II Notes, due December,
2041(current balance of $175,414,862), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
previously on March 5, 2012 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the WARF and a decrease in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios. Based on the latest
trustee report dated August 2013, the WARF of the portfolio has
increased to 1972 from 1678 since the last rating action in March
2012. The Class A/B/C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 52.36% and 47.62%, respectively, versus a February
2012 level of 59.74% and 55.61%, respectively.

Blue Heron Funding II Ltd., issued on March 22, 2002, is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed primarily by a
portfolio of RMBS, CMBS and structured finance securities
originated from 2002 to 2006.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

Moody's did not use a cash flow model to analyze the default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool. Instead, Moody's
analyzed the transaction by assessing the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and WARF.

The deal's ratings are not expected to be sensitive to the typical
range of changes (plus or minus two rating notches on Caa-rated
assets) in the rating quality of the collateral that Moody's
tests, and no sensitivity analysis was performed.


BOCA HOTEL 2013: Fitch Rates $77MM Class D Certs 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the Boca Hotel Portfolio Trust 2013-BOCA, series 2013-
BOCA commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $176,800,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $425,000,000* class X-CP 'NR';
-- $425,000,000* class X-EXT 'NR';
-- $64,200,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77,000,000 class D 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,000,000 class E 'NR'.

* Interest-only and notional class.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
the primary asset of which is one loan having an aggregate
principal balance of approximately $425 million as of the cutoff
date and primarily secured by the Waldorf Astoria Boca Raton
Resort & Club, DoubleTree Bahia Mar Fort Lauderdale Beach Hotel,
Hyatt Regency Pier Sixty-Six Resort & Spa and Waldorf Astoria
Edgewater Beach Hotel. The properties are located in Boca Raton,
Fort Lauderdale and Naples, FL. As of the TTM ended June 2013, the
portfolio was 65.8% occupied, with an average daily rate (ADR) and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) of $211.32 and 139.12,
respectively. The loan was originated by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
National Association and Citigroup Global Market Realty Corp.

Key Rating Drivers

Geographic and Asset Concentration: The loan is secured by four
hotels (1,852 keys) located in Florida, with two in Fort
Lauderdale and one each in Boca Raton and Naples. In addition, the
Waldorf Astoria Boca Raton Resort & Club accounts for
approximately 60.8% of the trailing 12-months (TTM) ended June
2013 net cash flow (NCF) and 69% of the appraised value. The loan
is more susceptible to single-event risk related to a market.
Hotel performance is considered to be more volatile due to the
segment's operating nature

High Leverage on Full Debt Stack: The total debt package includes
mezzanine financing in the amount of $370 million that is not
included in the trust. Fitch's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) for the full debt stack are
0.73x and 152.9%, respectively. However, Fitch's DSCR and LTV for
the trust component of the debt are 1.37x and 81.8%, respectively.

Asset Quality and Market Positioning: The properties received
Fitch property quality scores ranging from 'A-' to 'B'. The
properties offer resort-type amenities, two 18-hole golf courses,
and marinas located along the intercoastal waterway. Since
acquiring the portfolio in 2004, approximately $309 million has
been invested in the renovation of the hotels by the sponsor since
2005, with an additional $28.5 million in capital improvements
planned at the Boca Raton Resort & Club and $16 million in marina
improvements at the Hyatt Regency Pier Sixty-Six Resort & Spa.

Diversified Revenue Sources: For the TTM ended June 2013,
approximately $81 million of non-room and non-F&B revenue was
generated by the portfolio, representing 32.9% of the portfolio's
total revenues. Ancillary revenues include marina operations,
membership dues and initiation fees and rental income.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch performed several stress scenarios in which the NCF was
stressed. Fitch found that the pool could withstand a 69.9%
decrease in the most recent actual cash flow prior to experiencing
$1 of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings of class A (rated
'AAAsf' by Fitch) and found that a 17% decline in Fitch NCF would
result in a one-category downgrade, while a 42% decline would
result in a downgrade to below investment grade. The Rating
Sensitivity section in the presale report includes detailed
explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities.


C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by C-Bass CBO IX, Limited:

$20,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2039 (current outstanding balance of $9,899,235),
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf);

$10,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes, Due 2039, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 4,
2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf);

$12,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
Deferrable Interest Notes, Due 2039 (current outstanding balance
of $12,483,955), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrades are primarily a result
of deleveraging of the Class A-2 Notes and an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratio since February 2013.
Moody's notes that the Class A-2 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 44.5% or $8 million since February 2013. Based on
the Moody's calculation, the Class A-2 and A/B
overcollateralization ratios are at 225.6% and 112.2%,
respectively, versus February 2013 level of 168.9% and 108.2%.

Moody's also notes that Class C Notes are currently receiving
their periodic interest due along with a repayment of the deferred
interest to the extent interest proceeds are available.

C-BASS CBO IX, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of RMBS and ABS, the majority of
which were originated in 2003 and 2004.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8-9 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values.

Together, the simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the
Monte Carlo scenarios define the loss distribution for the
reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Among the uncertainties
in the residential real estate property market are those
surrounding future housing prices, pace of residential mortgage
foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing, unemployment rate
and interest rates.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are shown in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the current model output, where a
positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss, assuming
that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched up by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-2: +4

Class B: +2

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: 0

Moody's Caa1 and below rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-2: -2

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: 0


CALLIDUS DEBT V: Moody's Hikes Rating to $13MM Cl. D Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V, Ltd.:

$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
November 20, 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 5,
2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August
5, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$20,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August
5, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf))

$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due November 20, 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August
5, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

$10,000,000 Class Q-1 Securities Due November 20, 2020 (current
outstanding rated balance of $2,691,950), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on August 5, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$30,000,000 Class A-1A Revolving Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance $28,500,000), Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on December 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$270,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 27, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF, and higher WAS and WAC
compared to the covenant levels. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2598,
WAS of 3.04% and WAC of 8.96% compared to the covenant levels of
2610, 2.70% and 6.00% respectively. Moody's also notes that the
transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios are stable
since the last rating action.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $401.93 million, no defaulted par, a weighted
average default probability of 16.71% (implying a WARF of 2598), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.91%, and a
diversity score of 57. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V, Ltd., issued in December 2006,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class Q-1 Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2078)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class Q-1: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3118)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class Q-1: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels.


CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2012-2: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has confirmed all classes of Canadian Commercial
Mortgage Origination Trust 2012-1, as follows:

Classes A and X at AAA (sf)
Class B at AA (sf)
Class C at A (sf)
Class D at BBB (sf)
Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
Class F at BB (sf)
Class G at B (sf)

The trends on all classes are Stable.

The pool consists of 25 loans secured by 26 properties.  As of the
September 2013 remittance, the weighted-average debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.6x and the weighted-average debt yield
was 8.5%.  In comparison, the WA DSCR and WA debt yield when the
transaction closed in October 2012 were 1.7x and 8.7%,
respectively.  DBRS recognizes that many of the YE2012 financial
statements received do not necessarily reflect a stabilized,
twelve-month cash flow figure, given the transaction's closing
date.

The pool is concentrated by loan size, with a pool of 25 loans and
the largest loan represents 13.3% of the current pool balance.
There are currently four loans on the servicer watchlist, two of
which are being monitored for recognized performance issues.
Evton Yonge and St. Clair Office (Prospectus ID#4, 6.57% of the
current pool balance) and Dundee Ste. Foy Office (Prospectus
ID#23, 1.46% of the current pool balance) have been flagged for
below-threshold DSCRs.  The Evton loan's YE2012 DSCR of 1.04x
represents only a 0.3% decline from the DBRS underwritten cash
flow.  The Dundee Ste. Foy loan's YE2012 DSCR of 0.58x represents
a 39% decline from the DBRS underwritten cash flow and a 59%
decline from the issuer's underwritten cash flow.  The Quebec
office property was 22% vacant at issuance and occupancy remains
low at 80%.  DBRS will continue to monitor these loans and expects
to obtain a twelve-month financial statement ahead of next year's
surveillance review.

Another loan has been added to the watchlist for recent damage to
the property.  Kensington Crossing (Prospectus ID#12, 4.15% of the
current pool balance) is secured by an anchored retail property in
Edmonton, Alberta.  A fire occurred at the property on December
25, 2012, affecting eight tenant spaces, including the second- and
third-largest tenants, Dollarama (13.4% of NRA) and Bonanza
Western Grill (11.9% of NRA).  According to the servicer, the site
has been cleaned but reconstruction has not begun, as the borrower
only recently received replacement valuation and is currently
still planning the rebuild.  The property is currently receiving
full business interruption proceeds.  DBRS will continue to follow
up with the servicer for updates on the status of the property.

The pool benefits from full or partial recourse guarantees on all
but two loans in the pool.  The pool also benefits from a
relatively tight amortization schedule.  Over half of the current
pool balance amortizes on a schedule of 25 years or less.  DBRS
also considers the strong sponsorship in the pool to be a
mitigating influence to any potential risk associated with the
watchlisted loans.  Eight loans, representing 34.8% of the current
pool balance, are sponsored by or have recourse to DBRS-rated
entities.


CASTLE TRUST 2003-1: Debt Amendments No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's announced that the amendment of the indenture, executed on
September 25, 2013 (the Amendment), of Castle 2003-1 Trust
(Castle) would not, in and of itself and as of this time, result
in the downgrade, the placement on review for possible downgrade
or withdrawal of the ratings currently assigned to the notes
issued by Castle (the Notes).

The amendment would remove Myanmar from the list of prohibited
countries in Exhibit E of the indenture and enable the servicer to
place aircraft within the jurisdiction. In assessing the potential
impact of the amendment on the Notes, Moody's considered the
actual and potential exposure to Myanmar, which can be as high as
15% of the average base appraised value of the portfolio, in light
of the performance of the transaction and the current loan-to-
value ratios of each tranche of notes. Moody's notes that the
transaction has performed well since closing and increased the
credit enhancement available to each class of notes. Given the
lack of aircraft repossession history in Myanmar, Moody's also
considered the possibility that the servicer will have
difficulties in repossessing a meaningful percentage of the
collateral that can be placed in Myanmar.

Moody's believed that the Amendment did not have an adverse effect
on the credit quality of the Notes such that the Moody's ratings
were impacted. Moody's did not express an opinion as to whether
the amendment could have other, noncredit-related effects.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization", published in
March 1999.

On September 24, 2003, Moody's took these rating actions for
Castle 2003-1 Trust:

   $75,000,000, LIBOR + 1.25%, Class A-1 Notes maturing in May
   2027, rated Aa2;

   $621,000,000, 5.36%, Class A-2 Notes maturing in May 2027,
   rated Aa2;

   $700,000, LIBOR + 4.00%, Class B-1 Notes maturing in May 2027,
   rated A2;

   $61,800,000, 8.29% Class B-2 Notes maturing in May 2027, rated
   A2;

   $78,500,000, 12.37%, Class D-1 Notes maturing in May 2027,
   rated Ba2.


CAVALRY CLO II: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $21.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Cavalry
CLO II Ltd./Cavalry CLO II LLC's $409 million fixed- and floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
May 10, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) closes
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cavalry CLO II Ltd./Cavalry CLO II LLC
Fixed- and floating-rate notes

Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)

A                     AAA (sf)     279.00
B-1                   AA(sf)       44.00
B-2                   AA (sf)      16.50
C (deferrable)        A (sf)       26.50
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)     21.50
E (deferrable)        BB-(sf)      21.50


CDC COMMERCIAL 2002-FX1: Moody's Hikes Cl. N Certs Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four classes and
affirmed six classes of CDC Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Thru Certificates, Series 2002-FX1 as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of the five P&I bonds are due to increased credit
support resulting from paydowns and amortization.

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of
Class P is consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus is
affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X-CL, is consistent
with the credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.6% of the
current pooled balance compared to 3.5% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 0.2% of the original
pooled balance compared to 0.8% at last review.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 3 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to $84.4
million from $637.5 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 4%
to 62% of the pool. The pool contains two defeased loans
representing 16% of the pool balance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $757 thousand (38% loss severity). There are
currently no loans in special servicing or on the master
servicer's watchlist.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool balance. Moody's weighted average LTV is 76%
compared to 77% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.20X and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 1.19X and 1.43X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 80% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Seattle Supermall Loan ($52 million -- 62% of
the pool), which is secured by a 935,000 square foot (SF) retail
center located in Auburn, Washington. As of July 2013, the
property was 90% leased compared to 93% at last review. The
property continues to show stable performance. Major tenants
include Sam's Club, Bed Bath & Beyond and Burlington Coat Factory.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.35X, respectively,
compared to 81% and 1.33X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Village Marketplace Shopping Center
Loan ($8 million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
129,000 SF grocery-anchored retail center located five miles
southwest of Richmond, Virginia. A 36,804 SF Food Lion Supermarket
anchors the center on a lease expiring in March 2019. As of April
2013, the property was 90% leased compared to 88% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.3X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.21X, at last review.

The third largest loan is the Huffman Shopping Center Loan ($7.7
million -- 9.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 88,069 SF
grocery-anchored retail center located in Anchorage, Alaska. A
70,295 SF Carrs Supermarket anchors the center on a lease expiring
in October 2030. As of December 2012, the property was 98% leased.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 53% and 2.05X, respectively,
compared to 54% and 2.01X at last review.


CENT CDO 12: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes From 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Cent CDO 12 Limited:

$459,600,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due November 18, 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

$28,800,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due November 18, 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

$32,400,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due November 18, 2020,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf);

$22,800,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due November 18, 2020,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$22,800,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due November 18, 2020,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 17, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread levels
compared to the covenant levels assumed in prior reviews. Moody's
modeled a WARF of 2640 compared to the covenant level of 2900 and
a WAS of 3.3% compared to the covenant level of 2.8%.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $589 million, defaulted par of $19.5 million,
a weighted average default probability of 20.15% (implying a WARF
of 2640), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.63%,
and a diversity score of 81. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Cent CDO 12 Limited, issued in December 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2112)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3168)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels. In particular, given that the post-
reinvestment period reinvesting criteria do not require the
reinvestment to have a Moody's rating equal to or better than the
rating of the security sold or prepaid, Moody's considered the
deal's sensitivity to a portfolio having a higher WARF.


CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on $18.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on CFIP
CLO 2013-1 Ltd./CFIP CLO 2013-1 LLC's $370.50 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of May 6,
2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings after reviewing the effective date portfolio
(typically referred to as an "effective date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new-issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager.  Ratings may also reflect S&P's assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for an effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish
an effective date report each time we issue an effective date
rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P
added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CFIP CLO 2013-1 Ltd./CFIP CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)

A                          AAA (sf)                     258.00
B                          AA (sf)                       44.75
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        30.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      19.25
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       18.50


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. M Certs to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)'.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class M certificate
following principal losses detailed in the Sept. 17, 2013, trustee
remittance report.  The principal loss on class M was attributable
to the liquidation of the $5.2 million Pinewood Plaza Office
Building asset, which was with the special servicer, Torchlight
Investors LLC.  According to the September remittance report, the
loss severity for this asset was 57.3% (totaling $3.0 million in
principal losses).  Consequently, class M experienced a 2.2% loss
to its $5.2 million original principal balance, while class N lost
100% of its $2.9 million opening balance.  S&P had previously
lowered its rating on class N to 'D (sf)'.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


COMM 2004-LNB2: DBRS Hikes Class H Debt Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded six classes of COMM 2004-LNB2 as follows:

Class D to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
Class E to AAA (sf) from A (high) (sf)
Class F to AA (sf) from A (sf)
Class G to A (sf) from BBB (sf)
Class H to BB (sf) from B (low) (sf)
Class J to B (sf) from CCC (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction.  All trends are Stable.

The ratings upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to
the bonds as a result of loan repayment and amortization, in
addition to the current performance and maturity profile of the
remaining loans.  Since issuance, there has been collateral
reduction of 71.4%, with 52 loans remaining in the pool out of the
original count of 90 loans.  Approximately 42.4% of total
collateral reduction has occurred over the past 12 months, as
eight loans, including three of the four largest loans at
issuance, have been paid in full over the past year.  The
transaction also benefits from defeasance collateral as eight
loans, representing 43.5% of the current pool balance, are fully
defeased.

In the next 12 months, 48 loans, representing 71.2% of the current
pool balance are scheduled to mature.  Excluding defeasance, these
loans have a weighted-average exit debt yield of 13.2%.  Likewise,
the largest 15 loans in the transaction continue to exhibit stable
performance, with a weighted-average debt service coverage ratio
and weighted-average exit debt yield of 1.56x and 13.2%,
respectively.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the top 15 loans and loans on
the servicer's watchlist, which comprise approximately 80.9% of
the current pool balance.  As of the September 2013 remittance,
there are ten loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing
10.1% of the current pool balance.  DBRS considered the current
performance of these loans in its analysis, which included
assigning an elevated probability of default associated with the
latest reported cash flows to the extent it was warranted.  There
are no specially serviced assets in this transaction.


COMM 2013-CCRE11: DBRS Rates Class E Certificates 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-CCRE11 (the Certificates), to be issued by COMM 2013-CCRE11
Mortgage Trust.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Classes A-3FL, A-3FX, X-B, X-C, A-M, B, PEZ, C, D, E and F will be
privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on
interest-only certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers
the interest-only certificate's position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.


Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-M, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates.
Class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-M, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 46 fixed-rate loans secured by 82
commercial, multifamily and manufactured housing properties.  The
transaction has a balance of $1,269,818,466.  The pool exhibits a
DBRS weighted-average term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.65 times (x) and 10.0%, respectively, based on the
senior trust balances.  The DBRS sample included 25 loans,
representing 84.9% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 16.1%
of the pool, were shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS.
Properties representing 31.3% of the pool are located in urban
markets with increased liquidity, greater than transactions in the
recent past that typically have urban concentrations of 15% to
20%.  In addition, loans secured by properties located in tertiary
and rural markets represent only 10.4%.

The pool is concentrated by loan size as the top ten loans
represent 63.7% of the overall pool balance.  The pool has a
concentration level similar to a pool of 19 equal-sized loans.  At
44.9% of the pool, the transaction has a high concentration of 12
loans with DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x based on the trust balance.
However, these DSCRs are based on a weighted-average stressed
refinance constant of 9.9%, which implies an interest rate of
9.3%, amortizing on a 30-year schedule.  This represents a
significant stress of 4.1% over the weighted-average contractual
interest rate of the loans in the pool.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure
and underlying trust assets.  All classes will be subject to
ongoing surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades
by DBRS after the date of issuance.

COMM 2013-CCRE11: Fitch to Rate $17.46MM Class F Certs 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE11 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $42,296,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,309,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $411,267,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,003,156,000 a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,000,000 b class A-3FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 b class A-3FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $186,130,000 a,b class X-B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $114,284,000 b,c class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,189,000 b,c class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $236,504,000 b,c class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,031,000 b,c class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,910,000 b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,216,000 b class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,460,000 b class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

a Notional amount and interest only.
b Privately placed pursuant to rule 144A.
c Class A-M, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for class A-M, class B, and class C certificates.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Sept. 20, 2013. Fitch does not expect to rate the
$80,532,466 interest-only class X-C or the $42,856,466 class G.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in
the trust, primary assets of which are 46 loans secured by 82
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.270 billion, as of the cutoff date. The loans
were contributed to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate
Lending, L.P., and German American Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 87.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 92.1% of the pool.

Key Rating Drivers

Average Leverage: The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) are 1.24x and 97.5%, respectively,
in-line with the 2013 and 2012 averages of 1.36x and 99.8%, and
1.24x and 97.2%, respectively.

High Quality Assets: Seven of the top 10 loans, totaling 38.2% of
the pool, are secured by high-quality assets receiving a Fitch
property quality grade of 'B+' or better.

Pool Concentration: The pool is more concentrated by loan size
than average transactions in 2012 and 2013. The top 10 loans
represent 63.7% of the pool, higher than the 2013 and 2012 average
concentrations of 54.3% and 54.2%, respectively. The loan
concentration index (LCI) is 517, representing one of the more
concentrated conduit pools by loan size.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans (9.1% of the pool) have
investment-grade credit opinions. One Wilshire (6.3% of the pool)
has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf' and 200-206 East
87th Street Leased Fee (2.8% of the pool) has an investment-grade
credit opinion of 'BBB-sf'.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 3.6% below
the full-year 2012 net operating income (NOI) (for properties that
2012 NOI was provided, excluding properties that were stabilizing
during this period). Unanticipated further declines in property-
level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss severities on
defaulted loans, and could result in potential rating actions on
the certificates. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to COMM 2013-CCRE11 certificates and found that the
transaction displays average sensitivity to further declines in
NCF. In a scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'A?sf' could result. In a more severe scenario, in which NCF
declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior
'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could result. The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities on pages 75-76.

The master servicer will be Midland Loan Services, a Division of
PNC Bank, National Association, rated 'CMS1' by Fitch. The special
servicer will be Situs Holdings, LLC, rated 'CSS2' by Fitch.


COMM 2013-THL: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that the Directing
Certificate Holder has elected to terminate Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, the existing Special Servicer, and to
appoint Strategic Asset Services LLC as the successor Special
Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer and Replacement
will become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions
precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for COMM 2013-THL Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates (the Certificates). Moody's
opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with the
proposed designation and transfer of special servicing rights.
Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to whether this change
has, or could have, other non-credit related effects that may have
a detrimental impact on the interests of note holders and/or
counterparties.

The last rating action for COMM 2013-THL was taken on July 3,
2013. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.


COSO GEOTHERMAL: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on $629MM Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating on Coso Geothermal Power
Holdings LLC's (CGP) $629 million ($486 million outstanding) pass
through certificates due 2026 at 'CC'. The ratings affirmation
reflects the continued expectation that default is probable, as
operating cash flows and reserve funds will be insufficient to
meet long-term financial obligations.

Key Rating Drivers

-- Geothermal Resource Depletion: Underperformance of the
   geothermal resource has lowered net operating capacity at
   the Coso geothermal project's (Coso) three interlinked
   geothermal power plants. With the decline in the geothermal
   resource, energy revenues have fallen to levels that are not
   sufficient to meet debt obligations. (Supply Risk: Weaker)

-- Expected Payment Shortfalls: Fitch's projections indicate that
   cash available for debt service will result in shortfalls for
   future payment obligations on the fully amortizing
   certificates. These obligations are supported by the letter of
   credit (LC)-funded senior rent reserve. (Debt Structure:
   Midrange)

-- Finite Financial Support: Approximately $33.2 million in
   liquidity remains under the LC-funded senior debt service
   reserve, which Fitch expects to be exhausted between 2015 and
   2017. Absent further dedicated liquidity to meet Coso's debt
   obligations, the certificates are likely to default.

-- Limited Price Risk: Variable pricing on energy sales is
   limited to one-fifth of total revenues between July 2014 and
   March 2019. Coso executed an amendment with off-taker Southern
   California Edison (SCE, rated 'A-' with a Stable Outlook by
   Fitch) to fix the energy price earned at the BLM plant through
   June 30, 2014. (Revenue Risk: Midrange)

-- Lack of Dedicated Operating Reserves: The project has no
   dedicated operations and maintenance or major maintenance
   reserve, leaving little cushion to protect against increased
   operational costs. (Operation Risk: Weaker)

Rating Sensitivities

-- Further downgrades are likely as the geothermal resource
   depletes and reserve liquidity is exhausted.

-- Opportunities for a rating upgrade are not likely.

Security
Each tranche of the certificates represents an undivided interest
in a related pass-through trust, which holds the lessor notes
(notes) issued by the owner lessors. The notes are the sole
collateral and source of repayment of the certificates.

Credit Update
The 'CC' rating is based upon the strong likelihood that Coso will
default on its debt service obligations. Coso has been unable to
reverse a steady decline in geothermal resource output, and
reduced cash flow was insufficient to meet the debt portion of the
lease rent payment that was due in January 2013 ($43.4 million).
Coso was able to make its smaller July 2013 payment ($22.8
million) using operating cash flow but management projects another
shortfall on its January 2014 payment ($40.9 million).

Coso's LC facility includes a $40 million senior rent reserve.
Coso drew $9.7 million from the reserve to make its January 2013
payment, but was able to pay back a portion of the drawn principal
($2.9 million) with excess cash in July. As a result, the
remaining balance in the senior rent reserve is $33.2 million.
Absent a significant improvement in net capacity levels, operating
cash flow will continue to fall short of required payments, and
these reserve funds will eventually be exhausted, leading to
default on the certificates.

In developing a base case for long-term expected performance,
Fitch utilized recent performance as an assumption for Coso's net
capacity and applied minimal additional stress. This scenario
indicates a financial profile in which default is probable. Fitch
expects Coso to operate below breakeven levels for the remainder
of the debt tenor, with a DSCR average of 0.82 times (x) and
minimum of 0.70x. Based on this profile, and the availability of
liquidity in the reserve, Fitch expects default to occur between
2015 and 2017.

CGP is a special-purpose company formed to lease and operate the
Coso project, which consists of three interlinked geothermal power
plants located in Inyo County, CA. Coso provides royalty payments
to the U.S. Navy and the Bureau of Land Management for use of the
geothermal resource. Under a series of power purchase agreements,
Coso's entire output will be sold to SCE through January 2030.
Cash flows from both Coso and Beowawe, an affiliated geothermal
project in Nevada, are available to service CGP's rent payments
under the CGP lease. Rent payments are the sole source of cash
available to pay debt service on the pass-through trust
certificates.


CPS AUTO 2013-C: Moody's Assigns Provisional Ratings to 5 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C. This will
be the third senior/subordinated transaction of the year for
Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

Class A Notes, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Class B Notes, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of CPS as
servicer, and the backup servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the underlying
pool is 14.00%. The loss expectation was based on an analysis of
CPS' portfolio vintage performance as well as performance of past
securitizations, and current expectations for future economic
conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is
Medium/High versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the
Medium/High assessment for Governance due to the unrated
sponsor/servicer.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS," published in May 2013.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 21.0%, 25.0% or
29.0%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from Aa3 to A1, Baa1, and Ba1, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 15.5%, 18.0% or
21.5%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.25%, 17.0%,
or 19.5%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might
change from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3, respectively. If the net
loss used in determining the initial rating were changed to
14.25%, 16.0% or 19.0%, the initial model output for the Class D
notes might change from Ba3 to B1, the net loss used in determining the initial rating were changed
to 15.0%, 16.0% or 19.0%, the initial model output for the Class E
notes might change from B3 to
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CPS AUTO 2013-C: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C's $205 million asset-
backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 20,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 41.9%, 34.0%, 29.6%,
      26.4%, and 24.8% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of 2.8x, 2.3x, 1.75x, 1.5x, and
      1.17x its 13.25%-13.75% expected cumulative net loss range
      for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- The expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.75x S&P's expected net loss level, the rating on the class
      A notes will not decline by more than one rating category
      during the first year, and the ratings on the class B and C
      notes will not decline by more than two categories during
      the first year, all else being equal.  This is consistent
      with S&P's credit stability criteria, which outline the
      outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a one-category
      downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated securities
      and a two-category downgrade within the first year for 'A'
      and 'BBB' rated securities.

   -- The credit enhancement underlying each of the preliminary
      rated notes, which is in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread
      for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes under S&P's stressed cash flow
      modeling scenarios, which S&P believes are appropriate for
      the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1821.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C

Class       Rating      Type           Interest        Amount
                                       rate(i)       (mil. $)
A           AA- (sf)    Senior         Fixed          152.720
B           A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed           24.090
C           BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed           12.300
D           BB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed           10.250
E           B+ (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed            5.640

(i) The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on
     the pricing date.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class G Certs to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
G commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C3, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)'.

"We lowered our rating on the class G certificate to 'D (sf)'
following principal losses detailed in the Sept. 17, 2013, trustee
remittance report.  We attribute the principal loss on class G to
the liquidation of the $6.3 million Best Western Movieland asset,
which was with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.
According to the September remittance report, the loss severity
for this asset was 61.8% (totaling $6.3 million in principal
losses).  Consequently, class G reported a 15.6% loss to its
$24.2 million original principal balance, while class H lost 100%
of its $2.5 million opening balance," S&P said.  S&P had
previously lowered its rating on class H to 'D (sf)'.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


CREDIT SUISSE 1997-C1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. I Debt to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed two classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Series 1997-C1 as follows:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. I, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of two P&I classes are due to increased credit
support as a result of paydowns and amortization as well as
anticipated paydowns from defeased loans and other loans
approaching maturity that are well positioned to refinance.

The rating of Class J is consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus is affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class A-X, is
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and thus is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.4% of the
current pooled balance. Moody's base expected loss plus cumulative
realized losses is now 1.5% of the original pool balance compared
to 1.9% at last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's also
used its credit-tenant lease ("CTL") financing methodological
approach ("CTL" approach). Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating
of a transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease. The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan. The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust. The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant
loans, Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model,
incorporated in its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-9 to
generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 20, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $66.8
million from $1.36 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 16% of the pool. Three loans, representing 59% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains a CTL component which represents 40%
of the pool. The conduit component consists of one loan which
represents 2% of the pool.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $19.7 million loss (20%
loss severity on average). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

The only conduit loan is the Glastonbury Country Club Loan ($1.0
million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-hole golf
course located in an upscale neighborhood near Hartford,
Connecticut. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
low DSCR. Performance has declined in 2012 due to lower revenues.
The loan fully amortizes over the loan term and has amortized by
approximately 67% since securitization. The loan matures in
September 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.76X,
respectively, compared to 38% and 2.78 at last review.

The CTL component includes four loans secured by properties leased
to four tenants under bondable leases. The CTL exposures are Bank
of America Corporation ($11.0 million - 16.5% of the pool; Moody's
senior unsecured rating Baa2 - under review direction uncertain),
Target Corporation ($9.7 million - 14.6%; Moody's senior unsecured
rating A2 - stable outlook), Kohl's Corporation ($4.6 million -
6.9%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1 - stable outlook) and
Bon-Ton Stores Inc. ($1.2 million - 1.8%; Moody's senior unsecured
rating Caa2 - stable outlook).

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for the
CTL component is 534. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of
a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within the pool.


CVS CREDIT A-2: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Certificate
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of CVS Credit Lease
Backed Pass-Through Certificate, Series A-2 as follows:

Series A-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2007 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

During the term of the transaction, the A-2 Certificate is
supported by CVS Caremark Corporation (CVS) lease obligations on
96 single-tenant buildings. On September 23, 2013 Moody's upgraded
CVS's senior unsecured rating to Baa1 from Baa2. CVS's upgrade
reduces the term risk of the A-2 Certificates, however, CVS's
lease obligations are not sufficient to repay the A-2 Certificate
principal in full. Therefore, the balloon risk is unchanged by the
CVS upgrade. The remaining principal of the A-2 Certificate is
insured under residual value insurance policies, however the
residual insurance provider is not a Moody's rated entity. The
rating of the A-2 Certificate is affirmed at Ba1 (sf) based on
CVS's rating (senior unsecured debt rating Baa1, stable outlook)
as well as the balloon risk at the certificate's final
distribution date. The rating on the A-2 Certificate is notched
down from CVS's rating due to the size of the loan balance at
maturity relative to the value of the collateral assuming the
existing tenant is no longer in occupancy (the dark value).

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Commercial Real
Estate Finance: Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease
Financings," published in November 2011.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issue can also be found in the Credit
Policy & Methodologies directory.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.

No models were used during this analysis.

The CTL rating actions are a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance was $125 million. The Certificates
are supported by 96 single-tenant, stand-alone retail buildings
leased to CVS. Each building is subject to a fully bondable triple
net lease guaranteed by CVS. The properties are located across 17
states. The rated final distribution date is January 2023.

CVS, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, fills the largest
number of prescriptions in the United States. The company fills or
manages more than 1 billion prescriptions annually. It operates
over 7,500 retail pharmacy stores in 42 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Brazil. In addition, it has a pharmacy
benefits management operation; a mail order and specialty pharmacy
division; an on-line pharmacy; and over 650 MinuteClinics in
twenty five states and the District of Columbia. It is the only
fully integrated pharmacy health care company in the United
States. Revenues were over $123 billion in 2012.


DRYDEN 30: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund
LLC's $473.15 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 26,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
     notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
     payable to the subordinated notes.

  -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
     withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
     (not including excess spread).

  -- The cashflow structure, which can withstand the default rate
     projected by Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model, assessed
     using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
     collateralized debt obligation criteria.

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
     bankruptcy remote.

  -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
     primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
     secured term loans.

  -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

  -- S&P's projections of the timely interest and ultimate
     principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
     assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
     commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
     various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
     from 0.259%-12.813%.

  -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
     coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
     diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
     rated notes' outstanding balance.

  -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
     which during or after the reinvestment period will lead to
     the reclassification of up to 50.00% of available excess
     interest proceeds (before paying certain uncapped
     administrative expenses, subordinate and incentive
     management fees, hedge amounts, supplemental reserve account
     deposits, and subordinated note payments) into principal
     proceeds to purchase additional collateral assets or, after
     the end of the reinvestment period, to pay principal on the
     notes sequentially, at the option of the collateral manager.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1835.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund LLC

Class                   Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)             312.15
B                       AA (sf)               64.75
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                39.25
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              24.25
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)               20.75
F (deferrable)          B (sf)                12.00
Subordinated notes      NR                    43.25

NR-Not rated.


DUANE STREET II: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Duane Street CLO II, Ltd.:

$25,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due August 20,
2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 24, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
August 20, 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2012
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

$18,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
August 20, 2018, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 24, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$238,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
(current outstanding balance of $80,806,062.97), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$75,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Revolving Floating Rate Notes Due
2018 (current outstanding balance of $25,464,095.47), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$11,750,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
August 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1and A-2 Notes have
collectively been paid down by approximately 64.97%, or $197.14
million, since August 2012. Based on the latest trustee report
dated August 11, 2013, the Senior, Mezzanine and Junior
Overcollateralization Ratios are 137.7%, 111.3% and 105.5%,
respectively, compared to 122.4%, 108.7% and 105.3%, respectively,
in August 2012. The August 11, 2013 trustee-reported OC ratios do
not reflect the August 20, 2013 payment distribution, when $42.8
million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the Class A-1
and A-2 Notes.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the amount of defaulted collateral in the CLO has increased from
$2.85 million in August 2012 to $15.46 million in August 2013
based on the trustee reports. Moody's further treated as defaulted
in its analysis another $7.63 million of collateral, because they
either have a rating of Ca or had undergone distressed
restructuring.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $184.65 million, defaulted par of $23.09
million, a weighted average default probability of 17.22%
(implying a WARF of 2795), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.38%, and a diversity score of 39. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Duane Street CLO II, Ltd., issued in July 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2236)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3354)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on $11.8MM Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Eagle Creek CLO Ltd.:

$23,200,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due February 28, 2018, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on January
24, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

$12,700,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due February 28, 2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
January 24, 2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$183,600,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
February 28, 2018 (current outstanding balance of $51,776,205),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 24, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

$45,900,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
February 28, 2018, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on January 24,
2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$11,800,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due February 28, 2018 (current outstanding balance of
$10,460,103), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on January 24, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in January 2013. Moody's notes that the Class A-
1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 71.8% or $131.8
million since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee
report dated August 20, 2013, the Class A, Class B, Class C and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 144.3%,
121.0%, 111.2% and 104.3%, respectively, versus December 2012
levels of 123.3%, 112.0%, 106.6% and 102.6% respectively.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the excess spread available to the rated notes has decreased since
the last rating action. Based on the August 2013 trustee report,
the weighted average spread is currently 3.02% compared to 3.32%
in December 2012.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the August 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 11.4% of the underlying portfolio, up from 7.3% in
December 2012. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity. Notwithstanding the increase in the
overcollateralization ratio of the Class D notes, Moody's affirmed
the rating of the Class D notes due to the market risk posed by
the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $151.1 million, no defaulted par, a weighted
average default probability of 12.74% (implying a WARF of 2192), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.51%, and a
diversity score of 29. The default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where
they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's
expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The
average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
factors.

Eagle Creek CLO Ltd., issued in February 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1754)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +3

Class D : +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2631)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D : 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


ENHANCED RETURNS 2004-13-E: Moody's Ups Certs Rating from Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced
Returns, Series 2004-13-E:

$50,000,000 RACERS, Series 2004-13-E Deferrable Certificates,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on November 20, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns, Series
2004-13-E is a CDO repack security whose rating is based primarily
upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality of the
Underlying Assets which include (i) $50MM SFA CABS II CDO Ltd.,
Class B Notes ("the SF CDO") that are currently rated Ca by
Moody's, (ii) a credit default swap that references corporate
obligors as the reference portfolio (the "Corporate Synthetic
Obligation" or "CSO") and (iii) $50MM Citigroup Global Markets
Holdings Zero Coupon Bond that are currently rated Baa2, direction
uncertain.

The rating action is a result of the shortened time to maturity on
the credit default swap. The likelihood of the Certificates
incurring losses due to defaults in the reference portfolio under
the credit default swap has diminished since the last rating
action. Additionally, the reference portfolio under the credit
default swap has slightly improved.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes also is
a result of an increase in the deal's reserve account to $12
million from $4.3 million since the last rating action in November
2012. The interest and principal distributions received on the
Class B Notes of SFA CABS II CDO Ltd. are passed through to
RACERS, Series 2004-13-E, and used to pay interest on the
certificates. The excess interest and principal received from SFA
CABS II CDO Ltd. Class B Notes is deposited into the deal's
reserve account and can be drawn to pay for interest shortfalls on
the certificates on future payment dates. On the Final Scheduled
Distribution Date, the amounts in the reserve account can be drawn
to pay for interest and principal on the certificates. The
increase in the reserve account is due to principal amortizations
of the Class B Notes in SFA CABS II CDO Ltd.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, "Rating CDO Repacks: An
Application Of The Structured Note Methodology" published in
February 2004, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate
Collateralized Synthetic Obligations" published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8-9.

Moody's rating action factors in a number of sensitivity analyses
and stress scenarios. Results are given in terms of the number of
notches' difference versus the base case, where higher notches
correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-versa:

- Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the maturity
of the CSO by six months, keeping all other things equal. The
results of this run is comparable to the base case.

- Market Implied Ratings ("MIRS") are modeled in place of the
corporate fundamental ratings to derive the default probability of
the reference entities in the portfolio. The gap between an MIR
and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an indicator of the
extent of the divergence in credit view between Moody's and the
market. The result of this run is comparable to the base case.

- Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting all
entities rated Caa1 and below. The result of this run is
comparable to the base case.

Moody's notes that key model inputs used in its analysis are based
on the published methodology. Rating assumptions for all publicly
rated corporate credits in the underlying portfolio have been
adjusted for "Review for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible
Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

Moody's does not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done by the CDOROM model. For a description
of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the CDOROM user's
guide on Moody's website.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario anticipated by Moody's of a gradual recovery in the
corporate universe. Should macroeconomics conditions evolve, the
CDO repack rating will change to reflect the new economic
developments.


FOXE BASIN 2003: Moody's Lowers Rating on $22MM Cl. C Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following notes issued by Foxe Basin CLO 2003, Ltd.:

  $22,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Notes Due
  December 15, 2015 (current outstanding balance of $5,264,604),
  Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on November 1, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of increased concerns about the potential
occurrence of a default with respect to payment of current
interest on the Class C Notes. Moody's analysis indicates that
scheduled interest collections will not be sufficient to allow
payment in full of the accrued interest due on the Class C Notes
on the payment date scheduled to occur on December 15, 2013,
unless the issuer is able to collect sufficient additional
principal proceeds from collateral sales or repayments. An
interest shortfall on the Class C Notes, which are now the senior-
most outstanding notes, will trigger an Event of Default (EOD). As
provided in Section 5.2 of the Indenture, during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, a majority of the
Controlling Class (Requisite Noteholders) may vote to accelerate
the payments on the notes. In addition, the Requisite Noteholders
may direct the trustee to proceed with the sale and liquidation of
the collateral. The severity of any potential losses to the notes
may depend on the timing and choice of these remedies following an
Event of Default. Despite the likelihood of a payment default, and
the uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of
the notes or liquidation of the collateral, Moody's analyzed the
expected loss on the Class C Notes to be negligible. In Moody's
assessment, the aggregate par coverage available to the Class C
Notes from performing collateral and the potential recoveries
generated by liquidating currently defaulted securities at their
respective market values are likely to be sufficient to fully
repay the outstanding balance on the Class C Notes.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio consists of three
performing assets, one of which is a security that matures after
the stated maturity of the notes. Based on the September 2013
trustee report, the long-dated security currently represents 21.9%
of the performing collateral. This investment potentially exposes
the notes to market risk in the event of its liquidation on or
before the notes' maturity.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the transaction has benefited from
the deleveraging of the notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in January
2013. Moody's notes that the Class B Notes have been paid down in
full and Class C Notes have been paid down by approximately 68.8%
or $11.6 million since January 2013. Based on the latest trustee
report dated September 5, 2013, the Class C overcollateralization
ratio is reported at 116.3% versus January 2013 levels of 102.9%.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since
the beginning of the year. Based on the September 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2235
compared to 3165 in January 2013.

Moody's notes that the key factors considered in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published
methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers. Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $4.8 million,
defaulted par of $7.1 million, a WARF of 2613, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 46.5%, and a diversity score of 2.
The properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in the cash
flow model analysis of the scheduled collateral collections and
payment distributions. In consideration of the small size of the
performing portfolio, Moody's analysis also focused on the
availability of collateral and collections to fully repay the
interest and principal due on the outstanding notes.

Foxe Basin CLO 2003, Ltd., issued in December 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans and defaulted securities. The portfolio
currently has three performing obligors.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009.

In consideration of the rating implications of a potential
default, as well as the wide range of uncertainties that can
potentially impact the deal, Moody's does not expect typical
credit performance changes in the underlying collateral, such as
changes in collateral default probabilities, to be significant
drivers of its future ratings on the notes. As a result, Moody's
did not perform any standard rating sensitivity analyses on the
notes.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels and the ultimate repayment of the
notes. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's
decision to work out versus sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming a range of market prices and recovery rates in order to
account for potential volatility in default recoveries.

2) Long-dated assets: The presence of a large single asset that
matures after the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
liquidation risk on the asset. Moody's analyzed the implications
of assuming the asset's liquidation on or before the CLO's
maturity using a range of assumed liquidation values.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of three
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default.


GALAXY VII: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on $13.5MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Galaxy VII CLO, Ltd.:

$26,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
October 13, 2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade;

$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
October 13, 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2013
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

$10,000,000 Class Y Combination Notes Due October 13, 2018
(current rated balance of $7,440,931.17), Upgraded to A3 (sf);
previously on July 15, 2013 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade.

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$270,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due October 13, 2018
(current outstanding balance of $124,675,143), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$60,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due October 13,
2018 (current outstanding balance of $ 27,654,375), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on July 28, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$29,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due October 13,
2018, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf);

$13,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
October 13, 2018, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 29, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and/or an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization (OC) ratios
since September 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have
been paid down by approximately 53% or $168.5 million since
September 2012. Based on the latest trustee report dated August
13, 2013, the senior and mezzanine overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 144.0% and 115.4% respectively, versus September
2012 levels of 123.8% and 109.7%, respectively.

In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also announced that it
had concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, and Class Y Notes announced on July 15,
2013. At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed
certain of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC
ratios resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments
during the first half of 2013.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from an improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since September
2012. Based on the August 2013 trustee report, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2406 compared to 2602 in
September 2012.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $257.2 million, defaulted par of $6.6 million,
a weighted average default probability of 14.40% (implying a WARF
of 2444), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.62%,
and a diversity score of 53. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Galaxy VII CLO, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class Y Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1956)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +4

Class E: +4

Class Y: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2933)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -3

Class E: -1

Class Y: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal is allowed to reinvest certain proceeds
after the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
has the flexibility to deteriorate some collateral quality metrics
to the covenant levels.


GE COMMERCIAL 2002-1: Moody's Takes Action on Five CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed two classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-1 as
follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due primarily to increased credit support
resulting from paydowns and amortization the improved credit
quality of one loan that defeased since last review.

The rating of Class N is consistent with Moody's expected loss and
is thus affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is
consistent with the expected credit performance of its referenced
classes and thus is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 15% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 26%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is 2.8% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 2.5% at Moody's last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 1, compared to a Herf of 4 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $32 million
from $1.04 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 16% to
67% of the pool. One loan, representing approximately 17% of the
pool, has defeased and is collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

One loan, representing 67% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Sixteen loans have liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss to the trust of $24 million. Loans that
were liquidated from the pool averaged a 19% loss severity.
Currently, one loan, representing 16% of the pool, is in special
servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Campus Executive
Park Loan ($5 million -- 16% of the pool), which is secured by a
two-building, 78,000 square foot office property located in
Sacramento, California. The loan transferred to special servicing
in November 2011 for imminent monetary default. The property has
been vacant since September 2009. Notice of default and notice of
foreclosure have been filed. Negotiations between the servicer and
borrower for a possible loan modification are ongoing. Moody's
estimates a high loss severity for this loan.

The conduit pool consists of one loan representing 67% of the
pool. This loan is the 15555 Lundy Parkway Loan ($21 million)
which is secured by twin, Class A, suburban office properties,
comprising a total 453,000 square feet and located in Dearborn,
Michigan. The property is 100% leased to Ford Motor Company
(Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa3, stable outlook) through
December 2016. The loan is on the watchlist due to Ford's credit
rating falling below Baa2 (or the equivalent rating for the other
rating agencies). Ford's lease expiration of December 31, 2016
falls just beyond the loan's scheduled maturity date of December
10, 2016. The loan is fully amortizing. Moody's current LTV and
stressed DSCR are 31% and 3.19X, respectively, compared to 43% and
2.27X at last review.


GE COMMERCIAL 2003-C2: Moody's Lowers Class X-1's Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
affirmed ten classes and downgraded one class of GE Commercial
Mortgage Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates 2003-C2 as follows:

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Cl. BLVD-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BLVD-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BLVD-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. BLVD-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of two P&I classes are due to increased credit
support due to amortization and paydowns. The pool has paid down
by 78% since Moody's last review.

The ratings of six pooled P&I classes are commensurate with
Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The ratings of four
non-pooled, or rake classes, are commensurate with the credit
quality of the Boulevard Mall B-note, which supports these
classes. The downgrade of the IO Class, Class X1, is due to the
decline weighted average rating factor (WARF) of its referenced
classes due to the payoffs of highly rated classes.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 36.8% of
the current balance, compared to 10.1% at last review. Although
the percentage has increased from last review, the dollar amount
has actually decreased from $35.0 million to $27.7 million.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized loss is now 3.9% compared
to 4.5% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 18 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's also utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating the
P&I classes in this deal since 83% of the pool is in special
servicing and performing conduit loans only represent 17% of the
pool . In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan that we expect will
generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer and available market data.
The loss given default for each loan also takes into consideration
repayment of servicer advances and to date and estimated future
advances and closing costs. Translating the probability of default
and loss given default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's
then applies the aggregate loss from specially serviced loans to
the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of
principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 78% to $75.4
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to
51% of the pool. One loan, representing 4% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Two loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $18.6 million (43% loss severity).
Currently five loans, representing 83% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Boulevard
Mall Loan ($38.7 million A-note -- 51% of the pool), which
represents a participation interest in a $77.4 million senior
mortgage. The property is secured by a 590,000 square foot (SF)
portion of a 1.2 million SF regional mall located two miles east
of the Las Vegas Strip. The property is also encumbered by an
$17.9 million B-note, which supports the non-pooled or rake bonds
BLVD-2, BLVD-3, BLVD-4 and BLVD-5. The mall is anchored by JC
Penney, Macy's and Sears. Macy's and Sears are not part of the
loan collateral. As of December 2012, the inline occupancy was 76%
compared to 78% as of December 2011. The loan was transferred to
special servicing due to imminent default in January 2013. The
loan is currently due for the March 1, 2013 payment. The borrower
initially was seeking a loan modification, however, it has decided
that it is willing to transfer the property to the trust via a
deed in lieu of foreclosure. The property is currently being
marketed for sale and has received several offers.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Raines
Distribution Center Loan ($15.9 million -- 21% of the pool), which
is secured by a 1.1 million SF warehouse/distribution facility in
Memphis, Tennessee. The loan transferred to special servicing in
May 2010 and became REO in May 2011. The special servicer is
marketing the property for sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Greenfield
Medical Center II Loan ($3.7 million -- 5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 28,488 SF medical office building located in Gilbert,
Arizona. The sale of this property should close by the end of
September 2013 and the proceeds will pay the loan off in full with
no loss to the trust.

The remaining specially serviced loans are represented by a mix of
property types. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $26.7 million
loss (43% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loans representing 6% of the pool and has estimated a
small loss from this loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 100% of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-
defeased loans. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 57% compared to 72% at Moody's
prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.2%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.77X and 1.62X, respectively, compared to
1.65X and 1.48X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Grove Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($4.8million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 38,340 SF
shopping center located in Ontario, California. The loan is
currently on the watchlist due to a drop in occupancy, however, a
lease has been signed for the vacant space. The Borrower is in the
process of refinancing the existing loan and acquiring the shadow-
anchor space that was occupied by Albertson's. Moody's identified
this as a troubled loan due to historic poor performance and
approaching maturity. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 143% and
0.66X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.65X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Barrington Place Apartments Loan
($3.5 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 218-unit
multifamily property located in Louisville, Kentucky. The property
was 78% leased as of December 2012 compared to 81% in December
2011. The loan is currently on the watchlist for upcoming
maturity. The borrower had secured a refinancing commitment in
June 2013, however, it needed more time for loan closing. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.68X, respectively, compared to
58% and 1.66X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Spring Lake Apartments Loan ($2.2
million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 84-unit
multifamily property located in Russelville, Arkansas. The
property was 94% leased as of December 2012 compared to 95% as of
December 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.54X,
respectively, compared to 57% and 1.52X at last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. E Secs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes of
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Series 2004-C2 as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The IO Class, Class X-1, is
affirmed since the rating is consistent with the expected credit
performance (or the WARF) of its referenced classes.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.3% of the
current balance compared to 3.6% at last review. Base expected
loss plus realized losses to date totals 12.0% of the original
pool balance compared to 11.8% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 13 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs the large
loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the excel-
based Large Loan Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 10, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 40% to $561.2
million from $933.7 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans, excluding
defeasance, representing 45% of the pool. Ten loans, representing
35% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. government
securities. There are two loans, representing 19% of the pool,
with investment grade credit assessments.

There are 15 loans, representing 10% of the pool, on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss totaling $88.3 million
(average loss severity of 61%). There are currently four loans,
representing 14% of the pool, in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Military Circle Mall Loan ($53.2
million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 740,788 square
foot (SF) enclosed regional shopping mall located in Norfolk,
Virginia. The loan transferred to special servicing on August 9,
2013 due to imminent default. Anchor tenants include JC Penney,
Macy's and Cinemark Theater. Sears closed its store at this
location in May 2012. Financial performance for full year 2012
declined compared to prior years in concert with declining
occupancy. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $15.9 million loss
(21% overall expected loss) for the four specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 29% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 80% compared to 90% at last review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.3% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
conduit DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 1.32X
and 1.21X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Jersey Gardens
Loan ($70.9 million -- 12.6% of the pool), which represents a 52%
participation interest in a $137.5 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million SF
outlet mall located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The largest tenants
are Loews Theatres, Burlington Coat Factory and Forever 21. The
property was 100% leased as of December 2012 versus 98% at last
review. Property performance has steadily increased. The loan
sponsor is Glimcher Realty Trust (Moody's senior unsecured rating
(P)Ba2; stable outlook). Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR for the senior loan are Aaa and 2.42X compared to
Aa3 and 2.24X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the 731
Lexington Avenue Loan ($36.9 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which
represents a 16% participation interest in the senior portion of a
first mortgage loan totaling $231.6 million. The loan is secured
by a 694,000 SF office condominium situated within a 1.4 million
SF complex located in midtown Manhattan. The property is also
encumbered by an $86 million B-note that is held outside of the
trust. The property is 100% leased to Bloomberg, LP through 2028.
Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and
2.42X, respectively, compared to A3 and 2.39X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 8% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Escondido Village
Shopping Center Loan ($16.5 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 191,629 SF retail center located north of San Diego
in Escondido, California. Financial performance has declined
slightly since last review. The center was 92% leased as of June
2013 versus 88% as of September 2012. The loan has amortized 14%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.1X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Stonybrook Apartments Loan ($13.6
million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 258-unit
apartment complex located in Deptford, New Jersey. This loan has
amortized 14% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 91% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.0X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the DDC Portfolio Loan ($12.6 million --
2.2% of the pool), which is secured by six properties located
throughout northern Virginia. Financial performance has steadily
increased in recent years. This loan has amortized 13% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.72X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.7X at last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Cuts Rating on 3 Certs to Low-C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed 21 classes
of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C1.

The downgrades are due to increased loss expectations,
particularly with regard to the already specially serviced assets.

Fitch modeled losses of 16.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 16.1%, including $78.7
million (4.6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 24 loans (38%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes nine specially serviced assets (15.5%).

As of the September 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 27.9% to $1.25 billion from
$1.73 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, four loans
(5.1% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes B through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Design Center of
the Americas loan (7.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
789,725 square foot (sf) showroom property located in Dania Beach,
FL.  The loan was modified in September 2012.  Occupancy at the
property declined 54% during the 3rd quarter (3Q) 2012 due to
several tenants totaling 423,466 sf vacating the property.  Per
the sub-servicer, the borrower is in the process of converting a
portion of the property to general office use and repositioning
the asset to enhance its value.  As of the July 2013 rent roll,
the property is 49% occupied with average rent at $31.25 sf.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the
Specially-serviced DDR Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio loan (5.8%).
The portfolio was originally secured by 35 single-tenanted retail
properties located in California, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas, of
which 17 currently remain.  The collateral was previously 100%
leased by Mervyn's under 20-year leases; however, the tenant
subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, and rejected
and vacated each of the stores.  To date, ten of the stores have
been fully leased, four partially leased, 3 are vacant, and 18
have been sold.  The portfolio is currently 73% leased.  All
reserves have been depleted and proceeds from the sale of
properties and previous funds held in reserve have been used to
reduce the outstanding principal.

The loan is split into three pari passu notes, including the
fixed-rate A-2 note in this transaction, the fixed-rate A-1 note
($71.0 million) securitized in the GE 2005-C4 transaction (not
rated by Fitch) and the floating-rate A-3 note ($11.4 million)
securitized in the COMM 2005-FL11 transaction.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the
specially-serviced Newburgh Mall loan (2.5%), which is secured by
a 386,101 sf regional mall located in Newburgh, NY.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in November 2011 due to the
borrower's request for a loan modification as a result of a
declining leasing activity due to weak economic conditions.  Per
the July 2013 rent roll, the mall is 85% occupied.  The special
servicer continues to follow a dual track of modification and
foreclosure.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-3 through A-1A remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown.  Rating
Outlook on class A-M is Negative due to the potential for future
defaults and increased loss expectations on some of the larger
Fitch loans of concern as well as the increasing expenses on the
REO assets.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating

Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

  -- $169.7 million class A-M to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf', Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;
  -- $114.6 million class A-J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 55%;
  -- $36.1 million class B to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
  -- $19.1 million class C to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $23.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $576.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $184 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.7 million class D at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $21.2 million class E at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $17 million class F at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $19.1 million class G at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $19.1 million class H at 'Csf', RE 0%;
  -- $1.9 million class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
  -- $5.1 million class FNB-1 at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.6 million class FNB-2 at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.1 million class FNB-3 at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $4.5 million class FNB-4 at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $2.4 million class FNB-5 at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
  -- $13.3 million class FNB-6 at 'CCCsf', RE 95%.

Fitch does not rate the class Q certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XP and XC
certificates.


GREENPOINT 2001-1: Moody's Ups Rating on II-M-2 Tranche to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class II-M-2
tranche from GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
2001-1, backed by manufactured housing loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-1

Cl. II M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The action is a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectation on this pool.

The upgrade is primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement
due to excess spread and non-declining reserved fund. Performance
has remained generally stable from Moody's last review.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


GS MORTGAGE 2005-ROCK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. J Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2005-ROCK as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 1, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2009 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I certificate classes are due to the
stable performance of the real estate collateral and key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and
Moody's debt service coverage (DSCR), remaining within acceptable
ranges. The rating of IO Class X-1 is consistent with the
performance of its referenced classes and is thus affirmed.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

The $1,685.0 million Rockefeller Center loan is secured by a
$1,210.0 million first lien mortgage on the borrower's fee and
leasehold interests in the property and an additional $475.0
million in debt secured by a pledge of 100% of the equity interest
in the borrower. The fixed-rate interest-only loan has a 20-year
term maturing in May 2025. Non-trust subordinate debt consists of
a $320 million mezzanine loan, also maturing in 2025.

Rockefeller Center is a 12-builidng office, retail and
entertainment complex located in midtown Manhattan, New York City.
The landmark development consists of about 6.7 million square feet
of office, retail, entertainment and commercial area. Amenities
include the Top of the Rock observation deck, plaza areas, an ice-
skating rink and Radio City Music Hall. As of the June 2013 rent
rolls the office space was 93% leased, the same as last review and
at securitization. The total property, including Radio City Music
Hall, was 93% leased, compared to 94% at last review.

Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio is 72% compared to 71% at last
review. Moody's stressed debt service coverage (DSCR) is 1.28x
compared to 1.29 at last review. Moody's credit assessment is Ba1,
the same as last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG6: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class M Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes and affirmed 15 classes
of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II (GCCFC) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-GG6 due to an
increase in expected losses from the specially serviced loans and
two loans within the Top 15.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are due to an increase in modeled losses associated
with the already underperforming loans. Fitch modeled losses of
14.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 12.9%, including $113.5 million (2.9% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 44 loans (20.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 13 specially serviced assets (16.9%).

As of the September 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 32% to $2.65 billion from
$3.9 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(0.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes F through S.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced Windsor Capital Portfolio loan (6.3% of the pool), which
is secured by eight full-service Embassy Suites hotels containing
a total of 1,906 rooms. The hotels are primarily located in
secondary markets across six states, Washington (Bellevue and
Lynwood), Oregon (Tigard), Ohio (Blue Ash), Michigan (Livonia),
Colorado (Colorado Springs and Denver), and Texas (El Paso). The
loan transferred to the special servicer in October 2010 due to
imminent maturity default. The special servicer commenced
foreclosure proceedings and was granted receivership, but before
the receiver could take possession the borrower filed for
bankruptcy. Court proceedings are ongoing in efforts to finalize
an agreement between the sponsor and lender, which is anticipated
to resolve the bankruptcy through the marketing and sale of all
the properties. The total exposure of the loan has increased
significantly due to fees and expenses.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced SilverCreek Portfolio loan (2.6%), which is secured by 37
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted retail strip shopping
centers totaling 636,166 square feet (sf) located across 17 states
primarily in the mid-west. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in January 2010 for monetary default. The Borrower filed
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the Northern District of Indiana around
April 3, 2012. The lender and debtor's chief restructuring officer
have reached agreement on a joint plan for the resolution of the
bankruptcy which includes the liquidation of the loan collateral
through marketing and sale of the 37 properties.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Watergate
loan (2.5%), which is secured by a 199,603 sf, 12- story office
building and the adjoining 61,481 sf Watergate Retail Plaza
located in Washington, D.C. The property is part of the six-
building Watergate complex, an international landmark. Occupancy
was a reported 53.9% as of June 30, 2013, which includes five
recently executed leases (28,579 sf). The debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) was a reported 0.46x as of year to date (YTD)
June 30, 2013, down from 0.86x at YE 2011 and 1.29x at issuance.
The borrower continues to actively market the vacant space through
in house and third party brokers.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through A-1A remain Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement and continued paydown. Rating
Outlooks on classes A-M through A-J are Negative due to the
potential of further deterioration in the performance of Fitch
Loans of Concern.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $292.6 million class A-J to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
   Negative;
-- $19.5 million class B to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
-- $48.8 million class C to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $39 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $29.3 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $43.9 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $39 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $390.1 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
   Stable.
-- $298.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $109.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $109.8 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $43.9 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $43.9 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.4 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.7 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-P and X-C
certificates.


GSC PARTNERS VII: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by GSC Partners CDO Fund VII, Limited:

$29,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on March 22, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

$21,700,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on March 22, 2013 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

$17,750,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 22, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

$45,600,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, (current
outstanding balance of $40,446,202), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on March 22, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in March 2013. Moody's notes that the Class
A-1 and A-2 Notes have been paid off and Class B Notes have been
paid down by approximately 11% or $5.2 million since March 2013.
Based on the trustee report dated August 15, 2013, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 199.1%, 150.0%, 126.6% and 112.3%, respectively,
versus February 2013 levels of 147.3%, 127.8%, 116.2% and 108.2%,
respectively. Moody's also notes the reported
overcollateralization ratios in the August 15 trustee report do
not reflect the recent payment of $48 million to the Class A-1, A-
2 and B Notes on August 26, 2013.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 3919 compared to 3157
in March 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $127 million, defaulted par of $22 million, a
weighted average default probability of 20.39% (implying a WARF of
3919), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.30% and
a diversity score of 22. The default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

GSC Partners CDO Fund VII, Limited, issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans, with significant exposure to middle market
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed a one-notch equivalent downgrade for
assets with CEs that were not updated within the last 13 months
and an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months, which represent approximately
1.5% and 5.1%, respectively, of the collateral pool. Additionally,
for each CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3% of
the collateral pool, Moody's applied a two-notch equivalent
assumed downgrade. This adjustment was applied to approximately
8.4% of the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3135)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4703)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates.


HALCYON 2005-2: Novation Confirmation No Impact on Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that entry by Halcyon
2005-2, Ltd. (the "Issuer") into a novation confirmation among the
Issuer, FMS Wertmanagement, as transferee, and Depfa Bank PLC
("DEPFA Bank"), as transferor, relating to existing credit default
swap transactions ("CDS") pursuant to the ISDA Master Agreements,
dated as of October 7, 2005 (collectively the "Novation
Confirmation") and performance of the activities contemplated
therein will not in and of themselves and at this time result in
the withdrawal, reduction or other adverse action with respect to
any current rating by Moody's (including any private or
confidential ratings or credit estimates) of any Class or Sub-
Class of Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not express an
opinion as to whether the Novation Confirmation could have non-
credit-related effects.

The Novation Confirmation effectively transfers all of the rights
and obligations of DEPFA Bank as CDS counterparty to FMS
Wertmanagement. Under the novated CDS, FMS Wertmanagement, as
credit protection buyer, has the obligation to make fixed rate
payments to the Issuer as well as any "Additional Fixed Amounts"
with respect to the underlying reference obligations.

In assessing the impact of the Novation Confirmation on the
current Moody's ratings of the Notes, Moody's assessed the credit
quality of the transferee and reviewed the Novation Confirmation
to determine whether it changed the obligations of the swap
counterparty in any respect that could negatively affect the
credit quality of the rated securities. Moody's rating view is
based primarily on its opinion that FMS Wertmanagement is a
highly-rated entity and that the Novation Confirmation does not
diminish the CDS counterparty's obligations to the Issuer.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs", published in May 2012.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

On January 24, 2013, Moody's too these rating actions as follows:

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)


HILLMARK FUNDING: Moody's Hikes $25MM Class C Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by HillMark Funding Ltd.:

$24,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021
Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$28,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021 Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 18,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$368,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021
Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 18, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

$15,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2021 Notes, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from a lower WARF and higher weighted
average spread (WAS) compared to the covenanted levels. Moody's
modeled a WARF of 2444 compared to a covenant of 2683, and a WAS
of 3.09% compared to a covenant of 2.13%. Moody's also notes that
the transaction's reported collateral quality and
overcollateralization ratio have been relatively stable.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $468.2 million, defaulted par of $11.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.36%
(implying a WARF of 2444), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.89%, and a diversity score of 59. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

HillMark Funding Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a
collateralized loan and bond obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1955)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2933)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


HOME EQUITY 2007-FRE1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Subprime RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-FRE1, backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-
FRE1

Cl. 1-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect the correction of an error
in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow model
previously used by Moody's in rating this transaction.

The pooling and servicing agreement for this transaction states
that principal and interest collections are commingled first and
then used to make payments on the bonds. However, the cash flow
model used in prior rating actions incorrectly applied separate
interest and principal waterfalls. Due to the discovery of this
error, two tranches from this transaction were placed on watch on
May 14, 2013. The error has now been corrected, and these rating
actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


HOME LOAN: Moody's Takes Action on $49MM RMBS Issued 2005 to 2006
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the rating of one tranche from two transactions,
backed by subprime mortgage loans, issued by Home Loan Mortgage
Loan Trust.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools.
In addition, the rating actions reflect correction of errors in
the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models
previously used by Moody's in rating these transactions.

For both transactions, the pooling and servicing agreements state
that principal and interest collections are commingled first and
then used to make payments on the bonds. However, the cash flow
models used in prior rating actions incorrectly applied separate
interest and principal waterfalls. Due to the discovery of this
error, two tranches from these transactions were placed on watch
on May 14, 2013. The models for these transactions also allocated
losses incorrectly. The errors have now been corrected, and these
rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


IMPAC CMB: Moody's Takes Action on $619MM 2003-2005 Alt-A Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
tranche, upgraded the ratings of three tranches and confirmed the
ratings of 20 tranches from five transactions, backed by Alt-A
RMBS loans, issued by Impac CMB.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. 1-B-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-6 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-6

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-7 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-7

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-9 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-9

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on May 14,
2013 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-1 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2005-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on May 14, 2013 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Ratings Rationale:

These actions reflect recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. These rating
actions consist of one downgrade, three upgrades and 20
confirmations. The upgrades are due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The actions also reflect the correction of an error in the
Structured Finance Workstation (SFW) cash flow models used by
Moody's in rating these transactions, specifically in how the
models handle principal and interest allocation. The cash flow
models used in past rating actions incorrectly used separate
interest and principal waterfalls. However, the pooling and
servicing agreements for these transactions provide that all
collected principal and interest is commingled into one payment
waterfall to pay all promised interest due on bonds first, and
then to pay scheduled principal. Due to the discovery of this
error, 23 tranches were placed on review on May 14, 2013. In
addition the excess spread available to cover losses was
incorrectly allocated among the various pools in Impac CMB 2004-7
and Impac CMB 2004-9. The errors have been corrected, and these
rating actions take into account the correct interest and
principal waterfalls and excess spread allocation.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.1%
in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


JP MORGAN 2013-INN: Fitch to Rate $74MM Class E Certs 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on JPMorgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates, JPMCC 2013-INN.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $287,700,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $488,750,000* class X-CP 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $575,000,000* class X-EXT 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,600,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,400,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66,300,000 class D 'BBB-sf; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,000,000 class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional and interest only.

The expected ratings are based upon information received by the
issuer as of Sept. 19, 2013.

The certificates in this transaction represent the beneficial
interest in a trust that holds a $575 million mortgage loan
secured by 51 hotel properties with a total of 6,844 keys located
in 16 states across the U.S. The loan is sponsored by a joint
venture between Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. and Chatham
Lodging Trust.

Key Rating Drivers

Moderate Trust Leverage: Fitch's stressed DSCR and loan to value
ratio (LTV) for the trust component of the debt are 1.37x and
77.9%, respectively.

Single-Borrower Hotel Concentration: The transaction is primarily
secured by 51 extended stay, limited service, and full service
hotel properties. Hotel performance is considered to be more
volatile due to the lodging sector's operating nature.
Portfolio Performance: After experiencing two years of year-over-
year revenue per available room (RevPAR) declines, the portfolio's
year-over-year RevPAR performance turned positive beginning in
2010. Subsequently, portfolio RevPAR grew 5.1% in 2011 and 10% in
2012. Overall, the portfolio's TTM (as of July 2013) RevPAR
performance is approximately 5.3% above its previous peak
performance in 2007.

Diversity: The portfolio exhibits significant geographic diversity
across 32 markets in 16 states. The largest state exposure is
California with 10 hotels representing 37.3% by allocated loan
amount. No single hotel contributes more than 6.8% of net cash
flow (NCF). The portfolio is comprised of eight different
franchise flags, with the Marriot Extended Stay brand (Residence
Inn) being the majority, serving as the flag for 68.8% (by loan
balance) of the total portfolio.

Asset Quality and Age: The 51 properties comprising the portfolio
have an average age of 25 years (built from 1963 to 2006) and have
generally been renovated most recently between 2007 and 2012. The
portfolio demonstrates little performance differentiation based on
property age. The portfolio's assets are well maintained, with
$141.8 million ($20,716 per key) of capital improvements spent
from 2007 to 2012. In addition, $96.6 million ($14,113 per key) in
capital improvements are budgeted through 2018.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch found that the pool could withstand a 77.2% decline in value
and an approximately 63% decrease in the most recent actual cash
flow prior to experiencing $1 of loss to the 'AAAsf' rated class.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings of class A (rated
'AAAsf' by Fitch) and found that a 17% decline in Fitch NCF would
result in a one category downgrade, while a 46% decline would
result in a downgrade to below investment grade. The Rating
Sensitivity section in the presale report includes a detailed
explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP1: Ratings Unchanged Over Proposed Defeasance
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service was informed that Pier 39 Limited
Partnership, the Borrower for the Pier 39 mortgage loan, has
elected to defease the loan with U.S. Government Securities. The
proposed defeasance will become effective upon satisfaction of the
conditions precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the defeasance transaction. Moody's has
determined that this proposed defeasance will not, in and of
itself, and at this time, result in a downgrade or withdrawal of
the current ratings to any class of certificates rated by Moody's
for JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2005-
LDP1.

Moody's opinion only addresses the credit impact associated with
the proposed defeasance. Moody's is not expressing any opinion as
to whether this change has, or could have, other noncredit related
effects that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of
note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. 2005-LDP1 was taken on August 29, 2013, when
Moody's affirmed the ratings of 19 classes of JP Morgan 2005-LDP1
as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's will continue to monitor these ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.


JP MORGAN 2007-FL1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class H Certs to Csf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes and
downgraded five classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-FL1.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012 Confirmed at
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012 Confirmed at
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. RS-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-4, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-6, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. RS-7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) remaining within acceptable ranges. The downgrades
are due to higher expected loss estimates associated with the
Resorts International Loan than what was anticipated at last
review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
pooled certificate balance decreased to $599 million from $713
million at last review due to a loan pay off (Westin Chicago North
Shore Loan) and loan pay downs. The Certificates are
collateralized by six floating-rate loans ranging in size from 4%
to 27% of the pooled trust mortgage balance. The largest three
loans account for approximately 75% of the pooled balance.

The deal has a modified pro-rata structure. Interest on the pooled
trust certificates are distributed first to A-1 and X-2 pro rata,
and then to Classes A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, and L,
sequentially. Prior to a monetary or material non-monetary event
of default, scheduled and unscheduled principal payments are
allocated to the Pooled Classes and junior participation interests
on a pro rata basis. Initially, 80% of the principal received is
paid to the Class A-1 and A-2 certificates sequentially, and 20%
was allocated pro rata to the other certificates.

Principal distributions are made sequentially from the most senior
to the most junior class after the outstanding principal balance
of the Pooled Trust Assets (exclusive of Trust Assets related to
Specially Service Mortgage Loans) is less than 20% of the initial
principal balance of the Trust Assets. All losses and shortfalls
will be allocated first to the relevant junior interest, then to
the Raked Classes, and then to Classes L, K, J, H, G, F, E, D, C,
B, and A-2 in that order, and then to Class A-1.

The pool has experienced $48.7 million of losses to date affecting
Classes K and L due to the liquidation of two loans. In addition,
interest shortfalls totaling $6.7 million affect all the pooled
Classes as well as rake classes associated with the Resort
International Loan. Moody's weighed average pooled LTV ratio is
145% compared to 117% at last review and 62% at securitization.
Moody's pooled stressed DSCR is 1.35X, compared to 1.31X at last
review and 1.86X at securitization.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. Large
loan transactions generally have a Herf of less than 20. The pool
has a Herf of 5, the same as at last review.

The largest loan, the PHOV Portfolio loan ($140.1 million, 27% of
the pooled balance), is secured by nine full-service hotels with
2,256 guest rooms located in California (3 properties), Louisiana
(2 properties), Florida (2 properties), Illinois (1 property) and
South Carolina (1 property). Two New Jersey properties (DoubleTree
Hotel & Executive Meeting Center and Hilton Hotel East Brunswick)
were released from the pool in July 2013. Forbearance was
completed in September 2012, including maturity extension through
July 2014 and a full cash trap. The loan has an additional B note
and new mezzanine loan held outside of the trust.

The portfolio's (including all 11 properties) net cash flow (NCF)
for the trailing twelve month period ending June 2013 was $12.6
million which is down from the same period a year ago. However,
Moody's positive outlook for some of the larger assets in major
markets is somewhat mitigating the decline in the most recent NCF.
The appraised (July 2012) value of the remaining assets total $297
million. Moody's current pooled LTV is 83%. Moody's credit
assessment is B2, compared to B3 at last review.

The second largest pooled exposure, the Marriott Waikiki loan
($124.7 million, 24% of the pooled balance), is secured by a
leasehold interest in a 1,310 room full-service hotel known as The
Marriott Waikiki Beach Resort and Spa located in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Loan modification was completed in January 2013, including
maturity extension through May 2014, and a $20 million trust loan
pay down. The loan has an additional B note of $131.6 million
outside of the trust as well as $25 million of mezzanine
financing.

The property's NCF for 2012 was $25.3 million, up significantly
from 2011 NCF of $17.7 million. Moody's current pooled LTV is 57%
and stressed DSCR is 2.45X. Moody's credit assessment is Baa3
compared to Ba1 at last review.

The third largest loan is the Resorts International loan ($116.0
million, 23% of pooled balance plus $87.7 million non-pooled, rake
balance) which is secured by two hotel/casinos with a total of 439
rooms: the Bally's Tunica (Robinsonville, Mississippi) and Resorts
Tunica (Tunica, Mississippi).

In July 2009, the portfolio was transferred to special servicing
due to payment default. Both the Bally's Tunica and the Resorts
Tunica are REO. Moody's anticipates a loss on this loan and
Moody's credit assessment is C, the same as last review. Non-
pooled Classes RS-1, RS-2, RS-3, RS-4, RS-5, RS-6, and RS-7 are
secured by the junior portion of the Resorts International
Portfolio Loan.


JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Rights Transfer No Impact on Moody's Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  was informed that the Directing
Certificate Holder has elected to terminate KeyCorp Real Estate
Capital Markets, Inc., the existing Special Servicer, and to
appoint Strategic Asset Services LLC as the successor Special
Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer and Replacement
will become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions
precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for JP Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-FL2 (the Certificates). Moody's opinion
only addresses the credit impact associated with the proposed
designation and transfer of special servicing rights. Moody's is
not expressing any opinion as to whether this change has, or could
have, other non-credit related effects that may have a detrimental
impact on the interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for JPMCC 2012-FL2 was taken on June 27,
2013. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

On June 27, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
J.P Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-FL2. Moody's
rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-CP, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. X-EXT, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)


KINGSLAND VI: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Kingsland VI/Kingsland VI LLC's $333.0 million floating-rate debt.

The debt issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

  -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated debt through
     the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
     subordinated notes.

  -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
     withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
     (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
     can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
     Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
     using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
     collateralized debt obligation criteria.

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
     bankruptcy-remote.

  -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
     primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
     secured term loans.

  -- The portfolio manager and designated replacement manager's
     experienced management teams.

  -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
     principal payments on the rated debt, which S&P assessed
     using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
     with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
     scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

  -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
     coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
     diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
     balance of the rated debt outstanding.

  -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
     failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
     50% of excess interest proceeds, that are available before
     paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
     subordinated hedge termination payments, any refinancing
     expenses, collateral manager subordinated and incentive
     fees, and subordinated note payments, to principal proceeds
     for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
     reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1833.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Kingsland VI/Kingsland VI LLC

Class                  Rating                  Amount
                                             (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  2.00
A-1                    AAA (sf)                170.00
A loans(i)             AAA (sf)                 50.00
A-2(i)                 AAA (sf)                  0.00
B                      AA (sf)                  44.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                   25.00
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                 19.00
E (deferrable)         BB (sf)                  15.00
F (deferrable)         B (sf)                    8.00
Subordinated notes     NR                       34.70

  (i) The class A-2 notes have a rated principal amount of
      $50 million, which includes the $50 million rated principal
      amount of class A loans.  The aggregate outstanding amount
      of class A loans can be converted to class A-2 notes, at
      which point the corresponding amount of converted class A
      loans will be canceled.

NR-Not rated.


LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class K Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed three classes of LB Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of one P&I class is due to increased credit
enhancement levels and overall stable credit quality of the
remaining loans. The pool balance has decreased 9% since last
review.

The affirmation of Class H is due to key rating parameters,
including weighted average rating factor (WARF) and base expected
loss, remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of Class K is
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus is affirmed. The
rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.1% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.1% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses is now 2.7% of
the original pool balance, the same as at the last review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
(CTL) financing methodology approach (CTL approach) because the
transaction is secured solely by CTL loans. Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of the CTL component is primarily based on
the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating)
of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing
the real estate collateral supporting the bonds. This tenant's
credit rating is the key factor in determining the probability of
default on the underlying lease. The lease generally is
"bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease, yielding
fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box, sufficient under
all circumstances to pay in full all interest and principal of the
loan. The leased property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote,
special purpose borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and
assignment of rents to the securitization trust. The dark value of
the collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined to determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction. For deals that include a pool of credit tenant
loans, Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model,
incorporated in its public CDO rating model CDOROMv2.8-9 to
generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess the ratings.

The methodology used in rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review also incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
which uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology. The calculator
then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a target and
mid-point . For example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf)
rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf)
rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the
calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $13.3
million from $892.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
93% of the pool. The pool originally included two loans with
credit assessments, 120 conduit loans and 12 CTL loans. Due to
paydowns, the entirety of the pool now consists of CTL loans.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist or
in the special servicing.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $23.4 million (23% loss severity
on average). Due to realized losses, classes L, M, N and P have
been eliminated entirely and class K has experienced a 26%
principal loss.

The CTL loans are secured by 12 properties leased to four tenants.
The exposures are CVS/Caremark Corp. (Moody's senior unsecured
rating Baa2 - positive outlook; 71.9% of the pool), Rite Aid
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa2 - stable
outlook; 13.8% of the pool), Walgreen Co. (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa1 - negative outlook; 10.7% of the pool), and
McDonald's Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating A2 -
stable outlook; 3.6% of the pool).

The bottom-dollar WARF for this pool is 1,189 compared to 1,210 at
last review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within the pool.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C7: Moody's Cuts X-CL Certs Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded one class of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C7 as
follows:

Cl. J, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2003 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2009 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of Classes J and K are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The ratings of Classes L, M,
N, P, Q and S are consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus
are affirmed. The rating for the Moody's rated IO class, Class X-
CL is downgraded due to a decline in the weighted average rating
factor (WARF) of its referenced classes.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain its
current rating. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 31.9% of
the current pooled balance compared to 5.1% at last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus cumulative realized losses is now
1.8% of the original pool balance, compared to 2.5% at the last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to 7 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $78.7
million from $1.45 billion at securitization. The deal has paid
down 89% since last review. The Certificates are collateralized by
eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less than 1% to 39% of
the pool. One loan, representing approximately 3% of the pool is
defeased and is collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

One loan, representing 38% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an aggregate
realized loss of $603,600 (18% average loan loss severity).
Currently, five loans, representing 56% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Shepherd Office Center Loan ($30.7 million -- 39.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 637,500 square foot (SF) former regional
mall which was converted into an office property in downtown
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The property was 91% leased as of July
2013 compared to 80% at Moody's last review. The loan transferred
to special servicing in September 2010 due to imminent monetary
default. The Lender entered into a Forbearance Agreement with the
Borrower wherein Lender will receive no less than $30.7 million
prior to September 30, 2013. The Borrower has expressed that it
will be unable to perform on or before that date and the Lender
has agreed to extend the timing of this matter to December 31,
2013 pending the receipt of $5.0 million from Borrower and
Guarantors on or before September 30, 2013. Should the Borrower
fail to perform, the Lender will move to complete foreclosure as
soon as practicable.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Grand Pavilion
loan ($5.9 million -- 7.6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
62,500 SF retail property located in Atlanta, Georgia. The loan
transferred to special servicing for monetary default in September
2010. The lender foreclosed on the property on October 14, 2011.
As of July 2013, property was 26% leased.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Fletcher Heights
Marketplace Loan ($4.6 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 26,000 SF retail property located in Peoria, Arizona.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2012 due
to monetary default as a result of tenancy delinquency and
vacancy. The lender foreclosed on the property on November 19,
2012. As of July 2013, the property was 61% occupied.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by retail
properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $17.9 million (41% loss
on average) loss for all specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 96% of the performing pool,
respectively. Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 128% compared to 89% at last full review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 2.2%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
conduit DSCRs are 0.91X and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 1.32X
and 1.18X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

There are two loans remaining in the conduit pool representing 41%
of the deal. The largest loan is the Shops at Gainey Village Loan
($29.7 million -- 37.9% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
138,3000 SF retail center located in Scottsdale, Arizona. The
tenancy consists primarily of local and regional boutique
retailers. The loan was 79% leased as of April 2013 compared to
74% at last review. The loan was modified in June 2011 to extend
the loan maturity to December 2013. The loan sponsor is an
affiliate of Principal Global Investors. The loan is currently on
the watchlist due to its upcoming maturity. The borrower has
indicated to the Master Servicer that it is refinancing the loan
and plans to close with new lender on or around September 30,
2013. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.77X,
respectively, compared to 166% and 0.62X at last review.

The second conduit loan is the Cabarrus Family Medicine Medical
Office Building ($2.2 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which secured
by a 23,555 SF office property located in Harrisburg, a
northeastern suburb of Charlotte, North Carolina. As of December
2012, the property was 81% occupied compared to 100% at last
review. The property is occupied by two tenants, Cabarrus Family
Medicine (60% of the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration
February 2016) and Copperfield OB/GYN (30% of the NRA; lease
expiration October 2017). Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR
are 60% and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 53% and 1.94X at last
review.


LCM III: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on seven
classes of notes from LCM III Ltd. and LCM IV Ltd.  Both
transactions are U.S. collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
managed by LCM Asset Management.  At the same time, Standard &
Poor's removed its ratings on all seven of these notes from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with positive implications on
Sept. 5, 2013.  In addition, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'AAA
(sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes of LCM IV Ltd.

The actions reflect three factors: the deleveraging of the senior
notes, improving credit quality, and the potential market value
risk of the long-dated assets in the transaction.

For LCM III Ltd., after the Sept. 3, 2013, payment date, the
principal amortization has resulted in $236.47 million in paydowns
to the Class A notes since S&P's last rating actions, which were
based on the trustee report dated March 20, 2012.  The outstanding
balance of the Class A notes is approximately 8.87% of its
original balance.  The credit quality of the underlying portfolio
has improved.  The 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction
fell to $1.44 million from $11.44 million over the same period.
The transaction held no defaulted assets as of Aug. 23, 2013.

For LCM IV Ltd., after the July 12, 2013, payment date, the
principal amortization has resulted in $184.16 million in paydowns
to the Class A-1 and A-2 notes since our last rating actions,
which were based on the trustee report dated May 1, 2012.  Both
notes have paid down to approximately 7.52% of their original
balance.  The credit quality of the underlying portfolio has
improved.  The 'CCC' rated collateral held in the transaction fell
to $1.25 million from $6.31 million over the same period.  The
transaction held no defaulted assets as of July 31, 2013.

S&P also noted that both transactions held long-dated assets that
mature after the stated maturity of the transaction.  Based on the
August 2013 trustee report, LCM III Ltd. held long-dated assets
that constitute about 26% of the underlying portfolio.  For LCM
IV, the long-dated assets account for approximately 31% of its
underlying portfolio according to the July 2013 trustee report.
S&P's analysis took into account the potential market value or
settlement-related risk arising from the potential liquidation of
the remaining securities on the legal final maturity date of the
transaction.

The ratings on the Class C and D notes of LCM III Ltd. are driven
by the largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test
S&P introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria update.

The affirmations reflect our belief that the current support
available is commensurate with the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

LCM III Ltd.

Class          Rating
          To           From
A         AAA(sf)      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
B         AAA(sf)      A(sf)/Watch Pos
C         A+(sf)       BBB(sf)/Watch Pos
D         BB+(sf)      B(sf)/Watch Pos

LCM IV Ltd.

Class          Rating
          To           From
A-1       AAA(sf)      AAA(sf)
A-2       AAA(sf)      AAA(sf)
B         AAA(sf)      AA+(sf)/Watch Pos
C         AA(sf)       BBB+(sf)/Watch Pos
D         BB+(sf)      B+(sf)/Watch Pos


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2013-1: Moody's Rates Nine Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings of P-1
(sf) to the Class A-1 notes, Aaa (sf) to the Class A-2 notes,
Class A-3 notes and Class A-4 notes, Aa2 (sf) to the Class B
notes, A1 (sf) to the Class C notes, Baa1 (sf) to the Class D
notes, Ba1 (sf) to the Class E-1 notes and Ba2 (sf) to the Class
E-2 notes, issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 9, LLC (LRF 2013-1
or the issuer). LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. (not rated) is the
servicer for the transaction, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S.
Bank; Aa3 stable) is the back-up servicer, and while the Class A
notes are outstanding, Assured Guaranty Corp. (Assured; A3 stable)
is the Class A note guarantor and control party for the
transaction.

The collateral backing the notes consists of fixed rate leases and
commercial loan contracts acquired or originated primarily by LEAF
Capital Funding, LLC (LEAF or the originator), and secured by the
related underlying office equipment and other equipment. Moody's
median cumulative net loss expectation for the LRF 2013-1 pool is
3.50% and its Aaa level is 22%.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 9, LLC

$87,500,000 Class A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

$70,000,000 Class A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$65,000,000 Class A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$50,042,000 Class A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$7,850,000 Class B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$18,036,000 Class C, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

$7,682,000 Class D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

$11,189,000 Class E-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

$7,682,000 Class E-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The definitive ratings that Moody's assigned to the notes are
based primarily on: (1) the credit quality of the collateral pool
to be securitized, which is highly diverse by obligor, obligor
industry type and obligor location, but somewhat concentrated by
equipment type; 2) the continued strong, stable performance of
similar collateral that LEAF originated, including that for LEAF's
prior three transactions and its managed portfolio; 3) the level
of credit enhancement available to support the notes; 4) the
sequential pay structure; and 5) the strong back-up servicing
arrangement with U.S. Bank and the presence of Assured, a highly-
rated guarantor and control party, to provide strong oversight,
which in Moody's view, will mitigate operational risk for this
transaction. In addition, the P-1 (sf) rating Moody's assigned to
the Class A-1 notes is based on its expectation for the cash flows
the underlying receivables will generate during the collection
periods prior to Class A-1's legal final maturity date in October
2014.

Credit enhancement available to support the notes consists of
overcollateralization, subordination (in the case of the Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E-1 notes), a non-declining
reserve account and excess spread. At closing, hard credit
enhancement available to support the notes is equal to 19.9% for
the Class A notes, 17.6% for the Class B notes, 12.2% for the
Class C notes, 9.9% for the Class D notes, 6.5% for the Class E-1
notes and 4.2% for the Class E-2 notes. The credit enhancement for
the notes will build over time because of the sequential pay
structure, the excess spread trapping mechanism and the non-
declining reserve account. The Class A notes also benefit from a
financial guaranty insurance policy by Assured; however, the other
forms of credit enhancement (i.e., excluding the Class A insurance
policy) are sufficient to support the Aaa (sf) ratings Moody's
assigned to the Class A notes.

The presence of Assured, a highly-rated guarantor and control
party for the transaction, will provide strong support in the form
of oversight that goes beyond the Class A insurance policy. This
oversight, in Moody's view, is a strong mitigant of operational
risk for this transaction that is not directly linked to the
financial strength rating of Assured. As a result, the ratings of
the notes, including the Class A notes, would likely be unaffected
by even a multi-notch downgrade of Assured. Should however the
Class A insurance policy be terminated or Assured be downgraded to
below investment grade, Moody's would revisit Assured's role in
mitigating operational risk as it relates to its rating of the
notes.

The issuer will use amounts in the prefunding account to acquire
additional contracts from the originator during the initial three
months of the transaction, subject to Assured's consent and other
conditions. Although the amount of additional contracts the issuer
can acquire during the prefunding period is significant at about
25% of the overall pool, Assured has a strong financial incentive
to ensure that the additional contracts the issuer acquires does
not weaken the credit quality of the overall pool.

There is a minor amount of exposure to end-of-lease equipment
value in this transaction because the collateral value being
advanced against includes a portion of the residual value assigned
to the equipment under the lease contracts. The residual value
securitized at closing is equal to about 2% of the discounted pool
balance of all contracts.

V Score

Moody's assigns an Assumption Volatility Score of Medium to LRF
2013-1, stronger than the Medium/High score it assigns to the U.S.
Small Issuer Equipment Lease and Loan ABS sector. The V Score
indicates "medium" uncertainty about critical assumptions.

Significant deviations from the sector within the individual
categories include the following: 1) Moody's assigns a score of
medium to issuer/sponsor/originator's historical performance
variability, stronger than the medium/high it assigns to the
sector because of the relatively stable performance of LEAF's
collateral; 2) Moody's assigns a score of medium to market value
sensitivity, weaker than the low/medium it assigns to the sector
because of the transaction's exposure to residuals; 3) Moody's
assigns a score of low/medium to experience of, arrangements among
and oversight of transaction parties, stronger than the medium it
assigns to the sector because of the transaction parties'
significant securitization experience, including Assured's
oversight role; and 4) Moody's assigns a score of low/medium to
back-up servicer arrangement, stronger than the medium it assigns
to the sector because of the strong back-up servicing arrangement
with U.S. Bank in place at closing and Assured's oversight role.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by Equipment Leases and
Loans" published in March 2007.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 5.35%, 8.05%,
or 10.35%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class A
notes might change from Aaa (sf) to Aa1 (sf), Aa3 (sf), and A2
(sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 4.00%, 5.40%
or 6.50%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class B notes
might change from Aa2 (sf) to Aa3 (sf), A2 (sf), and Baa1 (sf),
respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.90%, 4.80%
or 5.80%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class C notes
might change from A1 (sf) to A2 (sf), Baa1 (sf), and Baa3 (sf),
respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.85%, 4.80%
or 5.90%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class D notes
might change from Baa1 (sf) to Baa2 (sf), Ba1 (sf), and Ba3 (sf),
respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.90%, 4.65%
or 5.40%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class E-1
notes might change from Ba1 (sf) to Ba2 (sf), B1 (sf), and B3
(sf), respectively.

For the transaction, if the expected cumulative net loss used in
determining the initial rating were to be changed to 3.60%, 4.15%
or 5.10%, the initial model-indicated rating for the Class E-2
notes might change from Ba2 (sf) to Ba3 (sf), B2(sf) and less than
B3 (sf), respectively.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-LLF: Moody's Hikes Cl. G Certs Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four and
affirmed the ratings of four classes of Lehman Brothers Floating
Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF C5. Moody's rating action
is as follows:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2012 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. INO, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 1, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to loan payoffs and the resulting buildup of
credit support in the transaction. The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) remaining
within acceptable ranges.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 payment date, the transaction's
pooled certificate balance decreased to $204 million from $274
million at last review primarily due to loan pay offs (Park Hyatt
Beaver Creek Loan, Liberty Square Loan and Renaissance Houston
Loan). The Certificates are collateralized by five floating-rate
loans ranging in size from 7% to 47% of the pooled trust mortgage
balance. The largest three loans account for approximately 84% of
the pooled balance.

Moody's weighted average trust loan to value (LTV) ratio is 99%,
up from 93% at the last review. Moody's weighted average trust
stressed DSCR is at 1.05X, down from 1.12X at the last review.

The cumulative bond loss totals $91,767 and interest shortfalls
total $237,608 as of the current distribution date. The majority
of the bond losses affect pooled Class J ($44,737), and a rake
bond, Class INO ($42,094). The interest shortfalls affect pooled
Class J, as well as rake bonds, Classes INO ($12,189) and VIS
($39,772). There are no outstanding advances.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by fee interests in The
Normandy Office Portfolio Loan ($96.6 million; 47% of pooled
balance plus $12.4 million non-pooled, or rake bonds). Comprised
of ten class A/B office and industrial buildings, the portfolio
totals approximately 1.4 million square feet and is located in the
greater Boston area and northern New Jersey. The loan modification
was completed in December 2012 which included a loan maturity
extension through June 2014 (plus a one year extension option
subject to a debt yield test) as well as a $12 million new cash
equity infusion. The borrower is required to sell properties and
pay down the loan by $20 million over the next 12 month period.
There is additional mezzanine debt held outside the trust.

As of the December 2012 rent roll, the portfolio was 75% leased.
The portfolio's year-end 2012 NCF was $7.0 million, down from $8.6
million achieved in the trailing twelve month period ending in
March 2012. Moody's weighted average LTV for the pooled portion is
over 100%. Moody's current credit assessment for the pooled
portion is Caa3, the same as last review. Moody's does not rate
three rake bonds associated with this loan (NOP-1, NOP-2, NPO-3).

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by fee interests in
The Interstate Office Portfolio Loan ($49.8 million; 24% of pooled
balance plus a $2.8 million rake bond). The collateral for the
loan consist of a 960,000 SF office park with 11 office buildings
and three development sites located outside of Atlanta, GA in Cobb
County. As of the December 2012 rent roll, the office portfolio
was 79% leased.

A loan modification was completed in April 2012, and the loan was
returned to the master servicer in July as a Corrected Loan in
July 2012. The maturity date for this loan was extended to October
2014 with a principal pay down of $3.5 million and reserves
established. Moody's weighted average LTV for the pooled portion
is 83%. Moody's current credit assessment for the pooled portion
is B2, the same as last review.

The Sheraton old San Juan Loan ($24.5 million; 12% of pooled
balance) is the third largest loan in the pool. The loan is
secured by a 240-room full service hotel located in Old San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The property offers 10,000 SF of meeting space as
well as 10,000 SF of casino. In 2013, guestrooms are under
renovation which is scheduled to be completed by 4Q of 2013.

A loan modification was completed in February 2013 which extended
the maturity date to June 2013 with four consecutive 6-month
extension options. The property's NCF for year-end 2012 was
approximately $690,800, and management is budgeting NCF for year-
end 2013 to be approximately $1,238,200. Moody's weighted average
LTV for the pooled portion is over 100%. Moody's current credit
assessment for the pooled portion is Caa3, the same as last
review.


LENOX CDO: Moody's Upgrades $45MM Cl. A-1S Senior Notes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Lenox CDO, Ltd.:

$70,000,000 Class A-1S First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Delayed Draw Notes Due 2043 (current balance of $44,725,000),
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on January 13, 2012 Confirmed at
Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating upgrade is the result of
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit improvement is observed through a decrease in the
WARF. Based on the latest trustee report dated August 2013, the
WARF of the portfolio has decreased to 1557 from 1764 in September
2012. This is due in part to the deal's exposure to a significant
proportion of CLO tranches which have been subject to positive
rating actions during 2013. Moody's notes that based on its
calculation, the par coverage on the Class A-1S Notes of 122% has
been stable since September 2012.

Lenox CDO, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs, SME CLOs and
EM CDOs.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Moody's did not use a cash flow model to analyze the default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool. Instead, Moody's
analyzed the transaction by assessing the transactions' underlying
collateral quality.

The deal's ratings are not expected to be sensitive to the typical
range of changes (plus or minus two rating notches on Caa-rated
assets) in the rating quality of the collateral that Moody's
tests, and no sensitivity analysis was performed.


LIMEROCK CLO I: Moody's Affirms $20MM Cl. D Notes' Ba3 Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Limerock CLO I:

$80,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
outstanding balance of $78,591,856.94), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
outstanding balance of $58,943,892.70), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$23,000,000 Class A-3b Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$29,000,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf);

$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2023,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$207,000,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
outstanding balance of $202,951,588.68), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$19,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Affirmed Baa3
(sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Affirmed Ba3
(sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

$14,000,000 Class J Blended Securities Due 2023 (current rated
balance of $11,524,321.98), Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on
August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio. Based on the latest trustee report dated
August 13, 2013, the weighted average rating factor is currently
2436 compared to 2604 in September 2012. Additionally, the deal
benefited from an improvement in the weighted average recovery
rate which is currently reported at 49.9% versus 48.6% in
September 2012.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $478.3 million, defaulted par of $8.2 million,
a weighted average default probability of 19.29% (implying a WARF
of 2663), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.63%,
a weighted average spread of 2.91%, and a diversity score of 65.
The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Limerock CLO I, issued in April 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with material exposure to CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Class J Blended
Securities was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2131)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: 0

Class A-4: +2

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class J Blended: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3196)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3a: 0

Class A-3b: -1

Class A-4: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class J Blended: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

2) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
collateral quality metrics' existing buffers against the covenant
levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of
reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor,
weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and diversity
score. However, Moody's also considered a spread level higher than
the covenant level due to the large difference between the
reported and covenant levels.


LNR CDO 2003-1: S&P Lowers Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on five classes from the
same transaction.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction's liability structure and the underlying collateral's
credit characteristics using its global CDOs of pooled structured
finance assets criteria.  S&P affirmed its ratings on classes B,
C-FL, and C-FX certificates because S&P believes these classes
have sufficient credit enhancement to support the current ratings.

The downgrades also reflect the transaction's exposure to
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) collateral
that has experienced negative rating actions.  The downgraded CMBS
collateral is from 14 transactions and totals $96.4 million (28.4%
of the total asset balance).  In lowering S&P's ratings on classes
D-FL and D-FX to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)', it also considered the
potential for additional negative rating actions on the underlying
collateral.  S&P lowered its ratings on classes F-FL and F-FX to
'D (sf)' because it believes these classes are unlikely to be
repaid in full.

According to the Aug. 21, 2013, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $339.7 million, while its liabilities
(including capitalized interest) totaled $629.3 million.  This was
down from $762.7 million in liabilities at issuance.  The
transaction's current asset pool includes CMBS tranches from 28
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2003
($339.7 million; 100%).  Of the underlying collateral,
$188.7 million (55.6%) are rated 'D (sf)' or have credit opinions
of 'cc (sf)'.

S&P's analysis of LNR 2003-1 Ltd. reflects its exposure to the
following certificates, on which Standard & Poor's has lowered its
ratings or credit opinions:

   -- JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series
      2002-C1 (classes H, J, K, and L; $29.8 million; 8.8%);

   -- LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C7 (classes P and Q;
      $13.4 million; 3.9%); and

   -- GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. series 2003-C1 (class N;
      $10.2 million; 3.0%).

According to the trustee report, the deal is passing the class C
and D overcollateralization tests, but failing the class E, F, and
G overcollateralization tests.  The transaction is also passing
the class C and D interest coverage tests, but failing the class
E, F, and G interest coverage tests.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To            From
D-FL        B+ (sf)       BB- (sf)
D-FX        B+ (sf)       BB- (sf)
F-FL        D (sf)        CCC- (sf)
F-FX        D (sf)        CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LNR 2003-1 LTD.

Class       Rating
B           BB+ (sf)
C-FL        BB+ (sf)
C-FX        BB+ (sf)
E-FL        CCC-(sf)
E-FX        CCC-(sf)


MADISON PARK XI: Moody's Rates $14MM Class F Notes 'B2'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
notes issued by Madison Park Funding XI, Ltd.:

$190,500,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$17,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A-1B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$103,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$30,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$14,000,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2025 (the
"Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's ratings of the notes address the expected losses posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Madison Park XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must be invested in
first lien senior secured loans (including participation interests
with respect to first lien senior secured loans) and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, senior secured
notes, senior unsecured loans, senior secured bonds and high-yield
bonds. The underlying collateral pool is approximately 60% ramped
as of the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue
one additional tranche of subordinated notes. The transaction
incorporates interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered,
divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in
sequential order of priority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $500,000,000

Diversity of 50

WARF of 2500

Weighted Average Spread of 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 43%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

The notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF Impact in Rating Notches

WARF + 15% (2500 to 2875) Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

WARF + 30% (2500 to 3250) Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector."

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
May 2013.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  affirmed the ratings of 18 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CIP1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes A-2 through B are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of Classes C through L are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X-C, is consistent with the expected credit performance of
its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.4% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 11.7%. Realized losses have increased from 2.0% of the
original balance to 2.1% since the prior review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.3% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 35 compared to 34 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to $1.45
billion from $2.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 118 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 37% of the pool. Five loans, representing 4% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
There are no loans with investment grade credit assessments.

Twenty-four loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $44.1 million (48% loss severity on
average). Eleven loans, representing 16% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Highwoods Portfolio 57 Loan ($135.5 million -- 9.4% of
the pool), which is currently split into a $75.5 million A-Note
and $60 million B-Note. Located in Tampa, Florida and Charlotte,
North Carolina, the portfolio was originally secured by 31 Class A
and B office buildings. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in March 2010, prior to the loan maturing in August
2010. The note was restructured into an $100 million A-note and a
$60 million B-note in June 2011, with the maturity extended until
May 2014. Nine properties have been released from the portfolio
for $24.5 million. As of June 2013, the portfolio was 65% leased
compared to 60% in June 2012.

The remaining ten specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $96.1 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 8% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $18.1 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 92%
of the pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 97% compared to 100% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.6%
to the most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.14X, respectively, compared to
1.42X and 1.16X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 17% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Glenbrook Square Mall Loan ($160.9 million --
11.1% of the pool), which is secured by an interest in a 1.2
million square foot mall located in Fort Wayne, Indiana that is
owned by an affiliate of General Growth Properties Inc. (GGP).
This loan was transferred to special servicing after GGP's
bankruptcy filing in April 2009. Subsequent to a modification in
January 2010, the loan was returned to the master servicer in May
2010. This loan is also subject to the 1% workout fee associated
with the modification agreement at the time the loan is paid off.
The mall is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney and Sears. As of June
2013, in-line occupancy was 83% compared to 87% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.80X, respectively,
compared to 119% and 0.80X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Residence Inn Hotel Portfolio 1
Loan ($47.0 million -- 3.2%), which is secured by four limited
service hotels located in New York, Florida and Texas. Performance
has improved since last review although the portfolio still is
operating below original expectations. The weighted average
occupancy for the portfolio was 74% as of December 2012 compared
to 70% at the prior review and 78% at securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 125% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to
134% and 0.97X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Residence Inn Hotel Portfolio 2 Loan
($40.1 million -- 2.8%), which is secured by four limited service
hotels located in California, Rhode Island, Delaware and Michigan.
Performance continues to improve. The weighted average RevPar for
the portfolio was $79.3 as of December 2012 compared to $77.1 at
the prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and
1.22X, respectively.


MESA WEST 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed the rating of eleven classes of notes issued
by Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1. The affirmations are due to
key transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate
with the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2009 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Mesa West Capital CDO, Ltd. 2007-1 is a static (the reinvestment
period ended in February, 2013) cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of a-notes and whole loans (100% of the pool balance).
As of the August 26, 2013 Trustee Report, the aggregate note
balance of the transaction, including preference shares, has
decreased to $496.2 million from $600.0 million at issuance, as a
result of the regular amortization of collateral.

No assets are considered defaulted as of the August 26, 2013
Trustee report.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,471
compared to 4,792 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 5.4% at last
review), and Caa1-C (100.0% compared to 94.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.6 years, compared to 5.7 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying collateral and taking into account the asset
pool static period reached in February 2013.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 55.9% compared to 54.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 30.6%, compared to 31.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated Notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
up from 55.9% to 65.9% or down to 45.9% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 9 notches upward and
0 to 7 notches downward respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


MORGAN STANLEY 2000-PRIN: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D, and E commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-PRIN, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In
addition, Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings on eight other
classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follows S&P's analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrades reflect S&P's expected available credit enhancement
for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most
recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the most
recent rating level.  The upgrades also reflect S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral as well as the deleveraging of the trust balance.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificate ratings
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimated necessary credit
enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.  The
affirmations also reflect S&P's review of the remaining loans'
credit characteristics and performance as well as the transaction-
level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels might suggest positive
rating movements for classes D through J, S&P's analysis also
considered limited liquidity support available to the classes.  In
addition, S&P considered in its analysis the number of loans with
exposure to single tenant or tenants occupying more than 30% of
net rentable area.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

As of the Aug. 23, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $68.4 million, down from
$557.6 million at issuance.  The pool comprises 29 loans, down
from 102 loans at issuance.  To date, the transaction has
experienced losses totaling $0.6 million (0.1% of the
transaction's original certificate balance).  The master servicer-
-Wells Fargo Bank N.A.--provided full-year 2012 financials
information for 87.7% of the loans in the pool.  No assets were
reported to be with the special servicer, Principal Global
Investors LLC (Principal).  Thirteen loans ($21.6 million; 31.9%)
were reported to be on the master servicer's watchlist.  Details
of the three largest loans on the master servicer's watchlist are
as follows:

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.51x
and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 44.9% for the
29 remaining loans in the pool.

The Stop & Shop loan ($5.9 million, 8.6%) is the second-largest
loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 190,021-sq.-ft. grocery-
anchored retail property in Norwood, Mass.  The loan appears on
the watchist due to the DSC falling below the DSC threshold of
1.40x.  The reported DSC was 1.19x for year-end 2012.  According
to the Feb. 28, 2013, rent roll, the property was 100.0% occupied.

The 6100 Gateway Drive & 10700 Valley View Street loan
($4.4 million, 6.5%) is the fifth-largest loan in the pool and the
second-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan
is secured by a 130,005-sq.-ft. industrial property in Cypress,
Calif.  The loan is current but appears on the watchlist due to a
decrease in occupancy at the collateral property.  The property
has been 100% vacant since United Healthcare vacated the property
after its lease expired on July 31, 2009.  According to the
servicer, a new tenant signed a seven-year lease for approximately
54,829-sq.-ft., improving occupancy to 42.2%.  The borrower
continues to actively market the remaining vacant space.

The Winn Dixie & Video loan ($2.3 million, 3.4%) is the third-
largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is
secured by a 55,840-sq.-ft. grocery-anchored retail property in
Orlando, Fla.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to a low
reported DSC, which was 1.01x for year-end 2012.  Per the master
servicer, the loan will be removed from watchlist upon
verification from the subservicer that the loan has been removed.
According to the Dec. 31, 2012, rent roll, the property is 100%
occupied.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-PRIN
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Rating     Rating        Credit enhancement
Class        To         From               (%)

C            AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)          58.12
D            AA (sf)    A (sf)            42.83
E            A+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)         36.28

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-PRIN
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)

B          AAA (sf)                     86.52
F          BB+ (sf)                     16.62
G          BB (sf)                      12.25
H          BB- (sf)                      7.88
J          B+ (sf)                       5.69
K          B- (sf)                       3.51
L          CCC+ (sf)                     1.32
X          AAA (sf)                      N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ5: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed five classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc.,
Series 2003-IQ5 as follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit support due to
amortization and paydowns as well as anticipated paydowns from
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down by 73% since Moody's last review.

The ratings of four P&I classes are consistent with Moody's
expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X1, is consistent with the weighted average rating factor
(WARF) of its referenced classes and is thus affirmed.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement levels for rated classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.8% of the
current balance compared to 3.0% at last review. Although the
percentage has increased from last review, the dollar amount has
actually decreased from $8.2 million to $3.5 million. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is 0.6% compared to 1.0% at last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 7 compared to 10 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 73% to $74.1
million from $778.8 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 21 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 29% of the pool. One loan, representing 29% of the
pool, has an investment grade credit assessment.

Twelve loans, representing 59% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.4 million (20% loss severity).
Currently three loans, representing 34% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Bell
Atlantic Mobile Building Loan ($14.3 million -- 19% of the pool),
which is secured by a 150,244 square foot (SF) single tenant
office building located in Laurel, Maryland. The property is 100%
leased to Verizon with a lease expiration date one month prior to
the loan maturity, with two five-year extension options. The loan
transferred to SS on September 2, 2013 due to a covenant default
that required the Borrower to direct the tenant (Verizon) to send
the full rental payment to the lender if it did not exercise its
5-year renewal option by mid-summer. The Lender would then hold
the excess funds in a reserve account. Verizon instead extended
for one year; however, the borrower argues that it is not required
to direct the tenant to send the full rental payment to the
Lender. There is a dispute over the language in the loan documents
regarding this covenant.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Wright Executive
Center Loan ($7.8 million -- 11% of the pool). This loan is
secured by two office buildings located within the Dayton MSA in
Fairborn, Ohio. This loan transferred to special servicing due to
maturity default. The court is in the process of reviewing a
motion to appoint a receiver and the SS is moving forward with the
foreclosure process. The borrower is also trying to come up with
an acceptable DPO offer.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Midlothian
Station Shopping Center Loan ($3.1 million -- 4% of the pool).
This loan is secured by a 66,165 SF retail center located in
Midlothian, Virginia. The loan transferred to special servicing on
June 7, 2013 due to maturity default. The borrower had trouble
refinancing due to a decrease in NOI resulting from a decrease in
occupancy. A loan extension was requested and negotiations are
still in the process. If this fails, a receiver will be appointed
and will move forward with foreclosure.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 5% of the pool. Moody's has estimated
an aggregate $3.1 million loss (20.7% expected loss on average)
for the specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 95% of the pool's non-specially serviced loans.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 58% compared to 73% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 17% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.6%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.96X, respectively, compared to
1.43X and 1.53X at last review. Moody's actual conduit DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the 3 Times Square Loan
($21.3 million -- 29% of the pool), which represents a 21% pari
passu interest in a $101.5 million loan. The property is also
encumbered by a subordinate B-note totaling $94.8 million which is
held outside the trust. The loan is secured by an 884,000 SF Class
A office building located in the Times Square office submarket of
midtown Manhattan. The property remains 99% leased, the same as at
last review. The building's largest tenants are Reuters Group (78%
of the net rentable area (NRA);lease expiration November 2021) and
Bank of Montreal (12% of NRA; lease expiration November 2021). The
loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 39% since
securitization. The loan matures on November 15, 2021. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.96X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 3.75X at Moody's last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Providence Village Plaza Loan
($6.9 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 91,478 SF
Giant Food anchored retail center located in Aldan, Pennsylvania.
This property was 98% leased as of September 12, 2013. As of
September 6, 2013, the Borrower was working on getting a
commitment letter with Morgan Stanley for refinance. There is a
possible environmental issue at the property that the is delaying
the refinancing process. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and
1.59X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.44X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Airpark Business Center Loan ($4.1
million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a three-building
industrial property located in Hebron, Kentucky. The property was
100% leased as of December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
53% and 2.07X, respectively, compared to 61% and 1.83X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the James Building Loan ($2.1 million --
3% of the pool), which is secured by a 109,589 SF office building
located in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 38% and 3.00X, respectively, compared to 35% and 3.22X at the
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  affirmed the ratings of 15 classes of
Morgan Stanley I Trust 2006-HQ10 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-HQ10 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2006 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2010 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the below-investment grade P&I classes are consistent
with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The rating of
the IO Class, Class X-1, is consistent with the expected credit
performance of its referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement levels for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.9% of the
current balance compared to 9.9% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.9% of the original
pooled balance compared to 11.8% at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 28 compared to 29 at last review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $1.24
billion from $1.49 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 112 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool. Two loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
The pool contains three loans with investment-grade credit
assessments, representing approximately 17% of the pool.

Twenty-seven loans, representing approximately 14% of the pool,
are on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes
loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established
as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting
package. As part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated since securitization, of which
14 loans generated an aggregate loss of $50.3 million
(approximately 52% average loss severity). Currently there are 14
loans in special servicing, representing approximately 17% of the
pool balance. The largest specially serviced loan is the AZ
Office/Retail Portfolio Loan ($72.0 million -- 5.8% of the pool),
which is secured by three cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
mixed use (retail and office) properties located in Scottsdale,
Arizona. As of August 2013, the portfolio was 78% leased compared
to 80% at last review. The loan transferred to special servicing
in March 2012 due to imminent payment default and is currently
paid through to September 2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Kings Crossing
Shopping Centre Loan ($35.3 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 272,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in
Shreveport, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2009 due to imminent payment default.
Foreclosure was filed in December 2009 and a receiver was
appointed in July 2011. A foreclosure sale occurred in August 2012
and the property is currently REO. As of June 2013 the property
was 56% occupied; however, new leases were recently signed and the
occupancy is expected to increase to 100%.

The remaining specially serviced loans are a mix of industrial,
office and retail. Moody's has estimated $62.7 million (32%
expected loss) for 13 out of the 14 specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans, representing 6% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $10.8 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through P
have experienced $7.87 million in cumulative interest shortfalls.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, ASERs, extraordinary trust
expenses and loan modifications.

Excluding defeased and specially serviced loans, Moody's was
provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating results for 97%
and 98% of the pool. Excluding defeased, specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 105%
compared to 109% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.0X,
respectively, compared to 1.22X and 0.97X, respectively, at last
full review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Waterside Shops
Loan ($120.0 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
265,664 SF regional mall located in Naples, Florida. The loan is
interest-only throughout its term. The property is also encumbered
with a $45.0 million B-note held outside the trust. The center is
anchored by Nordstrom (which is not part of the collateral for the
loan), Saks Fifth Avenue, and Barnes & Noble. As of June 2013, the
property was 98% leased, essentially the same at the prior review.
Excluding the Apple store, comparable inline sales per SF for the
trailing twelve months as of June 2013 were $669 compared to $642
in 2012. The loan matures in October 2016. Moody's credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.12X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Sony Pictures
Plaza Loan ($47.8 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 328,847 SF office building located in Culver City,
California. The property is also encumbered with a $37.0 million
B-note held outside the trust. The property is 100% leased to Sony
Pictures Entertainment through 2027 with an early termination
option available in 2017. The loan is benefitting from
amortization and matures in September 2016. Moody's value is based
on a lit/dark analysis. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Baa1 and 1.71X, respectively, essentially the same as at
last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Cherry Creek
Shopping Center Loan ($30.0 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is
a 11% pari-passu interest in an interest-only first mortgage loan
secured by the borrower's interest in a 547,457 SF regional mall
located in Denver, Colorado. The property is anchored by Neiman
Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, Macy's and Nordstrom, which are not
part of the collateral. As of June 2013, the collateral space was
92% leased, the same as at last review. Excluding the Apple store,
comparable inline sales per SF were $522 in 2012 compared to $500
in 2011. The loan matures in June 2016. Moody's credit assessment
and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.24X, respectively, essentially
the same as last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the PPG Portfolio Loan ($101.6
million -- 8.2% of the pool), which is secured by seven cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties located in
Arizona, Colorado, and Indiana. As of June 2013, the portfolio was
88% leased, essentially the same as at last review. The
portfolio's performance has been stable and the loan is
benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
111% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.85X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Briargate Loan ($71.4
million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 225,922 SF
luxury lifestyle center located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. As
of March 2013, the property was 95% leased, the same as at last
review. Excluding the Apple store, comparable sales per SF for
trailing 12 months ending in March 2013 were $350 compared to $340
for the same period in 2012. Performance remains stable and the
loan is benefitting from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 129% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 130% and 0.75X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the One Bethesda Center Loan ($53.0
million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 171,436 SF
office building located in Bethesda, Maryland. As April 2013, the
property was 99% leased and has consistently been leased above 98%
since securitization. The property's largest tenant is the Boston
Consulting Group, which leases 32% of the net rentable area (NRA)
through 2019 and 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and
0.91X, respectively, compared to 115% and 0.90X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: Moody's Keeps C Ratings on 2 CMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-TOP25 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the investment-grade P&I classes are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings below-investment grade P&I classes are consistent with
Moody's expected loss and thus affirmed. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X, is consistent with the expected credit performance
of its referenced classes and thus affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.0% of the
current balance. At last full review, Moody's cumulative base
expected loss was 6.4%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 46 compared to 49 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to $1.34
billion from $1.56 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 184 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool. There are two loans, representing 3% of
the pool, with investment-grade credit assessments. The pool does
not contain any defeased loans.

Sixty-one loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $72.4 million loss (80%
loss severity on average). Currently eight loans, representing 2%
of the pool, are in special servicing. The specially serviced
loans are secured by a mix of property types. Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $8.9 million loss (33% expected loss on
average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 26 poorly
performing loans representing 10% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $25.1 million loss (19% expected loss based on a 52%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 100% and 70% of the performing pool
respectively. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95% compared to 100% at
last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 9.8% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.65X and 1.21X, respectively,
compared to 1.60X and 1.17X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the London NYC Hotel
Land Interest Loan ($27.0 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is
secured by the ground lease payments under the 564-room London NYC
Hotel situated on West 54th Street in New York City. The loan is
interest-only for the entire 10-year term and matures in November
2016. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa
and 2.71X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 24 Fifth Avenue
Coop Loan ($15.5 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which is secured by
a 419-unit Class A residential coop building located on lower
Fifth Avenue in the Greenwich Village neighborhood of New York
City. The loan is interest only for the entire 10-year term and
matures in December 2016. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.64X, respectively, compared to Aaa and
2.67X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 18% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Mount Pleasant Towne Centre Loan
($95.2 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 443,000
square foot (SF) regional outdoor mall located in Mount Pleasant,
South Carolina, along the Isle of Palms just outside of
Charleston. The mall is anchored by Belk and the largest tenants
include Bed Bath and Beyond, Old Navy, Barnes and Noble, and
Consolidated theaters. The loan is interest-only for the entire
10-year term and matures in December 2016. As of June 2013, the
property was 94% leased compared to 93% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.80X, respectively, compared
to 128% and 0.72X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Four Seasons Hotel Loan
($72.0 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 285-
room luxury hotel located in Los Angeles, California. The
performance has declined significantly since 2008 due to low
occupancy and general decline in the hotel market but over the
past two years has improved in occupancy, room rates and revenue
per available room (RevPAR). The loan is interest-only for the
entire 10-year term and matures in December 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 110% and 1.01X, respectively, the same at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Shoppes at Park Place Loan
($71.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 325,000
SF foot regional outdoor mall located in Pinellas Park, Florida,
about 15 miles west of Tampa. The largest tenants are Regal
Cinemas and American Signature Furniture. The mall is shadow
anchored by Target and Home Depot. The property was 99% leased as
of June 2013, which was the same at last review. The loan is
interest-only for the entire 10-year term and matures in January
2017. The property's performance has remained stable over the life
of the loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.79X,
respectively, compared to 133% and 0.73X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Moody's Keeps Rating Over Rights Transfer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service  was informed that the Directing
Certificate Holder has elected to terminate KeyCorp Real Estate
Capital Markets, Inc., the existing Special Servicer, and to
appoint Strategic Asset Services LLC as the successor Special
Servicer. The Proposed Special Servicer Transfer and Replacement
will become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions
precedent set forth in the governing documents.

Moody's has reviewed the Proposed Special Servicer Replacement.
Moody's has determined that this proposed special servicing
replacement will not, in and of itself, and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings to any class
of certificates rated by Moody's for Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-
C2 (the Certificates). Moody's opinion only addresses the credit
impact associated with the proposed designation and transfer of
special servicing rights. Moody's is not expressing any opinion as
to whether this change has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

The last rating action for Morgan Stanley Capital I 2011-C2 was
taken on May 23, 2013. The principal methodologies used in this
rating were "Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS
Transactions" published in April 2005 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

On May 23, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of eleven classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2011-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)


MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.'s
$451.5 million fixed- and floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of May 13, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings after reviewing the effective date portfolio
(typically referred to as an "effective date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager.  Ratings may also reflect S&P's assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for an effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish
an effective date report each time we issue an effective date
rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P
added.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P noted.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd./Mountain Hawk I CLO Corp.

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)

A-1                        AAA (sf)                     310.00
A-X                        AAA (sf)                      10.00
B-1                        AA (sf)                       40.00
B-2                        AA (sf)                       10.00
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        29.00
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      23.00
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       29.50


MSBAM 2012-C6: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on $12.6MM Class H Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I,
Inc. MSBAM 2012-C6 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of MSBAM 2012-C6 is based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral pool. As of the September
2013 remittance the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 0.9% to $1.11 billion from $1.12 billion at issuance.
Full year 2012 financials were available for 40 (76%) of the
remaining 61 loans in the pool.

The largest loan of the pool (11.2%) is collateralized by 1880
Broadway/15Central Park West Retail, a 84,240 sf retail
condominium unit located on the eastern side of Broadway between
West 61st Street and West 62nd Street in Manhattan's Upper West
Side Neighborhood. The property is 100% occupied and the major
tenants that occupy the space are Best Buy (54.4% of NRA), West
Elm (30.3% of NRA), and JP Morgan Chase (12.9% of NRA). Above the
ground floor retail collateral are luxury residential units that
are not part of the collateral.

The second largest loan of the pool (6.8%) is collateralized by
the Hyatt Regency Austin, a 448 room full service hotel located in
downtown Austin, TX. The subject is located along the south side
of Lady Bird Lake near downtown Austin, with proximity to the
Austin CBD, the University of Texas, and Zilker Park, home to a
variety of popular music and arts festivals. As of year-end 2012
the NOI DSCR is 3.01x and the August YTD occupancy, Rev PAR, and
ADR are 80%, $137, and $171 respectively.

The third largest loan in the pool (6.7%) is collateralized by the
Chelsea Terminal Building, a 1,054,442 sf series of contiguous
mixed-use buildings located in Manhattan's Chelsea neighborhood.
The property is located two blocks west of the elevated Highline
park and two blocks south of the Javits Convention Center and
Hudson Yards redevelopment project. The building was mainly being
used as mini-storage for many years before being redeveloped to a
mixed-use office and retail product in recent years. The property
had substantial damage from Hurricane Sandy which included
electrical damage and loss of equipment due to the flooding. The
servicer has received a payment of $3.6 million from the insurance
company and a recent inspection of the property notes that the
repairs were substantially complete however the electrical work is
pending a redesign of the permanent system.

Rating Sensitivity
The Rating Outlooks remain Stable for all classes. No rating
actions are expected unless there are material changes to property
occupancies or cash flows, increased delinquencies, or any loans
transferred to special servicing. The pool has maintained
performance consistent with issuance. Additional information on
rating sensitivity is available in the report 'Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6' (Oct. 1, 2012), available
at www.fitchratings.com.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $56.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $236 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $411.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $192.4 million class PST* at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.5 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.1 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40.7 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.8 million class F at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.7 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.6 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $874.6 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $94.1 million class X-B at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

* Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
  for a related amount of class PST certificates, and class PST
  certificates may be exchanged for class A-S, class B, and class
  C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class J and X-C certificates.


NEUBERGER BERMAN XV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Neuberger Berman CLO XV Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XV
LLC's $376.25 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 20,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which it
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2600%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated notes' outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of up to 50% of the
      excess interest proceeds that are available before paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees, subordinated
      hedge termination payments, collateral manager subordinated
      and incentive fees, and subordinated note payments, to
      principal proceeds during the reinvestment period to
      purchase additional collateral assets and, after the
      reinvestment period, up to 100% of the excess interest
      proceeds to pay down the notes according to the note payment
      sequence.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1822.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Neuberger Berman CLO XV Ltd./Neuberger Berman CLO XV LLC

Class                     Rating                 Amount
                                               (mil. $)
X                         AAA (sf)                 1.25
A-1                       AAA (sf)               105.00
A-2                       AAA (sf)               150.00
B-1                       AA (sf)                 20.00
B-2                       AA (sf)                 25.00
C (deferrable)            A (sf)                  29.00
D (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                20.75
E (deferrable)            BB (sf)                 17.75
F (deferrable)            B (sf)                   7.50
Subordinated notes        NR                     35.965

NR-Not rated.


NOB HILL: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on $11.3MM Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Nob Hill CLO, Limited:

$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

$11,350,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf);

$14,145,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf);

$13,580,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$210,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
(current balance of $95,625,112), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 9, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

$11,300,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2018, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on September 9, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios.
Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 53% or $108.1 million since August 2012. Based on
the latest trustee report dated August 2013, the Class A/B, Class
C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 132.83%, 120.58% 110.78% and 103.76%, respectively, versus
August 2012 levels of 119.22%, 112.53%, 106.78%, and 102.43%,
respectively.

Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since the last rating action. Based on the August 2013 trustee
report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2971
compared to 2682 in August 2012. Moody's also calculates that
17.77% of the current portfolio is comprised by exposure to
issuers with low speculative-grade ratings of Caa1 or below.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $174.2 million, defaulted par of $10.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 20.44%
(implying a WARF of 3207), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.02%, and a diversity score of 39. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Nob Hill CLO, Limited, issued in July 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2566)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3848)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


NOMURA 2007-2: Cl. A-R Term Changes No Impact on Moody's Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reviewed, among other documents, the
Second Supplemental Indenture, dated as of September 25, 2013 (the
"Agreement"), between Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2, Ltd.(the "Issuer")
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (the "Trustee"). Moody's review
concluded that the proposed change to the Class A-R Notes does
not, in and of itself, and at this time result in a reduction or
withdrawal, of the current ratings assigned by Moody's (including
any private or confidential ratings or credit estimates) of any
Class or Sub-Class of Notes issued by the Issuer. Moody's does not
express an opinion as to whether the Agreement could have non-
credit-related effects.

The agreement involves the conversion of Class A-R Notes from
Certificated Notes to Global Notes, as well as the removal of the
Class A-R Rating Criteria for the holders of the Class A-R Notes.

The principal methodology used in reaching its conclusion and in
monitoring the ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer is
"Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs", published in May 2012.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating the Notes issued by the Issuer can also be
found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings of the notes issued
by the Issuer. Any change in the ratings will be publicly
disseminated by Moody's through appropriate media.

On July 3, 2013, Moody's affirmed the ratings of sixteen classes
of Notes issued by Nomura 2007-2, Ltd:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-R, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)


PHILADELPHIA AUTHORITY: S&P Corrects Rating on 2006 Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has corrected its long-term
rating to 'BB-' from 'D' on the Philadelphia Authority for
Industrial Development, Pa.'s series 2006 revenue bonds, issued
for the Please Touch Museum.  The outlook is stable.


PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C1: Moody's Raises Class G's Rating from B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed two CMBS classes of PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corporation
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C1 as
follows:

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of one class is due to increased credit support
resulting from paydowns and amortization.

The rating of the below investment grade P&I bond is consistent
with Moody's expected loss and is affirmed. The rating of the IO
Class, Class X, is consistent with the credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current pooled balance compared to 6.2% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 6.7% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at last review.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8 compared to 10 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 16, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $16.9
million from $801 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 70% of the pool. There are five defeased
loans representing 26% of the pool balance.

Two loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
a realized loss of $52.8 million (36.5% loss severity). There are
currently no loans in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for one poorly performing loan
representing 17% of the pool. Moody's has estimated a loss.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 88%
of the pool balance. Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 76%. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed conduit
DSCRs are 1.53X and 3.55X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 36% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Las Lomas Apartments Loan ($2.9 million - 17% of the
pool), which is secured by a 231-unit apartment complex located in
Dallas, Texas. The property was 88% leased as of June 2013
compared to 73% at last review. Property performance has struggled
due to low occupancy and below market rents. Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 177% and 0.6X, respectively compared to 188% and 0.6X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 1506 N. Lee Trevino Loan ($1.7
million - 10% of the pool), which is secured by a 47,000 square
foot (SF) retail strip center located 15 miles east of downtown El
Paso, Texas. The property was 88% leased as of June 2013. The
property performance has remained stable and the loan is fully
amortizing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 36% and 3.32X,
respectively compared to 37% and 3.19X at last review.

The third largest loan is the K-Mart Dyer Street Loan ($1.5
million - 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 112,000 SF single
tenant retail property located in El Paso, Texas. The property is
100% occupied by K-Mart through March 2023. Property performance
has remained stable and the loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 32% and 3.34X, respectively compared to 31%
and 3.55X at last review.


PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C2: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes
and affirmed five classes of PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C2 as
follows:

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to overall improved pool financial
performance and increased credit support due to expected loan
payoffs from loans approaching maturity that are well positioned
for refinance.

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Class,
Class X, is consistent with the expected credit performance of its
referenced classes and thus is affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 22.9% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 20.9%. Realized losses have remained at 1.4% since the prior
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
3.6% of the original pooled balance compared to 3.4% at last
review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10 compared to 9 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $100.2
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 83% of
the pool.

Seven loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $15.4 million (18% loss severity on
average). Three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Taconic Corporate Park Loan ($12.5 million - 12.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a 210,000 square foot (SF) office property
located Yorktown Heights, New York. The loan transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 as the result of imminent
default. The loan became real estate owned (REO) in May 2011. As
of June 2013, the property was 43% leased compared to 42% at last
review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is The Shops at Eagle
Pointe (B) Loan ($4.1 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is
secured by two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted retail
properties located in Forsyth and Woodstock Georgia. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2012 due to maturity
default and foreclosure occurred in April 2013. This loan has been
deemed non-recoverable.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $10.8 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (65% expected loss on average). Moody's
has assumed a high default probability for five poorly performing
loans representing 38% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate
$11.6 million loss (31% expected loss based on a 65% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool's non-specially serviced loans. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 63% compared to 67% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.43X and 2.04X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 1.91X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Sweetheart Cup Distribution Center Loan ($19.1 million
-- 19.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.03 million SF
industrial building located in Hampstead, Maryland. The property
is fully occupied by a single tenant, Solo Cup Company, through
July 2020. The loan had an anticipated repayment date (ARD) of
October 1, 2010 but remains current. Although property performance
has been stable since securitization, Moody's utilized a Lit/Dark
analysis to reflect potential cash flow volatility due to the
single tenant exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and
1.83X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.72X at last review.
This loan is expected to payoff in October 2013.

The second largest loan is the Northside Marketplace Loan ($13.8
million -- 13.8% of the pool) which is secured by an 189,299 SF
retail property located in Nashville, Tennessee. At Moody's last
review, the loan was in special servicing due to imminent default
and passing its ARD of September 1, 2010. The loan was
subsequently modified and returned to the master servicer in
December 2012. Terms of the modification include a maturity date
extension until January 2017, an interest rate reduction from
8.31% to 4.5%. The loan remains on the watchlist. The largest
tenants are Dick's Sporting Good, Best Buy and Old Navy. As of
July 2013 the property was 75% leased. Moody's identified this
loan as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 163%
and 0.67X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Kingsley Hotel and Suites Loan ($8.8
million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 150-key
Radisson Hotel located in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. The loan
previously transferred to special servicing in February 2009 due
to imminent default. An A/B note modification was approved in May
2011 which extended the maturity to May 2014, and created a $4.8
million B-note with a 0% interest rate. The loan is on the
watchlist due to low DSCR. Moody's identified this loan as a
troubled loan. Moody's LTV is over 200%.


PREFERRED TERM X: Moody's Ups Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Preferred Term Securities X, Ltd:

$287,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due July 3, 2033
(current balance of $86,166,265.07), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on Aug 5, 2013 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade

$67,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due July 3, 2033,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$2,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes due July 3,
2033, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$88,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due July 3,
2033 (current balance of $88,771,581.56 including deferred
interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

$19,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due July
3, 2033 (current balance of $19,166,591.47 including deferred
interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

$70,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes due July
3, 2033 (current balance of $71,118,142.02 including deferred
interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2012
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 Notes, an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios as well
as the improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio. The deleveraging is due to the redemption of underlying
assets. Moody's also notes that $32.3 million of assets that were
previously deferring interest have cured their interest deferrals
and are now performing assets. Finally, Moody's notes that the
Class B-1, B-2 and B-3 Notes are no longer deferring interest.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 26.3% or $30.7 million since October 2012, due to
the disbursement of principal proceeds from redemptions of
underlying assets. As a result of this deleveraging, based on
Moody's calculations the par coverage has improved to 295.24% for
the Class A-1 notes and 163.95% for the Class A-1, A-2 and A-3
notes. According to the latest trustee report dated June 28, 2013,
the senior principal coverage ratio is 156.65 % (limit 128.0%),
versus the October 2012 level of 135.93%.

In taking the forgoing actions, Moody's also announced that it had
concluded its review of its ratings on the issuer's Class A and B
notes announced on August 5, 2013. At that time, Moody's placed
certain of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of senior notes and increases in par
coverage ratios.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, and
weighted average recovery rate are based on its published
methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $254.4 million, defaulted/deferring par of $136.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.59%
(implying a WARF of 751), Moody's Asset Correlation of 28.41%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities X, Ltd, issued on June 26, 2013, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q2-2013.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011, and "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Cross Sector Rating Methodology "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8.9 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 118 points from the
base case of 751, the model-implied rating of the A-1 notes is one
notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the WARF is
decreased by 391 points, the model-implied rating of the A-1 notes
is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to banks that are deferring interest on
their TruPS but satisfy specific credit criteria and thus have a
strong likelihood of resuming interest payments. Under this
sensitivity analysis, Moody's gave par credit to $13.0 million of
bank TruPS. In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran
alternative default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower
likelihood of a large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +0

Class A-2: +0

Class A-2: +0

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Class B-3: +1

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +0

Class A-2: +0

Class A-3: +0

Class B-1: +0

Class B-2: +0

Class B-3: +0

Moody's notes that this transaction is still subject to a high
level of macroeconomic uncertainty although its outlook on the
banking sector has changed to stable from negative. The pace of
FDIC bank failures continues to decline in 2013 compared to the
last four years, and some of the previously deferring banks have
resumed interest payment on their trust preferred securities.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Keeps Rating on 2 CMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed two classes of Prudential Securities Secured Financing
Corp. 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 30, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-EC, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade of the one P&I bond is due to increased credit support
resulting from paydowns and amortization.

The rating of Class M is consistent with Moody's expected loss and
thus are affirmed. The rating of the IO Classes, Class AE-C, is
consistent with the credit performance of its referenced classes
and thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.3% of the
current pooled balance compared to 1.3% at last review. The deal
has paid down 32% since last review. Moody's base expected loss
plus realized losses is 2.2% of the original pooled balance
compared to 2.1% at last review.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, the same as at the prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from Conduit and Large Loan models in formulating a
rating recommendation. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type and sponsorship. These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $20.3
million from $1.15 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
36% of the pool. The pool contains two defeased loans representing
49% of the pool balance.

Two loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $25.5 million (40.5% loss severity). There are
currently no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 operating results for 88%
of the non-defeased loans. Moody's weighted average LTV is 52%,
the same as at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 2.55X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 2.39X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 33% of the pool. The largest
loan is the Best Buy Crestwood Loan ($2.9 million -- 14.6% of the
pool), which is secured by a 45,000 square foot (SF) single-tenant
retail building located in Crestwood, Missouri. The property is
100% leased to Best Buy through November 2017. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.86X, respectively, compared to 59% and
1.82X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Landmark Center Loan ($2.3 million
-- 11.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 37,000 SF medical
office building located in Warwick, Rhode Island. As of March
2013, the property was 76% leased compared to 80% in December
2012. The property has a major tenant occupying 33% of the net
rentable area vacating in December 2013. The servicer has
indicated there is a proposal out to a prospective tenant to take
over this space. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.53X,
respectively, compared to 69% and 1.65X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Village Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($1.4 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery-
anchored retail center located in Hazlehurst, Georgia. As of June
2013, the property was 88% leased. The major tenants include
Harvey's, Goody's, and Dollar General. These three tenants occupy
81% of the net rentable area and all have leases expiring in 2018.
Performance and occupancy have remained stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.12X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.82X at last review.


RACE POINT VII: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Race
Point VII CLO Ltd./Race Point VII CLO Corp.'s $561 million
floating rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of Jan. 16, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Race Point VII CLO Ltd./Race Point VII CLO Corp.'s
Class                   Rating        Amount (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                 4.50
A                       AAA (sf)               381.00
B                       AA (sf)                 72.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                  45.00
D (deferrable)          BBB(sf)                 30.00
E (deferrable)          BB-(sf)                 28.50


RASHINBAN CLO 2006-I: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I, LTD.:

$12,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

$26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$20,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Variable Funding Floating
Rate Notes due 2020 (current commitment amount of $19,992,248),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 18, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

$284,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020
(current outstanding balance of $283,889,923), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 18, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$12,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2020, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in November 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's
modeled a weighted average spread of 3.41% compared to the
covenant of 2.75%. Moody's also notes that the transaction's
reported overcollateralization ratios are stable.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $383.4 million, defaulted par of $2.9 million,
a weighted average default probability of 16.56% (implying a WARF
of 2627), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.34%,
and a diversity score of 70. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I, LTD., issued in November 2006,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2102)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3152)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.



REALT COMMERCIAL 2005-1: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. J Certs to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of ten classes and
affirmed five classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1 as
follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of ten P&I classes are due primarily to increased
credit support resulting from paydowns and amortization as well as
expected future paydowns from high-quality loans that mature
within the next 24 months and are well positioned for refinance.

The affirmation of Class A-2 is due to key parameters, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining
within acceptable ranges. The ratings of Classes K and L are
consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus are affirmed. The
ratings of the IO Classes, XC-1 and XC-2, are consistent with the
expected credit performance of their referenced classes and are
thus affirmed.

Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 1.3% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 1.5%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss is 0.5% of the original,
securitized deal balance, compared to 0.8% at Moody's last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, unchanged from Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 59% to $143 million
from $348 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 36 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 65% of the pool. The pool includes two
loans with investment-grade credit assessments, representing 28%
of the pool. Seven loans, representing approximately 11% of the
pool, are defeased and are collateralized by Canadian Government
securities.

Two loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have liquidated from the pool and the trust has
experienced no principal losses to date. There are also no loans
currently in special servicing. Moody's has assumed a high default
probability for one poorly-performing loan representing 4% of the
pool, and has estimated a small loss for this loan based on a 50%
probability of default.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2011 and full-year 2012
operating results for 97% of the performing pool. Excluding the
troubled loan, Moody's weighted average LTV is 60% compared to 66%
at last full review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12.4% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.63X and 1.82X, respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.59X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Bayfield Mall
Loan ($24 million -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a
443,000 square foot (SF) anchored community shopping center
located in Barrie, Ontario. The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule. The largest tenants include Canadian Tire (25% of the
net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration in February 2022); Telus
Communications (9% of the NRA; lease expiration in December 2014)
and Bowlerama (8% of the NRA; lease expiration in July 2016).
Property financial performance has declined slowly but steadily in
recent years, following consistent declines in occupancy. As of
April 1, 2013, property occupancy was 85%, down from 87%, which
was reported in December 2012. These figures were below the 92%
reported at Moody's last review and the 95% reported at Moody's
second-prior review, in November 2011. The property was built in
1971 and underwent major renovations in 1998. The decline in
performance has been partially offset by amortization. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.50X at Moody's last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Desjardins Visa
Building Loan ($16 million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured
by a 202,000 SF office building located in Montreal, Quebec. The
property is currently 100% leased, with 94% of the property NRA
leased to Quebec-based financial cooperative Visa Desjardins
through 2017, approximately three years beyond the loan maturity
date of December 12, 2014. The tenant has been in the property
since 1993. The loan is 100% recourse to the sponsor, Allied
Properties REIT. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are A3 and 1.69X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.55X at
Moody's last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Fernbrae Manor Loan ($10 million -- 7% of
the pool), which is secured by a 186-unit retirement residence in
Kelowna, British Columbia. The property was 79% leased as of year-
end 2012, the same as at Moody's last review. The loan is 100%
recourse to the loan sponsor, Unicare Fernbrae Holdings. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.29X, respectively,
compared to 78% and 1.24X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the Pleasantview Walk Project Loan ($8
million -- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 68-unit,
townhouse-style multifamily property in Brampton, Ontario, a
suburb of Toronto. The property was 95% occupied as of January
2013. Net operating income is below the level reported at
securitization, however NOI has increased steadily in recent
years. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 96% and 0.87X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Observatory Place Loan ($8 million -
- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by an 87,000 SF mixed-use
office and retail plaza, located in Richmond Hill, Ontario, a
suburb of Toronto. The property was 100% leased as of year-end
2012 reporting, compared to 97% the prior year and 92% at
securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and,
1.60X respectively, essentially unchanged from Moody's last
review.


ROCKWALL CDO II: S&P Raises Rating on Class A-3L Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1LA, A-1LB, A-2L, A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L notes from Rockwall CDO
II Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by
Highland Capital Management L.P.  The transaction has a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior tranches from
underlying CLO tranches originated between 2007 and 2012.  Based
on the July 2013 trustee report, the transaction held about
$324.18 million of CLO securities, representing approximately 35%
of the collateral balance.

The transaction also had a note cancellation, whereby subordinate
debt the CLO issued was retired before the debt was paid out, as
originally contemplated through the payment waterfall.  S&P has
generally seen such actions take place either after a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) manager purchases the debt
using principal proceeds at a discount from par, or after
subordinate noteholders submit the debt for cancellation without
payment.  Because S&P believes that other types of CDO
transactions are subject to cancellation of subordinate notes in a
similar fashion, S&P will continue to take separate rating
actions.

The upgrades incorporate two primary factors.  First, the credit
quality of the underlying CLO tranches has improved because of
deleveraging.  Second, S&P used additional stresses in its
analysis that reflects its view of increased credit risks and
credit stability considerations regarding CDOs tranches that have
experienced note cancellations.

The underlying portfolio's credit quality has improved since S&P's
most recent rating actions.  According to the July 23, 2013,
trustee report, the transaction held $30.89 million in defaulted
assets (compared with the $43.77 million noted in the Jan. 23,
2012, trustee report, which S&P used for the March 2012 rating
actions).  The amount of 'CCC' rated collateral held in the
transaction's asset portfolio also fell over the same period.  The
transaction held $31.32 million of 'CCC' rated collateral as of
July 2013, down from $43.77 million in January 2012.

In S&P's opinion, cancellation of subordinate debt affects two of
the five key areas of its analytical framework.  Cancelling
subordinate debt primarily affects a transaction's payment
structure and cash flow mechanics.  S&P also believes that debt
cancellation affects credit stability.

For transactions S&P believes have experienced subordinated debt
cancellations, its surveillance reviews will include the use of an
additional rating stress designed to assess the potential
creditworthiness of the affected transactions, without the support
of interest diversion tests linked to outstanding subordinated
tranches.  Accordingly, S&P took the following approach
in its review of the transaction:

  -- S&P generated cash flow analysis using two scenarios.  The
     first scenario considered the current note balances
     (including any note cancellations) when modeling the
     interest or principal diversion mechanisms.  For purposes of
     the second scenario, S&P assumed that currently outstanding
     subordinated tranches had been cancelled, and accordingly,
     S&P only reflected the senior notes balance when calculating
     any interest or principal diversion mechanisms.

  -- For each tranche, S&P applied the lowest of the rating
     levels indicated by the cash flow analysis under the two
     scenarios described above as the starting point for S&P's
     rating analysis.

  -- S&P then reviewed the level of cushion relative to its
     credit stability criteria and made further adjustments to
     the ratings that it believed were appropriate.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Rockwall CDO II Ltd.
Class          Rating
          To             From
A-1LA     A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
A-1LB     A- (sf)        BB+ (sf)
A-2L      BBB (sf)       BB- (sf)
A-3L      BB+ (sf)       B+ (sf)
B-1L      BB- (sf)       CCC+ (sf)
B-2L      B (sf)         CCC- (sf)


SALUS CLO 2012-1: CBRS Confirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has taken the following ratings to notes issued by Salus
CLO 2012-1, Ltd., pursuant to the Salus CLO 2012-1, Ltd.  Amended
and Restated Indenture dated as of September 19, 2013:


Notes              Current       Spread  Stated          Final
                    Par                   Maturity        Rating
-----              -------       ------  ---------       -------

Class X Notes      $0            N/A     March 5, 2015   WR

Class A-1 Notes    $65,000,000   2.25%   March 5, 2021   AAA (sf)

Class A-2 Notes    $100,000,000  2.50%   March 5, 2021   AAA (sf)

Additional Class   $110,000,000  2.25%   March 5, 2021   AAA (sf)
A-2 Notes

Class B Notes      $15,000,000   4.50%   March 5, 2021   AA (sf)

Additional Class   $18,000,000   3.75%   March 5, 2021   AA (sf)
B Notes

Class C Notes      $10,000,000   5.50%   March 5, 2021   A (sf)

Additional Class   $12,000,000   4.75%   March 5, 2021   A (sf)
C Notes

Class D Notes      $15,000,000   8.00%   March 5, 2021   BBB (sf)

Additional Class   $18,000,000   6.75%   March 5, 2021   BBB (sf)
D Notes

Class E Notes      $15,000,000   10.50%  March 5, 2021   BB (sf)

Additional Class   $18,000,000   8.75%   March 5, 2021   BB (sf)
E Notes

Class F Notes      $7,500,000    11.50%  March 5, 2015   WR

The Notes issued by Salus CLO 2012-1, Ltd. are collateralized by a
portfolio of primarily senior secured middle market loans
originated by Salus Capital Partners, LLC ("Salus"), a subsidiary
of Harbinger Group, Inc.  Salus Capital Partners II, LLC, a
subsidiary of Salus, will act as the collateral manager for Salus
CLO 2012-1 Ltd.

The withdrawal of the rating on the Class X Notes is due to the
cancelation of the Class X commitments.  The withdrawal of the
rating on the Class F Notes is at the request of the Collateral
Manager on behalf of the Issuer. The ratings on the Class A-1
Notes, the Class A-2 Notes and the Class B Notes address the
timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of principal
on or before their respective Stated Maturity (as defined in the
Indenture referred to above).  The ratings on the Class C Notes,
the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes address the ultimate
payment of interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or
before their respective Stated Maturity.

The ratings reflect the following:

(1) The Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Amended and Restated Indenture, the
    Collateral Management Agreement as amended between Salus CLO
    2012-1 Ltd. and Salus Capital Partners II, LLC and all
    ancillary documentation.

(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.

(3) DBRS's assessment of the portfolio quality.

(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
    loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios.

(5) DBRS's assessment of the asset selection, servicing, and
    collateral management capabilities of Salus Capital Partners
    II, LLC.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS provides a credit
estimate for certain U.S. middle market, non-financial corporate
obligors in the portfolio. Credit estimates are not ratings;
rather, they represent a model-driven default probability for
certain obligors that is used in assigning a rating to the
Facility.


Issuer                Debt Rated       Rating Action  Rating
------                ----------       -------------  ------

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class X Notes    Discontinued- Discontinued
                                        Withdrawn

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class A-1 Notes  New Rating     AAA (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class A-2 Notes  Confirmed      AAA (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Additional       New Rating     AAA (sf)
                       Class A-2 Notes

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class B Notes    Confirmed      AA (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Additional       New Rating     AA (sf)
                       Class B Notes

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class C Notes    Confirmed      A (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Additional       New Rating     A (sf)
                       Class C Notes

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class D Notes    Confirmed      BBB (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Additional       New Rating     BBB (sf)
                       Class D Notes

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class E Notes    Confirmed      BB (sf)

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Additional       New Rating     BB (sf)
                       Class E Notes

Salus CLO 2012-1 Ltd. Class F Notes    Discontinued- Discontinued
                                        Repaid


SARGAS CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on $14MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of the
following notes issued by Sargas CLO I, Ltd.:

$17,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due August 27, 2020, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

$231,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 27, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $19,323,772.09),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$7,750,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
August 27, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 23, 2013
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$3,250,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due August
27, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)

$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due August 27, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 15,
2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$14,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
August 27, 2020, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on April 23, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

$5,000,000 Type I Composite Notes Due August 27, 2020 (current
rated balance of $889,577.42), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
April 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$7,625,000 Type III Composite Notes Due August 27, 2020 (current
rated balance of $1,818,561.32), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
April 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating confirmation and affirmations on
the notes are consistent with the net combined effect of
deleveraging of the senior notes and deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio. These two factors offset each
other and their combined effect is credit neutral to the rated
notes.

Moody's also announced that it has concluded its review of its
rating on the issuer's Class C Notes announced on July 15, 2013.
At that time, Moody's said that it had upgraded and placed certain
of the issuer's ratings on review primarily as a result of
substantial deleveraging of the senior notes and increases in OC
ratios resulting from high rates of loan collateral prepayments
during the first half of 2013.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by
approximately 51.5% or $119.0 million since March 2013. Based on
the latest trustee report dated August 14, 2013, the Class A-2,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 221.6%, 156.3%, 126.1%, and 108.9%, respectively,
versus March 2013 levels of 144.2%, 126.4%, 114.9%, and 107.0%,
respectively. The August 14, 2013 trustee-reported OC ratios do
not reflect the August 27, 2013 payment distribution, when $19.9
million of principal proceeds were used to pay down the Class A-1
Notes.

Notwithstanding benefits of the deleveraging, Moody's notes that
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated
since March 2013. Based on the August 2013 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 3823 compared to 3105
in March 2013. Additionally, based on the trustee reports, the
deal's exposure to collateral rated Caa1 or below has increased to
25.5% of performing par (or $28.9 million), from 18.7% (or $41.7
million) in March 2013.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $88.6 million, defaulted par of $17.8 million,
a weighted average default probability of 26.7% (implying a WARF
of 4368), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.3%,
and a diversity score of 15. The default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Sargas CLO I, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with significant exposure to middle market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013. The methodology used in rating the Type I Composite
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004. The methodology used in
rating the Type III Composite Notes was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"). Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain adjustments with
respect to the default probabilities associated with CEs.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months, which
represent approximately 6.4% of the collateral pool. Additionally,
for each CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3% of
the collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed
downgrade. This adjustment was applied to approximately 11.0% of
the pool.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3494)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: -+1

Type I Composite: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5241)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Type I Composite: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. For concentrated pools if applicable:
Moody's also conducted tests to assess the collateral pool's
concentration risk in obligors bearing a credit estimate that
constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.

4) Issuer concentration: Over 20% of the portfolio comprises of
assets by three large obligors which poses concentration risk to
the deal. The performance of the portfolio will be significantly
impacted should any of these large issuers default or suffer a
deterioration in credit quality.


SCHOONER TRUST 2004-CF2: Moody's Hikes Cl. L Certs Rating to B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of nine classes and
affirmed four classes of Schooner Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-CF2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit support as a result of
anticipated paydowns from defeasance and performing maturing
loans, as well as amortization.

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO class, X,
is consistent with the performance of its referenced classes and
thus is affirmed.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.1% of the
current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's bases
expected loss plus realized loss is 0.7%, the same as last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May
2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22 compared to 24 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $236 million
from $363 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 51 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) representing 33% of the pool. Fourteen loans,
representing approximately 44% of the pool, are defeased and are
collateralized by Canadian Government securities.

Two loans, representing 1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for 97% and 95% of the pool's non-defeased loans,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV is 59%, the same as at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% of the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.59X and 1.77X,
respectively, compared to 1.61X and 1.77X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Stillwater Creek Retirement Community Loan
($14 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 204 unit
independent living/assisted living/retirement care complex located
seven miles southeast of Ottawa. This loan is benefitting from
amortization and is full recourse to the sponsor. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.8X, respectively, compared to
54% and 2.1X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Hespeler Road Retail Loan ($11
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 136,063 square
foot (SF) retail center located in Cambridge, Ontario. This loan
is benefitting from amortization and is full recourse to the
sponsor. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 77% and 1.23X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Van Horne Shopping Centre Loan ($8.5
million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a retail shopping
center located in Montreal, Quebec. This loan is benefitting from
amortization and is full recourse to the sponsor. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 61% and, 1.53X respectively, compared to
64% and 1.48X at last review.


SCHOONER TRUST 2005-3: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has upgraded the ratings of four classes of Schooner Trust,
Series 2005-3 as follows:

Class C to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
Class D1 to A (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
Class D2 to A (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
Class E to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction.  The trends on Class K through Class L
remain Negative, reflecting the risk associated with the 71
Rexdale Boulevard loan, which is discussed in detail below.  The
trends on the remaining classes are Stable, including Class J,
which had its trend changed to Stable from Negative with this
review as the DBRS analysis concluded that the class is no longer
subject to risk associated with the current poor performance of
the 71 Rexdale Boulevard loan.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to
the bonds from a collateral reduction of approximately 29.9% since
issuance.  As of the September 2013 remittance, 13 loans have paid
out of the pool since issuance, leaving 81 loans remaining in the
transaction.  The transaction also benefits from defeasance
collateral as 23 loans, representing 12.2% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased.  Overall pool performance remains
stable as the largest 15 loans in the transaction, excluding
defeasance collateral and the 71 Rexdale Boulevard loan, have a
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and weighted-
average debt yield of 1.66 times (x) and 16.0%, respectively.

The 71 Rexdale Boulevard loan (3.6% of the current pool balance)
remains on the servicer's watchlist with this rating action and
has been on the servicer's watchlist since October 2012.  The loan
is secured by a former food processing and cold storage facility
near the Islington Avenue and Highway 401 interchange in
northwestern Toronto.  The property has been 100% vacant since
July 2011, when the previous sole tenant exercised its lease
termination option, which included paying a termination fee
roughly equivalent to 80% of the annual debt service.  While the
servicer reports some interest in the property from new tenants,
the specific use, size and specialty build-out of the property
have proven to be an on-going challenge in leasing the subject.
As a result of the building being vacant for the entire 2012
calendar year, the YE2012 DSCR was -1.08x compared with 1.18x at
YE2011 and 1.52x at YE2010.  According to the servicer, the
borrower is now considering alternative options to re-tenant the
space, including possible sub-division to convert it for multi-
tenant usage.  The loan remains current as the borrower continues
to pay debt service and operating expenses.  As of the September
2013 remittance, the loan has a reserve account balance of $1.4
million, which can be used for capital repairs, improvements to
the property, leasing commissions and tenant inducements.  DBRS
continues to closely monitor this loan.  In its analysis, DBRS
concluded that if a distressed sale of the asset were to occur, it
is unlikely that such loss would impact the rated Classes;
however, any loss could erode the credit enhancement to Classes K
and L.  Therefore, the trends remain Negative.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the top 15 loans, the loans
on the servicer's watchlist and the shadow-rated loans, which
comprise approximately 64.8% of the current pool balance.  At
issuance, DBRS shadow-rated seven loans, representing 8.0% of the
current pool balance, as investment grade.  DBRS has confirmed
that the performance of these individual loans remain consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

There are currently four loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 5.7% of the current pool balance.  The DBRS analysis
considered that a few of these loans, including 71 Rexdale
Boulevard, have an elevated probability of default as a result of
these performance issues. There are no loans in special servicing.

Issuer           Debt Rated                    Rating    Rating
                                               Action
------           ----------                    ------    ------
Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class A-1

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class A-2

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class B

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Upgraded  AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class C

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class XC-1

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed AAA(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class XC-2

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Upgraded  A(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class D-1

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Upgraded  A(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class D-2

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Upgraded  BBBhigh
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class E

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed BBB(low)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class F

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed   BBhigh
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class G

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed  BB(low)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class H

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Trend      B(high)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,  Change
                  Class J

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed  B(sf)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class K

Schooner Trust,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-     Confirmed  B(low)
Series 2005-3     Certificates, Series 2005-3,
                  Class L


SCHOONER 2006-6: DBRS Hikes Cl. F Certificates From 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has upgraded the ratings of five classes of Schooner
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
6, as follows:

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class C to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D to A (low) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction.  All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to
the bonds from a collateral reduction of approximately 28.4% since
issuance.  As of the September 2013 remittance, 22 loans have paid
out of the pool since issuance, leaving 98 loans remaining in the
transaction.  The transaction also benefits from defeasance
collateral as six loans, representing 8.6% of the current pool
balance, are fully defeased.  Overall pool performance remains
stable as the largest 15 loans in the transaction, excluding
defeasance collateral, have a weighted-average debt service
coverage ratio and weighted-average debt yield of 1.54 times and
12.6%, respectively.

There are currently ten loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 10.4% of the current pool balance.  The DBRS analysis
considered that a few of these loans have an elevated probability
of default as a result of these performance issues.  There are no
loans in special servicing.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the top 15 loans and the
loans on the servicer's watchlist, which comprise approximately
58.6% of the current pool balance.


SDART 2012-6: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Cl. E Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance, Fitch Ratings has affirmed
six classes of the Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-6
transaction as follows:

  -- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating affirmations are based on available credit enhancement
and loss performance.  The collateral pool continues to perform
within Fitch's expectations.  Under the credit enhancement
structure, the securities are able to withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the current rating and make full payments to
investors in accordance with the terms of the documents.

The ratings reflect the quality of Santander Consumer USA, Inc.'s
retail auto loan originations, the strength of its servicing
capabilities, and the sound financial and legal structure of the
transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected base case loss proxy and impact available loss coverage
and multiples levels for the transaction.  Lower loss coverage
could impact ratings and Rating Outlooks, depending on the extent
of the decline in coverage.

In Fitch's initial review of the transaction, the notes were found
to have limited sensitivity to a 1.5x and 2.5x increase of Fitch's
base case loss expectation.  To date, the transaction has
exhibited strong performance with losses within Fitch's initial
expectations with rising loss coverage and multiple levels
consistent with the current ratings.  A material deterioration in
performance would have to occur within the asset pool to have
potential negative impact on the outstanding ratings.


SIGNUM VERDE 2007-3: Fitch Hikes Rating on CLP5.30BB Notes to B-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades the following rating for Signum Verde
Limited 2007-03:

-- CLP5,300,000,000 credit-linked notes, to 'B-sf' from 'CCCsf';
   Outlook Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating action follows Fitch's upgrade of the issuer of the
reference entity, CEMEX, S.A.B. de C.V. (CEMEX; rated 'B+',
Outlook Stable by Fitch) on July 30, 2013. Fitch monitors the
performance of the underlying risk-presenting entities and adjusts
the rating accordingly through application of its current credit-
linked note (CLN) criteria, 'Global Rating Criteria for Single-
and Multi-Name Credit-Linked Notes' dated Feb. 21, 2013.

Fitch's rating of Signum 2007-03 is credit-linked to the ratings
of CEMEX and the qualified investment issuer and swap
counterparty, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (Goldman Sachs; rated 'A',
Outlook Stable). The Rating Outlook reflects the status of the
main risk driver, CEMEX, which remains the highest risk-presenting
entity.

Rating Sensitivities

The rating remains sensitive to rating migration of the underlying
risk-presenting entities. A downgrade of either the qualified
investment or the reference entity would likely result in a
downgrade to the notes.

Signum 2007-03 is designed to provide credit protection on the
reference entity, CEMEX. The credit protection is arranged through
a CDS between the issuer and the swap counterparty. Payments of
interest and principal are made in U.S. dollar (USD) amounts
adjusted according to both the prevailing value of the Unidad de
Fomento (UF) and the CLP/USD exchange rate. Proceeds from the
issuance of the notes were used to purchase qualified investments
in the form of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. floating-rate notes due
2017, which collateralize the CDS.


SORIN REAL I: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A1 Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed the ratings of six classes of Notes issued by Sorin Real
Estate CDO I Ltd. The upgrade is due to greater than expected
amortization and recoveries from defaulted assets since last
review combined with improvement in the weighted average rating
factor (WARF) and weighted average recovery rate (WARR). The
affirmations are due to the key transaction parameters performing
within levels commensurate with the existing ratings levels. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-remic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class A1 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on Oct 3, 2012 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Class A2 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously
on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously
on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on Nov 11, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class D Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class E Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf);
previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Class F Fixed Rate Subordinate Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously
on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd. is a currently static (the
reinvestment period ended in September 2010) cash CRE CDO
transaction collateralized by a portfolio of: i) commercial
mortgage backed securities, including rake bonds (CMBS) (36.7% of
the pool balance); ii) asset backed securities (ABS) (27.6%); iii)
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) (15.9%); iv) b-notes
(19.2%); and v) whole loans (0.6%). As of the August 30, 2013 Note
Valuation report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $190.5 million from
$403.0 million at issuance, with the pay-down directed to the
Class A1 Notes, as a result of amortization, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and interest proceeds paid as principal proceeds
due to the failure of certain par value tests.

There are 12 assets with a par balance of $30 million (20.3% of
the current pool balance) that are considered defaulted as of the
August 30, 2013 monthly trustee report. While there have been no
realized losses to the deal to date, Moody's does expect
significant losses to occur on the defaulted assets once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,329
compared to 6,961 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (9.5% compared to 12.5% at last
review), A1-A3 (0% compared to 0.2% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(24.9% compared to 23% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.7% compared to
11.8% at last review), B1-B3 (4.1% compared to 0% at last review),
and Caa1-Ca/C (43.8% compared to 52.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.3 years compared to 3.5 years at
last review. The current WAL is based on the assumption about
extensions on the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 16.5% compared to 16.2% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.9% compared to 11.7% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 25, 2013.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, released on May 16, 2013,
was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its effect on the
capital structure of the deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 16.5% to 6.5% or up to 26.5% would result in the modeled
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward and
0 to 1 notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery in the commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
modestly positive direction along with a rise in investment
activity and stabilization in core property type performance.
Limited new construction and moderate job growth have aided this
improvement. However, a consistent upward trend will not be
evident until the volume of investment activity steadily increases
for a significant period, non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


STONE TOWER: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B-1L Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
A-3L notes from Stone Tower CDO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction backed by tranches from other CDOs.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class B-1L notes.
S&P removed the ratings on both classes from CreditWatch, where it
placed them with positive implications on Sept. 5, 2013.  The
transaction is managed by Stone Tower CDO Debt Advisors LLC.

The upgrade primarily reflects paydowns to the class A-1LA, A-1LB,
A-2L, and A-3L noteholders.  Since S&P's previous rating action in
November of last year, the class A-1LA, A-1LB, and A-2L notes have
paid down completely and their ratings have subsequently been
withdrawn.  The class A-3L notes have received a $12.31 million
paydown and are currently about 38.44% of their original notional
balance.

The upgrade also reflects the increased overcollateralization
(O/C) available to support the notes since the November 2012
rating action.  Per the Aug. 20, 2013, trustee report, the class
A-3L O/C was 538.31%, up from 130.58% noted in the Oct. 22, 2012,
report that S&P referenced for its November 2012 rating action.
The class B-1L O/C was 136.59% per the August 2013 report,
significantly higher than the trigger value of 105.00%.  At the
time of the November 2012 rating action, the similar ratio was
95.90%, failing its trigger by a large margin.

Additionally, the transaction had $24.75 million in assets rated
in the 'CCC' category or below as of the Aug. 20, 2013, trustee
report.  This is down from more than $49.99 million noted in the
Oct. 22, 2012 report.  However, the $24.75 million translates to
more than 65% of the performing pool, while the $49.99 million was
about 34% of the performing pool at the last rating action.

The transaction has significant exposure to one structured finance
obligor rated 'CCC- (sf)' that constitutes more than 50% of the
current performing balance.  This obligor is a mezzanine tranche
of a hybrid collateralized loan obligation transaction.

The rating on the class B-1L notes is driven by the top obligor
test, part of the supplemental tests we introduced in September
2009.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B-1L notes to reflect
the sufficient credit support available at the current rating
levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING ACTIONS

Stone Tower CDO Ltd.
                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-3L          AA- (sf)     BB- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1L          CCC- (sf)    CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:             Stone Tower CDO Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Stone Tower CDO Corp.
Collateral manager: Stone Tower Debt Advisors LLC
Trustee:            U.S. Bank N.A.
Transaction type:   Cash flow CDO of CDOs

CDO--Collateralized debt obligation.


UNITED COMMERCIAL 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. M Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
M commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from United
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1, a U.S. small-balance
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to
'BB+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A certificates from the same
transaction.  The outlook is stable.

The upgrade of the class M certificates follows S&P's analysis of
the transaction, and reflects the paydown of the pool balance, as
well as the pool collateral's historical and current performance.
The affirmation of the class A certificates reflects the financial
enhancement rating on Assured Guaranty Corp., which provides an
insurance policy guaranteeing scheduled principal and interest
payments for the class A certificates.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the remittance report dated Aug. 28, 2013, the collateral
pool consisted of 52 loans with an aggregate principal balance of
$60.6 million, down from 307 loans with a balance of
$402.5 million at issuance.  The loans range in size from $13,403
to $5.7 million, with a $1.2 million average loan balance.  All of
the underlying properties securing the remaining loans are in
California.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells
Fargo), did not provide any recent financial information for a
majority of the loans or a watchlist for the transaction, because
the borrowers are not required to submit operating statements or
rent rolls.  S&P considered the geographic concentration and lack
of reporting in its analysis of the transaction.  To date, the
trust has experienced realized losses totaling $11.5 million on 45
assets, resulting in a weighted average loss severity of 21.6%.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED LOANS

As of the Aug. 28, 2013, trustee remittance report, there were
four loans ($12.2 million, 20.2%) with the special servicer, also
Wells Fargo.  In addition, Wells Fargo informed us that the pool's
largest ($5.7 million, 9.4%) remaining loan , which is secured by
a 57,018-sq.-ft. mixed-use property in Vallejo, Calif., was
transferred to the special servicer after the August 2013
remittance report, for imminent default. Wells Fargo is currently
gathering information on the recent transfer.

The second-largest ($5.4 million, 9.0%) loan with the special
servicer is secured by an 86,087-sq.-ft. mixed-use property in Van
Nuys, Calif.  The loan's payment status was reported as late, but
less than 30-days delinquent.  The loan is scheduled to mature in
February 2014.  According to the special servicer's reporting
comments, the borrower is working to refinance the loan.  S&P
anticipates a minimal loss upon the loan's ultimate resolution.

The third-largest ($2.9 million, 4.8%) loan with the special
servicer is secured by a 71,874-sq.-ft. mixed-use property in
Pittsburg, Calif.  The loan, which was scheduled to mature this
past August, has a reported payment status of a matured balloon
loan.  According to the Wells Fargo's reporting comments, the
borrower and special servicer are discussing a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure.  S&P anticipates a minimal loss upon the loan's
ultimate resolution.

The fourth-largest ($2.4 million, 3.9%) loan with the special
servicer is secured by a 10,075-sq.-ft. retail property in Half
Moon Bay, Calif.  The loan has a reported payment status of 90-
plus days delinquent.  There is a $212,305 appraisal reduction
amount (ARA) against the loan.  S&P anticipates a minimal loss
upon the loan's ultimate resolution.

The smallest ($1.5 million, 2.5%) loan with the special servicer
is secured by a 4,930-sq.-ft. restaurant in San Francisco.  The
loan's payment status was reported as 90-plus days delinquent.
According to the special servicer's reporting comments,
negotiations are being held with prospective buyers.  There is a
$337,875 ARA against the loan.  S&P anticipates a minimal loss
upon the loan's ultimate resolution.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING RAISED

United Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                    Rating
Class           To        From
M               BB+ (sf)  B+ (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

United Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class           Rating       Outlook
A               AA- (sf)     Stable


VENTURE III: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B and C notes from Venture III CDO Ltd. and the class A-1, A-2,
and B notes from Venture V CDO Ltd. and removed them all from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where they were placed on
Sept. 5, 2013.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class C and D notes from Venture V CDO Ltd.  Venture III CDO Ltd.
and Venture V CDO Ltd. are collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions managed by MJX Asset Management LLC.

The Venture III CDO Ltd. reinvestment period ended in January
2010.  The class A-1 notes paid off its remaining balance in April
2013, and the class A-2 notes paid off its remaining balance on
the most recent July payment date.  Since S&P's July 2012 rating
action, more than $118 million has been paid down.  As of the
September 2013 trustee report, the transaction had over
$18 million in the principal balance collection account.  The
upgrades of the class B and C notes to 'AAA (sf)' reflect the pay
downs to the transaction and the current principal balance
available for future pay downs.

The Venture V CDO Ltd. reinvestment period ended in May 2012.
Since then, the class A notes paid off nearly $174 million of its
balance, reducing its outstanding balance to $121.0 million. The
upgrades of the class A-1, A-2, and B notes reflect the pay downs
to the class A-1 notes, which have helped create additional
support for the subordinate notes. The improvements are also
evident in the class A, B, and C par value ratios, which have
increased since S&P's February 2012 rating actions.

As of the Aug. 20, 2013, trustee report, Venture V CDO Ltd. has
roughly $27.8 million of loans maturing after the transaction's
legal final maturity in November 2018.  Exposure to these long-
dated assets subjects the transaction to potential market value
risk, as the manager may have to liquidate these securities when
the transaction matures in order to pay down the notes on their
final maturity date.  The affirmations of the class C and D notes
from Venture V CDO Ltd. reflect this potentially negative risk.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

Venture III CDO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
Def B         AAA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AAA (sf)     BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Venture V CDO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1           AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Venture V CDO Ltd.

Class         Rating
C             BBB- (sf)
D             B+ (sf)


VIBRANT CLO II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Vibrant
CLO II Ltd./Vibrant CLO II LLC's $335.40 million floating- and
fixed-rate debt.

The debt issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated debt through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2654%-12.5332%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      rated debt outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's interest reinvestment test, a failure of
      which during the reinvestment period will lead to the
      reclassification of excess interest proceeds that are
      available before paying incentive management fees, uncapped
      administrative expenses, and subordinated note payments into
      principal proceeds for collateral asset purchases.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1729.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Vibrant CLO II Ltd./Vibrant CLO II LLC

Class                     Rating                    Amount
                                                  (mil. $)
A-1                       AAA (sf)                 214.800
A-2A                      AA (sf)                   35.100
A-2B                      AA (sf)                   10.000
B (deferrable)            A (sf)                    28.900
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                  18.800
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)                   16.400
E (deferrable)            B (sf)                    11.400
Subordinated notes        NR                        31.500
M (deferrable)            NR                         0.875

NR-Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C22: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 5 Cert Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed ten classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
C22 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-PB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2006 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. IO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations to the four investment grade P&I classes (Classes
A-3 through A-1A) are due to key parameters, including Moody's
loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges. The
ratings of the six below investment grade P&I classes (Classes D
through J) are consistent with Moody's expected loss and thus are
affirmed.

The downgrades to four P&I classes (Classes AM through C) are due
to higher than expected realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans. The interest-only class,
Class IO, is downgraded to align its rating with the expected
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.4% of
the current pooled balance compared to 13.6% at last review.
Realized losses have increased by $68 million since Moody's last
review. Realized losses plus Moody's base expected loss is now
14.9% of the original deal balance compared to 13.1% at last
review.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.64 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 43 at Moody's prior review.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $2.0 billion
from $2.5 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 131 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 38%
of the pool. Three loans, representing 4% of the pool, have
investment grade credit assessments. Four loans, representing 1%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.

Sixteen loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool, resulting
in a realized loss of $109 million (71% loss severity). Ten loans,
representing 15% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Westin Casuarina Hotel
& Spa Loan ($140 million -- 7.0% of the pool) which is secured by
an 826-room luxury hotel spa and casino located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The loan was transferred to special servicing in March
2010 due to poor financial performance. A receiver was appointed
in October 2011 and the trust is pursuing foreclosure.

The master servicer has recognized an aggregate $116 million
appraisal reduction for six of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $204 million loss (68% expected
loss on average) for all of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $10 million loss (17% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial year 2013
operating results for 94% and 88% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99%,
which is the same as at last review. The conduit portion of the
pool excludes defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans as
well as the three loans with a credit assessments. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.01X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Metro Pointe at
South Coast Loan ($50 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is
secured by a leasehold interest on a 386,000 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Costa Mesa, California. The property was
99% leased as of June 2013, the same as at last review. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.39X,
respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.29X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the Shoppes at East
Chase Loan ($26 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by
a 364,000 SF retail center located in Montgomery, Alabama. The
property was 98% leased as of June 2013 compared to 94% as of June
2012. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A2
and 1.84X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.71X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the 1201 Broadway Loan
($10 million -- 0.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 132,000
SF office building located in New York, New York. The property was
99% leased as of June 2013 compared to 95% at last review. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.40X,
respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.34X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Hyatt Center Loan ($156 million -- 7.8% of
the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest in a
first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.5 million SF Class
A office building located in Chicago, Illinois. The loan is
structured with a revolving mezzanine loan. The property was 90%
leased as of March 2013 compared to 95% as of June 2012. The loan
had a 60-month interest-only period, and is now amortizing on a
360-month schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and
1.03X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.23X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Abbey Pool II Loan ($131
million -- 6.5%), which is secured by a portfolio of 14 retail,
office, industrial and mixed-use properties located in California.
The collateral was originally 16 properties, but two of the
properties have defeased. The portfolio was 87% leased as of June
2013, compared to 85% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 106% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 111% and 0.92X
at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the 300 Four Falls Corporate
Center Loan ($67 million -- 3.4%), which is secured by a 293,000
SF Class A office building located in West Conshohocken,
Pennsylvania. The property was 85% leased as of June 2013,
compared to 86% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
107% and 0.91X, respectively, which is the same as at last review.


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2007-SL3: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from WaMu
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL3 (WaMu 2007-SL3), a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from
the same transaction.  Lastly, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven
classes from WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
(WaMu 2006-SL1), also a U.S. CMBS transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transactions,
which included a review of the deal structures, the historical and
current performance of the transactions' collateral, historical
and current interest shortfalls, and the liquidity available to
the trusts.

S&P's upgrades on the five classes from WaMu 2007-SL3 considered
the pool's deleveraging.  The WaMu 2007-SL3 transaction's balance
as of the Aug. 23, 2013, remittance report was 53.6% of its
balance at issuance, reflecting principal paydown totaling
$560.9 million.

S&P's affirmations on the 13 principal and interest-paying classes
from the two transactions considered the volume of loans in
special servicing and the pools' geographic concentrations.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven classes from WaMu 2006-SL1 because
of the pool's historical weighted average loss severity.  Since
issuance, the deal lost $20.2 million on 35 assets, which resulted
in a 64.1% weighted average loss severity.

S&P affirmed its rating on the interest-only (IO) class X
certificates from WaMu 2007-SL3 to reflect its criteria for rating
IO securities.

When S&P analyzed the specially serviced assets, it primarily
considered recent appraisals and brokers' opinions of value to
arrive at loss estimates for the collateral.  S&P's estimates also
considered expenses and fees required to complete the workout
process.  S&P's analysis of the remaining loans in the pools
considered the collateral's performance to date, as well as the
impact economic conditions may have on future performance.

Details of the two WaMu trusts as of the Aug. 23, 2013, remittance
reports are as follows:

                          WaMu 2006-SL1

The collateral pool for WaMu 2006-SL1 consists of 299 loans and
two real estate-owned (REO) assets with an aggregate trust balance
of $307.4 million, compared with 443 loans totaling $511.4 million
at issuance.  Since issuance, the transaction has paid down
$184 million of the principal amount.  The top three property
types remaining in the pool are multifamily ($211.8 million,
68.9%), industrial ($26.2 million, 8.5%), and mixed-used
($22.5 million, 7.3%).  The properties are primarily located in
California ($178.3 million, 58.0%) and New York ($29.9 million,
9.7%).  Currently, the special servicer, KeyBank Real Estate
Capital (KeyBank), has 13 assets totaling $14.9 million (4.9%). Of
these assets, nine have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs)
totaling $3 million against them.  The reported payment status of
the specially serviced assets is as follows: two ($1.6 million,
0.5%) are REO; three ($8.8 million, 2.9%) are in foreclosure; six
($3.7 million, 1.2%) are 90-plus days delinquent; one ($368,797,
0.1%) is late, but is less than 30 days delinquent; and one
($455,115, 0.2%) is current.

Ninety-seven loans ($98.7 million, 32.1%) from WaMu 2006-SL1
appear on the master servicer's (also KeyBank) watchlist,
primarily due to their low reported debt service coverage (DSC).
S&P determined that two ($6.2 million, 2.0%) of the watchlist
loans are credit-impaired, based on their reported delinquent
payment status (one reported as 30 days delinquent and the other
reported as 60 days delinquent) and because the master servicer
indicated that the borrowers have been non-responsive.  One
hundred-and-five loans ($100.1 million, 32.6%) from the pool have
a reported DSC of less than 1.1x, and 77 loans ($72.9 million,
23.7%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                          WaMu 2007-SL3

The collateral pool for WaMu 2007-SL3 consists of 570 loans and
two REO assets with an aggregate trust balance of $688.3 million,
compared with 899 loans totaling $1.28 billion at issuance.  Since
issuance, the transaction has paid down $560.9 million of the
principal amount.  The top three property types remaining in the
pool are multifamily ($315.5 million, 45.8%), retail
($113.6 million, 16.5%), and mixed-used ($106.2 million, 15.4%).
The properties are primarily located in California
($446.0 million, 64.8%) and New York ($114.9 million, 16.7%).
KeyBank, the special servicer, has 24 assets totaling $37 million
(5.4%).  Of these assets, 12 have ARAs totaling $8.6 million
against them.  The reported payment status of the specially
serviced assets is as follows: two ($2.1 million, 0.3%) are REO;
seven ($7.5 million, 1.1%) are in foreclosure; nine ($9.2 million,
1.4%) are 90-plus days delinquent; and six ($18.2 million, 2.6%)
are late, but are less than 30 days delinquent.

One hundred-and-ninety-five loans ($254.9 million, 37.0%) from
WaMu 2007-SL3 appear on the master servicer's (also KeyBank)
watchlist, primarily due to their low reported DSC.  S&P
determined that two ($4.4 million, 0.6%) of the watchlist loans
are credit-impaired, based on their reported delinquent payment
status (both reported as 30 days delinquent) and the non-
responsiveness of the borrowers, as detailed in the reporting
comments.  One hundred-and-ninety-nine loans ($269.4 million,
39.1%) from the pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.1x, and 55
loans ($89.3 million, 13.0%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

As part of its analysis, Standard & Poor's stressed the specially
serviced and credit-impaired assets, the loans on the transaction
watchlists, and certain other loans in the pools.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Rating     Rating
Class    To         From           Credit enhancement (%)

A-J      AA+ (sf)   AA- (sf)                        21.01
B        A+ (sf)    A- (sf)                         17.28
C        A- (sf)    BBB (sf)                        15.18
D        BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)                       11.68
E        BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)                        10.04

RATINGS AFFIRMED

WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)

A        A+ (sf)                  17.22
A-1A     A+ (sf)                  17.22
B        BBB+ (sf)                13.90
C        BB+ (sf)                  9.11
D        BB- (sf)                  5.79
E        B- (sf)                   3.50
F        CCC (sf)                  2.25

WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)

A        AAA (sf)                  41.53
A-1A     AAA (sf)                  41.53
F        B+ (sf)                    7.94
G        B (sf)                     6.55
H        B- (sf)                    4.68
J        CCC- (sf)                  2.11
X        AAA (sf)                    N/A

N/A - Not applicable.


WELLS FARGO 2012-LC5: Moody's Affirms Cl. F Certs Rating to 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms the ratings of twelve classes of
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2012-LC5 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf),
remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating of the IO Classes,
Class X-A and X-B, are consistent with the expected credit
performance of their referenced classes and thus are affirmed.
This is Moody's first full review of WFCM 2012-LC5.

Based on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their
current ratings. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement levels for rated classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.5% of the
current pooled balance. The performance expectations for a given
variable indicate Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range
of performance over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's
may, if warranted, change these expectations. Performance that
falls outside the given range may indicate that the collateral's
credit quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated
when the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a
deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a
rating action nor does performance within expectations preclude
such actions. The decision to take (or not take) a rating action
is dependent on an assessment of a range of factors including, but
not exclusively, the performance metrics.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.63 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in our analysis. Based on the model
pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 70, the same as at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review.

Deal Performance:

As of the September 17, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 1.0% to
$1.26 billion from $1.27 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool. There is one investment
grade credit assessment representing 8% of the pool.

Three loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated and there are no loans in special
servicing at this time.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year or full
year 2012 operating results for 100% and 78% of the performing
conduit pool, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 102% compared to 103% at securitization. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 7.5% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.08X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.06X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Trump Tower Condominium
Loan ($100.0 million - 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by the
commercial condominium component of the Trump Tower. The tower is
located at 725 Fifth Avenue in New York City. The collateral is a
Class A multi-tenant office and retail building containing
approximately 244,500 square feet (SF) and consists of the lower
level, ground floor and floors 2 - 26. The retail represents
approximately 24% of the collateral and is located on the Garden
Level (Lower Level), Grade and 2nd through 4th floors. The office
space comprises the remaining 76% of the collateral and is located
on the 5th and 14th through 26th floors. Due to the public atrium
there are no 6th through 13th floors within the building. The
largest tenant in the retail space is Gucci (20% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration February 2026) which
operates its American flagship store. The remaining floors 29-68,
are comprised of the residential component and are not contributed
as loan collateral. The loan is interest only for the full 10-year
term. As of July 2013 occupancy was 100% compared to 99% at
securitization. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Aaa and 1.75X, respectively, the same as at
securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 27% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Westside Pavilion Loan ($152.8 million --
12.1% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in
a 755,500 SF regional mall (collateral is 535,500 SF) located in
Los Angeles, California. The property is situated approximately 10
miles west of downtown Los Angeles. The Property was constructed
in 1985 and most recently renovated in 2007, the scope of which
included the addition of a 12-screen movie theater. The mall
anchors include Macy's (non-owned) Macy's Home and Nordstrom. The
collateral also includes an Urban Home, Westside Tavern
restaurant, and Landmark Theatres. As of June 30th, 2012 the
property was approximately 96% leased compared to 97% at
securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and
0.93X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.92X at securitization.

The second conduit loan is the Starwood Capital Hotel Portfolio
($110.0 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted portfolio of 16 limited-service
hotels and four full-service hotels totaling 1,735 keys. Eighteen
properties are located in Texas with one property each in Altus,
Oklahoma and Texarkana, Arkansas. All of the hotels currently
operate under individual franchise agreements, with no franchise
agreements rolling during the loan term. Hotel flags include
Holiday Inn Express (6), Hampton Inn & Suites (4), Courtyard
Marriott (3), Comfort Inn & Suites (1), Holiday Inn (1), Fairfield
Inn and Suites by Marriott (1), Candlewood Suites (1) and Country
Inn & Suites (1). Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 85%
and 1.60X, respectively, the same as at securitization.

The third conduit loan is the 100 Church Street Loan ($80.0
million -- 6.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 21-story, 1.1
million square foot (SF) Class B+ office building in the City Hall
office submarket of Lower Manhattan. The loan represents a 34.8%
pari-passu piece in a $230.0 million loan. The property was
originally built in 1958 and renovated in 2012. Property occupancy
was 80% as of December 2012. The City of New York signed an
expansion space lease which will bring occupancy up to 96% later
this year. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and
0.93X, respectively, the same as at securitization.


* Fitch: CMBS Recovery Rates Strong, Remaining Loans Challenged
---------------------------------------------------------------
Recovery rates for CMBS loans in special servicing remain
uncertain, Fitch Ratings says. The 66% recovery rate on loans
liquidated during the first one-half of 2013 and the decline in
volume of CMBS loans in special servicing are signs that the
commercial real estate market is improving. The rise in commercial
real estate values has supported the increase in resolutions.

The percentage of CMBS loans in special servicing is now at 9%. In
2010, it peaked at 12%. CMBS special servicers resolved a total of
$17.09 billion (974 loans) during the first one-half of 2013; 58%
were resolved through liquidation and 42% through modification.
Their combined recovery rate was 80%. Of the $9.88 billion
liquidated, $4.07 billion, or 40% of liquidated loans were
liquidated with recoveries greater than 85%. Thirteen loans over
$50 million also had recoveries greater than 85%.

"In our view, because the loans that are left to be resolved are
larger and more complicated they may not be resolved at the 80%-
85% recovery rates observed since 2009. The recovery will depend
on many factors including property type, market, property values,
and special servicer capabilities. We have begun seeing some of
the refinanced CMBS loans in new CMBS transactions," Fitch says.


* Rights Transfer to Nationstar Mortgage No Impact on 2 Issuers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service stated that the transfer of servicing
from Bank of America, N.A. of approximately 1,461 loans from two
RMBS transactions to Nationstar Mortgage LLC will not, in and of
itself and at this time, result in a reduction or withdrawal of
the current ratings on the securities issued by these
transactions.

BOA requested that Moody's provide its opinion on whether the
ratings on the securities issued by the affected transactions
would be downgraded or withdrawn as a result of each of the
transactions having its loan servicing transferred to Nationstar
from BOA by way of the mortgage servicing right sale. After the
MSR sale, Nationstar will service and own the servicing rights to
these approximately 1,461 loans. The transfer of these loans is
scheduled for October 31, 2013.

Moody's view is based primarily on its opinion that the ratings of
each of the securities in the transactions will not have material
negative implication following changes in servicing strategy that
occur after transfer of servicing rights.

Moody's opinion addresses only the current impact on Moody's
ratings, and it does not express an opinion as to whether the
transfer of servicing rights has or could have any other effects
that investors may or may not view positively.

The determination was made without regard to any applicable
Certificate Insurance Policy, with respect to Insured
Certificates.

The methodology used in assessing the credit impact of the
servicing transfer was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in June 2013. Other methodology includes "Moody's
Methodology for Assessing RMBS Servicer Quality (SQ)" published in
January 2013.

Affected Transactions:

Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-7

Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)


* Moody's Takes Action on $273.9MM Securities Issued 1995 to 2005
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 tranches
from 14 transactions, backed by manufactured housing loans, and
issued between 1995 and 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitization Corp. Series 2002-2

Class A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2004
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Class M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CountryPlace Manufactured Housing Contract 2005-1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CSFB Manufactured Housing Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-MH3

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-06

M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2006 Confirmed at
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-09

M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1996-04

A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-04

A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-05

A-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

A-7, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded to
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-01

A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

A-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2004 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-02

A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2006 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2004
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Oakwood Mortgage Investors, Inc., Series 1999-A

A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2009 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Senior/Subordinate
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-A

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1997-3

A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The rating action consists of 28 upgrades. The upgrades are
primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement due to
sequential pay structures and non-amortizing subordinate bonds.
Performance has remained generally stable from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.1%
in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $347MM RMBS From Four Issuers
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-19

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-4

Cl. IA-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IA-8, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR1
Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrade rating actions are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments/fast liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 8.1%
in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $151MM of Subprime RMBS From 10 Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches and downgraded the ratings of nine tranches from ten
transactions backed by subprime mortgage loans issued by various
trusts.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-BC2

Cl. A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-HE11

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Downgraded
to A2, Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2008
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Downgraded
to A2, Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc. 1997-HE1

A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

A5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-3

A-7, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-D

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust 2005-2

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2013
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2013 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Home Equity Trust 2004-1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral pools. The upgrades are a result of improved
credit performance of the related pools and/or buildup of
securities' credit enhancement as the transaction seasons.
Downgrades reflect higher pool losses and/or reductions in bond
specific credit enhancement.

The downgrade of Cl. M2 issued by People's Choice Home Loan
Securities Trust 2005-2 is primarily the result of recent interest
shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped because of a weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.2% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $84MM of RMBS Issued 1999 to 2005
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 7 tranches
backed by Subprime residential mortgage loans, issued by various
trusts.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-1

Cl. M3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 6, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-3

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2004
Assigned Aaa (sf)

Issuer: Fairbanks Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-1

A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

M-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are the result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The downgrade actions from Aames Mortgage Investment
Trust 2005-1 are primarily the result of recent interest
shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped because of a weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are our central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $126MM of Subprime RMBS from 10 Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 15
tranches and upgraded the ratings of 7 tranches from 10
transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans. Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-
WF1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-ABF1

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Downgraded
to A2, Outlook Stable on Jan 17, 2013)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2002-1

Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-01

A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

A-6IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

A-7IO, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-04

A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

A-13IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-01

A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

A-9IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-4

B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Confirmed at
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1

Cl. A-6F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 7,
2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

A-1A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2009 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 14,
2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

A-5F, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2008 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 18,
2008 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

A-6F, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2008 Downgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 18,
2008 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Upgraded to B3,
Outlook Positive on May 21, 2013)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance or structural
features resulting in higher expected losses for the bonds than
previously anticipated. The upgrades are due to improvement in
collateral performance, and/ or build-up in credit enhancement.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $254MM of RMBS From 13 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches and upgraded the rating of one tranche from four
transactions issued by various issuers, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
2004-HE7

Cl. M1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE6

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2004-2

Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. MF-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions reflect recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated expected losses on the pools. The
downgrade of Cl. AF-3, Cl. AF-4 and Cl. AF-5 of Saxon Asset
Securities Trust 2004-2 is primarily the result of recent interest
shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped because of a weak
interest shortfall reimbursement mechanism on the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in June 2013.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's
forecasts an unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for 2013.
Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on 49 RMBS Tranches From Various Issuers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of seven
tranches and downgraded the ratings of 42 tranches from 11
transactions issued by various issuers. The collateral backing
these deals consists of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate
mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) or
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWMBS Re-Performing Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series
2002-1

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-LT1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust 2004-R3

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AF, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AS, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. PT, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series
2004-R2

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 6, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. PT, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1

Cl. I-F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. I-SF, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 1999-5

Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan
Trust 2004-NP1

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan
Trust 2004-NP2

Cl. A, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M2, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Union Planters Mortgage Finance Corp., Series 2000-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-RP1 Tr

Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-F, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-HJ, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-S, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of FHA-VA
portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these
pools and the structural nuances of the transactions. The
downgrades are a result of higher than expected losses and erosion
of credit enhancement supporting some of these bonds. The current
delinquent pipeline includes loans that have been in foreclosure
for over four years. Moody's believes the severity on some of
these loans could be much higher than the FHA-VA expected
severity.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and
a large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-
related expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA
guarantee covers only a portion of the principal based on the
lesser of either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and
unpaid interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan
amount. HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when
servicers submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties
on servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits. This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty. The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses
they deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2011. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
8.1% in August 2012 to 7.3% in August 2013. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for the 2013 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2013.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


* S&P Withdraws 51 Ratings on 9 CMBS Deals & 4 CRE-CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'D (sf)' ratings
on 51 classes from nine U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) and three commercial real estate-collateralized debt
obligation (CRE-CDO) transactions.

The withdrawals are due to the outstanding 'D (sf)' ratings
remaining for each of the affected transactions.  S&P had
previously lowered the ratings to 'D (sf)' because of principal
losses to the classes, accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P
believed would remain outstanding for an extended period of time,
interest shortfalls that the nondeferrable classes experienced,
and its expectation that the classes were unlikely to be repaid in
full.

The accumulated interest shortfalls are primarily a result of one
or more of the following factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts in
      effect for the specially serviced assets;

   -- Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
      property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance
      payments, and legal expenses; and

   -- Special servicing fees.

Below, S&P provides details of each of the nine CMBS and three
CRE-CDO transactions on which S&P had previously lowered the
outstanding ratings to 'D (sf)'.

      BANC OF AMERICA COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE INC. SERIES 2002-2

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes K, L, M, N, and O
in 2011 because of principal losses these respective classes had
incurred.

         BANC OF AMERICA LARGE LOAN INC. SERIES 2004-BBA4

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on class K in August 2010,
because of recurring interest shortfalls and principal losses from
a write-down on the notes.

BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC. SERIES 2000-WF1

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes H, I, J, K, and L,
predominantly in 2010, because of accumulated interest shortfalls
that S&P expected would remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.

BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC. SERIES 2006-BBA7

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on class K in 2010 because of
accumulated interest shortfalls that we believed would remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.

          CARBON CAPITAL II REAL ESTATE CDO 2005-1 LTD.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes F, G, H, I, and J to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' to 'D (sf)' in December 2011 because it
determined that these classes were unlikely to be repaid in full
following a decrease in performing assets, leading to a subsequent
reduction in the transaction's collateralization.

             CRYSTAL RIVER RESECURITIZATION 2006-1 LTD.

S&P lowered the ratings on classes A through K to 'D (sf)' in 2010
through 2013 because of interest shortfalls the nondeferrable
classes experienced and its expectations that the deferrable
classes were unlikely to be repaid in full.

     GMAC COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC. SERIES 2001-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on classes F though M to 'D (sf)' in
2010-2012 because of accumulated interest shortfalls that it
believed would remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.  S&P
lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on class N in 2009 and on class O
in 2005 because of principal losses.

                      JER CRE CDO 2005-1 LTD.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes A through G in 2010
through 2013 because of interest shortfalls the nondeferrable
classes experienced and its expectations that the deferrable
classes were unlikely to be repaid in full.

           MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL I INC. SERIES 1998-HF1

S&P lowered its rating on class K to 'D (sf)' in July 2010 because
of principal loss.

          MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL I INC. SERIES 1999-FNVI

S&P lowered its ratings on classes K and L to 'D (sf)' in 2008
because of accumulated interest shortfalls that it expected would
remain outstanding in the foreseeable future and principal losses,
respectively.

      WACHOVIA BANK COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST SERIES 2002-C2

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on classes M, N, and O in
November 2011 because of accumulated interest shortfalls that it
expected would remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.

    WACHOVIA BANK COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST SERIES 2005-WHALE6

S&P lowered its rating to 'D (sf)' on the class K in January 2013
because of accumulated interest shortfalls that it believed would
remain outstanding in the near term.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)
O                        NR                  D (sf)

Banc of America Large Loan Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-BBA4
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
H                        NR                  D (sf)
I                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BBA7
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)

Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
I                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)

Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  D (sf)
B                        NR                  D (sf)
C                        NR                  D (sf)
D                        NR                  D (sf)
E                        NR                  D (sf)
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-C1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)
H                        NR                  D (sf)
J                        NR                  D (sf)
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)
O                        NR                  D (sf)

JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        NR                  D (sf)
B-1                      NR                  D (sf)
B-2                      NR                  D (sf)
C                        NR                  D (sf)
D                        NR                  D (sf)
E                        NR                  D (sf)
F                        NR                  D (sf)
G                        NR                  D (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-HF1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-FNVI
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)
L                        NR                  D (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
M                        NR                  D (sf)
N                        NR                  D (sf)
O                        NR                  D (sf)

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-WHALE 6
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
K                        NR                  D (sf)

NR-Not rated.


* S&P Raises Ratings on 10 Synthethic CDOs to B+ and B-
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 10
tranches from 10 corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with positive implications.  S&P also lowered its ratings on two
tranches from one synthetic CUSIP commercial mortgage-backed
securities-backed CDO transaction and removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on three tranches from three corporate-backed
synthetic CDO transactions.  S&P also placed its ratings on 23
tranches from 14 corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating actions follows S&P's monthly review of synthetic CDO
transactions.  The CreditWatch positive placements and upgrades
reflect the transactions' seasoning, the rating stability of the
obligors in the underlying reference portfolios over the past few
months, and the synthetic rated overcollateralization (SROC)
ratios that rose above 100% at the next highest rating level.  The
affirmations are from synthetic CDOs that had SROC ratios above
100% or had sufficient credit enhancement at their current rating
levels.  The downgrades reflect the deterioration of the
underlying reference portfolio that caused the SROC ratio to fall
below 100% at the current rating levels.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

Capstan Master Trust Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust Series 3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Capstan Master Trust Series 4
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    B- (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Infiniti SPC Ltd.
10B-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
10B-1               BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Landgrove Synthetic CDO SPC
2007-2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   BB (sf)             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Mt. Kailash Series II
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Cr Link Ln          B+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
2006-8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C1-D1               B+ (sf)             CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
2007-18
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B1-A1               B+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
2007-29
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B3-D3               B+ (sf)             B- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS LOWERED
Pegasus 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  CCC (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A2                  CCC (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE
Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1A-$LS             A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-EURLMS             AA- (sf)/Watch Pos  AA- (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 4
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1¯LS               A+ (sf)/Watch Pos   A+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2007-6
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
IIA                 A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
IIIA                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
2008-8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
IA                  A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
2007-16
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
IB                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Mt Kailash Series III
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Cr Lkd Ln           BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-$LS              B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)
A3-$LMS             B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 2
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-$FMS             BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf)
A1-$LS              BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
A1A-$LS             BB (sf)/Watch Pos   BB (sf)
A1B-$LS             BB- (sf)/Watch Pos  BB- (sf)
A3-$LMS             B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)
A3A-$LMS            B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 4
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A3-YLS              B- (sf)/Watch Pos   B- (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 5
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-$LMS             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos BBB+ (sf)
A3-$LMS             BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos  BB+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 7
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1-ELS              B (sf)/Watch Pos    B (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A3-ELS              B+ (sf)/Watch Pos   B+ (sf)

Repacs Trust Series: Bayshore I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   A (sf)/Watch Pos    A (sf)
B                   A- (sf)/Watch Pos   A- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED
Athenee CDO PLC
2007-3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Athenee CDO PLC
2007-5
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Athenee CDO PLC
2007-8
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
                    BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)/Watch Pos


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 33 Classes From 14 CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 33
classes of notes from eight collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transactions, two collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed by mezzanine structured finance assets, two
CDOs of commercial mortgage-backed securities, and two CDO
transactions backed by tranches from corporate-backed CDOs.

The withdrawals follows the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the trustee's note payment reports.

The following transactions redeemed their classes in full after
notifying S&P that the equity holders directed optional
redemptions:

   -- CSAM Funding III,

   -- Pacifica CDO III Ltd., and

   -- Stone Tower CLO III Ltd.

In addition, S&P withdrew the rating on the combination notes from
ACA ABS 2007-3 Ltd. following the note exchange confirmed by the
trustee.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACA ABS 2007-3 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
Combo notes         NR                  AA+ (sf)

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   NR                  B+ (sf)

C-Bass CBO X Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Crest G-Star 2001-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B-1                 NR                  CCC+ (sf)
B-2                 NR                  CCC+ (sf)

CSAM Funding III
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                   NR                  BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

GSC Partners CDO Fund V Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

GSC Partners CDO Fund VII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Landmark V CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1L                NR                  AAA (sf)

N-Star Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
                          Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2A                NR                  BBB+ (sf)
A-2B                NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Pacifica CDO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2a                NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-2b                NR                  AA+ (sf)
B-1                 NR                  A (sf)
B-2                 NR                  A (sf)
C-1                 NR                  B+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  B+ (sf)

Stone Tower CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
C-2                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D-1                 NR                  B+ (sf)
D-2                 NR                  B+ (sf)

Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3L                NR                  BBB- (sf)

Veritas CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Zais Investment Grade Ltd. X

                            Rating
Class               To                  From
S                   NR                  A+ (sf)

NR-Not rated.


* S&P Puts 23 Ratings from 12 US CDO Transactions on Watch Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 23
tranches from 12 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.  Of the 23
tranches, eight are from five CDO transactions backed by trust-
preferred securities (TRuPS) and 15 are from seven CDOs of
structured finance securities.

The CreditWatch placements follow pay-downs to the liabilities
that have increased coverage and credit enhancement levels
available to these notes.

The 23 tranches have a total original issuance amount of
$1.81 billion, with $0.97 billion from CDO transactions of TRuPs
backed mostly by securities issued by bank-holding companies, and
$0.84 billion from CDOs backed by structured finance securities.

S&P will resolve CreditWatch placements after it completes a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review for each of
the affected transactions.  S&P expects to resolve these
CreditWatch placements within 90 days.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions we rate and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as it deems appropriate.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of
similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities
initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after
Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

ALESCO Preferred Funding II Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1                 BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos        BBB- (sf)
A-2                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC+ (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding III Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
A-2                 CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC- (sf)

Arroyo CDO I Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
B                   BBB (sf)/Watch Pos         BBB (sf)

Birch Real Estate CDO I Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-2                 CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC+ (sf)
A-2L                CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC+ (sf)

Crest 2003-2 Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
B-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
B-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

Crest Clarendon Street 2002-1 Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
C                   CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos        CCC+ (sf)

Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos        BBB+ (sf)
A-2                 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos        BBB+ (sf)
B-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
B-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

Gemstone CDO Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
A-3                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

Preferred Term Securities IX Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

TIAA Real Estate CDO 2003-1 Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1MM               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos/A-2    BBB+/A-2 (sf)
B-1                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
B-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

TPref Funding II Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-2                 BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)

Trapeza CDO VI Ltd.

                                 Rating
Class               To                         From
A-1A                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)
A-1B                BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos         BB+ (sf)





                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
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A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
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includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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